Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 4,389 judgments in total from the Islamabad High Court.

• M/s. Arsalan Poultry (Pvt.) Limited vs Officer Inland Revenue, Etc.sNLR 2015 Tax 140 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-01Read full judgment →
• M/s. AirwaVes Media (Pvt.) Ltd vs The Rent Controller (West) & two others2015 KLR Civil Cases 448 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-06Read full judgment →
• M/s. Advance Business System, etc vs Federation of Pakistan, etc2015 PLJ Islamabad 322 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-05Read full judgment →
• M/s Capital Poultry Feed and Daal Mills etc. vs Atlas Bank Limited etc.2015-IHC-65 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-03-05Read full judgment →
• M/s Attock Gen Limited. vs Additional Commissioner (Audit), Large2015-IHC-180 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-09Read full judgment →
• Muhammda Javaid and others vs F.O.P. and others2015 PLC (C.S.) 309 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-11
  regularization of servicescontractual employeesdaily wagersdiscrimination in servicefundamental rightsright to equalitygovernment policydue process
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment by the Islamabad High Court addresses multiple writ petitions filed by contractual and daily wage employees of various ministries, divisions, attached departments, autonomous bodies, and corporations. The petitioners grieved that their respective employers failed to refer their names to the Cabinet Sub-Committee for regularization under the Federal Government's policy for regularizing contractual and daily wagers, thereby violating their fundamental right to equality and non-discrimination. The core legal question centered on whether the executive authorities could arbitrarily deny the implementation of a lawful government policy to similarly placed employees, violating Articles 9, 18, 25, and 27 of the Constitution. The Court held that discrimination in service matters erodes public confidence and violates fundamental rights, emphasizing the state's duty to provide effective redress forums. By consent of the parties and the Additional Attorney General, the petitions were disposed of with directions for the Secretary Cabinet Division to constitute a committee to review the grievances, hear the parties, and pass speaking orders to ensure fair implementation of the policy in accordance with due process.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of employers to refer eligible contractual employees for regularization under a government policy violates the constitutional guarantee of equality under Article 25?
  • Can the executive authorities discriminate in the implementation of a lawful regularization policy among similarly placed employees?
  • Does the right to due process under Article 10-A of the Constitution require the provision of an effective administrative forum to resolve employee grievances?
  • To what extent can courts interfere with government policy-making and its implementation?
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• Muhammad Zubair, etc.s vs Senior Superintendent of Police, etc.2015 PLJ Islamabad 83 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-10Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zubair and others vs Senior Superintendent of Police and others2015 PLJ Islamabad 83, 2015 P Cr. L J 576 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-10
  quashment of FIRconstitutional petitioncriminal breach of trustentrustment of propertyalternative remedieswrit jurisdictionproperty exchange dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, seeking the quashment of FIR No. 846 of 2014 registered under section 406/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, at Police Station Margalla, Islamabad, relating to a property exchange dispute. The core legal question addressed is whether High Courts should exercise extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings when alternative remedies exist under criminal procedure and whether the ingredients of criminal breach of trust under section 405 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 are made out upon a bare reading of the FIR involving property exchange. The Islamabad High Court held that the power to quash a criminal case under Article 199 is an extraordinary remedy to be exercised sparingly, and where investigations are incomplete and disputed questions of fact regarding 'entrustment' exist, parties must pursue alternate remedies before the trial court rather than circumventing normal legal processes. The court laid down the principle that High Courts will exercise judicial restraint and decline to quash an FIR where alternate statutory remedies are available under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and where the core allegations involve factual disputes best resolved during trial.

  Questions settled

  • Can an FIR be quashed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 when investigation is still underway and no final report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 has been submitted?
  • Whether the exchange of properties without an element of entrustment constitutes the offence of criminal breach of trust under section 405 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is the High Court empowered to bypass alternate remedies available before the trial court, such as sections 249-A and 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, for the quashment of a criminal case?
  • Does a civil dispute between parties over a property transaction automatically bar the initiation or continuation of criminal proceedings arising from the same transaction?
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• Muhammad Zahid Aslam vs Haji DILBAGHand 7 others2015 PLJ Islamabad 340, 2015 YLR 1886 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-12Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zahid Aslam vs Haji Dilbagh and 7 others2015 PLJ Islamabad 340 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-12Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Talib Shahzad vs Ministry of Commerce, etcK.L.R. 2015 Labour & Service Cases 25, K.L.R. 2015 Labour & Service Cases 37, · Islamabad High Court · 2014-11-10Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shariq vs Federation of Pakistan, etc.2015 PLJ Islamabad 231 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-08Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shariq vs Federation of Pakistan and others2015 PLJ Islamabad 231, 2015 PLD Islamabad 180 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-08Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shafique Butt and anothers vs The State and others2015 YLR 877 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-08-05
  post-arrest bailnon-prohibitory clausefair trialjudicial biasdefamationindependence of judiciarydue process
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under sections 500, 501, 504, and 505(2) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, relating to the alleged display of defamatory banners concerning a sitting judge of the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to post-arrest bail for offences falling within the non-prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether observations made by the lower court regarding defamation of a judicial institution prejudiced the right to a fair trial. The Islamabad High Court held that since the offences fell within the non-prohibitory clause and section 505(2) was not attracted, bail should be granted favourably as a rule. The court emphasized that judges must maintain strict impartiality, avoid any perception of bias, and ensure a fair trial and due process as guaranteed under the Constitution, and that courts cannot treat offences as extraordinary simply because they relate to the judiciary. The petition was accepted and bail was granted to the petitioners.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail should be granted as a rule when offences fall within the non-prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does expressing views that an offence maligned the judiciary vitiate the perception of judicial impartiality and prejudice the right to a fair trial?
  • Whether Section 505(2) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is attracted in cases involving general allegations of defamation without meeting the statutory ingredients?
  • What are the defining exceptional grounds for refusing bail in cases falling within the non-prohibitory clause?
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• Muhammad Sajjad and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2015 PLJ Islamabad 15 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-10Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sajjad and other vs Fop and others2015 PLJ Islamabad 15, 2015 PLC (C.S.) 208 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-10
  regularization of servicescontractual employeesdaily wagersdiscrimination in servicefundamental rightsdue processservice tribunalexecutive policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment by the Islamabad High Court addresses multiple writ petitions filed by contractual and daily-wage employees seeking regularization of their services pursuant to a policy formulated by the Federal Government. The core legal question concerns the enforcement of the regularization policy and the redressal of grievances relating to discriminatory treatment in service matters, in violation of fundamental rights. The court held, through a consent order agreed upon by the parties, that the Federal Government shall constitute a dedicated committee to examine the grievances of each petitioner, pass speaking orders, and ensure non-discriminatory implementation of the policy. The key principle laid down is that public functionaries must act fairly, justly, and transparently, and that the State has a fundamental duty to provide effective, inexpensive dispute resolution forums, such as the Service Tribunal, to prevent executive apathy and uphold the rule of law and the right to due process.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with the implementation of a government regularization policy where fundamental rights such as equality are violated?
  • Does discrimination in service matters by public functionaries violate the guarantees of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Can the executive be directed through a consent order to establish a specialized committee for redressing service grievances of contractual employees?
  • Is the State under a constitutional obligation to maintain a functional service tribunal to provide an effective forum for resolving employee grievances?
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• Muhammad Naseer Abbasi vs Capital Development Authority & Others.2015-IHC-165 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-10-27Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nadeem vs The State, etc.2015 P.C.T.L.R. 809 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-03
  post-arrest bailcustoms smugglinggreen channelfurther inquiryrecovery of mobile phonesalternative sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner Muhammad Nadeem sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under the Customs Act, 1969, following the alleged recovery of 170 mobile phones from his baggage after he passed through the green channel at the airport. The core legal question was whether the petitioner made out a case for further inquiry regarding his passage through the green channel and whether he was entitled to post-arrest bail considering the alternative lesser sentence and completed investigations. The Islamabad High Court held that the case warranted further probe since the investigating officer admitted that available CCTV footage had not been examined to verify the prosecution's claim, and noted that when an alternate sentence is provided, the lesser sentence should be considered at the bail stage. Consequently, the court admitted the petitioner to post-arrest bail. The key principle laid down is that where a genuine dispute exists regarding the manner of apprehension and available corroborative evidence like CCTV footage remains unexamined, and where an alternate lesser sentence is provided, the case falls within the scope of further inquiry, justifying the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted when the investigating officer fails to obtain or examine available CCTV footage regarding the alleged manner of apprehension?
  • Should a lesser alternative sentence be considered by the court at the bail stage?
  • Does the recovery of goods at an airport without examining corroborative evidence constitute a case of further inquiry under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Muhammad Masood Malik, Etc.s vs Ministry of Petroleum & Natural2015 NLR Service 145 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Masood Malik and others vs Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources and others2015 NLR Service 145, 2015 PLC (C.S.) 248 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-09-19
  Bell Curve Conceptterms and conditions of servicestatutory rulesannual confidential reportspromotion policyconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed before the Islamabad High Court by serving officers of the Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL), challenging the introduction of a performance rating scheme based on the "Bell Curve Concept" through impugned circulars and letters. The core legal question was whether the implementation of the Bell Curve Scheme adversely affects and alters the statutory terms and conditions of service of the employees as governed by the Oil and Gas Development Corporation Employees (Service) Regulations, 1994, and whether it illegally hinders promotions and annual increments or deviates from prescribed ACR procedures. The court held that the Bell Curve System essentially provides a criteria and mechanism for the grant of bonuses and performance appraisal based on efficiency, without altering the statutory terms and conditions of service or obstructing promotions. The court laid down the principle that an organization or government entity is empowered to introduce restructuring, re-organization, or performance evaluation schemes to improve working efficiency, and that promotion cannot be claimed as a vested right.

