Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 4,389 judgments in total from the Islamabad High Court.

• Mrs. Asma Alamgir vs Federation of Pakistan and others2017 IHC 88 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-04-10Read full judgment →
• Mrs Asma Alamgir vs Federation of Pakistan and others2017 IHC 88, 2017 YLR 1626 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-04-10
  transitory bailprotective bailanticipatory bailsurrender to courtNational Accountability Bureaucall-up noticeterritorial jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution by a former Member of the National Assembly, Mrs. Asma Alamgir, seeking protective/transitory bail to prevent her arrest upon her return to Pakistan from abroad. The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) had initiated an inquiry against her regarding assets beyond means and issued a call-up notice. The petitioner sought transitory bail to safely return and surrender before the competent court and cooperate with the inquiry. NAB opposed the petition, arguing that bail cannot be granted in the absence of the accused and that the court lacked territorial jurisdiction. The Islamabad High Court, relying on established precedents, held that protective or transitory bail is granted for a limited period solely to enable an accused to surrender before the competent court without discussing the merits of the case. Consequently, the Court granted transitory bail for 15 days, directing her to appear before the inquiry officer within 48 hours of her arrival.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court grant protective or transitory bail to an accused person who is currently abroad and has not physically surrendered before the court?
  • What is the primary legal purpose and scope of granting protective bail to an accused?
  • Does the lack of territorial jurisdiction over the main inquiry bar a High Court from granting transitory bail to enable an accused to surrender before the competent forum?
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• Mohammad Waqas Malik, Advocate vs Islamabad Bar Council through Secretary and 2 others2017 CLC 1173 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-01-18Read full judgment →
• Moazzam Habib, etc vs Federation of Pakistan, etc2017 [M] C.L.R. 1468 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-06-09Read full judgment →
• Mirza Abdul Rehman vs Federation of Pakistan and others2017 PLC (C.S.) 1327 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-04-14
  quo warrantopublic officeconflict of interesteligibility criteriastatutory appointmentde facto doctrineregulatory authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment by the Islamabad High Court addresses petitions filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, challenging the appointment of Dr. Muhammad Aslam Afghani as the Chief Executive Officer of the Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan under the Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Act, 2012. The core legal questions involved whether the age restriction and the prohibition against financial conflict of interest under the Act of 2012 relate to the date of initiating the selection process or the date of the formal notification of appointment, whether the quantum of shares held constitutes a conflict of interest, and the scope of a writ of quo warranto. The Court held that eligibility regarding age and conflict of interest must be satisfied on the date the formal notification of appointment is issued, that any financial interest disqualifies a candidate regardless of its quantum, and that holding shares in a regulated entity creates an incurable conflict of interest rendering the appointment void. The Court declared the appointment illegal and set aside the notification while protecting past actions under the de facto doctrine.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the age limit prescribed for the appointment of the Chief Executive Officer under section 5 of the Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Act, 2012 is applicable on the date of initiation of the selection process or on the date of the formal notification of appointment?
  • Does the ownership of nominal shares in a regulated pharmaceutical company by a candidate attract the disqualification relating to a financial or professional conflict of interest under section 18 of the Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Act, 2012?
  • Is a disqualification arising from a financial conflict of interest at the time of appointment curable by subsequent disposal of shares?
  • What are the essential pre-conditions and the nature of jurisdiction for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
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• (1) Mirza Abdul Rehman (2) W.P. No. 3637 of 2016 vs (1) Federation of2017 PLC (C.S.) 1327, 2017 IHC 102 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-04-14
  quo warrantopublic officeconflict of intereststatutory interpretationde facto doctrineeligibility criteriaregulatory authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged the appointment of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan, alleging violations of the Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Act, 2012. The core legal questions concerned whether the prescribed age limit and conflict of interest provisions applied at the time of application or the date of appointment, and whether holding shares in a pharmaceutical company constituted a disqualifying conflict of interest. The Court held that the age limit and conflict of interest criteria are mandatory and must be satisfied on the date of the formal notification of appointment. It ruled that the respondent’s appointment was illegal as he exceeded the age limit and held shares in a pharmaceutical company, creating a conflict of interest under Section 18 of the Act of 2012. The Court established that "any" financial interest, regardless of quantum, triggers disqualification, and such defects are not curable. Consequently, the appointment was set aside, though past actions were protected under the de facto doctrine, and the government was ordered to initiate a fresh selection process.

  Questions settled

  • Does the age limit prescribed for the appointment of a Chief Executive Officer under the Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Act, 2012 apply to the date of application or the date of appointment?
  • Does holding any quantity of shares in a pharmaceutical company constitute a disqualifying financial conflict of interest under Section 18 of the Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Act, 2012?
  • Can a defect in the eligibility of a public office holder at the time of appointment be cured subsequently?
  • Is a writ of quo warranto maintainable against a person holding a public office if the petitioner is not an aggrieved person?
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• Minhaaj Saqib and 2 others vs Najm-Us-Saqib and another2017 YLR 870 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-05-31Read full judgment →
• Messrs Telenor Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan and 42017 PTD 2269 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-07-07
  Federal Excise Duty18th AmendmentTelecommunication ServicesLegislative CompetencePith and SubstanceSales Tax ModeConstitutional Interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns multiple writ petitions challenging show cause notices issued by the Inland Large Taxpayers Unit seeking to recover Federal Excise Duty on telecommunication services. The petitioners contended that following the 18th Amendment to the Constitution, the Federal Legislature lacks the authority to tax services, arguing that such levies are, in pith and substance, sales tax on services, which now falls under provincial jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the Federal Excise Duty on telecommunication services remains constitutionally valid. The Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the Federal Excise Duty on services is distinct from sales tax on services, as evidenced by separate entries in the 4th Schedule of the Constitution (Entry 44 and Entry 49). The Court ruled that the utilization of the 'sales tax mode' for collection is merely a machinery provision and does not alter the essential nature of the excise duty. Consequently, the Federal Government retains the authority to levy this duty, and the impugned notices were upheld as valid exercises of legislative power.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Government retain the authority to levy Federal Excise Duty on telecommunication services following the 18th Amendment to the Constitution?
  • Does the recovery of Federal Excise Duty through the 'sales tax mode' transform the nature of the tax into a sales tax on services?
  • Are the charging provisions of a fiscal statute distinct from its machinery provisions regarding assessment and collection?
  • Is a statute presumed constitutional unless its invalidity is proven beyond reasonable doubt?
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• Messrs Telenor Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Appellate Tribunal Inland2017 PTD 1181 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-01-09
  industrial undertakingfinal tax regimeadvance tax adjustmentquasi-judicial functionstatutory interpretationtelecommunication industrytax reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment addresses tax references concerning whether telecommunication service providers qualify as an 'industrial undertaking' under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, thereby entitling them to adjust advance income tax paid at the import stage under Section 148(7). The core legal question was whether the definition of 'industrial undertaking' in Section 2(29C) requires an entity to be simultaneously engaged in all listed trades or if these are independent categories, and whether administrative letters from the Federal Board of Revenue are binding on quasi-judicial forums. The Court held that the categories in Section 2(29C) are independent and must be construed harmoniously to avoid redundancy. It further ruled that administrative circulars or letters from the Federal Board of Revenue are not binding on quasi-judicial forums like the Appellate Tribunal. The Court emphasized that the Tribunal must conduct a factual inquiry into whether the taxpayer's operations involve processing materials that substantially change their original condition. Consequently, the cases were remanded to the Tribunal for a proper factual determination, as the previous findings were deemed perverse for failing to address these essential factual aspects.

