Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 4,389 judgments in total from the Islamabad High Court.

• Muhammad Raza and others vs Jammu and Kashmir Cooperative2013 PLD Islamabad 49 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-05-28
  Public interest litigationHousing schemeLayout plan deviationConversion of amenity plotsConstitutional petitionArticle 199 of the ConstitutionCapital Development Authority (CDA)Public spacesResidents' rightsIllegal construction
  Summary & questions settled

  This public-interest litigation was filed by residents of AJK Co-operative Housing Society, alleging illegal deviation from the approved layout plan and conversion of open public spaces into residential/commercial plots. The core legal questions concerned whether the society's actions violated the approved plan and residents' natural rights, and if constitutional jurisdiction was appropriate despite a pending civil suit. The Islamabad High Court allowed the petition, finding that the society had indeed made unauthorized changes, converting areas reserved for parks, schools, libraries, health centers, and a Sewerage Treatment Plant (STP) into residential/commercial plots, and failing to demarcate a graveyard. The Capital Development Authority (CDA) admitted these violations. The Court held that land specified for a particular purpose cannot be used for any other purpose and that constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution can be invoked where an authority acts unlawfully, without necessarily exhausting alternate remedies. The Chairman CDA was directed to initiate legal actions against the society and concerned staff for non-compliance and failure to address complaints.

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• Muhammad Rameez vs The State and another2013 YLR 968 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-02-07
  post-arrest bailaerial firingcommon intentionfacilitation of offencefurther enquirymurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed by the petitioner, Muhammad Rameez, seeking post-arrest bail in a case registered under Sections 302, 324, 34, and 337-F(ii) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, arising from a daylight firing incident that resulted in a death and injuries. The petitioner contended that he was only attributed the role of making aerial shots, which did not cause any direct injury, and that the determination of common intention required further inquiry. The prosecution opposed the bail, arguing that the petitioner facilitated the main offence and that the challan had already been submitted. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the bail petition, holding that the allegation of making aerial shots must be viewed in light of the main offence as a means of facilitation. The Court ruled that, on a tentative assessment, the petitioner shared a common intention with the co-accused, and since the challan was already submitted, releasing him on bail was not in the interest of justice. The trial court was directed to conclude the trial expeditiously.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the act of making aerial shots during an attack can be considered as facilitating the commission of the main offence for the purpose of determining common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a post-arrest bail petition be dismissed on a tentative assessment of shared common intention even if the accused did not directly cause any physical injury to the victims?
  • Does the submission of a challan affect the court's discretion to grant post-arrest bail in a murder case where the accused is charged with facilitating the crime?
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• Muhammad Rafique vs Ministry of Education through Secretary2013 PLJ Islamabad 60 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafique versus Ministry of Education through vs Secretary2013 PLC (C.S.) 545 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-02-18
  advance incrementsAllama Iqbal Open Universitybinding precedentsimilarly placed employeesterms and conditions of servicewrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves writ petitions filed by permanent employees of the Allama Iqbal Open University seeking the restoration and payment of two advance increments granted to them for obtaining a Master's degree in Educational Planning and Management, which were previously withdrawn following objections by the External Audit Committee. The core legal question is whether similarly placed employees who were not parties to earlier litigation decided by the Federal Service Tribunal and the Supreme Court of Pakistan are entitled to the benefit of those judgments. The Islamabad High Court held that once a question of law or principle is determined by the Supreme Court, it is binding on all courts and must be followed as a guideline; therefore, similarly placed persons are entitled to the same relief regardless of whether they were parties to the original litigation, and refusing such relief violates Articles 4 and 25 of the Constitution. All writ petitions were accepted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether similarly placed employees are entitled to the benefit of a Supreme Court judgment despite not being parties to the original litigation?
  • Does the Federal Government or Finance Division have the authority to override the decisions of the Allama Iqbal Open University regarding the pay and terms of service of its employees?
  • Is the refusal to extend a judicial benefit to similarly placed employees violative of Articles 4 and 25 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
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• Muhammad Musa Khan vs Special Judge, Central, Rawalpindi and another2013 PLD Islamabad 15 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-11-12
  emigration fraudcriminal appealacquittalburden of proofdishonoured chequesjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Special Judge Central, Rawalpindi, which convicted the appellant under sections 18 and 22 of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979, for allegedly receiving money under the false promise of sending complainants abroad for employment. The core legal question was whether the prosecution sufficiently established the offences of illegal emigration and inducement in the absence of material evidence such as passports or visas. The Islamabad High Court observed that while the appellant admitted to receiving money and issuing cheques, the prosecution failed to produce the passports or forged visas necessary to substantiate the charges under the Emigration Ordinance, 1979. Furthermore, the Court noted that the dishonour of cheques constitutes a separate offence outside the jurisdiction of the Federal Investigation Agency in this context. Consequently, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted. The key principle laid down is that criminal liability under the Emigration Ordinance, 1979, requires concrete evidence of the specific prohibited acts, and cannot be sustained solely on the basis of dishonoured cheques unrelated to the emigration process.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction under the Emigration Ordinance 1979 be sustained without the production of the alleged forged passports or visas?
  • Does the Federal Investigation Agency have jurisdiction to prosecute the offence of dishonoured cheques in the absence of a nexus to emigration offences?
  • Is the admission of receiving money for business investment sufficient to establish guilt for illegal emigration under the Emigration Ordinance 1979?
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• Muhammad Musa Khan Afridi vs The State And Another2013 KLR Criminal Cases 154 · Islamabad High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Masud Khan vs Muhammad Neroze Khan and 3 others2013 CLC 76 · Islamabad High Court · 2011-12-22Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Khalid vs The State and othersPLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 422, 2013 P Cr. L J 1197 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-09-20
  pre-arrest bailmala fidecivil disputeforgerycriminal misappropriationprohibitory clausedelay in FIRextraordinary discretionary relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for pre-arrest bail filed by the petitioner, who was accused of fraud, forgery, and impersonation regarding company shares. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail given the background of extensive, long-standing civil litigation between the petitioner and the complainant, who are brothers. The court held that the petitioner was entitled to the relief sought. The ratio of the decision rests on the finding that the criminal case appeared to be a tactical maneuver to convert a civil dispute into a criminal one, indicating prima facie mala fide on the part of the complainant. The court emphasized that the inordinate and unexplained delay of over eleven months in lodging the FIR, combined with the fact that the alleged offences did not fall within the prohibitory clause of the relevant bail provisions, justified the confirmation of bail. The key principle laid down is that where a criminal prosecution is initiated with malice to settle civil scores, and the statutory threshold for non-bailable offences is not met, the court will exercise its extraordinary discretionary jurisdiction to grant pre-arrest bail to prevent humiliation and irreparable loss.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of long-standing civil litigation between parties regarding the same subject matter raise a presumption of mala fide in a subsequent criminal case?
  • Is an inordinate and unexplained delay in lodging an FIR a valid ground for confirming pre-arrest bail?
  • Does the fact that the alleged offences do not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 entitle an accused to the grant of pre-arrest bail?
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• Muhammad Khalid vs State, etcPLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 422 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-09-20
  pre-arrest bailcivil disputemala fide prosecutionprohibitory clauseforgeryfraud
