Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 79,348 judgments in total from the Lahore High Court.

• Khadim Nadim Malik, Advocate vs Federation of Pakistan through President of Pakistan and 2 others1990 MLD 1931 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-09Read full judgment →
• Kh. Zubair Ahmad and others vs Collector and others1990 MLD 1941 · Lahore High Court · 1990-06-02
  land acquisitionconstitutional petitionlapse of proceedingsmandatory rulescorrigendumPunjab Land Acquisition Rules 1983statutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged land acquisition proceedings initiated by a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. The core legal question was whether the failure to issue a notification under Section 5 of the Act within one year of the preliminary notification, as mandated by Rule 7 of the Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983, caused the acquisition proceedings to lapse. The Court held that the proceedings had indeed lapsed. It determined that Rule 7 is mandatory, not directory, and that the failure to issue the Section 5 notification within the prescribed timeframe, absent an extension from the Board of Revenue, legally terminated the acquisition process. The Court further held that a corrigendum does not serve as an independent, fresh notification under Section 4, and that the government, as the framer of the rules, cannot challenge their vires. Consequently, once the Section 4 notification lapses, subsequent actions under Section 5 or Section 17 are legally impossible, as those provisions presuppose a valid, subsisting notification. The petition was accepted, and the acquisition proceedings were declared terminated.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to issue a notification under Section 5 of the Land Acquisition Act within one year of the Section 4 notification cause acquisition proceedings to lapse?
  • Is Rule 7 of the Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983, mandatory or directory?
  • Does a corrigendum to a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act constitute a fresh, independent notification?
  • Can the government challenge the vires of rules it has itself framed?
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• Karim Nawaz vs Border Area Committee, Lahore And Other1990 CLC 1423 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-22Read full judgment →
• Karim Bakhsh vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 808 · Lahore High Court · 1979-11-04Read full judgment →
• Karim Bakhsh vs Haji Ghulam Dastgir And 5 Other1990 CLC 1146 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-26Read full judgment →
• Karim Bakhsh and 2 others vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 814 · Lahore High Court · 1979-10-20Read full judgment →
• Karamat vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 503 · Lahore High Court · 1988-08-17Read full judgment →
• Kalo vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1469 · Lahore High Court · 1989-05-02Read full judgment →
• Khalid Hussain and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1329 (1) · Lahore High Court · 1989-07-03Read full judgment →
• Javaid Akhtar Nawaz vs Mehr Kabir1990 CLC 1122 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-09
  pre-emption suitclosure of evidenceOrder XVII Rule 3Order XVII Rule 2adjournment at party requestex parte proceedingsremand order
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose out of a pre-emption suit where the trial Court closed the defendant/appellant's evidence under Order XVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and decreed the suit after the appellant, his counsel, and witnesses failed to appear on an adjourned date. The lower appellate court affirmed the closure of evidence but remanded the case for decision after recording the plaintiff's statement. The appellant challenged the remand order, contending that Order XVII Rule 3 CPC was improperly applied as the specific date of 16-7-1983 was not adjourned at his request. The Lahore High Court held that Order XVII Rule 3 CPC applies only when time has been granted at the specific request of the defaulting party for the immediate date in question; previous adjournments at the party's request do not justify invoking Rule 3 on a later date not so adjourned. Furthermore, owing to the non-appearance of the appellant and his counsel, the trial Court should have proceeded under Order XVII Rule 2 read with Order IX Rule 6 CPC. The High Court set aside the decisions of both lower courts and remanded the case to the trial Court for fresh proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does Order XVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply if the case was not adjourned to that specific date at the request of the defaulting party?
  • Do prior adjournments granted at a party's request provide a valid basis for closing evidence under Order XVII Rule 3 CPC on a subsequent date not adjourned at that party's request?
  • What is the proper procedure for a trial court to follow under Order XVII CPC when a defendant and his counsel fail to appear on an adjourned hearing date?
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• Jan Muhammad And Another vs Muhammad Sarwar And 2 Other1990 CLC 1277 · Lahore High Court · 1989-12-03Read full judgment →
• Jamshaid Ali vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1175 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-14Read full judgment →
• Jameel Ahmad Khan and others vs A.C. and others1990 P Cr. L J 1475 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-13
  quashment of FIRDrugs Actnon-cognizable offencejurisdiction of policeDrug Courtconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed before the Lahore High Court seeking the quashment of FIR No. 202/89 registered under Section 27(2)(b) of the Drugs Act, 1976, regarding the alleged sale of an expired medicine that aggravated a patient's eye disease. The core legal question was whether police could register an FIR and investigate a non-cognizable offence under the Drugs Act without proper authority and whether prosecution could be initiated by a private party rather than an authorized inspector. The Court held that the alleged offence of selling an expired drug falls exclusively under the Drugs Act, where prosecution can only be instituted by a Federal or Provincial Inspector, and the offence being non-cognizable, police investigation without proper legal competence is void. The Court laid down the principle that private complaints for offences under the Drugs Act cannot bypass the statutory mechanism requiring initiation by designated inspectors, and police lack jurisdiction to investigate such non-cognizable matters without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an FIR for an offence under the Drugs Act can be registered and investigated by the police on the application of a private individual?
  • Can a police officer investigate a non-cognizable offence under the Drugs Act without a competent magistrate's order?
  • Who is legally authorized to institute a prosecution for an offence under the Drugs Act, 1976?
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• Jamal Din vs The State1990 MLD 1561 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-07Read full judgment →
• Jamal Din and others vs Additional District Judge, Jhang and others1990 MLD 1934 · Lahore High Court · 1990-05-30Read full judgment →
• Jalla and 3 others vs Muhammad Shafi and another1990 MLD 748 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-07Read full judgment →
• Jalal alias Jala vs District Magistrate, Kasur and 2 others1990 P Cr. L J 1529 · Lahore High Court · 1989-07-12
  preventive detentionmaintenance of public ordernexus between past conduct and detentionliberty of citizenmalafide or without lawful authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a constitutional petition challenging a preventive detention order passed by the District Magistrate, Kasur, under section 3 of the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960. The core legal question was whether a citizen can be detained preventively on the basis of past criminal cases, particularly where the detenu had already been acquitted in older cases and pending challans existed for recent ones, without establishing a clear nexus between past conduct and future apprehension. The Lahore High Court held that preventive detention is precautionary rather than punitive, represents a serious inroad on liberty, must be construed strictly, and cannot be utilized to punish a person for past acts. The Court ruled that the detaining authority lacked proper material and failed to establish a legal nexus between the detenu's activities and the necessity of detention. Consequently, the petition was accepted, the detention order was declared without lawful authority, and the detenu was ordered to be released forthwith.

