Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 79,348 judgments in total from the Lahore High Court.

• Muhammad Ali and 3 Others vs The State1980 P Cr. L J 1069 · Lahore High Court · 1980-03-10Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal and Another vs The State1980 PLD Lahore 518 · Lahore High Court · 1980-03-01Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal and 3 Others vs The State1980 P Cr. L J 371 · Lahore High Court · 1979-09-28Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Abdullah Khan vs National Bank of Pakistan and 2 Others1980 PLC (C. S.) 105 · Lahore High Court · 1979-12-15Read full judgment →
• Muhammad a Sin vs Mst. Dilshad Begum1980 PLD Lahore 32 · Lahore High Court · 1979-09-30Read full judgment →
• Mubarik Ali vs The State1980 P Cr. L J 23 · Lahore High Court · 1979-07-17Read full judgment →
• Mubarak vs Phullan and 7 Others1980 CLC 485 · Lahore High Court · 1979-06-01
  pre-emptionpartial pre-emptiondeficient court-feememorandum of appealtenancyMartial Law Regulation No. 115
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two regular second appeals arising from a consolidated judgment of the trial court which dismissed the appellants' pre-emption suits. The core legal questions involve whether the pre-emption suits suffered from partial pre-emption due to the appellants' separate tenancies and whether the appeals were liable to dismissal due to a deficient court-fee where no application under section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was filed. The Lahore High Court held that the appellants' tenancies were separate rather than joint, rendering their suits instances of partial pre-emption, and that the insufficiently stamped memoranda of appeal were not proper appeals in the absence of a formal application under section 149, C.P.C. to make up the deficiency. The court laid down that the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 do not apply to memoranda of appeal, and an insufficiently stamped memorandum of appeal remains a mere piece of paper unless time is extended under section 149 upon a proper application.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an insufficiently stamped memorandum of appeal can be regarded as a proper appeal without an application for extension of time under section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Do the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to memoranda of appeal?
  • Does filing a pre-emption suit for a half share in each killa of land constituting separate tenancies amount to partial pre-emption?
  • Whether pending appeals stand transferred to the Collector upon an amendment creating a new forum for pending suits only?
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• Mst. Zulekha vs Amir and 5 Others1980 P Cr. L J 619 · Lahore High Court · 1979-09-30Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zainab Bibi and Another vs Chairman, Miani Sahib Graveyard1980 CLC 1598 · Lahore High Court · 1979-10-21Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zahida Khanum vs The Land Acquisition Collector, Lahore1980 CLC 212 · Lahore High Court · 1979-04-23Read full judgment →
• Mst. Wallan vs Mst. Bashir Bibi and camas1980 CLC 1709 · Lahore High Court · 1979-11-20Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sheedi vs Muhammad Siddique and 2 Others1980 PLD Lahore 477 · Lahore High Court · 1980-03-17
  consent decreefraud and collusionlimitation periodvoid decreeimpersonationsuit for possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a plaintiff's appeal against the judgment of the Additional District Judge, Mianwali, which maintained the dismissal of the plaintiff's suit for possession on the ground that it was barred by limitation under Article 95 of the Limitation Act. The plaintiff-appellant had filed a suit for possession alleging that a previous consent decree regarding her inherited property was fraudulent, collusive, and obtained through impersonation without her participation. The lower appellate court dismissed the suit relying solely on the limitation period. The Lahore High Court examined the applicability of Article 95 of the Limitation Act and held that where a plaintiff was not genuinely a party to a decree or transaction—such as in cases of impersonation or where a person was never a party to the suit—Article 95 does not apply, because the decree is ab initio null and void and need not be set aside. The Court ruled that the lower appellate court erred in deciding the limitation issue without first recording findings on the merits regarding whether the plaintiff was actually a party to the consent decree. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the judgment was set aside, and the matter was remanded.