  Questions settled

  • Does the introduction of the Bell Curve Scheme by OGDCL alter the statutory terms and conditions of service of its employees?
  • Whether an employer has the prerogative to introduce restructuring and performance evaluation schemes to improve employee efficiency?
  • Can promotion be claimed as a vested right by an employee fulfilling qualification requirements?
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• Muhammad lqbal Gondal vs Government of Pakistan, etc2015 C.L.R. 1151 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-06Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Imran Hafeez vs Naveed Ali2015 PLJ Islamabad 385, 2015 CLC 1747 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-15Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Farooq Khan vs Excel-Labs, through Central Executive2015 PLD Islamabad 81 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-01-26
  consumer protectionmedical servicespathological testjurisdictionpurposive interpretationremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed against the order of the Additional Sessions Judge-IV (West), Islamabad, acting as the Authority under the Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995, which had dismissed the appellant's complaint on the ground that the medical diagnostic services of the respondent laboratory did not fall within the purview of unfair trade practices. The appellant had been diagnosed with Celiac Disease by the respondent, but a subsequent test a year later by another hospital showed he did not have the disease. The High Court examined whether the provision of medical diagnostic and pathological services falls within the scope of the Act. The Court held that the definition of 'services' under Section 2(5) of the Act is inclusive and covers medical services, and that a person obtaining pathological tests for consideration is a 'consumer' under Section 2(3). The Court emphasized that consumer protection legislation is benevolent and must be given a purposive interpretation to protect individuals from exploitation. Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order, and remanded the case for a decision on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Do medical diagnostic and pathological testing services fall within the definition of 'services' under the Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995?
  • Is a person who pays for and undergoes medical laboratory tests considered a 'consumer' under the Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995?
  • Can a consumer complaint be maintained under the Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995 for alleged defective medical diagnostic reports?
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• Muhammad Bostan vs Capital Development Authority (CDA) through its2015 C.L.R. 1114 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-04Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Azram vs National Institute of Health, Etc.s2015 NLR Service 84 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-10-15
  disciplinary proceedingsnatural justiceaudi alteram partemwrongful dismissalcriminal convictionfundamental rightslachesdiscrimination
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a security guard at the National Institute of Health, was dismissed from service following a criminal conviction. Upon his subsequent acquittal based on a compromise, his request for reinstatement was rejected. He challenged this dismissal, arguing that the proceedings violated the National Institute of Health Employees (Service) Regulations, 1989 and the principles of natural justice. The core legal question was whether an employer can dismiss an employee based on a criminal conviction without providing a show-cause notice or an opportunity for a hearing, and whether criminal and disciplinary proceedings are interchangeable. The Court held that disciplinary and criminal proceedings are distinct and independent. It ruled that Regulation 63 does not exclude the principles of natural justice; therefore, an authority must afford an employee a fair hearing before imposing penalties, even following a conviction. Furthermore, the Court found that treating the petitioner differently from a similarly situated employee violated Article 25 of the Constitution. The dismissal order was set aside as arbitrary and illegal, and the Court granted the requested relief, rejecting the plea of laches.

  Questions settled

  • Are criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings synonymous and interchangeable?
  • Does a criminal conviction automatically justify the dismissal of an employee without observing the principles of natural justice?
  • Does Regulation 63 of the National Institute of Health Employees (Service) Regulations, 1989, exclude the application of the principles of natural justice?
  • Can an employer treat similarly situated employees differently without a legitimate basis for classification?
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• Muhammad Azram vs National Institute of Health and others2015 PLC (C.S.) 537 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-10-15
  disciplinary proceedingsnatural justiceaudi alteram partemwrongful dismissalfundamental rightscriminal convictiondiscriminationservice regulations
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the dismissal of a National Institute of Health employee following his conviction in a criminal case, which was later overturned upon acquittal. The core legal questions concerned whether the Institute could dismiss the petitioner without a show-cause notice or hearing under the National Institute of Health Employees (Service) Regulations, 1989, and whether the dismissal violated the principle of non-discrimination. The Court held that the dismissal was illegal and set aside the impugned order. It ruled that disciplinary proceedings are distinct from criminal proceedings and that the outcome of a criminal trial does not automatically dictate the result of disciplinary actions. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that Regulation 63 does not exclude the mandatory application of the principles of natural justice (audi alteram partem). Any disciplinary action taken without providing the employee an opportunity to be heard is arbitrary and void. Additionally, the Court held that treating the petitioner differently from a similarly situated employee who was reinstated after acquittal violated the fundamental right to equality guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Are criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings synonymous and interchangeable?
  • Does Regulation 63 of the National Institute of Health Employees (Service) Regulations, 1989, exclude the application of the principles of natural justice?
  • Can an employee be dismissed from service following a criminal conviction without being issued a show-cause notice or granted a hearing?
  • Does the differential treatment of similarly situated employees violate Article 25 of the Constitution?
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• Muhammad Adnan Moin vs Federation of Pakistan, Etc.2015-IHC-144 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-12-07
  disciplinary proceedingsnatural justicesummary procedureregular inquiryconstitutional petitionmisconductservice lawdiscretionary power
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns constitutional petitions challenging the dismissal of employees from the National Telecommunication Corporation (NTC) following disciplinary proceedings. The core legal question was whether the authorized officer lawfully exercised discretion by dispensing with a regular inquiry under Rule 6 of the Government Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules 1973, opting instead for summary proceedings under Rule 5. The Court held that the dismissal orders were unsustainable, as the allegations involved serious, disputed questions of fact that necessitated a regular inquiry to satisfy the requirements of natural justice. The Court emphasized that the authorized officer’s discretion to bypass a regular inquiry is not absolute and must be exercised reasonably and in good faith. By failing to hold a regular inquiry, the petitioners were denied the right to cross-examine witnesses and properly defend themselves, causing significant prejudice. Consequently, the Court set aside the dismissal orders, reinstated the petitioners with back benefits, and clarified that while authorities may initiate fresh proceedings, they must strictly adhere to the established legal procedure and principles of natural justice.

