Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 4,389 judgments in total from the Islamabad High Court.

• Syed Nusrat Ali Shah vs Capital Development Authority, Islamabad2017 CLC 154 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-03-22Read full judgment →
• Syed Azhar Abbas Jafri. vs HBFC Workmen Union of Pakistan and others2017 PLJ Islamabad 234 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Syed Azhar Abbas Jafri vs HBFC Workmen Union of Pakistan and others2017 PLC (C.S.) 1393 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-01-31
  intra court appealappointment of CEOforeign nationalrecovery of benefitssalary for work doneBanks Nationalization Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra Court Appeal challenges a judgment passed by a Single Judge in Chambers which declared the appellant's appointment as Managing Director/Chief Executive Officer of House Building Finance Corporation Limited (HBFCL) unlawful and ordered the recovery of all benefits derived by him during his tenure. The core legal questions involved whether a foreign national could be appointed as CEO of HBFCL under the Banks (Nationalization) Act, 1974, and whether recovery of remuneration can be ordered from an employee whose appointment is subsequently declared illegal despite full disclosure of facts. The court held that the appellant's appointment was indeed in violation of Section 11(2)(c) read with Section 11-A of the Banks (Nationalization) Act, 1974, as he was a foreign national at the time of appointment, but modified the judgment to set aside the order of recovery of benefits since the appellant had made a candid disclosure of his nationality prior to appointment and had actually performed his duties. The key principle laid down is that an employee who has performed duties cannot be deprived of salary or benefits received for work done when there was no concealment or misrepresentation on their part.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a foreign national could be appointed as the Chief Executive Officer of House Building Finance Corporation Limited under the Banks (Nationalization) Act, 1974?
  • Can the recovery of salary and benefits be ordered from an employee who performed duties under an appointment later declared illegal, when the employee made a full disclosure of facts prior to appointment?
  • Does Section 11 of the Banks (Nationalization) Act, 1974 apply to the House Building Finance Corporation prior to its omission by the amending Act of 2011?
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• Syed Akif Hussain Shah vs Fbise and others2017 PLJ Islamabad 310, 2017 MLD 923 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-12-23
  date of birth correctionlimitation periodeducational testimonialssecond appealdeclaratory suitmatriculation certificatecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This Regular Second Appeal challenged the concurrent dismissal of a suit for declaration and mandatory injunction seeking to alter the appellant's date of birth in his Secondary School Certificate. The core legal questions were whether the suit was barred by limitation and whether educational testimonials prevail over subsequent identity documents. The Court held that the suit was grossly time-barred, having been filed twelve years after the issuance of the Matriculation Certificate, thereby exceeding the six-year limitation period prescribed under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the principle that educational testimonials constitute the primary record for a person's date of birth, taking precedence over later-issued documents such as National Identity Cards, passports, or birth certificates, unless cogent evidence proves otherwise. Consequently, finding no error of law in the concurrent findings of the lower courts, the High Court dismissed the appeal, noting that its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is restricted to questions of law and does not permit the reappraisal of factual findings.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit for the correction of a date of birth in a Matriculation Certificate barred by limitation if filed more than six years after the certificate's issuance?
  • Does a date of birth recorded in a Matriculation Certificate take precedence over a date of birth recorded in subsequently issued documents like a National Identity Card or passport?
  • What is the scope of the High Court's jurisdiction in a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Sultan Ubaid-Ur-Rehman vs The State and another2017 P Cr. L J 469 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-12-16
  criminal revisionsummoning of documentsSection 94 Cr.P.C.cross-examinationfair trialmortuary recordSection 342 Cr.P.C.
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenged the trial court's order refusing to summon the mortuary register from PIMS, Islamabad, regarding the date of the occurrence. The core legal question was whether the trial court correctly denied the defense's request to summon this record during the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, instead directing the defense to raise the plea at the stage of recording the accused's statement under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The High Court set aside the impugned order, holding that the trial court misconceived the legal position. The Court ruled that under Section 94, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the defense is entitled to summon necessary documents at appropriate stages of the trial to resolve factual ambiguities, particularly when the document is vital for effective cross-examination. The principle laid down is that forcing the defense to wait until the Section 342 stage to produce or summon evidence, when such evidence is crucial for testing the veracity of prosecution witnesses, is not warranted by law and hinders the fair conduct of the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court compel the defense to wait until the statement under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to summon necessary documents?
  • Is the defense entitled to summon documents under Section 94, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 during the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses?
  • Does the refusal to summon vital records for cross-examination violate the rights of the accused?
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• Soofia Munir and anothers vs Judge, Family Court (West), Islamabad2017 MLD 214 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-05-03Read full judgment →
• Sohail Ahmed Jan vs Siraj Ahmed Jan and others2017 IHC 276 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-07-04Read full judgment →
• Sharjeel Inam vs Federation of Pakistan and others2017 YLR 2423 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-03-20
  protective bailtransitory bailaccess to justiceabscondancefugitive from lawArticle 199National Accountability Bureausurrender before court
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an elected member of the Provincial Assembly of Sindh residing abroad since 2015 with pending warrants issued under the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999, invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the Islamabad High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 seeking protective/transitory bail upon surrendering before the Court, in order to approach the competent court in Sindh. The prosecution opposed the petition, contending that the petitioner was a proclaimed offender and fugitive disentitled to relief. The High Court granted protective bail for fifteen days subject to surety bonds, holding that protective bail is granted without assessing case merits under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, solely to enable an accused to surrender and reach the competent court. The Court established that access to justice is an integral constitutional right under the rule of law, and surrendering before the Court demonstrates bona fides, rendering abscondance a matter for the trial court rather than an absolute bar to transitory protection.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 can grant protective bail to an accused person to enable them to approach the competent court of another province?
  • Does alleged abscondance or status as a fugitive operate as an absolute bar to the grant of protective or transitory bail when the accused surrenders before the High Court?
  • Whether the merits or demerits of the underlying criminal case under Section 497 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1898 are to be evaluated when considering a petition for protective bail?
  • Is the right of access to a competent court a fundamental right that warrants the grant of transitory protection to an accused?