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought pre-arrest bail in FIR No. 37 dated 27.01.2012 registered under Sections 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Kohsar, Islamabad, concerning allegations of forgery, fraud, and impersonation regarding company shares. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail where the dispute arose from extensive prior civil litigation between brothers over company assets and share ownership, and whether criminal proceedings were initiated with mala fide intent. The Islamabad High Court held that the long-standing civil disputes, prior agreements, and unexplained delay in lodging the FIR established a prima facie case of mala fide and an attempt to convert civil litigation into a criminal matter, while the offences involved did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The court laid down that where a business and property dispute between family members is essentially civil in nature and involves ongoing civil litigation, criminal process cannot be used as an instrument of pressure, and pre-arrest bail ought to be granted when mala fide of the complainant is apparent and the offences do not fall within the prohibitory clause.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be granted when the criminal case arises out of a long-standing civil dispute between the parties?
  • Does an unexplained delay in lodging the FIR raise a presumption of mala fide for the purpose of pre-arrest bail?
  • Are offences under Sections 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 covered by the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Muhammad Jamul vs Naseer Ahmad Bhutta and 2 others2013 C.L.R. 116 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-06-13Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Islam Khan vs Zarai Taraqiati Bank Ltd. etc2013 PLJ Islamabad 17 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-01-22Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Islam Khan vs Zarai Taraqiati Bank Ltd. and others2013 KLR Criminal Cases 185, 2013 PLJ Islamabad 17, 2013 PLC (C.S.) 795 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-01-22
  voluntary returnplea bargainconvictiondismissal from serviceNational Accountability Ordinancedepartmental inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the dismissal from service of the petitioner, a Joint Director of Zarai Taraqiati Bank Ltd., who had previously availed of voluntary return under Section 25(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, after a notice from NAB. The core legal question was whether availing voluntary return constitutes a conviction and warrants departmental dismissal from service in the same manner as a plea bargain under Section 25(b). The Islamabad High Court held that voluntary return under Section 25(a), availed prior to the authorization of investigation and accepted by the Chairman NAB without court approval, does not amount to a conviction, unlike a plea bargain under Section 25(b) which explicitly attracts the disqualification and conviction consequences of Section 15 of the Ordinance. The court ruled that departmental authorities cannot dismiss an employee merely for opting for voluntary return without independent proof or inquiry into corruption allegations, and set aside the dismissal order with back-benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Does availing the benefit of voluntary return under Section 25(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 amount to a conviction?
  • Are the legal consequences of conviction under Section 15 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 attracted in cases of voluntary return?
  • Can an employee be dismissed from service departmentally solely on the ground of having entered into a voluntary return with NAB without independent proof of corruption?
  • What is the distinction between voluntary return and plea bargain under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 regarding judicial approval and conviction status?
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• Muhammad Islam Khan vs Zarai Taraqiati Bank Itd., Etc.2013 KLR Criminal Cases 185 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-01-16Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ilyas alias Qari Jamil and anothers vs Federal Review Board2013 MLD 87 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-05-23Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ghafoor vs Ministry of Railway through Secretary_Chairman,and others2013 PLJ Islamabad 227, 2013 PLC (C.S.) 1113 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-05-29
  constitutional petitionservice mattermove-overacting charge basisjurisdiction of High Courtterms and conditions of servicelaches
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a retired civil servant, filed a constitutional petition seeking a 'move-over' from BPS-17 to BPS-18 and the subsequent recalculation of pensionary benefits, alleging discriminatory treatment by the Pakistan Railways. The core legal questions were whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate a service-related dispute regarding move-over benefits, and whether an employee appointed on an acting charge basis is entitled to claim such benefits. The Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the matter pertained to the terms and conditions of service, thereby attracting the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Court held that the petition was meritless as acting charge appointments are merely stop-gap arrangements that do not confer a vested right to regular promotion or move-over. The key principle established is that constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 cannot be invoked for service matters falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of service tribunals, and that employees serving on an acting charge basis do not qualify for move-over benefits reserved for regular members of a service or cadre.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to adjudicate a dispute regarding the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant?
  • Is an employee appointed on an acting charge basis entitled to claim the benefit of move-over to a higher pay scale?
  • Does an appointment on an acting charge basis confer a vested right to regular promotion or seniority?
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• Muhammad Ghafoor vs Ministry of Railway through its2013 PLJ Islamabad 227 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Farhan vs Estate Officer, Islamabad and 2 others2013 PLJ Islamabad 47, 2013 PLC (C.S.) 812 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-02-19
  government accommodationallotmenttransferretention of houseAccommodation Allocation Rulesillegal possessionIslamabad High Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition was filed by a federal government employee seeking to declare an official letter allowing a transferred civil servant to retain government accommodation as illegal, and praying for the vacation of the house for peaceful delivery of possession to the petitioner. The core legal question was whether a government employee, upon transfer and after being provided official accommodation at the new place of posting, can retain government accommodation in Islamabad beyond the permissible rules, and whether possessing multiple accommodations violates the applicable regulations. The Islamabad High Court held that the retention of the official quarter by the respondent was in direct violation of the Accommodation Allocation Rules, 2002, especially since he was already provided accommodation at his foreign posting and was holding multiple accommodations. The court declared the retention order without lawful authority and directed the authorities to immediately vacate the house and deliver possession to the petitioner. The key principle laid down is that a transferred government employee cannot retain government accommodation beyond the prescribed grace period or when in possession of another official residence, and any executive permission contrary to the Accommodation Allocation Rules, 2002 is illegal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a government employee transferred to an out-station or abroad can retain government accommodation beyond the limits prescribed under the Accommodation Allocation Rules, 2002?
  • Can a government employee possess more than one government accommodation at the same time under the Accommodation Allocation Rules, 2002?
  • What are the consequences under the Accommodation Allocation Rules, 2002 when a government servant is found in possession of multiple accommodations?
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• Muhammad Farhan vs Estate Office through Joint Estate Officer2013 PLC (C.S.) 812 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-02-19
  government accommodationallotment of quarterAccommodation Allocation Rules 2002retention of accommodationwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition was filed before the Islamabad High Court by a federal government employee seeking the cancellation of an order that permitted respondent No. 3 to retain government accommodation after being transferred abroad. The petitioner, who was subsequently allotted the quarter in question, contended that respondent No. 3 had already been provided official accommodation at his new posting site in Algiers, rendering the retention order illegal under the Accommodation Allocation Rules, 2002. The core legal question before the Court was whether a civil servant who is transferred and provided with accommodation at his new place of posting can lawfully retain government accommodation previously allotted to him beyond the permissible statutory period. The Islamabad High Court allowed the petition, holding that the retention order issued by respondent No. 2 was without lawful authority. The Court laid down the principle that under Rules 15 and 17 of the Accommodation Allocation Rules, 2002, a government servant cannot retain accommodation after transfer when provided accommodation elsewhere, nor can an employee hold more than one accommodation simultaneously.

