Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 4,389 judgments in total from the Islamabad High Court.

• Messrs S.I.S. Corporation (Pvt) Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior and others2018 PLD Islamabad 150 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-09-29
  public procurementwrit jurisdictionalternative remedylocus standijudicial reviewtender evaluationGrievance Redressal Committee
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two writ petitions challenging a public procurement process for an e-Passport Personalization System initiated by the Directorate General, Immigration and Passports. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of writ petitions given the availability of a Grievance Redressal Committee (GRC) under the Public Procurement Rules, 2004, the locus standi of a local agent to challenge tender proceedings, and the scope of judicial review regarding tender conditions and evaluation criteria. The Court held that while the existence of an alternative remedy is a relevant factor, it is not an absolute bar to writ jurisdiction, especially where the statutory forum is inadequate or lacks independence. However, the Court dismissed the petitions on merits, ruling that a local agent lacks locus standi to challenge procurement decisions on behalf of a foreign principal. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that judicial review in procurement matters is restricted to the decision-making process rather than the merits of the decision, and that minor technical irregularities, such as an unsealed outer envelope, do not invalidate a bid absent prejudice.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of a Grievance Redressal Committee under the Public Procurement Rules, 2004, create an absolute bar to invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Can a local representative of a foreign company maintain a writ petition challenging a tender process if the foreign principal is not a party to the proceedings?
  • Is a procuring agency required to disqualify a bidder for a minor technical deviation, such as an unsealed outer envelope, if no prejudice is caused to other participants?
  • To what extent can a High Court exercise judicial review over the terms and conditions of a tender invitation?
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• Messrs Panther Developers through Ghulam Jillani vs Additional2018 MLD 1595 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-10Read full judgment →
• Messrs Hashtnagar Arms and Ammunition Dealers through Proprietor vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, Pak Secretariat, Islamabad and 3 others2018 PTD 795 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-01-11Read full judgment →
• Messrs Hani Trading Company vs Ministry of Commerce through Secretary, Islamabad and others2018 CLD 1470 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-09-04Read full judgment →
• Messrs Bestway Cement Limited through Senior Deputy Financial2018 PLJ Islamabad 297, PTCL 2018 CL. 872, 2018 PTD 977 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-12-26Read full judgment →
• Messrs Air Ciro through Senior Partner vs Government of Pakistan2018 [M] C.L.R. 1, 2018 PLJ Islamabad 94, 2018 YLR 164 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-05-19
  territorial jurisdictiondominant object testconstitutional petitionwrit of mandamuscivil aviation authorityaffairs of the federation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a constitutional petition filed before the Islamabad High Court challenging an impugned letter issued by the Airport Manager, Civil Aviation Authority, Allama Iqbal International Airport, Lahore, calling for bids to award a contract and license for airport facilities. The core legal question concerns the territorial jurisdiction of the Islamabad High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, particularly when a federal authority's policy is challenged alongside a localized administrative action. The court held that while the Islamabad High Court exercises jurisdiction over federal affairs, the 'dominant object' of the petition was to set aside a letter issued by a local authority based in Lahore concerning a provincial facility. Consequently, the Islamabad High Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to entertain the matter. The key principle laid down is that to determine the appropriate High Court when concurrent jurisdiction is invoked, the court must ascertain the 'dominant object' or primary grievance of the petition and the specific territorial limits of the person or authority performing the impugned function, rather than merely joining a federal entity as a formal party.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Islamabad High Court has territorial jurisdiction to challenge an administrative letter issued by a local airport manager based in Lahore?
  • How is the appropriate High Court determined when a petition involves federal policies as well as localized administrative actions?
  • Does Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to expand or interpret the constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199?
  • What is the test for ascertaining whether a person performs functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Messrs Aimnaz (Pvt.) Limited vs Federation of Pakistan, through the Secretary, Ministry of Law, Federal Secretariat, Islamabad and 2 others2018 PTD 1966 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-07-24
  anti-dumping dutyregulatory measurelegislative competenceexcessive delegationNational Tariff Commissiondirectory vs mandatorytrade remedy laws
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns multiple petitions challenging the investigations and determinations initiated by the National Tariff Commission (NTC) regarding the imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties under the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015. The core legal questions were whether the Anti-Dumping Duty constitutes a tax under Article 77 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, thereby requiring legislative imposition, and whether the NTC's power to impose such duties constitutes excessive delegation of legislative authority. The Court held that the Anti-Dumping Duty is not a tax or a fee, but rather a regulatory measure or remedial action designed to protect domestic industry from unfair trade practices, specifically dumping. Consequently, the Court ruled that the imposition of such duties does not violate Article 77 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Court determined that the statutory timeframes for investigations and determinations under the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015 are directory rather than mandatory, as the statute provides no specific consequences for failure to adhere to them. The petitions were dismissed, affirming the NTC's authority to act within the framework of the relevant trade remedy laws.

  Questions settled

  • Is the imposition of an anti-dumping duty considered a tax under Article 77 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the National Tariff Commission possess the authority to impose anti-dumping duties, or does this constitute excessive delegation of legislative power?
  • Are the timeframes prescribed for investigations and determinations under the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015, mandatory or directory?
  • Can the imposition of anti-dumping duties be challenged as a violation of the fundamental right to freedom of trade under Article 18 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Matee Ul Hassan vs National Industrial Relations Commission Appellate2018 IHC 65 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-05-04
  industrial relationsgrievance noticemandatory pre-requisitetermination of serviceN.I.R.C.Industrial Relations Act, 2012employer-employee dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the dismissal of the petitioner's grievance petition by the National Industrial Relations Commission (N.I.R.C.), which had held the petition incompetent for want of a mandatory grievance notice. The core legal question was whether an appeal filed by the petitioner to the President of his employer bank could be treated as a valid grievance notice under Section 33(1) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012. The Court held that the filing of a grievance notice upon the employer is a mandatory pre-requisite for initiating proceedings before the N.I.R.C. The Court affirmed that an appeal or mercy petition addressed to a higher authority, rather than the employer or appointing authority, does not satisfy the statutory requirement of a grievance notice. Consequently, the Court upheld the concurrent findings of the N.I.R.C. and dismissed the petition, establishing that a grievance notice is a distinct document that must be served upon the employer to trigger the jurisdiction of the N.I.R.C.

  Questions settled

  • Is the service of a grievance notice under Section 33(1) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 a mandatory pre-requisite for filing a grievance petition before the National Industrial Relations Commission?
  • Can an appeal or mercy petition addressed to a higher authority be treated as a valid grievance notice under Section 33 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  • Must a grievance notice be served specifically upon the employer or appointing authority to be legally valid?
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• Maryam Noor and another vs The State and another2018 P Cr. L J 1429 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-05-04
  quashment of FIRmala fideabuse of process of lawmalicious prosecutionfamily disputeconstitutional jurisdictioncustody of minors
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, seeking the quashment of FIR No. 17/2018 registered under sections 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Ramna. The petitioner, the former wife of the complainant, alleged that the FIR was lodged with mala fide intent to harass her and gain leverage in pending family court litigation regarding the custody of their minor children and the dissolution of marriage. The core legal question was whether the criminal proceedings constituted an abuse of the process of law, given the underlying civil nature of the dispute. The Court held that the FIR was tainted with mala fide and represented a colourable exercise of authority, as the allegations lacked criminal intent and the dispute was essentially a family matter. Consequently, the Court quashed the FIR, establishing the principle that constitutional courts must intervene to protect citizens from malicious prosecution and the abuse of criminal machinery to settle civil or family disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court quash an FIR if the underlying dispute is essentially of a civil or family nature?
  • Does the registration of an FIR to settle family disputes constitute an abuse of the process of law?
  • Under what circumstances can a High Court exercise its discretion to quash criminal proceedings?
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• Manzoor Ahmed vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Water and Power, Government of Pakistan and others2018 [M] C.L.R. 596, 2018 KLR Labour & Service Cases 40, 2018 IHC 38 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-02-22Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmed vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Water and Power, Government of Pakistan and 4 others2018 PLC (C.S.) 1224 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-03-01
  master and servantmaintainability of writ petitionstatutory rulesterms and conditions of servicePEPCOIESCOdepartmental promotion
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an employee of Islamabad Electric Supply Company (Pvt.) Ltd. ("IESCO"), filed a writ petition challenging the withdrawal of his promotion as Chief Engineer (BPS-20) by Pakistan Electric Power Company (Pvt.) Ltd. ("PEPCO"), the rejection of his departmental appeal, and his transfer/assignment to Quetta Electric Supply Company (Pvt.) Ltd. ("QESCO"). The core legal question was whether a constitutional writ petition is maintainable against corporate entities like PEPCO and IESCO by their employees for grievances regarding terms and conditions of service in the absence of statutory rules. The Islamabad High Court held that since IESCO and PEPCO do not possess statutory service rules and are incorporated under company law, the relationship between the company and its employee is strictly governed by the principle of "master and servant." Consequently, a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution is not maintainable for individual service grievances in the absence of a violation of statutory rules. The key principle laid down is that the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked by employees of government-owned companies for service matters unless the employer's adverse action violates express statutory provisions or statutory rules.