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• Shahida Fazil vs Mst. Hina Tahir and 2 others2017 YLR 622 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-02-22Read full judgment →
• Shahid Chanzaib vs C.D.A. and others2017 YLR 411 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-08-30Read full judgment →
• Shafique Ahmed vs The State and others2017 P Cr. L J 376 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-12-09
  inherent jurisdictioncancellation reportexecutive orderjudicial proceedingsSection 561-A Cr.P.C.Magistrate's powers
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged an order of the Illaqa Judicial Magistrate (FIA) which had accorded concurrence to a police cancellation report submitted under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding an FIR registered under the Passports Act 1974. The core legal question was whether the High Court could exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to set aside an order passed by a Magistrate in an executive or administrative capacity, specifically when concurring with a police cancellation report. The Court held that the petition was not maintainable. Relying on established Supreme Court precedents, the Court reasoned that a Magistrate, when concurring with a police cancellation report, acts in an executive or administrative capacity rather than as a Court conducting judicial proceedings. Consequently, the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 561-A are inapplicable to such executive actions, as those powers are strictly reserved for judicial proceedings and orders of a Court. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order of a Magistrate concurring with a police cancellation report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 considered a judicial or an executive order?
  • Can the High Court exercise its inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 against an executive or administrative order passed by a Magistrate?
  • Does the definition of 'Court of Justice' under Section 20 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 apply to a Magistrate discharging administrative duties?
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• Shafique Ahmed Qureshi vs Walait Khan and others2017 MLD 612 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-10-25Read full judgment →
• Shafique Ahmed Khan etc vs Learned Rent Controller, Islamabad (West2017 PLJ Islamabad 348 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Shafique Ahmed Khan and others vs Rent Controller Islamabad (West)2017 PLJ Islamabad 348, 2017 CLC 360 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-11-07Read full judgment →
• Saw Ullah vs The State and others2017 PLD Islamabad 143 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-02-27Read full judgment →
• Saudi Pak Industrial & Agricultural Investment Company Limited vs The Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Cabinet Division & 3 othersK.L.R. 2017 Civil Cases 43 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Salman Shahid vs Federation of Pakistan through Interior Ministry and 42017 PLD Islamabad 218 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-03-31Read full judgment →
• Saleem Ullah Khan vs Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Interior2017 YLR 1224 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-05-06
  territorial jurisdictionrent restrictionurban areademarcation maphousing society
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition was filed before the Islamabad High Court to determine the territorial jurisdiction of the PWD Housing Society in terms of notification S.R.O. 83(KE)/2002 issued under the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001. Upon notices being issued, the Surveyor General of Pakistan submitted certified true copies and a demarcated map identifying the boundary pillars and reference points. The core legal question addressed was whether the PWD Housing Society falls within the urban area limits notified for the purpose of rent restriction laws in Islamabad. The Court held that, based on the demarcated map provided by the Surveyor General, the PWD Housing Society does not fall within the territorial limits of the notification. The Court laid down the principle that the determination of territorial jurisdiction for rent control matters must strictly adhere to the notified map references and boundary pillars established under the relevant statutory notifications, directing all Rent Controllers to verify pending cases accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Does the PWD Housing Society fall within the territorial limits of notification S.R.O. 83(KE)/2002 under the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001?
  • How is the territorial jurisdiction of urban areas determined for the purpose of rent restriction in Islamabad?
  • What is the legal effect of a demarcated map provided by the Surveyor General of Pakistan in resolving territorial disputes before Rent Controllers?
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• Sajjad Khan alias Shahzad Khan vs The State and others2017 P Cr. L J 1121 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-12-09
  criminal appealqatl-i-amdinjured witnesssifting grain from chafffalsus in uno falsus in omnibusappreciation of evidencelife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and life imprisonment sentence imposed upon the appellant for the murder of Kausar Mahmood and the attempted murder of Karam Ellahi. The core legal question concerns the reliability of the prosecution's evidence, specifically whether the conviction of one accused is sustainable when co-accused were acquitted, and whether the testimony of an injured witness remains credible despite alleged inconsistencies. The Court held that the conviction was sound, affirming that the testimony of the injured witness, which remained largely unchallenged during cross-examination, provided direct ocular evidence of the appellant's guilt. The Court rejected the appellant's argument that the acquittal of co-accused necessitated the acquittal of the appellant, emphasizing the principle of "sifting the grain from the chaff." It held that the maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus does not apply universally in the Pakistani criminal justice system. Furthermore, the Court established that failure to confront a witness with previous contradictory statements during cross-examination renders those statements ineffective for impeachment purposes, and unchallenged testimony constitutes an admission of facts.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquittal of co-accused automatically invalidate the conviction of a remaining accused if the evidence against them is distinct?
  • Is the maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus a universal rule in the Pakistani criminal justice system?
  • What is the legal effect of failing to confront a witness with their previous contradictory statements during cross-examination?
  • Can the testimony of an injured witness be considered sufficient to sustain a conviction without further corroboration?
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• Saifco Group through its Chief Executive and another vs Privatisation2017 IHC 161 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-05-29Read full judgment →
• Saifco Group through Chief Executive and another vs Privatisation2017 CLC 1493 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-06-20Read full judgment →
• Saif Ullah vs State, etc2017 PLJ Islamabad 318 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-02-27Read full judgment →
• (1) Saeed Ahmad and others (2) Kamran Nawaz and others (3) Syed2017 IHC 193 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-07-11
  unfair labour practicedisciplinary proceedingsshow-cause noticefake educational certificatesmisconductjudicial interferenceripeness doctrineservice rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves four consolidated writ petitions challenging orders of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) which dismissed the petitioners' complaints against the Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL). The petitioners, employees of OGDCL, sought to restrain the company from taking disciplinary action following the discovery that they had submitted bogus educational certificates. The core legal question was whether the initiation of disciplinary proceedings, specifically the issuance of show-cause notices for submitting fake credentials, constitutes an "unfair labour practice" under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, and whether such proceedings are ripe for judicial intervention. The Court held that the initiation of disciplinary proceedings for misconduct is a lawful management right and does not constitute an unfair labour practice. The Court affirmed that the mere issuance of a show-cause notice does not provide a cause of action for NIRC intervention, as disciplinary processes must be allowed to reach finality. Furthermore, the Court established that submitting fake educational testimonials, even if not strictly required for the specific post, constitutes serious misconduct, and the employer is entitled to verify credentials and initiate disciplinary action accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Does the issuance of a show-cause notice for alleged misconduct constitute an unfair labour practice under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  • Is a writ petition maintainable against a show-cause notice before the conclusion of disciplinary proceedings?
