Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 79,348 judgments in total from the Lahore High Court.

• Mst. Nazia Bibi vs Muhammad Saleem, etc.2013 C.L.R. 63 · Lahore High Court · 2012-05-03Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nazia Arshad & another vs State & anotherPLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Lahore) 164 · Lahore High Court · 2012-12-18
  pre-arrest bailacid attackAnti-Terrorism Act 1997matrimonial disputemala fideSection 336-B PPCitlaf-i-salahiyyat-i-udwpublic place
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought pre-arrest bail in a case registered under Sections 324 and 336-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (PPC) and Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 (ATA). The allegation against petitioner No. 1 was that she sprinkled acid on her husband, causing injuries to his thigh and penis, while petitioner No. 2, her brother, provided transportation afterwards. The petitioners argued that the FIR was mala fide, stemming from matrimonial disputes, and that the medical evidence showed only non-grievous injuries falling under Section 337-F(i) PPC. The High Court found an unexplained 18-hour delay in reporting, confirming bad faith aimed at avoiding financial commitments made in the Nikahnama. The court held that Section 7 ATA was inapplicable as the incident occurred within a private hotel room rather than a public place and lacked terrorism elements under Section 6. Further, Section 324 PPC did not apply for lack of intent to kill, and Section 336-B PPC was not attracted without proof of itlaf-i-salahiyyat-i-udw. Consequently, the court confirmed the petitioners' pre-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an offence under Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 can be made out if the alleged incident occurred within a private room rather than a public place?
  • Whether Section 336-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be attracted in the absence of medical evidence proving itlaf-i-salahiyyat-i-udw?
  • Does an injury categorized under Section 337-F(i) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 constitute grievous violence for the purposes of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be granted where an FIR is lodged with inordinate delay due to underlying matrimonial disputes and financial ulterior motives?
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• Mst. Nasreen'fatima vs The Bank of Punjab through Manager2013 CLD 218 · Lahore High Court · 2012-06-28
  banking suitex parte decreeexecution proceedingsinterlocutory ordermaintainability of appealfinancial institution
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged an interlocutory order dated 4th of April, 2012 passed by the Banking Court-III, Multan, whereby a show-cause notice was issued to the Tehsildar in execution proceedings arising from an ex parte judgment and decree. An application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 filed by the appellant to set aside the ex parte decree remained pending. The core legal question was whether an appeal against such an interlocutory order is maintainable in execution proceedings during the pendency of an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and in light of the statutory bar under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The Lahore High Court held that the impugned order was purely interlocutory, caused no prejudice to the appellant, and was barred from appeal under Section 22(6) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as incompetent, establishing that interlocutory orders in banking execution proceedings cannot be challenged by way of appeal where barred by statute.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal is maintainable against an interlocutory order passed by a Banking Court in execution proceedings?
  • Does Section 22(6) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 bar appeals against interlocutory orders?
  • Can execution proceedings be challenged while an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is pending?
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• Mst. Nasim Akhtar vs Mukhtar Ahmad2013 C.L.R. 418, 2013 C.L.R. 388 · Lahore High Court · 2011-10-07Read full judgment →
• Mst. Najma Parveen vs Ghulam Jannat and others2013 MLD 661 · Lahore High Court · 2012-09-25Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naheed Akhtar vs Station House Officer, P.S.A. Division, Sheikhupura and anotherPLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Lahore) 194 · Lahore High Court · 2012-04-26
  Hizanatcustody of minorsillegal confinementwelfare of minorshabeas corpusmother's custody
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the recovery of two minor children, a daughter aged seven and a son aged five months, from the alleged illegal custody of their father, the second respondent. The petitioner, the mother of the minors, contended that the father had forcibly taken the children, rendering his custody illegal and endangering their welfare. The court noted that the children were produced before it in compliance with a prior order. Upon hearing the petitioner and observing that the respondent failed to appear despite notice, the court addressed the core legal question of the mother's right to custody. The court held that the mother possesses the primary right of Hizanat (custody) over the minor children, famously observing that the mother's lap is God's own cradle. Consequently, the court ordered the custody of the minors to be handed over to the petitioner. It clarified that this order does not preclude the father from seeking custody through appropriate proceedings under the Guardian and Wards Act 1890, which the Guardian Court would determine based on the welfare of the minors.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mother have the primary right of Hizanat over minor children in a habeas corpus petition?
  • Can a father seek custody of minors after a habeas corpus petition has been decided in favor of the mother?
  • Is a habeas corpus petition under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 an appropriate remedy for the recovery of minor children from a parent?
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• Mst. Naeema Maqbool vs Muhammad Boota2013 YLR 607 · Lahore High Court · 2010-11-01Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mussarat Iqbal Niazi vs Judge Family Court, etc.2013 PLJ Lahore 104 · Lahore High Court · 2012-12-18Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mussarat Iqbal Niazi vs Judge Family Court and others2013 PLJ Lahore 104, 2013 CLC 276 · Lahore High Court · 2012-12-18
  dissolution of marriagekhuladowerbridal giftsfamily courtconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of three writ petitions involving family law disputes regarding dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula and the return of benefits. The core legal question concerns whether bridal gifts, such as land and gold ornaments transferred at the time of marriage, can be made a condition for the return of consideration in a khula-based dissolution of marriage. The Lahore High Court held that bridal gifts are the sole property of the wife and cannot be ordered to be returned as consideration for khula, restricting the consideration strictly to the dower amount specified in the nikahnama. The court laid down the principle that while a marriage may be dissolved on the basis of khula requiring consideration, such consideration must be drawn from the dower and cannot encroach upon independent bridal gifts or property previously gifted to the wife.

  Questions settled

  • Can bridal gifts given to a wife at the time of marriage be made a condition for the grant of khula?
  • Whether land transferred as a gift to the wife can be ordered to be returned as consideration for khula?
  • What constitutes valid consideration for the dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula?
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• Mst. Munawar Shahzadi vs Muhammad Ghafoor2013 C.L.R. 679, 2013 CLC 880 · Lahore High Court · 2010-06-07
  specific performanceimmovable propertytime as essence of contractagreement to sellrescission of contractearnest moneycontractual obligations
  Summary & questions settled

  This Regular First Appeal arises from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property. The core legal question is whether the stipulation of a specific time period for the execution of a sale deed in an agreement to sell renders time the essence of the contract, thereby barring specific performance if the deadline is missed. The Lahore High Court held that in contracts for the sale of immovable property, time is not ordinarily considered the essence of the contract unless explicitly stated in unmistakable language or evidenced by the parties' conduct. The Court found that the agreement lacked a clause providing for the automatic termination or rescission of the contract upon the expiry of the stipulated period. Furthermore, the appellants failed to serve any notice of rescission or demonstrate that the parties intended time to be essential. Consequently, the Court upheld the decree for specific performance, establishing the principle that a mere mention of a deadline in such agreements does not make time the essence of the contract, and specific performance remains available unless the vendor proves a clear intention to the contrary or serves a notice of rescission.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere mention of a specific time period for the execution of a sale deed in an agreement to sell make time the essence of the contract?
  • Can a party to an agreement to sell unilaterally treat the time fixed in the contract as the essence of the contract?
  • Is a notice of rescission required to establish that time was intended to be of the essence in a contract for the sale of immovable property?
  • Can specific performance of an agreement to sell be granted after the expiry of the period fixed in the contract?
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• Mst. Mehmooda Arif vs District Coordination Officer (DCO)/2013 PLC (C.S.) 492 · Lahore High Court · 2012-02-03
  constitutional petitioneducators recruitmentmerit policyadministrative discretionvested rightsarbitrary actionservice matters
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition arises from a grievance regarding the recruitment process for Secondary School Educators (SSE Arts) in District Nankana Sahib, where the petitioner claimed that she was arbitrarily denied full marks allocated for computer literacy under the recruitment policy, affecting her merit position. The core legal question was whether the Selection and Recruitment Committee could exercise unguided discretion to award fractional marks for computer literacy based on an internal corrigendum issued after the closing date for applications. The Lahore High Court held that administrative discretion must be exercised judiciously, fairly, and reasonably, and that rules or criteria governing appointments cannot be altered or amended to the detriment of candidates' vested rights after the expiry of the last date for submitting applications. The court laid down the principle that post-deadline administrative modifications or internal notifications altering selection criteria are void ab initio, and that candidates are entitled to be evaluated strictly in accordance with the terms and conditions published in the initial advertisement and recruitment policy.