  Questions settled

  • When is a regular inquiry mandatory under the Government Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules 1973?
  • Can an authorized officer dispense with a regular inquiry when charges involve disputed questions of fact?
  • Does the exercise of discretion under Rule 5 of the Government Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules 1973 require the application of an independent mind?
  • Is a proceeding based solely on questionnaires sufficient to satisfy the requirements of a regular inquiry under Rule 6 of the Government Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules 1973?
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• Muhammad Abid Farooq vs The State and anotherPLJ 2015 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 10, PLJ 2015 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 795, 2015 P Cr. L J · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-09
  post-arrest bailnon-prohibitory clausecriminal breach of trustcivil transactionhabitual offenderpresumption of innocencefair trialprevious conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition seeking post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, concerning an alleged breach of trust regarding a loan transaction. The core legal questions involved whether a loan transaction failing civil repayment constitutes a criminal offence under the non-prohibitory clause, and whether the mere registration of other cases or a previous conviction in an unrelated matter automatically disentitles an accused from bail. The Islamabad High Court held that the transaction prima facie appeared to be of a civil nature, making it a case for further inquiry under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and that registration of multiple cases or a prior conviction does not negate the constitutional right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence. The court laid down the principle that bail in non-prohibitory offences should be granted as a rule unless exceptional circumstances exist, and courts must not allow prior convictions or pending cases to create bias or deny an accused the right to defence and due process guaranteed under Article 10-A of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Does failure to repay a loan transaction constitute a criminal offence of criminal breach of trust under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, or is it a matter of a civil nature?
  • Does the mere registration of multiple criminal cases against an accused suffice to treat them as a habitual offender for the refusal of bail?
  • Whether a previous conviction in an unrelated case automatically disentitles an accused from the concession of bail in a subsequent case falling within the non-prohibitory clause?
  • How does the constitutional right to a fair trial and due process under Article 10-A of the Constitution apply when considering bail for an accused facing multiple criminal proceedings?
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• Muhammad Abid Farooq vs StatePLJ 2015 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 795 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-09
  post-arrest bailcriminal breach of trustnon-prohibitory clausefurther inquiryhabitual offenderfair trialpresumption of innocenceprevious conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, arising from a monetary loan dispute. The core legal questions concerned whether a loan transaction lacking 'entrustment' constitutes criminal breach of trust, whether bail should be granted in offences falling within the non-prohibitory clause, and the impact of other pending cases or a previous conviction on an accused's right to bail, fair trial, and the presumption of innocence. The Islamabad High Court held that the transaction prima facie appeared to be of a civil nature, making it a case of further inquiry under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and that registration of multiple cases or a prior conviction does not automatically disentitle an accused to bail or negate the constitutional presumption of innocence. The court laid down the principle that each case must be assessed on its own merits, and refusing bail merely due to other pending cases or a conviction infringes upon the fundamental right to a fair trial and due process guaranteed under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan.