  Questions settled

  • Is a constitutional petition under Article 199 maintainable against corporate entities like IESCO and PEPCO regarding employment disputes?
  • Does the principle of master and servant apply to employees of public sector companies that lack statutory service rules?
  • Can an employee invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court in the absence of a violation of statutory rules or laws?
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• Malik Tariq Ayub and another vs The State and 5 others2018 P Cr. L J 1719 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-07-12
  anti-terrorism courtjurisdictiondeletion of section 7terrorismmens reaprevious enmityconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an order passed by an Anti-Terrorism Court deleting Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 from the challan and transferring the case to an ordinary court. The core legal question was whether the alleged offence, involving a high-profile daylight or late-night shooting using automatic weapons on a thoroughfare causing widespread panic, fell within the definition of 'terrorism' under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and whether previous personal enmity excludes the application of anti-terrorism laws. The Islamabad High Court held that the trial court committed an error of law by failing to properly appreciate binding precedents of the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the broader scope of 'design' and the psychological impact of crimes on public safety. The High Court ruled that the question of jurisdiction and applicability of anti-terrorism provisions cannot be determined solely on police investigation records without recording material prosecution evidence. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside, and the trial court was directed to decide the matter after recording evidence within sixty days.

  Questions settled

  • Whether previous personal enmity between parties excludes the application of Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Can an Anti-Terrorism Court decide an application for the deletion of anti-terrorism charges solely on the basis of police reports and investigation records without recording material prosecution evidence?
  • What constitutes a 'design' to create fear, panic, or a sense of insecurity under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Does a judgment rendered by a larger bench of the Supreme Court prevail over a contrary view taken by a smaller bench?
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• Malik Sajjad vs Shafqat Zaman and others2018 IHC 127 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-10-29Read full judgment →
• Malik Riazullah vs Mst. Dilnasheen and others2018 CLC 1569 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-08-03
  civil revisionde-exhibit documentsproduction of documentsOrder XIII Rule 2 CPCexhibiting documentspublic documentsadmissibility of evidencecase decided
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision under Section 115 C.P.C. challenged a trial court's order dismissing an application to 'de-exhibit' documents produced by the plaintiff's witness during examination-in-chief. The dispute concerned inheritance rights where the plaintiff produced public and certified judicial documents not initially appended to the plaint or listed under Order VII, Rule 14 C.P.C. The High Court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 contains no provision for 'de-exhibiting' or physically removing documents once received into evidence and marked as exhibits. The court clarified that Order XIII, Rule 2 C.P.C. gives trial courts discretion to receive documents after the first hearing upon showing good cause, especially where public or certified documents are concerned and no prejudice is caused. Merely marking a document as an exhibit does not conclusively prove its contents, genuineness, or admissibility, which remain open to challenge during trial. Additionally, orders admitting or refusing evidence do not constitute a 'case decided' under Section 115 C.P.C., making the revision non-maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 contain any provision allowing a trial court to de-exhibit or remove documents once they have been received in evidence and marked as exhibits?
  • Does the mere marking of a document as an exhibit in trial proceedings establish its evidentiary value, genuineness, or admissibility?
  • Can a trial court admit documents into evidence after the first hearing under Order XIII, Rule 2 C.P.C. without a formal application if good cause is shown?
  • Does an order admitting or refusing to admit documentary evidence constitute a 'case decided' under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code for the purpose of revision?
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• Malik Riaz Ullah vs Mst. Dilnasheen, etc2018 [M] C.L.R. 1711 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-03Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Ramzan Sabir vs Mst. Shahina Akhtar and others2018 [M] C.L.R. 99 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-12-04Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Ramzan Sabir vs Mst. Shahina Akhtar and 2 others2018 YLR 703, 2018 [M] C.L.R. 99 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-12-11Read full judgment →
• Malik Bashir Ahmad and 4 others vs Federal Government of Pakistan2018 PLD Islamabad 68 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-10-23
  land acquisitionpublic purposestate largessfiduciary dutyIslamabad Capital TerritoryCapital Development Authoritytransparencyconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the acquisition of their land in Sectors F-14 and F-15, Islamabad, initiated under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 for the Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation. The core legal questions concerned whether the Land Acquisition Act 1894 or the Capital Development Authority Ordinance 1960 governs land acquisition in Islamabad, and whether the proposed housing scheme constituted a valid "public purpose." The Court held that the Capital Development Authority Ordinance 1960 is a special, self-contained statute that prevails over the general Land Acquisition Act 1894 within the Islamabad Capital Territory. Consequently, the acquisition proceedings were declared illegal and void. The Court ruled that the scheme failed the "public purpose" test, as it involved the non-transparent distribution of state land as "largess" to specific groups, which constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty. The judgment established that state assets must be disposed of through transparent mechanisms, such as public auction, and that executive authorities cannot distribute state property to privileged classes without express legislative authorization, as such actions violate fundamental rights and the principle of equality.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Capital Development Authority Ordinance 1960 prevail over the Land Acquisition Act 1894 regarding land acquisition in the Islamabad Capital Territory?
  • Can the acquisition of land for the distribution of plots to specific groups of government employees and professionals be classified as a "public purpose"?
  • Are executive authorities empowered to dispose of state-owned land in a non-transparent manner without express legislative authorization?
  • Does the distribution of state land as "largess" to specific categories of beneficiaries violate the fundamental rights of the public?
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• Major Muhammad Nouman vs Usman Habib and another2018 IHC 112 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-09-19Read full judgment →
• Major Anees-Ur-Rehman vs Additional District Judge; Islamabad and another2018 MLD 454 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-10-19Read full judgment →
• Mahera Sajid vs Station House Officer, Police Station Shalimar & 6 others2018 CLC 1858, 2018 CLC 1858, 2018 KLR Criminal Cases 300, 2018 IHC 85 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-07-11Read full judgment →
• Maham Shabbir and another vs Additional District Judge, West, Islamabad and 2 others2018 CLC 452 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-10-27Read full judgment →
• Lahore Electric Supply Company Limited (LESCO) and others---2018 PLD Islamabad 20 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-06-22
  tariff determinationNEPRAright of hearingreconsideration petitionjudicial reviewcouncil of common interestsfiduciary dutyprocedural impropriety
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition and connected matters challenged the tariff determination by the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA), its refusal to entertain review petitions, and the dismissal of a reconsideration petition by the Federal Government concerning electric power distribution companies (DISCOs). The core legal questions involved whether distribution companies are entitled to a meaningful right of hearing during tariff redetermination proceedings under Section 31(4) of the Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997, whether the statutory period of 15 days for a redetermination is mandatory or directory, how the term 'anew' must be interpreted, and the binding nature of policies framed by the Council of Common Interests and the Federal Government upon the regulator. The Islamabad High Court held that proceedings to determine a tariff anew require a fresh, de novo approach where affected stakeholders such as DISCOs possess an essential right to a meaningful hearing, that the 15-day timeline is directory, and that constitutional policy frameworks and guidelines hold binding force on the regulator. The Court laid down key principles regarding procedural fairness, natural justice, the scope of judicial review over economic regulators, and the binding constitutional authority of policies formulated under Articles 153 and 154 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether distribution companies have a right to a meaningful hearing when a tariff reconsideration petition is decided anew under Section 31(4) of the Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997?
  • Is the fifteen-day period prescribed under Section 31(4) of the Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997 for determining a tariff anew mandatory or directory?
  • Are the policy guidelines formulated by the Council of Common Interests and the Federal Government binding upon the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority in the performance of its functions?
  • What is the scope of judicial review by superior courts over economic and regulatory determinations made in a quasi-judicial capacity?
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• Khalid Nazir, etc. vs State, etc.PLJ 2018 Cr.C. 642 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-08-11
  criminal revisionprivate complaintsecond complaintissuance of processsummoning orderabuse of processjudicial discretiondelay in filing
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision challenged an order summoning the petitioners in a private complaint, following the dismissal of an earlier complaint regarding the same incident. The core legal question was whether a second criminal complaint is maintainable on identical facts without disclosing new circumstances, and whether a trial court must provide reasons when issuing summons. The Court held that while there is no absolute bar to filing a second complaint, it constitutes an abuse of process if it merely re-litigates facts already adjudicated upon without presenting fresh evidence. Furthermore, the issuance of summons is not a mechanical exercise; the trial court must scrutinize the complaint, assess the evidence, and consider the potential for harassment, particularly when there is a significant delay in filing. The Court emphasized that the trial court failed to apply its mind or discuss the evidence properly. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remanded for a fresh decision, requiring the trial court to properly evaluate the material on record and the implications of the previous dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Is a second criminal complaint maintainable on the same facts and circumstances after the dismissal of an earlier complaint?
  • Does the issuance of summons in a private complaint require the trial court to provide reasons and demonstrate an application of mind?
  • Can a criminal revision be maintained against an order issuing summons in a private complaint?
  • Does a significant delay in filing a criminal complaint affect the court's scrutiny of the allegations?
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• Khalid Nazir and others vs The State and othersPLJ 2018 Cr.C. 642, 2018 MLD 26 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-08-11
  criminal revisionprivate complaintsecond complaintsummoning orderabuse of processjudicial discretionpreliminary inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenged an order summoning the petitioners in a private criminal complaint. The core legal question was whether a second private complaint is maintainable after the dismissal of a previous one on the same facts, and whether the trial court properly applied its judicial mind when issuing summons. The Court held that while there is no absolute bar to filing a second complaint, it is an abuse of process to entertain one without the disclosure of fresh, material facts and circumstances not previously considered. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the issuance of summons is not a mechanical exercise; a magistrate must scrutinize the complaint and supporting material to prevent harassment. The Court found that the trial court failed to adequately discuss the evidence or the previous dismissal, rendering the summoning order legally flawed. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter for a fresh decision, mandating that the trial court must properly evaluate the evidence and the history of the case before issuing any process.