  Questions settled

  • Can a transferred government employee retain official accommodation beyond the statutory period when provided accommodation at the new posting site?
  • Is a government employee permitted to possess more than one official accommodation simultaneously under the Accommodation Allocation Rules, 2002?
  • Whether an administrative order granting permission to retain government accommodation in violation of the Accommodation Allocation Rules, 2002 is legally sustainable?
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• Muhammad Ashfaq Ahmed vs Ali Arshad Hakeem, Etc.2013 PLC (C.S.) 1463, 2013 PLJ Islamabad 296, 2013 P.C.T.LR. 811 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-06-05
  public appointmentjudicial reviewFBR Chairmanopen advertisementgood governancecolourable exercise of authorityconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the appointment of the Chairman of the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) and the Secretary of the Revenue Division, contending that the selection process was opaque, lacked merit, and violated constitutional principles of equality and good governance. The core legal question was whether the government could bypass open advertisement requirements for a high-level public appointment without demonstrating genuine exceptional circumstances. The Court held that the appointment was a colourable exercise of authority, as the government failed to justify the relaxation of mandatory open advertisement procedures. The Court emphasized that public offices must be filled through transparent, competitive processes to ensure the selection of the most qualified candidates. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned notifications and directed the government to initiate a fresh, competitive appointment process for the Chairman of the FBR. The judgment reaffirms that executive discretion in public appointments is subject to judicial review and must adhere to the principles of merit, fairness, and due process as guaranteed by the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Can the government relax the requirement of open advertisement for public appointments without demonstrating exceptional circumstances?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to review the appointment of a contract employee in a public office despite the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution?
  • Is an employee of a public organization an aggrieved person entitled to challenge the appointment of a superior officer?
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• Muhammad Ashfaq Ahmed vs Ali Arshad Hakeem, etc2013 PLJ Islamabad 296 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-06-05
  public appointmentjudicial reviewgood governanceopen advertisementcolourable exercise of authoritywrit jurisdictionmerit-based recruitment
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the appointment of the Chairman of the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) and the Secretary of the Revenue Division, alleging that the selection process was tainted by mala fide, lacked transparency, and violated principles of good governance. The core legal question was whether the executive authority acted lawfully in appointing the respondent without open advertisement, relying on a claim of "exceptional circumstances." The Court held that the appointment was a colourable exercise of authority. It found that the respondents failed to substantiate any exceptional situation justifying the waiver of the mandatory open advertisement process. The Court emphasized that public appointments to key state positions must be conducted through a fair, open, and competitive process to ensure merit and public trust. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned notifications and directed the authorities to initiate a transparent, competitive selection process for the position. The judgment reinforces the principle that executive discretion in public appointments is subject to judicial review and must adhere to constitutional guarantees of equality of opportunity and due process.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to review the appointment of a contract employee in a public office despite the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution?
  • Can the requirement for open advertisement in public appointments be relaxed without demonstrating specific exceptional circumstances?
  • Does an employee of a government department have locus standi to challenge the appointment of a high-ranking official within that same organization?
  • Is the appointment of a Chairman of the Federal Board of Revenue subject to the principles of transparency and competitive merit?
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• Muhammad Ashfaq Ahmed vs Ali Arshad Hakeem and others2013 PLC (C.S.) 1463 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-06-05
  Chairman FBRcontract appointmentopen advertisementgood governanceequality of opportunityjudicial reviewcolorable exercise of authority
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the notifications appointing respondent No. 1 as Chairman of the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) and Secretary Revenue Division, contending that the appointment was made without open advertisement, lacked transparency, violated constitutional guarantees of merit and equality of opportunity, and was a colorable exercise of executive authority. The core legal questions involved whether the appointment of a public functionary to a key specialized post without open competitive bidding or exceptional circumstances is legally sustainable, and whether constitutional jurisdiction is barred. The court held that the appointment was non-transparent, unconstitutional, and vitiated by a lack of fair competition and open advertisement, as no genuine exceptional circumstances existed to bypass the rules. The court set aside the impugned notifications and directed the authorities to conduct a fresh, competitive appointment process through proper advertisement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the appointment of the Chairman of the Federal Board of Revenue without an open competitive process and advertisement is lawful?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have exclusive jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution to bar a constitutional petition challenging the contract appointment of a public functionary?
  • Can the requirement of open advertisement for public appointments be relaxed without demonstrating exceptional circumstances?
  • Whether an employee of the department has the locus standi to challenge an illegal top-slot appointment in their organization under Article 199 of the Constitution?
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• Muhammad Arif, etc. vs Federation of Pakistan, etc.2013 C.L.R. 366 · Islamabad High Court · 2011-12-21Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arif vs Capital Development Authority, Islamabad through Chairman and 4 others2013 YLR 295 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-05-31Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arif etc vs Federation of Pakistan etc2013 C.L.R. 366, 2013 PLJ Islamabad 171 · Islamabad High Court · 2011-12-21Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amin Qamar vs The Bank of Punjab and others2013 PLC 291 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-06-12
  National Industrial Relations CommissionIntra-Court Appeal18th AmendmentIndustrial RelationsJurisdictionRetrospective effectTrade union
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a series of Intra-Court Appeals challenging an order by a Single Judge who directed the transfer of cases from the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) to provincial tribunals. The core legal question was whether the NIRC retained jurisdiction over labor disputes involving industry-wise trade unions operating at the national level following the 18th Amendment to the Constitution and the repeal of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008. The Court held that the NIRC maintains jurisdiction over establishments or industries operating in the Islamabad Capital Territory or across more than one province, as provided by the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2011 and the Industrial Relations Act, 2012. The Court reasoned that labor laws are procedural and, therefore, possess retrospective effect, validating actions taken after the 2008 Act's repeal. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order, affirming that the provincial transfer mechanism under the Punjab Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2010 did not apply to national-level industry-wise unions. This judgment clarifies the legislative competence of the Federation regarding national labor disputes post-18th Amendment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the National Industrial Relations Commission retain jurisdiction over trade unions operating in more than one province after the 18th Amendment?
  • Do the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2011 and the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 have retrospective effect regarding labor disputes?
  • Does the Punjab Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2010 apply to industry-wise trade unions operating at the national level?
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• Muhammad Amin Qamar vs Bank of Punjab, etc2013 PLJ Islamabad 83 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-06-12
  National Industrial Relations Commission18th AmendmentIndustrial relationsRetrospective effectProcedural lawJurisdictionTrade union registration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves multiple Intra Court Appeals challenging a Single Judge's order that directed the transfer of cases from the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) to provincial Labour Courts. The core legal question was whether the NIRC retained jurisdiction over trade unions of national, industry-wise character following the repeal of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008 and the passage of the 18th Amendment to the Constitution. The Bank of Punjab contended that labour had become a provincial subject, necessitating the transfer of pending cases under the Punjab Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2010. The Court held that the NIRC maintained jurisdiction because the unions operated across multiple provinces and the Islamabad Capital Territory. It ruled that the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2011 and the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, which were subsequently promulgated, applied to these entities. The Court established that labour laws are procedural in nature and possess retrospective effect, thereby validating actions taken during the interim period after the 2008 Act's repeal. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order, affirming the NIRC's authority to adjudicate these disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Does the National Industrial Relations Commission retain jurisdiction over trade unions of national, industry-wise character after the 18th Amendment?
  • Are labour laws considered procedural laws capable of having retrospective effect?
  • Does the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2011 apply to establishments operating in more than one province?
  • Did the repeal of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008 on April 30, 2010, divest the National Industrial Relations Commission of jurisdiction over pending cases?
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• Muhammad Akram vs Additional Sessions Judge_Justice of Peace, Islamabad and others2013 PLD Islamabad 45 · Islamabad High Court · 2011-07-06Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal vs The State2013 P Cr. L J 591 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-02-19
  narcotics controlplea of guilttrial procedureillegal convictionremandcode of criminal procedurecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Special Court convicting the appellant under section 9(b) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, based on an alleged plea of guilt. The core legal question revolves around the legality of recording a conviction without adhering to the mandatory trial procedure outlined in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Islamabad High Court held that the trial court failed to follow the prescribed procedural steps, including framing charge, recording plea properly under section 265-E, and recording prosecution evidence under section 265-F, before jumping to a conviction. The court laid down the principle that a conviction based on a purported plea of guilt must strictly follow the procedural stages mandated by law, and bypassing these stages vitiates the trial. Consequently, the conviction was set aside and the matter was remanded back to the trial court for proceedings in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal lies against a conviction where the accused has pleaded guilty?
  • Can a trial court convict an accused on a plea of guilt without following the mandatory procedure for trial under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • What is the effect of bypassing the recording of prosecution evidence and jumping directly to a conviction based on an oral admission of guilt?
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• Muhammad Adnan vs Federation of Pakistan, Ministry of Overseas2013 C.L.R. 109 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mst. Zubaida vs The State Etc.2013 KLR Criminal Cases 146 · Islamabad High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sidra vs StatePLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 200 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-03-13
  post-arrest bailnarcoticssuckling babyheinous crimeControl of Narcotic Substances Actfemale accusedexpeditious trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail petition filed by a female accused charged under Section 9-C of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, seeking relief on the grounds of being a woman with a suckling infant and pregnancy. The core legal question was whether the presence of a suckling child and pregnancy constitutes sufficient grounds for the grant of bail in a narcotics case. The Court held that narcotics offenses are heinous crimes against society, and granting bail on such grounds would encourage drug traffickers to exploit women as carriers. The Court distinguished the present case from precedents involving individual offenses, emphasizing that the societal impact of drug trafficking necessitates a stricter approach. Consequently, the bail petition was dismissed. However, the Court issued mandatory directions to trial courts to prioritize the trials of female under-trial prisoners with suckling babies, mandating their disposal within one month, and directed jail authorities to ensure proper medical care for the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Is a female accused charged under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 entitled to bail solely on the ground of having a suckling baby?
  • Does the existence of a suckling baby mandate the grant of bail in cases involving heinous crimes against society?
  • What directives must trial courts follow regarding the trial of female under-trial prisoners who have suckling babies?
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• Mst. Rubina Farooq etc vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary2013 PLJ Islamabad 140 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mst. Robia Ayub vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Education and others2013 PLC (C.S.) 915 · Islamabad High Court · 2011-05-19
  DeputationRepatriationPermanent absorptionWedlock policyCivil servantWrit jurisdictionPolicy decisionFundamental rightsTerms and conditions of serviceConstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned a petition challenging a circular issued by the Federal Director of Education, which mandated the automatic repatriation of deputationists to their parent departments upon completing a maximum five-year deputation period. The petitioner, a CT Teacher on deputation, sought to have the circular set aside as being in contravention of the wedlock policy and various Articles of the Constitution, and requested permanent absorption at her Islamabad posting. The core legal questions involved the High Court's power to interfere with a policy decision under writ jurisdiction and whether a deputationist holds a vested right to permanent absorption or indefinite deputation, or if their fundamental rights were infringed. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that a policy decision cannot be interfered with under writ jurisdiction without strong reasons or discrimination, which were not demonstrated. It was ruled that a civil servant on deputation has no vested right to permanent absorption, as deputation is a temporary administrative arrangement. The claim based on the wedlock policy was rejected due to lack of proof regarding the husband's current posting in Islamabad. Matters relating to terms and conditions of service do not infringe fundamental rights, thus precluding invocation of constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199.