  Questions settled

  • Does Article 95 of the Limitation Act apply to a suit challenging a decree where the plaintiff was not actually a party to the decree or transaction?
  • Is it necessary to seek cancellation of a decree that is ab initio null and void due to impersonation or lack of participation?
  • Can a question of limitation under Article 95 of the Limitation Act be determined without first recording findings on the merits of whether the plaintiff was a party to the disputed decree?
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• Mst. Sajada Banu vs Mst. Maqsoodan Begum1980 CLC 1183 · Lahore High Court · 1979-12-21Read full judgment →
• Mst. Resham Jan vs Allah Ditta and 2 Others1980 CLC 739 · Lahore High Court · 1979-07-10Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rehmatey and 7 OTHERss vs Khanan (Represented by Legal Heirs)1980 CLC 1765 · Lahore High Court · 1980-01-12Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rehmat Bim alias Rehmo vs Ch. Noor Muhammad and 2 Others1980 PLD Lahore 770 · Lahore High Court · 1980-05-05Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rehmat Bibi and 2 Others vs Mst. Maryam Akhtar1980 CLC 883 · Lahore High Court · 1979-11-23Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nazir vs Hafiz Ghulam Mustafa and Another1980 CLC 1024 · Lahore High Court · 1979-12-09Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nasira Begum vs Sardar Begum1980 CLC 2015 · Lahore High Court · 1980-03-17Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kaneez Fatima vs Bashir Ahmad1980 CLC 865 · Lahore High Court · 1979-12-16Read full judgment →
• Mst. Janatan Bibi and 6 Others vs Kh. Shaiq Hassan1980 CLC 1564 · Lahore High Court · 1980-01-01Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hashmat Bibi vs Muhammad Rafi and Another1980 CLC 967 · Lahore High Court · 1979-11-10
  arbitration awardcompromise of suitintervention of courtconsent of partiesrent restrictionpower of attorney
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves civil revision and second appeal arising from concurrent judgments refusing to make an arbitration award a rule of the court or to record it as a compromise under Order XXIII, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question was whether an arbitration award obtained without the intervention of the court in a pending suit can be treated as a compromise or adjustment under Order XXIII, Rule 3, C.P.C., without the express consent of all parties under the proviso to Section 47 of the Arbitration Act 1940. The Lahore High Court held that while the arbitration agreement was executed with valid authority through a power of attorney, the proviso to Section 47 of the Arbitration Act 1940 explicitly mandates the subsequent consent of all parties to the award before it can be considered as a compromise or adjustment of a suit. The court laid down that an arbitration reference made without court intervention in a pending suit is a nullity unless saved by Section 47, which requires contemporaneous or subsequent consent of all parties to utilize the award as a compromise, and antecedent consent does not satisfy this statutory requirement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an arbitration award obtained without the intervention of the court in a pending suit can be treated as a compromise under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without complying with Section 47 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • Does the proviso to Section 47 of the Arbitration Act 1940 require the consent of all parties to be given after the award is made, or does antecedent consent suffice?
  • Can a husband enter into a valid arbitration agreement on behalf of his wife when holding a general power of attorney authorizing him to compromise and refer matters to arbitration?
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• Mst. Farkhanda Akhtar and 3 Others vs Chairman, Evacuee Trust1980 PLD Lahore 804 · Lahore High Court · 1978-10-11
  evacuee trust propertystriking off partiesremand proceedingspermanent transfer deedcompensation poolimpleadment
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition arose from a dispute regarding the status of Property No. SW-96-R/3, Lahore, which had been transferred to the petitioners by the Settlement Department in 1960. The Evacuee Property Trust Board subsequently sought a declaration that the property was evacuee trust property. During the proceedings, the petitioners' names were struck off from the reference on the basis of a 1971 Central Government policy directing that urban evacuee trust properties utilized prior to June 30, 1968, should remain intact with the transferees, with the Board being reimbursed by the Settlement Department. No appeal was filed against the deletion of the petitioners' names. However, following a subsequent remand by the High Court in an appeal where the petitioners were not parties, the Chairman of the Board attempted to implead them again and stayed the issuance of their Permanent Transfer Deeds. The High Court held that once a party's name is struck off without objection or appeal, the matter cannot be unilaterally reopened. Furthermore, a person who was not a party to the appeal resulting in a remand cannot be impleaded at the remand stage. The Court also ruled that under the government's policy, even if the property were trust property, the transfer to the petitioners remained protected, and the Board's remedy lay solely in recovering the price from the Settlement Department. The impugned order was declared without lawful authority and void.

  Questions settled

  • What is the legal effect of striking off a party's name from proceedings when no appeal is filed against such an order?
  • Can a person who was not a party to the High Court appeal that resulted in a remand be impleaded as a party during the subsequent remand proceedings?
  • Does the Chairman of the Evacuee Property Trust Board have the authority to direct the Settlement Department to stay the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed for property already transferred via a Provisional Transfer Order?
  • Does a government policy protecting transfers of utilized evacuee trust properties restrict the Evacuee Property Trust Board's remedy solely to recovering the price from the Settlement Department?
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• Mst. Fahmeeda Begum vs Nisar Ahmad Qureshi1980 P Cr. L J 700 · Lahore High Court · 1979-12-15Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bismillah Khanum vs Mst. Razia Begum and Another1980 CLC 321 · Lahore High Court · 1979-09-28Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bilquees and Others vs Bha,Na1980 PLD Lahore 322 · Lahore High Court · 1973-04-29Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bilqees Begum vs Syed Ali Turab (Represented by Legal Heirs) and Another1980 CLC 930 · Lahore High Court · 1979-12-03
  written statementsecond appealprocedural lawcivil procedureex parte proceedingsremandsummons
  Summary & questions settled

  This second appeal challenges a trial court decree passed under Order VIII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, following the appellant's failure to file a written statement. The core legal questions were whether the penal provisions of Rule 10 apply to a failure to file a written statement under Rule 1, and whether a general direction in a summons constitutes being "required" by the court to file such a statement. The Court held that Rule 10 indeed empowers the court to pronounce judgment for failure to file a written statement under Rule 1. However, it clarified that the term "so required" in Rule 10 necessitates a specific judicial direction, not merely a general instruction contained in the initial summons. Since the trial court had not specifically required the appellant to file a written statement, the immediate pronouncement of judgment without evidence was improper. The Court established that in the absence of a specific requirement, the court should proceed under Order IX, Rule 6, rather than invoking the summary powers of Order VIII, Rule 10. The appeal was allowed and the case remanded.