  Questions settled

  • Whether preventive detention can be ordered on the basis of past criminal conduct resulting in acquittals?
  • Is it necessary to establish a nexus between past activities and the necessity of precautionary detention?
  • Can the law of preventive detention be used for the purpose of punishing a person for past acts?
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• Jaffer vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1321 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-10Read full judgment →
• Ittehad Chemicals through its Managing Director vs Punjab Labour1990 PLC 227 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-21
  workman definitionsupervisory capacitylabour lawreinstatementwrit jurisdictionindustrial relationsnature of duties test
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenged the orders of the Punjab Labour Court and the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, which had reinstated an employee (Respondent No. 3) with back benefits. The core legal question was whether the respondent, employed as a Senior Foreman (Civil), qualified as a 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The High Court held that the lower courts erred in their assessment. The court ruled that the respondent was not a 'workman' because his primary duties were supervisory in nature. The court established that an employee's designation is not conclusive; the essential test is the 'pith and substance' of the duties performed. Where an employee's main function is supervisory, the performance of incidental manual or clerical tasks does not qualify them as a 'workman.' Consequently, the petition was accepted, and the impugned orders were declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect.

  Questions settled

  • Does the designation of an employee determine their status as a 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Is an employee whose primary duties are supervisory considered a 'workman' if they perform incidental manual or clerical tasks?
  • Does the lack of power to hire and fire employees automatically qualify a supervisor as a 'workman'?
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• Ittefaq Foundry vs Federation of Pakistan1990 PLD Lahore 121 · Lahore High Court · 1990-01-27
  delegated legislationjudicial reviewtax exemptionequal protection of lawfreedom of tradearbitrary taxationdiscriminatory classification
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a private steel foundry, challenged the Federal Government's notifications imposing differential Excise Duty and Sales Tax on 'Billets' compared to 'Ingots,' arguing these products are functionally identical. The core legal question was whether the government's delegated legislative power to grant tax exemptions was exercised arbitrarily, unreasonably, and in violation of fundamental rights, specifically the right to equality and freedom of trade. The Court held that the impugned notifications were discriminatory and lacked a rational basis, as the government failed to justify the differential treatment of Billets and Ingots. Consequently, the Court declared the levies illegal and directed the government to reconsider the exemption policy. The judgment establishes that delegated legislative power, even in tax matters, is subject to judicial review for reasonableness and non-arbitrariness. It emphasizes that the government must demonstrate that any classification between similar products is based on relevant, substantial differences, and failure to provide such justification renders the action violative of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of law under the Constitution of Pakistan.

  Questions settled

  • Can the court exercise judicial review over delegated legislative powers regarding tax exemptions?
  • Does the government's failure to provide a rational basis for classifying similar products for tax purposes violate the constitutional right to equality?
  • Does the repeal of an Ordinance under Article 89 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 automatically revive a previous notification that was substituted by the repealed Ordinance?
  • Is the grant of tax exemption a matter of absolute executive grace, or is it subject to the test of reasonableness?
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• Ittefaq Foundries(Pvt.) Ltd. vs Federation Of Pakistan And OtherPTCL 1990 CL. 1211 · Lahore High Court · 1990-01-27Read full judgment →
• Ittefaq Foundries (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Pakistan Railways through its Chairman1990 MLD 1 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-08Read full judgment →
• Ittefaq Foundries (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Pakistan Railways and others1990 PLD Lahore 164 · Lahore High Court · 1990-01-16Read full judgment →
• Islamia University, Bahawalpur through its ViceChancellor vs Khadim1990 MLD 2158 · Lahore High Court · 1990-05-30
  land acquisitionmarket valuecompensationinterestRibalocus standireference court
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses multiple regular first appeals arising from an award of the reference court dated September 21, 1987, concerning the compulsory acquisition of agricultural land for Islamia University, Bahawalpur. The core legal questions involved whether the university and landowners had the right to file appeals, whether compensation was correctly assessed, whether the provisions for interest under sections 28 and 34 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 are repugnant to the Islamic injunctions against Riba, and whether landowners were barred from challenging the award for failing to file objections under section 9. The court held that the university, as a beneficiary and stranger to the acquisition proceedings, had no locus standi to file an appeal under section 54 of the Act. Furthermore, the court held that interest awarded under sections 28 and 34 of the Act is in the nature of compensation or damages for the wrongful deprivation of land and does not constitute Riba. The key principles laid down include that a beneficiary entity lacks locus standi to appeal an acquisition award, and that statutory interest in compulsory land acquisition represents compensatory damages rather than prohibited interest.