  Questions settled

  • Does a loan transaction involving a failure to repay constitute criminal breach of trust under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860?
  • Whether the mere registration of multiple criminal cases against an accused is sufficient to classify them as a habitual offender and deny post-arrest bail?
  • Does a previous conviction in one criminal case automatically disentitle an accused to the concession of bail in another pending case?
  • How does the constitutional right to a fair trial and presumption of innocence affect the consideration of bail when an accused is facing multiple criminal prosecutions?
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• Muhammad Abid Farooq vs State and anotherPLJ 2015 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 10 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-09
  post-arrest bailcriminal breach of trustnon-prohibitory clausefurther inquiryhabitual offenderfair trialpresumption of innocenceprevious conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, arising from a financial dispute over an unpaid loan. The core legal questions concern whether a loan transaction lacking entrustment constitutes criminal breach of trust, and whether an accused's previous conviction or pending cases disentitle them to bail in a separate matter under the non-prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Islamabad High Court held that the transaction was prima facie of a civil nature, making the case one of further inquiry under Section 497, and that the mere registration of other cases or a conviction in an unrelated matter cannot be used to deny bail or infringe upon the constitutional right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence. The court laid down the principle that each case must be adjudicated on its own merits, and treating a previous conviction as a universal bar to bail in other pending cases violates the right to due process and fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Does a financial dispute involving an unpaid loan constitute a criminal breach of trust under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, or a matter of a civil nature?
  • Whether the mere registration of multiple criminal cases against an accused is sufficient to classify them as a habitual offender for the denial of bail?
  • Does a conviction in an unrelated criminal case automatically disentitle an accused to the concession of bail in a subsequent case?
  • How does the constitutional right to a fair trial and due process under Article 10-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, apply when considering previous convictions and pending cases during bail adjudication?
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• Mst. Shamim Akhtar vs Pirzada Khalil Ur Rehman and 2 others2015 YLR 2176 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-11Read full judgment →
• Mst. Samina Khattak, etc vs SHO, Police Station Kohsar, etc2019 P Cr. L J 909, 2019 P Cr. L J 909, 2015-IHC-135 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-27
  quashment of FIRcustody of minorsnatural guardianhabeas corpusfamily disputeright to fair trialGuardian and Wards Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for the quashment of an FIR registered against a mother for the alleged kidnapping of her minor daughters, alongside a habeas corpus petition filed by the father seeking custody. The core legal questions were whether a criminal case under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be maintained against a natural guardian (mother) for retaining custody of minors, and whether habeas corpus proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are the appropriate forum for resolving custody disputes between parents. The Court held that a criminal case cannot be registered against a natural guardian for retaining custody of their own children, as such disputes fall exclusively under the jurisdiction of a Guardian Court. The Court quashed the FIR, noting that the police and criminal courts are not the proper forums for family disputes. Furthermore, the Court dismissed the habeas corpus petition, affirming that such jurisdiction is reserved for exceptional cases of real urgency and cannot substitute for the Guardian and Wards Act 1890. The judgment establishes that unwarranted references to courts in an FIR are illegal as they may prejudice the right to a fair trial.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal case for kidnapping be registered against a natural guardian for retaining custody of their minor children?
  • Is the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 an appropriate substitute for the Guardian and Wards Act 1890 in custody disputes?
  • Does an unwarranted reference to a court in an FIR violate the right to a fair trial?
  • Under what circumstances can a High Court exercise its powers to quash an FIR?
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• Mst. Nomail Zia-- vs Adnan Riaz2015 NLR Civil 435 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-09-16Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nasreen Akhtar vs Justice of Peace/Learned Additional Sessions2015 P Cr. L J 1644 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-07-01
  First Information Reportcognizable offenceJustice of the Peacemandatory registrationpolice inquirycriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal petition challenging an order passed by an Ex-Officio Justice of the Peace, who dismissed a request for the registration of an FIR on the ground that a parallel inquiry was pending before the Capital Development Authority. The core legal question is whether an officer in charge of a police station or a Justice of the Peace has the authority to conduct an inquiry into the veracity of information regarding a cognizable offense before complying with the mandatory duty to register an FIR under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that the duty to register an FIR upon receiving information of a cognizable offense is mandatory and cannot be delayed or refused pending an inquiry. The Court affirmed that neither the police nor the Justice of the Peace has the authority to adjudicate the truth or falsity of such information at the registration stage. The key principle laid down is that the scope of a Justice of the Peace under Section 22-A(6) is limited to determining if the information discloses a cognizable offense; if it does, the registration of an FIR must be directed without further inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Does an officer in charge of a police station have the authority to conduct an inquiry into the truth or falsity of information before registering an FIR under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What is the scope of the jurisdiction of an Ex-Officio Justice of the Peace under Section 22-A(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when considering a petition for the registration of an FIR?
  • Can the registration of an FIR be refused or delayed on the ground that a separate inquiry is being conducted by another authority?
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• Mst. Nasreen Akhtar vs Justice of Peace/Learned Additional Sessions2015-IHC-159 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-08Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naseem Fatima vs Capital Development Authority through its2015 PLJ Islamabad 135 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mst. Naseem Fatima vs Capital Development Authority through Its2015 NLR Civil 572 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mst. Naseem Fatima vs Capital Development Authority through Chairman and 4 others2015 PLJ Islamabad 135, 2015 YLR 1348 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-03-11Read full judgment →
• Mst. Khadija Qurban vs Federal Government Employees' Housing2015 PLJ Islamabad 285, 2015 MLD 1447 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-03Read full judgment →
• Mst. Khadija Qurban vs Federal Government Employees Housing2015 PLJ Islamabad 285 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mst. Ashram Bibi vs Musa Khan, etc.2015 PLJ Islamabad 103 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-03-11Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ashram Bibi vs Musa Khan and others2015 PLJ Islamabad 103, 2015 CLC 973 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-03-11Read full judgment →
• Ms. Zohra Pirzada and 3 others vs SSP, Islamabad and 5 others2015 PLJ Islamabad 411 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-07-01Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Sanam Jabeen vs Federal Public Service Commission through its2015 KLR Civil Cases 452 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mrs. Ambreen Naseem Khawaja vs Federation of Pakistan and others2015 P Cr. L J 506 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-12-26
  quashment of FIRinherent powers of High Courtabuse of process of lawfamily disputeconstitutional petitionpower of attorneychild custody
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 was filed seeking the quashment of an F.I.R. registered under Section 363 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, arising out of a family dispute regarding the removal and custody of a minor child between close relatives. The core legal questions examined were whether the quashment of an F.I.R. can be sought through a special power of attorney without the accused joining the investigation or seeking pre-arrest bail, and whether the High Court can exercise its inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 to quash an F.I.R. stemming from a civil/family dispute used as an instrument of harassment. The Islamabad High Court held that an attorney is competent to file for quashment on behalf of an absent petitioner, and that the F.I.R. was an abuse of the process of law. The court laid down the principle that criminal proceedings cannot be permitted to be utilized as a coercive tool or pressure tactic to settle civil and family disputes, and the High Court is duty-bound under its inherent jurisdiction to quash such mala fide proceedings to secure the ends of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Can the quashment of an F.I.R. be sought through a special power of attorney without the accused joining the investigation and applying for bail?
  • In what situations can the High Court exercise its inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 to quash an F.I.R.?
  • Whether an F.I.R. arising out of a family or civil dispute can be quashed to prevent the abuse of the process of law?
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• Montage Design Build, Islamabad through Partner vs Republic of Tajikistan through Embassy of Tajikistan and 2 others2015 PLJ Islamabad 33 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Montage Design Build through Partner vs The Republic of TAJIKISTANthrough the Embassy of Tajikistan and 2 others2015 CLD 8 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-12-10
  mobilization advance guaranteeunconditional guaranteebank guaranteeinjunctioninterim reliefindependent contractirretrievable injusticefraud
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged an order dismissing an application for a temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, seeking to restrain the encashment of a Mobilization Advance Guarantee furnished by an insurance company. The appellant, a partnership firm, had entered into an agreement to design an embassy complex and provided the guarantee to secure an advance payment. The respondent subsequently demanded encashment of the guarantee following a dispute over the awarding of construction work. The core legal questions addressed the nature of the guarantee—whether conditional or unconditional—and the circumstances under which a court may grant an injunction to restrain the encashment of an unconditional guarantee. The Islamabad High Court held that the guarantee was an autonomous, unconditional, and irrevocable contract, and that courts must exercise strict restraint, refusing to grant injunctive relief unless exceptional circumstances such as established fraud or irretrievable injustice are clearly made out. The principle laid down is that an unconditional guarantee constitutes an absolute obligation to pay upon demand according to its terms, independent of any underlying contractual disputes between the primary parties, and courts cannot rewrite the clear intentions of contracting parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Mobilization Advance Guarantee constitutes an independent and autonomous contract separate from the underlying primary agreement?
  • Under what exceptional circumstances can a court grant an interim injunction to restrain the encashment of an unconditional and irrevocable guarantee?
  • Does a dispute arising out of the performance or breach of the underlying primary contract justify restraining the encashment of an unconditional guarantee?
  • Whether the existence of a remedy through an executable money decree negates the plea of irretrievable injury or injustice in matters of guarantee encashment?
  Read full judgment →
• Montage Design Build through Partner vs The Republic of Tajikistan2015 PLD Islamabad 13 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-12-10Read full judgment →
• Miss Summara Nayaz vs Fop through Secretary Establishment Division and 3 others2015 PLC (C.S.) 671 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-01-22
  Intra Court AppealArticle 199writ jurisdictiondefinition of personInternational Islamic Universitymaintainabilityad hoc employmentgovernmental control test
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra Court Appeal was filed before the Islamabad High Court challenging the dismissal of a writ petition wherein an ad hoc employee contested the cessation of her service with the International Islamic University. The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the International Islamic University qualifies as a 'person' performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, thereby rendering it amenable to the High Court's constitutional writ jurisdiction. Evaluating the statutory governance structure under the International Islamic University Ordinance 1985 alongside established Supreme Court precedents, the Court analyzed whether the State exercised substantial administrative and financial dominance. The High Court determined that the Federal Government does not exercise meaningful administrative or financial control over the University, as its affairs are overseen by independent boards and its finances are largely self-generated. Consequently, the Court held that the University is not a 'person' under Article 199 and dismissed the appeal as non-maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the International Islamic University constitute a 'person' performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • What criteria determine whether an autonomous or statutory educational institution is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Does the lack of substantial executive, administrative, and financial control by the Federal Government over a university preclude the issuance of a writ under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Summara Nayaz vs F.O.P. through Secretary Establishment Division2015 PLJ Islamabad 67 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mirza Saeed Akhtar Baig vs The State2015 P Cr. L J 608 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-08-21
  post-arrest bailnon-prohibitory clauseco-accused statementadmissibility of evidencebogus documentsfurther inquirycheating