  Questions settled

  • Whether administrative authorities can alter recruitment criteria or introduce a corrigendum after the last date for submission of applications?
  • Does the exercise of discretionary power by a selection committee require transparent and judicious standards?
  • Can candidates acquire a vested right to be considered under the original terms of an advertisement once the application deadline has passed?
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• Mst. Mah Rukh Batool vs Judge Banking Court No. III, Multan and 52013 PLJ Lahore 63 · Lahore High Court · 2012-10-22Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mah Rukh Batool vs Judge Banking Court No,III, Multan and 52013 CLD 598 · Lahore High Court · 2012-09-22Read full judgment →
• Mst. Lubna Bibi, Etc. vs District Co-Ordination Officer, Chakwal, Etc.K.L.R. 2013 Civil Cases 27 · Lahore High Court · 2012-10-01Read full judgment →
• Mst. Khan Begum, etc. vs Aftab Din, etc.2013 C.L.R. 66 · Lahore High Court · 2012-05-21Read full judgment →
• Mst. Khalida Bibi vs Muhammad Shafi, etc2013 PLJ Lahore 542 · Lahore High Court · 2013-06-28Read full judgment →
• Mst. Khalida Bibi vs Muhammad Shafi and others2013 PLJ Lahore 542, 2013 YLR 2839 · Lahore High Court · 2013-06-28Read full judgment →
• Mst. Jameela Bibi vs Station House Officer and others2013 MLD 823 · Lahore High Court · 2012-11-15
  habeas corpuscustody of minorguardian judgeextraordinary jurisdictionmaintainability of petitionfamily law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition filed under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 by a mother seeking the recovery of her minor son from the custody of his father, alleging forcible removal. The core legal question was whether the High Court should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to recover a minor when alternative remedies are available. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the jurisdiction under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is to be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances involving real urgency. The Court observed that the petitioner failed to demonstrate such circumstances and provided inconsistent details regarding the alleged removal of the minor. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Guardian Judge possesses the requisite authority to regulate custody and maintenance matters. Consequently, the Court declined to intervene, directing the petitioner to seek her remedy before the appropriate Guardian Judge, thereby reinforcing the principle that habeas corpus petitions for minor custody should not bypass established family law forums without compelling justification.

  Questions settled

  • Is a petition under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 maintainable for the recovery of a minor when the petitioner has not demonstrated exceptional or extraordinary circumstances?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to decline a habeas corpus petition for minor custody when the petitioner has access to a Guardian Judge?
  • Should the High Court exercise its jurisdiction under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to recover a minor when the primary objective appears to be financial maintenance rather than urgent custody?
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• Mst. Ishrat Bibi vs Mst Hashmat Bibi and others2013 CLC 499 · Lahore High Court · 2012-12-11Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hina Fakhar vs Rana Shahid and two others2013 C.L.R. 1606 · Lahore High Court · 2013-07-16Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hanifan Bibi, etc. vs Mrs. Hameecla Bibi2013 C.L.R. 407 · Lahore High Court · 2011-09-28Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hameeda Bibi and 5 others vs Ataa Muhammad2013 YLR 1289 · Lahore High Court · 2012-06-25Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghulam Sahira and others vs Member Federal Land Commission, Islamabad2013 MLD 1 · Lahore High Court · 2012-10-02
  Martial Law Regulation 115Federal Land Commissionland ceilingalienation of landbona fide transactionejusdem generisproduce index unitssuo motu revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged an order dated 28-12-1976 passed by the Member, Federal Land Commission, which declared a 1971 sale transaction of 610 acres of land by the petitioner in favour of her minor children to be void. The core legal questions were whether the Federal Land Commission possessed the jurisdiction to declare such a sale transaction invalid without legally admissible evidence, and whether the term 'otherwise' in the proviso to Paragraph 7 of Martial Law Regulation 115 of 1972 should be interpreted under the principle of ejusdem generis to exclude sales. The Court held that the Federal Land Commission acted without lawful authority, noting that the transaction was previously validated by the Additional Chief Land Commissioner and that the Commission failed to collect legally admissible evidence to prove the transaction was not bona fide. The Court reaffirmed that the term 'otherwise' in the regulation is of wide amplitude and not restricted to gifts. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioner's total landholdings were within the permissible ceiling of 12,000 produce index units, rendering the resumption order unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Land Commission have the jurisdiction to declare a sale transaction between a declarant and their heirs invalid without legally admissible evidence?
  • Should the term 'otherwise' in the proviso to Paragraph 7 of Martial Law Regulation 115 of 1972 be interpreted using the principle of ejusdem generis to exclude sales?
  • Is it necessary to prove the transfer of physical possession of land to minor children to validate a transaction under Martial Law Regulation 115 of 1972?
  • Can the Federal Land Commission resume land if the total holding of the declarant remains below the ceiling of 12,000 produce index units?
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• Mst. Ghulam Fatima through Special Attorney vs Nazir Ahmad through LRs, and others2013 CLC 810 · Lahore High Court · 2011-11-23Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghazala Yasmeen and 3 otherss vs Sarfraz Khan Durrani2013 CLC 1406 · Lahore High Court · 2012-05-10
  specific performanceimmovable propertytime is of the essencepleadingsdiscretionary reliefearnest moneycontractual obligations
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a consolidated suit involving a dispute over an agreement to sell immovable property. The appellants (sellers) and respondent (buyer) entered into an agreement where the respondent paid earnest money, with the balance due by a specific date, subject to the appellants clearing title documentation. The appellants failed to transfer the property in their names by the deadline and did not notify the respondent of any progress. The respondent sued for specific performance, while the appellants sued for cancellation of the agreement. The trial court decreed the respondent's suit and dismissed the appellants' suit. On appeal, the appellants argued that time was of the essence and that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion under the Specific Relief Act, 1877. The High Court held that in contracts for immovable property, time is not normally of the essence unless expressly intended. Furthermore, the court found no evidence of hardship or misrepresentation by the respondent. The court affirmed that evidence led beyond pleadings is inadmissible. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the decree for specific performance.

  Questions settled

  • Is time considered of the essence in contracts for the sale of immovable property?
  • Can a party lead evidence on facts not pleaded in their original suit?
  • What are the grounds for refusing specific performance under the Specific Relief Act 1877?
  • Does the failure to appeal against a consolidated judgment dismissing a cross-suit weaken the appellant's position in the remaining appeal?
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• Mst. Fatima Bibi vs S.D.O. Canals, Minchinabad, Etc.K.L.R. 2013 Civil Cases 14 · Lahore High Court · 2012-09-25Read full judgment →
• Mst. Farah Mehnaz and others vs Safeer Hussain Jaffar and others2013 CLC 235 · Lahore High Court · 2011-11-17
  child custodyhizanatwelfare of the minorguardians and wardsmother custodysecond marriage of mother
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil writ petition challenges the appellate judgment and decree whereby the Additional District Judge set aside the Guardian Judge's order and granted the application under section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 for the custody of a minor daughter to the respondent-father. The petitioner-mother, who had contracted a second marriage, contested the custody claim, demonstrating continuous care of the minor and submitting an affidavit undertaking to reside permanently near Gujar Khan and forego maintenance claims for the minor's welfare. The core legal question concerned whether the mother's second marriage automatically forfeits her right to hizanat (custody) or whether the welfare of the minor remains the paramount consideration. The Lahore High Court held that the welfare of the minor is the supreme consideration, overriding strict personal law presumptions regarding disqualification due to a second marriage, especially where the father's conduct indicated an attempt to evade maintenance. The court laid down the principle that maternal custody should not be disturbed if it serves the best physical, psychological, and emotional interests of the child, restoring the trial court's dismissal of the father's custody petition with visitation rights.