  Questions settled

  • Are the categories of trade listed in Section 2(29C) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, independent of each other or must an entity be engaged in all of them to qualify as an industrial undertaking?
  • Is an administrative letter or circular issued by the Federal Board of Revenue binding on quasi-judicial forums such as the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue?
  • Does the failure of the Appellate Tribunal to address relevant factual questions raised before it constitute a question of law?
  • Under what circumstances is tax collected at the import stage under Section 148 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, considered adjustable rather than a final tax?
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• Messrs Oil and Gas Development Company Limited vs Messrs Excel2017 CLD 1274 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-01-30Read full judgment →
• Messrs Mia Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Pakistan PWD and others2017 PLD Islamabad 29, 2017 PLJ Islamabad 65 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-09-30
  writ petitionpublic procurementPPRA Rulesselective biddingre-tenderingprequalificationopen competitive biddingpublic advertisement
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 was filed to challenge the decision of the Pakistan Public Works Department (Pak PWD) to award a re-procurement contract for HVAC equipment through selective bidding among previously prequalified bidders without issuing a fresh public tender advertisement. The core legal questions before the court were whether a procuring agency can bypass fresh public advertisement after terminating a contract, whether the petition was barred due to alleged disputed facts, and whether pending arbitration proceedings precluded constitutional jurisdiction. The Islamabad High Court held that the writ petition was maintainable because the petitioner sought to enforce statutory procurement norms rather than contractual rights, and the respondents failed to establish any genuine factual controversy requiring evidence. On the merits, the court held that open competitive bidding through public advertisement under the PPRA Rules, 2004 is mandatory, and the absence of an express prohibition in the rules against selective bidding does not validate non-transparent re-tendering without public notice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a procuring agency can award a re-procurement contract through selective bidding among previously prequalified bidders without issuing a fresh public advertisement under the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority Rules, 2004?
  • Does a general assertion of disputed facts by a respondent automatically bar the High Court from exercising its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Can a party challenge an illegal public procurement re-tendering process via a constitutional petition while contractual termination disputes are pending under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940?
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• Messrs Labels Franchise through Mrs. Amna Badar Afzal and 2 others vs Capital Development Authority through Chairman and 2 others2017 CLC 150 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-08-10Read full judgment →
• Messrs Eagle Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Manager (Admin) vs Federation of Pakistan, through Secretary, Revenue Division Islamabad and 3 others2017 PTD 361 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-12-15Read full judgment →
• Messrs Dewan Petroleum (Pvt.) Limited vs Executive Director, SECP and another2017 CLD 1237 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-01-25Read full judgment →
• Messrs Catalyst Communication (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Messrs National2017 CLC 466 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-07-11Read full judgment →
• Messrs Cargill Holdings vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Cabinet Division and others2017 MLD 372 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-06-15Read full judgment →
• Masood Ahmed Orakzai vs Parveen Shoukat and another2017 PLD Islamabad 194 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-04-06
  appeal against acquittalprivate complaintlocus standiaggrieved personcheatingdeceased complainantcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Judicial Magistrate, Islamabad, which acquitted respondent No. 1 of the charge under Section 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in a complaint case. The core legal question before the High Court was whether an appeal against an acquittal in a private complaint can be maintained by a legal heir (son) of the deceased original complainant under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that an appeal against acquittal in a complaint case must be instituted by the complainant herself under Section 417(2), and that a legal heir who is not the direct complainant cannot maintain such an appeal under the general provisions of Section 417(2-A) or as an 'aggrieved person' without statutory backing. The key principle laid down is that special provisions governing appeals against acquittal in private complaints override general provisions, and legal heirs of a deceased complainant lack locus standi to file such appeals unless specifically authorized by law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a legal heir of a deceased complainant maintain an appeal against an order of acquittal under Section 417(2-A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does a special provision governing appeals against acquittal in private complaints prevail over general provisions of appeal?
  • Who is competent to file an appeal against an acquittal recorded in a case instituted upon a private complaint?
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• Maple Leaf Cement Factory Limited through Group Director Finance vs Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), Islamabad through Director General and 3 others2017 P Cr. L J 1540 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-05-10
  territorial jurisdictionwrit petitionFIA inquirycommercial disputecriminal matters
  Summary & questions settled