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under sections 420, 468, 471, 467, 419, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, relating to the preparation of bogus documents and files. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail where the primary evidence against him was a co-accused's statement and the only applicable offence attracted fell within the non-prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Islamabad High Court held that the petitioner made out a case for bail since the statement of the co-accused before the police was inadmissible as evidence against him under Article 38 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, leaving only an offence under section 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, which falls within the non-prohibitory clause. The court laid down the key principle that bail in offences falling within the non-prohibitory clause is to be granted favourably as a rule, unless exceptional circumstances such as risk of abscondence, tampering with evidence, repetition of the offence, or previous conviction are present.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the statement of a co-accused recorded before the police can be used as evidence against an accused person?
  • Does an offence under section 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 fall within the non-prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • What are the exceptional circumstances in which bail should be declined for offences falling within the non-prohibitory clause?
  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail when the only material implicating him is the statement of a co-accused and no incriminating evidence is recovered?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Ajmal. vs Syed Nazar Hussain Shah Bukhari, etc.2015-IHC-29 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-03-13Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Ajmal vs Syed Nazar Hussain Shah Bukhari and others2015 CLC 1568 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-17Read full judgment →
• Messrs Travel Waljis (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Commissioner Appeals, Income Tax, Islamabad andothers2015 P.C.T.L.R. 1, 2015 P.C.T.L.R. 710, PTCL 2015 CL.472, 2015 PTD 550, 2015 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-11-06Read full judgment →
• Messrs Travel Waljis (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Commissioner Appeals, Income Tax, Islamabad and others2015 PTD 550 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-11-06Read full judgment →
• Messrs Trans Tech Pakistan through Authorized Officer vs Alternative2015 PLJ Islamabad 458, 2015 YLR 2528 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-07-31Read full judgment →
• Messrs Punjab Oil Mills Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan and others2015 PTD 1219 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-03-24Read full judgment →
• Messrs Eman Enterprises and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2015 PTD 767 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-10-29
  sales taxbudgetary measuresdelegated legislationFinance Billtax exemptionstatutory interpretationfiscal policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the validity of S.R.O. No. 420(I)/2014, which increased the sales tax rate on the import of finished goods from 5% to 17% effective from June 4, 2014. The petitioners challenged this notification, arguing that since the amendment was proposed as a budgetary measure for the 2014-15 financial year, it should only have taken effect from July 1, 2014, and that collecting the higher rate before the passage of the Finance Bill violated the principle established by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Court held that because the government explicitly linked the amendment to the budgetary measures for the 2014-15 financial year, the collection of the increased tax rate prior to the commencement of that financial year was unjustified. Consequently, the Court declared the collection of the 17% tax rate between June 4, 2014, and June 30, 2014, to be null and void, while disposing of the related contempt petition due to a lack of evidence of willful disobedience.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Federal Government implement a tax increase via S.R.O. before the commencement of the financial year if the increase is explicitly proposed as a budgetary measure for that upcoming year?
  • Does the collection of sales tax at an increased rate prior to the passage of the Finance Bill violate the principles regarding budgetary measures?
  • Is the withdrawal of a concessionary tax rate through an S.R.O. valid if it contradicts the stated effective date of a budgetary proposal?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Capital Poultry Feed and Daal Mills through Managing Partner2018 [M] C.L.R. 1578, 2015 PLJ Islamabad 167, 2015 CLD 1149 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-23Read full judgment →
• Messrs Bannu Woollen Mills Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan and 2 others2015 PTD 1058 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-17Read full judgment →
• Messrs Bahria Town (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan through Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue and 2 othersPTCL 2015 CL. 810, 2015 PTD 1639 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-01-29Read full judgment →
• Messrs Bahria Town (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan through Chairman Federal Board of Revenue2015 PTD 1790 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-12Read full judgment →
• Messrs Advance Business System and others vs Fop and others2015 PLJ Islamabad 322, 2015 PTD 2004 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-05Read full judgment →
• Mehtab Ahmed vs The State and others2015 YLR 1132 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-16
  post-arrest bailstatutory delayfair trialState-appointed counselfiduciary dutyhardened criminalright to defence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a murder case registered under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, on the ground of statutory delay under the 3rd Proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, having remained incarcerated for over four years without the trial being concluded. The core legal questions concerned whether the delay caused by counsel appointed by the court at State expense is attributable to the accused to forfeit statutory bail, and whether a mere charge for an offence punishable with death brings the accused within the exception of being a hardened, desperate, or dangerous criminal under the 4th Proviso. The Islamabad High Court held that an accused cannot be held responsible for delays occasioned by the non-appearance of a State-appointed counsel, as no free choice or control was exercised, creating a fiduciary duty on the State and the court to ensure effective representation. Furthermore, a mere charge for a capital offense does not suffice to classify an accused as a habitual or dangerous criminal. The court laid down the principle that acts or omissions of a State-appointed counsel do not prejudice the accused's statutory right to bail, and granted the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the delay caused by the non-appearance of a counsel appointed by the court at State expense is attributable to the accused for the purposes of denying statutory bail under the 3rd Proviso to section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a mere charge for an offence punishable with death bring an accused within the exception of being a hardened, desperate, or dangerous criminal under the 4th Proviso to section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail as of right under the 3rd Proviso to section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when detained for a continuous period exceeding two years without conclusion of the trial, provided the delay is not occasioned by the accused?
  • Does the registration of multiple cases without a final conviction suffice to declare an accused a habitual offender under the fourth proviso to section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Mansoor Ahmed Bajwa vs Federation of Pakistan, etc2015 KLR Labour & Service Cases 78 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-01-26Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Rafique vs Mst. Tanveer Jahan and another2015 PLD Islamabad 30 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-12-26
  DNA testpaternity disputesuccession certificatepersonal libertyconsentprima facie casesummary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arises from concurrent orders of the lower courts dismissing the petitioner's application for a DNA test to challenge the paternity of respondent No. 2 in succession certificate proceedings. The core legal question is whether a court can compel a person to undergo a DNA test or blood sample collection without their consent and in the absence of a strong prima facie case. The Islamabad High Court held that a DNA test cannot be ordered in a routine manner or as a fishing expedition to challenge paternity, and no person can be compelled to provide a blood sample without consent, which would otherwise infringe upon personal liberty. The court established that a strong prima facie case must be established supported by sufficient material, and summary succession proceedings are not the appropriate forum to resolve intricate paternity disputes. The petition was accordingly dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court compel a person to undergo a DNA test without their consent?
  • Whether a DNA test can be ordered in summary succession proceedings to challenge paternity?
  • What is the threshold of proof required for a court to order a DNA test in paternity cases?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Rafique vs Mst. Tanveer Jahan & another2015 PLJ Islamabad 94 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-12-26Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri vs The State2015 PLD Islamabad 85 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-03-09
  blasphemyextra-judicial killinggrave and sudden provocationburden of proofrule of lawqatl-i-amddeath sentenceanti-terrorism
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal and capital punishment reference arose from a judgment of the Anti-Terrorism Court convicting the appellant for the murder of Salman Taseer, the then Governor of Punjab, under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The appellant admitted to shooting the deceased with his official firearm while deployed as a security guard, raising the defense that the deceased had committed blasphemy by criticizing the blasphemy laws, rendering him liable to be killed under Islamic law, and that the act was committed under grave and sudden provocation. The core legal questions involved whether an individual can take the law into their own hands to execute punishment for alleged blasphemy, whether the defense of grave and sudden provocation was available, and whether the offense constituted terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The Islamabad High Court held that no citizen is authorized to take the law into their own hands or act as an executioner, as Pakistan is a constitutional state governed by law. The court upheld the conviction and death sentence under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, ruling that the murder was premeditated and that extra-judicial killings find no justification in Islamic law or the laws of the land. However, the court set aside the conviction under section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, holding that the specific elements of terrorism were not established. The key principle laid down is that the administration of justice and enforcement of penal laws vest exclusively in the state and its courts, and individual vigilantism under the guise of religious enforcement is unlawful and punishable as murder.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an individual can take the law into their own hands to execute a person accused of blasphemy?
  • Does criticism of the blasphemy laws amount to the offense of blasphemy under Section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Whether the defense of grave and sudden provocation is available to an accused who deliberately seeks out or provokes the situation resulting in the homicide?
  • Does the murder of an individual by a security guard assigned to protect him constitute an act of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  Read full judgment →
• Major (Retd.) Ahmed Nadeem Sadal, etc vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Sports2015 C.L.R. 171 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Major (Retd.) Ahmed Nadeem Sadal and 3 others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Sports, Islamabad and 3 others2015 C.L.R. 171, 2015 PLJ Islamabad 1, 2015 CLC 34 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-05
  constitutional petitionsuppression of factsabuse of processclean handsfrivolous litigationspecial costsPakistan Cricket Board
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution was filed by petitioners challenging amendments made to the Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB) constitution via a notification dated 10-7-2014. During ex parte arguments, the Court was informed by the Additional Attorney General that the Supreme Court of Pakistan had already settled the matter through a short order and detailed judgment, approving the new PCB constitution and issuing execution directions. The petitioners suppressed these Supreme Court proceedings, short order, and judgment in their petition and subsequent affidavits, despite having received certified copies. The core legal questions were whether deliberate suppression of material facts and abuse of court process warrant outright dismissal and whether the High Court can impose heavy special costs beyond statutory limits under Section 35-A C.P.C. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that equitable constitutional jurisdiction requires clean hands and full disclosure. Finding the petitioners' conduct reprehensible and fraudulent, the Court imposed special costs of Rs. 1,000,000 on each petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Does deliberate concealment or suppression of material facts disentitle a petitioner from seeking equitable relief under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Can the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution impose heavy costs exceeding the limit specified in Section 35-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to deter frivolous litigation?
  • Whether filing a writ petition that suppresses a binding prior Supreme Court judgment on the same subject matter constitutes an abuse of the court process?
  Read full judgment →
• Major (R.) Waqar Ali Shah and 4 others vs Nawab Ali and 5 others2015 C.L.R. 1232 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-09
  regularization of servicescontingent employeesadministrative policydue processintra-court appealstatutory bodiesCabinet Division notification
