Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 4,389 judgments in total from the Islamabad High Court.

• Ghulam Nabi Khan vs Secretary, Interior Division, Ministry of Interior2015 C.L.R. 868 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-16Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Murtaza vs Vice-Chancellor, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, etcK.L.R. 2015 Civil Cases 10 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-11-07Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Abbas vs Additional Sessions Judge (West) Islamabad and 22015 MLD 1740 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-08-04Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence and otherss vs Messrs Aalme Engineers (Pvt.) Ltd2015 CLC 1273 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-05Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan and anothers vs Saeed Ahmed Khan and others2015 CLC 1797 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-13Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan and another vs Saeed Ahmed Khan, etc.2015 CLC 1797, 2015 PLJ Islamabad 374 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-13Read full judgment →
• Federation of Employee Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. vs DoctorsK.L.R. 2015 Civil Cases 38 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-11-05Read full judgment →
• Federal Board of Revenue vs Kh. Saleem. and anotherPTCL 2015 CL. 313 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-04-21Read full judgment →
• Fazal-e-Qadir and 5 others vs Muhammad AzamK.L.R. 2015 Civil Cases 150 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-04Read full judgment →
• Fateh All Khan vs Federation of Pakistan, etcK.L.R. 2015 Civil Cases 148 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-01-19Read full judgment →
• Euro Duty Free Shop (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan, etc.2015 P.C.T.L.R. 418 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-06-23Read full judgment →
• Euro Duty Free Shop (Pvt.) Ltd vs Federation of Pakistan and others2015 PTD 790 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-06-23Read full judgment →
• Ejaz Baig vs StatePLJ 2015 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 728 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-08-03
  post-arrest bailcurrency smugglingcustoms actfurther inquiryforeign exchange regulationprohibitory clause
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under the Customs Act, 1969 and the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947, for attempting to smuggle foreign and local currency from the Benazir Bhutto International Airport, Islamabad. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail given the circumstances of his apprehension and the statutory limits on carrying foreign currency. The Islamabad High Court held that the case warranted further inquiry, noting uncertainty regarding whether the petitioner had crossed the customs declaration stage and whether the currency fell within permissible limits when considering the accompanying family members. Additionally, the court observed that the petitioner was no longer required for investigation and that alternative punishments justified granting bail. The court admitted the petitioner to post-arrest bail, laying down the principle that tentative assessments regarding statutory compliance and the stage of attempting an offense under the Customs Act can constitute grounds for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the carriage of foreign currency exceeding prescribed limits by a passenger accompanied by family members constitutes a case of further inquiry for the purpose of bail?
  • Does the failure to clearly establish in the FIR that an accused had crossed the customs declaration counter bring the case within the scope of further inquiry?
  • Whether the existence of alternate punishments of imprisonment or fine affects the application of the prohibitory clause for granting bail?
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• Ehsan Ullah Qureshi vs United Bank Limited2015 PLJ Islamabad 401, 2015 CLD 899 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-03-31Read full judgment →
• Ehsan Ullah Qureshi vs United Bank Limited through Manager2015 CLD 938 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-01-29Read full judgment →
• Ehsan Ullah Qureshi vs United Bank Limited through its Manager2015 PLJ Islamabad 91 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-01-29Read full judgment →
• Eastern Testing Services (Pvt.) Ltd. vs SECP, Etc.2015-IHC-171 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-12-08
  constitutional petitionmaintainabilityalternate remedyCompanies OrdinanceSECPwrit jurisdictiondisputed questions of factstatutory appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a company incorporated under the Companies Ordinance 1984, challenged two orders passed by the Deputy Registrar of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) regarding the removal of its Chief Executive Officer. The petitioner argued that the Deputy Registrar lacked the power of review and that the impugned orders were passed without jurisdiction and based on mala fides. The core legal question was whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 is maintainable when the petitioner has bypassed available statutory remedies under the Companies Ordinance 1984 and the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act 1997. The Court held that the petition was not maintainable, emphasizing that constitutional jurisdiction is discretionary and should not be invoked when adequate alternate statutory remedies exist, such as appeals or revisions before the Commission or Appellate Bench. The Court established that unless an order is palpably without jurisdiction, mala fide, or void, the High Court will not interfere, especially when the matter involves disputed questions of fact, such as the service of an injunctive order.

  Questions settled

  • Is a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 maintainable when adequate statutory remedies are available under the Companies Ordinance 1984?
  • Can a High Court resolve disputed questions of fact, such as the service of an injunctive order, while exercising its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199?
  • Does the Registrar of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan possess the power of review under the Companies Ordinance 1984?
  • Under what exceptional circumstances will a High Court entertain a constitutional petition despite the existence of an alternate statutory remedy?
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• Dr. Taqdees Naqash vs Senior Superintendent of Police and others2015 P Cr. L J 1628 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-30
  medical negligencequashing of FIRprofessional misconductPM&DCconstitutional jurisdictioncriminal negligencemens rea
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed before the Islamabad High Court to quash an FIR registered under section 322 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 against medical professionals and a hospital following the death of a patient due to alleged professional negligence. The core legal question was whether criminal proceedings could be initiated against medical practitioners without first exhausting the special statutory mechanism under the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council regulations, and whether the High Court could quash the FIR in constitutional jurisdiction by evaluating the degree of negligence. The court dismissed the petition, holding that the complainant had in fact already approached the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council where disciplinary proceedings were conducted and the petitioners were found negligent and censured. The court laid down the principle that once the special remedy under medical regulations is exhausted and professional negligence or misconduct is determined by the regulatory body, criminal and civil law can validly be set into motion, and the High Court will not enter into a deeper factual appreciation of mens rea or the degree of negligence within its constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether criminal proceedings can be initiated against medical practitioners for professional negligence without exhausting remedies under special medical regulations?
  • Can the High Court in constitutional jurisdiction go into the details to ascertain the degree of negligence on the part of medical practitioners?
  • Does the prior determination of professional negligence and imposition of censure by the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council permit the initiation of criminal proceedings?
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• Dr. Taqdees Naqaish vs Senior Superintendent of Police and others2015 PLJ Islamabad 354 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-30Read full judgment →
• Dr. Rana Muhammad Akhlaq vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Cabinet Division and others2015 CLC 397 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-04-09Read full judgment →
• Dr. Mumtaz Ahmed and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2015 CLC 577 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-01-16Read full judgment →
• DR. Kamran Jahangir vs Chancellor, Shifa Tameer-E-Millat University, etc2015 PLJ Islamabad 140 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Dr. Kamran Jahangir vs Chancellor Shifa Tameer-E-Millatuniversity2015 PLJ Islamabad 140, 2015 PLC (C.S.) 710 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-27
  writ jurisdictionmaintainability of petitionstatutory bodyfunction testeducational institutionjudicial restraintin loco parentisArticle 199
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged the termination of the petitioner’s service as Vice-Chancellor of Shifa Tameer-e-Millat University. The core legal question was whether the University, established by an Act of Parliament, qualifies as a "person" under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, rendering it amenable to the High Court's writ jurisdiction. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the University does not constitute a "person" under Article 199(5). The ratio decidendi establishes that mere creation by statute is insufficient to invoke writ jurisdiction. Instead, an entity must satisfy the "function test," requiring that it perform state functions involving sovereign power, be substantially controlled by the government, and be funded by the state. As the University lacked such administrative and financial government control, it fell outside the scope of Article 199. Additionally, the Court invoked the doctrine of in loco parentis, emphasizing judicial restraint regarding the administrative autonomy of educational institutions to preserve their prestige and discipline.