  Through the instant constitutional petition, the petitioner company assailed an inquiry notice and order issued by the Deputy Director, Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), Commercial Banking Circle, Peshawar, following a complaint regarding business transactions and advance payments for the supply of cement. The core legal question before the Islamabad High Court was whether it could assume territorial jurisdiction to entertain a petition against an inquiry pending and being conducted within the territorial jurisdiction of Peshawar merely because the complaint was initially addressed to the Director General FIA at Islamabad. The Court held that while the Islamabad High Court possesses concurrent jurisdiction over the Director General FIA, the proper forum to challenge an ongoing inquiry is determined by the place of occurrence, the territory where evidence is collected, and where the inquiry or investigation is actively carried out. Consequently, the Court dismissed the writ petition for want of territorial jurisdiction, ruling that the petitioner must approach the competent court located within the territorial limits of Peshawar.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Islamabad High Court have territorial jurisdiction to entertain a petition against an FIA inquiry being conducted outside Islamabad?
  • How is the territorial jurisdiction of a court in criminal matters and writ petitions determined?
  • Can a petitioner choose a writ jurisdiction based on convenience or the location of the headquarters under principles analogous to section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Mansoor Ali vs The learned Additional District Judge (West), Islamabad2017 IHC 133 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-05-23Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Ashraf vs Director Excise and Taxation, Motor2017 YLR 1136 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-02-27Read full judgment →
• Malik Bashir Ahmed, etc. vs The Federal Government of Pakistan, through Secretary Cabinet Division, Pak Secretariat, Islamabad, etc2017 IHC 234 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-10-23Read full judgment →
• Majid Hussain vs Farrah Naz and others2017 YLR 84 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-09-05Read full judgment →
• Mahfooz Khan and others vs Secretary, Aviation Division and others2017 IHC 200 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-06-21
  up-gradation of postsproforma promotionAirport Security Forceretrospective promotionFundamental Rulescivil service lawadministrative delayconditional concurrence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, retired employees of the Airport Security Force (A.S.F.), filed this writ petition seeking up-gradation of their posts with effect from 12.03.2015, the date the Finance Division granted conditional concurrence for such up-gradation. The petitioners argued that administrative delays in amending the recruitment rules deprived them of timely promotion. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the up-gradation of posts was subject to specific conditions, including the amendment of recruitment rules, which were not satisfied until 05.08.2016. Consequently, no up-graded posts existed prior to that date against which the petitioners could have been promoted. The Court affirmed that up-gradation is a policy matter, distinct from promotion, and does not confer an automatic right to the incumbent. Furthermore, the Court held that proforma promotion under the proviso to FR-17(1) requires the appointing authority's satisfaction, which the petitioners failed to seek through the proper administrative channels. The Court concluded that in the absence of existing up-graded posts and a selection process, the petitioners' claim for retrospective benefits was legally unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the conditional concurrence of the Finance Division for the up-gradation of posts create a vested right for incumbents to claim up-gradation from the date of such concurrence?
  • Is up-gradation of a post synonymous with the automatic promotion of its incumbent?
  • Can a civil servant claim proforma promotion under the proviso to FR-17(1) without first approaching the competent authority?
  • Does the delay in amending recruitment rules entitle an employee to retrospective up-gradation of their post?
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• (1) LTH JV (2) Mr. Bilal A. Khwaja vs Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority &2017 IHC 154, 2021 PCTLR 1420, 2021 [M] CLR 1627 · Islamabad High Court
  Dispute Review Boardarbitrator misconductinterim injunctionnatural justicecivil court jurisdictionimpartialityquasi-judicial proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an Intra-Court Appeal against an order restraining a Dispute Review Board (DRB) member from acting in that capacity due to alleged misconduct. The core legal question was whether a Civil Court has jurisdiction to restrain a DRB member from performing their duties when the contract is silent on the removal procedure, and whether such a member's conduct—specifically sharing draft decisions via email—constitutes a breach of impartiality and confidentiality obligations. The Court held that the Civil Court has jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to entertain such a suit, as the right to a fair and impartial adjudicator is a civil right. The Court affirmed the restraining order, ruling that the member's admitted conduct of sharing draft decisions violated the fundamental principles of natural justice, impartiality, and confidentiality required of quasi-judicial bodies. The key principle laid down is that where a contract provides no mechanism for the removal of an adjudicator who has demonstrably breached the duty of impartiality, the Court may exercise its inherent powers to intervene to prevent a miscarriage of justice and avoid the multiplicity of proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Civil Court have jurisdiction to entertain a suit for the removal of a Dispute Review Board member when the underlying contract is silent on the removal procedure?
  • Does the sharing of draft decisions by a Dispute Review Board member with parties or third parties before the finalization of the decision constitute misconduct?
  • Can a court grant an injunction to restrain a Dispute Review Board member from acting if their conduct creates a reasonable apprehension of bias?
  • Is the principle of 'nemo judex in causa sua' applicable to the proceedings of a Dispute Review Board?
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• Linkdotnet Telecom vs Federation of Pakistan and others2017 CLC 105 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-07-18Read full judgment →
• Liaqat Ali Mir, vs The Addl. Sessions Judge, Etc.,2017 IHC · Islamabad High Court · 2017-02-10
  Muslim Family Laws Ordinanceright of appealrevisional jurisdictionCode of Criminal Procedurepolygamymagisterial trialspecial law
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an order of the Additional Sessions Judge (ASJ) which dismissed the petitioner's appeal against a conviction under Section 6(5) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. The ASJ held that because the Ordinance does not explicitly provide a right of appeal, the appeal was not maintainable. The core legal question was whether a conviction under a special law, where the trial was conducted under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (CrPC), is subject to appellate or revisional jurisdiction. The High Court held that the ASJ erred in dismissing the appeal. The Court reasoned that since the trial was conducted under the CrPC, the appellate and revisional provisions of the CrPC apply to the proceedings. Furthermore, the Court established that even if a specific right of appeal were absent, the Sessions Judge possesses revisional jurisdiction under Sections 435 and 439-A of the CrPC to examine the legality of the Magistrate's order. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order and directed the ASJ to decide the appeal on its merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of an express right of appeal in the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, preclude an appeal against a conviction under Section 6(5) of that Ordinance?
  • Are proceedings conducted under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, for offences under special laws subject to the appellate and revisional provisions of the Code?
  • Does a Sessions Judge have revisional jurisdiction under Sections 435 and 439-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, over the proceedings of an Executive Magistrate?
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• Lahore Electric Power Supply Company Limited (LESCO) vs National Electric2017 [M] C.L.R. 1552 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Khalid Pervez Bhatti vs Mst. Madiha Rafiq2017 PLJ Islamabad 97 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-11-01Read full judgment →
• K.K. Oil and Giiee Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. vs F.B.R. etc.2017 PLJ Islamabad 196 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-03-18Read full judgment →
• Javed Iqbal and another vs Pakistan Mobile Communications Ltd. and 32017 PTD 1257 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-01-17Read full judgment →
• Javed Iqbal and another vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Planning and Development Division and others2017 IHC 196 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-05-23Read full judgment →
• Islamabad Law College vs Higher Education Commission through its2017 PLJ Islamabad 210, 2017 YLR 1399 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-02-02Read full judgment →
• Islah-ud-Din Chaudhry and another vs Sardar Muhammad Naseer Abbasi2017 IHC 168 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-07-06Read full judgment →
• Infospan (Private) Limited vs Messrs Telecom Foundation and another2017 CLC 131 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-04-22
  arbitration agreementstay of legal proceedingsstep in the proceedingswritten statementcivil suitlease agreementwaiver of arbitration
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, challenges the dismissal of the appellant's application under Section 34 of the same Act, whereby the appellant sought to stay a civil recovery suit filed by respondent No. 1 and refer the dispute to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the lease agreements. The core legal question was whether allowing a suit to be adjourned on six occasions over six months for filing a written statement without asserting the right to arbitration amounted to taking a 'step in the proceedings' and indicated acquiescence, thereby disentitling the defendant from seeking a stay under Section 34. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a defendant wishing to invoke an arbitration agreement must act promptly at the earliest possible opportunity before submitting to the court's jurisdiction. The Court established that failing to object and permitting multiple adjournments for a written statement until the right to file it is struck off constitutes an unequivocal intention to proceed with the suit, forfeiting the right to demand arbitration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether obtaining multiple adjournments for the filing of a written statement amounts to taking a step in the proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940?
  • Can a defendant seek a stay of legal proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 after the right to file a written statement has been struck off?
  • Does a distinction exist between an adjournment specifically sought by a defendant to file a written statement and an adjournment granted routinely by the court in the defendant's presence regarding Section 34 applications?
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• Independent Media Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd vs Pakistan Electronic2017 MLD 1256 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-05-08Read full judgment →
• Imtiaz Ali Khokhar alias Taji Khokhar vs The State and another2017 MLD 1311 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-04-21
  post-arrest bailabetmentfurther inquiryserious illnessrenal failurefundamental rightsdelayed statementscriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Islamabad High Court decides two consolidated bail petitions filed by Imtiaz Ali Khokhar alias Taji Khokhar, who sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under sections 302, 34, 109, and 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, as well as in a private complaint involving allegations of abetment in a murder. The core legal questions concerned whether the petitioner made out a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, given the delayed and unverified statements regarding abetment, and whether his critical health condition—suffering from end-stage renal failure, diabetes, and ischemic heart disease requiring specialized tertiary care—warranted the concession of bail. The court held that the petitioner successfully established a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and that his serious medical condition justified bail, emphasizing that allegations of abetment should not deprive an accused of fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 9 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Consequently, the bail petitions were allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused charged with abetment is entitled to bail when the statements regarding abetment are recorded with a significant delay and lack proper verification?
  • Does a critical medical condition, such as end-stage renal failure requiring specialized tertiary care not available in jail, constitute sufficient grounds for the grant of bail?
  • Can bail be granted under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the role ascribed to the accused requires further inquiry?
  • Whether allegations of abetment alone are sufficient to deprive an accused of fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 9 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Ikram Ullah vs The State and others2017 YLR 712 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-12-06
  narcotics controlbenefit of doubtcriminal appealpolice investigationforensic evidencerecovery memomaterial contradictions
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the possession of narcotics. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt despite alleged material contradictions and procedural illegalities during the investigation. The Islamabad High Court held that the conviction was unsustainable due to glaring discrepancies in the prosecution's evidence, including conflicting testimonies regarding the weighing of the contraband, unexplained discrepancies in the forensic analysis report, the failure to produce the vehicle (case property) at trial, and the presence of conflicting FIR numbers on the case property parcels. The Court emphasized that the prosecution failed to establish a reliable chain of custody and that the investigation was fundamentally flawed. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction, ruling that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of doubt. The judgment reaffirms the principle that an accused is entitled to acquittal when the prosecution’s case is built on distorted facts, concealment of truth, and incurable procedural illegalities.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to produce the vehicle allegedly used in the commission of a narcotics offense undermine the prosecution's case?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when there are material contradictions between prosecution witnesses regarding the method of weighing seized narcotics?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt when the prosecution fails to explain discrepancies in the forensic analysis report and the handling of case property?
  • Does the investigating officer acting as both complainant and investigator, combined with procedural irregularities in the preparation of recovery memos, vitiate the prosecution's case?
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• Homeopathic Dr. Jamil Akhtar Ghauri vs Federation of Pakistan and others2017 CLC 575 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-08-30
  statutory tenureNational Council for Homeopathypremature removallocus poenitentiaeGeneral Clauses Actconstitutional jurisdictiontenure postnatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns intra-court appeals challenging the dismissal of writ petitions regarding the premature removal of nominated members of the National Council for Homeopathy (NCH). The appellants were nominated for a five-year term under the Unani, Ayurvedic and Homeopathic Practitioners Act, 1965. The Federal Government subsequently issued a notification superseding the initial appointment notification, effectively removing the appellants before their tenure expired. The core legal question was whether the Federal Government could unilaterally curtail this statutory tenure without following the removal procedure prescribed by the Act. The Court held that the appointment constituted a tenure post with a fixed five-year term under the Unani, Ayurvedic and Homeopathic System of Medicine Rules, 1980. Consequently, the Federal Government could not prematurely curtail this tenure by invoking general powers of withdrawal under the General Clauses Act, 1897. The Court affirmed that removal must strictly follow the procedure set out in Section 13 of the Unani, Ayurvedic and Homeopathic Practitioners Act, 1965, and that the impugned notification was unlawful and of no legal effect.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Federal Government prematurely curtail the statutory tenure of a member of the National Council for Homeopathy by issuing a superseding notification?
  • Does the power to issue a notification under the General Clauses Act, 1897, allow the government to bypass specific removal procedures prescribed in a special statute?
  • Is the assumption of office by a member of the National Council for Homeopathy conditional upon the taking of an oath?
  • Must an authority provide reasons and follow due process when removing a member from a statutory tenure post?
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• Hassan Zia and anothers vs Mrs. Umera Arsam and others2017 CLC 23 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-08-30Read full judgment →
• Gun and Country Club Islamabad through Secretary vs National2017 PLC 130, 2017 KLR Labour and Service Cases 185 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-04-13
  Industrial RelationsContempt of CourtInterim InjunctionWrit JurisdictionUnfair Labour PracticeNational Industrial Relations CommissionTermination of Service
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged orders passed by the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) in contempt proceedings, which suspended termination notices issued by the petitioner to its employees. The petitioner contended that the NIRC lacked jurisdiction to grant interim relief, such as suspending terminations, within the scope of contempt proceedings, and that such orders were not appealable. The Court examined the scope of the NIRC's powers under the Industrial Relations Act 2012. It held that Section 57(2)(c) of the Act confers broad authority upon the NIRC to grant interim relief, including injunctions, in any proceedings before it, distinguishing this from the limited powers under the Contempt of Court Ordinance 2003. Consequently, the NIRC acted within its jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court determined that the petitioner possessed an alternative remedy of revision before the Full Bench of the NIRC under Section 58(2)(d) of the Act. As the impugned orders were not patently illegal or without jurisdiction, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 is not appropriate for challenging interlocutory orders where statutory remedies exist.