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves multiple Intra-Court Appeals challenging a judgment that declared the regularization of services for various government, semi-government, and statutory employees void ab initio. The core legal question concerned the validity of the regularization process and the appropriate mechanism for reviewing the status of contingent and temporary employees. The court held that the impugned judgment was unsustainable. Relying on a notification issued by the Cabinet Division, the court directed that a newly constituted Committee be responsible for examining regularization cases on their individual merits, strictly adhering to the guidelines set forth in the 2008 policy. The court established that while the regularization policy provides a framework for employment, it does not legitimize illegal appointments. Consequently, departments retain the liberty to initiate proceedings against employees regularized through irregularities, provided that such actions strictly observe the mandatory requirements of due process as guaranteed under Article 10-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The Committee is mandated to pass speaking orders after affording all parties an opportunity of hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Does the regularization of government employees under a specific policy preclude departments from taking disciplinary action against those appointed through illegal means?
  • What procedural requirements must a committee follow when reviewing the regularization of government employees to satisfy the constitutional guarantee of due process?
  • Can a court declare the regularization of employees void ab initio when a government-constituted committee exists to evaluate such cases on their individual merits?
  Read full judgment →
• Major (R) Waqar Ali Shah and 4 others vs Nawab Ali and 5 others2015 PLJ Islamabad 220 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-09
  regularization of servicescontract employeescontingent employeesdue processintra court appealadministrative policyservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns multiple Intra Court Appeals challenging a judgment that declared the regularization of services of various contract and contingent employees by a Cabinet Sub-Committee as void ab initio. The core legal question involved the validity of the regularization process and the appropriate mechanism for determining the eligibility of such employees. The Court allowed the appeals and set aside the impugned judgment, directing that the regularization process be conducted by a newly constituted Committee established by the Federal Government. This Committee is tasked with examining each case on its own merits, adhering to the guidelines set forth in the 2008 regularization policy, and providing an opportunity for a hearing to all affected parties. The Court established that while regularization policies exist, they cannot be implemented to legitimize illegal appointments. Furthermore, departments maintain the authority to investigate and take action against illegal regularizations on a case-by-case basis, provided that any adverse order strictly adheres to the mandatory requirements of due process as guaranteed under Article 10-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Can a regularization policy be used to legitimize illegal appointments?
  • Does a department have the authority to initiate proceedings against employees regularized through illegal means?
  • Must an order having an adverse effect on an employee's rights comply with the requirements of due process?
  • Is the regularization of employees by a Cabinet Sub-Committee subject to review by a specifically constituted Committee under the 2008 policy guidelines?
  Read full judgment →
• MaAHMED Nadeem Sadal and 3 others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Sports, Islamabad and 3 others2015 PLJ Islamabad 1 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Kousar Aslam Pervaiz vs Government of Pakistan, Establishment DivisionK.L.R. 2015 Civil Cases 128 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• lqbal Muhammad Khan vs Abdul Aziz2015 C.L.R. 1095 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-04Read full judgment →
• Khushnood Ahmad vs Learned Additional District Judge, Islamabad and others2015 C.L.R. 1418 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Khalid Safdar vs The Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Government ofPakistan, IslamabadK.L.R. 2015 Civil Cases 46 · Islamabad High Court
  upgradation of postscivil servicerental ceilingRules of Business 1973promotionadministrative lawdiscrimination
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged an Office Memorandum issued by the Finance Division, which reclassified the upgradation of Private Secretaries (BPS-17) to Senior Private Secretaries (BPS-19) as a "move-over" rather than a promotion, thereby denying them associated rental ceiling and house rent allowances. The core legal question was whether the Finance Division could unilaterally reclassify this upgradation and deny financial benefits without consulting the Establishment Division. The Court held that the impugned Office Memorandum was legally invalid, discriminatory, and issued without the mandatory consultation required by the Rules of Business, 1973. Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the Court affirmed that the upgradation of posts constitutes a promotion. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned Office Memorandum, directing that the upgradation of Private Secretaries be treated as a promotion to prevent financial loss and the deprivation of premature increments. The judgment establishes that administrative actions altering the terms and conditions of service, particularly those involving financial rights, must strictly adhere to procedural requirements, including mandatory consultation with the Establishment Division, and cannot be arbitrarily reversed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the upgradation of a post constitute a promotion for civil servants?
  • Is consultation with the Establishment Division mandatory for the Finance Division when changing the terms and conditions of service of federal civil servants?
  • Can an administrative authority unilaterally reclassify an upgradation as a move-over to deny financial benefits to civil servants?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Safdar vs Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Govt. of Pakistan, Islamabad2015 PLJ Islamabad 21 · Islamabad High Court
  upgradationpromotioncivil servicerental ceilingRules of BusinessFinance Divisiondiscriminatory treatmentwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the Finance Division’s Office Memorandum dated 25th July 2014, which reclassified the upgradation of Senior Private Secretaries (BPS-19) as a "move-over" rather than a promotion, thereby denying them associated rental ceiling and house rent allowances. The core legal question was whether the Finance Division could unilaterally downgrade the status of these civil servants and deny them financial benefits without proper consultation or authority. The Court held that the impugned Office Memorandum was issued without the mandatory consultation with the Establishment Division, violating Rule 11 of the Rules of Business, 1973, and lacked the requisite approval of the Prime Minister. Furthermore, the Court found the action discriminatory and inconsistent with the original 2011 upgradation policy. Relying on the principle that upgradation constitutes promotion, the Court set aside the impugned memorandum. It ruled that the upgradation of Private Secretaries to Senior Private Secretaries must be treated as a promotion to protect civil servants from financial loss and the deprivation of legitimate service benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the upgradation of a civil servant to a higher pay scale constitute a promotion?
  • Can the Finance Division unilaterally change the terms and conditions of service of federal civil servants without consulting the Establishment Division?
  • Is an administrative order issued without the mandatory consultation required by the Rules of Business, 1973, legally valid?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Safdar vs Secretary, Ministry of Finance Government of Pakistan, IslamabadK.L.R. 2015 Civil Cases 46, 2015 PLJ Islamabad 21, 2015 PLC (C.S.) 460 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-11-07
  upgradationpromotionmove-overtime scalerental ceilingcivil servantterms and conditions of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition was filed by a Senior Private Secretary challenging an Office Memorandum issued by the Finance Division that sought to treat the grant of BPS-19 as a time-scale/move-over rather than an upgradation or promotion, thereby denying consequential financial benefits and rental ceiling allowances. The core legal question was whether the Finance Division could unilaterally alter the status of upgradation granted through a prior Office Memorandum and deny corresponding allowances without the concurrence of the Prime Minister and consultation with the Establishment Division. The Islamabad High Court held that the initial Office Memorandum explicitly upgraded the posts with the Prime Minister's approval, and the subsequent impugned memorandum issued by the Finance Division was illegal, discriminatory, without lawful authority, and in violation of the Rules of Business, 1973. The court ruled that upgradation amounts to promotion and set aside the impugned memorandum, laying down the principle that vested rights created under an official policy approved by the competent authority cannot be arbitrarily withdrawn or curtailed by a subordinate division.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the grant of a higher basic pay scale through upgradation amounts to promotion?
  • Can the Finance Division unilaterally alter the terms of an upgradation policy approved by the Prime Minister without consulting the Establishment Division?
  • Whether civil servants are entitled to enhanced rental ceiling and housing allowances upon upgradation to a higher pay scale?
  • Does a change in the terms and conditions of service of federal civil servants require mandatory consultation with the Establishment Division under the Rules of Business, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Irshad and 6 others vs Mst. Mukhmal Jan2015 C.L.R. 874 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-06Read full judgment →
• Irfan Ahmed, etc. vs Federation of Pakistan, etc.2015-IHC-132 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-12-21Read full judgment →
• Iqbal Muhammad Khan vs Abdul Aziz2015 C.L.R. 1095, 2015 PLJ Islamabad 261, 2015 CLC 1667 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-04Read full judgment →
• International Islamic University, Islamabad and others vs Dr. Shameem2015 PLC (C.S.) 1336 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-07-09
  writ jurisdictiondefinition of personInternational Islamic Universitystatutory rulesaffairs of the federationconstitutional petitionintra court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by a larger bench of the Islamabad High Court addresses intra court appeals and writ petitions concerning the legal status of the International Islamic University, Islamabad, and whether it is amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan. The core legal question was whether the University constitutes a 'person' performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, and whether its rules and regulations are statutory in nature. The court held that the International Islamic University is a body corporate established under the International Islamic University Ordinance, 1985, possessing statutory rules and regulations, controlled substantially by the Federal Government through the President as Chancellor and the Board of Trustees, and financed largely through public funds. Consequently, the court ruled that the University qualifies as a 'person' under Article 199(5) of the Constitution and is fully amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The appeals were disposed of accordingly, with certain matters remanded for decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the International Islamic University, Islamabad is a 'person' within the meaning of Article 199(5) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Are the rules and regulations of the International Islamic University of a statutory nature?
  • Is the International Islamic University amenable to the constitutional writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the International Islamic University perform functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation?
  Read full judgment →
• Inam Ullah Khan. vs Aksa Solutions Development Services Pvt. Ltd. Etc.2019 CLD 355, 2015 IHC 41 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-11-30Read full judgment →
• Imran Masood vs The State2015 P Cr. L J 259 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-10-03
  post-arrest bailstatutory delaySection 497 CrPCright to fair trialcriminal trial delayhardened criminalmurder trial
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a murder case registered under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, citing statutory delay under the 3rd Proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, as he had been incarcerated for over two years. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail as of right, given that the trial had not concluded within the statutory period and whether the delay was attributable to him. The Court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail, as the record demonstrated that the delay was caused by the prosecution, the complainant, or administrative exigencies, rather than by the petitioner. The Court clarified that delay caused by co-accused in a private complaint, to which the petitioner was not a party, could not be imputed to him. Furthermore, the Court established that a mere charge for a capital offense does not render an accused a 'hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal' under the 4th Proviso without evidence of prior convictions.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to bail as a matter of right under the 3rd Proviso to Section 497(1), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, if the trial for a capital offense exceeds two years?
  • Can delay caused by co-accused in a private complaint be attributed to an accused who was not a party to the compromise negotiations for the purpose of statutory bail?
  • Does a mere charge for an offense punishable with death automatically classify an accused as a 'hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal' under the 4th Proviso to Section 497(1), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Imran and anothers vs The STATEand another2015 YLR 831 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-04-15
  post-arrest bailcross-versionfurther inquirymedical evidencetentative assessmentcriminal procedurebail adjudication
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for post-arrest bail filed in cross-cases arising from FIR No. 22/2013, involving charges under Sections 302, 324, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail in light of the specific allegations and the evidentiary record. Regarding the petitioner Imran, the Court observed that the allegation of a 'Danda' blow was unsupported by medical evidence, necessitating further inquiry into his guilt. Regarding the petitioner Muhammad Qasim Zafar, the Court noted that the allegations were limited to minor injuries under Section 337A(i) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and that a medical board report suggested the possibility of self-inflicted wounds, while the alleged firing was ineffective. The Court held that both petitioners were entitled to bail, emphasizing that observations made during bail proceedings are tentative and should not influence the trial court. The judgment reinforces the principle that where allegations lack medical corroboration or involve bailable offences, the case for further inquiry is established.

