Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 4,389 judgments in total from the Islamabad High Court.

• Ahmad Nadeem Abbasi vs Chaudhry Muhammad Ishaq & others2016 IHC · Islamabad High Court · 2016-03-18Read full judgment →
• Abid Khan vs Zaman Khan Abbasi and 4 others2016 PLD Islamabad 19 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-07-31Read full judgment →
• Abid Khan vs Gul Zaman Khan Abbasi and 4 others2016 PLJ Islamabad 12 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-07-31Read full judgment →
• Abid Associated Agencies International Ltd. etc. vs Areva etc.2016 PLJ Islamabad 38 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-23Read full judgment →
• Abdul Sattar Baloch vs The Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad & others2016 KLR Labour & Service Cases 191 · Islamabad High Court
  service appealjurisdiction of service tribunalcivil servantremoval from serviceabatement of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged his dismissal from service under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000 by filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal. Initially, the appeal was abated on the ground that the employee of the House Building Finance Corporation was not a civil servant under the Civil Servants Act 1973 and lacked statutory rules. Subsequently, upon an application for restoration, the appeal was restored based on the contention that the rules were statutory. However, relying on a subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court, the respondents argued that corporation employees are not civil servants and cannot approach the Service Tribunal. The Tribunal held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the service appeal since the appellant did not fall within the definition of a civil servant. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of, leaving the appellant to seek remedy before the appropriate forum.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee of the House Building Finance Corporation qualifies as a civil servant under the Civil Servants Act 1973?
  • Does the Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to entertain appeals filed by employees of corporate bodies lacking statutory civil servant status?
  • What is the effect of a Supreme Court ruling regarding lack of tribunal jurisdiction on a pending service appeal?
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• Abdul Latif vs Siwijan alias Bibi Jan and another2016 CLC 1293 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-02-15Read full judgment →
• Zohra Pirzada and 3 others vs S.S.P. Islamabad and 5 others2015 PLJ Islamabad 411, 2015 P Cr. L J 1667 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-07-01
  quashing of FIRpre-arrest bailcognizanceforgeryCode of Criminal Procedurejudicial proceedingsbail cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  The case involves a petition to quash an FIR registered under sections 420, 468, 471, and 193 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, alongside petitions seeking the cancellation of pre-arrest bail granted to the accused. The core legal question is whether the registration of an FIR regarding documents produced in civil proceedings is barred by Section 195(1)(c) read with Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which requires a court complaint for taking cognizance. The Court held that the bar under Section 195(1)(c) applies only to the stage of a court taking 'cognizance' of an offence, not to the registration of an FIR or police investigation. The judgment clarifies that registration of an FIR and taking cognizance are distinct concepts. The statutory bar does not prevent police from registering an FIR or conducting investigations; it only restricts the court from initiating trial proceedings without the requisite complaint. Consequently, the Court refused to quash the FIR and dismissed the bail cancellation petitions, finding no legal infirmity in the bail order.