  Questions settled

  • Does the National Industrial Relations Commission have the authority to grant interim relief in contempt proceedings under the Industrial Relations Act 2012?
  • Can a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 be maintained against an interim order passed by the National Industrial Relations Commission?
  • Does the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission possess revisional jurisdiction over interlocutory orders passed by a Bench of the Commission under the Industrial Relations Act 2012?
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• Gun & Country Club Islamabad through its Secretary vs National Industrial2017 KLR Labour and Service Cases 185 · Islamabad High Court
  National Industrial Relations Commissioncontempt proceedingsinterim reliefindustrial disputeunfair labour practicerevisional jurisdictionconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed before the Islamabad High Court assailing interlocutory orders passed by the National Industrial Relations Commission suspending the termination of certain employees and a suspension notice. The core legal questions involved whether the Commission had the jurisdiction to grant interim relief in contempt proceedings and whether an adequate alternate remedy by way of revision existed under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012. The Court held that unlike general contempt statutes restricting courts strictly to penalizing contemnors, Section 57 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 confers wide additional powers upon the Commission—including the power to grant interim injunctions across any proceedings. Furthermore, the Court held that the Full Bench of the Commission possesses revisional jurisdiction over interim orders under Section 58(2)(d). The petition was accordingly dismissed on the grounds that the impugned orders were within jurisdiction and an alternate remedy was available.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the National Industrial Relations Commission has the jurisdiction to grant interim relief or injunctions in contempt proceedings under Section 57 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  • Does the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission have revisional jurisdiction over interim or interlocutory orders under Section 58(2)(d) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  • Is a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 maintainable against an interim order passed by the National Industrial Relations Commission when an alternate statutory remedy is available?
  • Does an employer who issued termination notices suspended by the Commission have the locus standi to maintain a writ petition despite not being formally arrayed as a party in the contempt proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulfraz and others vs Mir Dad and another2017 PLJ Islamabad 52, 2017 MLD 453 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-09-27Read full judgment →
• Gulfraz & others vs Mir Dad & another2017 PLJ Islamabad 52 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-09-27Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Umer Memon, etc vs Jabbar Satti, etc.PLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 23 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-01-26Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan, through D.G., National Training Bureau, Ministry of Education vs M_s James Construction Company (Pvt.) Ltd2017 IHC 182 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-05-29Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through. D.G., National Training Bureau, Ministry of Education vs M_s. James Construction Company (Pvt.) Ltd2017 [M] C.L.R. 1380 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Federal Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education through Chairman vs Azam Ali Khan2017 YLR 906 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-12-23
  civil revisiondate of birth correctioneducational testimonialssuo motu revisional jurisdictionlimitationevidentiary valueadmission formbirth certificatename changedeclaration suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenged the dismissal of an appeal as time-barred, which originally sought to overturn a civil court's judgment decreeing a change in the respondent's name and date of birth in educational testimonials. The core legal questions involved the evidentiary weight of documents for changing a date of birth in educational records and the revisional court's power to intervene when an appeal is dismissed on limitation grounds. The Islamabad High Court held that the civil court misread evidence and acted contrary to established law by giving preference to later-issued documents (birth certificate, Form-B, passport, CNIC) over earlier, admitted educational records (admission form, SSC certificate) for date of birth correction. The Court emphasized that strong, unimpeachable evidence, preferably pre-dating educational testimonials, is required for such changes. It further ruled that a revisional court can exercise its suo motu jurisdiction to set aside an illegal judgment and decree, even if an appeal against it was dismissed as time-barred. Consequently, the High Court set aside the lower courts' judgments and dismissed the respondent's civil suit.