  Questions settled

  • Does a beneficiary university or local authority have the locus standi to file an appeal against an award of the reference court under the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
  • Whether the interest awarded under sections 28 and 34 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam regarding Riba?
  • Are the provisions of section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 mandatory such that failure to file written objections precludes landowners from seeking a reference under section 18?
  • What constitutes proper market value and potentiality when assessing compensation for agricultural land compulsorily acquired under the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
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• Ishfaq Ahmad and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1317 · Lahore High Court · 1989-12-11Read full judgment →
• Irshad Ullah and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 920 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-09Read full judgment →
• Irshad Hussain Bokhari vs Bashir Ahmad And Other1990 CLC 658 · Lahore High Court · 1989-07-03Read full judgment →
• Irshad Ahmad and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 374 · Lahore High Court · 1989-06-13Read full judgment →
• Inam Ullah vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 529 · Lahore High Court · 1989-12-04
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryconflicting versionscommon intentionmurderbenefit of doubtinvestigation report
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a post-arrest bail application filed by the petitioner, Inam Ullah, in a case registered under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail when the investigation had produced three mutually contradictory versions of the incident, thereby casting doubt on the prosecution's case. The High Court granted bail to the petitioner, holding that the existence of three conflicting versions of the occurrence, as presented by different investigating officers, rendered the case one for further inquiry within the meaning of Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The court established the principle that where the prosecution's case is riddled with significant contradictions regarding the accused's presence and role, and where the investigation itself is inconsistent, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt at the bail stage, as the matter requires further probe by the trial court. The court emphasized that each criminal case must be decided on its own peculiar facts.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of multiple, conflicting versions of an incident during the investigation constitute grounds for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail when the investigation reports are inconsistent regarding their presence at the scene of the crime?
  • Can the court grant bail if the prosecution's version of the incident is contradicted by the medical evidence on record?
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• Imtiaz Gohar Etc. vs Addl: Commissioner Etc.K.L.R. 1990 Revenue Cases 154 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-25Read full judgment →
• Imtiaz Gohar and others vs Additional Commissioner and others1990 MLD 1912 · Lahore High Court · 1990-06-16
  ejectment suitsAdditional Commissionerjurisdictiondelegation of judicial powerrevision petitionLand Reforms RegulationsRevenue Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the jurisdiction of an Additional Commissioner to hear revision petitions under the Punjab Land Reforms (Procedure for Ejectment Suits) Rules, 1977. The petitioners challenged orders passed by an Additional Commissioner, arguing that the statutory power to hear revisions under Rule 7 of the Ejectment Rules is vested personally in the Commissioner and cannot be exercised by an Additional Commissioner. The Court examined whether the Additional Commissioner possessed the requisite authority under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967, or the Land Reforms Regulations, 1972. The Court held that the power of revision under the Ejectment Rules is a personal, judicial power conferred specifically upon the Commissioner. It concluded that an Additional Commissioner, appointed under Section 9 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967, does not automatically possess the Commissioner's powers under other enactments unless expressly provided by law. Consequently, the Court declared the orders passed by the Additional Commissioner to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect, establishing that statutory judicial powers designated to a specific authority cannot be delegated without express legislative authorization.