  Questions settled

  • Does Order VIII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to a failure to file a written statement under Rule 1?
  • Does a general direction in a summons to file a written statement constitute a specific requirement under Order VIII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a court pronounce judgment under Order VIII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without evidence when a defendant fails to file a written statement?
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• Mst. Amina Begum vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Circle Lahore1980 PLD Lahore 571 · Lahore High Court · 1980-03-30
  evacuee propertyresumption of propertydemand noticedead personvoid orderlegal heirsconstitutional petitionSettlement Scheme No. VIII
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two connected constitutional petitions relating to the transfer of an evacuee property initially allotted partly to the original transferee, Malik Ali Akbar, who subsequently died. The core legal question is whether an order of resumption of property passed without issuing a demand notice to the legal heirs of the deceased transferee, and instead issued in the name of the deceased person, is void as a nullity, and whether subsequent transfers based on such a void resumption can be sustained. The Lahore High Court held that the order of resumption passed in violation of mandatory provisions of Settlement Scheme No. VIII and without notice to all legal heirs is a nullity and without lawful authority. Consequently, all subsequent orders transferring the property to third parties fall alongside it. The Court laid down the principle that a void order is non-existent in the eye of the law, must be struck down regardless of the consequences, and cannot be cured by subsequent proceedings where there is a conflict of interest among heirs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order of property resumption issued in the name of a deceased transferee without notice to his legal heirs is a nullity?
  • Does a void order of resumption fall along with all subsequent transfers made on its basis?
  • Whether service of demand notice on one legal heir constitutes valid notice to all heirs when there is a conflict of interest among them?
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• Mst. Staran Begum vs Abdul Hadi1980 P Cr. L J 79 · Lahore High Court · 1979-06-26Read full judgment →
• Mst. Allah Rakhi and 4 Others vs The State1980 P Cr. L J 561 · Lahore High Court · 1979-05-06Read full judgment →
• Mst, Bushra Perveen vs Abdul Rahman1980 PLD Lahore 350 · Lahore High Court · 1980-01-11Read full judgment →
• Mst Saeeda Bano and Another vs Chief Settlement & Rehabilitation1980 CLC 1346 · Lahore High Court · 1980-01-28Read full judgment →
• MRS. Suleman vs Abdul Ghafoor1980 CLC 316 · Lahore High Court · 1979-05-11
  ejectment petitionrent defaultnotice periodlocus standilandlord and tenantmisreading of evidencesecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This second appeal challenges the concurrent judgments of the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge, Lahore, ordering the appellant's ejectment from a rented property. The core legal questions concerned the locus standi of a single co-landlord to initiate ejectment proceedings and the effect of filing an ejectment petition before the expiration of the thirty-day notice period mandated by Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. The Court held that while a single co-landlord possesses the locus standi to file such a petition, the instant petition was premature and lacked a cause of action because it was instituted before the statutory thirty-day notice period had elapsed. Furthermore, the Court found that the lower courts misread the evidence regarding the alleged default in rent payment, as they improperly penalized the tenant for failing to produce rent receipts despite the landlord's admission that he never issued them. Consequently, the Court set aside the ejectment order, emphasizing that doubts regarding rent payment should be resolved in favor of the tenant, and dismissed the ejectment application.

  Questions settled

  • Can a single co-landlord institute an ejectment petition against a tenant without impleading other co-landlords?
  • Is an ejectment petition filed before the expiry of the thirty-day notice period under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 maintainable?
  • Does the non-production of rent receipts by a tenant constitute proof of default when the landlord admits to not issuing receipts?
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• Mohammad Sarwar alias Feroze Ali vs Abdul Ghani and 7 Others1980 CLC 946 · Lahore High Court · 1979-12-08
  presentation of appealunsigned vakalatnamaprocedural irregularitycurable defectoral authoritylimitation actletters patent appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This Letters Patent Appeal arose from a suit for declaration under custom where the lower appellate court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal on the ground that it was improperly presented because the vakalatnama attached to the memorandum of appeal was not signed by the appellant. The core legal question was whether the failure of an appellant to sign a vakalatnama or memorandum of appeal, where oral instructions were genuinely given to the advocate, renders the presentation an absolute nullity or constitutes a curable irregularity. The High Court held that the primary objective of Order III and Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is to ensure that appeals are filed under authentic authority. Since the appellant had orally instructed the counsel and actively participated in proceedings, the omission to sign the vakalatnama was a mere procedural oversight and curable irregularity. The Court modified the Single Judge's judgment, allowed the appeal, and held the presentation lawful.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of an appellant to sign a vakalatnama render the presentation of an appeal a nullity?
  • Can a defect in the presentation of a memorandum of appeal under Order XLI Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be cured after the expiration of limitation?
  • Whether oral instructions given to an advocate are sufficient to establish genuine representation so as to treat an unsigned power of attorney as a curable irregularity?
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• Mohammad Akram and 2 Others vs The State1980 P Cr. L J 653 · Lahore High Court · 1979-12-14Read full judgment →
• Mn. Nusrat Wahid and 3 Others vs Administrator, Thal Bhakkar1980 CLC 334 · Lahore High Court · 1979-06-15Read full judgment →
• Mistri Abdul Ghafoor (Represented by Legal Heirs) vs Mst. Mehraj1980 PLD Lahore 414 · Lahore High Court · 1979-12-22
  second appealejectmentex parte orderrevision petitionjurisdictionrent controllercivil courtvoid ab initio
  Summary & questions settled

  This regular second appeal arose from an ejectment proceeding under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. The tenant was initially proceeded against ex parte and ejected. Subsequently, the Rent Controller recalled the ex parte order. The landlord challenged this recall via a revision petition before the Additional District Judge, who accepted the revision and remanded the case. The Rent Controller then dismissed the tenant's application to set aside the ex parte order, which was affirmed on appeal. The tenant's legal heirs appealed to the High Court, arguing that the revision petition before the Additional District Judge was incompetent and a nullity. The High Court held that revisional powers must be expressly conferred by statute, and no such power exists under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. Furthermore, since a Rent Controller is not a civil court, Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is inapplicable. Consequently, the Additional District Judge's revisional order was void ab initio, rendering all subsequent proceedings unsustainable. The appeal was accepted, and the case remanded to the Rent Controller to proceed from the stage of the recalled ex parte order.