  • Does the submission of a fake educational certificate constitute misconduct if the qualification was not a prerequisite for the employment position?
  • Can an employer initiate disciplinary proceedings for the verification of educational credentials without it being classified as an unfair labour practice?
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• Sabir Khan and 4 others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary2017 PLJ Islamabad 144 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• S.A. Brother (Pvt.) Limited vs Askari Bank Limited and another2017 KLR Civil Cases 155 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-01-09Read full judgment →
• Roger Lee vs Ch. Muhammad Salman and others2017 YLR 681 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-10-24Read full judgment →
• Razi vs Oil and Gas Development Company Ltd. and othersK.L.R. 2017 Labour & Service Cases 80, 2017 PLC 226 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-11-23
  service recordsdate of birth correctionsuperannuationestoppelindustrial relationswrit jurisdictionbelated claim
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged an order of the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) which had reversed a decision allowing the petitioner to correct his date of birth in his service records from 1956 to 1966. The petitioner, having served for over twenty years, sought this change shortly before his superannuation. The core legal question was whether an employee can alter their date of birth recorded at the time of induction into service after a significant lapse of time. The Court held that the date of birth declared at the time of entry into service is final and cannot be amended at a subsequent stage, particularly when the request is made belatedly near retirement. The Court emphasized that such attempts are often mala fide and operate as an estoppel against the employee. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that stale and belated applications for the alteration of birth dates cannot be entertained in the interest of service discipline and finality of records.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee seek the correction of their date of birth in service records after a significant lapse of time?
  • Is the date of birth declared at the time of induction into service considered final for the purpose of superannuation?
  • Does the doctrine of estoppel apply to a civil servant seeking to change their date of birth near the age of retirement?
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• Rasool Bakhsh vs The State2017 P Cr. L J 1351 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-02-14
  circumstantial evidencecapital punishmentbenefit of doubtrecovery from open placecriminal appealmurder referenceappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and capital punishment awarded to the appellant for offences under sections 302, 460, 392, and 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution's case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, including the recovery of a weapon and travel records, as there were no eyewitnesses to the double murder. The core legal question was whether the chain of circumstantial evidence was unbroken and sufficient to establish the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of circumstances linking the appellant to the crime. It ruled that recovery of a weapon from an open, accessible place is unreliable, and mere coincidence of travel with a co-accused does not prove participation. The Court emphasized that in cases of circumstantial evidence, the chain must be unbroken, and any missing link entitles the accused to an acquittal. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction, acquitted the appellant, and answered the murder reference in the negative, reiterating that the benefit of doubt is a right, not a grace.

  Questions settled

  • Is a recovery of a weapon from an open place accessible to the general public sufficient to corroborate circumstantial evidence?
  • Can an accused be convicted on circumstantial evidence if the chain of circumstances is not unbroken?
  • Does the mere coincidence of travelling on the same flight as a principal accused constitute sufficient evidence of participation in a crime?
  • Is the benefit of doubt a matter of grace or a matter of right for an accused in a criminal trial?
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• Rashid Mukhtar vs The State and others2017 YLR 1925 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-05-23
  criminal appealbenefit of doubttwo versions casemedical evidenceinterested witnessesmotiveweapon recoverymurderacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Trial Court whereby the appellant was convicted and sentenced for murder and attempt to murder under sections 302(b) and 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions involved the appreciation of conflicting ocular and medical evidence in a two-version case, the proof of motive, the reliability of weapon recovery, and the benefit of doubt. The Islamabad High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the motive through independent evidence, the recovery of the alleged weapon was doubtful, and the medical testimony did not rule out the defence version that the minor deceased sustained fatal injuries from an accidental fall during a scuffle. Setting aside the conviction, the court laid down the principle that where two interpretations of evidence exist or a reasonable possibility of the defence plea's truthfulness emerges, the benefit of doubt must be extended to the accused, leading to an acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the prosecution is bound to prove the alleged motive through independent corroborative evidence?
  • Does a contradiction between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the cause of injury entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt?
  • How should a court evaluate a case involving two competing versions and a plausible defence plea?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the recovery of the crime weapon is shrouded in doubt and lacks independent corroboration?
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• Raja Sajjad Hussain vs The State and another2017 P Cr. L J 1513 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-05-15
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationmaintainabilitycriminal revisionbreach of compromiseSection 489-F PPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition sought pre-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner had previously been granted pre-arrest bail by the Sessions Court based on a compromise, which was subsequently cancelled by the same court due to the petitioner's breach of the compromise terms. The petitioner then filed a fresh application for bail before arrest directly in the High Court. The core legal question was whether a fresh petition for bail before arrest is maintainable in the High Court after the Sessions Court has cancelled a previously granted pre-arrest bail. The High Court held that such a petition is not maintainable. Relying on the principle established in Muhammad Malik Pervaiz v. The State, the Court ruled that where pre-arrest bail is cancelled by the Sessions Court, the appropriate remedy is to file a criminal revision against that order, not a fresh bail application. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioner failed to demonstrate the necessary mala fide or ulterior motives required for the grant of pre-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Is a fresh petition for bail before arrest maintainable in the High Court after the Sessions Court has cancelled a previously granted pre-arrest bail?
  • What is the appropriate legal remedy when a Sessions Court cancels a previously granted pre-arrest bail?
  • Is proof of mala fide or ulterior motives a prerequisite for the grant of bail before arrest?
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• Raja Khurram Ali Khan vs Mst. Tayyaba Bibi through father and another2017 P Cr. L J 1469 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-05-23
  revisional jurisdictionmaintainabilityHigh Court original jurisdictioninferior criminal courtJudge-in-Chamberscompounding of offencesSection 439 CrPCSection 435 CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was filed before the Division Bench of the Islamabad High Court against an order passed by a Judge-in-Chambers in a case transferred to the High Court under Section 526, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for trial under its original jurisdiction. The petitioner sought acquittal on the basis of a compromise under Section 345, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which was dismissed by the Single Judge. The primary legal question before the Division Bench was whether a revision petition under Section 439, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 lies before a Division Bench against an order passed by a Single Judge of the same High Court exercising original criminal jurisdiction. Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the Division Bench held that a Single Judge exercising original criminal jurisdiction is not an inferior criminal court within the meaning of Section 435, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, nor can its record be called for under Section 439. Consequently, a Division Bench has no revisional jurisdiction over orders passed by a Judge of the same High Court. The revision petition was accordingly dismissed as non-maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Single Judge of a High Court exercising original criminal jurisdiction an inferior criminal court under Section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a Division Bench of a High Court entertain a criminal revision petition under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 against an order passed by a Single Judge of the same High Court?