  Questions settled

  • Can a revisional court set aside an illegal judgment and decree if the appeal against it was dismissed as time-barred?
  • What evidentiary weight is given to documents for changing a date of birth in educational testimonials?
  • Do documents issued after educational testimonials, such as birth certificates or CNICs, hold greater evidentiary value for date of birth correction?
  • Is a suit for declaration seeking a change in the plaintiff's name maintainable under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877?
  • When is corroboration required for a birth certificate issued long after the alleged date of birth?
  Read full judgment →
• Federal Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education through Chairman vs Abeer Masood2017 CLC 1085 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-12-14
  correction of date of birthrevisional jurisdictionconcurrent findingsadmissibility of documentslimitationpresumption of truthCNIC
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment from the Islamabad High Court, delivered by Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui, J., addresses a civil revision petition filed by the Federal Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education challenging concurrent lower court judgments that decreed a suit for declaration in favor of the respondent, correcting her date of birth in educational certificates from 17.08.1992 to 17.08.1994. The core legal questions involved whether a suit for correction of date of birth is barred, whether objection to admissibility of documents can be raised subsequently, and whether concurrent findings of fact can be interfered with in revisional jurisdiction. The court held that CNIC and official birth certificates carry a presumption of truth and outweigh an admission form filled out due to parental illiteracy, that objections to documentary evidence cannot be raised for the first time if no objection was taken during trial, and that a plea of limitation cannot be raised for the first time in revisional jurisdiction. The court laid down the principle that concurrent findings of fact by lower courts cannot be interfered with under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without establishing perversity or arbitrariness, and genuine mistakes in academic records regarding dates of birth should be corrected if no prejudice is caused.

  Questions settled

  • Can an objection to the admissibility of documents in evidence be raised for the first time when no objection was made during trial?
  • Whether a plea of limitation can be raised for the first time before the High Court in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction?
  • Does a Computerized National Identity Card carry a presumption of truth regarding date of birth over an admission form entry?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower courts be interfered with under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without showing perversity or arbitrariness?
  Read full judgment →
• Fawad Ahsan etc vs Chairman Arbitration Council Islamabad2017 IHC 189 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-05-17Read full judgment →
• Fawad Ahsan and another vs Chairman, Arbitration Council, Islamabad and another2017 PLD Islamabad 364 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-08-16Read full judgment →
• Fauji Fertilizer Company Limited Employees Gratuity Fund vs Federation of Pakistan through Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad and others2019 P.C.T.L.R. 243, 2017 PTD 1544 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-05-19Read full judgment →
• Farrukh Nisar vs Israr Ahmed2017 [M] C.L.R. 1310 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-11-12Read full judgment →
• Farrukh Nawaz Bhatti vs Federal Government through Prime Minister of Pakistan & 3 others2017 IHC 267 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-12-29
  quo warrantostatutory autonomyregulatory captureconflict of interestde facto doctrinepublic officeappointment procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a constitutional petition seeking a writ of quo warranto challenging the Federal Government's appointment of the Mayor of the Metropolitan Corporation, Islamabad, as an ex-officio Member and part-time Chairman of the Capital Development Authority (CDA). The core legal question was whether the Federal Government could bypass the statutory appointment process prescribed by the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960, by appointing an elected official to the Board on an ex-officio and part-time basis. The Court held that the impugned notifications were illegal and ultra vires. It determined that the CDA is an autonomous regulatory body and appointments to its Board must strictly adhere to the fixed-term and qualification requirements of the Ordinance of 1960. The respondent’s appointment violated statutory disqualification clauses regarding conflict of interest and holding incompatible elected office. The judgment establishes that statutory regulatory bodies must maintain autonomy; appointments to key positions must be transparent, merit-based, and follow the specific procedures laid down by the governing statute, rather than being subject to the unfettered discretion of the executive.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Federal Government appoint a person to the Board of the Capital Development Authority on an ex-officio or part-time basis?
  • Does the doctrine of 'pleasure of the government' grant the executive unfettered discretion in appointing members to statutory regulatory bodies?
  • Is the office of the Chairman of the Capital Development Authority a public office subject to a writ of quo warranto?
  • Does a conflict of interest, as defined in the Capital Development Authority Ordinance 1960, disqualify a person from being appointed as a member of the Board?
  Read full judgment →
• Farooq Ahmad vs Additional District and Sessions Judge (West)2017 MLD 567 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-11-03
  Section 12(2) CPCrent restrictioncivil revisionfraud and misrepresentationinherent powersappellate jurisdictionIslamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a challenge to an appellate order dismissing a revision petition against a Rent Controller's decision. The petitioner, aggrieved by an eviction order, filed an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 before the Rent Controller, alleging fraud and misrepresentation. Upon dismissal, the petitioner appealed to the Additional District Judge, who rejected the petition, ruling that the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001, a special statute, provided no remedy of revision. The High Court addressed whether an order passed under Section 12(2), Code of Civil Procedure 1908, is revisable and whether an appellate court may convert an appeal into a revision. The Court held that while the Rent Restriction Ordinance is a special law, the Rent Controller possesses inherent power to address fraud via Section 12(2), Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Since such orders are not appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, they are subject to revision under Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Court established that appellate courts should treat mislabeled appeals as revisions to ensure justice, remanding the case for proper adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order passed by a Rent Controller on an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 subject to revision?
  • Can an appellate court treat an incorrectly filed appeal as a revision petition?
  • Does a Rent Controller have the inherent power to set aside an order obtained through fraud or misrepresentation?
  • Is an order passed under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Farhad' Khan vs Asad Zulfiqar & others2017 PLJ Islamabad 167 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-03-28Read full judgment →
• Ednan Syed and others vs Federal Government Employees' Housing2017 CLC 1002 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-09-28Read full judgment →
• Ednan Syed & others vs Federal Government Employees Housing2017 PLJ Islamabad 118, 2017 CLC 1002 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-09-28Read full judgment →
• DV Com Data vs Pakistan Telecommunication Authority through Chairman and another2017 PLD Islamabad 177 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-04-07
  Late Payment Additional FeeInitial Spectrum Feetelecommunication licensecontractual obligationpenaltyPakistan Telecommunication Authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an order of the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) demanding payment of a Late Payment Additional Fee at the rate of two percent per month on outstanding dues, primarily concerning the Initial Spectrum Fee for a Wireless Local Loop License. The core legal questions revolved around whether the Late Payment Additional Fee constituted a penalty barred under Section 74 of the Contract Act 1872, whether the appellant was exempted from payment due to lack of willful default or reliance on an alleged government policy directive, and whether the levy was authorized under the terms of the license agreement and the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act 1996. The Islamabad High Court held that the Late Payment Additional Fee is a contractual obligation and functions as compensation for delayed payment rather than a penalty, and therefore is not hit by Section 74 of the Contract Act 1872. The Court affirmed that the licensee is strictly bound by the express terms of the license agreement freely entered into, and dismissed the appeal, upholding the PTA's order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Late Payment Additional Fee stipulated in a telecommunication license agreement constitutes a penalty under Section 74 of the Contract Act 1872?
  • Does the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority have the power under the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act 1996 to impose terms and conditions in a license beyond those explicitly enumerated in Section 21?
  • Can a licensee avoid the payment of Late Payment Additional Fee on the ground that the default in paying the Initial Spectrum Fee was not willful?
  • Do policy directives issued by the Federal Government under Section 8 of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act 1996 have the effect of unilaterally modifying the terms of an existing license?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Mumtaz Ahmed, etc. vs Federation of Pakistan, etc.K.L.R. 2017 Civil Cases 17 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-01-16Read full judgment →
• Dr. Mumtaz Ahmed, etc vs Federation of Pakistan etc2017 [M] C.L.R. 917 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-01-16Read full judgment →
• Dr. Muhammad Usman vs Comsats Institute of Information2017 PLC (C.S) 1434 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-01-31
  contractual employmentunauthorized absenceex-Pakistan leavescholarship bondwrit of mandamusbreach of contractwilful absence
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition was instituted by Dr. Muhammad Usman against the COMSATS Institute of Information Technology seeking directions to notify his charge assumption, assign him duties as an Assistant Professor, release his salary, approve ex post facto ex-Pakistan leave for post-doctoral research in Sweden, and renew his service contract. The petitioner, having previously availed a scholarship for higher studies abroad under an agreement requiring him to return and serve the respondent for three years, stayed abroad beyond his sanctioned leave without authorization to pursue further research, despite repeated refusals and show-cause notices from the respondent. The core legal question was whether a contractual employee who remains absent from duty without sanctioned leave and violates scholarship bond conditions can compel an employer through a writ of mandamus to condone unauthorized absence and renew employment. The court held that an employee who stays abroad without sanctioned leave commits willful absence from duty, disentitling them to discretionary constitutional remedies. The court laid down the principle that no leniency or exception should be shown to scholarship holders who violate their bonds by unauthorized extensions of stay abroad.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee who remains abroad beyond sanctioned leave compel an employer through a writ of mandamus to condone unauthorized absence?
  • Whether an employee can claim a right to renewal of a fixed-term contractual employment after violating bond conditions?
  • Does the pendency of an appeal for leave justify an employee staying abroad beyond the sanctioned leave period?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Muhammad Saeed---Petitioner vs Sardar Muhammad Akram and2017 MLD 1643 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-03-14Read full judgment →
• Dr. Muhammad Saeed vs Sardar Muhammad Akram and others2017 IHC · Islamabad High Court · 2017-01-20Read full judgment →
• Dr. Kamran Jahangir vs Chancellor, Shifa Tameer-e-Millat University, etc.K.L.R. 2017 Civil Cases 1 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-27Read full judgment →
• Dr. Kamran Jahangir vs Chancellor, Shifa Tameer-e-Millat University, etc2017 [M] C.L.R. 944 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-27Read full judgment →
• Dr. Joseph Wilson---Petitioner vs Federation of Pakistan through2017 P Cr. L J 1569 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-07-20
  Exit Control List (E.C.L.)Constitutional PetitionFundamental RightsFreedom of MovementDue ProcessOpportunity of HearingSpeaking OrderJudicial ReviewNational Accountability Bureau (NAB)Misuse of Authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the placement of the petitioner's name on the Exit Control List (E.C.L.) by the Ministry of Interior on the recommendation of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB). The core legal question was whether such placement, without prior notice, opportunity of hearing, or a speaking order, violated the petitioner's fundamental rights and due process. The Islamabad High Court held that the freedom to travel abroad is a fundamental right under Articles 4, 9, and 15 of the Constitution, subject only to restrictions by due process of law. The Court found that the Ministry of Interior acted mechanically, failing to apply its independent mind, afford an opportunity of hearing, or record reasons for its decision, thereby infringing the petitioner's fundamental rights. The Court emphasized that mere pendency of an inquiry or investigation is not a sufficient ground for E.C.L. placement. Consequently, the Court set aside the memorandum and directed the immediate removal of the petitioner's name from the E.C.L.