  Questions settled

  • Does the bar under Section 195(1)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to the registration of an FIR?
  • Is the registration of an FIR and the taking of cognizance by a court considered the same legal stage?
  • Can a High Court quash an FIR under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 on the grounds of mala fide or civil liability?
  • Does the requirement of a court complaint under Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 prevent police investigation into documents produced in civil proceedings?
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• Zohra Pirzada & 3 Others vs SSP, Islamabad & 5 Others2015-IHC-186 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-21Read full judgment →
• Zohra Begum vs Fazal-e-Rab Pirzada and 4 others2015 PLJ Islamabad 443, 2015 C.L.R. 1438 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-07-09Read full judgment →
• Ws. Al-Safa Gqlden Co. Limited Pvt. vs Capital Development Authority2015 PLJ Islamabad 395 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Umer Hayat vs Inspector-General of Police, Islamabad and others2015 PLJ Islamabad 275, 2015 P Cr. L J 1551 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-08
  registration of FIREx-Officio Justice of Peacecognizable offencewrit jurisdictionpreliminary inquiryinvestigation procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought to challenge an order passed by an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, which dismissed his application for the registration of an FIR against an accused who allegedly submitted a fake driving license and misappropriated funds. The core legal question was whether an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, when considering an application for FIR registration under Sections 22-A and 22-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, should adjudicate the merits of the case or merely determine if a cognizable offence is disclosed. The High Court held that the Justice of Peace exceeded his jurisdiction by forming an opinion on the merits of the dispute, noting that the genuineness of documents is a matter for investigation, not preliminary adjudication. The Court set aside the impugned order, directing the police to record the complainant's statement and register an FIR if a cognizable offence is made out. The key principle laid down is that the registration of an FIR is a procedural step to facilitate investigation, and the Justice of Peace must confine his inquiry to whether the complaint discloses a cognizable offence rather than pre-judging the factual allegations.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace have the authority to decide the merits of a case when considering an application for the registration of an FIR?
  • Is the registration of an FIR a mandatory procedural step when a complaint discloses a cognizable offence?
  • Can an Investigating Officer arrest an accused immediately upon the registration of an FIR without collecting tangible evidence?
  • What is the appropriate remedy if a complainant files a false FIR?
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• Umer Hayat vs Inspector General of Police, Islamabad, etc.2015 PLJ Islamabad 275 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-08Read full judgment →
• Travel Waljis (Pvt) Limited vs Commissioner Appeals, Income Tax, Islamabad etc111 TAX 18 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• The State vs Muhammad Abbasi and others2015 P Cr. L J 1685 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-18
  murder referencecapital punishmentself-defenseburden of proofcircumstantial evidenceocular evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a Murder Reference and connected criminal appeals arising from a trial court judgment convicting Muhammad Abbasi for the murder of Naseer Ahmed under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions involved the validity of the conviction based on ocular and circumstantial evidence, the burden of proof regarding the accused's plea of self-defense, and the appropriateness of the death sentence. The Court held that the prosecution successfully established the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, while the defense failed to substantiate its plea of self-defense. The conviction and death sentence were upheld, and the acquittal of the co-accused was maintained. The Court laid down that while the prosecution bears the primary burden of proof, the onus shifts to the accused under Article 121 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 when claiming an exception like self-defense. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is discarded in Pakistan, requiring courts to sift the grain from the chaff, and that death sentences depend on the specific facts and circumstances of each case.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proof shift to the accused when a plea of self-defense is raised?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on circumstantial evidence?
  • Is the maxim 'falsus in uno falsus in omnibus' applicable in Pakistani criminal jurisprudence?
  • What criteria should a court apply when choosing between the alternative sentences of death or life imprisonment under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• The Imperial Electric Company (Pvt) Limited vs Zhongxing Telecom2015-IHC-35 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-11-17Read full judgment →
• The Federal Government of Pakistan--Complainant vs General (R)2015 NLR Criminal 226 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-11-21
  high treasonemergencyselective prosecutionabetmentco-accusedprovisional constitution ordersuperior judiciary
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal complaint filed by the Federal Government against the accused under Article 6 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 for high treason, stemming from the imposition of a state of emergency, the issuance of the Provisional Constitution Order No. 1 of 2007, and the Oath of Office (Judges) Order, 2007 on November 3, 2007. During the trial, the accused filed an application seeking dismissal of the complaint on the ground of selective prosecution, or alternatively, the addition of numerous state functionaries, including the then Prime Minister, former Federal Law Minister, and former Chief Justice Abdul Hameed Dogar, as co-accused. The core legal question was whether the investigation and prosecution were fatally selective and whether sufficient material existed on record to summon other individuals as aiders and abettors under Section 107 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. By a majority decision, the court held that while the accused could not dictate who should be prosecuted, the record contained sufficient material indicating active complicity by the then Prime Minister, the then Federal Law Minister, and Justice Abdul Hameed Dogar in facilitating the offence. The court partially allowed the application, directing the Federal Government to file amended charges including these individuals as co-accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused facing trial for high treason can compel the prosecution to array other individuals as co-accused?
  • Does the statutory definition of abetment under Section 107 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 extend to actions that facilitate the removal and replacement of superior court judges during an unconstitutional state of emergency?
  • Whether the failure of an investigation report to identify all potential aiders and abettors renders the trial or complaint legally defective?
  • Can a special court direct the federal government to add co-accused based on material already brought on the record during trial?
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• The Auditor General of Pakistan vs Federation of Pakistan, etcK.L.R. 2015 Labour & Service Cases 19, 2015 C.L.R. 395 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-19Read full judgment →
• Telecom Services & Consultants Pvt. Ltd vs Ooredoo Q.S.C. etc2019 CLC 887, 2015-IHC-38 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-07-01Read full judgment →
• Tauqeer Sadiq vs The State, etc.2015-IHC-183 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-03-12Read full judgment →
• Syed Zafar Ali Shah vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad and 34 others2015 PLJ Islamabad 299, 2015 PLD Islamabad 156 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-13
  resignation of membersArticle 64Speaker of National Assemblyseparation of powerspolitical question doctrinejudicial reviewvacation of seats
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the status of Members of the National Assembly who had allegedly tendered resignations but subsequently retracted them. The petitioner sought a declaration that the respondents' seats were vacant and requested the Court to direct the Speaker and the Election Commission to proceed accordingly. The core legal question was whether the Speaker is under a mandatory, mechanical duty to accept resignations, and whether the Court could interfere under Article 199 of the Constitution. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Speaker has a constitutional duty to conduct an inquiry to satisfy himself that a resignation is voluntary, genuine, and intended to relinquish the seat. The Court established that a resignation is ineffective if retracted before the Speaker concludes this inquiry. Furthermore, the Court held that the matter falls within the Speaker's exclusive domain, and under the doctrine of separation of powers and the political question doctrine, judicial interference is unwarranted. The Court emphasized that the will of the people is sacrosanct, and seats cannot be vacated without strict adherence to constitutional requirements.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Speaker have a mechanical duty to accept a resignation, or is an inquiry required to determine if it is voluntary and genuine?
  • Can a Member of the National Assembly effectively retract a resignation before the Speaker concludes the inquiry into its validity?
  • Is the Speaker's satisfaction regarding the genuineness of a resignation subject to judicial review under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Does the doctrine of separation of powers preclude the Court from interfering in the Speaker's handling of parliamentary resignations?
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• Syed Zafar Ali Shah vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Government of Pakistan and 34 others2015 PLJ Islamabad 299 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Syed Jarjees Abbas Kazmi, etc vs Piac, etc2015 C.L.R. 887 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-22Read full judgment →
• Syed Bilal Adil vs District Judge West, Islamabad and 2 others2015 YLR 2405 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-08-12
  Writ PetitionEvictionRent Restriction OrdinanceDefault in rentDeposit of rentSection 17(8)Section 17(9)Condonation of delayConstitutional jurisdictionLandlord-tenant dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment consolidates multiple writ petitions challenging eviction orders issued by the Rent Controller and upheld by the District Judge. The petitioners, tenants of shops, were directed by the Rent Controller under Section 17(8) of the Islamabad Rent Restrictions Ordinance, 2001, to pay rent arrears and future rent. Their defence was struck off, and eviction orders were passed due to alleged delay in depositing rent. The core legal question concerned the interpretation of Section 17(8) and Section 17(9) of the Ordinance, specifically whether tendering rent by cheque to the landlord or delay due to the Presiding Officer's absence constituted valid compliance, and if such delay could be condoned. The High Court dismissed the petitions, holding that rent under Section 17(8) must be deposited with the Court, not tendered to the landlord by cheque. It further ruled that absence of the Presiding Officer does not justify non-deposit, as a Duty Judge was available. The Court emphasized that Section 17(9) is mandatory, leaving no discretion to the Rent Controller to condone delay or non-compliance with an order under Section 17(8).

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• Supernet Limited through Deputy General Manager vs Federation of Pakistan through SecretaryFinance, Islamabad & two others2015 IHC · Islamabad High Court · 2015-07-13Read full judgment →
• Sultan Mahmood vs Mansoor Shamsi and anotherPLJ 2015 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 384 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-10-17
  cancellation of bailpost-arrest baildishonoured chequemisuse of bail concessionabsconsioncriminal procedurejudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition sought the cancellation of post-arrest bail granted to the respondent in a case involving dishonoured cheques and alleged fraud. The petitioner argued that the respondent had a history of absconsion and that the complainant was not properly notified during the initial bail hearing. The core legal question was whether the respondent's bail should be cancelled based on these allegations. The Court held that the petition for cancellation of bail must be dismissed. It reasoned that the considerations for cancelling bail are distinct from those for granting it, and the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the respondent had violated any conditions of the bail bond or misused the concession of bail after it was granted. The Court affirmed that absconsion alone is not a sufficient ground to cancel bail, and that strong, exceptional circumstances are required to deprive an accused of liberty once bail has been granted. The judgment lays down that cancellation is improper unless the original bail order was patently illegal, erroneous, or resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Is absconsion by an accused sufficient ground to cancel bail once granted?
  • What are the criteria for cancelling bail after it has been granted by a competent court?
  • Does a difference of opinion regarding the tentative assessment of evidence justify the cancellation of bail?
  • Must the court that granted bail be approached first if fresh grounds for cancellation arise?
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• Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited through its Deputy Chief Law Officer.2015-IHC-95 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-12-16Read full judgment →
• Sohail Younas. vs The State, etc.2015-IHC-53 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-01-07
  post-arrest bailprohibitory clauseEmigration Ordinancealternative sentencejudicial discretionbail refusal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition sought post-arrest bail for offences under the Emigration Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether an offence carrying alternative sentences—imprisonment or a fine—automatically falls outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, thereby entitling an accused to bail as a right. The Court rejected the petitioner's contention that the availability of a lesser sentence (fine) mandates treating the offence as non-prohibitory. The Court held that where a statute provides alternative sentences, one of which falls within the prohibitory clause, the court must exercise judicial discretion based on the facts and circumstances of the case, rather than applying a blanket rule. The Court emphasized that the legislative intent behind providing severe punishments would be defeated if the lesser sentence were automatically prioritized at the bail stage. Consequently, finding sufficient incriminating material connecting the petitioner to the alleged illegal emigration business, the Court refused bail, holding that the offence fell within the prohibitory clause.