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• Raja Imran Akhtar vs National Highway Authority and others2017 IHC 207 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-07-07Read full judgment →
• Raja Asif Khan vs Masood Ahmad Bhatti, etc.PLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 419 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-02-25
  Illegal Dispossession Actmens realand grabbingcivil disputecriminal appealproperty demarcationpossessionacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court under Section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, regarding an alleged illegal occupation of a plot. The core legal question was whether the appellant’s construction on the disputed property constituted the criminal offence of illegal dispossession under the Act, or if the matter was essentially a civil dispute regarding plot demarcation. The High Court held that the conviction was unsustainable. It determined that the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, is intended to curb forcible dispossession by land grabbers and does not apply to civil disputes involving competing claims or administrative errors in plot earmarking. The court emphasized that the prosecution failed to establish the requisite mens rea (criminal intent) or the essential ingredients of the offence, noting that the appellant acted under a perceived lawful authority granted by the Capital Development Authority. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction, acquitted the appellant, and clarified that such disputes regarding property location and possession must be resolved through appropriate civil or revenue forums.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 apply to civil disputes concerning property demarcation between private parties?
  • Is proof of mens rea a mandatory requirement for a conviction under Section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005?
  • Can a conviction under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 be sustained when the alleged offender acted under a belief of lawful authority granted by a municipal body?
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• Professor Dr. Shah Junaid Ahmad Hashmi and 2 others vs Registrar2017 PLJ Islamabad 370, 2017 YLR 1191 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-11-09Read full judgment →
• Park View Enclave (Private) Limited vs Capital Development Authority and others2017 IHC 269 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-12-21Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited vs Religious Affairs and others2017 PLD Islamabad 135 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-03-13Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited vs Administrator General Zakat, Ministry of Religious Affairs, etc2017 IHC 11 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-02-28Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited vs Muhammad Dilpazeer2017 PLJ Islamabad 153 · Islamabad High Court
  Voluntary Separation SchemeNational Industrial Relations CommissionWorkman statusGrievance petitionLimitation periodStatutory terms of servicePensionary benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions filed by the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited challenging orders passed by the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) regarding pensionary benefits claimed by former employees under a Voluntary Separation Scheme. The court addressed whether former employees who voluntarily separated are 'workmen' entitled to invoke NIRC jurisdiction, whether the grievance petitions were barred by limitation, and whether the Industrial & Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 applies to employees with statutory terms of service. The High Court allowed the petitions, setting aside the NIRC orders. It held that the respondents, having voluntarily separated, did not qualify as 'workmen' under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, as their departure was not linked to an industrial dispute. Furthermore, the court ruled that the mandatory grievance procedure under Section 33 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 must be strictly followed, and that the Industrial & Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 is inapplicable to employees whose terms of service are statutory, as they are governed by specific legislative protections.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee who voluntarily separates from service under a scheme qualifies as a 'workman' to invoke the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Relations Commission?
  • Does the Industrial & Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 apply to employees whose terms of service are statutory?
  • Is a grievance petition maintainable under Section 33 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 without the service of a mandatory grievance notice?
  • Can the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Relations Commission be invoked for the enforcement of rights where the separation from service was not a result of an industrial dispute?
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• Pakistan Mobile Communications Ltd., Islamabad vs - And Warid2017 PLJ Islamabad 316 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-12-15Read full judgment →
• Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (Piac) vs Federation of Pakistan, etc2017 PLJ Islamabad 101 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (Piac) vs Federation of Pakistan and others2017 PLJ Islamabad 101, 2017 PLC (C.S.) 602 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-11-18
  Wafaqi Mohtasibjurisdictionpublic sector appointmentexecutive functionmal-administrationconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC) challenging an order passed by the President of Pakistan on a representation under the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983. The core legal question was whether the Wafaqi Mohtasib and subsequently the President had the jurisdiction to entertain a complaint and issue directions regarding matters of appointment and recruitment in a public sector corporation where no allegation of maladministration was established. The Islamabad High Court held that appointments and recruitments in public sector entities are executive functions falling outside the jurisdiction and domain of the Wafaqi Mohtasib under Article 9 of the Ombudsman Order, and consequently, neither the Mohtasib nor the President possessed the authority to entertain such complaints or issue directions for the accommodation of candidates. The petition was allowed, and the impugned order was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether matters of appointment and recruitment in a public sector company fall within the jurisdiction of the Wafaqi Mohtasib under Article 9 of the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983?
  • Does the President have the authority on a representation under Article 32 of the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983, to issue directions for appointment when the Mohtasib lacked initial jurisdiction?
  • Whether an unselected candidate on a waiting list has a vested right to appointment after the completion of an induction process and commencement of training?
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• Pak. U.K. Association (Pvt.) Ltd vs The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan2017 CLC 599 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-09-15
  Arbitration agreementCondition precedentEngineer's decisionSection 20 Arbitration ActOrder VII Rule 11 CPCFIDIC contractAllegation of biasPremature application
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, filed by the applicant seeking to file an arbitration agreement in court and refer contractual disputes to arbitration, alongside the respondent's application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (C.P.C.) seeking dismissal of the Section 20 application as premature. The core legal question was whether a party can bypass a mandatory contractual condition precedent requiring initial reference of disputes to the Engineer (Clause 67.1) prior to initiating arbitration, solely on unsubstantiated allegations of bias and misconduct against the Engineer. The Islamabad High Court allowed the respondent's Order VII, Rule 11 C.P.C. application and dismissed the applicant's Section 20 application as premature. The Court held that contractual dispute resolution mechanisms and preconditions are binding and conferral of arbitral jurisdiction must strictly align with the contract. Bare, vague, and unsubstantiated allegations of bias do not relieve a party from its contractual obligation to refer disputes to the designated Engineer.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party file an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 without fulfilling a mandatory contractual condition precedent requiring prior reference of disputes to an Engineer?
  • Can unsubstantiated and bald allegations of bias against an agreed-upon Engineer relieve a contracting party from the contractual obligation to submit disputes for the Engineer's decision prior to arbitration?