  Questions settled

  • Does the second marriage of a mother automatically forfeit her right to the custody (hizanat) of a minor child?
  • Is the welfare of the minor considered the paramount and overriding factor in determining child custody under Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890?
  • Can a father's conduct regarding the payment of maintenance influence the court's assessment of his bonafides in seeking custody?
  • Under what circumstances can a mother's custody of a minor child of tender age be disturbed in favor of the natural father?
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• Mst. Faiza Iqbal and 7 others vs Government of the Punjab through Secretary Education, Lahore and another2013 PLC (C.S.) 299 · Lahore High Court · 2012-02-03
  constitutional petitioneligibility criteriaeducators recruitmentsemester systemannual systemfundamental rightsequality before lawdiscriminatory policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 challenged paragraph No. 2 of an impugned letter dated 24-11-2011 issued by the Government of the Punjab, which introduced a new eligibility criteria for the posts of Educators for candidates who passed their graduation examination through the semester system by requiring a weightage of the notified subject of not less than 75% of the total degree marks, a condition absent from the initial advertisement and Recruitment Policy 2011. The core legal question was whether such a subsequent, unpublicized classification between semester and annual system graduates violates the right to equality under Article 25 of the Constitution. The Lahore High Court held that the impugned condition was discriminatory, violated fundamental rights, and contradicted the terms of the advertisement. The court set aside the offending paragraph as illegal and unlawful, directing authorities to reconsider the petitioners' applications strictly on merit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the government can introduce new eligibility criteria for public sector posts after the publication of the initial advertisement?
  • Does imposing a higher percentage requirement on graduates from the semester system compared to the annual system violate Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Whether public authorities are bound to adhere strictly to the terms and conditions advertised in recruitment notices?
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• Mst. Erum Khan vs Abdul Gayyur KhanPLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Lahore) 168 · Lahore High Court · 2012-10-04
  special leave to appealpolygamydirectory provisionsupply of copiesremand of caseMuslim Family Laws Ordinancedismissal of complaint
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal under Section 417(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was filed against an order of the Special Judicial Magistrate, Multan, which dismissed a private complaint concerning alleged polygamy due to non-supply of statement copies under Section 241-A of the Code. The petitioner contended that Section 241-A is directory in nature and reasonable opportunity ought to have been granted to ensure compliance. The High Court affirmed that the provisions of Section 241-A, Cr.P.C. are directory rather than mandatory, and the trial magistrate should have afforded an opportunity to comply. However, considering the lapse of nearly nine years since the original order, the Court held that remanding the case for trial was not justified, as it would cause undue hardship to the parties and negatively impact their children and matrimonial lives. Consequently, the High Court declined to remand the matter and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Are the provisions of Section 241-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 directory or mandatory in nature?
  • Should a trial Magistrate grant reasonable opportunity to comply with Section 241-A, Cr.P.C. before dismissing a complaint?
  • Can a court refuse to remand a criminal case for trial despite procedural errors if significant time has elapsed and remand would adversely affect the parties' family life?
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• Mst. Bushra Bibi, etc. vs Hidayatullah, etc.2013 C.L.R. 553 · Lahore High Court · 2013-01-18Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bashiran, etc vs Govt. of Punjab, etc2013 C.L.R. 928 · Lahore High Court · 2010-04-06Read full judgment →
• Mst. Baro And Other vs Adj And OtherK.L.R. 2013 Civil Cases 94 · Lahore High Court · 2012-10-17Read full judgment →
• Mst. Balqees Akhtar vs Additional District Judge and others2013 MLD 1686 · Lahore High Court · 2013-06-10Read full judgment →
• Mst. Azim Khatoon vs Mst. Jindan through L.Rs. and another2013 YLR 1055 · Lahore High Court · 2011-05-02Read full judgment →
• Mst. Aliya Fazil and anothers vs Mirza Farhan Rubbani and anothers2013 MLD 1631 · Lahore High Court · 2013-06-28Read full judgment →
• Msf. Munawar Shahzadi and another vs Muhammad Ghafoor2013 C.L.R. 679 · Lahore High Court · 2010-06-07
  specific performancetime as essence of contractagreement to sellimmovable propertyforfeiture of earnest moneyrescission of contract
  Summary & questions settled

  This Regular First Appeal arises from a judgment and decree dated 06.02.1996 passed by the Civil Judge 1st Class, Lahore, decreeing the respondent's suit for possession through specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 03.07.1989 concerning a residential property. The core legal question revolves around whether the specification of a three-month period for completion in the agreement to sell made time of the essence of the contract under Section 55 of the Contract Act 1872, and whether the appellants could treat the contract as revoked without serving notice or establishing such intention. The Lahore High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the trial court's decree in favour of the respondent. The court held that in agreements for the sale of immovable property, time is not ordinarily of the essence unless expressly stated in unmistakable language, and a party seeking to rely on time must demonstrate the intention of the parties and serve a timely notice for rescission upon default, which the appellants failed to do.