  Questions settled

  • Is a second private criminal complaint maintainable after the dismissal of a previous complaint on the same facts?
  • Does the issuance of summons in a private criminal complaint require the trial court to record reasons and demonstrate application of mind?
  • Can a criminal revision be filed against an order issuing summons in a private complaint?
  • Does an unexplained delay in filing a private criminal complaint cast doubt on the veracity of the allegations?
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• Kartar Lal Pirwani vs Muhammad Waqar Azeem and others2018 IHC 93 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-07-13Read full judgment →
• Kartar Lal Pirwani vs Muhammad Waqar Azeem and 3 others2018 YLR 2219 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-06-04
  Regular First Appealrejection of plaintres judicataspecific performancewithdrawal of suitprivity of contractcompensationdamages
  Summary & questions settled

  This Regular First Appeal was filed against the order and decree of the Civil Judge, Islamabad, which rejected the appellant's plaint for specific performance and permanent injunction under Order VII, Rule 11 of the C.P.C. on the ground of res judicata. The appellant had entered into an agreement to sell with respondents Nos. 1 and 2, who had previously contracted with respondent No. 3. Respondent No. 1's prior suits for specific performance against respondent No. 3 were dismissed as withdrawn or rejected, without any adjudication on the merits. The High Court held that the principle of res judicata under Section 11 of the C.P.C. does not apply because the appellant was not a party to the earlier suits, the subsequent agreement was not the subject matter of those suits, and there was no prior adjudication on the merits. Additionally, the Court ruled that even in the absence of privity of contract with the original owner, a court has the power under Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, to award damages or compensation for breach of contract in lieu of specific performance. The appeal was allowed, the impugned decree set aside, and the case remanded for trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a subsequent suit is barred by the principle of res judicata if the previous suit was dismissed as withdrawn without an adjudication on the merits?
  • Can a plaint be rejected partially under Order VII, Rule 11 of the C.P.C. if some of the reliefs claimed are barred by law while others are not?
  • Does a court have the power to award damages or compensation under Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, in a suit for specific performance even if the plaintiff has not specifically prayed for such relief?
  • Can the principle of res judicata be applied against a person who was not a party to the former suit and whose contract was not the subject matter of that former litigation?
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• Kartar Lal Pirwani vs Muhammad Waciar Azeem and others2018 [M] C.L.R. 1682 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-05-31Read full judgment →
• Kareem Khan vs Inspector-General of Police ICT Islamabad and 32018 PLD Islamabad 108 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-01-15Read full judgment →
• Kaloo Khan and others vs OGDCL and others2018 IHC 148 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-13
  bogus educational testimonialsmisconductdismissal from servicefrauddisciplinary proceedingsOGDCLwrit petitionservice benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns several writ petitions filed by employees of the Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL) challenging their dismissal from service. The petitioners were terminated after disciplinary inquiries confirmed they had submitted bogus educational testimonials to either secure employment or obtain service benefits, such as increments and promotions. The core legal question was whether the submission of fake educational certificates constitutes "misconduct" warranting the major penalty of dismissal, particularly when the specific qualification was not a mandatory prerequisite for the position held. The Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the submission of fake educational documents constitutes fraud and a "cardinal sin" that deprives deserving candidates of employment opportunities. The Court affirmed that such conduct qualifies as misconduct, justifying the penalty of dismissal regardless of whether the certificate was a strict requirement for the initial appointment. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that public sector entities are obligated to verify credentials and initiate disciplinary and criminal proceedings against employees who utilize forged documents, and noted that the petitioners failed to exhaust available departmental appellate remedies before approaching the Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the submission of a bogus educational certificate by an employee constitute misconduct warranting dismissal from service?
  • Can an employee be dismissed for submitting a fake educational certificate if that specific qualification was not a mandatory requirement for their initial appointment?
  • Is the submission of fake educational testimonials considered a fraud on the employer and other deserving candidates?
  • Are employees required to exhaust departmental appellate remedies before challenging disciplinary actions in a writ petition?
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• Javed Iqbal and another vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Planning and Development Division and others2018 PLC (C.S.) 228 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-08-21
  minimum wagecontractual employeesfundamental rightsright to livelihoodpublic policyBECS projectwrit petitionexploitation of labor
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, teachers in the Basic Education Community Schools (BECS) project, filed this writ petition seeking a direction to the respondents to fix their monthly salary at the government-notified minimum wage of Rs. 13,000, rather than the lower honorarium they were receiving. The core legal question was whether the government could pay contractual employees less than the statutory minimum wage based on their employment contracts. The Court held that the payment of a salary below the minimum wage to the petitioners was unlawful and constituted exploitation. Relying on Supreme Court precedents, the Court ruled that the state is obligated to ensure fair remuneration, and any contract stipulating wages below the statutory minimum is unenforceable as it violates public policy. The Court affirmed that the right to life under Article 9 of the Constitution includes the right to earn a livelihood with dignity, and paying meager wages impedes the state’s constitutional obligation to provide education under Article 25-A. Consequently, the respondents were directed to ensure the petitioners receive the notified minimum wage.

