Pakistan Case LawLatest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 14,893 judgments in total from the Peshawar High Court.
- Shahzad Gul vs The State1973 PLD Peshawar 8 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-10-16Read full judgment →
- Salahuddin Khan and 3 Other vs Sultan E Romf, and 10 Other1973 PLD Peshawar 95 · Peshawar High Court · 1973-03-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenges an order of the Additional District Judge, Peshawar, which rejected the appellants' application for a temporary injunction in a suit regarding the management of a public limited company. The core legal question was whether the appellants, claiming to be the rightful Chief Executive and Directors, were entitled to injunctive relief against the respondents. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants failed to establish a prima facie case. The court found that the election of the appellants as directors violated the mandatory cumulative voting requirements of the Companies (Managing Agency and Election of Directors) Order, 1972, and their subsequent appointment as Chief Executive lacked the requisite approval from the Controller of Capital Issues. Consequently, the appointment was a nullity. The court affirmed that discretionary injunctive relief requires a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and potential irreparable loss, none of which were satisfied. Furthermore, the court emphasized the statutory bar on jurisdiction under Article 16(2) of the Presidential Order, which precludes courts from granting injunctions against actions taken thereunder.
Questions settled- Does an election of company directors that violates mandatory cumulative voting requirements render the election a nullity?
- Can a court grant a temporary injunction where the applicant's underlying appointment lacks the required statutory approval from the Controller of Capital Issues?
- Does Article 16(2) of the Companies (Managing Agency and Election of Directors) Order, 1972, bar courts from granting injunctions regarding actions taken under the Order?
- Is a party who fails to join necessary parties to an appeal entitled to relief?
- Mumtaz Begum vs Abdul Qayum and Another1973 PLD Peshawar 173 · Peshawar High Court · 1973-06-25Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Saerd vs Syed Munawar Shah and 5 Other S1973 PLD Peshawar 80 · Peshawar High Court · 1973-03-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision petition arises from a suit for declaration filed by the petitioner claiming that the suit property was part of a Waqf-ul-aulad created by his late father, and that a subsequent sale deed executed by certain respondents was void. The lower courts dismissed the suit, holding it incompetent under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 as the plaintiff was out of possession and failed to seek consequential relief, and further finding that the Waqf deed was executed merely as a shield to defraud creditors and never acted upon. The Peshawar High Court upheld the dismissal, affirming that a suit for a mere declaration without seeking possession is barred where the plaintiff is out of possession. The Court further analyzed the legal principles governing the validity of Waqf deeds, subsequent conduct of the dedicator, and the requirement of a genuine intention to dedicate property, ultimately concluding that the purported Waqf was invalid and never meant to be acted upon.
Questions settled- Is a suit for a mere declaration maintainable under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 when the plaintiff is out of possession and fails to seek consequential relief by way of possession?
- To what extent can the subsequent conduct of a dedicator be taken into consideration to determine the validity and real intention behind the creation of a Waqf?
- Does a Waqf deed fail when the ultimate destination of the property includes persons who are not descendants or family members of the waqif?
- What is the legal effect of executing a Waqf deed without any intention to divest ownership, but merely to utilize it as a shield against potential claims by creditors?
- Muhammad Humayun Khan vs The Chief Secretary, Government of West Pakistan, Lahore and 4 Other1973 PLD Peshawar 85 · Peshawar High Court · 1973-02-28Read full judgment →
- Mst. Qamar Sultana vs Mian Qhulam Yaqoob Bandai and Another1973 PLD Peshawar 116 · Peshawar High Court · 1973-04-08Read full judgment →
- Mst. Eidun Nisa Begum vs Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, West1973 PLD Peshawar 1 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-07-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This writ petition challenged an order by the Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, which cancelled several gift mutations of land in favor of the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the administrative permission granted by the Deputy Land Commissioner to gift land under the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation, 1959, constituted a completed gift, and whether mutations attested after the donor's death were valid. The Court held that the petition was meritless. It ruled that administrative permission to gift land under the Regulation does not equate to a completed gift. Under Mahomedan Law, a valid gift requires three essentials: an unequivocal declaration by the donor, acceptance by the donee, and the delivery of possession, all of which must occur during the donor's lifetime. The Court emphasized that the donor's conduct, including previous refusals to gift, indicated no intention to complete the gift. Consequently, mutations attested after the donor's death could not validate an incomplete gift. The Court affirmed that delivery of possession remains a necessary condition for a valid gift, even between spouses.