  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Joseph Wilson vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Interior and others2017 IHC 158 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-05-09Read full judgment →
• Dr. Basharat Hassan Bashir vs Alternative Energy Development Board, etc.K.L.R. 2017 Civil Cases 61 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-04-28Read full judgment →
• Dr. Basharat Hassan Bashir vs Alternative Energy Development BoardK.L.R. 2017 Civil Cases 61, 2017 PLC (C.S.) 7 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-04-28
  constitutional petitionregularization of serviceMP scalestatutory regulationslocus poenitentiaepast and closed transactiontermination of servicedue process
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the termination of the petitioner’s services as Director General of the Alternative Energy Development Board (AEDB). The core legal question was whether the petitioner’s regularization into a permanent scale was lawful and whether his termination, based on a Supreme Court judgment regarding the non-regularizability of MP-scale posts, was valid. The Court held that the petition was without merit. It determined that the petitioner’s initial appointment and subsequent regularization were made without adhering to mandatory procedures, such as open advertisement and competition. Consequently, the petitioner failed to establish a valid employment contract or a vested right to the position. Relying on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Dr. Mukhtar Ahmed v. Muhammad Anees Saddozai, the Court held that MP-scale posts are special and cannot be regularized. The Court established the principle that appointments made in violation of statutory procedures are inherently illegal and cannot be protected by the doctrines of locus poenitentiae or past and closed transaction, as such protections do not apply to void-ab-initio appointments.