  Questions settled

  • Does the availability of an alternative sentence of a fine automatically exclude an offence from the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail as a matter of right when a statute provides for alternative sentences of imprisonment or a fine?
  • How should a court exercise its discretion regarding bail when an offence carries alternative sentences, one of which falls within the prohibitory clause?
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• Sohail Younas vs The State and others2015 P Cr. L J 563 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-01-15
  post-arrest bailemigration offenceprohibitory clausealternative sentencesentence of fineforged documentsjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a post-arrest bail petition filed by the petitioner, Sohail Younas, facing trial for offences under Sections 17/18-22 of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979 read with Section 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question raised was whether an accused is entitled to bail as of right, and whether an offence falls outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, solely because the statute provides for alternative punishments including a lesser sentence of a fine alongside a term of imprisonment extending up to 14 years. The Islamabad High Court held that where alternative punishments are provided for an offence under the same statute, the court must consider the facts and circumstances of the case and the higher sentence of imprisonment bringing the matter within the prohibitory clause, rather than automatically granting bail based on the lesser alternative sentence of a fine. The court laid down the principle that the availability of an alternative sentence of a fine does not exclude the application of the prohibitory clause, and discretion must be exercised based on tentative assessment of the incriminating material on record. Consequently, the bail petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an accused become entitled to bail as of right if a statute provides for an alternative sentence of a fine alongside a term of imprisonment?
  • Whether an offence falls outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 merely because the penal provision prescribes an alternative lesser sentence of a fine?
  • How should courts exercise judicial discretion in bail matters when alternative punishments, including both imprisonment and fine, are provided under the same statute?
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• Sohail Younas vs State etc.PLJ 2015 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 774 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-01-15
  post-arrest bailprohibitory clauseEmigration Ordinanceforged documentsjudicial discretionalternative sentencingbail application
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for post-arrest bail concerns an accused charged under Sections 17, 18, and 22 of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979, read with Section 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for allegedly facilitating illegal emigration through forged documents. The core legal question was whether an offence providing alternative sentences—specifically imprisonment or a fine—automatically falls outside the "prohibitory clause" of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, thereby entitling the accused to bail as a matter of right. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the existence of an alternative sentence of a fine does not automatically exclude an offence from the prohibitory clause if the statute also prescribes imprisonment exceeding ten years. The Court established the principle that the "prohibitory clause" applies based on the maximum potential sentence, and the alternative sentence of a fine is merely one factor for judicial consideration rather than a basis for bail as a right. Consequently, the Court refused bail, citing sufficient incriminating material connecting the petitioner to the alleged illegal business.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of an alternative sentence of a fine automatically exclude an offence from the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail as a matter of right when an offence provides for both imprisonment and a fine as alternative sentences?
  • How should a court determine whether an offence falls within the prohibitory clause when multiple alternative sentences are prescribed by statute?
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• Silver Oaks School through Special Attorney vs Capital Development2015 CLC 779 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-01-28Read full judgment →
• Silvar Oaks School vs Capital Development Authority, Islamabad through its Chairman, and 2 othersK.L.R. 2015 Civil Cases 157 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Shereen Gul alias Fatima vs Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court-I, Islamabad, etcPLJ 2015 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 3 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-09Read full judgment →
• Shereen Gul alias Fatima vs Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court-I, Islamabad and others2015 P Cr. L J 724 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-09
  re-examination of witnessSection 540 Cr.P.C.filling lacunajust decisioncriminal revisionAnti-Terrorism Courtransom
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition challenged an order passed by the Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court, Islamabad, which allowed the re-examination of a complainant witness under Section 540, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner argued that the re-examination was an afterthought intended to fill lacunas in the prosecution's case, specifically regarding the involvement of the accused. The core legal question was whether the trial court correctly exercised its discretion to recall a witness for further testimony when certain factual aspects, such as details of ransom payment, were omitted during the initial examination. The High Court upheld the impugned order, holding that the trial court acted within its mandate under Section 540, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The court determined that the recall was essential for a just decision of the case rather than an improper attempt to fill evidentiary gaps. The key principle established is that Section 540, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, mandates the court to recall witnesses if their evidence is essential for a just conclusion, prioritizing adjudication on merits over technical objections.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recall of a witness under Section 540, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, to record omitted facts constitute an impermissible attempt to fill a lacuna in the prosecution's case?
  • Is a trial court empowered to recall a witness for re-examination if such evidence is deemed essential for a just decision of the case?
  • Does Article 161 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 empower a judge to put questions to witnesses to obtain proof of relevant facts?
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• Shell Pakistan Limited, Karachi through Attorney vs Capital2015 PLD Islamabad 36 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-03-11
  advertisement feeregulatory feeCapital Development AuthorityNational Highway Authoritydelegation of powersconstitutional petitionfascia signboardsquid pro quo
  Summary & questions settled

  These constitutional petitions challenged demand notices for advertisement fees on business signboards issued by the Capital Development Authority (CDA) and the National Highway Authority (NHA). The core legal questions concerned the vires of the Islamabad (Control of Advertisement) Regulations, 1977, the legality of delegating fee collection to private contractors, and the NHA’s authority to levy fees on signboards on private premises. The Court held that the 1977 Regulations are valid and that the CDA may levy fees on fascia signboards, as these constitute regulatory charges rather than taxes. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the CDA may delegate the ministerial task of fee collection to private contractors without violating the principle of delegatus non potest delegare. However, the Court declared the NHA’s demand for fees on signboards located on private property along the building line of highways illegal, finding no statutory basis for such levies. The judgment establishes that regulatory fees are permissible where an authority regulates an obligatory duty, and that statutory bodies cannot impose levies without explicit legislative authorization.