  Questions settled

  • Does a statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 that is unsupported by medical evidence constitute sufficient grounds to deny post-arrest bail?
  • Can bail be granted when the medical evidence regarding the injuries sustained by the complainant party is inconclusive or suggests self-inflicted wounds?
  • Is an ineffective fire that does not hit any person or object a sufficient basis to deny bail in a case involving attempted murder?
  • Under what circumstances does a case qualify for 'further inquiry' into the guilt of an accused for the purpose of granting bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Iftikhar Rashid and 3 others vs Federation of Pakistan and 5 others2015 C.L.R. 1049 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-29
  constitutional petitionlocus standiservice mattersdisciplinary proceedingspublic interest litigationaggrieved personjurisdiction of service tribunals
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, retired police officers, filed this constitutional petition seeking a declaration that civil servants must perform duties in accordance with law and challenging disciplinary proceedings initiated against two specific respondents. The core legal questions were whether the petition was maintainable given the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution, and whether the petitioners possessed the requisite locus standi as 'aggrieved persons' under Article 199 to challenge disciplinary actions against third-party civil servants. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that disciplinary matters concerning civil servants fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of Service Tribunals established under Article 212. The Court affirmed that the bar on jurisdiction cannot be circumvented by third parties filing petitions under the guise of public interest litigation, applying the principle that what is not permissible directly cannot be achieved indirectly. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the petitioners lacked locus standi because they failed to establish a personal legal grievance or violation of their own fundamental rights, which is a prerequisite for invoking the High Court's extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to entertain a constitutional petition regarding the disciplinary proceedings of civil servants in light of Article 212 of the Constitution?
  • Can a third party maintain a constitutional petition on behalf of a civil servant to challenge disciplinary proceedings by framing it as public interest litigation?
  • Is a petitioner required to be an 'aggrieved person' to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199?
  Read full judgment →
• Huma Maqsood vs Vice-Chancellor, Iqra University, etcK.L.R. 2015 Labour & Service Cases 23, 2015 C.L.R. 399 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-09Read full judgment →
• Homoeopathic Doctor Aftab Hassan Minhas vs National Counsel for Homoeopathy through its Registrar_Secretary and 3 others2015 PLC (C.S.) 991, 2015 PLJ Islamabad 190 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-03-04
  Intra Court AppealConstitutional PetitionDepartmental ProceedingsMaintainabilityLaw Reforms OrdinanceService Regulations
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra Court Appeal challenged the dismissal of a Constitutional Petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, which had contested the appointment of a Registrar and the initiation of departmental inquiry proceedings. The core legal question was whether an Intra Court Appeal is maintainable against an order passed by a Single Judge in constitutional jurisdiction when the underlying departmental law provides a remedy of appeal. The Court held that the appeal was not maintainable. Relying on the proviso to Section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, and the precedent set in Karim Bibi vs. Hussain Bukhsh, the Court determined that if the law applicable to the original proceedings provides for an appeal, revision, or review, an Intra Court Appeal is barred. Since the National Council for Homoeopathy (Staff) Service Regulations, 1987, explicitly provided a right of appeal against departmental penalties, the constitutional challenge to those proceedings was precluded from further appeal. The Court affirmed that the appointment of the Registrar remained the prerogative of the Council.