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• Mst. Nomail Zia vs Adnan Riaz2013 C.L.R. 1310 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-09-16Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mirrat Manzoor Bajwa vs Additional District Judge,Islamabad2013 C.L.R. 30, 2013 PLD Islamabad 11 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-05-30Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mirrat Manzoor Bajwa vs Additional District Judge and another2013 C.L.R. 30 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-05-30Read full judgment →
• Mst. Amna Bibi vs State and anotherPLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 104 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-01-24
  pre-arrest bailfurther inquirycommon intentionpolice investigationexonerationcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for confirmation of pre-arrest bail filed by the petitioner, who was accused in FIR No. 327 of 2012 under Sections 302 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who had been declared innocent by the police during the investigation and exonerated by key eye-witnesses, was entitled to the confirmation of pre-arrest bail despite the heinous nature of the alleged offense. The Court held that the case constituted a fit instance for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as the evidence exonerating the petitioner created sufficient grounds for relief. Consequently, the Court confirmed the ad-interim bail. The key principle laid down is that the heinousness of an allegation should not, by itself, preclude the grant of pre-arrest bail if the accused is otherwise qualified for such relief. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that if a case for bail is established, it is unnecessary to subject the accused to incarceration before granting bail, as courts must maintain a balance between the administration of justice and the prevention of unnecessary harassment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the heinous nature of an allegation automatically bar the grant of pre-arrest bail?
  • Is an accused entitled to pre-arrest bail when the police investigation declares them innocent and key eye-witnesses exonerate them?
  • Under what circumstances does a case qualify for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Ms. Anber Javed vs Bahria University, etc.2013 C.L.R. 809 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-04-23Read full judgment →
• MS. Anber Javed vs Bahria University, etc2013 PLJ Islamabad 284 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-04-23Read full judgment →
• Ms. Anber Javed vs Bahria University and others2013 C.L.R. 809, 2013 PLJ Islamabad 284, 2013 CLC 1351 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-04-23Read full judgment →
• Miraj Gul vs Rukhsana Ameen, etc2013 PLJ Islamabad 63 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-02-18Read full judgment →
• Miraj Gul vs Rukhsana Ameen and others2013 KLR Civil Cases 337, 2013 PLJ Islamabad 63, 2013 PLC (C.S.) 1089 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-02-18
  civil revisionnecessary partyaudi alteram partemgovernment accommodationallotmentimpleadmentremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil revision petitions challenging judgments regarding the allotment of government accommodation. The core legal question is whether an occupant and allottee of disputed government premises, who was excluded from the original suit, constitutes a necessary party entitled to be heard, and whether a decree passed in their absence is legally sustainable. The High Court held that the petitioner, as the occupant and allottee, was indeed a necessary party whose rights were directly affected by the litigation. Consequently, the court found that the lower courts erred by proceeding without him, thereby violating the fundamental principle of audi alteram partem. The court set aside the impugned judgments and decrees and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to implead the petitioner and decide the case afresh. The key principle laid down is that a person whose interests are adversely affected by a decree is a necessary party, and courts must ensure such individuals are heard to prevent a mockery of justice, as judicial decisions cannot be made in the absence of affected parties.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person who was not a party to the original suit invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court if their rights are adversely affected by the decree?
  • Is an occupant of government accommodation a necessary party in a civil suit filed by a third party seeking the allotment of that same accommodation?
  • Does the failure to implead a necessary party in a civil suit render the resulting judgment and decree liable to be set aside?
  • Can a court pass a valid decree in a civil suit without associating a person who is in actual possession of the disputed property?
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• Miraj Gul vs Rukhsana Ameen And Other2013 KLR Civil Cases 337 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-02-18Read full judgment →
• Mir Laeeque Shah vs Capital Development Authority through its Chairman2013 C.L.R. 882 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-05-30Read full judgment →
• Mir Laeeque Shah and others vs Capital Development Authority through Chairman2013 YLR 311 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-05-30Read full judgment →
• Messrs Yz CNG Station through Sole Proprietor vs Employees' Old Age2013 PLC 178 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-04-24
  constitutional petitionEmployees' Old Age Benefits Actarbitrary exercise of powerdue processright to hearingstatutory inquiryCNG station registration
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a CNG station owner, filed a constitutional petition challenging the unilateral registration of their establishment under the Employees' Old Age Benefits Act, 1976, and the subsequent demand for contributions based on an arbitrary assessment of the number of employees. The core legal question was whether the respondent institution could lawfully register an establishment and demand contributions based on presumptive facts and mechanical assessments without conducting a proper inquiry. The court held that the respondent's actions were arbitrary, inconsistent, and lacked a factual basis, violating the principles of due process. The court set aside the impugned orders and remanded the matter to the respondent institution. The key principle laid down is that statutory authorities cannot proceed in a mechanical or arbitrary fashion based on presumptive facts; they must conduct a proper inquiry, provide the affected party an opportunity of hearing, and allow them to rebut evidence before imposing registration or financial liabilities.

  Questions settled

  • Can a statutory authority register an establishment and demand contributions based on presumptive facts without a proper inquiry?
  • Is a statutory authority required to provide an opportunity of hearing to an establishment before registering it under the Employees' Old Age Benefits Act 1976?
  • Does the unilateral assessment of employee strength by an authority without evidence violate the principles of due process?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Sajid Traders, Lahore and 4 others vs M_o Commerce, Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance and 4 others2013 PLJ Islamabad 201, 2013 PTD 697 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Messrs Premier Kadanwari Development Company Ltd. vs Customs, Central Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Islamabad2013 PTD 1037 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-04-04Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan Ordnance Factories (Pof) Wah Cantt vs CollectorNLR 2013 Tax 85 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Messrs Pak Gulf Construction (Pvt) Limited vs Federation of PakistanPTCL 2013 CL. 420, 2013 PTD 21 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-07-02Read full judgment →
• Messrs M. N. Construction COMPANYs vs Federation of Pakistan and others2013 PLD Islamabad 85 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-03-28Read full judgment →
• Messrs Karachi Steel Mills and others vs WAPDA and others2013 CLC 141 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-10-24
  Fuel Adjustment Chargeselectricity billingconsumer protectionretrospective levyarbitrary exercise of authoritynatural justicewrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a series of writ petitions filed by consumers against WAPDA and other electricity distribution entities challenging the imposition and collection of Fuel Adjustment Charges (FAC). The core legal question addressed is whether electricity distributors can arbitrarily levy FAC as arrears with retrospective effect and whether the Regulatory Authority has a statutory obligation to protect consumer interests against such demands. The Court held that the levy and demand of Fuel Adjustment Charges as arrears with retrospective effect are unconstitutional and violate principles of natural justice. The Court ruled that the Regulatory Authority is statutorily obligated to protect consumer interests rather than permitting distributors to raise FAC demands mechanically. Furthermore, the scope of FAC is strictly limited to actual variations in fuel prices. The Court directed distributors to issue amended bills and adjust any excessive amounts already collected from consumers, emphasizing that all consumers must be treated equally. The judgment establishes that the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan prohibits exploitation and mandates the High Court to protect citizens from arbitrary executive actions and illegal financial demands.