Questions settled- Does administrative permission to gift land under the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation constitute a completed gift?
- Are the three essentials of a gift under Mahomedan Law—declaration, acceptance, and delivery of possession—required even when the donor and donee are husband and wife?
- Can a gift mutation be validly attested after the death of the donor if the gift was not completed during the donor's lifetime?
- Does a mere proposal to gift land in a declaration form under the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation amount to an unequivocal declaration of gift?
- Khaista Gul vs Mian Gul1973 PLD Peshawar 89 · Peshawar High Court · 1969-06-12Read full judgment →
- Islamic Republic of Pakistan through the Secretary, Communication, Islamabad vs The Settlement Commissioner, Peshawar Division, Pesahwar and 2 Other1973 PLD Peshawar 143 · Peshawar High Court · 1973-05-07Read full judgment →
- Hazrat Said vs Jaffar and Another1973 PLD Peshawar 115 · Peshawar High Court · 1973-05-10Read full judgment →
- H. Niamatullah Khan vs Mst. Shabnama and 5 Other1973 PLD Peshawar 177 · Peshawar High Court · 1973-05-10Read full judgment →
- Gul Naushad vs The State1973 PLD Peshawar 150 · Peshawar High Court · 1973-04-04Read full judgment →
- Fida Muiiammad vs Province of N. W. F. P. through Its Home Secretary, Peshawar and Another1973 PLD Peshawar 156 · Peshawar High Court · 1973-06-20Read full judgment →
- Fazal Gul vs Mst. Farosha and 35 Other1973 PLD Peshawar 182 · Peshawar High Court · 1973-05-23Read full judgment →
- Colony Sarhad Textile Mills Ltd. vs Superintendent, Central Excise and Land Customs, Nowshera1973 PLD Peshawar 68 · Peshawar High Court · 1973-02-23Read full judgment →
- Abdul Hanan vs The State1973 PLD Peshawar 175 · Peshawar High Court · 1973-07-30Read full judgment →
- The State vs Gul Badshah1972 PLD Peshawar 105 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-01-25Read full judgment →
- The State vs Aminullah and Another1972 PLD Peshawar 92 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-12-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is an appeal filed by the State against the acquittal of two accused, Aminullah and Hidayatullah, by the Sessions Judge, Peshawar, for an offence under Section 302/34, P.P.C., concerning the murder of Atta Muhammad. The Sessions Judge had disbelieved the three eye-witnesses, who were close relatives of the deceased, primarily on the grounds that their evidence required independent corroboration due to their relationship and certain discrepancies. The High Court found the trial judge's approach palpably erroneous, holding that relationship alone does not render witnesses 'interested' without a motive for false implication, and that the doctrine of 'falsus in uno falsus in omnibus' is not applicable in Pakistan. The Court also clarified that an appellate court can interfere with an acquittal if the appreciation of evidence is perverse or foolish, leading to a miscarriage of justice. The High Court re-evaluated the evidence, preferring the convincing eye-witness account over perfunctory medical evidence, and found the accused guilty. The Court further addressed the 'expectation of life' doctrine, ruling that inordinate delay in an acquittal appeal does not universally preclude the death penalty, especially for gruesome or callous murders. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and both accused were convicted under Section 302/34, P.P.C., and sentenced to death.
Questions settled- Does relationship alone make a witness 'interested' requiring independent corroboration?
- Is the doctrine of 'falsus in uno falsus in omnibus' applicable in Pakistan?
- Under what circumstances can an appellate court interfere with an order of acquittal?
- Can direct eye-witness testimony be preferred over conflicting medical evidence?