  Questions settled

  • Can a District Judge or Additional District Judge exercise revisional jurisdiction over an order of a Rent Controller under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Is a Rent Controller considered a civil court for the purposes of invoking revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • What is the legal effect of subsequent judicial proceedings that are based on an initial revisional order that was passed without jurisdiction and is a nullity?
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• Mirza Munawar Ahmad and Another vs Official Liquidator and 31980 PLD Lahore 86 · Lahore High Court · 1979-06-05
  pre-incorporation contractwinding upofficial liquidatorestoppel against statuteultra virespartnership dissolutionmortgage of assetscompany law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two intra-court appeals against an order of the Company Judge regarding the ownership of property claimed by both a partnership firm and a company under liquidation. The core legal question was whether the assets of a partnership firm had legally transferred to a company formed by the partners, given that the company was not in existence at the time of the purported transfer agreement, and whether the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan's security interest over the firm's assets remained valid. The Court held that a company cannot be a party to a contract made before its incorporation, nor can it ratify such a pre-incorporation contract. Consequently, the purported transfer of assets was void, and the property remained vested in the partnership firm. The Court further held that a statutory body like the Bank cannot be estopped from performing its statutory duties, and no estoppel arises against a company for ultra vires acts or pre-incorporation conduct. The appeals were accepted, the property was ordered to be released to the firm, and the Bank was permitted to exercise its rights under the credit agreement.

  Questions settled

  • Can a company be a party to or ratify a contract entered into on its behalf before its incorporation?
  • Does the doctrine of estoppel apply against a statutory body performing its statutory duties?
  • Is a pre-incorporation agreement binding on a company after it is formed?
  • Does the dissolution of a partnership require the realization of all assets before it is considered complete?
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• Mirza Muhammad Yusuf vs Mst. Razia Sultana1980 CLC 909 · Lahore High Court · 1973-11-15Read full judgment →
• Mirza Mohammad Anwar Baig vs Mst. Ismat Jehan1980 PLD Lahore 316 · Lahore High Court · 1980-02-02Read full judgment →
• Mir Sanam Khan and Others vs The State1980 P Cr. L J 92 · Lahore High Court · 1979-10-15Read full judgment →
• Mian Usman Saigal vs Thal Development Authority1980 CLC 1296 · Lahore High Court · 1980-03-10Read full judgment →
• Mian Saeed Hassan vs Sadiq Khan and Another1980 PLD Lahore 431 · Lahore High Court · 1980-02-12Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Nazeer and Another vs The Land Acquisition1980 CLC 687 · Lahore High Court · 1979-06-26Read full judgment →
• Messrs Zor Engineering Ltd. vs State Bank of Pakistan1980 PLD Lahore 534 · Lahore High Court · 1980-04-26
  rejection of plaintcause of actioncivil revisionbuilding contractOrder VII Rule 11 CPCscope of trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the concurrent orders of the lower courts rejecting the petitioner's plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in a suit seeking to declare a certificate of valuation issued by a referee under a building contract as illegal and mala fide. The core legal question is whether the courts below correctly applied Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to reject the plaint based on the pendency of a prior suit for damages and outside material supplied by the defendant. The Lahore High Court held that while considering the rejection of a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, courts must examine solely the statements made within the plaint itself and cannot rely on defences or material provided by the opposite party or a previously instituted suit at the pre-trial stage. The court laid down the principle that competency and a statutory bar under clause (d) are distinct, and a decision on the rejection of a plaint cannot be based on outside material or a premature assessment of the merits before written statements and issues are framed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court can look into material supplied by the opposite party or consult a previously instituted suit when considering the rejection of a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Are the competency of a suit and a legal bar under clause (d) of Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 distinct legal questions?
  • Does a plaint disclosing a basis for challenging a certificate issued under a contract disclose a cause of action at the pre-trial stage?
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• Messrs the Mont Blanc Industry (Regd.) vs Abdul Aziz1980 CLC 396 · Lahore High Court · 1979-05-26Read full judgment →
• Messrs Suleman & Co. vs Islamic Republic of Pakistan and 2 Others1980 CLC 2183 · Lahore High Court · 1979-09-22Read full judgment →
• Messrs Shah Noor Studios vs W. Z. Studios1980 CLC 433 · Lahore High Court · 1979-06-05
  rejection of plainttemporary injunctionspecific performancepersonal service contractprima facie caseprivity of contractrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition arose from a suit filed by the respondent-company seeking a permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from printing a film at another laboratory, and a direction to hand over the film to the respondent for printing pursuant to a contract. The trial court refused a temporary injunction and dismissed the suit as incompetent, holding that a contract involving personal service and technical processing could not be specifically enforced under Section 21(b) of the Specific Relief Act, thereby barring an injunction under Section 56(f). The Additional District Judge allowed the respondent's appeal on merits even though the film had already been handed over. The High Court set aside the lower appellate court's judgment, holding that a court must examine whether a suit is barred by law under Order VII Rule 11 CPC from the face of the plaint. Since the contract involved personal skill/service and third parties were not bound by it, specific performance was legally barred, making the suit incompetent. The trial court's order was restored with the modification that the plaint stood rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