  Questions settled

  • Are Alternative Energy Development Board (AEDB) Employees Service Regulations statutory in nature?
  • Can an appointment made without following due process, such as open advertisement and competition, be regularized?
  • Does the doctrine of past and closed transaction protect an appointment that was inherently illegal from its inception?
  • Are holders of posts created on MP Scales entitled to regularization?
  Read full judgment →
• Dilshad Ahmed Khan vs Niaz Ahmad Zahid, etc,2017 PLJ Islamabad 206 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-12-21Read full judgment →
• Dilshad Ahmed Khan vs Niaz Ahmad Zahid and others2017 PLJ Islamabad 206, 2017 CLC 712 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-12-21Read full judgment →
• Defence Housing Authority, Islamabad vs Shafqat Rasool and others2017 YLR 538 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-09-20Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue (Zone-III), L.T.U., Islamabad vs M_s. Oil and Gas Development Co. LtdPTCL 2017 CL. 41 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue (Zone-II), Ltu, Islamabad vs Messrs Ghazi2017 PTD 150 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-01-21Read full judgment →
• College of Physician and Surgeons of Pakistan (CPSP) vs 'Fop, etc2017 PLJ Islamabad 292 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-02-09Read full judgment →
• Col.(R) Javed Agha and 31 others vs Arshad Mahmud and 4 others2017 MLD 627 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-09-22
  non-conforming usezoning regulationsCapital Development Authoritydelegated legislationfundamental rightsland useguest housestrichotomy of powers
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the Capital Development Authority’s (CDA) enforcement actions against guest houses operating in residential areas of Islamabad, questioning the constitutionality of the Capital Development Authority Ordinance 1960 and the Islamabad Residential Sectors Zoning (Building Controlled Regulations) 2005. The core legal questions concerned whether these regulations constituted excessive delegation of legislative power, violated fundamental rights regarding property and trade, and whether the CDA possessed the authority to impose penalties for "non-conforming use." The Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the Ordinance and its regulations are valid. It ruled that the CDA acts within its statutory mandate to regulate land use and zoning. The Court affirmed that fundamental rights, including the freedom of trade, are subject to reasonable restrictions in the public interest. Furthermore, it held that the CDA’s regulatory framework for penalties does not violate the trichotomy of powers or the Constitution, as the regulations remain within the scope of the parent statute. The judgment establishes that running a guest house in a residential zone constitutes a commercial activity, which is a prohibited non-conforming use under the applicable zoning laws.

  Questions settled

  • Does the operation of a guest house in a residential area constitute a "non-conforming use" under the Islamabad Residential Sectors Zoning (Building Controlled Regulations) 2005?
  • Can the Capital Development Authority impose penalties for non-conforming use through regulations framed under the Capital Development Authority Ordinance 1960?
  • Does the delegation of rule-making power to the Capital Development Authority under the Capital Development Authority Ordinance 1960 violate the constitutional principle of the trichotomy of powers?
  • Are the restrictions on the use of residential property for commercial purposes in Islamabad a violation of the fundamental right to trade and property?
  Read full judgment →
• Col. (Retd.) Nadeem Shafique Raja vs Jamshed Khan Barki2017 [M] C.L.R. 798 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-04-13Read full judgment →
• Col. (Retd) Nadeem Shafique Raja vs Jamshed Khan Barki2017 CLC 1512, 2017 IHC 140 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-04-13Read full judgment →
• Cobussen Principal Investment Holdings Limited through Special2017 CLD 1411 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-02-11Read full judgment →
• Ch. Naseer Ahmed and another vs The Rent Controller and others2017 IHC 172 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-04-26Read full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Arshad vs PTCL through General Manager2017 CLC 119 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-05-25Read full judgment →
• Ch. Mohammad Nawaz and another vs The Federal Government2017 IHC 175 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-06-19Read full judgment →
• Ch. Ahmed Nadeem vs Abdul Qayyum and another2017 C.L.R. 133 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-03-10Read full judgment →
• BNP Pvt. Ltd. etc. vs Capital Development Authority.2017 IHC · Islamabad High Court · 2017-03-03Read full judgment →
• BNP Pvt. Ltd. etc. vs Capital Development Authority2017 PLJ Islamabad 249 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-03-03Read full judgment →
• BNP Pvt. Ltd. and others vs Capital Development Authority2017 PLD Islamabad 81, 2017 PLJ Islamabad 249 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-03-03
  plot cancellationmaster plan violationregulatory negligencefiduciary dutycommercial and business plotconstitutional petitionthird-party rightstransparency in public auction
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, challenged the cancellation of a plot lease by the Capital Development Authority (CDA) originally allotted for a five-star hotel. The core legal question concerned whether a plot allotted and advertised strictly for a five-star hotel could lawfully be utilized for constructing and selling residential apartments, and whether regulatory failure by the CDA created enforceable rights for third-party purchasers. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the construction and sale of residential apartments on a plot earmarked exclusively for a hotel violated the Master Plan, the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960, and subordinate regulations. The ratio decidendi is that no legal right can accrue from an illegal and void foundation, and a party cannot justify a statutory violation by pointing to other regulatory breaches by the state. The court laid down the key principles that the CDA holds public land in a fiduciary capacity as a trustee for citizens, that transparency and strict adherence to the Master Plan are mandatory in public land disposal, and that regulatory negligence by a statutory body does not validate illegal construction or legitimize the creation of unauthorized third-party rights.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plot allotted and advertised for the construction of a five-star hotel be lawfully utilized for constructing and selling residential apartments?
  • Whether third-party purchasers can claim legal rights or protection on the basis of a superstructure built upon an illegal and void foundation?
  • Does regulatory failure or negligence by a statutory authority estop it from cancelling a lease executed in violation of mandatory zoning laws and master plans?
  • Can a party justify an illegal venture or breach of law by pleading that similar violations by others went unpunished?
  Read full judgment →
• Azra Jamali and others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, M_o Commerce and another2017 PLC (C.S.) 533 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-03-17
  Trade Officerspolicy changeexecutive policyjudicial reviewRules of Business 1973constitutional jurisdictionterms and conditions of servicelegitimate expectationservice tenure
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra Court Appeal challenges a judgment of the Single Judge dismissing the appellants' writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, which sought to set aside recall notices issued to them as Trade Officers and to enforce a four-year tenure under the Policy of 2005 and Strategic Trade Policy Framework 2002-2015. The core legal questions involve whether the High Court's jurisdiction is barred under Article 212 of the Constitution, and whether the executive can alter a policy to curtail the tenure of Trade Officers and issue recall notices without performance evaluation. The Islamabad High Court held that the matter of performance evaluation and fitness to hold a post is not barred by Article 212(1)(a) and is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 199. On merits, the Court held that the executive possesses the prerogative under Rule 15(a) of the Rules of Business, 1973, to formulate and amend policy decisions with the approval of the Prime Minister, and courts will not interfere in pure policy matters unless they violate the Constitution or law. The Court laid down that executive policy decisions regarding tenure and postings cannot be overridden by appointment letters, and public servants do not possess a vested right to specific postings or unalterable policy frameworks, provided they are treated without discrimination under Article 25.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a challenge to the evaluation of performance and tenure of Trade Officers is barred under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Does the executive branch have the authority under the Rules of Business, 1973 to alter an existing policy and curtail the tenure of public office holders?
  • Can a court interfere with a policy decision of the executive in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Do public servants acquire a vested right or legitimate expectation based on a previous government policy so as to prevent the implementation of a newly amended policy?
  Read full judgment →
• Aziz Ahmad etc. vs Mohammad Irshad etc.2017 IHC 125 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-12-16Read full judgment →
• Aziz Ahmad and others vs Mohammad Irshad and others2017 YLR 1064 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-12-16Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmed vs Deputy Commissioner, Islamabad and another2017 CLC 143 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-10-26Read full judgment →
• Asjad Asad Wasi vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, M/o2017 PLC (C.S.) 955 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-04-26
  resignationwithdrawal of resignationcivil servanttermination of serviceintra court appealdisputed questions of factmaster and servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra Court Appeal challenges the dismissal of the appellant's writ petition seeking to set aside the acceptance of his resignation and to allow its withdrawal, thereby claiming regularization in service as a Programmer (BPS-17) with Pakistan Railways. The core legal question revolves around whether a government servant can unilaterally withdraw a resignation after it has been accepted by the competent authority, and whether a resignation tendered voluntarily can be recalled. The court held that a resignation voluntarily submitted by a public servant terminates the employment relationship upon its acceptance by the competent authority, and in the absence of a written withdrawal prior to such acceptance, it attains finality. The key legal principles laid down are that a resignation must be voluntary, that it takes effect upon acceptance by the competent authority, and that it cannot be withdrawn after acceptance unless permitted by the relevant rules or authority.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government servant withdraw a resignation after it has been accepted by the competent authority?
  • Does the tendering of a resignation amount to termination of service before its acceptance by the competent authority?
  • Can a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution resolve disputed questions of fact regarding the verbal withdrawal of a resignation?
  • What constitutes a voluntary resignation under service law?
  Read full judgment →
• Asjad Asad Wasi vs Federation of Pakistan through its Secretary, M/o2017 C.L.R. 94 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-04-26Read full judgment →
• Asjad Asad Wasi vs Federation of Pakistan through its Secretary, M/o2017 PLC (C.S.) 955, 2017 PLJ Islamabad 86 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-04-26
  resignationcivil servicetermination of employmentwithdrawal of resignationwrit jurisdictionemployer-employee relationshipvoluntary resignation
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra Court Appeal challenges an order dismissing a writ petition filed by the appellant, who sought to challenge the acceptance of his resignation from the position of Programmer at Pakistan Railways. The core legal question was whether a civil servant can unilaterally withdraw a resignation after it has been accepted by the competent authority, and whether such a resignation, once accepted, terminates the employer-employee relationship. The Court held that the resignation was a voluntary act and that the appellant failed to provide evidence of coercion or a timely withdrawal. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition, holding that once a resignation is accepted by the competent authority, the employment relationship is severed, and the employee has no inherent right to withdraw it. The key principle laid down is that while a resignation may be withdrawn before acceptance, it becomes effective and irrevocable upon acceptance by the competent authority, absent specific statutory provisions to the contrary. Furthermore, the Court noted that disputed questions of fact regarding the alleged withdrawal are not appropriately resolved under constitutional writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant unilaterally withdraw a resignation after it has been accepted by the competent authority?
  • Does the acceptance of a resignation by the competent authority effectively terminate the employer-employee relationship?
  • Can disputed questions of fact regarding the withdrawal of a resignation be resolved under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Amjad Ali vs Federal Shariat Court through Its Registrar, Etc2019 PLC (C.S.) 91, 2017 IHC 245 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-11-15
  writ jurisdictionArticle 199(5)Federal Shariat Courtadministrative ordersjudicial comitymaintainabilityservice matterconstitutional bar
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging administrative orders passed by the Chief Justice and a Bench of the Federal Shariat Court regarding the petitioner's dismissal from service. The core legal question was whether the bar contained in Article 199(5) of the Constitution, which excludes courts and tribunals from the definition of 'person' for writ jurisdiction, extends to administrative or executive orders passed by judges of the Federal Shariat Court. The Court held that the petition was not maintainable. Relying on precedents from larger benches of the Supreme Court, the Court determined that the constitutional bar under Article 199(5) applies to acts performed by a judge in their capacity as a 'judge of the Court' or 'member of the Court,' including administrative decisions. The Court distinguished recent contrary authority, affirming that judicial comity and the doctrine of coordinate jurisdiction necessitate that such administrative orders remain immune from writ jurisdiction under Article 199, except in limited circumstances like quo warranto or actions in a private capacity.