  Questions settled

  • Are contractual government employees entitled to the minimum wage notified by the government despite agreeing to a lower salary?
  • Does the payment of a salary below the minimum wage violate the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Is an employment contract that stipulates wages below the statutory minimum wage enforceable against the state?
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• Islamabad Law College vs Higher Education Commission through its2018 [M] C.L.R. 35 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Iroko Mercy Chimizie alias Jeff Jack More, etc vs The State2018 KLR Criminal Cases 335 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-16
  electronic transactionsviolation of privacy of informationcheating and dishonestycyber crimefraudulent email scampretended inheritance scampre-conviction detention benefit
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Prevention of Electronic Crime Court, Islamabad, whereby the appellants were convicted under Section 36 of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002 and Section 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, for committing an online legacy fraud ("black dollars" scam). The core legal questions involved whether sending an email constitutes an offence under Section 36 of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002, and whether the prosecution established the charges of cheating and unauthorized access to information systems. The Islamabad High Court held that the ingredients of Section 36 of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002, were not met as the appellants did not gain or attempt to gain unauthorized access to an information system, thereby setting aside that conviction, but maintained the conviction under Section 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, while reducing the sentence. The key principles laid down include that mere transmission or receipt of a fraudulent email does not constitute a violation of privacy of information under Section 36 of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002, and that the extension of the benefit of pre-conviction detention under Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, is mandatory unless strong and convincing reasons are recorded for its refusal.

  Questions settled

  • Does sending a fraudulent email constitute an offence under Section 36 of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002?
  • Whether an accused person can be convicted under Section 36 of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002, without evidence of unauthorized access to an information system?
  • Is the extension of the benefit of pre-conviction detention under Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, mandatory for a convicted person?
  • Can a trial court deny the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, without recording cogent and convincing reasons for such refusal?
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• International Islamic University and others vs Dr. Shahim Tariq2018 IHC 23 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-03-19Read full judgment →
• Inam-Ul-Rahiem vs Chairman, National Accountability Bureau, Islamabad and another2018 PLD Islamabad 251 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-02-08
  National Accountability Bureauaccountabilityjurisdictionholder of public officestatutory interpretationcorruptionimmunitypenal statute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged the National Accountability Bureau’s (NAB) refusal to investigate a complaint against General (Rtd) Pervez Musharraf, a former President and retired military officer, on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, grants the Bureau jurisdiction to investigate a former President and retired military officer for alleged corruption. The Court held that the Bureau erred in its interpretation, ruling that it possesses the requisite jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that the definition of "Holder of public office" under Section 5(m) of the Ordinance of 1999 explicitly includes persons who have served as President and those who have retired or resigned from the Armed Forces. Consequently, such individuals are not immune from accountability. The Court established the principle that statutory provisions must be interpreted to give effect to every word, avoiding redundancy, and that penal statutes require strict construction. It further affirmed that the Bureau has a mandatory statutory obligation to consider complaints and proceed in a fair, transparent manner, ensuring across-the-board accountability without fear or favor.

  Questions settled

  • Does the National Accountability Bureau have the jurisdiction to investigate a former President of Pakistan under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Are retired members of the Armed Forces of Pakistan amenable to the jurisdiction of the National Accountability Bureau under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Can the National Accountability Bureau refuse to entertain a complaint on the grounds of immunity for a former public office holder?
  • Does the definition of 'Holder of public office' in the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, include persons who have resigned or retired from the Armed Forces?
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• Imran Mohsin vs National Accountability Bureau through Chairman2018 PLD Islamabad 62 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-10-25Read full judgment →
• Imran Ahmad and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2018 IHC 73 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-06-21
  regularization of servicescontract employeesdaily wage employeescivil servantsproject employeesappointment procedurelegitimate expectation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns numerous Intra Court Appeals and writ petitions challenging a consolidated judgment regarding the regularization of contract, daily-wage, and project-based employees across various Federal Government departments. The core legal question was whether these employees possess an enforceable right to regularization based on government policies or length of service, despite not being appointed through the prescribed statutory selection process. The Court held that there is no inherent legal right to regularization outside the statutory framework provided by the Civil Servants Act, 1973. It emphasized that appointments to civil posts must strictly adhere to prescribed selection procedures, including advertisement and, for BPS-16 and above, processing through the Federal Public Service Commission. The Court established a framework for regularization: project employees may only be considered if their projects are converted to non-development status, and BPS-16 and above posts must be referred to the FPSC for fitness determination. It further mandated that future appointments must strictly comply with the law, prohibiting arbitrary contract or daily-wage hiring.