  Questions settled

  • Can a contract involving personal service or technical skill be specifically enforced under the Specific Relief Act?
  • Whether an injunction can be granted to prevent the breach of a contract whose specific performance is barred by law?
  • Is it mandatory for a court to reject a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC at the initial stage if the suit is barred by law on the allegations in the plaint?
  • Can a person who is not a party to a contract be bound by its obligations or compelled to perform it?
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• Mst. Sughran Mai vs The State1980 PLD Lahore 386 · Lahore High Court · 1980-01-25
  quashment of proceedingshudood ordinancezinapuberty in muslim lawvalidity of marriagekafa'atguardian consentabuse of processinherent powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 sought the quashment of proceedings pending against the petitioner, Mst. Sughran Mai, under Sections 10 and 16 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979. The core legal questions involved the validity of a marriage contracted by a minor girl upon attaining puberty without the consent of her guardian, the doctrine of kafa'at (social equality) in Islamic law, and whether an irregular or valid marriage precludes a charge of zina under the Ordinance. The court held that an adult or pubescent Muslim girl may contract a valid marriage of her own free will, that lack of guardian consent or social inequality (ghair kafoo) does not render a marriage void so as to constitute zina, and that the continuation of proceedings where no evidence of the alleged offence exists is an abuse of the process of the court. The proceedings against the petitioner were accordingly quashed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Muslim female who has attained puberty contract a valid marriage of her own free will without the consent of her guardian?
  • Does a marriage contracted in ghair kafoo render the marriage void so as to constitute zina under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979?
  • Whether the High Court can exercise its inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash criminal proceedings when the evidence does not disclose any offence?
  • Does an irregular (fasid) marriage attract the penal consequences of hadd or tazir for sexual intercourse between the spouses?
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• Messrs M. Rafique & Co., Gujranwala vs Badaruddin1980 CLC 1300 · Lahore High Court · 1979-10-21Read full judgment →
• Messrs International Travel Services Ltd. vs Secretary, Tourism1980 CLC 2071 · Lahore High Court · 1980-03-25Read full judgment →
• Messrs Imran Agencies, Gujranwala vs The Federal Government of Pakistan and 2 Others1980 PLD Lahore 446 · Lahore High Court · 1979-11-27Read full judgment →
• Messrs Burmah Oil Mills Ltd., Karachi vs Messrs Colony Textile Mills1980 CLC 512 · Lahore High Court · 1979-07-10Read full judgment →
• Messrs Baig & Company vs Province of Punjab and 4 Others1980 PLD Lahore 511 · Lahore High Court · 1980-05-24Read full judgment →
• Messrs Alfozia Recruiting Agency vs Government of Pakistan1980 CLC 1511 · Lahore High Court · 1979-10-12Read full judgment →
• Messrs Albario Construction Corporation vs Assessing Authority, Excise and Taxation Department, Lahore and Another1980 CLC 414 · Lahore High Court · 1979-03-13Read full judgment →
• MEssits Link Engineering Company Ltd. vs Government of Pakistan1980 PLD Lahore 469 · Lahore High Court · 1979-10-06Read full judgment →
• Mehr Din vs Nazar Hussain and Another1980 P Cr. L J 1067 · Lahore High Court · 1978-03-31Read full judgment →
• Mehdi Khan vs Faqir Muhammad and 4 Others1980 PLD Lahore 110 · Lahore High Court · 1979-11-24
  pre-emption suitpower of attorneytermination of agencylimitation periodprocedural technicalitiessubstantial justiceoral saleZarpanjum
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a suit for possession by way of pre-emption regarding a land sale. The core legal question was whether the death of one of several principals terminates a power of attorney, thereby invalidating a subsequent sale deed, and whether a one-day delay in depositing Zarpanjum and court fees warrants dismissal of the suit. The court held that under Section 201 of the Contract Act, 1872, the death of one principal terminates the agency, rendering the registered sale deed ineffective. Consequently, the limitation period for the pre-emption suit commenced from the date of the subsequent oral sale, not the registered deed. Furthermore, the court ruled that procedural technicalities, such as a minor delay in depositing funds, should not be used to defeat substantive rights when the party acted in good faith. The court emphasized that courts should prioritize substantial justice over rigid procedural adherence. The judgment establishes that agency terminates upon the death of any principal and that trial courts possess the discretion to condone minor procedural delays to ensure the determination of cases on their merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the death of one of several principals terminate a power of attorney?
  • Does the limitation period for a pre-emption suit run from an invalid registered sale deed or a subsequent valid oral sale?
  • Can a court condone a one-day delay in the deposit of Zarpanjum and court fees in a pre-emption suit?
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• Megna Industries Ltd., Gujranwala vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Rawalpindi Zone, Rawalpindi41 TAX 148 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Meer Muhammad Sharif vs Mirza Muhammad Ashraf and 4 Others1980 CLC 1984 · Lahore High Court · 1980-02-29
  arbitrationrule of courtex partenotice of filingobjections to awardrevision petitionlimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition was filed against an order of the trial court making an arbitration award a rule of the court without providing the petitioner an opportunity to file objections. The respondent had applied to make the award a rule of the court, and the petitioner was proceeded against ex parte. After the arbitrator filed the award, the trial court immediately made it a rule of the court based on the statements of the arbitrator and the respondent. The Lahore High Court addressed whether the revision petition was maintainable and whether the trial court erred in failing to issue notice of the filing of the award. The Court held that because no notice of the filing of the award was given, the petitioner was deprived of the opportunity to object, meaning the order did not fall under the appealable category of refusing to set aside an award under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act 1940. Consequently, a revision petition was competent. The Court ruled that Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act 1940 mandatorily requires the court to give notice of the filing of the award to the parties to allow them to file objections within the 30-day limitation period under Article 158 of the Limitation Act 1908. The petition was accepted, and the case was remanded.