  Questions settled

  • Does an entity established by an Act of Parliament automatically qualify as a 'person' amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • What are the criteria for determining whether a body corporate is a 'person' performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation or a Province under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Is the doctrine of 'in loco parentis' a valid ground for judicial restraint in administrative matters of educational institutions?
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• Dr. Arif Hayat vs Sher Muhammad and 8 others2015 PLJ Islamabad 187, 2015 CLC 1383 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-02
  civil revisionconsolidation of suitsspecific performanceejectment petitionrent controlinherent powersconflicting judgments
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision arises from a dispute where the petitioner sought the consolidation of a suit for specific performance and two ejectment petitions involving the same parties and the same property. The trial court had previously dismissed the application for consolidation, reasoning that the jurisdictions of the Civil Court and the Rent Controller are distinct. The core legal question was whether a civil suit and rent ejectment petitions concerning the same property and parties could be consolidated to avoid conflicting judgments and multiplicity of litigation. The High Court held that consolidation is permissible and necessary to prevent conflicting findings and unnecessary litigation. The Court reasoned that while the Rent Controller exercises specific powers, there is no express legal bar preventing the consolidation of rent proceedings with a civil suit. The Court emphasized that the Rent Controller possesses powers analogous to a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and that procedural flexibility exists to ensure justice. Consequently, the High Court set aside the trial court's order and directed the consolidation of the three cases.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil suit for specific performance and rent ejectment petitions involving the same property and parties be consolidated?
  • Does the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance 2001 contain an express bar against consolidating rent proceedings with a civil suit?
  • Does a Rent Controller possess powers analogous to a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding the summoning of witnesses and production of documents?
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• Dr. Aftab Hassan Minhas vs National Councel for Homoeopathy2015 PLC (C.S.) 991 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-03-04
  Intra Court Appealmaintainabilitydepartmental proceedingsstatutory appealLaw Reforms OrdinanceConstitutional Petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an order of a Single Judge in Chambers, which dismissed a Constitutional Petition filed by the appellant against the appointment of a Registrar and the initiation of departmental inquiry proceedings against him. The core legal question was whether an Intra Court Appeal is maintainable under the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, when the underlying departmental proceedings provide a statutory right of appeal. The Court held that the appeal was not maintainable. Relying on the proviso to Section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, and the principle established in Karim Bibi v. Hussain Bukhsh (PLD 1984 SC 344), the Court determined that if the law governing the proceedings from which a Constitutional Petition arises provides for at least one appeal against the original order, no Intra Court Appeal is competent. Since the National Council for Homoeopathy (Staff) Service Regulations, 1987, explicitly provide a right of appeal against penalties imposed during departmental proceedings, the appellant had an alternative remedy, rendering the Intra Court Appeal barred by the statutory proviso.

  Questions settled

  • Is an Intra Court Appeal maintainable against an order passed in a Constitutional Petition if the relevant statute provides a right of appeal against the original order?
  • Does the existence of a statutory right of appeal in departmental proceedings bar an Intra Court Appeal under the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972?
  • What is the scope of the term 'original order' within the context of the proviso to Section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972?
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• Dewan Salman Fibre Ltd., etc. vs Federation of Pakistan, through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, etc2015 P.C.T.L.R. 677 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Dewan Salman Fibre Ltd. and others vs Federation of Pakistan, through Secretary, M_O Finance and others2015 PTD 2304 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-14
  Fiscal incentivesSales tax exemptionPromissory estoppelVested rightsEconomic reformsIndustrialization policyGovernment commitmentsTaxation lawConstitutional petitionExecutive authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This case involved an Intra-court appeal and two writ petitions challenging the Federal Government's withdrawal and dilution of fiscal incentives, specifically sales tax exemptions, granted to Dewan Salman Fibre Limited (DSF) for establishing an industrial unit in an underdeveloped area. DSF had invested heavily based on S.R.O.s promising a five-year sales tax exemption. The core legal questions revolved around the applicability of promissory estoppel, vested rights, and the legality of subsequent S.R.O.s that curtailed the exemption period, imposed Central Excise Duty, and introduced sales tax on raw materials, effectively reducing the benefit. The Court held that the government could not arbitrarily withdraw or dilute time-bound fiscal incentives through executive notifications, especially when investors had acquired vested rights by altering their position in reliance on such promises. It emphasized that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Consequently, the Court accepted the appeal and one writ petition, declaring the impugned S.R.O.s illegal and ineffective qua the appellant's rights, but dismissed the writ petition challenging amendments to the Sales Tax Act, affirming the legislature's power within constitutional limits.