  • Does an Engineer's prior adverse opinion or expression of views regarding a contractor's performance disqualify them from adjudicating contractual disputes under a standard dispute resolution clause?
  • Is an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of the C.P.C. if filed prematurely without exhausting agreed pre-arbitration dispute resolution mechanisms?
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• PAEC Foundation Housing Scheme and others vs Sharfulislam Khan2017 PLJ Islamabad 242, 2017 MLD 1023 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-02-28Read full judgment →
• PAEC Foundation Housing Scheme and others vs Sharf-Ul-Islam Khan2017 PLJ Islamabad 242 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-02-28Read full judgment →
• Open International University for Complimentary Medicine, Sari Lanka2017 CLC 1215, 2017 PLJ Islamabad 358 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-01-31Read full judgment →
• Oil and Gas Development Company Ltd. vs Sacked Employees Review2017 PLJ Islamabad 36 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Oil and Gas Development Company Ltd vs Federal Board of Revenue and 2PTCL 2017 CL. 51 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• N/A vs Federation of Pakistan and others2017 CLC 575, 2017 CLC 878 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-08-30
  statutory tenurepremature removalNational Council for Homeopathylocus poenitentiaegeneral clauses actnatural justiceintra-court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This intra-court appeal addresses the legality of a notification issued by the Federal Government superseding an earlier notification that had nominated the appellants as members of the National Council for Homeopathy (NCH) for a statutory tenure of five years. The core legal question is whether the Federal Government can prematurely curtail the fixed statutory tenure of members appointed under the Unani Ayurvedic and Homeopathic Practitioners Act, 1965, by invoking Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, without resorting to the specific removal procedure under Section 13 of the Act. The Islamabad High Court held that once a member is appointed to a tenure post under a special statute, their term cannot be prematurely curtailed or replaced except for justifiable reasons through the specific statutory mechanism provided for removal and after observing natural justice. The court established that general powers of withdrawal under the General Clauses Act cannot override specific tenure protections under special legislation, and that a notification takes legal effect upon issuance unless the statute expressly conditions it on oath-taking or gazette publication as a condition precedent.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Federal Government prematurely curtail the fixed statutory tenure of a member appointed to a statutory body without resorting to the specific removal procedure prescribed in the governing statute?
  • Does Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 permit the withdrawal or supersession of a notification appointing a person to a tenure post governed by a special law?
  • Whether the assumption of office or validity of a statutory nomination can be made conditional upon taking an oath of office when neither the parent statute nor the rules prescribe such a condition?
  • Does the failure to record reasons for issuing a superseding notification violate Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897?
  Read full judgment →
• Rana Imran Latif vs StatePLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 966 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-06-30
  defamationmens reaactus reuscriminal appealreputationstrict liabilityfreedom of press
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a conviction under Section 501 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for printing defamatory material. The core legal question addressed is whether the prosecution successfully established the essential ingredients of defamation, specifically the requisite mens rea and the actual lowering of the complainant's reputation in the estimation of others. The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction, holding that the prosecution failed to prove that the appellant acted with the necessary intention or knowledge to harm the complainant's reputation. The court established the principle that defamation is not a crime of strict liability; therefore, the prosecution must prove both the actus reus and the mens rea for each offense. Under Section 499 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, an imputation is only defamatory if it is made with the intent to harm or knowledge that it will harm a person's reputation, and it must lower the moral or intellectual character of that person in the estimation of others.

  Questions settled

  • Is the offence of defamation under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 a crime of strict liability?
  • What are the essential ingredients of mens rea required to sustain a conviction for defamation under Section 499 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the publication of material constitute defamation if it fails to lower the moral or intellectual character of a person in the estimation of others?
  • Must the prosecution prove that the accused had the intention or knowledge that the published material would harm the reputation of the complainant to secure a conviction under Section 501 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Ejaz Chaudhry and others vs Maheen Zafar and others2017 P Cr. L J 1407 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-03-24
  transfer of criminal casereasonable apprehension of biasfair trialjudicial impartialitylocus standiinterested partysubordinate judiciary
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a transfer application regarding a criminal case involving the alleged torture of a minor child by the accused, Maheen Zafar and Raja Khurram Ali Khan. The core legal question was whether the trial, currently pending before a Judicial Magistrate in Islamabad, should be transferred to the Islamabad High Court to ensure a fair and impartial trial, given that one of the accused is a serving Additional District and Sessions Judge in the same jurisdiction. The Court held that the transfer was necessary, emphasizing the principle that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done. It reasoned that the subordinate relationship between the presiding Magistrate and the accused judge created a reasonable apprehension of bias, making a fair trial unlikely in the lower court. The key principle laid down is that under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, a case may be transferred when circumstances, such as a professional connection between the accused and the presiding judge, create a reasonable apprehension that a fair and impartial trial cannot be conducted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal case be transferred from a subordinate court to the High Court if the accused is a serving judge within that same jurisdiction?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to transfer a criminal case on its own initiative under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Are human rights activists considered an 'interested party' with locus standi to file a transfer application under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is it necessary to prove actual bias of a magistrate to justify the transfer of a criminal case?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Ejaz Chaudhry & others vs Maheen Zafar & others2017 P Cr. L J 1407, 2017 IHC 22 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-03-24
  transfer of criminal casefair trialreasonable apprehension of biaslocus standiinterested partysubordinate courtconstitutional due process
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses transfer proceedings and an application regarding whether a criminal trial involving allegations of torture against a minor domestic worker should be transferred from the court of a Judicial Magistrate to the Islamabad High Court. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of a transfer application by human rights activists and whether a fair trial could be conducted before a magistrate who is administratively subordinate to one of the co-accused, a serving Additional District and Sessions Judge. Holding that third-party human rights activists lack locus standi as an 'interested party' under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the court nevertheless exercised its suo motu power on reference from the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The court held that because the trial magistrate is subordinate to the accused judge, a reasonable apprehension of bias arises, making a transfer expedient for the ends of justice and ensuring a fair trial under the Constitution. The case was consequently withdrawn and ordered to be tried directly by the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether human rights activists or third parties who are not complainants or victims qualify as an interested party with locus standi to file a transfer application under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a criminal case be transferred from a subordinate court to the High Court when one of the accused is a serving judicial officer and the trial magistrate is subordinate to him?