  Questions settled

  • Are the Islamabad (Control of Advertisement) Regulations, 1977 ultra vires to the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can the Capital Development Authority delegate the ministerial function of collecting advertisement fees to a private contractor?
  • Does the National Highway Authority have the legal authority to impose fees on signboards displayed on private properties located on the building line of highways?
  • Is the distinction between a tax and a regulatory fee dependent on the principle of quid pro quo?
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• Shahida Sultan vs Hafiz Muhammad Ilyas2015 C.L.R. 1220 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-23Read full judgment →
• Shahida Sultan vs Hafiz Muhammad Ilyas, 'etc.s2015 PLJ Islamabad 194 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-23Read full judgment →
• Shahida Sultan vs Hafiz Muhammad Ilyas and others2019 [M] C.L.R. 56, 2015 PLJ Islamabad 194, 2015 CLC 1366 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-23Read full judgment →
• Shafqat Hussain vs President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and 8 others2015 PLJ Islamabad 235 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-11Read full judgment →
• Shabbir Hussain vs Noor Rahman and another2015 P Cr. L J 1651 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-19
  illegal dispossessionsupply of statementscursory statementscognizance of offencecriminal revisionprocedural irregularity
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenges an order passed by the trial court overruling the petitioner's objections regarding the recording of evidence of prosecution witnesses whose cursory statements or copies under section 265-C of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 were not supplied before the framing of charge in a complaint under the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005. The core legal question concerned whether procedural irregularities in supplying documents or recording cursory statements before charge vitiate the trial or bar the examination of witnesses. The Islamabad High Court partly allowed the petition, holding that while entire proceedings cannot be vitiated merely due to improper framing of charge or cognizance errors under section 529 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the trial court must properly observe codal formalities. The court laid down that where necessary procedures under the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005 and the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are bypassed, proceedings may be regularized by remanding the matter for proper recording of cursory statements or fresh investigation report by the concerned police officer.

  Questions settled

  • Whether failure to supply copies of witness statements to the accused before the framing of charge vitiates the entire trial?
  • What is the applicable procedure for trials under the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005 when the statute is silent on procedural aspects?
  • Does an error in taking cognizance of an offence vitiate proceedings in good faith under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the trial court permit the recording of evidence of witnesses whose cursory statements were not recorded or provided prior to the commencement of trial?
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• Sardar Muhammad Jahangir vs Judge Family Court and 2 others2015 PLJ Islamabad 79, 2015 CLC 990 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-03Read full judgment →
• Sardar M. Jahangir vs Judge Family Court & 2 others2015 PLJ Islamabad 79 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-03Read full judgment →
• Safiullah Jokhio, etc vs Federation of Pakistan, etc2015 PLC (C.S.) 1304, 2015 C.L.R. 1061 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-06-06
  writ of quo warrantodeputation and absorptionconstitutional jurisdictionFederal Investigation Agencyservice mattermala fide appointmentstransfer and promotioncivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant writ petition challenged the induction of private respondents into the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) on deputation followed by absorption, alleging that these appointments were made on political considerations, bypassing established legal frameworks, and violating rules of transparency and merit. The core legal questions revolved around whether the deputation and subsequent absorption of officers from various non-law enforcement departments into the FIA violated the FIA Act, 1974 and the FIA (APT) Rules, 1975, and whether such service-related administrative actions infested with mala fides are amenable to the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court notwithstanding the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution. The Islamabad High Court allowed the petition, holding that the impugned inductions were arbitrary, illegal, and unconstitutional, and directed the immediate repatriation of the private respondents to their parent departments. The court laid down the key principle that while statutory rules permit the requisitioning of personnel on deputation to enhance agency capabilities, such discretionary powers cannot be exercised in a mala fide, despotic manner to accommodate individuals at the expense of institutional integrity and the promotion rights of regular employees, and that administrative actions vitiated by mala fides and illegality remain subject to judicial review under Article 199.

  Questions settled

  • Are illegal and mala fide administrative actions of government departments and statutory bodies amenable to the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court despite the bar contained in Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Can employees from unrelated departments and non-law enforcement backgrounds be inducted into the Federal Investigation Agency on deputation and subsequently absorbed against the provisions of the FIA (APT) Rules, 1975?
  • Does the power of the competent authority to requisition personnel on deputation under the FIA (APT) Rules, 1975 include unbridled discretion to bypass promotion quotas and regular employees' rights?
  • Whether appointments and grades such as BPS-19 in the Federal Investigation Agency can be filled through transfer and absorption contrary to the requirement of filling them ordinarily by promotion?
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• Safiullah Jokhio and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2015 PLC (C.S.) 1304 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-06-06
  writ of quo warrantodeputationservice mattersconstitutional jurisdictionFIA (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1975illegal appointmentmala fideseniority rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the induction and subsequent absorption of forty-five respondents into the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) on deputation, alleging that these appointments were made on political grounds, bypassing the established recruitment rules and violating the seniority rights of regular agency officers. The core legal question was whether the court could exercise constitutional jurisdiction in this service-related matter despite the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution, and whether the impugned inductions violated the FIA Act, 1974 and the FIA (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1975. The court held that the petition was maintainable because the impugned actions were illegal, mala fide, and coram non judice. Finding that the respondents were inducted without merit or requisite expertise, the court declared the appointments illegal and unconstitutional. It ordered the immediate repatriation of the respondents to their parent departments. The judgment established that statutory powers regarding deputation cannot be exercised in a despotic or arbitrary manner to circumvent recruitment laws, and that administrative actions lacking transparency and merit are subject to judicial review.

  Questions settled

  • Is a writ petition maintainable against illegal or mala fide administrative actions in service matters despite the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Can the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) exercise its power of deputation to induct personnel from other departments in a manner that bypasses the FIA (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1975?
  • Are appointments made on political considerations rather than merit to the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) subject to judicial review and cancellation?
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• Roman Catholic Diocese of Islamabad/Rawalpindi through Bishop and2015 PLJ Islamabad 347 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-24Read full judgment →
• Riaz Hanif Rahi, Advocate vs Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Law2015 C.L.R. 229 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-08-25Read full judgment →
• Riaz Hanif Rahi vs Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Law and Justice, Islamabad and 9 others2015 PLD Islamabad 7 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-05
  Vires of legislationRepresentation of Peoples ActJudicial reviewPolitical question doctrineSeparation of powersLegislative competenceWisdom of ParliamentDirections to ParliamentFrivolous litigationConstitutional interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged the vires of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1976, arguing it lacked a voter definition, failed to address class-based societal needs, and had inadequate candidate scrutiny under Sections 14 and 15. The petitioner also sought directions for new legislation and guidelines. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition with costs, holding that the eligibility of a voter is explicitly provided in Article 51(2) of the Constitution. The Court found the petitioner's other grounds to be purely political opinions, reiterating that purely political questions are generally not justiciable unless they involve a legal or constitutional issue requiring interpretation of the Constitution or determining validity on its touchstone. The judgment affirmed that courts cannot question the wisdom of Parliament in enacting a law, nor can they issue directions to the legislature to legislate a particular law or dictate the manner of legislation. The Court further noted that internal proceedings of parliamentary committees fall outside judicial jurisdiction under Article 69 of the Constitution. The petition was deemed without merit and not maintainable, with the Court emphasizing the duty to prevent frivolous litigation from wasting public time and clogging the judicial system.