  Questions settled

  • Is a revision petition maintainable against an order making an award a rule of court where no notice of the filing of the award was ever issued to the affected party?
  • Is it mandatory for a court to issue notice to the parties under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act 1940 after an arbitration award is filed?
  • What is the limitation period for a party to file objections to an arbitration award after it is filed in court?
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• Mazhar Khan vs The State1980 P Cr. L J 1085 · Lahore High Court · 1979-12-09Read full judgment →
• Master Chiragh Din vs Mian Anwar Rashid1980 CLC 650 · Lahore High Court · 1979-04-06Read full judgment →
• Master Abdul Rashid vs Submartial Law Administrator, Sector 2, Rawalpindi and 3 Others1980 PLD Lahore 356 · Lahore High Court · 1980-03-12Read full judgment →
• Maqbool Ahmad Cheema vs Muhammad Ikram1980 CLC 361 · Lahore High Court · 1979-09-21Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain vs The State1980 PLD Lahore 438 · Lahore High Court · 1980-01-25Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad vs The State1980 P Cr. L J 624 · Lahore High Court · 1979-11-06Read full judgment →
• Mammora and 6 Others vs The State1980 P Cr. L J 463 · Lahore High Court · 1979-04-07Read full judgment →
• Malika Niaz Begum and Others vs Chairman, Federal Land Commission1980 CLC 2163 · Lahore High Court · 1979-06-05Read full judgment →
• Malik Shah Naw Az Khan vs Liaqat Sultan Khan Etc.1980 CLC 462 · Lahore High Court · 1979-10-13Read full judgment →
• Malik Najibullah Khan Etc. vs Malik Muhammad Bahadar Etc.1980 CLC 1216 · Lahore High Court · 1980-01-13
  giftmushaadelivery of possessionrevocation of giftconsent decreeres judicatasecond appealMuslim law
  Summary & questions settled

  This second appeal arose from a suit filed by the donor (plaintiff) seeking a declaration that a gift of land and residential houses made in favour of his brother (the original defendant) had been revoked. The trial and lower appellate courts concurrently decreed the suit on the ground that delivery of possession had not been proved, rendering the gift incomplete and revocable. Before the High Court, the appellants argued that because the gift concerned an undivided share in joint property (mushaa) made by one co-sharer to another, actual delivery of possession was unnecessary, and that a prior consent decree operated as res judicata. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under Muslim law, even a gift of an undivided share in property must be accompanied by delivery of possession in some form to be complete. The Court further held that a consent decree, being a convenient device to avoid stamp duty, does not bar an inquiry into the actual completion of the gift, and declined to disturb the concurrent findings of fact.

  Questions settled

  • Is delivery of possession necessary to complete and validate a gift of an undivided share in joint property (mushaa) under Muslim law?
  • Does a consent decree in a prior suit operate as res judicata to bar a subsequent inquiry into whether a gift was completed by delivery of possession?
  • Can a concurrent finding of fact regarding the non-delivery of possession of gifted property be disturbed in a second appeal?
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• Malik Najib Ullah Khan Etc. vs Saif Ullah Etc.1980 CLC 2155 · Lahore High Court · 1980-01-12
  giftdelivery of possessionrevocation of giftconcurrent findings of factsecond appealadmissionpardanashin lady
  Summary & questions settled