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• Companies Zone vs MS. Fahmida HamidNLR 2015 Tax 78 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-12Read full judgment →
• Communication House (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Pakistan Telecommunication2015 NLR Civil 356 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner, I.R. vs OGDCL, etc.2015 P.C.T.L.R. 364 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-08Read full judgment →
• Commissioner vs OGDCL, etc.2015 PLJ Islamabad 100 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-15Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax Companies Zone vs Ms.NLR 2015 Tax 78, 2015 P.C.T.L.R. 625, 2015 YLR 1167, PLJ 2015 Tax Cases (Isl.) 53 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-12
  tax referencesubstantial question of lawadvisory jurisdictiondeemed incomeIncome Tax Appellate Tribunalfactual controversygeneral public importance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns six consolidated Tax References filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax against the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal's decision, which favored the assessees regarding the addition of loan amounts as deemed income under Section 12(18) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the issues raised by the Revenue constituted substantial questions of law suitable for reference to the High Court under Section 133 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Court held that the proposed questions were essentially factual in nature, specific to the individual circumstances of the assessees, and lacked the general public importance or precedential value required for a reference. The Court emphasized that its advisory jurisdiction in tax references is limited to resolving problematic or debatable legal questions of general application, rather than acting as an appellate forum for factual disputes. Consequently, the Court dismissed the applications, ruling that no substantial question of law arose from the Tribunal's decision that necessitated judicial intervention.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of the High Court's jurisdiction in tax references under the Income Tax Ordinance?
  • Does a question of law in a tax reference require general public importance to be considered by the High Court?
  • Can factual controversies be converted into legal issues for the purpose of a tax reference?
  • Is the High Court's advisory jurisdiction in tax matters intended to function as an appellate or revisional jurisdiction?
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• Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax Companies Zone vs Ms111 TAX 329 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax, Companies Zone, Islamabad vs Messrs2015 PTD 1169 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-16Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax vs Gammon Pakistan Limited2015 PTD 1921 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-10Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax Companies Zone, Islamabad vs M/s.PLJ 2015 Tax Cases (Isl.) 81 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax Companies Zone, Islamabad vs M/s.2015 P.C.T.L.R. 892 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax Companies Zone, Islamabad vs Messrs2015 PTD 2067 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-16Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs OGDCL and others2015 P.C.T.L.R. 364, 2015 PLJ Islamabad 100, 2015 PTD 899 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-15Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue (Zone-I), Regional Tax Office, IslamabadPLJ 2015 Tax Cases (Isl.) 86 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue (Zone-I), Islamabad vs Mis. Askari2015 P.C.T.L.R. 705 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue (Zone-I) vs Messrs Askari Sovereign2015 P.C.T.L.R. 705, PLJ 2015 Tax Cases (Isl.) 86, 2015 PTD 2477 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-14Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs, Chairman, Islamabad vs Customs AppellatePTCL 2015 CL.189 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-12-20Read full judgment →
• Collector Customs, Model Customs Islamabad vs Mubarak Shah and 2PTCL 2015 CL. 642 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-06-11Read full judgment →
• Col. (R) Javed Agha, etc vs Arshad Mahmud, etc2015 C.L.R. 402 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Col. (R) Javed Agha and others vs Arshad Mehmud and others2015 YLR 998, 2015 C.L.R. 402 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-01-21Read full judgment →
• Chief Security Officer, Airports Security Force, Islamabad and others2015 PLC (C.S.) 807, 2015 PLJ Islamabad 359 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-12
  intra court appealmaintainabilitylaw reforms actairports security forcedepartmental appealconstitutional petitionbar of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra Court Appeal challenges the judgment of a learned Single Judge in Chambers who accepted a writ petition filed by an employee of the Airports Security Force against his retirement order. The core legal question was whether an Intra Court Appeal is maintainable under Section 3 of the Law Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 against an order of a Single Judge when the law applicable to the original proceedings provides for an appeal. The court held that since the applicable statutes and rules—specifically the Airport Security Force Act, 1975, the Airport Security Force (Discipline) Rules, 1977, and the Civil Servant Appeal Rules, 1977—provided a remedy of appeal against the original order of retirement, the proviso to Section 3(2) of the Law Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 squarely barred the Intra Court Appeal. The court laid down the principle that an Intra Court Appeal before a division bench is not competent against an order passed by a Single Judge in constitutional jurisdiction if the original proceedings permitted an appeal, revision, or review under the governing law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Intra Court Appeal is maintainable under Section 3 of the Law Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 when the law applicable to the original proceedings provides a remedy of appeal?
  • Does the bar under the proviso to Section 3(2) of the Law Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 apply if an aggrieved employee has a remedy of departmental appeal against an order of retirement?
  • Whether the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 is barred in service matters of civil servants under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
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• Chief Security Officer Airports Security Force and others vs Tariq2015 PLC (C.S.) 807 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-12
  Intra Court AppealmaintainabilityLaw Reforms Actdepartmental appealservice matterstatutory remedywrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra Court Appeal challenges a judgment passed by a Single Judge in a writ petition concerning the retirement of an Airport Security Force employee. The core legal question is whether an Intra Court Appeal is maintainable against a Single Judge's order in a constitutional petition when the underlying proceedings provided a statutory remedy of appeal. The Court held that the appeal is not maintainable. Relying on the proviso to Section 3(2) of the Law Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972, the Court determined that where the law applicable to the original order provides for at least one appeal, revision, or review, an Intra Court Appeal is barred. Since the respondent had a statutory right of appeal against the retirement order under the Airport Security Force (Discipline) Rules, 1977, and potentially the Civil Servant Appeal Rules, 1977, the bar under the Law Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972, was fully attracted. The principle laid down is that the availability of a departmental appellate remedy precludes an Intra Court Appeal against a High Court judgment arising from such proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is an Intra Court Appeal maintainable against a judgment of a Single Judge if the original proceedings provided a statutory right of appeal?
  • Does the proviso to Section 3(2) of the Law Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972, bar an Intra Court Appeal when a departmental remedy was available?
  • Does the availability of an appeal under the Airport Security Force (Discipline) Rules, 1977, preclude an Intra Court Appeal against a High Court judgment?
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• Ch. Sajid Mehmood vs Inspector General of Police, I.C.T., Islamabad2015 YLR 81 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-09-17
  superdariseizure of propertystolen vehiclewrit petitionalternative remedyMagistrate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed before the Islamabad High Court seeking directions to restrain police from harassing the petitioner, prevent the alleged tampering of a seized vehicle's chassis and engine numbers, and obtain superdari (custody) of a car seized by the Anti Car Lifting Cell. The core legal question was whether a writ petition is maintainable for the release of a vehicle seized by the police under the Code of Criminal Procedure when an adequate remedy before an Ilaqa Magistrate is provided by law. The court held that the writ petition was incompetent and non-maintainable because the statutory scheme under the Code of Criminal Procedure requires the police to report any seized property suspected of being stolen to the concerned Magistrate, who has the exclusive jurisdiction and supervisory role to pass appropriate orders regarding its disposal, custody, or local inspection. The key principle laid down is that where an alternate and efficacious remedy is available before a Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure for the release and disposal of seized property, invoking the constitutional writ jurisdiction of the High Court is barred.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional writ petition is maintainable for the recovery and superdari of a vehicle seized by the police?
  • What is the procedure required of the police upon the seizure of property suspected to be stolen under the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • Can a Magistrate order the disposal or local inspection of a seized vehicle under the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • Is prior notice mandatory under the law when the police seize property suspected to be stolen?
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• Capital Development Authority vs Mst. Fanzeem Bibi2015 C.L.R.1110 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-12Read full judgment →
• C.D.A. and otherss vs R.M. Gulistan Engineers and Contractors (Pvt.)2015 CLC 734 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-01-22Read full judgment →
• Basil Ahmed Affandi vs Lubna Butt, etcK.L.R. 2015 Civil Cases 1 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-11-05Read full judgment →
• Bahria Town (Pvt.) Ltd vs Federation of Pakistan2015 PTD 1790, PTCL 2015 CL. 840 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-12Read full judgment →
• B.C.International (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Tashfeen Qayyum, etc.2015 PLJ Islamabad 250 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-06