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• Riaz Ahmed M/s. Shaheen Tent Service vs Fop through Chairman Federal2015 C.L.R. 865 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Riaz Ahmed & Company vs The Appellate Bench No.1, S&ECP, Islamabad &2015 IHC 7 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-18Read full judgment →
• Riaz Ahmad vs Government of Pakistan2015 NLR Civil 442 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-09-09Read full judgment →
• Razik Hussain vs Additional Sessions Judge and others2015 PLJ Islamabad 364 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-25Read full judgment →
• Razik Hussain vs Additional District and Sessions Judge-v and 22015 PLJ Islamabad 364, 2015 YLR 2271 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-25Read full judgment →
• Rakshani Builders (Pvt.) Ltd vs Capital Development Authority (CDA), Islamabad through Chairman2015 YLR 2116 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-28
  arbitration agreementappointment of arbitratorexistence of disputeconstruction contractcivil court jurisdictionstay of work
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 seeking the filing of an arbitration agreement in court, the appointment of an arbitrator, and the reference of disputes arising from a construction contract. The applicant and respondent entered into a contract for the construction of a project, which was subsequently delayed and stopped due to various alleged contraventions by the respondent, including failure to deliver land, drawings, and utility shifts. The applicant invoked the arbitration clause after the respondent failed to address claims and the project engineer failed to render a decision within the stipulated timeframe. The respondent opposed the application as premature, arguing that contractual claims procedures had not been followed. The Islamabad High Court held that the existence of the arbitration agreement and an active dispute between the parties are the primary conditions for relief under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The court concluded that a genuine dispute existed and that the merits of the claims are to be decided by the arbitrator, not the civil court. Consequently, the application was allowed, directing the parties to proceed with the appointment of arbitrators.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential conditions to be satisfied before an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 can be granted?
  • Does a civil court have the jurisdiction to delve into the merits of the disputes when considering an application for the appointment of an arbitrator?
  • Whether the failure to pay a claim or repudiation of a claim by one party constitutes a sufficient dispute to warrant recourse to arbitration?
  • Can an arbitration clause be invoked if the project engineer fails to render a decision within the stipulated timeframe under the contract?
  Read full judgment →
• Raja Waqas Shafique vs The State and another2015 MLD 22 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-29
  post-arrest bailmurderhusband liabilityfirearm injuryballistic matchtentative assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a murder case registered under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, alleging the murder of his wife inside his house. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail given his nomination in the FIR, specific attribution of a firearm injury by a witness, supportive medical evidence regarding the nature of the injury, and the recovery of the weapon matching the empties. The Islamabad High Court held that since the unnatural death occurred inside the husband's house, a heavy responsibility lay upon him to explain the circumstances, and prima facie evidence including matching ballistic reports connected him to the crime. The court established the principle that an accused husband bearing the onus of explaining a murder occurring within his matrimonial home, coupled with positive forensic recovery, disentitles him to post-arrest bail at the tentative assessment stage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused husband is entitled to post-arrest bail when his wife is found murdered inside his residential house?
  • Does the recovery of a weapon matching crime empties constitute sufficient prima facie proof to deny bail?
  • Whether the rule of consistency applies when the case of the petitioner is distinguishable from co-accused already granted bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Raja Ghulam Farid vs Chief Commissioner, Islamabad and 7 others2015 CLC 1600 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-09-17Read full judgment →
• Quran Hussain vs Federation of Pakistan, etc2015 C.L.R. 1106 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-13
  sacked employeesreinstatementlimitation periodstatutory interpretationservice tribunalsuperannuation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former contract employee whose services were allegedly terminated orally in 1998, approached the Islamabad High Court seeking reinstatement under the Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010. The core legal question was whether an employee who failed to file an application within the statutory limitation period of ninety days as mandated by Section 3 of the Act, having instead pursued remedies under earlier repealed ordinances, could claim benefits under the Act. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the provisions of Section 3 regarding the ninety-day limitation period are unambiguous and mandatory, and since the petitioner failed to file the requisite application within the stipulated time, he was not entitled to relief. The key principle laid down is that statutory limitation periods prescribed for claiming benefits under remedial legislation must be strictly complied with, and proceedings under prior ordinances cannot substitute for mandatory applications required under a subsequent enactment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee seeking relief under the Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010 is strictly bound by the limitation period provided in Section 3 of the Act?
  • Can an application filed under earlier repealed ordinances be treated as a valid application under the Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010?
  • Does a sacked employee who has reached the age of superannuation prior to the enactment of the Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010 have to comply with the mandatory application procedure?
  Read full judgment →
• Qazi Mustafa Kamal vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary2015 PLC (C.S.) 37 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-06-24
  public interest litigationquo warrantojudicial reviewpublic sector appointmentstructured discretionconflict of interestmerit-based recruitment
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the appointment of the Managing Director (MD) of Pakistan Television Corporation (PTVC), alleging that the recruitment process was manipulated, non-transparent, and designed to favor a specific candidate. The core legal questions were whether the appointment process complied with the principles of merit, transparency, and fairness mandated by the Supreme Court, and whether the respondent's appointment, despite his alleged conflict of interest and failure to meet educational criteria, was legally sustainable. The Court held that the entire recruitment process was polluted, non-transparent, and tailored to accommodate the respondent, who lacked the requisite qualifications and had misrepresented his financial status regarding liabilities to PTVC. The Court set aside the notification of the respondent's appointment, declaring it illegal. The key principles laid down are that public office is a public trust; recruitment to such offices must be above-board and merit-based; discretionary powers of the executive must be structured and exercised reasonably; and the courts have a duty to judicially review the integrity of the selection process to prevent nepotism and arbitrariness.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court judicially review the recruitment process for a public office under its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does the doctrine of laches apply to a writ of quo warranto challenging the illegal holding of a public office?
  • Is the executive authority's discretion in appointing heads of public sector organizations absolute or subject to judicial review for transparency and merit?
  • Does the participation of a candidate in a selection process estop them from later challenging the validity of that same process in a quo warranto petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited vs Federation of Pakistan, etc.2015-IHC-177 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-12-28
  Income Tax Ordinance 2001Excessive delegationFiscal statutesJurisdiction of tax authoritiesShow cause noticeConstitutional petitionMachinery provisionsAggrieved person
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment addresses multiple writ petitions challenging notices issued under Section 122(5-A) read with Section 122(9) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 and the constitutionality of Sections 122(5-A) and 210 of the Ordinance. The petitioners contended that the impugned notices were issued by officers lacking the requisite grade (BPS-19/20) and that the statutory provisions constituted excessive delegation of legislative power. The Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the notices were issued by competent authorities. It ruled that the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 does not prescribe specific Basic Pay Scale (BPS) grades for the exercise of powers by Income Tax authorities, and courts cannot read such requirements into fiscal statutes. Furthermore, the Court held that Sections 122 and 210 do not constitute excessive delegation of legislative power but are valid machinery provisions. The key principle established is that fiscal statutes must be interpreted strictly according to their express language, while machinery provisions are construed liberally to ensure effective tax administration, and legislative discretion granted within a clear statutory framework does not violate constitutional guarantees.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 require an officer to hold a specific Basic Pay Scale (BPS) grade to exercise the powers of a Commissioner or Additional Commissioner?
  • Do Sections 122 and 210 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power?
  • Can a show cause notice issued under Section 122(5-A) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 be challenged as an adverse order under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Are machinery provisions in a fiscal statute subject to the same strict construction as charging sections?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. vs Pakistan2015-IHC-68 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-13Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. vs Pakistan2015 PLD Islamabad 184 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-05
  subordinate legislationultra virespenaltytelecommunication chargesdelegated legislationstatutory interpretationregulatory powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under section 7(1) of the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (Re-organization) Act 1996 challenged an enforcement order imposing a penalty for non-payment of annual charges for allocated numbers. The core legal question was whether the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority possesses the statutory power to impose penalties or create financial liabilities through subordinate legislation (Regulations) without complying with the parent statute's prescribed mechanisms. The Islamabad High Court held that delegated legislation cannot go beyond the scope of the parent statute and that the imposition of a penalty or charge through regulations without fulfilling the mandatory prerequisites of Section 5(2)(p) of the Act is ultra vires, void, and inoperative. The key principle laid down is that punitive actions and financial charges must be explicitly authorized by the parent statute, and subordinate legislation cannot bypass statutory limitations or render specific statutory provisions redundant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority can impose a penalty or financial charge through Regulations without complying with Section 5(2)(p) of the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (Re-organization) Act 1996?
  • Can subordinate legislation create punitive liabilities or charges that exceed the scope of the parent statute?
  • Does Section 5(1) of the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (Re-organization) Act 1996 grant general powers to the Authority to levy charges or impose penalties independent of specific statutory provisions?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd vs Pakistan2015 KLR Civil Cases 419 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pakistan Muslim League (N) vs Pakistan Muslim League and 2 othersK.L.R. 2015 Civil Cases 22 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-11-05Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) andanother vs M.2015 CLC 1066, 2015 PLJ Islamabad 63, 2015 P.C.T.L.R. 617 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-01-28Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) and anothers vs M. Iqbal, Sole Proprietor of Messrs Pemseco and 3 others2015 CLC 1066 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-01-28Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) & another vs M.2015 PLJ Islamabad 63 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Pak Gulf Construction Pvt. Ltd vs Deputy Commissioner, Inland Revenue, etc2015 C.L.R. 436 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-18Read full judgment →
• Omv Maurice Energy Limited through General Manager/authorized2015 MLD 1615 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-12-30Read full judgment →
• Omv Energy vs Ocean Pakistan and others2015 CLC 1504 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-30
  pecuniary jurisdictionarbitration petitionrejection of plaintlocus standidisputed questions of factOrder VII Rule 11Arbitration Act 1940
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two civil miscellaneous applications filed within an arbitration petition. The first application challenged the High Court's pecuniary jurisdiction, arguing that the petition should be returned to a Civil Court. The second application sought the rejection of the arbitration petition under Order VII, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, alleging the petitioner lacked locus standi due to disputed succession rights. The core legal questions were whether the High Court possessed pecuniary jurisdiction based on the dispute's value and whether the petition could be rejected based on disputed factual claims regarding the petitioner's status as a successor party. The court dismissed both applications. It held that under the Arbitration Act 1940, the court is defined as a Civil Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter, and since the dispute value exceeded one hundred million rupees, jurisdiction was established. Furthermore, the court ruled that factual disputes regarding the petitioner's legal status could not be resolved under Order VII, Rule 11, which is limited to pleadings. The court affirmed that Order VII, Rule 11 cannot be used to adjudicate disputed questions of fact.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court possess pecuniary jurisdiction over an arbitration petition where the value of the dispute exceeds one hundred million rupees?
  • Can an application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be used to adjudicate disputed questions of fact regarding the legal status of a party?
  • Is a court defined as a Civil Court under Section 2(c) of the Arbitration Act 1940 for the purpose of determining jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Omer Ismail Khalid, etc.s vs Pakistan Medical & Dental Council, etc.2015 PLJ Islamabad 108 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-12-09Read full judgment →
• Omer Ismail Khalid and otherss vs Pakistan Medical and Dental2015 PLD Islamabad 65 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-12-09
  medical registrationNational Examination Boardpromissory estoppellocus poenitentiaevested rightsregulatory authorityforeign medical qualificationspublic interest
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, medical graduates from a foreign university, challenged the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council’s requirement to pass the National Examination Board (NEB) examination for registration. They contended that their prior enrollment and a Registrar's letter created a vested right to exemption, invoking principles of promissory estoppel and locus poenitentiae. The core legal questions concerned whether the Registrar’s letter created a binding exemption, whether the Medical and Dental Council (Amendment) Act 2012, which inserted Section 15, applied retrospectively, and whether the court should exercise its equitable jurisdiction to waive the examination requirement. The Court held that the petitions lacked merit, ruling that mere enrollment does not confer a vested right to registration. It found the Registrar’s letter unauthorized and void, and affirmed that Section 15 mandates competence assessment for all foreign graduates. The Court established that no estoppel can operate against a statute, and that public interest in ensuring medical competence overrides individual claims to registration without assessment. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed, emphasizing that regulatory standards for public safety are paramount.