  Questions settled

  • Is the levy and demand of Fuel Adjustment Charges as arrears with retrospective effect constitutional?
  • Does the Regulatory Authority have a statutory obligation to protect consumer interests regarding Fuel Adjustment Charges?
  • Can electricity distributors demand Fuel Adjustment Charges in a mechanical fashion?
  • Are electricity distributors required to adjust excessive amounts collected from consumers through Fuel Adjustment Charges?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Indus Rags through Proprietor and 3 others vs Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 4 others2013 CLC 24 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-05-28Read full judgment →
• Messrs Glauser Int. vs Capital Development Authority and others2013 KLR Criminal Cases 289, PLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 504, 2013 MLD 812 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-02-14
  contempt of courtnon-prosecutionrestoration of petitionwithdrawal of petitionrepetitive petitionscompliance with court order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a contempt petition filed against the Capital Development Authority (CDA) for alleged non-compliance with a court order dated 17-6-2008, which directed the respondent to decide the petitioner's claim within two weeks. The contempt petition had been dismissed twice for non-prosecution, and the petitioner sought restoration and subsequently, permission to withdraw the petition to file a fresh one. The Court examined the merits of the contempt petition and found that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any reasonable grounds for initiating contempt proceedings, noting a lack of evidence regarding the petitioner's attempts to approach the respondents or proof that the claim remained undecided. Furthermore, the Court observed a lack of diligence by the petitioner in pursuing the case. Relying on established jurisprudence, the Court held that a litigant cannot be permitted to file repetitive petitions for the same relief. Consequently, the Court dismissed the contempt petition and the associated applications, affirming that contempt proceedings are a matter between the Court and the alleged contemnor, and no action was warranted in this instance.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner be allowed to file repetitive petitions for the same subject matter and relief?
  • Is a contempt petition maintainable where the petitioner fails to demonstrate reasonable grounds for non-compliance by the respondent?
  • Does the Court have the discretion to drop contempt proceedings if no action is warranted?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Faco Trading through Proprietor vs Member, Customs, Federal2013 PTD 825 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-05-29
  customs valuationvaluation advicefall back methodtransaction valueimport dutysequential orderwrit jurisdictionnatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment resolves a series of writ petitions challenging valuation advice orders issued by the Directorate General of Customs Valuation under Section 25-A of the Customs Act, 1969. The petitioners, importers of ceramics and other goods, argued that the customs authorities bypassed the sequential valuation methods provided in Section 25 and arbitrarily applied the 'Fall Back Method' under Section 25(9) without providing reasons for excluding prior methods. The court examined whether the 2007 amendment to Section 25(10), which removed the mandatory sequential order, granted unfettered discretion to the authorities. The court held that while the sequential order is no longer mandatory, the valuation officer must still provide specific reasons for adopting a particular method and excluding others to ensure the decision is not detrimental to the importer. Furthermore, the court found that the 'Fall Back Method' must be based on data from the preceding 90 days and cannot rely on arbitrary internet prices. Consequently, the impugned valuation orders were set aside for being illegal and based on presumptions, and the cases were remanded for fresh determination.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the customs authorities are bound to provide reasons for excluding primary valuation methods before resorting to the Fall Back Method under Section 25(9)?
  • Does the amendment to Section 25(10) of the Customs Act, 1969, grant valuation officers unfettered power to pick and choose valuation methods without regard to the importer's interest?
  • Can a valuation advice order based on internet prices and general market trends be sustained under the Fall Back Method?
  • What is the maximum operative period for a valuation criteria adopted under the Fall Back Method pursuant to Rule 121 of the Customs Rules, 2001?
  • Is a writ petition maintainable against a valuation order if the order is passed in violation of the provisions of the Customs Act despite the availability of alternate remedies?
  Read full judgment →
• Maskeen Sultan vs CDA through its Chairman2013 C.L.R. 104 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-05-04Read full judgment →
• Mashal Khan vs Federation of Pakistan, etc.2013 C.L.R. 849 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-10-11Read full judgment →
• Maqsood Ahmed vs Additional Deputy Commissioner (General/Inqu Iry2013 KLR Criminal Cases 218, 2013 PLD Islamabad 80 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-04-08Read full judgment →
• Maqsood Ahmed vs Additional Deputy Commissioner (General/Inquiry2013 KLR Criminal Cases 218 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-04-08Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad vs The State and 2 others2013 P Cr. L J 445 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-05-31
  appeal against acquittaldouble presumption of innocencemisreading of evidencefraudcriminal breach of trustappreciation of evidencedismissal in limine
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed under Section 417(2-A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, challenging the acquittal of the respondents in a case involving allegations of fraud and misappropriation under Sections 406, 419, 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the trial court's acquittal was based on a misreading or non-reading of evidence warranting appellate interference. The Court held that the prosecution failed to produce cogent evidence to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, noting that the complainant failed to substantiate the transaction details. The Court dismissed the appeal in limine, affirming that an accused acquitted after a regular trial enjoys a double presumption of innocence. The key principle laid down is that the High Court will only interfere with an acquittal if there is gross misreading or non-reading of evidence resulting in a miscarriage of justice, as the standard of appraisal in acquittal appeals differs significantly from that applied in appeals against conviction.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of the High Court's interference in an appeal against an acquittal?
  • Does an accused person enjoy a double presumption of innocence after being acquitted by a trial court?
  • Is there a difference in the method of appraisal of evidence between an appeal against conviction and an appeal against acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Masood etc vs Muhammad Ayub Malik etc2013 PLJ Islamabad 145 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-07-05Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Masood and others vs Muhammad Ayub Malik and others2013 PLJ Islamabad 145, 2013 P Cr. L J 805 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-07-05
  cross-versionFirst Information Reportquashmentfinal reportinvestigationCode of Criminal Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners filed a writ petition seeking the quashment of a police-recorded cross-version of respondent No.1, an order restraining the official respondents from conducting a fresh investigation, and a directive for the submission of a final report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 along with the arrest of certain accused persons. The core legal question was whether a cross-version of an accused can be recorded by the police during an ongoing investigation without registering a separate First Information Report, and whether such a statement can form the basis of a challan or final report. The Islamabad High Court held that recording a cross-version without a separate First Information Report under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is illegal, and that statements recorded under sections 161 or 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 cannot serve as a substitute for an First Information Report or be used to submit a challan against the complainant. The court laid down the principle that a cross-case must be instituted through a separately registered First Information Report or a direct complaint, and quashed the impugned cross-version while directing the submission of a final report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Can the police record a cross-version of an accused without registering a separate First Information Report under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What is the legal status of a statement recorded by the police during investigation when used as a cross-version against the complainant party?
  • Whether a final report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be withheld or delayed on the basis of an unregistered cross-version?
  • How should a cross-case properly be brought before the authorities or a court of law according to criminal procedure?
  Read full judgment →
• Makhmood Hussain vs The State and another2013 YLR 679 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-10-31
  post-arrest bailstatutory baildelay in trialcriminal proceduremurderadjournmentsdiscretionary relief
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under sections 302, 452, 337-A(ii), 337-F(i), and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following an incident where he allegedly trespassed into the complainant's home and inflicted fatal injuries. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail on statutory grounds under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, given the duration of his incarceration and the delay in the trial's conclusion. The Court examined the trial court's order sheets and determined that the delay in the trial could not be attributed solely to the prosecution, as the accused party had also contributed to the delay by seeking numerous adjournments. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner failed to satisfy the requirements for statutory bail. The principle laid down is that the concession of statutory bail is unavailable where the accused has actively contributed to the delay in the conclusion of the trial. The bail application was dismissed, with a direction to the trial court to conclude the proceedings expeditiously within three months.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused claim statutory bail under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the delay in the trial is partially attributable to the accused's own conduct?
  • Is the grant of bail on statutory grounds a matter of right when the accused has sought numerous adjournments?
  • Does the court have the authority to direct an expeditious conclusion of a trial when denying a bail application?
  Read full judgment →
• Makhdoomzada Syed Mushtaq Hussain Shah vs Additional Sessions2013 PLD Islamabad 26 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-07-05
  quashment of FIREx-Officio Justice of PeaceFederal Investigation Agencycriminal procedurejurisdiction of Justice of Peaceregistration of FIRIslamabad Capital Territory
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition sought the quashment of an FIR registered under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, following a direction issued by an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace. The petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace to direct the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) to register a case, arguing that the FIA operates under distinct procedural rules and that the Islamabad Capital Territory lacked the requisite notification for such judicial powers. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the FIA constitutes a police station and its members are officers in charge within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace possesses the authority under Section 22-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to issue directions to the FIA for the registration of criminal cases. The Court further affirmed that Sessions and Additional Sessions Judges act as Justices of the Peace by virtue of their office, and that the procedural requirements for preliminary inquiries were duly satisfied, finding no illegality in the impugned proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace have the jurisdiction to direct the Federal Investigation Agency to register an FIR?
  • Is the Federal Investigation Agency considered a police station for the purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can an Additional Sessions Judge exercise the powers of a Justice of the Peace by virtue of their office?
  • Does the Federal Investigation Agency (Inquiries and Investigations) Rules, 2002 preclude a Justice of the Peace from ordering the registration of a criminal case?
  Read full judgment →
• Makhdoom M. Niaz Inqlabi, Advocate etc. vs Election Commission of Pakistan, etc2013 C.L.R. 349 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-02-20Read full judgment →
• Major General (R) Malik Muhammad Farooq vs Government of Pakistan, etc2013 C.L.R. 814 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-04-12Read full judgment →
• Major General (R) Malik Muhammad Farooq vs Government of Pakistan, etc2013 PLJ Islamabad 288 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-04-12Read full judgment →
• Major (Retd.) Ahmad Nadeem Sadal vs Federation of Pakistan and others2013 YLR 2349 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-07-04Read full judgment →
• Maj. Gen Retd. Malik Muhammad Farooq vs Government of Pakistan2013 C.L.R. 814, 2013 PLJ Islamabad 288, 2013 PLC (C.S.) 962 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-04-12
  contractual appointmentwrit jurisdictioncaretaker governmentmerit-based appointmentpublic sector corporationservice matterconstitutional mandate
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a retired Major General, challenged the premature termination of his contract as Managing Director of the Utility Stores Corporation by the caretaker government. The petitioner argued that the caretaker government lacked the mandate to terminate a fixed-term contract and that the removal violated the Companies Ordinance, 1984, and the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The core legal question was whether the petitioner’s contract appointment, made without a competitive process, was enforceable through a writ petition and whether the caretaker government's action was legally sustainable. The Court held that the writ petition was not maintainable because the enforcement of a contract of service cannot be sought through constitutional jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court ruled that government posts must be filled through open, transparent, and competitive processes, rejecting the practice of appointing retired Army officers without merit-based selection. The Court emphasized that any policy allowing such preferential appointments is unconstitutional and offensive to natural justice. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and the Court directed the government to initiate a competitive recruitment process for the position.