  arbitration agreementstay of proceedingsres judicatacorporate authorizationcivil revisionjoint venture agreementSection 34 Arbitration Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision concerns a dispute arising from a Joint Venture Agreement, specifically regarding the removal of a Chief Executive Officer. The petitioner sought to stay civil proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, citing an arbitration clause. The trial court initially dismissed the application due to a lack of authorization but later granted a second application. The appellate court reversed this, citing res judicata and the petitioner's conduct. The High Court held that the dismissal of an application for lack of authorization does not constitute a decision on the merits, and thus, the doctrine of res judicata does not bar the filing of a subsequent, validly authorized application. The Court affirmed that where an arbitration agreement exists, the court must stay proceedings unless the applicant has taken steps in the suit or filed a written statement. The Court further held that the appellate court erred by prematurely deciding the merits of the underlying dispute regarding the CEO's removal, which was a matter for the arbitrator. The revision petitions were accepted, and the trial court's stay order was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dismissal of an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940 for lack of authorization bar the filing of a subsequent application?
  • Can a court decide the merits of an underlying dispute when determining an application to stay proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • Does the doctrine of res judicata apply to an order dismissing an application that was not decided on its merits?
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• B.C. International Pvt. Ltd. vs Tashfeen Qayyum, etc.2015-IHC-23 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-01-29
  Arbitration Act 1940Stay of legal proceedingsForeign arbitration clauseAuthorization of companyRes judicataJoint venture agreementCivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises from a judgment of the Additional District Judge setting aside an order of the Trial Court that had stayed legal proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940. The core legal question concerned whether the dismissal of a prior application under Section 34 for lack of proper authorization by a juridical person creates a bar to filing a second application, and whether the appellate court could examine the merits of the underlying dispute regarding corporate management. The Islamabad High Court held that the dismissal of an application on the sole technical ground of lacking authorization does not attract the doctrine of res judicata, and no limitation period bars the filing of a fresh application under Section 34 provided the statutory pre-requisites are met. The Court laid down the principle that an incompetently instituted proceeding by a company is a nullity that does not bar a subsequent valid application, and reaffirmed that courts must dynamically uphold arbitration agreements, especially foreign ones, without delving into the merits of the underlying corporate disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dismissal of an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940 for lack of proper authorization create a bar to filing a second application?
  • Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies to an order dismissing a proceeding on a technical ground without adjudication on merits?
  • Can an appellate court examine the merits of an underlying dispute when deciding an application to stay proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • Is a suit or legal proceeding invalidly instituted by a company curable by subsequent ratification?
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• B.C. International Pvt. Ltd vs Tashfeen Qayyum, etc2015 KLR Civil Cases 433 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-05
  arbitration agreementstay of legal proceedingsres judicatacorporate authorizationjoint venture agreementcivil revisionarbitration clause
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision arose from a dispute over a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) containing an arbitration clause. The respondents filed a suit for declaration and injunction regarding the removal of a Chief Executive Officer. The petitioner filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 to stay the suit. An initial application was dismissed due to a lack of authorization for the signatory, but the petitioner filed a second, valid application, which the Trial Court granted. The Appellate Court reversed this, citing res judicata and the petitioner's conduct. The High Court held that the dismissal of the first application for procedural incompetence did not bar the second application, as the doctrine of res judicata requires a decision on merits. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 does not impose a strict limitation period, provided no written statement has been filed. The Appellate Court erred by deciding the merits of the underlying dispute instead of focusing on the enforceability of the arbitration agreement, which the Court upheld in the interest of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dismissal of an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 due to lack of authorization bar the filing of a subsequent application?
  • Can a court decide the merits of a dispute when determining an application to stay proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940?
  • Is a suit instituted by a company without proper authorization by the Board of Directors valid?
  • Does the doctrine of res judicata apply to an application dismissed solely on procedural grounds without adjudication on the merits?
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• B.C. International (Pvt) Ltd vs Tashfeen Qayyum and others2015 KLR Civil Cases 433, 2015 MLD 1347 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-05
  stay of legal proceedingsarbitration agreementforeign arbitration clauseres judicataauthorization of company suitjoint venture agreementcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated civil revision petition arises from a dispute regarding the interpretation of a Joint Venture Agreement containing an arbitration clause. The respondents filed a suit for declaration and perpetual injunction following a resolution to remove the first respondent from the position of Chief Executive Officer. The petitioner filed an application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 to stay the proceedings. The initial application was dismissed for lack of proper authorization, but a subsequent application by an authorized representative was accepted by the Trial Court. On appeal, the lower appellate court set aside the stay order, holding that the dismissal of the first application barred the second and that the petitioner's conduct precluded arbitration. The Islamabad High Court accepted the revision, holding that the dismissal of an application due to procedural incompetence does not attract res judicata or bar a fresh application where no limitation period applies and statutory conditions are met, and that courts must dynamically enforce arbitration agreements in the absence of compelling reasons.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dismissal of an application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 on the sole ground of lack of proper authorization create a bar to the filing of a second application?
  • Can a legal proceeding or application instituted on behalf of an incorporated company by an unauthorized person be cured by subsequent ratification?
  • What are the essential ingredients and pre-requisites required to be satisfied for staying legal proceedings under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940?
  • Should courts adopt a dynamic approach while dealing with an application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 involving a foreign arbitration clause?
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• Azhar Iqbal, etc. vs Government of Pakistan, etc.2015 PLJ Islamabad 151 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-03-12Read full judgment →
• Azhar Ali Azhar vs Federal Investigation Agency and anotherK.L.R. 2015 Civil Cases 4 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-11-07Read full judgment →
• Asif Ali Hashmi through 4 Legal Heirs vs Muhammad Arif Mian and 42015 PLJ Islamabad 330, 2015 PLD Islamabad 191 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-29Read full judgment →
• Ashiq Hussain Shah, etc.s vs Mst. Sarwar Jan, etc.2015 PLJ Islamabad 28 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-02-10Read full judgment →
• Asad Javed vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Interior and others2015 C.L.R. 964 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Asad Javed vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Interior and others2015 PLJ Islamabad 389, 2015 P Cr. L J 1340 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-24
  transfer of offendersforeign convictionsentence remissionnarcotics controlhabeas corpusconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by a prisoner seeking remissions in a 25-year sentence awarded by a Crown Court in the United Kingdom and subsequently transferred to Pakistan under the Transfer of Offenders Ordinance, 2002. The core legal questions involved whether the foreign sentence was incompatible with Pakistani laws and whether the petitioner was entitled to remissions for the period of imprisonment served abroad. The Islamabad High Court held that the sentence of 25 years for trafficking 195 kilograms of cocaine was not excessive or incompatible with Pakistani law, particularly noting that under section 57 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, imprisonment for life is equivalent to 25 years and corresponds with the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. However, the Court ruled that under section 9(2) of the Transfer of Offenders Ordinance, 2002, the enforcement of the sentence is governed by Pakistani law, making the transferred offender entitled to remissions for the entire period of sentence served both abroad and in Pakistan. The petition was disposed of with directions to the authorities to recalculate and reissue the Roll of Sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a sentence awarded by a foreign court can be reviewed and adapted under the Transfer of Offenders Ordinance, 2002 for being incompatible with Pakistani laws?
  • Is a prisoner transferred to Pakistan under the Transfer of Offenders Ordinance, 2002 entitled to remissions for the period of sentence served abroad?
  • How is the sentence of imprisonment for life reckoned under the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 in relation to determinate foreign sentences?
  • Does the law of Pakistan govern the enforcement and remission of a sentence for an offender transferred from a foreign jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Asad Ja'ved vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Interior and others2015 PLJ Islamabad 389 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Arslan Poultry (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Officer Inland Revenue and others2015 PTD 448 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-01
  writ jurisdictionalternate remedyIncome Tax OrdinanceAppellate Tribunalconstitutional petitionstatutory referencemaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an order passed by the Appellate Tribunal, Inland Revenue, regarding tax assessment. The petitioner sought to invoke the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, arguing that the impugned order was outside the scope of Section 133 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The core legal question was whether the High Court could exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction when a statutory remedy, specifically a 'Reference' under Section 133 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, was available to the aggrieved party. The Court held that the petition was not maintainable. It reasoned that the existence of an alternate, efficacious statutory remedy precludes the exercise of writ jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that when a statute prescribes a specific manner for an act to be done, it must be performed in that manner alone. Exercising writ jurisdiction in such circumstances would defeat the legislative intent and render the statutory provision for a Reference redundant. Consequently, the petition was dismissed in limine, directing the petitioner to pursue the statutory Reference remedy.