  Questions settled

  • Is time considered of the essence of the contract in agreements for the sale of immovable property?
  • Can a party unilaterally treat the time fixed in an agreement to sell as the essence of the contract without an express stipulation?
  • Does the mere mention of a specified period for completion in a sale agreement make time the essence of the contract?
  • Is the service of a notice of rescission required when a vendor alleges breach of time limits in a contract for sale of immovable property?
  Read full judgment →
• Ms. Ayesha Siddiqa vs Government of Punjab and others2013 YLR 1796 · Lahore High Court · 2013-04-04Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Sarwar Nazir vs Mirza Rashid Ahmad2013 PLD Lahore 495 · Lahore High Court · 2013-01-15Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Nasreen Tariq vs Abdul Basit and 2 others2013 MLD 1388 · Lahore High Court · 2012-06-06
  temporary injunctionprivate nuisanceresidential areacommercial useschool establishmentCantonment propertycivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises out of a suit for declaration, permanent and mandatory injunction, and cancellation of a lease deed, filed by respondent No.1 against the petitioner and pro forma respondent No.3, challenging the establishment of a private school in a residential area (Firdousi Road, Rawalpindi Cantt). The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's application for a temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C., but the Additional District Judge accepted the appeal and restrained the petitioner from running the school pending the suit. The core legal question was whether establishing a school in a residential property without conversion amounts to a private nuisance warranting a temporary injunction. The Lahore High Court dismissed the revision petition, holding that the appellate court rightly exercised its jurisdiction in granting the injunction. The High Court laid down the principle that opening and running a school in a purely residential area without converting the lease for commercial purposes causes private nuisance to neighbors by disrupting peace, increasing traffic, and polluting the area, thereby satisfying the requirements of a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss for granting temporary injunctions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the establishment of a school in a residential area constitute a private nuisance for the neighbors?
  • Whether running a school in a building leased strictly for residential purposes without conversion justifies granting a temporary injunction?
  • Can a revisional court interfere with a well-reasoned appellate order granting a temporary injunction when no legal infirmity is shown?
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• Mrs. Abida Rabia Hussain through Special Attorney vs Messrs Marjan CNG2013 YLR 63 · Lahore High Court · 2010-06-10Read full judgment →
• MRs, Razia Nadeem and others vs Province of Punjab and others2013 PLC (C.S.) 46 · Lahore High Court · 2012-04-04
  regularization of servicecontract employeesequal treatmentfundamental rightsselection committeepublic service commissioncivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, serving as Lecturers on contract basis since 1998-1999, filed writ petitions seeking regularization of their services. They were recruited through a high-powered committee established by the Government of the Punjab, rather than the Public Service Commission. The core legal question was whether these contract employees, having served for over a decade and selected on merit through a validly constituted committee, were entitled to regularization, particularly when similarly situated colleagues had been regularized. The Court held that the Government possessed the authority under the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974, and the Punjab Public Service Commission (Functions) Rules, 1978, to constitute selection committees for recruitment. The Court found that the petitioners' selection process was merit-based and legal. Denying them regularization while granting it to others in similar circumstances violated the principle of equal treatment under Article 25 of the Constitution. Consequently, the Court allowed the petitions, directing the respondents to regularize the petitioners' services within two months, establishing that valid merit-based recruitment via a government-constituted committee satisfies the requirements for regularization.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Government have the authority to constitute a selection committee for recruitment to posts in BS-16 and above without reference to the Public Service Commission?
  • Can contract employees recruited through a government-constituted committee be denied regularization solely because they were not recruited through the Public Service Commission?
  • Does the refusal to regularize contract employees who are similarly situated to others who have been regularized violate the right to equal treatment under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
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• Moiz Aly Manji vs The State and others2013 YLR 1198 · Lahore High Court · 2013-03-01
  pre-arrest baildishonoured chequeprohibitory clausecriminal liabilitybail confirmation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed under Section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking confirmation of pre-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail given the allegations of dishonoured cheques and the nature of the offence. The Court observed that the cheques in question did not explicitly name the complainant, and the determination of whether they were issued with dishonest intention remained a matter for the trial court. Furthermore, the Court noted that the offence charged did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as it carries a maximum punishment of three years. Emphasizing that in non-prohibitory offences, the grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception, and noting the absence of any prior criminal record, the Court confirmed the ad interim pre-arrest bail, holding that the petitioner had established a case for the concession of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Is the grant of bail the rule and refusal the exception in cases involving offences that do not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Mohsin vs State and anotherPLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Lahore) 106 · Lahore High Court · 2012-09-11
  post-arrest baildelay in FIRjuvenile offenderdacoitycriminal recoverystatutory exception
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition has been filed by the petitioner Mohsin seeking post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 501 dated 03.12.2011 registered under Sections 397, 412, 459, 380, 337-F(v), 337-A(iii), 337-H(1), and 337-L(2) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Rajowa, District Chiniot. The core legal question involves whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail considering the unexplained two-month delay in lodging the FIR, the nature of the recovery, and the claim of being a minor at the time of the alleged occurrence. The court held that the unexplained delay in reporting the crime, the minor recovery of money without other stolen property, the petitioner's alleged minority, and the fact that further detention would not serve any useful purpose justified granting bail. The court laid down that delayed FIR reporting without plausible explanation, coupled with mitigating circumstances like minority and lack of previous conviction, weighs in favor of granting post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained two-month delay in lodging an FIR create sufficient doubt to warrant post-arrest bail?
  • Can the claim of minority at the time of the alleged occurrence be considered as a ground for granting bail in heinous offences?
  • Whether the recovery of a nominal amount without other stolen property justifies further incarceration of an accused during trial?
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• Mohsin Raza vs D.C.O. etc.2013 PLJ Lahore 684 · Lahore High Court · 2013-06-10Read full judgment →
• Mohsin Ali Raza Shah vs The State And Another2013 KLR Criminal Cases 321 · Lahore High Court · 2012-10-24
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirymedical evidence conflictplea of alibiinvestigating officer reportcolumn No. 2 challan
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a post-arrest bail petition arising from F.I.R. registered under Sections 302, 324, 109, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, concerning a fatal shooting incident resulting in one death and injuries to another. The core legal question revolves around whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, given the conflict between the ocular and medical evidence regarding the weapons used, the petitioner's initial declaration of innocence by the investigating officer, and his placement in column No. 2 of the challan. The Lahore High Court held that the discrepancy concerning the weapon types and injuries, coupled with the investigating officer's findings favoring the petitioner's plea of innocence, brought the case within the ambit of further inquiry under Section 497(2). The court laid down the principle that tentative assessment of medical and investigative data indicating a plausible conflict with the prosecution's initial narrative warrants the grant of post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether conflict between ocular account and medical evidence regarding the nature of weapons used makes out a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the finding of innocence by the investigating officer placing the accused in column No. 2 of the challan justify the grant of post-arrest bail?
  • Can tentative assessment of the record be undertaken at the bail stage to determine if reasonable grounds exist for further probe into the petitioner's guilt?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Abida Parveen vs Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan through ViceChancellor and another2013 CLC 1150 · Lahore High Court · 2012-11-21
  grace marksuniversity regulationreasonable classificationconstitutional equalityacademic discretionLLB examinationstudent progression
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the validity of a university regulation regarding the award of grace marks to law students. The petitioner, an LLB student, failed her Part-III examination by a narrow margin and sought the benefit of five grace marks, which were denied under the third proviso of the university's regulation because she appeared in the examination in parts rather than as a whole. The core legal question was whether the university's regulation, which restricts grace marks to students passing in the first attempt while excluding those appearing in parts or 2nd annual examinations, violates the constitutional guarantees of equality and due process. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the regulation constitutes a reasonable classification rather than discriminatory treatment. The Court reasoned that the university has the authority to frame regulations to manage student progression and that students who have already consumed extra time by appearing in parts or supplementary exams are not similarly situated to those passing in the first attempt. The key principle established is that educational institutions may implement reasonable classifications in their academic regulations to incentivize timely completion of degrees, provided such rules are general in nature and not targeted at specific individuals.

  Questions settled

  • Does a university regulation restricting grace marks to students passing in the first attempt violate the constitutional right to equality?
  • Can a university differentiate between students appearing in examinations as a whole versus those appearing in parts for the purpose of awarding grace marks?
  • Is a university regulation that denies grace marks to students who have already availed extra time for examination attempts considered discriminatory?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirza Muhammad Shehzad vs Muhammad Younas, etc.2013 C.L.R. 601 · Lahore High Court · 2011-10-12Read full judgment →
• Ministry of Defence and 3 others vs Muhammad Athar2013 MLD 1284 · Lahore High Court · 2013-03-26
  intra-court appealcondonation of delaylimitation periodsufficient causeconversion of cplabypassing remedytime-barred appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment from the Lahore High Court addresses an Intra-Court Appeal (ICA) that arose after a Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal (CPLA) filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan was converted into an ICA and remanded to the High Court. The primary legal question concerned whether sufficient cause was shown by the appellants to justify the condonation of delay in filing the ICA under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908, given that the appeal was filed well beyond the twenty-day limitation period prescribed under Article 151 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908, and after bypassing the proper forum by mistakenly pursuing a CPLA. The court held that the appellants failed to provide any reasonable explanation or sufficient cause demonstrating circumstances beyond their control for the delay, noting that the defaulting party must explain the delay of each day and cannot claim condonation based on a casual approach, particularly when alerted to the correct remedy during the prior proceedings. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay was dismissed, and the ICA was thrown out as barred by time.

  Questions settled

  • Whether time spent in prosecuting a mistaken remedy like a CPLA can automatically constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing an Intra-Court Appeal?
  • What is the prescribed period of limitation for filing an appeal from a decree or order of a High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction under the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • Does the limitation period for an Intra-Court Appeal exclude the time spent in obtaining certified copies of the relevant record?
  • What constitutes sufficient cause for the condonation of delay under the law governing limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• Mina Bibi vs Manak Khan and others2013 CLC 115 · Lahore High Court · 2012-06-06
  inheritancedivorceburden of proofmutation of inheritanceadmissibility of evidencecivil revisiontalaq
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision arises from a dispute over inheritance rights, where the petitioner, claiming to be the widow of the deceased, challenged a mutation of inheritance that excluded her. The core legal question was whether the respondents successfully proved the alleged divorce between the petitioner and the deceased, which would disqualify her from inheritance. The Lahore High Court held that the burden of proof rested squarely on the defendants to establish the factum of divorce, including its pronouncement, documentation, and confirmation by the relevant Union Council. The Court found that the defendants failed to produce the original divorce deed, failed to prove the deceased appeared before the Union Council, and relied on inadmissible documentary evidence that did not comply with statutory certification requirements. Consequently, the Court set aside the appellate court's judgment, restoring the trial court's decree in favor of the petitioner. The key principle laid down is that when a party asserts a fact—such as a divorce—to disinherit a legal heir, the onus of proving that fact through positive, admissible evidence lies entirely upon the party making the assertion.