  Questions settled

  • Can the enforcement of a contract of service be sought through a writ petition?
  • Does a caretaker government have the authority to terminate a fixed-term contract of a Managing Director?
  • Are government posts required to be filled through a competitive and transparent process regardless of the candidate's prior military service?
  • Is a policy that allows for the appointment of retired Army officers without a competitive process constitutionally valid?
  Read full judgment →
• Lt. General (Retd.) Naeem Khalid Lodhi vs President of Pakistan through Cabinet Secretary, Islamabad and 4 others2013 C.L.R. 46, 2013 NLR Service 29, 2013 PLC (C.S.) 330 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-06-04
  contractual appointmentwrit jurisdictiontermination of servicefactual controversyjudicial reviewservice lawstigmacivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a retired Lieutenant General appointed as Secretary, Defence Division on a two-year contract, challenged his termination before the Islamabad High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973. He alleged that his termination was stigmatized by media reports of "gross misconduct" and was effected without due process or inquiry. The respondents contended that the termination was a simple contractual separation, permitted by the appointment terms upon payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice, which the petitioner had accepted. The Court held that the petition was not maintainable as it involved factual controversies regarding the alleged stigma, which the respondents denied. Furthermore, the Court found that the termination adhered to the standard terms and conditions of the contract, which allowed for separation without assigning reasons. Consequently, the Court ruled that constitutional jurisdiction could not be invoked to challenge a lawful contractual termination, especially where the petitioner had already accepted the terminal benefits and secured alternative employment. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court resolve factual controversies regarding alleged stigma in termination of contract employment through constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Is a contract employee entitled to a formal inquiry when the termination is effected under terms allowing for separation without assigning reasons?
  • Does the acceptance of salary in lieu of notice by a contract employee preclude a challenge to the termination of their services?
  • Can media reports be treated as conclusive evidence of stigma in service matters when explicitly denied by the state?
  Read full judgment →
• LT. General (Retd.) Naeem Khalid Lodhi vs President of Pakistan2013 NLR Service 29 · Islamabad High Court
  contractual appointmenttermination simpliciterwrit jurisdictionfactual controversyservice lawstigmadue process
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a retired Lieutenant General appointed as Secretary, Defence Division on a two-year contract, challenged his termination via a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. He contended that his removal, reported in the media as being for "gross misconduct," carried a stigma, thereby necessitating a formal inquiry and due process. The respondents argued that the termination was a contractual "termination simpliciter" permitted under the terms of appointment, which allowed for removal upon payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice, and that the petitioner had already accepted such payment and secured new employment. The Court held that the petition involved disputed factual controversies regarding the nature of the termination—whether it was disciplinary or contractual—which could not be adjudicated within the limited scope of writ jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that where a contract explicitly permits termination without assigning reasons, and the employee accepts the terms, the Court will not interfere. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, establishing that contractual service disputes involving factual controversies are not amenable to constitutional review.