  Questions settled

  • Is a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 maintainable against an order of the Appellate Tribunal when a statutory remedy of Reference under Section 133 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is available?
  • Does the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 defeat the legislative intent when a specific statutory remedy is provided by the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does Section 131(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 govern the power of the Appellate Tribunal to grant or refuse a stay of tax recovery proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Arslan Poultry (Pvt.) Ltd vs Officer Inland Revenue and othersNLR 2015 Tax 140, 2015 P.C.T.L.R. 271, PLJ 2015 Tax Cases (Isl.) 50, 2015 PTD · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-01Read full judgment →
• Ansar Mahmood vs Jamshed Ahmed Mustafa Zuberi and 6 others2015 C.L.R. 197, 2015 PLD Islamabad 1 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-08-25Read full judgment →
• Amir Ahmad vs Government of Pakistan, etc.2015 PLJ Islamabad 454 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-19Read full judgment →
• All Pakistan SRBC Workers' Union vs National Industrial Relations2015 KLR Civil Cases 202, K.L.R. 2015 Labour & Service Cases 46, KLR 2015 · Islamabad High Court
  trade union registrationworkman definitionlocus standiindustrial relationsrival unionlabour law
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by an existing trade union challenging the registration of a rival trade union under the Industrial Relations Act 2012. The petitioner contended that the rival union's members, who were television engineers, did not qualify as 'workmen' under the law due to their designations and benefits. The National Industrial Relations Commission and the Registrar had both allowed the registration, which the petitioner appealed. The High Court examined the definition of 'workman' and held that the nature of duties performed, rather than the designation or salary, is the determining factor. Finding no evidence that the engineers performed administrative or managerial duties, the Court upheld their status as workmen. Crucially, the Court also ruled on locus standi, holding that the registration of a trade union is strictly a matter between the applicant union and the Registrar. Consequently, an existing trade union has no locus standi to object to, intervene in, or appeal against the registration of a rival trade union under the Act.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the designation of an employee or the actual nature of their duties is the determining factor in deciding if they qualify as a workman under the Industrial Relations Act 2012?
  • Does an existing trade union have the locus standi to object to or intervene in the registration proceedings of a new trade union before the Registrar?
  • Can an existing trade union file an appeal under Section 12 of the Industrial Relations Act 2012 against the registration of a rival trade union?
  Read full judgment →
• All Pakistan SRBC Workers Union vs National Industrial Relations2015 C.L.R. 601 · Islamabad High Court
  trade union registrationlocus standiworkman definitionIndustrial Relations Act 2012managerial capacitytrade union rivalryadministrative duties
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenges the registration of a trade union, specifically questioning whether T.V. Engineers qualify as "workmen" under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, and whether a rival trade union has the standing to object to such registration. The core legal questions concern the locus standi of existing unions in registration proceedings and the criteria for defining a "workman." The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the registration of a trade union is a matter strictly between the applicant union and the Registrar of Trade Unions. Consequently, rival unions lack the locus standi to intervene or object to the registration process. Regarding the status of the employees, the Court affirmed that the determination of whether an individual is a "workman" rests on the nature of their actual duties rather than their job designation or salary. The key principle laid down is that the registration process under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, is an exclusive administrative procedure between the Registrar and the applicant, precluding third-party interference or objections from rival trade unions.