  Questions settled

  • Does mere enrollment in a foreign medical institution create a vested right to registration under the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Ordinance 1962?
  • Can the principle of promissory estoppel be invoked against a statutory requirement for medical registration?
  • Does an unauthorized letter issued by a Registrar create a binding exemption from mandatory statutory examinations?
  • Is the requirement to pass the National Examination Board examination for foreign medical graduates applicable to students enrolled before the enactment of the Medical and Dental Council (Amendment) Act 2012?
  Read full judgment →
• Oil and Gas Development Company Ltd vs Agha Muhammad and Brothers and others2015 MLD 1821 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-07-09
  arbitration agreementlimitation periodsection 20 applicationsufficient causedelegation of authorityarbitral jurisdictioncivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges an order by a Civil Judge who, while allowing an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act 1940, referred the issue of limitation to the Arbitrator. The core legal question was whether the court, when considering an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act 1940, has the jurisdiction to delegate the determination of the application's limitation period to the Arbitrator. The Court held that the question of whether an application under Section 20 is time-barred is a preliminary matter that must be decided by the Court itself before granting the application or referring the dispute to arbitration. The Court emphasized that the determination of 'sufficient cause' under Section 20(4) of the Arbitration Act 1940 is a statutory obligation of the Court and cannot be delegated to the Arbitrator. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter for the trial court to decide the limitation issue independently, distinguishing between the limitation of the application itself (a judicial function) and the limitation of the underlying claim (an arbitral function).