  Questions settled

  • Is an Additional Commissioner competent to hear revision petitions under the Punjab Land Reforms (Procedure for Ejectment Suits) Rules, 1977?
  • Does the power of an Additional Commissioner under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967, extend to exercising the powers of a Commissioner under the Land Reforms Regulations, 1972?
  • Can a judicial power conferred by statute upon a specific authority be delegated to another officer without express legislative provision?
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• Ijaz Hussain vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1975 · Lahore High Court · 1990-05-20Read full judgment →
• Ijaz Akhtar vs The Secretary, Punjab Public Service CommissionK.L.R 1990 Labour & Service Cases 339 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Ijaz Akhtar vs Secretary, Punjab Public Service Commission and another1990 PLC (C.S.) 749 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-09
  constitutional petitionage relaxationgovernment servantdisabled personsstatutory interpretationbeneficial legislationpublic service commission
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the Punjab Public Service Commission’s decision to reject the petitioner’s application for the post of Extra-Assistant Commissioner on the grounds of being overage. The petitioner, a government servant with over four years of service, sought to combine the 35-year age limit prescribed for government servants under the West Pakistan Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 1964, with the 10-year age relaxation for disabled persons provided by the Punjab Civil Servants Recruitment (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 1976. The core legal question was whether applying both provisions constituted impermissible double relaxation. The Court held that the 35-year limit for government servants is the prescribed age limit under the 1964 Rules, not a relaxation. Consequently, the 10-year disability benefit is an addition to the base age limit, not a second relaxation. The Court established that beneficial legislation must be interpreted benevolently, and since the petitioner was not claiming multiple relaxations but rather applying a specific age limit to a disability benefit, the rejection was unlawful. The petition was allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the 35-year age limit for government servants under the West Pakistan Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 1964, constitute a relaxation of the upper age limit?
  • Can a government servant who is also a disabled person claim the 10-year age relaxation provided by the Punjab Civil Servants Recruitment (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 1976, in addition to the age limit prescribed for government servants?
  • How should beneficial legislation be interpreted when determining eligibility for public service recruitment?
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• Ijaz Ahmad and 3 others vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1152 · Lahore High Court · 1989-06-21Read full judgment →
• Ijaz Ahmad and 2 others vs The Government of Punjab through Secretary, Education, Civil Secretariat, Lahore and 4 others1990 PLC (C.S.) 697 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-16
  service matterexclusive jurisdictionlacheswrit petitionPunjab Service TribunalLaw Reports Actdismissal in limine
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges the termination of the petitioners' services as Malis and a Chaukidar in the Education Department, seeking a declaration that the termination order dated 28-2-1989 is illegal and void. The core legal questions are whether the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a service matter where the petitioners failed to exhaust departmental remedies or approach the Punjab Service Tribunal, and whether the petition is barred by laches due to a delay of over one year. The Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that the Punjab Service Tribunal possesses exclusive jurisdiction over such service matters under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the petition is barred by laches due to the unexplained delay in filing. The Court also clarified that unreported judgments cited by the petitioners are not binding, emphasizing that under Section 3 of the Law Reports Act, 1875, courts are not obligated to treat non-authorized case reports as binding authority. The judgment affirms the necessity of exhausting statutory remedies and adhering to limitation periods in service-related litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to entertain a service matter where the petitioner has not approached the Punjab Service Tribunal?
  • Is a delay of over one year in filing a petition regarding a service matter sufficient to constitute laches?
  • Are unreported judgments binding on the High Court under the Law Reports Act, 1875?
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• Iftikhar Ahmad Shaikh vs Ch. Muhammad Din and 2 others1990 PLD Lahore 461 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-25
  ejectment petitionspecified period tenancymandatory vs directorycause of actionjurisdictional defectwrit jurisdictionRent Restriction Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an ejectment order passed against the petitioner-tenant. The core legal question was whether the proviso to Section 13(3) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, which prohibits a landlord from applying for eviction before the expiry of a specified tenancy period, is mandatory or directory. The petitioner argued that filing an ejectment petition before the lease expiry was a jurisdictional defect that could not be cured. The Court held that the proviso is directory rather than mandatory. It reasoned that the statute does not explicitly declare that non-compliance results in nullity, and the primary object of the Rent Restriction Ordinance is to resolve landlord-tenant disputes expeditiously. Consequently, where the cause of action matures during the pendency of the litigation, the initial defect is cured, and dismissing the petition on technical grounds would only lead to unnecessary, repetitive litigation. The Court affirmed that the prohibition is intended for the tenant's benefit, which can be waived, and that the proceedings are valid if the condition is satisfied during the pendency of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Is the proviso to Section 13(3) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance regarding the expiry of a specified tenancy period mandatory or directory?
  • Can an ejectment petition filed before the expiry of a specified tenancy period be maintained if the cause of action matures during the pendency of the proceedings?
  • Does the failure to comply with a statutory condition precedent automatically render a legal proceeding void if the statute does not explicitly state the consequence of nullity?
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• Ibrahim Textile Mills Ltd. vs Federation Of Pakistan,Etc.PTCL 1990 CL. 118 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Hussain Khan and 2 others vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1520 · Lahore High Court · 1989-06-13Read full judgment →
• Hazoor Ahmad vs The State1990 MLD 138 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-23Read full judgment →
• Hayat Ullah vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1426 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-12Read full judgment →
• Hameed Ahmed vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 725 · Lahore High Court · 1989-06-25Read full judgment →
• Haji Riaz Hussain vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1299 · Lahore High Court · 1989-02-15Read full judgment →
• Haji Riaz Ahmad Butt vs Secretary, Transport Government of Punjab1990 CLC 1825 · Lahore High Court · 1990-05-19Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Shah vs Mst. Hamidan Bibi1990 MLD 597 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-25
  damages for civil suitfrivolous suitsmalicious prosecutionlitigation costsmaintainability of suitcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises out of a civil suit for the recovery of damages and litigation costs filed by the respondent against the petitioner, alleging that previous declaratory suits filed against her were mala fide, frivolous, and vexatious. The trial court decreed the suit for Rs. 8,000, which the Additional District Judge reduced to Rs. 5,000 on appeal. The core legal question was whether a separate civil action can be maintained in law to recover costs incurred or damages suffered on account of the institution or defence of a previous civil suit. The Lahore High Court held that no separate suit is maintainable for the recovery of litigation costs or damages for mental torture and loss of reputation arising from the institution of a previous civil suit, as sections 35 and 35-A of the Code of Civil Procedure provide the exclusive remedies and mechanisms for awarding costs and special costs in such cases. The petition was accepted, and the judgments of the courts below were set aside, dismissing the respondent's suit.