  Questions settled

  • Does a rival trade union possess the locus standi to object to the registration of another trade union under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  • Is the registration of a trade union a matter exclusively between the applicant union and the Registrar?
  • What is the legal test for determining whether an employee qualifies as a 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
  Read full judgment →
• All Pakistan CNG Association through Authorized representatives vs Pakistan State Oil Company Ltd. through Managing Director2015 YLR 1813 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-17Read full judgment →
• Akram Rashid vs Hamid Ali Khan2015 C.L.R.1288, 2015 PLJ Islamabad 226, 2015 CLC 1290 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-05
  civil revisionex parte decreesetting aside ex parte decreelimitation actcondonation of delaydaily delay explanationin-charge liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition was directed against concurrent orders of the lower courts dismissing the petitioner's application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the C.P.C. to set aside an ex parte judgment and decree passed against him in a suit for declaration, injunction, and damages. The petitioner, who had been sued by name as the in-charge of an educational training centre, initially participated in the proceedings but later absented himself, leading to the ex parte decree. His application to set aside the decree was filed with considerable delay and lacked a separate application for condoning the delay, which the lower courts dismissed as time-barred. The core legal questions involved the applicability of the limitation period when a defendant participates and subsequently absents himself, and the necessity of explaining daily delay. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the revision, holding that Article 164 of the Limitation Act, 1908 applies to defendants who participated and then absented, requiring a 30-day limitation period and a satisfactory explanation for each day of delay. The court laid down that ignorance of law is no excuse, lapse of time creates valuable rights, and equity assists the vigilant rather than the indolent litigant.

  Questions settled

  • Which article of the Limitation Act, 1908 applies to an application for setting aside an ex parte decree when the defendant initially participated in the proceedings and subsequently absented himself?
  • Is a defendant seeking to set aside an ex parte decree out of time required to explain the delay for each day?
  • Does the relinquishment of an official post by a defendant constitute a sufficient ground for failing to pursue pending legal proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahsar Mahmood vs Jamshed Ahmed Mustafa Zuberi, etc2015 C.L.R. 197 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-08-25Read full judgment →
• Adnan Qureshi vs Capital Development Authority2015 C.L.R. 1240 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-01-31
  temporary injunctionofficial accommodationgovernment servantallotment rulescivil revisionpermanent workmantrespassercapital development authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the concurrent orders of the lower courts dismissing the petitioner's application for a temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioner, son of a retired government servant, sought to restrain the Capital Development Authority from evicting him from an official flat allotted to his father and claimed entitlement to regularization and allotment of the same accommodation under the Accommodation Allocation Rules 2002 and the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968. The core legal question was whether a child of a retired government servant and subsequently regularized employee is entitled to indefinitely retain official accommodation of a higher category than their own entitlement. The Islamabad High Court held that daily-wage or work-charged service does not automatically confer the status of a Federal Government Servant under the Accommodation Allocation Rules 2002, and that occupants retaining higher-category accommodation beyond the permissible six-month post-retirement period become trespassers. The court dismissed the revision, affirming that children of retired servants cannot retain accommodations exceeding their personal entitlement category.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person appointed on daily wages or work-charged basis automatically become a Federal Government Servant eligible for official accommodation allotment without a formal regularization order?
  • Can the child of a retired government servant retain official accommodation of a higher category than their own entitlement after the expiry of the statutory six-month post-retirement period?
  • What constitutes a trespasser under the Accommodation Allocation Rules 2002 regarding the unauthorized retention of government or hired accommodation?
  Read full judgment →
• Abid Khan vs Gul Za an Khan Abbasi and 4 others2015 C.L.R 1154 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-07-31Read full judgment →
• Abid Associated Agencies International Pvt. Ltd. etc. vs Areva, etc.2015 IHC 4 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-05-28Read full judgment →
• Abid Associated Agencies International (Pvt.) Ltd. and others vs Areva2015 MLD 1646 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-23
  arbitration agreementstay of proceedingsforeign arbitral awardsarbitration clausecommercial contractinternational arbitration
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter involves an application under Section 4 of the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011, seeking to stay a civil suit filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants, who were parties to an agency agreement containing an arbitration clause. The core legal question was whether the court should stay the suit proceedings in favor of arbitration, specifically considering whether the arbitration agreement was 'null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed' under Section 4(2) of the Act. The Court held that the application should be allowed and the suit stayed. The Court clarified that the 'null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed' exception applies to the arbitration agreement itself, not the underlying contract. Since the arbitration clause remained valid and the disputes fell within its scope, the court lacked discretion to refuse the stay. The Court emphasized that arbitration clauses must be honored, especially in international commercial contracts, to maintain the sanctity of agreements and the international image of the country.