  Questions settled

  • Does a court have the authority to delegate the determination of the limitation period of an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act 1940 to an Arbitrator?
  • Is the question of whether an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act 1940 is time-barred a matter to be decided by the Court or the Arbitrator?
  • What is the distinction between the limitation period for filing an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act 1940 and the limitation period for the underlying claim?
  • Is the determination of 'sufficient cause' under Section 20(4) of the Arbitration Act 1940 a non-delegable judicial function?
  Read full judgment →
• Noshiba Latif & twenty-one others. vs The Islamia University of Bahawalpur2015-IHC-123 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-30Read full judgment →
• Nosheen Agha and another vs Additional District Judge (West)2015 CLC 349 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-12-02Read full judgment →
• National Highway Authority vs Zarghoon Enterprises Pvt. LtdK.L.R. 2015 Civil Cases 141 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-11-19Read full judgment →
• National Highway Authority vs Zarghoon Enterprises (Pvt) LtdK.L.R. 2015 Civil Cases 141, 2015 MLD 746 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-11-19
  arbitration awardrule of the courtmisconduct of arbitratorrate fixationcivil caseobjections to award
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil matter arises from objections filed by the National Highway Authority against an arbitration award dated 29-6-2013 regarding a dispute over rate fixation for increased quantities in a highway construction project. The core legal question is whether the arbitrator misconducted himself or misinterpreted contract clauses concerning the Engineer's power to fix rates. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the objections, holding that an arbitrator is the final judge of law and fact, and courts cannot act as courts of appeal to reappraise evidence or search for latent errors unless an error is manifest on the face of the award. The court laid down the principle that judicial interference in domestic arbitration awards must be minimal, and courts should promote certainty by enforcing binding arbitration agreements freely entered into by parties, while deprecating the tendency of government departments to challenge arbitral awards without strong grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court act as a court of appeal to reappraise evidence recorded by an arbitrator?
  • Is an arbitrator considered the final judge of questions of law and fact?
  • What is the extent of judicial interference permissible when parties have voluntarily chosen an arbitration forum?
  • Whether an arbitration award can be set aside without an error appearing manifestly on its face?
  Read full judgment →
• National Highway Authority vs Sher Zaman2015 C.L.R. 704 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-03-03Read full judgment →
• National Highway Authority through its Chairman vs M/s. Husnain2015 CLC 1400, 2015 PLJ Islamabad 173 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-03-25Read full judgment →
• National Highway Authority through Chairman vs Messrs Husnain2015 CLC 1400 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-03-25Read full judgment →
• National Highway Athority vs Sher Zaman2015 PLJ Islamabad 124 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-03-11Read full judgment →
• National Electric Power Regulatory Authority vs Registrar of Trade Unions, NIRC, etc2015 C.L.R. 440 · Islamabad High Court
  trade union registrationcollective bargaining agentregulatory authorityestablishment and industryjurisdictionconstitutional petitioncoram non-judice
  Summary & questions settled

  The National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) filed a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging the registration of a trade union and a Collective Bargaining Agent certificate issued by the Registrar of Trade Unions under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, along with the dismissal of its application for cancellation under Section 11 of the same Act. The core legal question was whether NEPRA qualifies as an 'establishment' or 'industry' under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, thereby bringing its employees within its scope and granting the Registrar jurisdiction, and whether an alternate remedy was available to NEPRA. The Islamabad High Court held that NEPRA is a regulatory authority performing administrative functions of the State and does not carry on any business, trade, manufacture, or production of goods and provision of services to qualify as an 'establishment' or 'industry'. Consequently, the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 does not apply to NEPRA, and the Registrar lacked jurisdiction to register a trade union or issue a CBA certificate. The court laid down the principle that regulatory authorities engaged in state administration rather than commercial or industrial activities fall outside the ambit of labor legislation, and orders passed without jurisdiction are coram non-judice and amenable to constitutional judicial review.

  Questions settled

  • Whether NEPRA falls within the definition of an establishment or industry under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  • Does the Registrar of Trade Unions have jurisdiction to register a trade union for the employees of a regulatory authority like NEPRA?
  • Is an appeal maintainable by an employer under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 against an order refusing to cancel a trade union registration?
  • Can orders passed without jurisdiction by a statutory registrar be challenged under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  Read full judgment →
• National Electric Power Regulatory Authority vs Registrar of Trade2015 PLC 148 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-01-15
  constitutional petitiontrade union registrationCollective Bargaining Agentestablishmentindustryregulatory authorityjurisdictioncoram non-judice
  Summary & questions settled

  The National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the Islamabad High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging the registration of a trade union and its certification as a Collective Bargaining Agent (CBA) under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, as well as an order dismissing NEPRA's application for cancellation of said registration. The core legal question was whether NEPRA qualifies as an 'establishment' or 'industry' under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, thereby bringing its employees and operations within the regulatory ambit of the Registrar of Trade Unions, and whether an alternate remedy of appeal was available to NEPRA. The Court held that NEPRA is exclusively a regulatory authority established under the Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997, and does not engage in any business, manufacture of goods, or provision of services that would render it an 'establishment' or 'industry' under the Act of 2012. Consequently, the Registrar lacked jurisdiction to register a trade union or issue a CBA certificate for NEPRA, rendering the impugned actions coram non-judice and without lawful authority. The key principle laid down is that regulatory authorities performing sovereign administrative or regulatory functions of the State do not fall within the definition of an establishment or industry under labor laws, and acts done without jurisdiction by statutory functionaries are nullities amenable to judicial review under Article 199.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority qualifies as an establishment or industry under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  • Does the Registrar of Trade Unions have the jurisdiction to register a trade union and issue a Collective Bargaining Agent certificate for employees of a regulatory authority?
  • Whether an employer has a right of appeal under Section 12 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 against an order of the Registrar of Trade Unions?
  • Are orders passed without jurisdiction by a statutory authority open to judicial review under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Nasir Ali Shah Bukhari and 2 others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance and 7 others2015 PLJ Islamabad 423, 2015 CLD 1787 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-05
  banking moratoriumamalgamation of banksnon-obstante clauseregulatory powerexcessive delegationconstitutional petitionshareholder rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the actions of the State Bank of Pakistan regarding the moratorium and proposed amalgamation of KASB Bank Limited under Section 47 of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962. The petitioners, shareholders of the bank, contended that the State Bank of Pakistan’s powers constituted excessive delegation, infringed upon their property rights, and that the amalgamation process violated statutory requirements. The core legal questions concerned whether the State Bank of Pakistan’s regulatory actions were judicial in nature, whether Section 47 allowed for excessive delegation, and the applicability of Section 48 procedures. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the State Bank of Pakistan’s powers under Section 47 are administrative and regulatory, not judicial. It further ruled that Section 47, containing a non-obstante clause, overrides Section 48 regarding amalgamation procedures. The Court affirmed that the State Bank of Pakistan acted within its statutory mandate and that the petition was premature, as it was based on speculation rather than actualized injury. The judgment establishes that regulatory actions under specific banking statutes are not judicial functions and that non-obstante clauses effectively exclude conflicting provisions within the same legislative part.