  Questions settled

  • Upon whom does the burden of proof lie when a defendant asserts a divorce to disinherit a widow?
  • Is a mutation of inheritance valid if the underlying proceedings regarding the divorce of an heir are not proven?
  • Can documentary evidence that fails to meet the certification requirements of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 be relied upon to prove a fact in issue?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Azam vs Returning Officer, Constituency PP82, Jhangvi and 6 others2013 CLC 1647 · Lahore High Court · 2013-04-10Read full judgment →
• Mian Khan and anothers vs The State and anothers2013 P Cr. L J 856 · Lahore High Court · 2012-12-10
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirymedical and ocular contradictioncapital punishmentstatutory bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Lahore High Court through a criminal petition filed by Mian Khan and Bhai Khan seeking post-arrest bail in case F.I.R. No. 50 dated 4-2-2012 registered under sections 302, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Sadar Pattoki, District Kasur. The core legal question is whether contradictions between the ocular account and the medical report, alongside the placement of the accused in column No. 2 of the report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, make the case one of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The court held that where specific injuries attributed to the accused are not supported by the postmortem report and the investigating officer casts doubt on direct involvement, reasonable grounds exist for further inquiry, making bail a matter of right. The court accepted the petition and admitted the petitioners to post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contradiction between the ocular account and the postmortem report make a criminal case one of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail as a matter of right when their case falls within the scope of section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, even if the offence carries capital punishment?
  • Does previous absconsion bar the grant of post-arrest bail when the accused otherwise has a meritorious case for further inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Aurangzeb vs Rent Controller And OtherK.L.R. 2013 Civil Cases 36 · Lahore High Court · 2012-05-10Read full judgment →
• Messrs Yasir Enterprises through Ch. Basher Ahmed vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary and 7 othersPLJ 2013 Tax Cases (Lah.) 194, 2013 PTD 821 · Lahore High Court · 2013-01-21
  constitutional petitioncustoms adjudicationquashing of FIRalternate remedyvoid ab initiocriminal proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed before the Lahore High Court seeking to challenge and quash criminal proceedings stemming from F.I.R. No. 01 dated 3-4-2009, registered against the petitioner by the Customs authorities following a dispute over imported goods declared as petroleum residue but alleged to be High Speed Diesel. The core legal question was whether criminal proceedings on identical allegations could continue when the departmental adjudication proceedings and the underlying show cause notice had been declared void ab initio by the Customs Appellate Tribunal, and whether a constitutional petition was barred due to an alternate remedy under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that since the Tribunal's findings setting aside the adjudication had attained finality, and no challan had been submitted nor trial commenced, the remedy under Section 265-K was inapplicable. Consequently, the High Court allowed the petition and quashed the F.I.R., laying down the principle that criminal proceedings resting on the same allegations as department adjudication cannot be allowed to proceed when the foundational adjudication proceedings have been finally declared void and there is no prospect of conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether criminal proceedings can continue on the same allegations when departmental adjudication proceedings have been declared void ab initio by the Customs Appellate Tribunal?
  • Is a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 barred due to the availability of an alternate remedy under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when no challan has been filed and trial has not commenced?
  • Does the quashment of an FIR follow as a natural consequence when the foundational show cause notice and adjudication orders have attained finality in favor of the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs United Ethanol Industries Ltd. vs Messrs JDW Sugar Mills Ltd.2013 YLR 2846 · Lahore High Court · 2013-05-28Read full judgment →
• Messrs Stylo Shoes through Managing Partner and another vs Deputy2013 PTD 1780 · Lahore High Court · 2013-05-27
  Sales Tax Act 1990search warrantbusiness premisesretailer vs manufacturerwrit petitionCriminal Procedure Code
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses two writ petitions challenging an order obtained by the respondent-department from a Judicial Magistrate for the search of the petitioners' business premises under section 40 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, read with sections 96 and 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The core legal question was whether the department must serve a notice under section 38 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, prior to obtaining a search warrant under section 40 of the same Act, and whether the search warrant was obtained through false information. The Lahore High Court held that sections 38 and 40 cater to different situations, and there is no statutory requirement to issue a notice under section 38 before proceeding under section 40. The court established that section 40 empowers an officer having reason to believe that relevant documents or things are kept in any place to obtain a search warrant from a Magistrate based on pending proceedings, and such searches do not mandate prior notice.

  Questions settled

  • Is it mandatory to issue a notice under section 38 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 before obtaining a search warrant under section 40 of the said Act?
  • Does section 40 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 restrict search warrants exclusively to the registered business premises of the person against whom an inquiry is pending?
  • Are notices mandatory under sections 96 and 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 prior to the execution of a search?
  • Can the respondent-department approach the vendors or suppliers of a registered person for verification following a legally conducted search?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Sprint Energy (Pvt.) Limited through Advisor vs Ahsaan Ullah and 2 others2013 CLC 799 · Lahore High Court · 2012-10-17
  arbitration actstay of legal proceedingsstep in the proceedingsrejection of plaintarbitration agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges an order dismissing the appellant's application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which sought to stay a civil suit for recovery of rent and damages filed by the respondent. The core legal question was whether filing an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the rejection of the plaint constitutes taking a 'step in the proceedings' that disentitles a party from subsequently invoking section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The Lahore High Court held that filing an application for the rejection of a plaint indicates acquiescence in the court's jurisdiction and constitutes a step in the proceedings, thereby barring a subsequent application to stay proceedings under the arbitration law. The court laid down the principle that a defendant wishing to rely on an arbitration clause must inform the court of its insistence upon arbitration at the earliest possible stage and before taking any other active steps in the judicial proceedings, such as seeking the rejection of the plaint.

  Questions settled

  • Whether filing an application for the rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 constitutes a step in the proceedings under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940?
  • What are the mandatory conditions required to be fulfilled for staying legal proceedings under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940?
  • Does a defendant disentitle themselves to the protection of section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 by participating in court proceedings before invoking the arbitration clause?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Sprint Energy (Pvt) Limited through Advisor vs Ahsaan Ullah and 2 others2013 CLD 885 · Lahore High Court · 2012-10-17Read full judgment →
• Messrs Silkbank Limited through Authorized Attorneys vs Messrs K.K.P.2013 CLD 643 · Lahore High Court · 2012-11-22Read full judgment →
• Messrs Sahib Gas Ways through Partner and 4 otherss vs The Bank of Punjab through Manager2013 CLD 501 · Lahore High Court · 2012-10-22
  banking suitleave to defendex parte decreerecovery of financesappealmaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges an order dismissing an application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for setting aside an ex parte judgment and decree passed in a recovery suit. The core legal question was whether an application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is maintainable against a decree passed after the dismissal of an application for leave to defend on merits. The court held that where an application for leave to defend is dismissed on merits and a decree follows, such a decree cannot be assailed through an application to set aside an ex parte judgment, but must be challenged via a regular appeal under Section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001. The key principle laid down is that Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is incompetent when the underlying dismissal of leave to defend occurs on merits rather than for non-prosecution, requiring the aggrieved party to file a statutory appeal against the judgment and decree.

  Questions settled

  • Is an application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 maintainable when an application for leave to defend is dismissed on merits?
  • What is the appropriate remedy to challenge a decree passed following the dismissal of an application for leave to defend under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001?
  • Whether an appeal is competent against an order dismissing an application to set aside an ex parte decree when the original decree itself was passed on merits?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Saghir Co. through Proprietor vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary2013 PTD 636 · Lahore High Court · 2012-06-12Read full judgment →
• Messrs Raza Services through Attorney vs Collector of Customs2013 PTD 1251 · Lahore High Court · 2013-04-09Read full judgment →
• Messrs Premier Industrial Chemical Manufacturing Co. vs versusPLJ 2013 Tax Cases (Lah.) 57 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Messrs Premier Industrial Chemical Manufacturing Co vs Commissioner Inland Revenue and 3 othersPLJ 2013 Tax Cases (Lah.) 57, 2013 PTD 398 · Lahore High Court · 2012-12-28
  tax auditaudit selection parametersFederal Board of Revenuetaxpayer transparencydelegation of powerswrit petitionprocedural fairness
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a batch of writ petitions challenging notices issued by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) for the selection of taxpayers for audit for the Tax Year 2011. The core legal question involved the validity of the audit selection process, specifically whether the FBR had properly framed and applied parameters for such selection, and whether the powers to initiate such audits were legally delegated to the Member (Audit). Upon consensus between the parties, the Court set aside the impugned notices and directed the FBR to initiate the audit process afresh. The Court laid down key guidelines requiring the FBR to frame three separate sets of parameters for audit selection under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and the Federal Excise Act, 2005. Furthermore, the FBR was mandated to publicize these parameters in the print media and on its website, ensure that notices to taxpayers specify the applicable parameters, and consider establishing a Grievance/Review Panel to address issues arising from the audit selection process, thereby ensuring transparency and procedural fairness.