  • Whether actual bias of a magistrate must be proved to justify the transfer of a criminal trial, or if the reasonable apprehension of bias or connection to a party is sufficient?
  • Does the transfer of a criminal trial to the High Court result in the accused losing their right of appeal under the law?
  Read full judgment →
• Noman Ahmed and others vs Mst. Sobia Farooq and others2017 PLJ Islamabad 418 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-11-21Read full judgment →
• Nomad Art Gallery Centre vs Capital Development Authority through itsK.L.R. 2017 Civil Cases 183 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Nomad Art Gallery Center vs Capital Development Authority through Chairman2017 CLC 941 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-01-10Read full judgment →
• Nazeer-Ud-Din vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Passport2017 PLJ Islamabad 182 · Islamabad High Court
  promotionpending criminal casefitness for promotionconstitutional jurisdictionservice tribunal jurisdictionprevention of corruptioncivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by the petitioner seeking a direction to the respondents to consider him for promotion to the post of Assistant (BPS-14) from the date of creation of the vacancy. The respondents had withheld consideration for promotion solely due to the pendency of a criminal case and an FIR registered under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The core legal question was whether a civil servant could be denied consideration for promotion merely on the ground that a criminal case or trial is pending against him, and whether the High Court has jurisdiction under Article 199 in matters involving fitness for promotion. The court held that the mere pendency of a criminal case or trial does not constitute a valid ground for denying a civil servant consideration for promotion, as everyone is presumed innocent until proven guilty and promotion consideration is a legal right. Furthermore, the court held that since the Service Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to determine fitness for promotion under Section 4 of the Federal Service Tribunal Act, 1973, the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 is not ousted by Article 212 of the Constitution. The petition was accordingly allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant be denied consideration for promotion merely on account of the pendency of a criminal case against him?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to entertain appeals regarding the fitness or otherwise of a person to be promoted to a higher grade?
  • Is the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 ousted in matters relating to the determination of fitness of a civil servant for promotion?
  • Does the pendency of a criminal trial strip a civil servant of their right to be considered for promotion in accordance with law?
  Read full judgment →
• National Testing Service Pakistan through Company Secretary vs Assistant Commissioner I.R., Unit-I, Zone-I and 5 others2017 PTD 873 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-01-23Read full judgment →
• National Highway Authority vs M/s. China Petroleum Engineering2017 PLJ Islamabad 400 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• National Highway Authority vs Messrs China Petroleum Engineering2017 PLD Islamabad 1 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-04-22Read full judgment →
• National Highway Authority vs Lilley International (Pvt.) Ltd. and another2017 [M] C.L.R. 590 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-03-02Read full judgment →
• National Highway Authority vs Lilley International (Pvt.) Ltd and another2017 PLJ Islamabad 425 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• National Highway Authority and others vs Lilley International (Pvt.)2017 PLJ Islamabad 339, 2017 PLJ Islamabad 425, 2017 CLC 952 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-03-02Read full judgment →
• Rana Imran Latif vs The State2017 LHC 481, PLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 966, 2017 PLD Islamabad 370 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-06-30
  defamationmens reaactus reuscriminal appealfreedom of pressstrict liabilityburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant, a newspaper editor, under Section 501 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for printing defamatory material. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established the essential ingredients of defamation, specifically the actus reus (the defamatory act) and the mens rea (the guilty mind/intent to harm). The Islamabad High Court held that the conviction was unsustainable because the prosecution failed to produce evidence demonstrating that the appellant acted with the requisite intention, knowledge, or reason to believe that the published material would harm the complainant's reputation. Furthermore, the court noted a lack of evidence proving that the imputation actually lowered the complainant's moral or intellectual character in the estimation of others. Emphasizing the principle of actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, the court ruled that defamation is not a strict liability offense and requires proof of both a guilty act and a guilty mind. Consequently, the court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant of all charges.

  Questions settled

  • Is the offence of defamation under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 a crime of strict liability?
  • What are the essential ingredients required to prove the offence of defamation under Section 499 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the publication of material regarding a person's professional conduct automatically constitute defamation if it does not lower their character in the estimation of others?
  • Must the prosecution prove mens rea for a conviction under Section 501 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Najam Sethi vs Dr. Faqir Hussain and another2017 CLC 311 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-01-19Read full judgment →
• Nadeem Raza Abbasi vs Sardar Abu Bakar & 2 others2017 PLJ Islamabad 106 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-03-01Read full judgment →
• M/s. Telenor Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd vs Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue & 32017 P.C.T.L.R. 226 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• M/s. Oil & Gas Development Company Limited vs M/s. Excel Techno2017 [M] C.L.R. 368 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• M/s. Mia Corporation (Pvt.) Limited vs Pakistan PWD and others2017 C.L.R. 1 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-09-30Read full judgment →
• M/s. Dewan Petroleum (Pvt.) Limited vs Executive Director, SECP and2017 P.C.T.L.R. 599 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• M/s. Catalyst Communications Pvt. Ltd vs M/s. National2017 C.L.R. 31 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• M/s Oil & Gas Development Company Limited vs M/s Excel Techno2017 IHC · Islamabad High Court · 2017-01-27Read full judgment →
• Muwammad Majid vs Secretary, Ministry of Manpower and Overseas2017 PLD Islamabad 19 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-04-26Read full judgment →
• Murad Ameer Shah vs Samar- Pervaiz and 3 others2017 P Cr. L J 1319 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-03-30
  Section 540 Cr.P.C.summoning of witnessfair trialjust decisionmaterial witnessrevision petitionacid attack
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition challenged the order of the Sessions Judge, Islamabad, which dismissed an application under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking to summon the complainant’s wife as a witness in an acid attack case. The core legal question was whether the trial court correctly exercised its discretion in refusing to summon a witness not listed in the initial challan. The High Court held that the trial court’s order was legally flawed as it failed to apply a judicial mind to the essentiality of the evidence for a just decision. The Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the application for reconsideration. The key principle laid down is that the power under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is wide and may be exercised at any stage of the proceedings. A court is obligated to summon a witness if their evidence is essential for a just decision, regardless of whether the witness was mentioned in the challan or if the application is filed at a late stage.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court summon a witness under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if that person was not included in the initial challan or calendar of witnesses?
  • Is the power of a court to summon a witness under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 limited by the stage of the trial?