  Questions settled

  • Can contract or daily-wage employees claim a legal right to regularization without following the prescribed statutory recruitment process?
  • Are project-based employees entitled to regularization if their project is converted from development to non-development status?
  • Does the Federal Public Service Commission have the authority to determine the fitness of ad-hoc appointees for regularization under the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Can the High Court declare a post as permanent under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Hakas (Pvt.) Ltd. through Managing Director vs Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) through Chairman and 2 others2018 YLR 412 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-11-16Read full judgment →
• Hajj Organizers Association of Pakistan through Authorized Officer2018 PLD Islamabad 323 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-03-15Read full judgment →
• Habib Bank Limited through Litigation Officer vs Federation of Pakistan2018 CLD 1152 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-13Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through Prime Minister and another vs Aftab Ahmad2019 PLC (C.S.) 623, 2018 IHC 125 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-10-10
  writ jurisdictionAJ&K Counciljudicial reviewmaintainabilitypersona designatawrit of mandamusterritorial jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This intra-court appeal challenged a judgment directing the appointment of the respondent as a Judicial Member (BS-20) of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Azad Jammu & Kashmir (ATIR, AJ&K). The respondent had participated in a competitive process and was recommended by the Departmental Selection Committee, but the Prime Minister of Pakistan, acting as Chairman of the AJ&K Council, subsequently ordered a fresh recruitment process. The core legal question was whether the Islamabad High Court possessed the jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to issue a writ of mandamus against the Prime Minister of Pakistan when acting in his capacity as Chairman of the AJ&K Council. The Court held that the AJ&K Council is a body created under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, and is not a creature of Pakistani law. Consequently, the Prime Minister, when acting as the Chairman of the AJ&K Council, is not performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province, or a local authority. Thus, the writ petition was not maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Islamabad High Court issue a writ of mandamus against the Prime Minister of Pakistan when acting in his capacity as Chairman of the AJ&K Council?
  • Is the AJ&K Council a body performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province, or a local authority under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the executive authority of the AJ&K Council extend beyond the territorial limits of Azad Jammu and Kashmir?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through D.G. National Training Bureau vs Messrs2018 PLD Islamabad 1 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-08-16
  arbitrationarbitral tribunallegal misconductnatural justicewaiversole arbitratorcivil revisioncontractual dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges a Civil Court order removing a two-member arbitral tribunal and appointing a sole arbitrator to resolve a contractual dispute. The core legal questions concern whether the Civil Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act, 1940, to remove the tribunal for failing to act and whether the petitioner waived its right to insist on contractual pre-conditions by participating in the appointment of arbitrators. The Court held that the arbitral tribunal failed to proceed with reasonable dispatch and that one arbitrator committed legal misconduct by deciding the matter unilaterally without hearing the respondent, violating natural justice. Consequently, the Court affirmed the Civil Court's authority under Sections 11 and 12 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, to remove the tribunal and appoint a sole arbitrator. The judgment establishes that arbitrators must act jointly, and failure to do so constitutes legal misconduct. Furthermore, a party waives the right to enforce contractual pre-arbitration conditions, such as prior reference to a consultant, by nominating an arbitrator without protest. The Court's power to appoint a sole arbitrator upon removal of a tribunal overrides contrary contractual provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court appoint a sole arbitrator when removing an existing multi-member arbitral tribunal under the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • Does a party waive the right to insist on contractual pre-arbitration conditions by participating in the appointment of arbitrators?
  • Does an arbitrator's unilateral decision to decline jurisdiction without hearing the parties constitute legal misconduct?
  • Is a retired Supreme Court judge entitled to charge fees for arbitration in cases involving government interests under President's Order No. 1 of 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation, Islamabad vs Abdul2018 [M] C.L.R. 464 · Islamabad High Court
  intra-court appealallotment of plotquota allocationcivil servant statusPTCL employeesservice conditionsautonomous bodies
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra-Court Appeal under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972 was filed by the Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation against an order dated 02.07.2008 passed by a learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 1608 of 2006. The dispute centered on whether Respondent No. 1, a retired employee of Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. (PTCL), was entitled to allotment of a plot under the 75% quota reserved for Federal Government employees or the 8% quota for employees of autonomous/semi-autonomous bodies. The appellant contended that PTCL is a public limited company under the Companies Ordinance 1984, and allotment of a plot is not a service condition protected under statutory provisions. The High Court observed that Respondent No. 1 had initially applied specifically under the 8% quota reserved for autonomous bodies and failed to qualify. Consequently, he could not subsequently claim entitlement under the 75% quota for Federal Government employees, as allotment of a plot is not an inherent terms and conditions right of a civil servant. The Division Bench allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the statutory protection of terms and conditions of service for transferred government employees extend to future plot allotment housing schemes?
  • Can an applicant who applied for a housing plot under an autonomous bodies quota subsequently claim entitlement under the quota reserved for Federal Government employees?
  • Is the allotment of a residential plot considered a statutory term and condition of service for a civil servant?
  Read full judgment →
• Federal Board of Intermediate & Secondary Education through its2108 PLJ Islamabad 105 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Fauji Fertilizer Company Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 3 others2018 PTD 719 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-10-23
  advance taxincome taxtax estimationdefault surchargetax authorities jurisdictionconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves constitutional petitions filed by taxpayers challenging notices issued by the respondent tax department demanding proof of payment of advance tax installments and justification for tax liability estimates under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The core legal question concerns the authority of the tax department to question, reject, or demand justification for advance tax estimates filed by taxpayers during the currency of the tax year prior to the filing of annual returns. The Islamabad High Court held that the tax department lacks the legal authority to question the correctness or veracity of advance tax estimates filed by taxpayers during the tax year. The court ruled that the exclusive statutory remedy against an incorrect estimate or shortfall is the levy of default surcharge under section 205 after the close of the tax year upon the filing of tax returns. Consequently, the impugned recovery notices were set aside as illegal and without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Can the tax department question or demand justification for an advance tax estimate filed by a taxpayer before the close of the tax year?
  • What are the available remedies for tax authorities if a taxpayer files an incorrect or shortfall estimate of advance tax?
  • Is a taxpayer permitted to file a nil estimate for advance tax under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• Fatima Energy Limited vs National Electric Power Regulatory2018 CLC 13 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-09-06Read full judgment →
• Farrukh Nawaz Bhatti vs Federal Government through Prime Minister of Pakistan and 3 others2018 KLR Civil Cases 56 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Farrukh Nawaz Bhatti vs Federal Government through Prime Minister of Pakistan & 3 others2018 PLJ Islamabad 166 · Islamabad High Court
  quo warrantostatutory autonomyregulatory capturede facto doctrinepublic officeCapital Development Authorityexecutive discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated petition challenged notifications issued by the Federal Government appointing the Mayor of the Metropolitan Corporation, Islamabad, as an ex-officio Member and part-time Chairman of the Capital Development Authority (CDA). The core legal question was whether these appointments violated the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960, and whether the Executive’s discretion in such appointments is unfettered. The Court held that the impugned notifications were illegal and ultra vires, as the Ordinance of 1960 mandates fixed-term appointments for Members and the Chairman, and does not permit "ex-officio" appointments or part-time arrangements for these statutory roles. The Court affirmed that the CDA is an independent, autonomous regulatory body, and appointments to its Board must follow a transparent, merit-based selection process, consistent with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court regarding regulatory autonomy. While setting aside the appointments, the Court invoked the de facto doctrine to protect past acts performed by the respondent. The judgment reinforces that statutory autonomy must be respected and that executive discretion is circumscribed by the specific legislative scheme and merit-based requirements.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the appointment of a Mayor as an ex-officio Member and part-time Chairman of the Capital Development Authority is permissible under the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960?
  • Does the doctrine of 'holding office during pleasure' grant the Federal Government unfettered discretion to appoint members to autonomous regulatory bodies?
  • Can a writ of quo warranto be issued against a person holding an office in a statutory body if the appointment violates the governing statute?
  • Does the de facto doctrine protect acts performed by an official whose appointment is subsequently declared illegal?
  Read full judgment →
• Farhat Nigar vs The Auditor General of Islamic Republic of Pakistan2018 CLC 392 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-09-12Read full judgment →
• Excel Techno Solutions Fze, UAE and another vs M/s Oil & Gas Development2018 IHC 139 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-09-14Read full judgment →
• Educational Services Pvt. Limited (Esl) through Company Secretary and 3 others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Capital Administration and Development Division, Islamabad and another2018 MLD 624 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-01-19Read full judgment →
• Educational Services Pvt. Limited (Esl) & three others vs Federation of Pakistan through its Secretary, Capital Administration & Development Division, Cabinet Secretariat, Islamabad2018 MLD 624, 2018 IHC 9 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-01-19Read full judgment →
• Educational Services (Pvt.) Ltd. (Esl) and three others vs Federation of Pakistan through its Secretary2018 [M] C.L.R. 678 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Dr. Muhammad Saeed vs Sardar Muhammad Akram and others2018 [M] C.L.R. 77 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-01-20Read full judgment →
• Dr. Joseph Wilson vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry2018 PLJ Islamabad 53 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Dr. Farzana Bari vs Ministry of Law, Justice and Human Rights through Secretary and 3 others2018 PLD Islamabad 127 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-02-08Read full judgment →
• Dr. Farzana Bari vs Ministry of Law, Justice and Human Rights and others2018 [M] C.L.R. 541, 2018 PLD Islamabad 127, 2018 IHC 12 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-02-06Read full judgment →
• Dr. Farzana Bari vs Ministry of Law, Justice and Human Rights and other2018 [M] C.L.R. 541 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-02-08Read full judgment →
• Dr. Farooq Sattar vs Election Commission of Pakistan and others2018 IHC 68 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-17Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax (Legal), Large Tax-payer Units, Islamabad vs (M/s.)2018 P.C.T.L.R. 995 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-03-13Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax (Legal), Islamabad vs Messrs Askari2018 PTD 1089 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-03-13
  income tax referenceaccrual basismercantile systemgovernment securitiesbad debtsnon-performing loanswritten off loansconcessional loans
  Summary & questions settled

  These consolidated Income Tax References before the Islamabad High Court arose from judgments of the Appellate Tribunal Income Tax involving banking companies. The primary legal questions concerned: (i) whether interest derived by banks from Government securities is taxable on an accrual or actual receipt basis under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 and the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001; (ii) whether provisions for non-performing loans are deductible as bad debts prior to being written off as irrecoverable; and (iii) the tax treatment of concessional loans granted by banks to employees under section 24(i) of the 1979 Ordinance. The High Court held that banks regularly employing the mercantile/accrual system of accounting are required to offer interest on Government securities for tax on an accrual/earned basis rather than upon actual receipt. Furthermore, prior to the insertion of Section 100A and the Seventh Schedule in 2007, deductions for bad debts were strictly limited to irrecoverable loans actually written off under the applicable SBP regulatory framework, excluding non-performing loans. Finally, deletions regarding concessional employee loans were upheld as no actual expenditure was proven by the Department.

  Questions settled

  • Are banking companies regularly employing the mercantile accounting system obliged to offer interest income on Government securities for tax on an accrual basis rather than actual receipt basis?
  • Whether non-performing loans classified as doubtful or loss are deductible as bad debts under section 23(1)(x) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 or section 29 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 without being actually written off as irrecoverable?
  • Does the difference between market interest rates and concessional interest rates on loans advanced to employees attract tax additions under section 24(i) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 in the absence of proof of actual expenditure?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue (Legal), Ltu, Islamabad vs (M_s.) Wi-Tribe, Islamabad2018 P.C.T.L.R. 747 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue (Legal), Islamabad vs Messrs Wi-Tribe, Islamabad2018 PTD 1413 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-05-21
  Federal Excise Dutyinternet servicestelecommunication servicesfiscal statute interpretationtax exemptionarbitrary assessmentvoice content
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns Federal Excise Reference Applications regarding the taxability of 'voice content' services, such as Skype and WhatsApp, provided via internet by a Wireless Local Loop licensee. The core legal question was whether such services are liable for Federal Excise Duty (FED) despite the statutory exemption for internet services, and whether tax authorities may arbitrarily bifurcate internet usage into 'voice' and 'non-voice' components for taxation purposes. The Islamabad High Court held that under the Federal Excise Act, 2005, internet services are explicitly exempted from FED. Since the respondent provides internet services and no technical mechanism exists to segregate 'voice content' from general data usage, the Department’s attempt to levy FED on such usage was invalid. The Court ruled that the arbitrary bifurcation of services by tax authorities was whimsical and legally unsustainable. The judgment affirms the principle that fiscal statutes must be construed strictly, and in cases of ambiguity or lack of clear statutory mechanism for assessment, the interpretation beneficial to the taxpayer must prevail, as tax authorities cannot impose liability through implication or arbitrary estimation.