  Questions settled

  • Must the Federal Board of Revenue frame separate audit selection parameters for the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and the Federal Excise Act, 2005?
  • Is the Federal Board of Revenue required to publicize audit selection parameters in the print media and on its website before initiating an audit?
  • Must notices issued to taxpayers for audit selection clearly specify the parameters attracted in their specific cases?
  • Does the Federal Board of Revenue have the discretion to establish a Grievance/Review Panel to address issues arising from the audit selection process?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Olive Grill Restaurant through Sole Proprietor vs Province of Punjab through. Secretary Home Department and others2013 PLD Lahore 689 · Lahore High Court · 2012-12-10Read full judgment →
• Messrs Nishat Dairy (Pvt) Ltd through Company Secretary vs Commissioner Inland Revenue and 4 others2013 PTD 1883 · Lahore High Court · 2013-03-25Read full judgment →
• Messrs Nish at Chunian Ltd. through Chief Officer vs Province of Punjab2013 CLC 34 · Lahore High Court · 2012-05-17
  license feeDistrict GovernmentPunjab Local Government Ordinancejudgment in rempast and closed transactionconstitutional petitioncorporate authorizationtaxation rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the levy and demand notice of license fee issued by the District Government to the petitioner-company under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 2001. The core legal questions involved the competency of the District Government to levy the license fee, whether a previous judgment setting aside similar notices constituted a judgment in rem or in personam, whether the matter was a past and closed transaction, and whether the petition was maintainable given defects in the corporate authorization. The Lahore High Court held that the District Government is statutorily competent to levy the license fee under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 2001 and its associated rules, following due codal formalities. The Court held that the prior disposal of the petitioner's writ petition alongside others was a judgment in rem affected by the Supreme Court's reversal of the main judgment, precluding the application of the past and closed transaction doctrine. Furthermore, the petition was incompetent due to defective corporate resolution and lack of proper authorization. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the District Government is competent to levy a license fee under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does a judgment disposing of multiple writ petitions challenging local taxation constitute a judgment in rem or a judgment in personam?
  • Whether the reversal of a common judgment by the Supreme Court prevents a matter from being treated as a past and closed transaction?
  • Is a constitutional petition filed by a company maintainable when the accompanying corporate resolution lacks proper names and signatures as required by law?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Land Mark vs Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and others2013 PTD 1720 · Lahore High Court · 2013-02-27Read full judgment →
• Messrs Lala Musa Flour and General Mills,. Gujrat through ManagingPLJ 2013 Tax Cases (Lah.) 72 · Lahore High Court · 2012-11-05Read full judgment →
• Messrs Lala Musa Flour and General Mills, Gujrat through ManagingPLJ 2013 Tax Cases (Lah.) 72, 2013 PTD 391 · Lahore High Court · 2012-11-05
  audit selectionCommissioner Inland RevenueFederal Board of Revenuecomputer ballotingbinding precedentcompliance of judgmentwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional writ petition before the Lahore High Court concerned the non-compliance and implementation of a binding judicial precedent by the tax authorities. The core legal question was whether the Commissioner Inland Revenue retained the jurisdiction to issue notices selecting taxpayers for an audit of their tax affairs, despite a previous judgment holding such power to rest exclusively with the Federal Board of Revenue through computer balloting. The High Court observed that despite clear findings in the judgment rendered in Writ Petition No. 393 of 2012 (Messrs Chenone Stores Ltd.), the respondent tax officials continued to issue illegal audit selection notices. Disposing of the writ petition, the High Court held that judicial precedents rendered by the High Court are binding upon administrative respondents and must be strictly complied with unless reversed or stayed by an interim order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Consequently, the respondents were directed to follow and implement the binding judgment in letter and spirit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Commissioner Inland Revenue has the jurisdiction to select taxpayers for audit under Section 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001?
  • Is a public authority bound to implement and follow a judgment of the High Court in the absence of a stay or reversal by the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
  • Does the power to select a taxpayer for audit through computer balloting rest exclusively with the Federal Board of Revenue?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Khan Tractors, Alipur Road, Khan Garh District Muzaffargarh2013 CLD 177 · Lahore High Court · 2012-05-17
  limitationcondonation of delayfinancial institutions recoveryspecial lawbanking courttime-barred appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal was preferred under section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, challenging orders passed by the Banking Court directing the auction of the appellants' property. Because the appeal was filed beyond the prescribed period, the appellants filed an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, seeking condonation of delay. The core legal question addressed by the Court was whether the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, are applicable to appeals filed under section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The Lahore High Court held that by virtue of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908, and the absence of any enabling provision in the special statute, section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings or appeals under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which prescribes its own distinct period of limitation. Consequently, the Court laid down the principle that the benefit of section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be availed of in appeals governed by the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, and dismissed the time-barred appeal in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Are the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 applicable to proceedings and appeals arising under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001?
  • Does section 29(2) of the Limitation Act 1908 exclude the application of section 5 to special laws prescribing a different period of limitation?
  • Can an appeal filed beyond the period of limitation provided in section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 be entertained through condonation of delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ittefaq Rice Mills vs Federation of Pakistan and others2013 PTD 1274 · Lahore High Court · 2013-05-23
  tax auditparametric ballotinghigh risk casesrisk parametersjudicial reviewFederal Board of Revenueaudit policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the selection of the appellant for a tax audit for the 2011 Tax Year, initiated by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) under Section 214C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The appellant contended that the selection process was flawed because it did not adhere to the 'high risk' criteria, arguing that a taxpayer must trigger all risk parameters to qualify for parametric balloting. The Court examined whether the FBR's audit policy, which identifies 'high risk' cases, requires the satisfaction of all risk parameters or if a single parameter suffices. The Court held that the FBR possesses the technical expertise and prerogative to design audit strategies and define 'risk.' It ruled that the FBR’s interpretation—whereby the attraction of even a single risk parameter qualifies a case as 'high risk'—is legally permissible. The Court affirmed that the selection process was valid, emphasizing that the FBR is the best judge to quantify risk, provided the policy is transparent and applied fairly. The appeal was dismissed, though the appellant was granted liberty to approach the relevant Review Panel regarding specific merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the selection of a taxpayer for audit under Section 214C of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 require the satisfaction of all risk parameters to qualify as a 'high risk case'?
  • Is the FBR's determination of 'high risk' cases through parametric balloting subject to judicial review regarding the technical weightage of risk parameters?
  • Can the FBR select a taxpayer for audit based on the attraction of a single risk parameter?
  • Does the FBR have the authority to determine the architecture and design of risk analysis for the purpose of parametric audit selection?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Honda Breeze through Managing Partner vs City District2013 MLD 1441 · Lahore High Court · 2012-12-18Read full judgment →
• Messrs Gujranwala Food Industries (Pvt) Ltd vs Messrs Coral2013 CLD 1862 · Lahore High Court · 2013-04-16Read full judgment →
• Messrs CMH Traders vs Chief Settlement Commissioner and others2013 PLD Lahore 631 · Lahore High Court · 2013-05-03Read full judgment →
• Messrs City Schools (Pvt.) Limited through Executive Director Project vs Azmat Nawaz2013 C.L.R. 333, 2013 CLD 451 · Lahore High Court · 2012-11-29
  civil revisionarbitration agreementstay of suitappointment of arbitratorres judicatarejection of plaintemployment contract
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner company invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Lahore High Court under section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to challenge an order dated 26-10-2011 dismissing its application under Order VII Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for the rejection of a subsequent application filed by the respondent under sections 8 and 20 of the Arbitration Act 1940. The underlying dispute arose from an employment contract containing an arbitration clause. The core legal questions involved whether the subsequent application was barred by the principle of res judicata under section 11 of Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and whether it was maintainable given an earlier order staying the suit under section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940. The High Court held that since the earlier order only stayed the suit and did not decide or record findings regarding the appointment of an arbitrator, the doctrine of res judicata was inapplicable, and objections regarding the maintainability of the pending application under section 20 were premature. The revision petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the principle of res judicata applies to bar a subsequent application under the Arbitration Act 1940 when the earlier order merely stayed the suit without deciding the appointment of an arbitrator?
  • Can an application seeking the appointment of an arbitrator under sections 8 and 20 of the Arbitration Act 1940 be maintained following an order staying the civil proceedings under section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • Whether an application under Order VII Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is competent to challenge the maintainability of an application filed under section 20 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Capital Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Securities and Exchange2013 CLD 1075 · Lahore High Court · 2012-09-20
  constitutional petitionInsurance Ombudsmanperformance bondcontract of guaranteemal-administrationjurisdictionpolicy holderlimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition assailed orders passed by the Insurance Ombudsman, the appellate authority, and the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan directing the petitioner, an insurance company, to honour a performance bond/guarantee issued on behalf of respondent No. 5 in favour of respondent No. 4. The petitioner argued that the contract was a guarantee rather than an insurance policy, that the claim was time-barred, and that the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction. The Lahore High Court examined the preamble and provisions of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, particularly Sections 2(XXVII), 2(XLVI), 125, and 127. The Court held that a contract of guarantee or performance bond is distinct from a contract of insurance and that the Ombudsman's jurisdiction is restricted to insurance business and protecting insurance policyholders. Furthermore, disputed factual issues requiring evidence do not fall within the ambit of 'mal-administration' under Section 127. Consequently, the High Court allowed the petition and declared the impugned orders to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Insurance Ombudsman have jurisdiction under the Insurance Ordinance 2000 to adjudicate disputes arising out of a performance bond or guarantee?
  • Is a contract of guarantee or performance bond legally distinguishable from a contract of insurance under the Insurance Ordinance 2000?
  • Can a dispute involving disputed factual questions that require recording of evidence be decided by the Insurance Ombudsman as an act of mal-administration?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Bilal Enterprises through Proprietor vs Federation of Pakistan2013 PTD 1332 · Lahore High Court · 2012-06-12
  customs dutyvaluation rulingprovisional assessmentretrospective effectrevision applicationtaxpayer benefitcustoms import
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition arises from the assessment of imported goods based on Valuation Ruling No. 350 dated 2-7-2011, which the petitioner challenged as contrary to Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1969. During the pendency of the petition, the Director Valuation entertained a review petition under Section 25-D of the Customs Act, 1969, and issued a revised Valuation Ruling No. 402 dated 29-9-2011, determining fresh and fair valuation rates. The core question before the Lahore High Court was whether the subsequent revised valuation ruling could be applied to consignments imported and declared before its issuance, or if its operation was strictly prospective. The Court held that a valuation ruling issued pursuant to a revision against an erroneous earlier ruling relates back and takes effect from the date of the original ruling, ensuring that the taxpayer is not burdened by departmental errors. The Court concluded that the petitioner's provisional assessment should be finalized based on the latest valuation ruling, establishing the principle that the benefit of ambiguity or error in tax and valuation matters must go to the taxpayer.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a subsequent valuation ruling issued under the Customs Act, 1969, pursuant to a revision petition, applies retrospectively to goods imported prior to its issuance?
  • Does a taxpayer get the benefit of a revised valuation ruling when the department itself finds the earlier valuation ruling to be erroneous?
  • How should provisional assessments of imported goods be finalized when a valuation ruling is subsequently revised by the competent authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Azgard Nine Ltd. vs Pakistan through Secretary and others2013 PTD 1030, 2013 PLD Lahore 282 · Lahore High Court · 2012-05-21
  Workers' Welfare FundMoney Billultra virestax vs feeconstitutional lawFederal Consolidated Fundlegislative competenceindustrial establishment
  Summary & questions settled