  Questions settled

  • Can a separate suit be maintained for recovering costs incurred in prosecuting or defending a previous civil suit?
  • Is an action maintainable to recover damages for mental torture and loss of reputation caused by the institution of a previous civil suit?
  • What is the scope of sections 35 and 35-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding compensation for frivolous or vexatious litigation?
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• Haji Muhammad Hussain vs S.H.O,, Police Station, Chunian and 6 others1990 P Cr. L J 1314 · Lahore High Court · 1989-08-27Read full judgment →
• Haji Mithu vs Muhammad Yousaf and 5 others1990 P Cr. L J 1466 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-21Read full judgment →
• Haji Chaseetu and 9 others vs Sarwar Khan1990 MLD 1368 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-03Read full judgment →
• Haji Ahmad Khan and 3 others vs The State1990 MLD 643 · Lahore High Court · 1989-02-22Read full judgment →
• Hafizullah vs Haji Hussain Bakhsh1990 CLC 603 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-21
  promissory noteadhesive stampseffectual cancellationstamp dutyremand orderadmissibility of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit filed by the plaintiff-appellant to recover Rs. 3,000 based on a Promissory Note and receipt. The trial court decreed the suit, finding the Promissory Note adequately stamped and cancelled. However, the appellate court reversed this finding, holding that the Promissory Note was deficiently stamped, the stamps were not effectually cancelled under Section 12 of the Stamp Act 1899, and remanded the case for oral evidence. The core legal question before the High Court was whether drawing lines across adhesive stamps constitutes an "effectual cancellation" under Section 12 of the Stamp Act 1899. The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the remand order, and held that drawing lines across a stamp is a valid and effectual mode of cancellation. The Court laid down the principle that the test for effectual cancellation is whether an ordinary conscientious person would conclude the stamp has already been used, and it is not required to make reuse a physical impossibility.

  Questions settled

  • Whether drawing a line across adhesive stamps constitutes an effectual cancellation under Section 12 of the Stamp Act 1899?
  • Is it legally required under the Stamp Act 1899 that a stamp be cancelled in such a manner that its reuse is a physical impossibility?
  • What is the legal criterion for determining whether an adhesive stamp has been sufficiently cancelled to prevent its reuse?
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• Hafeez Ahmad vs The State1990 MLD 190 · Lahore High Court · 1989-02-14Read full judgment →
• Habibullah Khan vs District Education Officer (Male), Bhakkar1990 PLC (C.S.) 699 · Lahore High Court · 1989-12-20Read full judgment →
• Habib Bank Limited vs Raza Muhammad1990 PLC 592 · Lahore High Court · 1989-04-24Read full judgment →
• Gulzar vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1168 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-04Read full judgment →
• Gulzar alias Bhutto vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 191 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-29Read full judgment →
• Gulzar Ahmad vs The State and another1990 MLD 2322 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-30Read full judgment →
• Gulzar Ahmad vs Assistant Commissioner/Collector CollectorK.L.R. 1990 Labour and Service Cases 311 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Gojra Samundri Sugar Mills Limited, Gojra vs Punjab Labour1990 PLC 506 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Gojra Sammundri Sugar Mills Limited vs Punjab Labour AppellateK.L.R.1990 Labour & Service Cases 249 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Ghulam Shabbir and 6 others vs The State and another1990 P Cr. L J 97 · Lahore High Court · 1989-04-10
  quashment of proceedingsforged documentjudicial proceedingsprivate complaintbar of jurisdictionpower of attorney
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Lahore High Court through a petition seeking the quashment of criminal proceedings pending against the petitioners arising out of FIR No. 377 of 1985 registered at Police Station Ahmadpur East, District Bahawalpur, under sections 420, 467, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns whether a criminal court can take cognizance of an offence regarding a forged document allegedly used in a judicial proceeding upon a private complaint, without a complaint from the concerned civil court. The Court held that under the provisions of section 195 and section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, a private complaint in respect of a forged document used in judicial proceedings is not competent, and criminal proceedings initiated otherwise than through the bar of section 195(1)(c) are barred. The petition was consequently accepted and the pending proceedings were quashed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal court take cognizance of a private complaint regarding a forged document used in judicial proceedings without a complaint from the concerned court?
  • Whether the provisions of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 bar a private complaint for offences relating to documents produced in a court?
  • Is a complaint by the concerned civil court a condition precedent for launching prosecution in respect of a forged document used in judicial proceedings under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Ghulam Sarwar vs Allah Ditta and 3 others1990 MLD 1901 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-09Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasul And Others vs Karim Bakhsh And Other1990C L C 1439 · Lahore High Court · 1983-11-26Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool vs Said Rasool and 2 others1990 PLD Lahore 457 · Lahore High Court · 1990-06-23
  constitutional petitionRent Controllerstriking off defencedetermination of rentarrears of rentexecution of ordercivil court decreeejectment proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging an order of the Rent Controller, upheld on appeal, which dismissed the petitioner tenant's objections to the execution of an order directing payment of arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 62,490. The tenant's defence had been struck off for non-compliance with a tentative rent deposit order under Section 13(6) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal questions were whether the Rent Controller possesses jurisdiction to finally determine and direct the payment of rent due to the landlord, and whether such a direction is executable under Section 17 of the Ordinance as a civil court decree. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that post-1960 amendment, Section 13(6) expressly empowers the Rent Controller to finally determine rent due and order its payment, sparing landlords separate recovery suits. Furthermore, under Section 17, such a final order is executable as a civil decree.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Rent Controller have jurisdiction under Section 13(6) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, to finally determine the amount of rent due from a tenant and direct its payment to the landlord?
  • Is an order passed by the Rent Controller determining rent and directing its payment to the landlord executable as a decree of the Civil Court under Section 17 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Does the Rent Controller become functus officio regarding the final determination and recovery of rent after passing an order striking off the tenant's defence or ordering eviction?
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• Ghulam Rasool and another vs Mst. Sardar Begum and another1990 MLD 1887 · Lahore High Court · 1990-05-08Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool and 3 others vs Muhammad Rafioue and 2 others1990 MLD 112 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-23Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Qadir vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1554 · Lahore High Court · 1989-07-26Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Nabi vs Muhammad Siddique1990 CLC 268 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-07Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Nabi vs Brig. Muhammad Akram And Other1990 CLC 664 · Lahore High Court · 1989-02-28
  rebuttal evidenceonus probandispecific performanceconstitutional petitionburden of proofbona fide purchasertrial procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This Constitutional petition challenges the orders passed by the trial court and the revisional court, which denied the petitioner the opportunity to produce evidence in rebuttal in a suit for specific performance. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, having explicitly reserved the right to produce rebuttal evidence, could be denied that opportunity by the lower courts. The Lahore High Court held that the lower courts erred in refusing this request. The Court reasoned that where the burden of proof (onus probandi) for a specific issue—in this case, whether the defendants were bona fide purchasers for consideration—lies on the respondents, the plaintiff is entitled to lead evidence in rebuttal to counter the evidence produced by the defendants. The Court emphasized that the petitioner had formally reserved this right on the record, and denying it obstructed the interests of justice. Consequently, the impugned orders were set aside, and the trial court was directed to allow the petitioner to produce evidence in rebuttal within a specified timeframe, ensuring the trial concludes expeditiously.