  Questions settled

  • Are internet services, including voice content rendered through applications, liable to Federal Excise Duty under the Federal Excise Act, 2005?
  • Can tax authorities arbitrarily bifurcate internet usage into voice and non-voice components to levy Federal Excise Duty in the absence of a statutory mechanism?
  • How should ambiguities in a fiscal statute be resolved regarding the interpretation of tax exemptions?
  • Is the determination of value for Federal Excise Duty on services dependent on the total charges imposed by the service provider?
  Read full judgment →
• CM Pak Limited vs The Pakistan Telecommunication Authority2018 PLD Islamabad 243, 2018 IHC 15 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-02-26Read full judgment →
• CM Pak Limited vs Pakistan Telecommunication Authority2018 PLD Islamabad 243 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-02-26Read full judgment →
• City School (Pvt.) through Manager Administration vs Rubina Habib and others2018 CLC 793 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-11-21Read full judgment →
• Chaudhry Asad-Ur-Rehman vs The Election Commission of Pakistan2018 CLC 1040 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-12-11Read full judgment →
• Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad vs Atta Muhammad2018 [M] C.L.R. 14 · Islamabad High Court
  upgradation of postswrit of mandamusterms and conditions of servicepolicy matterdiscriminationadministrative discretioncivil service law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a challenge to a High Court order directing the Federal Board of Revenue to initiate the process of upgrading posts held by the respondents. The respondents, serving as Superintendents and Deputy Superintendents, sought this relief based on the principle of non-discrimination under Article 25 of the Constitution, arguing that similar posts in other departments had been upgraded. The core legal questions involved whether upgradation constitutes a vested right, whether it falls under the terms and conditions of service, and whether a High Court can issue a writ of mandamus to compel such an administrative policy decision. The Court held that upgradation is not a statutory right but a policy matter governed by the Establishment Division's Office Memorandum dated 20.1.2001. It ruled that the decision to upgrade a post lies exclusively within the administrative domain of the relevant department, provided specific criteria are met. The Court established that upgradation is distinct from promotion, confers no automatic benefits to the incumbent, and cannot be claimed on the basis of discrimination or parity with other departments.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employee have a vested right to claim the upgradation of their post?
  • Can a High Court, under Article 199 of the Constitution, direct a government department to initiate the process of upgrading a post?
  • Is the plea of discrimination under Article 25 of the Constitution a valid ground for claiming the upgradation of a post?
  • Does the upgradation of a post automatically entitle the incumbent to the higher grade, pay, and privileges of that post?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Naseer Ahmed and another vs Rent Controller and others2018 YLR 29 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-07-24Read full judgment →
• Ch. Mohammad Nawaz and another vs The Federal Government2018 PLC (C.S.) 325 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-07-31
  plot allotment cancellationprinciples of natural justiceaudi alteram partemmove over vs promotionconstitutional jurisdictionhousing foundation
  Summary & questions settled

  This intra court appeal impugns an order of the Single Judge-in-Chambers dismissing the appellants' writ petition against the cancellation of a plot allotment by the Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation. The core legal questions involve whether a plot allotment can be cancelled without affording an opportunity of hearing, and whether a move over in pay scale constitutes a promotion for entitlement to a housing scheme category. The Islamabad High Court held that cancelling an allotment without a show-cause notice or opportunity of hearing violates the principles of natural justice, rendering the order void and coram non judice. The court also clarified that a move over is a financial extension and not a promotion. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the cancellation and the impugned order, and reaffirming that administrative authorities must strictly observe the audi alteram partem rule before affecting vested property rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an administrative authority can cancel a plot allotment without issuing a show-cause notice and affording an opportunity of hearing?
  • Does a move over from one pay scale to another amount to a promotion for determining plot category entitlement?
  • Is an order passed in violation of the principles of natural justice considered void and coram non judice?
  • Can a housing authority rescind an allotment after full payment has been made and the plot transferred without adhering to procedural fairness?
  Read full judgment →
• Capital Development Authority through its Chairman vs Mrs. Ameer Fatima2019 [M] C.L.R. 739, 2018 IHC 162 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-12-12Read full judgment →
• BNP (Private) Limited & Another vs Capital Development Authority etc2019 CLC 20, 2018 IHC 107 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-09-03Read full judgment →
• BBC Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. and another vs Masud Alam (deceased) through Legal Heirs and others2018 YLR 363 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-04-04Read full judgment →
• Ary Media Communications vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary Cabinet Division, Islamabad and 4 others2018 PLD Islamabad 285 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-23Read full judgment →
• Ary Media Communications vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary2018 IHC 50 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-05-23Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta vs The State2019 KLR Criminal Cases 6, 2019 PCRLJ 1316, PLJ 2019 Cr.C. 848, 2018 IHC 165 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-12-19
  juvenile justiceretracted confessionrape evidenceDNA profilingmurder convictioncriminal appealcorroborative evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant, a juvenile, for murder, rape, and destruction of evidence. The core legal questions concerned the validity of the appellant's retracted judicial confession, the sufficiency of corroborative evidence, and whether the charge of rape could be sustained without DNA or semen grouping evidence. The Islamabad High Court held that the conviction for murder and destruction of evidence was supported by a voluntary, corroborated judicial confession and medical evidence regarding the victim's injuries. However, the Court set aside the conviction for rape, ruling that in the absence of DNA profiling or semen grouping, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proof regarding the offence of Zina. The Court reaffirmed the principle that while a retracted confession may support a conviction if it is voluntary and corroborated by material evidence, the absence of forensic evidence in rape cases precludes a conviction under Section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The judgment emphasizes the necessity of strict adherence to procedural safeguards for juvenile offenders under the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for rape be sustained in the absence of DNA profiling or semen grouping?
  • Under what conditions can a retracted judicial confession be relied upon to sustain a conviction?
  • Does the failure to conduct DNA testing or semen grouping necessitate the acquittal of a charge under Section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • What are the mandatory procedural requirements for recording a valid judicial confession under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  Read full judgment →
• Al-Khair University through Addl. Registrar Bhimber A.J.K vs Higher2018 PLJ Islamabad 85 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Adil Aziz Qazi, Chairman Union Council-II, Mughal, Islamabad vs Election Commission of Pakistan through Secretary2018 MLD 1453 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-05-10Read full judgment →
• Abdul Latif vs Election Commission of Pakistan and another2018 CLC 227 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-10-26Read full judgment →
• Abdul Khaliq vs Muhammad Younas and others2018 IHC 152 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-11-19Read full judgment →
• (1) Nasir Mehmood (2) Rafaqat Hussain (3) The State vs (1) The State (2)2018 IHC 100 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-07-16
  murder referencejail appealadverse inferenceocular accountmedical evidenceforensic delayinterested witnessbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns jail appeals against convictions and death sentences for triple murder and attempted murder. The core legal question was whether the prosecution established the appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt despite significant evidentiary gaps. The Islamabad High Court acquitted the appellants, holding that the prosecution’s case was fundamentally flawed. The court found that the reliance on a single related and inimical witness, without independent corroboration, was insufficient. Crucially, the prosecution failed to produce key witnesses, necessitating an adverse inference under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The court further identified fatal contradictions between the ocular account and medical evidence, particularly regarding the nature of firearm injuries, and noted that an unexplained five-year delay in sending crime weapons and empties to the Forensic Science Laboratory rendered the forensic evidence inconsequential. Reaffirming that the benefit of the slightest doubt must be extended to the accused, the court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case, thereby setting aside the convictions and acquitting the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • What is the legal consequence of the prosecution's failure to produce key witnesses in a criminal trial?
  • Does an unexplained delay in sending crime weapons and empties to the Forensic Science Laboratory render forensic evidence inconsequential?
  • Can the testimony of an interested and inimical witness be relied upon without independent corroboration?
  • When does a contradiction between ocular testimony and medical evidence entitle an accused to the benefit of doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• (1) Muhammad Idrees (2) Adnan Iqbal vs (1) Colonel Joseph Emmanuel2018 IHC 47 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-05-11Read full judgment →
• (1) Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi (2) Abdul Wahab Baluch (3) Haroon Arshad2018 IHC 75 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-06-27Read full judgment →
• (1) Daily Khabrain (2) Daily 'The Post' (3) Daily Khabrain (4) Daily Ausaf vs2018 IHC 129 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-06-21
  newspaper employeeswage board awardlimitation periodimplementation tribunalrecovery of wagesex-employeesindustrial relations
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns multiple appeals and a writ petition challenging orders of the Implementation Tribunal established under the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973, regarding the recovery of wage arrears by newspaper employees. The core legal questions were whether ex-employees have standing to invoke the Tribunal's jurisdiction for wage recovery and whether the Limitation Act, 1908 applies to proceedings before the Tribunal. The Court held that ex-employees are entitled to seek recovery of wages for the period they were employed, as the definition of 'newspaper employee' is inclusive. Regarding limitation, the Court ruled that since the Act and its Rules are silent on the matter, the Limitation Act, 1908 applies to proceedings before the Tribunal. Specifically, Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 governs such applications, imposing a three-year limitation period from the date the cause of action accrues. The Court established that while the right to wages is not extinguished, the remedy is barred if the claim is not filed within three years of the accrual of the cause of action, noting that recurring defaults create fresh causes of action.