  This regular second appeal arises from concurrent judgments of the lower courts dismissing a civil suit filed by Mst. Fateh Bibi challenging a gift deed dated 5th February 1949 executed in favour of Malik Sultan Mahmood regarding a large agricultural estate, or alternatively seeking its revocation. The core legal questions involved the validity and completion of the gift through the delivery of possession, whether the lower appellate Court erred in failing to consider certain evidentiary documents, and whether admissions were properly utilized under the law. The Lahore High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that both lower courts had correctly found that the execution of the gift deed and the delivery of possession were duly proved by concurrent findings of fact based on sound oral and documentary evidence, and that no grounds were made out for second appellate interference. The key principles laid down include that a lower appellate court is not bound to explicitly reference every item of evidence provided there is substantial consideration of all relevant points, and that findings of fact based on concurrent evaluations will not be disturbed in second appeal without a demonstrable error of law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a lower appellate court is required to explicitly mention and discuss every single item of evidence or document considered by the trial court in its judgment?
  • Can the High Court in second appeal interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the execution and completion of a gift deed through delivery of possession?
  • Whether the failure to confront a witness with a prior statement under section 145 of the Evidence Act vitiates the proof of a document whose execution is entirely denied?
  • Is a suit for declaration and permanent injunction maintainable without a prayer for possession where the plaintiff is found not to be in possession at the time of instituting the suit?
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• Malik Muzaffar Khan vs Government of Punjab through Cheif1980 CLC 384 · Lahore High Court · 1979-09-04Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Sharif vs Rehmat Ali and Another1980 CLC 1163 · Lahore High Court · 1979-09-22Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Aslam vs Punjab Local Council Election Authority1980 CLC 2036 · Lahore High Court · 1980-03-05Read full judgment →
• Malik Jan Muhammad vs Shukaruddin and 6 Others1980 CLC 186 · Lahore High Court · 1979-10-16
  pre-emption suitcourt-fee deficiencyrejection of plaintnet profitslocal commissionerOrder VII Rule 11 CPCCourt Fees Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This Regular First Appeal challenges the trial court's order rejecting the appellant-plaintiff's plaint in a pre-emption suit under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 due to an alleged deficiency in court-fee resulting from incorrect harvest periods in the statement of net profits. The core legal question was whether the trial court was justified in summarily rejecting the plaint without invoking sections 9, 10, and 28 of the Court Fees Act 1870 when the revenue officials' statements of net profits were contradictory and unreliable. The Lahore High Court held that the trial court erred in resorting to summary rejection under Order VII, Rule 11 without first determining the correct court-fee through a local commission under section 9 of the Court Fees Act 1870, especially as the appellant had not acted contumaciously or with mala fides. The court laid down the principle that where statements of net profits prepared by revenue officials are contradictory and unreliable, the court must utilize statutory mechanisms under sections 9, 10, and 28 of the Court Fees Act 1870 to ascertain the correct court-fee rather than summarily penalize the litigant by rejecting the plaint.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaint be summarily rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for deficient court-fee when statements of net profits prepared by revenue officials are contradictory and unreliable?
  • Whether the trial court is required to issue a commission under section 9 of the Court Fees Act 1870 when annual net profits of pre-emption land have been wrongly estimated?
  • Does a pre-emptor's initial payment of tentative court-fee and subsequent compliance with court orders constitute contumacy or mala fides warranting the dismissal of the suit?
  • What is the proper procedure under the Court Fees Act 1870 when a document is found to be insufficiently stamped through mistake or inadvertence?
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• Malik Ghulam Abbas vs Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Khan and 2 Others1980 PLD Lahore 718 · Lahore High Court · 1980-05-27
  quo warrantolocal government electionsdisqualification of candidatesunregistered political partylegislative incorporation by referencecontinuing disqualification
  Summary & questions settled

  These writ petitions challenged the election of various members to local councils in Punjab. The core legal question was whether disqualifications for membership of Parliament or Provincial Assemblies, particularly concerning association with unregistered political parties, applied to local council elections under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, and whether such disqualifications applied if incurred after nomination but before the notification of election results. The Court held that Section 21(f) of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, incorporates by reference the disqualifications applicable to Parliament and Provincial Assemblies under the Houses of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Order, 1977. The Court ruled that these disqualifications are continuing in nature and apply to local council members. It further held that Section 29 of the Ordinance imposes a mandatory duty on the government to remove members who incur such disqualifications. Consequently, the Court declared the elections of the disqualified members void, affirming that writs of quo warranto are maintainable against them, as their continued holding of office is illegal.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 21(f) of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, incorporate by reference the disqualifications applicable to members of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies?
  • Are disqualifications for local council membership limited to the date of nomination, or are they continuing in nature?
  • Is the government duty-bound under Section 29 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, to remove a member who incurs a disqualification after their election?
  • Can a writ of quo warranto be issued against a local council member whose disqualification was discovered after the election results were notified?
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• Major (Rm.) Fazal Muhammad Khan vs Sardar Khan and 3 Others1980 PLD Lahore 33 · Lahore High Court · 1979-02-12Read full judgment →
• Majid Hussain and 5 Others vs Muhammad Rafique and Another1980 CLC 154 · Lahore High Court · 1979-05-21Read full judgment →
• Mahmoodulhassan vs Muhammad Jameel1980 CLC 829 · Lahore High Court · 1979-10-14Read full judgment →
• Mahmood Convict vs The State1980 P Cr. L J 68 · Lahore High Court · 1979-05-26Read full judgment →
• M. Suleman vs S. Zahid Hussain Qadri Etc.1980 CLC 783 · Lahore High Court · 1980-01-06Read full judgment →
• M. Hameed Malik vs M. Bashir Sheikh1980 CLC 281 · Lahore High Court · 1979-09-28Read full judgment →
• Lal Din vs Choohar1980 CLC 309 · Lahore High Court · 1979-05-05Read full judgment →
• Khushi Muhammad Etc. vs Boota Etc.1980 CLC 1201 · Lahore High Court · 1978-05-23Read full judgment →
• Khushhal Khan Kiani vs Commandant & Magistrate, Chenab Rangers1980 CLC 368 · Lahore High Court · 1979-09-19Read full judgment →
• Khurshid Ali vs Mst. Mumtaz Begum1980 CLC 1212 · Lahore High Court · 1979-12-03
  dissolution of marriagekhularestitution of conjugal rightsfixed aversionlimits of Godfamily law
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by the husband challenging the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, which reversed the trial court's decision and dissolved the marriage on the principle of khula. The petitioner contended that the wife had not specifically prayed for khula in her plaint and that since she failed to prove her allegations of cruelty, bad character, and misappropriation, she was not entitled to a dissolution. The High Court examined whether a court can grant a dissolution of marriage on the ground of khula even if it is not specifically pleaded and the other allegations remain unproven. Relying on established precedents, the Court held that a wife is entitled to khula as of right if she satisfies the court of her fixed aversion and that forcing her to remain in the marriage would mean forcing her into a hateful union where the limits of God cannot be observed. Finding that the serious rift, including the husband lodging a theft case against his wife, demonstrated strong hatred, the Court dismissed the petition and upheld the dissolution.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court dissolve a marriage on the ground of khula even if the wife has not specifically prayed for it in her plaint?
  • Is a wife entitled to the dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula if she fails to prove other allegations of cruelty and maltreatment?
  • What is the essential limitation on a wife's right to obtain a dissolution of marriage through khula?
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• Khuda Dad Khan vs Muhammad Abdul Hanan and 6 Others1980 CLC 500 · Lahore High Court · 1979-07-03Read full judgment →
• Khuda Bux vs Muhammad Yusuf1980 CLC 1907 · Lahore High Court · 1980-02-16Read full judgment →
• Khuda Bakhsh vs Nasiruddin and 4 Others1980 CLC 1702 · Lahore High Court · 1980-02-03Read full judgment →
• Khuda Bakhsh vs Additional Commissioner, Sargodha and 2 Others1980 PLD Lahore 353 · Lahore High Court · 1980-01-28
  ejectment of tenantrecovery of rentland reformsrevenue courttenancy lawsexecution of decree
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a landowner, filed two separate suits against his tenant (respondent No. 3) for recovery of a share of the produce and for ejectment before the Assistant Collector, both of which were decreed. On appeal, the Collector maintained the decree for recovery of produce but set aside the ejectment decree, relying on a precedent of the Board of Revenue. The petitioner challenged this through a writ petition before the Lahore High Court. The core legal question was whether a landlord who holds both a decree for arrears of rent and a decree for ejectment can pursue independent remedies or execute them separately under the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 and the Land Reforms Ordinance, 1972. The Lahore High Court held that the right of a person holding a decree for ejectment is independent of the right under a decree for arrears of rent, and both remedies can operate separately. The impugned order of the Collector was declared without lawful authority, establishing the principle that a landlord may pursue ejectment and rent recovery remedies independently under the applicable revenue laws.