  • Does a trial court have the jurisdiction to dismiss an application under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without considering whether the evidence is essential for a just decision?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaqub Brohi vs Ministry of Housing and Works through Secretary and 2 others2017 PLJ Islamabad 139, 2017 CLC 369 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-10-05Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaqub Brohi vs Ministry of Housing and Works and others2017 C.L.R. 84 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-10-05Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaqub Brohi vs Ministry of Housing & Works, Government2017 PLJ Islamabad 139 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-10-05Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Waqas Malik, Advocate High Court vs Islamabad Bar Council2017 [M] C.L.R. 383 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Sohail Kiyani and others vs Raja Muhammad Anwar and others2017 IHC 40 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-02-08Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shahid Fahim vs Abdullah Tayyab and 2 others2017 PLJ Islamabad 59 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-02-29Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saliheen Moghal through Attorney vs Swadeka Kader and 32017 CLC 208 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-08-05Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saeedullah vs Jamia Masjid Madni2017 IHC · Islamabad High Court · 2017-01-11Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz vs Shahida Perveen and otherK.L.R. 2017 Civil Cases 362 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-08-16Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz vs Shahida Perveen & others2017 IHC 186 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-07-28Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz vs Principle Secretary to Prime Minister of Pakistan and 11 others2017 PLD Islamabad 207 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-06-20Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Masroor-Ul-Haq vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, M_o Overseas Pakistan and HRD Islamabad and others2017 PLC (C.S.) 1365 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-12-13
  deputationrepatriationwedlock policyvested rightpromotion quotaconstitutional petitionworkers welfare fund
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an Assistant Director (BS-17) originally employed by the Sindh Workers Welfare Board (S-WWB), challenged an Office Order repatriating him from his deputation post at the Workers Welfare Fund (WWF) to his parent department. The petitioner argued that his movement to the WWF constituted a transfer rather than a deputation, that he had a legitimate expectation of absorption, and that his repatriation violated the government's wedlock policy. The core legal questions involved whether a deputationist holds a vested right to complete a deputation period, whether deputationists may occupy posts reserved for promotion, and whether the wedlock policy overrides the power of the competent authority to repatriate a deputationist. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that a deputationist has no vested right or entitlement to remain on deputation indefinitely, that the competent authority possesses the sole discretion to repatriate a deputationist at any time without assigning reasons, that deputationists cannot occupy posts reserved for local promotion quotas, and that the wedlock policy does not legally bar repatriation.

  Questions settled

  • Does a deputationist have a vested right to complete their tenure or remain on deputation in a borrowing department?
  • Can a competent authority repatriate a deputationist to their parent department at any time without assigning reasons?
  • Does the government's wedlock policy create an enforceable right preventing the repatriation of a deputationist?
  • May a deputationist lawfully hold a post reserved for the promotion quota of the borrowing department?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Majid vs Secretary, Ministry of Man Power & Overseas2017 PLD Islamabad 19, K.L.R. 2017 Civil Cases 49 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-04-26Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal Azhar Qureshi vs Ms. Shaista Khan Kundi and others2017 IHC 210 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-08-22Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ibrar Khan and another vs Deputy Commissioner and another2017 CLC 635 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-10-25Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain vs Estate Office & others2017 IHC · Islamabad High Court · 2017-02-27
  civil revisionallotment of government accommodationAccommodation Allocation Rulesrejection of plaintEstate OfficeCapital Development Authorityunauthorized occupant
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition, filed by a Capital Development Authority (CDA) employee, challenged the concurrent judgments of the lower courts rejecting his plaint under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. The petitioner sought to retain and obtain the allotment of government accommodation previously allotted to his retired mother, relying on Rule 15(2) of the Accommodation Allocation Rules, 2002 (AAR, 2002) and a Ministry of Housing and Works notification purporting to condone the time period for transfer. The core legal question was whether a CDA employee can claim allotment from the Estate Office pool and whether the Federal Government can relax statutory time limits under Rule 28 of the AAR, 2002. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition, holding that CDA employees are non-entitled for accommodation from the Estate Office pool under Rule 4(1), and that the Federal Government cannot alter substantive statutory time periods through executive directions under Rule 28. The court laid down the principle that executive notifications cannot amend or override statutory rules framed under the Civil Servants Act, 1973, and that unauthorized occupants become trespassers liable to eviction and penal consequences.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee of the Capital Development Authority is eligible for the allotment of government accommodation from the pool of the Estate Office?
  • Can the Federal Government condone or alter the time periods stipulated in Rule 15 of the Accommodation Allocation Rules, 2002, by issuing directions under Rule 28?
  • Does a family member of a retired government servant become a trespasser upon the expiry of the permissible retention period under the Accommodation Allocation Rules, 2002?
  • Is the placement of Estate Office accommodation into the pool of another department permissible under Rule 4(1) of the Accommodation Allocation Rules, 2002?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam Hayat vs Government of Pakistan and others2017 PLC (C.S.) 260 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-07-21
  civil servantdisciplinary proceedingsconstitutional petitionservice tribunaljurisdictionterms and conditions of serviceArticle 212 bar
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a civil servant, filed a constitutional petition seeking to challenge ongoing disciplinary inquiry proceedings, alleging violations of his right to a fair trial and procedural irregularities under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973. The core legal question was whether the High Court possesses jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan to entertain such a petition, given the exclusionary bar contained in Article 212 of the Constitution regarding matters pertaining to the terms and conditions of service. The Court held that the petition was not maintainable. It affirmed that disciplinary matters, including challenges to inquiry proceedings, fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal established under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The Court laid down the principle that a civil servant cannot bypass the Service Tribunal by invoking constitutional jurisdiction, even when alleging violations of fundamental rights or procedural impropriety, as Article 212 ousts the jurisdiction of the High Court in all matters relating to the terms and conditions of service.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to interfere in disciplinary inquiry proceedings against a civil servant?
  • Can a civil servant bypass the Service Tribunal by alleging a violation of fundamental rights in disciplinary matters?