- Does inordinate delay in the disposal of an appeal against acquittal preclude the imposition of the death sentence?
- The Collector, Mardan And 2 Other vs Mst. Taj Bibi And 14 Other1972 PLD Peshawar 197 · Peshawar High Court · -Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the scope of the District Court's jurisdiction in land acquisition references, specifically regarding the limitation period for filing objections. The core legal questions were whether a Court, upon receiving a reference from a Collector under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, has the jurisdiction to examine whether the initial objection application was filed within the statutory limitation period, and what constitutes the commencement date for the six-month limitation period under Section 18(2)(b). The Court held that once a Collector makes a reference, the Court lacks jurisdiction to go behind that reference to determine if the objection application was time-barred, as the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to the specific matters referred under Section 19. Furthermore, the six-month limitation period commences from the date the Collector signs the award containing all required declarations under Section 11, and this period is not extendable. The Court established that the Land Acquisition Act is a special statute creating a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, and the Court cannot review the Collector's administrative decision on limitation once a reference is formally made.
Questions settled- Can a Court go behind a Collector's reference to determine if the objection application was filed within the statutory limitation period?
- From what date does the six-month limitation period for challenging a land acquisition award under Section 18(2)(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 commence?
- Is the six-month limitation period for filing an objection application under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 extendable?
- Sher Zaman vs The State1972 P Cr. L J 617 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-01-13Read full judgment →
- Sattar Khan and 3 Other vs Mst. Zamu Jan1972 PLD Peshawar 78 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-01-12Read full judgment →
- Sar Anjam Khan vs Mir Afzal Khan and 14 Other1972 PLD Peshawar 37 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-09-30Read full judgment →
- Samar Qand and Another vs Muhammad Younas1972 PLD Peshawar 115 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-03-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This second appeal arises from a suit for possession by pre-emption regarding agricultural land. The core legal questions concerned whether the suit was barred by limitation, given prior unregistered sale deeds from 1944, and whether the plaintiff’s failure to include the shamilat (common land) share in the suit constituted fatal partial pre-emption. The High Court affirmed the lower courts' finding on limitation, concluding that the 1966 mutation represented a distinct transaction from the 1944 deeds, thus bringing the suit within the statutory period. However, the Court held that the doctrine of partial pre-emption is strictly applicable in pre-emption suits. By excluding the shamilat share from the claim, the plaintiff attempted to split the bargain, which is impermissible. The Court laid down the principle that a pre-emptor must substitute themselves for the vendee in the entire contract; they cannot pick and choose parts of the sale. Consequently, the failure to sue for the entire subject matter of the sale renders the suit incompetent, leading to the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim.
Questions settled- Can a pre-emptor sue for only a portion of the land sold in a single transaction?
- Does the exclusion of shamilat land in a pre-emption suit constitute fatal partial pre-emption?
- Is a court required to apply the law of partial pre-emption even if the issue was not raised in the written statement?
- Does a subsequent mutation constitute a separate transaction from prior unregistered sale deeds for the purpose of limitation?
- Sajid Hussain vs Mst. Shah Sultan1972 PLD Peshawar 136 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-04-10Read full judgment →
- Said Faqir and 7 Other vs N. W. F. P. Government through Home1972 PLD Peshawar 156 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-06-14Read full judgment →
- Qutab Khan vs Sain Sultan and 3 Other1972 PLD Peshawar 142 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-06-02Read full judgment →
- Nur Ahmad vs Muhammad Jan Khan and 3 Other1972 PLD Peshawar 164 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-07-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This Letters Patent Appeal arose from a judgment of a learned Single Judge in a first appeal under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, concerning the apportionment of compensation for acquired land. The appellant claimed a share of the compensation on the basis of a sale deed executed by a co-sharer, Mst. Sadri. The reference court and the Single Judge dismissed the claim, holding that the vendor had already alienated more than her share of the joint property and thus lacked saleable title in the disputed land at the time of the sale, and that the appellant had notice of this. The Peshawar High Court held that a Letters Patent Appeal from the judgment of a Single Judge in a first appeal under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act is competent without a fitness certificate, and that the special law of the Letters Patent overrides general appellate provisions. On merits, the Court held that a transferee claiming protection under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act must act in good faith and take reasonable care, and that exclusive possession by other co-sharers serves as notice. Furthermore, a claimant in land acquisition proceedings must affirmatively establish title or possession to receive compensation.