  Questions settled

  • Does the power of the State Bank of Pakistan to apply for a moratorium and prepare a scheme of amalgamation under Section 47 of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, constitute a judicial function?
  • Does the non-obstante clause in Section 47 of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, exclude the application of Section 48 regarding the procedure for amalgamation?
  • Can a constitutional petition be maintained on the basis of mere apprehension of future adverse action by a regulatory body?
  • Does the grant of extensive regulatory powers to the State Bank of Pakistan under the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, amount to excessive delegation of legislative power?
  Read full judgment →
• Nasir Ali Shah Bukhari and 12 others vs Federation of Pakistan and 72015 PLJ Islamabad 423 · Islamabad High Court
  constitutional petitionbanking companiesmoratoriumamalgamationexcessive delegationregulatory powersnon-obstante clauseshareholders rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, was filed by shareholders of KASB Bank Limited challenging the legality of actions taken under Section 47 of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, including a moratorium order, asset valuation confidentiality, and a proposed reconstruction or amalgamation scheme with another banking institution. The core legal questions involved whether Section 47 suffers from excessive delegation amounting to the exercise of judicial power by the executive, and whether the amalgamation procedure under Section 47 overrides Section 48 due to its non-obstante clause. The Islamabad High Court held that the powers exercised by the State Bank of Pakistan under Section 47 are regulatory and administrative rather than judicial, do not constitute excessive delegation, and properly override Section 48 by virtue of the non-obstante clause. The Court laid down that statutory regulatory powers conferred on the central bank to manage distressed banking companies are executive in nature, and that petitions based purely on apprehensions while statutory objections are pending remain premature.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the powers conferred upon the State Bank of Pakistan under Section 47 of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, amount to excessive delegation or the exercise of judicial power by the executive?
  • Does Section 47 of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, override Section 48 of the same Ordinance by virtue of its non-obstante clause in cases of bank amalgamation?
  • Whether a constitutional petition challenging a proposed scheme of amalgamation under Section 47 of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, is premature while objections before the regulatory authority are still pending?
  • Whether the State Bank of Pakistan acts in a judicial or administrative capacity when applying for a moratorium and preparing a reconstruction scheme for a banking company?
  Read full judgment →
• Naseer Pervaz Qureshi vs Board of Directors, ZTBL, through Company2015 PLC (C.S.) 1293 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-21
  writ petitionservice matterfactual controversydepartmental inquiryshow-cause notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves writ petitions filed against show-cause notices, charge sheets, and an inquiry committee notification issued by the respondent bank. The core legal question was whether disputed questions of fact regarding departmental proceedings and misconduct can be resolved within the constitutional writ jurisdiction. The Islamabad High Court held that factual controversies requiring extensive inquiry, collection, and appraisal of evidence are beyond the scope of writ jurisdiction under Article 199. The court established the principle that High Courts will not delve into the veracity of departmental allegations or explanations in writ proceedings, but directed the respondent bank to consider the petitioner's representations strictly in accordance with the applicable service regulations.

  Questions settled

  • Can factual controversies requiring extensive inquiry and appraisal of evidence be resolved within writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Whether the High Court can indulge in examining the veracity of allegations in a departmental show-cause notice or charge sheet?
  • Is a bank under a legal obligation to consider an employee's representation in accordance with its staff service regulations?
  Read full judgment →
• Nargis Sultana Chohan vs Presiding Officer and others2015 P Cr. L J 941 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-01-20
  Islamabad Consumers Protection Act 1995electricity consumerdefinition of consumerdefinition of servicessupply of electrical energyDistrict Consumer Courtjurisdiction of consumer courtremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was directed against an order of the Presiding Officer, District Consumer Court, Islamabad, which had dismissed the appellant's complaint regarding electricity meter shifting, billing disputes, and disconnection on the ground that an electricity user is not a consumer under Section 2(3) of the Islamabad Consumers Protection Act 1995. The primary legal question before the High Court was whether a recipient or user of electricity supply falls within the statutory definition of a consumer under the Act and can seek remedy before the Consumer Court Authority. The Islamabad High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order, and remanded the matter to the Authority for decision on the merits. The Court held that Section 2(5) of the Act explicitly includes the supply of electrical energy within the definition of services, and a person who hires such services for consideration is a consumer under Section 2(3). The Court emphasized that where statutory language is plain, electricity consumers fully qualify to maintain proceedings under consumer protection legislation.

  Questions settled

  • Does a user of electricity fall within the definition of a consumer under Section 2(3) of the Islamabad Consumers Protection Act 1995?
  • Does the supply of electrical energy constitute 'services' as defined under Section 2(5) of the Islamabad Consumers Protection Act 1995?
  • Can an electricity consumer maintain a complaint regarding billing and disconnection before the Authority under the Islamabad Consumers Protection Act 1995?
  Read full judgment →
• M/s. Win Pipe Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Additional Collector, Etc.sNLR 2015 Tax 134 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-07-03Read full judgment →
• M/s. Win Pipe Industries (Pvt.) Ltd vs Additional Collector and othersNLR 2015 Tax 134, PTCL 2015 CL.646 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-07-03Read full judgment →
• M/s. Wateen Telecom Ltd. vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, etc.2015 P.C.T.L.R. 429 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-04Read full judgment →
• M/s. Travel Waljis (Pvt.) Ltd vs Commissioner Appeals, Income Tax,PTCL 2015 CL.472 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• M/s. Travel Waljis (Pvt.) Limited vs Commissioner Appeals, Income Tax,2015 P.C.T.L.R. 710 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-11-06Read full judgment →
• M/s. Travel Waljis (Pvt.) Limited vs Commissioner Appeals Income Tax2015 P.C.T.L.R. 1 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-11-06Read full judgment →
• M/s. Trans Tech Pakistan through Habil Ahmed Khan, Authorized Officer2015 PLJ Islamabad 458 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• M/s. The Hub Power Company Limited vs Deputy Commissioner Inland2015 P.C.T.L.R. 724 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-11-24Read full judgment →
• M/s. Punjab Oil Mills,Ltd vs Federation of Pakistan, etcPTCL 2015 CL. 815, 2015 PTD 1219 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-03-24Read full judgment →
• M/s. Polyfine Chempharma (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Monopoly Control Authority, etc.2015 P.C.T.L.R. 382 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-11-12Read full judgment →
• M/s. DBH, Joint Venture Projects. v Ltd vs The Federation of Pakistan, etc.PTCL 2015 CL. 810 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-01-29Read full judgment →
• M/s. Capital Poultry Feed and Daal Mills, etc. vs Atlas Bank Limited, etc.2015 P.C.T.L.R. 766 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-03-05Read full judgment →
• M/s. Capital Poultry Feed and Daal Mills etc. vs Atlas Bank Limited, etc.2015 PLJ Islamabad 167 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-23Read full judgment →
• M/s. Bannu Woolen Mills Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan and 2 others2015 PTD 1058, 2015 P.C.T.L.R. 548 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-17Read full judgment →
• M/s. Arslan Poultry Pvt. Limited vs Officer Inland Revenue and othersPLJ 2015 Tax Cases (Isl.) 50 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-05Read full judgment →
• M/s. Arslan Poultry (Pvt.) Limited vs Officer Inland Revenue, etc.2015 P.C.T.L.R. 271 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-01Read full judgment →