  Questions settled

  • Can a contract employee challenge termination in writ jurisdiction when the contract explicitly allows for termination without assigning reasons?
  • Does a High Court have the jurisdiction to resolve factual controversies regarding whether a termination was 'with stigma' or 'simpliciter' in a constitutional petition?
  • Is a contract employee entitled to a formal inquiry under the Civil Servants Act, 1973, if the termination is not disciplinary in nature?
  Read full judgment →
• Lt. General (Reid.) Naeem Khalid Lodhi vs President of Pakistan, through Cabinet Secretary, Pak. Secretariat, Islamabad and 4 others2013 C.L.R. 46 · Islamabad High Court
  contract appointmenttermination of serviceconstitutional petitioncivil servantjudicial reviewfactual controversystigma
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a retired Lt. General appointed on contract basis as Secretary Defence Division for two years, challenged his pre-mature termination through a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. He alleged that his termination was passed with a stigma of gross misconduct through media reports without a show-cause notice or inquiry, violating his fundamental rights and due process. The respondents contended that the termination was strictly in accordance with the standard terms and conditions of contract employment, which permitted termination upon one month's notice or salary in lieu thereof without assigning any reasons, and that the petitioner had accepted his one month's salary and subsequently taken up a new contract appointment. The Islamabad High Court held that the termination was legally competent under the agreed terms of the contract, that Sections 15 and 16 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 regarding disciplinary action were inapplicable as the termination was not disciplinary, and that allegations of stigma based on disputed media reports involved factual controversies not resolvable in constitutional jurisdiction. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the termination of a contract employee without assigning reasons in accordance with standard terms and conditions is amenable to constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Can disputed press and media reports regarding allegations of misconduct form the basis of establishing a termination with stigma in writ jurisdiction?
  • Whether provisions governing disciplinary action under the Civil Servants Act, 1973 apply when a contract employment is terminated simpliciter under its agreed terms?
  • Does a constitutional petition lie to challenge the premature termination of a contract appointment involving factual controversies requiring the appreciation of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Lt. Col. (Retd.) Muhammad Azhar vs Federation of Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Chief Commissioner and others2013 MLD 338 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-04-26Read full judgment →
• LESCO and others. etc. vs North Star Textile Mills, etc.2013 C.L.R. 1385 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-06-27Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zahid Khan vs The State2013 P Cr. L J 1254 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-04-04
  narcotics recoverychemical analysissentencing reductionControl of Narcotic Substances Actcriminal appealmandatory sentencequantity of narcotics
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, where the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the recovery of narcotics. The core legal question was whether the prosecution proved the quantity of recovered charas exceeded 10 kilograms, given that samples from multiple packets were merged into a single parcel for chemical analysis. The Court held that the investigative procedure of merging samples failed to establish that the total quantity of narcotics exceeded 10 kilograms, thereby rendering the mandatory life imprisonment provision under the proviso to Section 9(c) of the Act inapplicable. Relying on the principle of safe and benign interpretation in criminal jurisprudence, the Court ruled that the prosecution failed to prove the specific quantity required for the enhanced penalty. Consequently, the Court modified the conviction and reduced the sentence to six years of rigorous imprisonment, to be read alternatively under Section 9(b) or 9(c) of the Act. The judgment establishes that independent analysis of each packet is necessary to trigger enhanced statutory penalties based on weight.

  Questions settled

  • Does the merging of samples from multiple narcotics packets into a single parcel for chemical analysis satisfy the evidentiary requirements to prove the total weight of the contraband?
  • Can a court impose the mandatory life imprisonment sentence under the proviso to Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 if the prosecution fails to prove the recovered narcotics exceeded 10 kilograms?
  • May a court apply the principles of Section 367(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to narcotics cases when there is doubt regarding the specific weight of the substance recovered?
  Read full judgment →
• M. Ashraf Azeem vs Federal Government of Pakistan and others2013 PLC (C.S.) 1147 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-04-12
  writ petitioncontractual appointmentcompetitive processtransparencymerit-based appointmentstate-owned corporationquo warrantosalary arrearstermination of contract
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Managing Director of Pakistan Television Corporation (PTVC), challenged his premature termination and sought payment of salary arrears and a new posting. During the proceedings, the court scrutinized the appointment of the incumbent Managing Director (respondent No. 4), who had been appointed for a third term without a competitive process. The court observed that the respondent's pay package, which included a 3% share of monthly advertising revenue, was unreasonable and offensive to the rights of regular employees. The court held that appointments to state-owned corporations must be competitive, transparent, and merit-based, as per the principles laid down by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the court declared the respondent's appointment illegal and void, ordered the recovery of the advertising revenue commissions paid to him, and directed the government to initiate a fresh, competitive recruitment process. Regarding the petitioner's specific claims for salary and damages, the court held that a writ petition is not maintainable for the enforcement of contractual obligations, advising him to seek remedy through a civil suit.

  Read full judgment →
• Kingcrete Builders through General Manager vs Central Board of Revenue through Chairman CBR, Islamabad2013 PTD 111 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-06-21Read full judgment →
• Khawaja Saad Saleem vs Federation of Pakistan and others2013 PTD 1895 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-06-19Read full judgment →
• Khalil Ahmed vs The State and anothers2013 P Cr. L J 389 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-09-12
  pre-arrest bailcriminal breach of trustcommon intentioninvestigationjudicial discretionrecovery of propertymala fide
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for pre-arrest bail filed by an accused nominated in an FIR registered under sections 406 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, involving allegations of criminal breach of trust and misappropriation of diesel. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to the extraordinary concession of pre-arrest bail given the allegations of his specific role in the offense and his conduct during the investigation. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition, withdrawing the previously granted ad interim bail. The Court held that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary discretionary relief, and an accused's conduct—specifically failing to join the investigation and engaging in evasive behavior before the courts—disentitles them to such relief. Furthermore, where recovery of property is outstanding and the accused is implicated by witnesses under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the court will not grant pre-arrest bail, as doing so would require a deeper appreciation of evidence, which is impermissible at the bail stage.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to pre-arrest bail when recovery of property is still to be effected?
  • Does the failure of an accused to join the investigation disentitle them to the grant of pre-arrest bail?
  • Can a court grant pre-arrest bail where the petitioner has demonstrated evasive conduct before the judiciary?
  • Is a deeper appreciation of evidence permissible at the stage of deciding a pre-arrest bail application?
  Read full judgment →
• Kalim Ullah Khan vs Secretary Capital Administrative and Development Division Pakistan Secretariat, Islamabad and 2 others2013 PLC (C.S.) 162 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-06-01Read full judgment →
• Joodat Kamran Alvi vs Additional District Judge and others2013 MLD 1466 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-05-16Read full judgment →
• Jehanzeb and 3 otherss vs The State and anothersPLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 613, 2013 MLD 1054 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-03-11
  criminal appealappellate jurisdictionMagistrate Section 30Code of Criminal ProcedureCourt of Sessionsentence exceeding four years
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenges an order passed by an Additional Sessions Judge, who returned an appeal filed against a conviction and sentence of seven years passed by a Judicial Magistrate Section 30, Islamabad, on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction under Section 408(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether an appeal against a sentence exceeding four years passed by a Magistrate Section 30 lies before the High Court or the Court of Sessions. The Court held that Section 408(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which mandates appeals to the High Court for sentences exceeding four years, applies specifically to sentences passed by an Assistant Sessions Judge, not a Magistrate. The Court clarified that the Court of a Magistrate Section 30 is distinct from the Court of Session, and appeals against its decisions lie before the Court of Session, which is the immediate superior court. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside, and the appeal was remanded to the Additional Sessions Judge for decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal against a sentence exceeding four years passed by a Magistrate Section 30 lie to the High Court or the Court of Session?
  • Does Section 408(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to sentences passed by a Magistrate Section 30?
  • Is a Magistrate Section 30 considered part of the Court of Session for the purposes of appellate jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Jehanzeb & 3 others vs State & anotherPLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 613 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-03-11
  criminal revisionappellate jurisdictionMagistrate Section 30Court of Sessionconviction and sentencereturn of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenges an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge returning the petitioners' appeal against their conviction and sentence under Section 408(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether an appeal against a conviction and sentence exceeding four years passed by a Judicial Magistrate Section 30 lies to the High Court or the Court of Session. The Islamabad High Court held that the appellate forum for a sentence passed by a Magistrate Section 30 lies before the Court of Session, as Section 408(b) applies specifically to sentences passed by an Assistant Sessions Judge and does not encompass Magistrates. The Court set aside the impugned order and directed the Additional Sessions Judge to decide the appeal on its merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal against a conviction and sentence exceeding four years passed by a Judicial Magistrate Section 30 lies to the High Court or the Court of Session?
  • Does Section 408(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to sentences passed by a Magistrate under Section 30?
  • Is an Additional Sessions Judge justified in returning an appeal filed against the judgment of a Magistrate Section 30 as being coram non-judice?
  Read full judgment →
• Javed Mahmood vs Government of Pakistan, etc2013 PLJ Islamabad 98 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-04-01Read full judgment →
• Jamila Pirzada and 3 others vs Col. (R) Mansoor Akber and 2 others2013 C.L.R. 362 · Islamabad High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Jameela Pirzada and others vs Muhammad Ali Sheikh and others2013 PLJ Islamabad 56 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-10-18Read full judgment →
• Jameela Pirzada and 3 others vs Muhammad Ali Sheikh and 2 others2013 C.L.R. 508 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-10-18Read full judgment →
• Irshad Ahmed and others vs Secretary, Ministry of Education and others2013 PLC (C.S.) 280 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-03-21
  contempt of courtregularization of servicescontract employeesdaily wage employeesservice lawgovernment policycivil servantsemployment termination
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns contempt of court proceedings initiated by former contract and daily-wage teachers seeking the implementation of a prior court order directing the regularization of their services. The core legal question was whether the respondents committed contempt by failing to regularize the petitioners and whether the petitioners were entitled to such relief under existing government policies. The court dismissed the contempt petitions, holding that the previous order relied upon by the petitioners was not an unconditional mandate for regularization but was contingent upon the outcome of pending litigation before the Supreme Court and subsequent government policy decisions. The court observed that the petitioners did not meet the specific eligibility criteria defined in the government's regularization policy, as their services had been terminated prior to the relevant periods. Consequently, no contemptuous act was established. The court laid down the principle that contempt jurisdiction cannot be invoked to enforce orders that are conditional or contingent upon future events, and that regularization of employment remains subject to established government policies and eligibility criteria, which must be strictly satisfied.