Questions settled- Whether a Letters Patent Appeal is competent against the judgment of a Single Judge in a first appeal under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act without obtaining a certificate of fitness?
- Does a co-sharer who has already alienated more than her total share in joint property retain any saleable interest to convey to a subsequent transferee?
- Whether exclusive possession of a disputed property by other co-sharers constitutes sufficient notice to put a subsequent transferee on inquiry regarding title under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act?
- Does a reference court under the Land Acquisition Act have the jurisdiction to inquire into the title of an objector claiming apportionment of compensation?
- Muhammad Yousaf Khan Khattak vs S. M. Ayub and 2 Other1972 PLD Peshawar 151 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-06-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from an application by Muhammad Yousaf Khan Khattak praying to stay the implementation of an Election Tribunal order declaring his election to N.W. 1 (Peshawar-1) void, and to direct the Election Commission to suspend the bye-election process pending final disposal of his appeal before the High Court. The applicant argued that stay powers are inherent in appellate jurisdiction or exercisable under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The High Court rejected the application, holding that its appellate jurisdiction under Section 64(3) of the National and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Ordinance 1970 is special and strictly limited to the statutory provisions, which do not confer stay powers or extend the general appellate powers of Section 151 CPC. Furthermore, Article 248(3) of the Interim Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1972 creates a mandatory constitutional obligation on the Election Commission to fill casual vacancies within sixty days, superseding any contrary statutory provisions and prohibiting stay orders that would dislocate the constitutional election timetable.
Questions settled- Does the High Court possess inherent or statutory power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to stay the implementation of an Election Tribunal order while exercising special appellate jurisdiction under the National and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Ordinance 1970?
- Can the High Court issue a stay order postponing a bye-election where the Constitution mandates that a casual vacancy in an Assembly must be filled within sixty days?
- Does an appeal under Section 64(3) of the National and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Ordinance 1970 automatically operate as a stay of the Election Tribunal's order?
- Muhammad vs Raz Gul1972 PLD Peshawar 146 · Peshawar High Court · -Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Sarfaraz Khan and Another vs Farid Khan and 22 Other1972 PLD Peshawar 109 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-03-30Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Samin Jan vs Messrs Ferozsons Laboratories Ltd., Nowshera and 2 Other1972 PLD Peshawar 133 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
- Muhammad Abbas vs Sultan Khan and 2 Other1972 PLD Peshawar 122 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-03-08Read full judgment →
- Mir Ahmad and Other vs Niaz Muhammad (Deceased) and 2 Other1972 PLD Peshawar 128 · Peshawar High Court · 1972-03-21Read full judgment →
- Mian Muhammad and Another vs Mst. Allah Rakhi and 7 Another1972 PLD Peshawar 84 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-12-06Read full judgment →
- Juma Khan vs Mst. Gul Ferosha1972 PLD Peshawar 1 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-07-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from an order of the Senior Civil Judge, Kohat, refusing to grant custody of two minor sons to their father, Juma Khan, under Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. The core legal questions concerned the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court over orders passed by a Family Court in guardianship matters and the entitlement of a Muslim father to the custody of sons over seven years of age. The Court held that while the Senior Civil Judge acted as a Family Court, the appeal was correctly filed in the High Court under Section 47 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. On merits, the Court ruled that under Muslim Law, the father is the natural guardian of sons over seven years, and the mother's continued custody becomes unauthorized. The key principle laid down is that the welfare of the minor is the paramount consideration, but there is a legal presumption that the minor's welfare lies in being in the custody of the natural guardian under personal law, which must be rebutted by affirmative evidence to the contrary.
Questions settled- Does an appeal against an order passed by a Family Court under the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 lie to the High Court under Section 47 of that Act?