  These writ petitions challenged the constitutional validity of amendments made to the Workers' Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971, via the Finance Acts of 2006 and 2008. The petitioners contended that the amendments, which redefined 'total income' to mean 'profit before taxation' (thereby preventing the deduction of carry-forward losses), were unlawfully enacted through a Money Bill. The core legal question was whether contributions to the Workers' Welfare Fund constitute a 'tax' or a 'fee' and whether such amendments fall within the scope of Article 73 of the Constitution. The Court held that a tax is a compulsory exaction for general public purposes forming part of the 'common burden,' whereas the Fund is a dedicated resource for workers' welfare, distinct from the Federal Consolidated Fund and the Public Account. Consequently, the contributions lack the essential attributes of a tax and cannot be modified via a Money Bill. The Court declared the impugned amendments ultra vires the Constitution, ruling that such legislative changes require the regular procedure under Article 70.

  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Azgard Nine Ltd vs Pakistan through Secretary and others2013 PTD 1030 · Lahore High Court · 2012-05-21
  Workers' Welfare FundMoney BillUltra ViresTax vs FeeConstitutional LawFinance ActFederal Consolidated FundLegislative Competence
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions challenged the constitutional validity of amendments made to the Workers' Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971, through the Finance Act, 2006 and Finance Act, 2008, which increased the quantum of contributions required from industrial establishments. The core legal question was whether contributions to the Workers' Welfare Fund constitute a "tax" or a "fee," and whether such levies could be amended via a Money Bill under Article 73 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. The Court held that the contributions do not constitute a "tax" because they are not part of the "common burden" of state revenue, and the Fund functions as an autonomous body corporate, distinct from the Federal Consolidated Fund. Consequently, the Court ruled that the impugned amendments were ultra vires the Constitution, as they could not be enacted through a Money Bill. The judgment establishes that a levy is a "tax" only if it is a compulsory exaction for general public purposes; levies dedicated to specific, non-state purposes managed by autonomous bodies are not taxes and cannot be amended through Money Bills.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contribution to the Workers' Welfare Fund constitute a tax or a fee?
  • Can provisions of the Workers' Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971 be amended through a Money Bill?
  • Does the Workers' Welfare Fund form part of the Federal Consolidated Fund?
  • What are the essential characteristics that distinguish a tax from a fee under the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Alpha Chemicals (Pvt.) Ltd. through Manager vs Federation of Pakistan and 4 others2013 PTD 2064 · Lahore High Court · 2013-05-30
  customs dutyexemptionS.R.O.statutory interpretationconstitutional jurisdictionprovisional assessmentpharmaceutical industry
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges a final assessment order issued under Section 81(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, which denied the petitioner customs duty exemption on imported platinum. The petitioner, a pharmaceutical company, claimed exemption under Table-I of S.R.O. 567(1)/2006, which grants general exemption for platinum. The respondent authorities argued that because the petitioner is a pharmaceutical entity, it is restricted to exemptions listed in Table-III of the same S.R.O., which does not include platinum. The core legal question was whether an importer belonging to a specific industry is precluded from claiming a general exemption under Table-I if that item is not listed in the industry-specific Table-III. The Court held that the assessment order was based on a misreading of the S.R.O. It determined that Table-I provides a general exemption for all importers without restriction, and the absence of platinum in Table-III does not negate the availability of the general exemption under Table-I. Consequently, the Court allowed the petition, establishing that industry-specific exemptions do not override or restrict the availability of general exemptions unless explicitly stated in the notification.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order passed under Section 81(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, subject to a statutory appeal or remedy?
  • Can an importer belonging to a specific industry claim a general exemption under Table-I of S.R.O. 567(1)/2006 if the item is not listed in the industry-specific Table-III?
  • Does the absence of a statutory remedy against a final assessment order under Section 81(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, justify the invocation of constitutional jurisdiction?
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• Mehrooz and anothers vs The State and others2013 YLR 398 · Lahore High Court · 2011-09-15
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirymurderabetmentconspiracyineffective firing
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions seeking post-arrest bail in a murder case registered under sections 302, 109, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioners, who were attributed roles of conspiracy and ineffective firing without overt acts against the deceased, are entitled to the concession of bail under the principle of further inquiry. The court held that where an accused person is not shown to have committed any overt act causing injury to the deceased and the circumstances render the allegations open to further inquiry, bail should be granted to prevent irreparable harm from pre-trial incarceration. The court laid down the principle that pre-trial detention should not be used as a punishment and that tentative assessment of the record pointing towards further inquiry justifies the release of accused persons on bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused person charged with abetment and conspiracy is entitled to post-arrest bail when not present at the scene of the crime?
  • Does attribution of ineffective firing without any overt act against the deceased make a case one of further inquiry under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be granted when the circumstances of the case create a reasonable doubt regarding the participation of the accused?
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• Mehr Zaman and 2 others vs State and 3 others2013 PLJ Lahore 476 · Lahore High Court · 2013-06-14Read full judgment →
• Mehboob Khan, Etc. vs Muhammad Suleman, Etc.K.L.R. 2013 Civil Cases 125 · Lahore High Court · 2011-09-27
  civil revisionpower of attorneyforged documentminordeclaration suitmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the appellate court's judgment and decree which reversed the trial court's dismissal and decreed the respondent's suit for declaration regarding a general power-of-attorney. The core legal question concerns the validity of a general power-of-attorney executed when some executants were minors and another was abroad. The court held that a power-of-attorney executed by minors without proper legal representation and involving a person residing abroad at the time of execution is fictitious, forged, void, and ineffective. The key principle laid down is that instruments affecting property rights executed by minors or persons absent from the country without valid legal representation or presence before the registering authority are legally unsustainable and void.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a general power-of-attorney executed by minors without proper legal representation is valid?
  • Can a power-of-attorney be legally executed by a person who was residing abroad at the relevant time without proper verification?
  • Whether an appellate court's judgment reversing a trial court's decision warrants interference in civil revision when based on proper appreciation of evidence?
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• Mehboob alias Booba vs The State and another2013 YLR 1225 · Lahore High Court · 2012-12-11
  post-arrest bailvicarious liabilityfurther inquiryprohibitory clausecriminal procedurebail
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for post-arrest bail filed by the petitioner, Mehboob alias Booba, in a criminal case involving charges under sections 337-F(i), 337-L(2), 302, 365, 148, 149, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given that no fatal injury was attributed to him, despite the case falling under the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail. The Court reasoned that the petitioner was not attributed any fatal injury to the deceased, and the determination of his vicarious liability remained a matter to be settled by the trial court after recording evidence. Furthermore, the petitioner had been incarcerated since July 2012, and the investigation was complete. The Court established the principle that where the specific role of an accused is limited and vicarious liability is contested, the case calls for further inquiry into guilt under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, justifying the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a fatal injury attributed to an accused in a murder case justify the grant of bail under the principle of further inquiry?