  Questions settled

  • Does the exception of 'null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed' under Section 4(2) of the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 apply to the underlying contract or the arbitration agreement itself?
  • Does a court have discretion to refuse an application to stay proceedings under Section 4 of the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 if the arbitration agreement is valid?
  • Can a party that has previously participated in arbitration proceedings later claim that the underlying agreement is incapable of performance to avoid a stay of suit proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Abeera Saeed vs Etc.s2015 NLR Civil 499 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-09-11Read full judgment →
• Abdul Qayyum vs Federation of Pakistan and 5, others2015 KLR Criminal Cases 274, 2015 PLJ Islamabad 178, 2015 P Cr. L J 1058 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-08
  death warrantAnti-Terrorism Courtterritorial jurisdictionexecution of death sentencelocus standiconstitutional petitionmoratorium on capital punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated matter involves a writ petition and a criminal miscellaneous application seeking the setting aside and suspension of death warrants issued against condemned prisoners whose death sentences were upheld up to the Supreme Court. The core legal question concerns whether the death warrant should be issued by the judge or court that originally passed the sentence or by the newly established Anti-Terrorism Court having current territorial jurisdiction over the Islamabad Capital Territory. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petitions, holding that under Section 381 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 read with the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, the currently established Anti-Terrorism Court possessing territorial jurisdiction is competent to issue the death warrant, and Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 does not apply to require the original judge's involvement. Furthermore, the court held that the petitioners, being brothers of the condemned prisoners, lacked locus standi to maintain the petitions, and that no valid compromise existed with the legal heirs. The court laid down the principle that execution warrants in anti-terrorism cases are to be issued by the court exercising current territorial jurisdiction rather than strictly the original trial judge.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the death warrant of a condemned prisoner is to be issued by the judge who originally passed the sentence or by the Anti-Terrorism Court having current territorial jurisdiction?
  • Does Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to the issuance of death warrants by Anti-Terrorism Courts?
  • Whether brothers of a condemned prisoner have the locus standi to file a constitutional petition challenging a death warrant?
  • Can a death warrant be suspended on the ground of a proposed compromise when the legal heirs state there is no compromise?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Qayyum vs Federation of Pakistan and 5 others2015 KLR Criminal Cases 274 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-04-08Read full judgment →
• Abdul Qayyum vs Chairman, Capital Development Authority, Islamabad and another2015 PLJ Islamabad 202 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-27Read full judgment →
• Abdul Qayyum vs Chairman Capital Development Authority (CDA), Islamabad and another2015 PLJ Islamabad 202, 2015 PLC (C.S.) 617 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-27
  access to justiceduty of careservice mattersconstitutional obligationextraordinary jurisdictionfundamental rightsfair trialCapital Development Authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment addresses numerous writ petitions filed by employees of the Capital Development Authority (CDA) concerning their service terms and conditions. The core legal question is whether the State and its controlled organizations have a constitutional and legal duty to provide an effective, inexpensive, and impartial forum for resolving service-related disputes for employees who are not civil servants and thus lack access to the Federal Service Tribunal. The Court held that the employer owes a duty of care to its employees, and the denial of an accessible, inexpensive forum constitutes a violation of fundamental rights, including access to justice, fair trial, and dignity, as guaranteed under Articles 9, 10-A, 14, and 25 of the Constitution. The Court established that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 199 is not an adequate remedy for such service disputes. Consequently, the Court directed the CDA to establish an independent forum for dispute resolution and ordered the Federal Government to initiate legislative measures to provide appropriate appellate forums for such employees, emphasizing the State's mandatory obligation to ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employer owe a legal duty of care to its employees to provide an effective and inexpensive forum for resolving service-related disputes?
  • Is the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution an adequate remedy for employees seeking redress for service-related grievances?
  • Does the failure of the State or its controlled organizations to provide an impartial forum for service disputes violate the fundamental right of access to justice?
  • Are statutory organizations under the Federal Government constitutionally obligated to establish independent tribunals for the resolution of their employees' service grievances?
  Read full judgment →
• ,Azhar Iqbal and otherss vs Government of Pakistan and others2015 PLD Islamabad 140 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-03-12
  Co-operative Societies ActHuman Rights CellArticle 184(3)Frivolous litigationFair trialRevisional powersFIR registrationConstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, members of a Cooperative Housing Society, challenged an order passed by the Registrar under Section 64-A of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, which remanded an inquiry for de novo proceedings, and a subsequent request to include their names in an FIR. The petitioners contended that an earlier letter from the Supreme Court's Human Rights Cell (HRC) had finalized the inquiry report, thereby precluding the Registrar's revisional intervention. The Islamabad High Court held that correspondence from the HRC is administrative in nature and does not constitute a binding judicial order under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Consequently, the Registrar retained full statutory authority to exercise revisional powers. The Court dismissed the petition as frivolous, noting that the petitioners abused the judicial process by misrepresenting administrative correspondence as Supreme Court directions. Furthermore, the Court established a key principle that naming courts or judges in FIRs without written authorization from the respective Registrar is illegal, as it prejudices the right to a fair trial and access to justice.

  Questions settled

  • Does a letter issued by the Human Rights Cell of the Supreme Court constitute a binding judicial order under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can the Registrar of Cooperative Societies exercise revisional powers under Section 64-A of the Co-operative Societies Act 1925 after an inquiry report has been forwarded by the Human Rights Cell?
  • Is it lawful to mention courts or judges in an FIR without obtaining prior written permission from the respective Registrar?
  • Does the High Court have the power to impose costs exceeding the limits prescribed in Section 35-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when exercising constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Warid Telecom vs Commissioner Inland Revenue and othersPLJ 2014 Tax Cases (Isl.) 99 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-03-28Read full judgment →
• Warid Telecom (Pvt.) Ltd., Etc.s vs Federation of Pakistan, Etc.NLR 2014 Tax 50 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-01-08Read full judgment →
• Warid Telecom (Pvt.) Ltd. etc vs Federation of Pakistan,etcNLR 2014 Tax 50, 2014 PTD 752, PTCL 2014 CL. 42 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-01-08Read full judgment →
• Warid Telecom (Pvt.) Ltd. and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2014 PTD 752 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-01-08Read full judgment →
• Tauqeer Sadiq vs The State, Etc.2014 NLR Criminal 468 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-03-12Read full judgment →
• Tauqeer Sadiq vs The State and othersK.L.R. 2014 Criminal Cases 69, 2014 NLR Criminal 468, 2014 P Cr. L J 1019 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-03-12
  post-arrest bailrule of consistencyabscondanceconstitutional petitionNAB referenceOGRA corruption
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition was filed by Tauqeer Sadiq, former Chairman of OGRA, seeking post-arrest bail in a corruption reference filed by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB). The core legal questions involved whether the petitioner was entitled to bail on the grounds of statutory delay, rule of consistency with co-accused who were already granted bail, and whether allegations of illegal increase in Unaccounted for Natural Gas (UFG) benchmarks and alleged abscondance warranted continued incarceration. The Islamabad High Court held that since the documentary evidence had already been seized by the prosecution, trial conclusion was not in sight, co-accused facing similar or graver allegations had been released, and further incarceration would serve no useful purpose, the petitioner was entitled to bail. The court laid down the principle that principles of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to bail petitions under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, that abscondance must be proven through evidence during trial, and that differential treatment in arresting co-accused amounts to discriminatory practice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be granted to an accused on the rule of consistency when co-accused facing similar allegations have already been released on bail?
  • Does the mere allegation of abscondance disentitle an accused to post-arrest bail when the abscondance itself is yet to be proved through evidence?
  • Are the principles of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable while considering bail under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Whether continued incarceration is justified when the prosecution's case rests on documentary evidence already seized and the conclusion of trial is not in the foreseeable future?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Masood Khan vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary2014 CLD 924 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-02-18Read full judgment →
• Tahir Mahmud vs Qasim M. Niazi and others2014 PLC (C.S.) 1199 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-04-04
  disciplinary proceedingsshow-cause noticenatural justicefair trialservice matterwrit jurisdictionmala fidesInquiry OfficerFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a BS-21 officer serving as Accountant General Pakistan Revenues, challenged the conduct of disciplinary proceedings and a subsequent show-cause notice issued under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973. The petitioner alleged that the Inquiry Officer failed to provide essential documents requested for his defense and refused to record statements of defense witnesses, thereby violating principles of natural justice and fair trial. The respondents raised preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of the writ petition, arguing that such matters fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal per Article 212 of the Constitution. The Islamabad High Court held that while the Service Tribunal generally has jurisdiction over terms and conditions of service, the High Court can intervene under Article 199 when proceedings are conducted in violation of mandatory rules or are tainted by mala fides, especially when the Tribunal is non-functional. Finding that the Inquiry Officer disregarded procedural requirements and prior assurances of fairness, the Court set aside the inquiry proceedings and directed that any fresh inquiry be conducted by a new Inquiry Officer.