  Questions settled

  • Can an ex-employee invoke the jurisdiction of the Implementation Tribunal to recover unpaid wages?
  • Is the Limitation Act, 1908 applicable to proceedings before the Implementation Tribunal constituted under the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973?
  • What is the applicable period of limitation for filing an application for recovery of wages before the Implementation Tribunal?
  • Does the Implementation Tribunal have the power to review its own orders?
  Read full judgment →
• Yasir Khan, etc. vs The State and anotherPLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 1036, K.L.R. 2017 Criminal Cases 322 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-08-31
  post-arrest bailgang rapedacoityidentification paradedelay in FIRprohibitory clausecriminal investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for post-arrest bail was filed by the petitioners in a case involving dacoity, gang rape, and the preparation of compromising videos of the victims. The petitioners contended that they were not nominated in the FIR, that there was an unexplained ten-day delay in lodging the FIR, and that the allegations of sexual assault were added as an afterthought. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the bail petition. The Court held that the delay in lodging the FIR was well-explained and immaterial, as victims of sexual assault often hesitate to approach the police due to societal stigma, family honor, and threats of blackmail. Furthermore, the petitioners were successfully identified by the victims during an identification parade. The Court emphasized that victims of such heinous crimes would not put their personal character and family honor at stake by fabricating a false story. Finding sufficient prima facie evidence connecting the petitioners to the offenses, which fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the Court declined bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a delay in lodging an FIR is fatal to the prosecution in cases involving sexual assault and blackmail?
  • Can post-arrest bail be granted where the accused are identified in an identification parade with specific roles in a gang rape?
  • What is the evidentiary significance of a victim's delay in reporting a sexual offense due to fear of social stigma and blackmail?
  Read full judgment →
• Yasir Khan, etc. vs State and anotherPLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 1036 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-08-31
  post-arrest bailgang rapedacoityprohibitory clauseidentification paradedelay in FIRinvestigation flaws
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under Sections 394, 376(2), 377, and 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Koral, Islamabad, involving allegations of dacoity, gang rape, unnatural offences, and the recording of compromising videos of victim ladies. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to post-arrest bail given the heinous nature of the offences, their identification during an identification parade, and the incriminating statements of the victims recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the bail petition, holding that the petitioners were prima facie connected to the commission of heinous offences falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and that deeper appreciation of evidence is not permissible at the bail stage. The court laid down the principle that in cases of sexual assault and dacoity, a delay in lodging the FIR is reasonably explained by considerations of family honour and fear of blackmail, and that victim testimonies coupled with identification parades provide sufficient grounds to withhold bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted in heinous offences like gang rape and dacoity when the accused are identified during an identification parade?
  • Does a delay in lodging the FIR due to concerns over family honour and blackmail constitute a valid explanation at the bail stage?
  • Are offences punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for ten years barred from bail under the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when reasonable grounds exist?
  • Can deeper appreciation of evidence be undertaken while deciding a post-arrest bail petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Wishal Masih vs The State and others2017 YLR 2031 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-06-03
  rapejuvenile offenderDNA evidencemedical evidenceBorstal institutionjuvenile justicecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Sessions Judge Islamabad convicting the appellant under Section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for rape of a seven-year-old child and sentencing him to ten years' simple imprisonment. The core legal questions involved whether the conviction was sustainable on ocular and medical evidence despite a negative DNA report, whether the trial by the Sessions Court violated the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance 2000, and how a juvenile convict should be sentenced and treated under the law. The Islamabad High Court held that the testimony of the minor victim, corroborated by medical evidence regarding injuries and a torn hymen, sufficiently proved the offense, and that the Sessions Court was legally competent to try a juvenile. The court upheld the conviction and sentence while modifying it to include a fine, and directed that the juvenile appellant be sent to a Borstal institution until he attains the age of eighteen years in accordance with the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance 2000. The key legal principles laid down emphasize that medical observations and victim testimony can prove rape independently of a negative DNA report, and that juvenile offenders must be dealt with through rehabilitative measures such as detention in a Borstal institution rather than standard adult imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for rape under Section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be sustained on the basis of ocular and medical testimony when the DNA report is negative?
  • Does the trial of a juvenile by a Sessions Court violate the provisions of the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000?
  • How should a juvenile offender convicted of a heinous offense be treated with respect to sentencing and detention in a Borstal institution?
  • Is the imposition of a fine mandatory upon conviction under Section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Wilson's Pharmaceuticals vs Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan2017 PLJ Islamabad 365 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Waseem Haroon and two others vs The State, etc2017 IHC 147 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-06-14
  criminal appealdacoityidentification paradeframing of chargerecovery evidenceacquittalQanun-e-Shahadat OrderCode of Criminal Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellants for robbery under Sections 395 and 412 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions concern the validity of the trial proceedings, specifically the failure to frame a proper charge, the admissibility of identification parade reports, and the reliability of recovery evidence. The Islamabad High Court held that the conviction was unsustainable due to multiple fatal flaws: no specific charge under Sections 395/412 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was ever framed against the appellants; the prosecution failed to produce the key eyewitnesses of the identification parade; the identification parade itself was conducted in violation of established legal principles; and the recovery evidence was deemed planted and unreliable due to unexplained discrepancies. The Court emphasized that a trial court must ensure charges are specific, fair, and clear, and that documentary evidence must be proved in accordance with the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellants, noting that remanding the case for a de novo trial was unjustified given the complete lack of credible evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained if the trial court fails to frame a specific charge against the accused?
  • Is a photocopy of an identification parade report admissible in evidence without being proved through primary evidence?
  • Does the recovery of incriminating items from the same location on different dates by the same investigation officer render the recovery proceedings unreliable?
  • Is a remand for a de novo trial justified when the prosecution has failed to produce any credible evidence or identify the accused in court?
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• Waheed Akhtar vs Sessions Judge (East) Islamabad, etc.2017 P Cr. L J 225, 2017 PLJ Islamabad 149 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-09-29
  FIR registrationEx-Officio Justice of Peacecross-versioncriminal procedurewrit jurisdictioncognizable offenceinvestigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged an order passed by the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace directing the registration of FIRs for both the petitioner and the respondent regarding a dispute over a farm house. The petitioner contended that the order was illegal and that separate FIRs for the same incident were not permissible. The core legal question was whether the law mandates a single FIR with a cross-version or allows for the registration of independent FIRs for the same incident. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the registration of separate FIRs for the same incident is legally permissible. The Court reasoned that recording cross-versions within a single FIR risks the investigation being spoiled or biased. By allowing independent FIRs, each case can be decided on its own merits under judicial supervision, ensuring that an aggrieved party is not deprived of a remedy due to the actions or bias of an Investigating Officer. The Court affirmed that the scheme of criminal law requires each case to be adjudicated independently, rejecting the notion that one party can simply step into the shoes of another.