  • Is the determination of vicarious liability a matter to be decided at the bail stage or by the trial court after recording evidence?
  • Does the completion of investigation and the petitioner's status as a previous non-convict constitute valid grounds for granting post-arrest bail?
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• Mehboob Alam vs Member, Board of Revenue and others2013 YLR 2280 · Lahore High Court · 2013-05-24Read full judgment →
• MCB Bank Ltd through Authorized Officer and another vs State Bank of Pakistan through Governor and another2013 CLD 1895 · Lahore High Court · 2013-05-28Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Hussain vs Government of Punjab Writ2013 C.L.R. 667 · Lahore High Court · 2012-05-15Read full judgment →
• Mazhar and anothers vs The State and anothers2013 MLD 1115 · Lahore High Court · 2012-12-20
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryDNA reportheinous offencecriminal procedurebail concession
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for post-arrest bail arises from an F.I.R. registered under Section 376(ii) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question is whether the petitioners are entitled to bail given the circumstances of the investigation, specifically the delay in the F.I.R., the discharge of a co-accused, and the medical evidence. The Court held that the petitioners are entitled to bail, noting that the prosecution's case has become doubtful due to the complainant's admission that a co-accused was falsely implicated, the absence of violence marks on the victim, and a negative DNA report. Furthermore, the investigation is complete, and the petitioners have no prior criminal record. The Court emphasized that the heinous nature of an offence does not constitute a valid ground to refuse bail when an accused is otherwise entitled to the concession. Consequently, the Court allowed the petition, finding that the case warrants further inquiry into the petitioners' guilt under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and admitted the petitioners to bail subject to furnishing bail bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Does the heinous nature of an offence justify the refusal of bail when an accused is otherwise entitled to it?
  • Can the discharge of a co-accused based on the complainant's statement render the prosecution's story doubtful for the remaining accused?
  • Is a negative DNA report and the absence of violence marks on a victim sufficient to warrant further inquiry into the guilt of an accused under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Mazhar Ahmad vs State and anotherPLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Lahore) 902 · Lahore High Court · 2013-03-14
  criminal appealanti-corruptionillegal gratificationbenefit of doubtacquittalappraisal of evidencestock witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Special Judge Anti-Corruption, whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question revolved around whether the prosecution successfully proved the foundational allegations of land ownership, illegal gratification, and misappropriation of sale consideration beyond a reasonable doubt. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution miserably failed to establish the foundational facts, as the primary complainant did not depose, the sole supporting witness was found to be an interested and unreliable stock witness, and essential evidence regarding ownership and receipt of bribe money was lacking. The court established that the prosecution must prove its case independently and cannot rely on weaknesses in the defense, and that a conviction cannot be sustained on uncorroborated, non-independent testimony. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal conviction be sustained solely on the uncorroborated testimony of a non-independent and unreliable witness?
  • Does the failure of the defense to produce certain evidence relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt?
  • Is a conviction sustainable under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 when the foundational fact of land ownership and payment of bribe is not proven?
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• Maula Bakhsh vs Muhammad Hussain and others2013 PLD Lahore 51 · Lahore High Court · 2012-09-10Read full judgment →
• Matloob Hussain vs M.B.R., etc.2013 PLJ Lahore 402 · Lahore High Court · 2013-06-11Read full judgment →
• Masal Khan vs Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Home, Islamabad 7 and others2013 YLR 820 · Lahore High Court · 2012-03-16Read full judgment →
• Maryam Balighi vs Government of Punjab through Chief Secretary and 2 others2013 MLD 455 · Lahore High Court · 2012-08-27Read full judgment →
• Maqsood Shahzad vs The State And AnotherK.L.R. 2013 Criminal Cases 97 · Lahore High Court · 2013-01-23
  post-arrest bailabductiondelayed FIRsupplementary statementfurther inquirycriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition seeking post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 365-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question revolves around whether the petitioner is entitled to bail when the FIR was lodged with an inordinate delay, the abductee remains unrecovered, and the petitioner's implication is based on a belated supplementary statement without substantial incriminating evidence. The Lahore High Court accepted the bail petition, holding that keeping the accused behind bars for an indefinite period without progress in recovery or solid evidence amounts to punishment, thereby bringing the case within the scope of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that bail cannot be withheld as a measure of punishment and an accused cannot be kept in custody indefinitely when the evidence relies heavily on a delayed supplementary statement and unrecovered victims.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail should be granted when an accused is implicated through a belated supplementary statement?
  • Can bail be withheld as a form of punishment when the alleged abductee remains unrecovered?
  • Does a case warrant further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the prosecution lacks concrete incriminating evidence?
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• Maqbool Ahmed vs State and anotherPLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Lahore) 28 · Lahore High Court · 2012-11-20Read full judgment →
• Maqbool Ahmad vs Additional District Judge and others2013 YLR 517 · Lahore High Court · 2011-06-08Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Qadir vs United Bank Limited through Branch Manager2013 CLD 2116 · Lahore High Court · 2013-07-10Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain, etc vs Shah Nawaz, etc2013 PLJ Lahore 494 · Lahore High Court · 2013-04-25Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmed vs D.P.O. and others2013 YLR 629, 2013 PLJ Lahore 115 · Lahore High Court · 2012-09-06Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad vs State and anotherPLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Lahore) 672 · Lahore High Court · 2013-06-19
  post-arrest baildishonoured chequeprohibitory clausecriminal breach of trustbail application
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a petition seeking post-arrest bail in connection with FIR No. 128/2013 registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following the dishonour of a cheque issued to the complainant. The petitioner contended that the cheque was issued as a guarantee for business transactions rather than a loan, and argued that the offence did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The State opposed the bail, citing the significant amount involved and the prima facie proof of the dishonoured cheque. The Court held that while the amount involved was substantial, the offence did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Furthermore, as the petitioner had been incarcerated since February 2013 and was no longer required for investigation, continued detention was deemed unnecessary. Consequently, the Court granted post-arrest bail, emphasizing that keeping the accused in custody for an indefinite period would not serve the prosecution's interests.

  Questions settled

  • Does an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the volume of the amount involved in a cheque dishonour case a sufficient ground to deny bail when the offence is outside the prohibitory clause?
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