  Questions settled

  • Is an Intra Court Appeal maintainable against a Single Judge's order in a Constitutional Petition if the underlying statute provides a right of appeal?
  • Does the proviso to Section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 bar an appeal where the original departmental proceedings are subject to an appellate remedy?
  • What constitutes an 'original order' for the purposes of determining the maintainability of an Intra Court Appeal under the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972?
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• Haroon Zaman and another vs Federation of Pakistan, etc2015 C.L.R. 392 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-11-06Read full judgment →
• Hamida Farhat Burki vs Capital Development Authority and 3 others2015 PLJ Islamabad 368 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-18Read full judgment →
• Haji Abdul Rasheed Rajput vs Muhammad Yaqoob and 7 others2015 PLJ Islamabad 133 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-26Read full judgment →
• Haji Abdul Rasheed Rajput vs Muhammad Yaqoob & Seven OTHERSs2015 NLR Civil 580 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-26Read full judgment →
• Haji Abdul Rasheed Rajput vs Muhammad Yaqoob & Seven Others2015 NLR Civil 580 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-26Read full judgment →
• Hafeez Akhtar Kiyani vs Bashir Ahmed & 5 Others2015-IHC-141 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-12-21Read full judgment →
• Great Bear International Services (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Pakistan2015 P.C.T.L.R. 796 · Islamabad High Court
  spectrum feescarce resourceboard resolutioncorporate authorizationlate payment feetelecommunication licenselimitation period
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a telecommunications company, challenged an enforcement order issued by the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) under the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act 1996, which demanded outstanding annual spectrum fees and late payment charges. The appellant contended that the spectrum fee was only payable upon actual 'use' of the allocated radio frequency spectrum, which it had not utilized during the relevant financial year, and that the late payment charges were subject to regulatory limitations. The respondent challenged the competency of the appeal, noting that a valid Board Resolution authorizing the litigation was not appended at the time of filing. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that radio frequency spectrum is a scarce state resource, and its allocation alone attracts the fee regardless of actual use. Furthermore, the court ruled that late payment charges agreed upon in the license are contractually binding. Crucially, the court held that a legal proceeding initiated on behalf of a corporate entity without a valid Board Resolution is incompetent, and such a defect cannot be cured by subsequent ratification after the expiry of the limitation period.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the annual spectrum fee is payable by a licensee upon the mere allocation of the radio frequency spectrum regardless of its actual use?
  • Can a late payment fee specified in a consensual telecommunication license be avoided by relying on separate statutory regulations?
  • Is a legal proceeding instituted on behalf of an incorporated company valid if a board resolution authorizing its filing is not appended at the time of institution?
  • Can the defect of an unauthorized filing on behalf of a corporate entity be cured by subsequent ratification after the limitation period has expired?
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• Great Bear International Services (Pvt.) Ltd vs Pakistan2015 PLJ Islamabad 290 · Islamabad High Court
  spectrum feetelecommunication licensecorporate litigationboard resolutionmaintainability of appealcontractual liabilitylimitation period
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged an enforcement order issued by the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority demanding payment of annual regulatory dues and Radio Frequency Spectrum fees. The core legal questions concerned whether spectrum fees are contingent upon actual usage, whether late payment penalties are governed by the license agreement or regulatory provisions, and whether an appeal filed by a corporate entity without a timely Board Resolution is maintainable. The Court held that the Radio Frequency Spectrum is a scarce state resource; therefore, the fee is payable upon allocation, regardless of whether the spectrum is actively used. Furthermore, the Court ruled that late payment fees stipulated in the license are binding contractual obligations. Finally, the Court affirmed that a legal proceeding initiated by a company without a valid Board Resolution authorizing the litigation is incompetently instituted. Such a defect is incurable if not rectified within the statutory limitation period, rendering the appeal non-maintainable. The principle established is that corporate litigation requires strict adherence to authorization protocols, and contractual license terms regarding fees and penalties remain enforceable regardless of usage or economic hardship.

  Questions settled

  • Is the payment of Radio Frequency Spectrum fee contingent upon the actual use of the spectrum by the licensee?
  • Are late payment fees stipulated in a telecommunication license binding as a contractual obligation?
  • Can an appeal filed by a corporate entity be maintained if a valid Board Resolution authorizing the litigation was not appended within the limitation period?
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• Great Bear International Services (Pvt) Ltd. vs Pakistan Telecommunication2015-IHC-71 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-06
  radio frequency spectrum feescarce resourcetelecommunication licenceboard resolutionmaintainability of appeallate payment feecontractual terms
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant appeal is directed against an enforcement order passed by the respondent Authority requiring the appellant to pay annual regulatory dues and the annual Radio Frequency Spectrum Fee along with late payment additional charges. The core legal questions concern whether the spectrum fee is payable only when the assigned spectrum is actually 'used', whether the late payment fee is governed by the licence terms or regulations, and whether an appeal filed by an incorporated company without a valid board resolution within the limitation period is maintainable. The court held that the spectrum fee is payable for the mere allocation of the radio frequency spectrum as a scarce State resource, regardless of its actual use; that the late payment fee arises from the consensual terms of the licence and is binding; and that an appeal instituted by a juridical person without a valid board resolution within the limitation period is incompetent and the defect is incurable. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the annual Radio Frequency Spectrum Fee is payable only upon the actual use of the assigned spectrum or simply for its allocation?
  • Whether the late payment additional fee is governed by the consensual terms of the licence or by the statutory regulations?
  • Whether an appeal filed on behalf of an incorporated company without a valid board resolution within the period of limitation is maintainable and whether the defect is curable?
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• Great Bear International Services (Pvt) Ltd vs Authority2015 PLJ Islamabad 290, 2015 CLD 1721 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-29
  spectrum feecorporate litigationboard resolutionlimitation periodtelecommunication licensecontractual liabilityscarce resourcemaintainability of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an enforcement order issued by the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority requiring the appellant to pay annual Radio Frequency Spectrum fees and late payment charges. The core legal questions concerned whether spectrum fees are contingent upon actual usage, the legal basis for late payment penalties, and the maintainability of an appeal filed by a corporation without a valid Board Resolution within the limitation period. The Court held that the Radio Frequency Spectrum is a scarce state resource, and fees are payable upon allocation, regardless of actual usage. Regarding the late payment charges, the Court determined that the license constitutes a binding contractual instrument, and the stipulated penalties are enforceable. Crucially, the Court ruled that legal proceedings initiated by a corporate entity without a valid Board Resolution at the time of filing are incompetent. Because the appellant failed to provide such authorization within the statutory limitation period, the defect was deemed incurable. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as not validly instituted, affirming that corporate litigation requires strict adherence to authorization protocols to prevent the circumvention of limitation periods.

  Questions settled

  • Is the payment of Radio Frequency Spectrum fees contingent upon the actual use of the spectrum by the licensee?
  • Can a corporate entity cure the defect of an unauthorized appeal by filing a Board Resolution after the expiry of the limitation period?
  • Are late payment fees stipulated in a telecommunication license enforceable as a contractual obligation?
  • Does the failure to append a valid Board Resolution at the time of filing an appeal render the proceedings incompetent?
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• Ghulam Rabbani and 3 others vs Nazir Ahmed and 4 others2015 PLJ Islamabad 51 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-01-09Read full judgment →