  Questions settled

  • Can contempt of court proceedings be initiated to enforce a court order that is conditional upon the outcome of future litigation or government policy?
  • Are contract or daily-wage employees entitled to automatic regularization of service absent specific eligibility criteria defined by government policy?
  • Does the failure to implement a conditional court order constitute a contemptuous act by the respondents?
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• Inaam Elahi Nasir and others vs National Bank of Pakistan and others2013 PLC (C.S.) 899 · Islamabad High Court · 2011-12-19
  Golden Handshake Schemeterritorial jurisdictionpensionary benefitsad hoc reliefwrit petitionlachesreasonable classification
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment decides three consolidated writ petitions filed by former employees of the National Bank of Pakistan (NBP) who sought the recalculation of their retirement benefits under the Golden Handshake Scheme (GHS). The petitioners requested the inclusion of ad hoc relief, revised leave encashment, and other bonuses in their pensionary emoluments, along with interest. The respondent-Bank raised objections regarding territorial jurisdiction and argued that the matter was settled by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petitions, holding that it lacked territorial jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution because the respondent-Bank's head office was in Karachi and the petitioners served in various cities of Punjab. On the merits, the Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in National Bank of Pakistan v. Nasim Arif Abbas (2001 SCMR 446), which established that employees who voluntarily opted for retirement under the GHS form a distinct class from continuing employees and cannot claim subsequent ad hoc reliefs or increments after accepting their benefits without objection.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have territorial jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to entertain a petition against a bank whose head office is located outside the Court's territorial limits and where the petitioners served in other provinces?
  • Can employees who voluntarily opted for retirement under a Golden Handshake Scheme and accepted their benefits without objection subsequently claim ad hoc relief or annual increments granted to continuing employees?
  • Whether employees retiring under a voluntary golden handshake scheme constitute a distinct legal class from continuing employees for the purposes of Article 25 of the Constitution?
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• Hassan Raza Syed vs District and Sessions Judge (West), Islamabad2013 PLD Islamabad 31 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-06-12Read full judgment →
• Hassan Raza Syed vs District & Sessions Judge (West) Islamabad2013 PLD Islamabad 31, 2013 PLJ Islamabad 229 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-06-12Read full judgment →
• Hafeez Iqbal Oil And Ghee Industries (Pvt.) Limited, Etc. vs Govt, Of Pakistan2013 P.C.T.LR. 792 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• G.M. Chaudhry and others vs Dr. Kamran Jehangir and others2013 PLC (C.S.) 206 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-03-13
  director-general appointmentquo-warrantolocus poententiaevoid ab initioreversionstatutory interpretationconstitutional petitionservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment resolves connected constitutional petitions concerning the legality of the appointment and subsequent reversion of Dr. Kamran Jehangir from the post of Director-General of the National University of Modern Languages (NUML). The core legal question was whether an unqualified person appointed to a statutory post requiring specific qualifications (a language-qualified Brigadier from the Army Education Corps under the NUML Ordinance, 2000) could claim protection against the recall of such appointment. The Islamabad High Court held that an initial appointment made in violation of mandatory statutory criteria is void ab initio, and the competent authority possesses the inherent power under the principle of locus poententiae to recall an illegal order without requiring formal disciplinary proceedings or adherence to procedural safeguards meant for lawful incumbents. The court established that writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to perpetuate an illegality or restore a person to a public office to which they have no lawful entitlement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appointment made in violation of mandatory statutory qualifications can be protected under the principle of locus poententiae?
  • Does the recall of a void ab initio appointment to a public office amount to reduction in rank requiring formal inquiry and show-cause notice?
  • Can a high court extend relief in writ jurisdiction to restore an individual to a public post to which they have no lawful entitlement?
  • Whether the bar under Article 199(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan applies when an authority acts without jurisdiction or coram non judice?
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• Five Star Building Materials and Gen. Order Suppliers and Another vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Islamabad and 6 OthersNLR 2013 Tax 58 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Federal Employees Cooperative _Housing Society, Islamabad through President vs Capital Develoment Authority, Islamabad through Chairman and anothers2013 MLD 255 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-03-17Read full judgment →
• Fazal Hussain vs Chief Commisisoner, Islamabad and others2013 PLD Islamabad 18 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-10-15
  Capital Development AuthorityCorruptionRule of LawJudicial ActivismConstitutional CourtsCommission of InquiryGood GovernanceArbitrary Exercise of PowerStatutory BodyPublic Interest
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses the pervasive corruption and irregularities within the Capital Development Authority (CDA), noting its "inbuilt culture" of non-compliance with rules, political interference, and the resulting extensive litigation challenging arbitrary actions and inaction. The Islamabad High Court underscored its constitutional duty to uphold the rule of law, protect fundamental rights, and combat corruption to ensure transparency and good governance. Recognizing the alarming scale of the issues, the court constituted a commission, headed by a retired Supreme Court judge, to investigate specific allegations of non-transparent land acquisition, plot allotments, project management, and recruitment practices. The commission is tasked with identifying responsible individuals, quantifying losses, and recommending measures to enforce a "rules culture" within the CDA, thereby providing guidance for its top echelons to achieve good governance.

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• Farrukh Zia vs Mst Bushra Begum and others2013 CLC 1077 · Islamabad High Court · 2011-01-24Read full judgment →
• Fariduddin vs Capital Development Authority, Islamabad and others2013 MLD 935 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-02-18Read full judgment →
• Farid-ud-Din vs Capital Development Authority; Islamabad, etc.2013 C.L.R. 915 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-02-18Read full judgment →
• Farid-Ud-Din vs Capital Development Authority, Islamabad, etc.2013 C.L.R. 915, 2013 MLD 935, 2013 PLC (C.S.) 1004, 2013 PLJ Islamabad 112 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-02-18
  deputationistCDA employeeplot allotmentCapital Development AuthorityIslamabad Land Disposal Regulationsconstitutional jurisdictionwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  Through this judgment, the Islamabad High Court disposed of two writ petitions filed by government officers who had served on deputation in the Capital Development Authority (CDA) and sought the issuance of allotment letters for residential plots on the basis of being treated as CDA employees. The core legal question was whether government servants serving on deputation in the CDA can be equated with regular CDA employees for the purpose of plot allotment quotas. The court held that deputationists do not enjoy the equal status of regular CDA employees and cannot claim entitlements under the quota reserved specifically for CDA employees. The court laid down the principle that deputationists remain government servants and must avail themselves of plot allotments through the quota reserved for federal government servants rather than seeking regular CDA employee status, as treating deputationists as regular employees would create an illegal advantage and undermine established statutory regulations governing land disposal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether government servants serving on deputation in the Capital Development Authority can be equated with regular CDA employees for the allotment of residential plots?
  • Do deputationists have a legal right to claim plot allotments under the quota reserved exclusively for regular CDA employees?
  • Can the Capital Development Authority board decisions override statutory regulations regarding land disposal and employee quotas?
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