  • Does the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution apply to disciplinary proceedings conducted under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amjad vs Federation of Pakistan2017 P Cr. L J 1266 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-03-29
  Exit Control Listfreedom of movementfundamental rightsacquittalconstitutional petitiontravel restrictioncriminal trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns constitutional petitions filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, seeking the removal of the petitioners' names from the Exit Control List (ECL) maintained by the Ministry of Interior. The core legal questions involved whether the refusal to remove the petitioners from the ECL—following their acquittal in a criminal case—violated their fundamental rights to liberty and freedom of movement, and whether such restrictions were backed by lawful justification under the Exit from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981 and the Exit from Pakistan (Control) Rules, 2010. The Islamabad High Court allowed the petitions and directed the removal of the petitioners' names from the ECL. The court held that the fundamental right of freedom of movement guaranteed under Article 15 of the Constitution cannot be abridged arbitrarily or on extraneous grounds, and that mere registration of an FIR or subsequent pending appeals against an acquittal do not constitute valid legal grounds under Rule 2 of the Exit from Pakistan (Control) Rules, 2010 to restrict travel.

  Questions settled

  • Does the registration of an FIR justify placing an accused person's name on the Exit Control List?
  • Can the federal government restrict the fundamental right of freedom of movement without satisfying the grounds enumerated in Rule 2 of the Exit from Pakistan (Control) Rules, 2010?
  • Does the acquittal of an accused person by a competent court entitle them to the immediate removal of their name from the Exit Control List?
  • Are pending appeals against an acquittal considered a valid legal justification for retaining a citizen's name on the Exit Control List?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akbar Chohan vs Rent Controller, Islamabad and others2017 MLD 53 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-06-29Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akbar Chohan vs Rent Controller Islamabad, etc.2017 MLD 53, 2017 PLJ Islamabad 23 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-06-29Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akbar Chohan vs Rent Controller Islamabad, etc2017 C.L.R. 107 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-06-29Read full judgment →
• Mubashir Luqman etc vs State & Another2017 YLR 2096, 2017 IHC 96 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-04-17
  quashing of proceedingsnon-cognizable offencespolice investigationpermission of magistratemiscarriage of justicecriminal procedurecognizance of offence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition seeking to set aside an order and quash trial proceedings pending before an Additional Sessions Judge under sections 501, 504, and 505(ii) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following the lodging of an FIR regarding an offensive banner. The core legal question was whether police investigation and subsequent trial proceedings for non-cognizable offences are vitiated when initiated without the prior permission of a Magistrate under Section 155(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, where a cognizable offence initially alleged is found inapplicable. The Islamabad High Court held that while police officers are generally not competent to investigate non-cognizable offences without a Magistrate's permission, an investigation conducted without such permission or through a bona fide error does not automatically vitiate the trial or render the court's cognizance bad in law unless it has caused serious prejudice to the accused resulting in a miscarriage of justice. The petition was accordingly dismissed, with the observation that the petitioners could approach the trial court if they considered the material insufficient.

  Questions settled

  • Does the investigation of a non-cognizable offence by the police without the prior permission of a Magistrate under Section 155(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically vitiate the trial?
  • Whether cognizance taken by a competent court on a police report involving a non-cognizable offence is bad in law in the absence of a preliminary magisterial order?
  • Does an illegality committed during a police investigation result in setting aside the subsequent trial in the absence of a grave miscarriage of justice or serious prejudice to the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Mubashir Luqman and other vs State and another2017 YLR 2096 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-04-17
  quashing of proceedingsnon-cognizable offencepolice investigationpermission of magistratemiscarriage of justicedefamationcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought the setting aside of an order and the quashing of trial proceedings pending before the Additional Sessions Judge under sections 501/504/505(ii) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, arising from an FIR concerning a banner containing allegedly defamatory statements. The core legal question was whether the investigation and subsequent trial of non-cognizable offences by the police without obtaining prior permission of a Magistrate under Section 155(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiates the trial and renders the proceedings without lawful authority, notwithstanding that a cognizable offence was initially included in the FIR. The court held that while police officers are generally not competent to investigate non-cognizable offences without a Magistrate's permission, an illegality or irregularity committed in the course of investigation does not vitiate the trial or invalidate the court's jurisdiction unless it has caused serious prejudice to the accused resulting in a miscarriage of justice. The petition was accordingly dismissed, leaving the petitioners at liberty to seek appropriate relief before the trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the investigation of a non-cognizable offence by the police without the prior permission of a Magistrate under Section 155(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically vitiate the trial?
  • Whether an illegality committed during the course of police investigation affects the competence and jurisdiction of the trial court to take cognizance?
  • Can proceedings be quashed on the ground of defective investigation in the absence of a serious prejudice or miscarriage of justice caused to the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shamim Akhtar vs Pirzada Khalil-Ur-Rehman and 2 Others2017 NLR Revenue 8 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-11Read full judgment →
• Mst. Safa Arshad vs Additional Sessions Judge (East), Islamabad and others2017 CLC 681 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-11-07Read full judgment →
• Ms Shagufta Hashmat, etc. vs Federation of Pakistan, through Secretary2017 IHC 241 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-11-01
  regularization of servicescontract employeesdaily wage employeescivil servantsAPT Rules 1973legitimate expectancytransparent recruitmentfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated petition involves various contract, daily wage, and contingent staff, predominantly teaching personnel in public schools or colleges, seeking regularization of their services against permanent posts. The core legal questions relate to the validity of competing regularization policies of the Federal Government, the binding nature of the Civil Servants Act 1973 and the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules 1973, and whether non-transparent appointments can confer a vested right to regularization. The Islamabad High Court held that appointments to public posts must strictly adhere to statutory mechanisms and principles of competitive transparency, and that executive policies cannot override primary or delegated legislation. The court declared that the first regularization policy (2008) and the new policy (2017) were valid, while an intervening committee policy approved only by the Prime Minister without Cabinet approval was void. The court laid down the key principle that public employment is a sacred trust requiring transparent recruitment on merit, and that illegal or non-transparent appointments cannot be regularized in violation of fundamental rights and statutory rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an executive policy of the Federal Government can override or bypass the provisions of the Civil Servants Act 1973 and the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules 1973?
  • Does an appointment made in a non-transparent manner without advertising the post create a legal right or legitimate expectancy to regularization?
  • Whether a regularization policy approved solely by the Prime Minister without the approval of the Federal Cabinet carries lawful authority?
  • Are appointments made to public posts in violation of prescribed statutory rules void ab-initio?
  Read full judgment →
• Ms Naheed Khan. vs Election Commission of Pakistan, etc.2017 IHC · Islamabad High Court · 2017-02-06Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Nusrat Kausar Gillani vs Aftab Ahmed Khan and another2017 IHC 165 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-02-24Read full judgment →