  Questions settled

  • Is a plaintiff entitled to produce evidence in rebuttal when the burden of proof for an issue lies on the defendant?
  • Can a court deny a party the right to produce rebuttal evidence if that right was explicitly reserved on the record?
  • Does the denial of an opportunity to produce rebuttal evidence constitute a valid ground for setting aside trial court orders in constitutional jurisdiction?
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• Ghulam Mustafa And Another vs Mst. Muhammadi Begum And Another1990 CLC 246 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-30
  landlord-tenant relationshipejectment petitionco-ownershiprent controller jurisdictionpartition suitconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges an appellate order directing the petitioner's eviction from a shop. The core legal question is whether a tenant, by purchasing a fractional share of the rented property during the pendency of ejectment proceedings, can extinguish the landlord-tenant relationship and oust the Rent Controller's jurisdiction. The Court held that the purchase of a share does not terminate the existing tenancy or divest the Rent Controller of jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that a tenant cannot challenge the landlord's title or the established relationship of landlord and tenant by acquiring a partial interest in the property during ongoing litigation. The key principle laid down is that the Rent Controller’s jurisdiction is limited to regulating the landlord-tenant relationship under the relevant rent laws; issues regarding co-ownership and partition must be resolved by a court of general civil jurisdiction. Consequently, the tenant remains liable for eviction under the rent laws, with the liberty to pursue a separate suit for partition in a civil court to assert rights arising from the purchased share.