  Read full judgment →
• Syed Shabi Hassan vs Guardian Judge, West Islamabad and another2014 CLC 510 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-11-20Read full judgment →
• Sohail Najeeb vs Ministry of Finance, etc.K.L.R. 2014 Civil Cases 136 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-01-23Read full judgment →
• Sohail Najeeb vs Ministry of Finance and others2014 CLD 848 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-01-23Read full judgment →
• Shereen Gul Alias Fatima vs Special Judge, Anti Terrorism Court-I, Islamabad, Etc2014-IHC-59 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-09
  re-examination of witnessSection 540 Cr.P.C.filling of lacunainterest of justiceAnti-Terrorism Courtcriminal revisionadjudication on merits
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition challenged an order passed by the Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court, Islamabad, which allowed an application under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the re-examination of a complainant witness. The petitioner argued that the re-examination was an attempt to fill lacunas in the prosecution's case after the witness failed to implicate the petitioner during the initial examination. The core legal question was whether the trial court correctly exercised its discretion under Section 540 Cr.P.C. to recall a witness for further testimony regarding facts not covered in the initial deposition. The Court held that the trial court's order was justified, reasoning that the witness's additional testimony regarding ransom payments was essential for a just decision and did not constitute filling a lacuna. The Court affirmed that Section 540 Cr.P.C. mandates the recall of witnesses when their evidence is essential for the just decision of the case. The principle laid down is that the court's power to recall witnesses should be exercised in the interest of justice and fair play to ensure adjudication on merits rather than technicalities.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court recall a witness under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the evidence is essential for a just decision?
  • Does the re-examination of a witness to clarify facts not previously deposed amount to filling a lacuna in the prosecution's case?
  • Does Article 161 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 empower a judge to question witnesses to obtain proper proof of relevant facts?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahzado Langah vs Federation of Pakistan, etc.2014 C.L.R. 626 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-01-10
  quo warrantocivil servantappointment by promotiondirect recruitmentcontract appointmentSecretary Law and Justicelocus standiconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the Islamabad High Court through a writ of quo warranto challenging the appointment of the respondent as Secretary Law, Justice and Human Rights Division. The core legal questions revolved around whether the post of Secretary Law and Justice could be filled through direct recruitment on a contract basis rather than strictly by promotion, whether the appointment suffered from illegalities, and whether the petitioner had the requisite bona fides to maintain a quo warranto petition. The court held that the post of Secretary Law and Justice is a civil post that can lawfully be filled by direct recruitment or contract appointment, that Section 9 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 only applies to promotions and does not prohibit direct recruitment to Basic Pay Scale 22 posts, and that the petitioner failed to establish bona fides or show any infringement of a superior right. The key principles laid down are that quo warranto is a discretionary remedy requiring the petitioner to prove bona fides, and that executive policy decisions regarding specialized qualifications for public posts will not be interfered with absent manifest illegality.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the post of Secretary Law, Justice and Human Rights Division can be filled through direct recruitment or contract basis instead of strictly by promotion?
  • Does Section 9 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 prohibit the filling of Basic Pay Scale 22 posts through direct recruitment?
  • What are the essential elements required to sustain a writ of quo warranto against the holder of a public office?
  • Can a petitioner lacking personal grievance or established bona fides successfully maintain a petition for quo warranto?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahzado Langah vs Federation of Pakistan and others2014 C.L.R. 626, 2014 PLC (C.S.) 853 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-01-10
  quo warrantocivil service appointmentconstitutional jurisdictionpublic officedirect recruitmentcontract appointmentwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the Islamabad High Court seeking a writ of quo warranto to challenge the appointment of the Secretary Law, Justice and Human Rights Division. The petitioner contended that the appointment was illegal, violated promotion rules under the Civil Servants Act, 1973, and lacked transparency. The core legal question was whether the post was reserved exclusively for promotion and if the appointment process was legally flawed. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the post of Secretary Law and Justice is a civil post that may be filled through direct recruitment or contract, and Section 9 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, does not mandate filling the position solely through promotion. The Court affirmed that the appointment was made by the competent authority through a transparent process. The judgment establishes that quo warranto is a discretionary remedy requiring the petitioner to prove bona fides and that the appointment was unlawful. Furthermore, courts will not interfere with policy-based qualification criteria for public offices absent clear illegality, discrimination, or violation of established rules.

  Questions settled

  • Can the post of Secretary Law and Justice be filled through direct recruitment or contract rather than promotion?
  • Does Section 9 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, prohibit the direct recruitment of a Secretary to the Law Division?
  • What are the essential elements required for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto against a public office holder?
  • Is the determination of educational qualifications and experience for a public post a matter for judicial interference?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. Ahsanuddin, Advocate and 2 others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2014 C.L.R. 586, 2014 CLC 451 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-01-15Read full judgment →
• Sh. Ahsan ud Din, Advocate and 2 others vs Federation of Pakistan, etc.2014 C.L.R. 586 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-01-23Read full judgment →
• Sarfraz Masih vs Manzoor Masih and others2014 CLC 282 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-06-20Read full judgment →