  Questions settled

  • Does the bar under Article 199(5) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, apply to administrative orders passed by a judge of the Federal Shariat Court?
  • Are acts performed by a judge of a superior court in their capacity as a member of the Court immune from writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • What are the recognized exceptions to the bar on writ jurisdiction against superior courts under Article 199(5) of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Ameer Hamza vs The State and others2017 P Cr. L J 21 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-08-18
  post-arrest bailstatutory baildacoityhardened criminaltrial delaySection 497 CrPCcriminal history
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition sought post-arrest bail for the petitioner, accused in a dacoity case under Section 395 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner argued for bail on statutory grounds due to the delay in trial, asserting that the delay was attributable to the prosecution. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, despite the trial delay, fell within the exception of the fourth proviso to Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, specifically regarding the classification of a 'hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal.' The court held that while the petitioner met the criteria for statutory bail, this right was defeated by the fourth proviso. The court affirmed that the classification of a 'hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal' does not strictly require a previous conviction. Given the nature of the offence—involving the snatching of official police property—and the petitioner’s involvement in ten other criminal cases, the court concluded he was a dangerous criminal and dismissed the bail petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the fourth proviso to Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 require a previous conviction to classify an accused as a 'hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal'?
  • Can the right to statutory bail due to trial delay be defeated by the classification of the accused as a dangerous criminal?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail as a matter of right if the delay in trial is not attributable to them?
  Read full judgment →
• Al-Mukhlis (Pvt.) Ltd. Company vs Messrs Telecom Foundation and another2017 YLR 1674 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-02-24Read full judgment →
• Al-Mukhlis (Pvt.) Limited Company vs M/s. Telecom Foundation and2017 YLR 1674, 2017 PLJ Islamabad 281 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-02-24Read full judgment →
• Al-Mukhlis (Pvt.) Limited Company vs M/s Telecom Foundation and2017 IHC 1 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-12-06Read full judgment →
• Al-Khair University through Muhammad Niaz, Additional Registrar2017 PLD Islamabad 198 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-06-22Read full judgment →
• Air League of Piac Employees vs Member NIRC and others2017 PLC 115 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-03-21
  Collective Bargaining AgentIndustrial Relations Act 2012Joint RegistrarStatutory InterpretationBeneficial LegislationNational Industrial Relations CommissionTrade Unions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the authority of a Joint Registrar and the National Industrial Relations Commission to determine a Collective Bargaining Agent under the Industrial Relations Act 2012, particularly when the office of the Registrar is vacant. The core legal question is whether a Joint Registrar possesses independent jurisdiction to perform functions under Section 19 of the Act, or if such powers are contingent upon the presence of a Registrar. The Court held that the Act is a beneficial statute requiring liberal interpretation to effectuate its purpose. It determined that Section 5 of the Act vests the Joint Registrar with powers and functions independent of the Registrar. Consequently, the term "Registrar" within the Act includes the "Joint Registrar" unless expressly excluded. Furthermore, the Commission maintains independent authority under Section 54(c) to initiate proceedings for determining a Collective Bargaining Agent. The Court concluded that both the Commission and the Joint Registrar are legally empowered to proceed with such determinations, ensuring the legislative intent of the Act is not frustrated by administrative vacancies. The petitions were disposed of with directions to proceed according to law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'Registrar' in the Industrial Relations Act 2012 include the 'Joint Registrar' for the exercise of statutory powers?
  • Is a Joint Registrar empowered to exercise functions under the Industrial Relations Act 2012 independently of the Registrar?
  • Does the National Industrial Relations Commission have the authority under Section 54(c) of the Industrial Relations Act 2012 to determine a Collective Bargaining Agent?
  • Can a Joint Registrar exercise powers under the Industrial Relations Act 2012 when the office of the Registrar is vacant?
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