- Is a Muslim father entitled to the custody of his minor sons once they have attained the age of seven years?
- Does the appointment of a Family Court under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964 exclude the application of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 regarding procedure and appeals?
- Can a father be denied custody of his minor children solely on the ground that he has remarried?
- Inspector-General of Police, West Pakistan and Another vs Abdur1972 PLD Peshawar 13 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
- Iftikhar vs The State1972 PLD Peshawar 27 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-11-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal and murder reference arose from the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the patricide of his father, for which he was sentenced to death by the trial court. The core legal questions involved the reliability and sufficiency of an uncorroborated dying declaration as the sole basis for a capital conviction, the effect of hostile eye-witnesses, and whether youth constitutes an extenuating circumstance warranting a lesser penalty. The Peshawar High Court held that the dying declaration was genuine, made while the deceased was in a fit mental state, and was sufficiently corroborated by medical evidence and ballistic reports matching the crime weapon recovered from the appellant. The court affirmed the conviction, ruling that a reliable dying declaration alone can sustain a murder conviction and that youth by itself is no ground to mitigate the normal death penalty for a calculated murder.
Questions settled- Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on the basis of a dying declaration?
- Whether the non-production of eye-witnesses by the prosecution who have turned hostile draws an adverse inference against the prosecution case?
- Does youth by itself afford a sufficient reason for awarding a lesser penalty than death in a calculated murder case?
- What is the evidentiary preference between a school certificate and an X-ray radiologist report for determining the age of an accused?
- Haji Muhammad Ali Khan and 4 Other vs Nur Muhammad Khan and 151972 PLD Peshawar 66 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-10-08Read full judgment →
- Farhatullah Khan vs The State1972 PLD Peshawar 22 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-11-02Read full judgment →
- West Pakistan through Secretary, Food Department, Lahore vs Haji1971 PLD Peshawar 20 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-11-13Read full judgment →
- Wahab Sadin and 4 Others vs The State1971 PLD Peshawar 135 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-04-28Read full judgment →
- Umar Gul and Another vs The State1971 PLD Peshawar 123 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-03-10Read full judgment →
- The State vs Qalandar Khan1971 PLD Peshawar 119 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-03-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal was brought by the State under section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 against the acquittal of the respondent, who was accused of falsification of accounts and fraud while serving as a ledger clerk in a cooperative bank. The core legal question before the High Court was whether a criminal trial is vitiated when a trial magistrate relies upon carbon copies of witness testimonies recorded in separate, distinct cases instead of examining witnesses independently on the record of the case at hand. The Peshawar High Court held that utilizing carbon copies of witness depositions from other proceedings constitutes an illegal procedure that vitiates the trial, as every criminal proceeding must be decided exclusively upon evidence properly recorded within that specific case. Consequently, the court accepted the appeal, set aside the acquittal, and remanded the matter for a fresh trial before a competent magistrate with directions to properly examine the witnesses and render an independent judgment.
Questions settled- Does the use of carbon copies of witness depositions from another case vitiate a criminal trial?
- Can a criminal court base its decision on evidence or findings recorded in a separate judicial proceeding?
- What is the legal consequence when a trial magistrate adopts irregular procedures regarding the examination of recalled witnesses?
- Whether an appellate court can set aside an acquittal and remand the case for a fresh trial upon finding a fundamental illegality in the trial procedure?