  Questions settled

  • Can separate FIRs be registered for the same incident?
  • Does the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace have the authority to direct the registration of FIRs for both parties in a dispute?
  • Is the registration of a cross-version within a single FIR the only legal mechanism for handling conflicting versions of an incident?
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• Waheed Akhtar vs Sessions Judge (East) Islamabad and others2017 P Cr. L J 225 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-09-29
  registration of FIREx-Officio Justice of Peacecross FIRcross-versionconstitutional petitioncognizable offencequashing of order
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 seeking to set aside an order passed by the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace directing the registration of a First Information Report (FIR) on the application of the opposing party, following earlier remand by the High Court. The core legal question revolved around the legality of registering multiple or cross-version FIRs regarding the same incident by rival parties. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that recording separate FIRs for different versions presented by rival parties is permissible under the law, and each case must be decided on its own merits rather than restricting parties to a single cross-version statement within the same FIR. The court laid down the principle that aggrieved persons with distinct versions of an incident are entitled to seek independent registration of FIRs, allowing separate investigations subject to judicial supervision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether multiple FIRs can be registered for the same incident representing different versions of rival parties?
  • Does Section 22-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 bar the registration of a second FIR for the same occurrence?
  • Can an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace direct the registration of FIRs on applications filed by both rival parties?
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• Uch Power (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Government of Pakistan, Federal Board of Revenue and 2 others2017 PTD 1215 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-11-07
  Intra Court Appealcondonation of delaydebit credit notesales taxarbitration clausegas supply agreementwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra Court Appeal challenged the Single Bench decision dismissing the appellant company's writ petition. The appellant, an Independent Power Producer, challenged a Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) order granting Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL) a 30-day time condonation under Section 74 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 to issue debit/credit notes under Section 9 for uncollected sales tax following a Supreme Court ruling. The appellant contended it was denied a hearing and should not bear liability for OGDCL's delay. The High Court affirmed that under the gas supply agreement, the appellant was bound to follow Pakistan's laws and pay lawfully imposed taxes passed on by OGDCL. The Court held that the writ petition was incompetent because the agreement contained a binding, multi-tiered dispute resolution clause (including arbitration) to settle contractual and invoicing disputes. Furthermore, the 30-day condonation period had already elapsed. The Intra Court Appeal was dismissed, affirming the Single Bench order.

  Questions settled

  • Is a writ petition maintainable when a binding agreement between the parties provides a specific dispute resolution and arbitration mechanism?
  • Does the Federal Board of Revenue have authority to grant time condonation under Section 74 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 for issuing debit/credit notes?
  • Can a party invoke constitutional writ jurisdiction to challenge an interim tax condonation order after the condoned period has already expired?
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• Uch Power (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan and 5 others2017 PTD 2377 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-04-04
  sales taxdefault surchargerecovery noticewillful defaultalternative remedyinjunctive relieftax liability
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged recovery notices issued by tax authorities regarding default surcharge on unpaid sales tax liability. The petitioner argued that the default occurred during a period covered by injunctive relief granted by the High Court in a pending Sales Tax Reference, and contended that default surcharge, being penal in nature, requires proof of willful default or mens rea. The respondents argued that under Section 34 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, default surcharge is mandatory regardless of whether the default is willful or otherwise, and noted that the petitioner had an alternative remedy available under Section 34-A of the same Act. The Court held that the plain language of Section 34 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, imposes liability for default surcharge on any failure to pay tax in time, whether the default is willful or otherwise. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, finding that the statutory provision does not require mens rea for the imposition of default surcharge and that the petitioner had failed to exhaust the alternative statutory remedy provided by law.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 34 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 require proof of willful default for the imposition of default surcharge?
  • Is the payment of default surcharge under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 applicable to defaults that are not willful?
  • Does the existence of an alternative remedy under Section 34-A of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 preclude a constitutional petition regarding recovery notices?
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• Uch Power (Pvt.) Limited. vs Federation of Pakistan & 5 others.2017 PTD 2377, PTCL 2017 CL. 808 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-04-04
  sales taxdefault surchargewillful defaultrecovery noticestatutory interpretationalternative remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged recovery notices issued by tax authorities for default surcharge on sales tax, arguing that the delay in payment was not willful but rather due to an injunctive order previously granted by the Court in a pending Sales Tax Reference. The petitioner contended that as the surcharge was penal in nature, it required proof of mens rea or willful default. The core legal question was whether default surcharge under Section 34 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, is strictly limited to willful defaults or applies to all defaults regardless of intent. The Court held that Section 34 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, explicitly mandates the payment of default surcharge for any failure to pay tax due, whether the default is willful or otherwise. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the statutory provision does not confine the imposition of surcharge to willful defaults and noting that the petitioner had an alternative statutory remedy available via representation to the Federal Board of Revenue under Section 34-A of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 34 of the Sales Tax Act 1990 require proof of willful default for the imposition of default surcharge?
  • Is the payment of default surcharge under the Sales Tax Act 1990 applicable to non-willful defaults?
  • Does the existence of an alternative remedy under Section 34-A of the Sales Tax Act 1990 preclude a constitutional petition against recovery notices?
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• Trek Technologies Limited vs Icondor Telecom (Private) Limited and another2017 CLD 572 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-12-16Read full judgment →
• Trading Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Sacked Employees Review2019 PLC (C.S.) 208, 2017 IHC 214 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-08-22
  sacked employeesreinstatementvoluntary retirementlimitation periodstatutory interpretationjurisdiction of tribunalgolden handshake
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged an order by the Sacked Employees Review Board reinstating an employee who had previously opted for voluntary retirement. The core legal question was whether an employee who voluntarily retired could be classified as a 'sacked employee' eligible for reinstatement under the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010, and whether the petition for reinstatement was time-barred. The Court held that the petition was not maintainable. It reasoned that the definition of 'sacked employee' in Section 2(f) of the 2010 Act is subject to the context of Sections 11 and 13, which restrict the Review Board's jurisdiction to specific categories of termination (dismissal, removal, or termination due to misconduct, absence, misappropriation, or medical unfitness). Voluntary retirement does not fall within these specific categories. Furthermore, the Court held that the petition was time-barred under Section 13(1) of the 2010 Act, and that the limitation period could not be extended or condoned by the Board or the Court. The principle laid down is that specific provisions in a special statute regarding jurisdiction and limitation override general definitions and that limitation periods in special laws must be strictly enforced.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of 'sacked employee' in Section 2(f) of the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010, override the specific eligibility criteria for petitioning the Review Board under Sections 11 and 13?
  • Can an employee who opted for voluntary retirement be considered a 'sacked employee' eligible for reinstatement under the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010?
  • Is the limitation period for filing a petition before the Sacked Employees Review Board under Section 13(1) of the Sacked Employees (Reinstatement) Act, 2010, subject to condonation of delay?
  • Does a High Court's direction to treat a writ petition as a representation before a statutory body absolve the petitioner from complying with the statutory limitation period for filing such a petition?
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• The Open International University for Complimentary Medicine, Siri2017 CLC 1215 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-01-31Read full judgment →
• The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Pakistan (CPSP) vs The Fop2017 PLJ Islamabad 292, 2017 CLC 1306 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-02-09Read full judgment →
• The College of Physician and Surgeons of Pakistan (CPSP). vs The Fop, etc.2017 IHC · Islamabad High Court · 2017-02-09Read full judgment →
• Syed Usman Khalid vs Atta Mohammad and others2017 IHC 55 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-03-08Read full judgment →