  Questions settled

  • Can a landlord independently execute a decree for ejectment alongside a decree for arrears of rent under the Punjab Tenancy Act 1887?
  • What are the statutory requirements for the ejectment of a tenant under paragraph 25-A of the Land Reforms Ordinance 1972?
  • Do the provisions of the Land Reforms Regulation 1972 override contrary provisions in other laws and court decrees?
  • What procedure must a Revenue Officer follow upon receiving an application for ejectment due to an unsatisfied decree for arrears of rent?
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• Khawaj Din vs Rationing Controller Food, Faisalabad and 2 Others1980 PLD Lahore 15 · Lahore High Court · 1979-04-06
  delegation of powersjudicial functionadministrative lawwrit jurisdictionrevision petitionWest Pakistan Foodstuffs Distribution Order 1967Rules of Business 1974
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged an order passed by a Deputy Secretary (General) in a revision petition filed under the West Pakistan Foodstuffs Distribution Order, 1967. The core legal question was whether the Secretary of the Food Department could delegate the statutory power of hearing revision petitions to a subordinate officer through a 'Standing Order' issued under the Rules of Business. The Court held that the power of revision under Section 6(3) of the Order constitutes a judicial function, as it requires the adjudication of rights, the weighing of evidence, and the provision of an opportunity for a hearing. Consequently, such powers cannot be delegated under the Rules of Business, which are designed for administrative and ministerial functions. Furthermore, the Court noted that delegating revisionary authority to an officer of lower rank than the original appellate authority would violate the hierarchy of the administrative scheme. The delegation was declared without lawful authority, and the revision petition was remanded to the Secretary for disposal in accordance with law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a statutory power of revision that requires a judicial hearing be delegated to a subordinate officer under the Rules of Business?
  • Does the definition of 'case' in the Rules of Business encompass judicial or quasi-judicial functions?
  • Is the exercise of revisionary power under the West Pakistan Foodstuffs Distribution Order, 1967, an administrative or a judicial act?
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• Khanu Etc. vs The State1980 P Cr. L J 316 · Lahore High Court · 1978-05-30Read full judgment →
• Khalifa Hussain Ahmad vs Mst.Sat Bharai1980 CLC 648 · Lahore High Court · 1979-06-23Read full judgment →
• Khalida Bahadur and Another vs Malik Muhammad Ijaz Hussain1980 CLC 1404 · Lahore High Court · 1980-02-02Read full judgment →
• Khalid Saeed vs Allauddin Pehlwan and 3 Others1980 CLC 133 · Lahore High Court · 1979-07-10Read full judgment →
• Khalid Rashid and Another vs Messrs Ameen Corporation and 21980 CLC 1071 · Lahore High Court · 1979-11-12Read full judgment →
• Khadim Hussain and Anothers vs The State1980 P Cr. L J 654 · Lahore High Court · 1979-10-15Read full judgment →
• Khadim Hussain Agha vs Muhammad Ashraf1980 CLC 621 · Lahore High Court · 1979-06-23Read full judgment →
• Kh. Saud Ahmad vs Sh. Abdur Rashid1980 PLD Lahore 557 · Lahore High Court · 1980-04-11Read full judgment →