  Questions settled

  • Does the purchase of a share in a property by a tenant during the pendency of ejectment proceedings extinguish the relationship of landlord and tenant?
  • Can a tenant resist eviction proceedings by claiming co-ownership status acquired after the initiation of the ejectment petition?
  • Does the Rent Controller have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon title disputes or partition claims between a landlord and a tenant?
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• Ghulam Murtaza Shah vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 803 · Lahore High Court · 1972-12-22Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1364 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-05Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 577 · Lahore High Court · 1978-02-22
  criminal appealnon-examination of investigating officerprejudice to accusedretrial declineddelay in trialhouse-trespasshostile witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Lahore High Court arose from the conviction and seven-year rigorous imprisonment sentence of the appellant under Sections 459 and 460 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following a delayed trial before a Section 30 Magistrate. The appellant contended that his conviction was bad in law due to the non-examination of key official witnesses, including the Investigating Officer and the medical officer, which severely prejudiced his defense. The High Court considered whether the failure to examine the Investigating Officer vitiates a criminal conviction and whether a retrial should be ordered after an extended period. The High Court held that the Investigating Officer is a vital witness whose absence deprives the accused of bringing out crucial material and contradictions, thereby causing grave prejudice. Concluding that the conviction could not be sustained and declining to order a retrial given that the incident occurred eight years prior and the appellant had already served over two years in detention, the Court set aside the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure to examine the Investigating Officer causes serious prejudice to the accused so as to invalidate a conviction?
  • Whether a retrial should be ordered when a conviction is set aside after a lapse of eight years and the accused has already served a substantial portion of his sentence?
  • Is a Magistrate required to record reasons when discharging co-accused persons under Section 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain vs The State1990 PLD Lahore 424 · Lahore High Court · 1990-05-23Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain vs Muhammad Bashir and 5 others1990 PLD Lahore 204 · Lahore High Court · 1989-12-19Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain Arshad And Another vs Allah Ditta And Other1990 CLC 1819 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-25
  pre-emption suitowner of the estateland revenue assessmentadditional evidencesecond appealburden of proofCode of Civil Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This second appeal arises from a pre-emption suit where the trial court initially decreed the suit, but the appellate court reversed the decision, finding the plaintiffs failed to establish their status as "owners of the estate." The core legal question was whether the plaintiffs possessed the requisite superior right of pre-emption under Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, specifically whether their land was assessed to land revenue, and whether the appellate court erred in refusing to admit additional evidence (an inheritance mutation) to prove this assessment. The High Court held that the term "owner of the estate" necessitates the co-existence of ownership of agricultural land and its assessment to land revenue. Since the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence of such assessment, they could not satisfy the statutory requirement. Furthermore, the court affirmed that Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 cannot be invoked to allow a litigant to fill evidentiary gaps or patch up a weak case due to their own negligence. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'owner of the estate' under the Punjab Pre-emption Act require that the land be assessed to land revenue?
  • Can a party use Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to introduce additional evidence to fill gaps in their case?
  • Does the burden of proof regarding the superior right of pre-emption lie on the plaintiff?
  • Are entries in a holding slip (khatauni) sufficient to prove that land is assessed to land revenue?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain and anothers vs Haji Safarash Khan1990 MLD 1740 · Lahore High Court · 1990-05-02Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain And Another vs Alam Sher And 3 Other1990 CLC 1246 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-06Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Haider And 19 Others vs Chief Administrator, Auoaf, Punjab1990 CLC 1803 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Ghulam Din Zia vs Commissioner Of Wealth Tax, Lahore And AnotherPTCL 1990 CL. 902 · Lahore High Court · 1989-01-24Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Abbas Shah vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 550 · Lahore High Court · 1978-03-26Read full judgment →
• Gaman vs Muhammad Ramzan1990 CLC 1247 · Lahore High Court · 1989-03-28Read full judgment →
• G.M. Malik, Chairman, Board of Intermediate and Secondary1990 CLC 1783 · Lahore High Court · 1990-05-12
  show-cause noticeservice matterconstitutional petitiondisciplinary proceedingsjurisdictionofficers of the boardmaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by the Chairman of the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Faisalabad, challenging a show-cause notice issued to him under Section 14(2) of the Boards of Secondary Education Act, 1976, for sanctioning his own casual leave, leaving the headquarters without permission, and authorizing the Secretary of the Board to act in his absence. The core legal questions involved whether the show-cause notice was validly issued under Section 14(2) of the Boards of Secondary Education Act, 1976, regarding officers of the Board, or whether it should have been under Section 12, and whether a constitutional petition is maintainable against a show-cause notice in service matters. The Lahore High Court held that the disciplinary proceedings against officers of the Board were rightly initiated under Section 14(2) of the Boards of Secondary Education Act, 1976, which is distinct from provisions governing ordinary employees. The Court further held that the constitutional petition was premature and not maintainable as the petitioner had adequate remedies before departmental authorities and the Service Tribunal. The petition was dismissed in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Whether disciplinary proceedings against an officer of the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education are properly initiated under Section 14(2) of the Boards of Secondary Education Act, 1976?
  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable against a show-cause notice issued in service matters when alternative departmental remedies are available?
  • Whether the Chairman of the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education is competent to sanction his own casual leave and authorize the Secretary to act in his absence?
  • Do the provisions of Section 12 and Section 14 of the Boards of Secondary Education Act, 1976 overlap regarding disciplinary actions against employees and officers?
  Read full judgment →
• G. M. Malik, Chairman, Board of Intermediate and Secondary1990 CLC 773 · Lahore High Court · 1990-01-24
  statutory tenureChairman of the Boardretirement agedeputationwrit jurisdictionconstitutional petitionstatutory construction
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 was filed to challenge the threatened retirement or removal of the petitioner from the office of the Chairman of the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Faisalabad, before the completion of his statutory three-year tenure. The core legal questions involved whether the tenure of the Chairman of the Board can be curtailed without following the mandatory show-cause procedure under section 14 of the Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act, 1976, and whether the age of retirement under section 17 of the Act applies to statutory officers like the Chairman. The Lahore High Court held that the Chairman holds a statutory tenure of three years which cannot be reduced except in the manner provided by the proviso to section 14(2) of the Act, and that the retirement provisions in section 17 do not apply to the officers specifically enumerated in section 13 (such as the Chairman). The key principles laid down are that statutory tenures cannot be arbitrarily curtailed in violation of express statutory safeguards, and specific tenure provisions prevail over general retirement age rules pursuant to statutory interpretation principles.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the three-year tenure of the Chairman of the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education can be reduced without complying with the mandatory requirements of section 14 of the Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act, 1976?
  • Does the age of retirement laid down in section 17 of the Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act, 1976 apply to officers specifically mentioned in section 13 of the said Act?
  • Can a civil servant on deputation as Chairman of the Board be prematurely retired from that office upon attaining the age of superannuation under general service rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Feroze Ahmad Khan And Others vs Settlement Commissioner And Other1990 CLC 1508 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-02Read full judgment →
• Fazal Muhammad vs Muhammad Jafar And 6 Other1990 CLC 1238 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-10Read full judgment →
• Fazal Muhammad alias Fazla vs Ghulam Ali and 2 others1990 PLD Lahore 201 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-12
  pre-emptioncondonation of delaylimitationTalabssecond appealfluid state of law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a pre-emption suit dismissed by the trial court and the first appellate court due to the appellant's failure to perform necessary Talabs (demands). The appellant filed a second appeal, which was time-barred, and sought condonation of delay. The core legal question was whether the delay in filing the appeal should be condoned given the fluctuating state of the law regarding the necessity of Talabs in pre-emption suits. The Court held that the delay should be condoned. It observed that the law of pre-emption had been in a state of flux following conflicting judicial pronouncements, culminating in the Supreme Court's decision in Ahmad v. Abdul Aziz, which clarified that Talabs were not required. The Court established the principle that where an appellant is genuinely misled by conflicting judicial precedents and a fluid state of law, such circumstances constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay under the relevant limitation provisions. Consequently, the Court admitted the appeal for further hearing on the merits regarding the sustainability of the lower courts' judgments.

  Questions settled

  • Can delay in filing an appeal be condoned where the appellant was misled by conflicting judicial precedents?
  • Does the fluid state of law regarding pre-emption requirements constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay?
  • Is the performance of Talabs a mandatory requirement for a pre-emption suit in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Ahmad v. Abdul Aziz?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Hussain And 3 Others vs Nawab Din1990 CLC 1446 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-03Read full judgment →
• Fateh Muhammad vs The State and another1990 P Cr. L J 1811 · Lahore High Court · 1990-06-03
  quashment of FIRforgerycognizable offenceabuse of process of lawcivil and criminal proceedingsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed seeking the quashment of an F.I.R. registered under sections 468, 471, and 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, concerning allegations of forgery regarding a gift deed of agricultural land. The core legal questions were whether the alleged forgery constituted an offence under section 463 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 despite the complainant's lack of direct interest in the property, and whether the existence of concurrent civil proceedings rendered the criminal case an abuse of the process of law. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the allegations of forgery were prima facie substantiated by the evidence, including the fabrication of a death certificate by the accused. The Court affirmed that any citizen may report a cognizable offence regardless of personal interest. Furthermore, it held that criminal proceedings are not barred merely by the pendency of civil litigation, especially when the alleged forgery occurred outside of court proceedings, rendering section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 inapplicable. The petition was dismissed as the investigation had established a prima facie case.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person who is not a direct beneficiary or heir report a cognizable offence?
  • Does the pendency of a civil suit automatically render criminal proceedings for forgery an abuse of the process of law?
  • Does the definition of forgery under section 463 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 require the complainant to have a direct interest in the property?
  • Is section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to offences not committed in relation to court proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Fateh Muhammad vs Riaz Ahmad alias Raju and another1990 P Cr. L J 454 · Lahore High Court · 1989-04-17Read full judgment →
• Fateh Muhammad vs Muhammad Hanif and anothers1990 PLD Lahore 82 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-23
  specific performancetemporary injunctionpendente lite alienationbalance of convenienceprima facie casedeposit of balance sale priceinterim reliefcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This first appeal arises from an order of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff-appellant's application for an interim injunction to restrain the defendants from alienating the suit property pendente lite in a suit for specific performance of a land sale agreement. The core legal questions involved whether the plaintiff had a prima facie case for the grant of a temporary injunction, whether time was of the essence of the contract, and whether the grant of such an injunction in a specific performance suit should be made subject to terms, specifically the deposit of the balance sale consideration. The Lahore High Court held that the plaintiff established a good prima facie case with a balance of convenience in his favour, and that time was yet to be determined as of the essence at trial. The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the trial court's order, granting the temporary injunction subject to the condition that the plaintiff deposits the balance sale consideration in court within two months to secure the defendants' interests against fluctuating real estate values and demonstrate bona fides.

  Questions settled

  • Whether time was of the essence of the contract in a suit for specific performance where the stipulated completion date had expired?
  • Can a temporary injunction restraining the alienation of property be granted in a suit for specific performance?
  • Whether the grant of an interim injunction in a suit for specific performance should ordinarily be subjected to the condition of depositing the balance sale consideration in court?
  • Does the failure to serve a pre-institution notice under Order XLIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 warrant the dismissal of an appeal once it has been admitted for a hearing on merits?
  Read full judgment →
• Fateh Khan and others vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1584 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-21Read full judgment →
• Fateh Khan And Others vs Rab Nawaz Khan And Other1990 CLC 257 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-26Read full judgment →
• Faryad Hussain Bokhari vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 201 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-16Read full judgment →
• Farman Alt and 4 others vs The State1990 MLD 2387 · Lahore High Court · 1990-06-17Read full judgment →
• Farman Ali vs Muhammad Yousuf Ali1990 CLC 1936 · Lahore High Court · 1990-07-15
  restoration of revision petitiondismissal for non-prosecutionno instructionspower of attorneyWakalatnamacause listsufficient causecondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from two applications seeking restoration of a civil revision petition dismissed for non-prosecution on 13-11-1988, alongside condonation of delay. The petitioner submitted that a new counsel had been engaged whose power of attorney was mislaid by the office, causing his name to be omitted from the cause list. Additionally, the petitioner contended that the previous counsel's statement of 'no instructions' automatically terminated his Wakalatnama, requiring notice to be sent directly to the petitioner.

  The Lahore High Court held that a revision petition dismissed in default can legally be restored, following Supreme Court precedent and rejecting contrary authority. However, on the merits, the Court ruled that under Order III Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, a counsel's statement of 'no instructions' does not automatically terminate the power of attorney, which remains in force until formally determined with leave of the Court or upon death/completion of proceedings. Furthermore, the omission of one counsel's name from the cause list does not constitute sufficient cause for restoration when the case number, parties' names, and co-counsel's name were correctly published. The applications were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil revision petition dismissed in default for non-prosecution be restored by the High Court?
  • Does a counsel's statement of having 'no instructions' automatically terminate their power of attorney under Order III Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the omission of a newly engaged advocate's name from the cause list constitute sufficient cause for restoration when all other case particulars and co-counsel's name are accurately listed?
  Read full judgment →
• Farid through Legal Heirs vs Mst. Inayatan and 2 others1990 MLD 1598 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-02Read full judgment →
• Faqir Ullah and others vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1386 · Lahore High Court · 1989-05-30Read full judgment →
• Faqir Muhammad- vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1031 · Lahore High Court · 1987-11-08Read full judgment →
• Faqir Muhammad vs Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and others1990 PLC 255 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-11Read full judgment →
• Faqir Muhammad vs District Magistrate, Gujranwala1990 P Cr. L J 571 · Lahore High Court · 1978-06-03Read full judgment →