- The State vs Hasham Khan Etc.1971 PLD Peshawar 164 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-01-11Read full judgment →
- The State vs Ghulam Ahmad1971 PLD Peshawar 198 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-04-01Read full judgment →
- The State vs Chiragh Shah and 4 Others1971 PLD Peshawar 233 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-07-12Read full judgment →
- The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Rawalpindi Zone, Rawalpinm vs Haji1971 PTD 260 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-01-28Read full judgment →
- The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Rawalpindi Zone, Rawalpindi vs Haji1971 PLD Peshawar 111 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
- Taj Muhammad and Others vs The State1971 PLD Peshawar 162 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-06-14Read full judgment →
- Sardar Ghulam Sarwar Khan and 2 Others vs Sardar Muhammad1971 PLD Peshawar 170 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-02-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a suit for pre-emption where the trial court initially granted a decree for possession after extending the time for the deposit of pre-emption money. The core legal question is whether the trial court acted within its jurisdiction in granting an extension of time for the deposit of pre-emption money under the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act, 1950, without sufficient cause, and whether such failure to deposit within the original time mandated the rejection of the plaint. The Court held that while a court has discretion to extend time for deposit, such discretion must be exercised judicially for good and sufficient reasons, ensuring the applicant's conduct is bona fide. The Court found that the trial court granted the extension on a vague, unsubstantiated excuse without applying its mind, rendering the order illegal and without jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court held that the mandatory requirement of the statute was violated, the extension was void, and the plaint must be rejected. The principle laid down is that the right of pre-emption is a predatory, artificial right, and statutory provisions governing it must be strictly construed against pre-emptors.
Questions settled- Does a court have the jurisdiction to extend the time for the deposit of pre-emption money under the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act 1950?
- Must the discretion to extend time for the deposit of pre-emption money be exercised for good and sufficient reasons?
- Does the failure to deposit pre-emption money within the time fixed by the court mandate the rejection of the plaint?
- Can an order passed in excess of the court's jurisdiction be treated as final or binding?
- Rehman Gul vs The State1971 PLD Peshawar 1 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-07-23Read full judgment →
- Rahmat Shah and 2 Others vs Sarwar and Another1971 PLD Peshawar 205 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-06-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment disposes of two second appeals arising from pre-emption suits. The core legal question was whether the plaintiff-pre-emptors had acquired a superior right of pre-emption when their own acquisition of land and the impugned sales were recorded in mutations attested on the same date, or where the pre-emptors' mutation was attested earlier but the sale was completed earlier. The lower courts had held that the plaintiffs had a superior right based on the serial number of the mutations. The High Court held that a sale of land is deemed completed on the day it is effected and admitted by the vendor, not on the date the mutation in the revenue records is formally sanctioned. Title passes when the transaction of sale is completed, and is not postponed until the attestation of the mutation. Therefore, the plaintiffs, having completed their purchase earlier through an oral sale admitted by the vendor, had become co-sharers before the impugned sales were completed, thus possessing a superior right of pre-emption. Both appeals were dismissed.
Questions settled- When is an oral sale of land considered complete for the purpose of establishing a superior right of pre-emption?
- Does the attestation date of a mutation in revenue records determine the completion date of a sale for pre-emption purposes?
- Do entries in mutation proceedings constitute conclusive evidence of facts recorded?
- When does title in property pass in an oral sale recorded through mutation?
- Nekam Gul and 2 Others vs The State1971 PLD Peshawar 32 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-12-09Read full judgment →
- Mureed Khan vs Mohammad Khan and 2 Others1971 PLD Peshawar 28 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-11-10Read full judgment →
- Muhib Gul vs The State1971 PLD Peshawar 50 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-11-18Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Humayun vs The State1971 PLD Peshawar 182 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-06-30Read full judgment →
- Mst. Bibi Rahmania and 14 Others vs Government through Director, North Regional Research Laboratories and Collector, Peshawar and 13 Others1971 PLD Peshawar 191 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This first appeal arises from a judgment of the Additional District Judge, Peshawar, dismissing a reference application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 as time-barred. The appellants contended that the District Judge lacked jurisdiction to examine the question of limitation once the Collector had made a reference, and that limitation issues could only be decided by the Collector. The core legal question is whether a reference court (District Judge or Additional District Judge) is competent to examine and determine whether a reference application made under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 is barred by time. The Peshawar High Court held that the reference court has the inherent power and duty to satisfy itself that all statutory conditions, including the requirement of limitation prescribed under section 18(2), have been strictly complied with, and that a reference made upon a time-barred application is invalid. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that the reference court is fully competent to go into the question of limitation.
Questions settled- Whether the reference court has jurisdiction to determine if an application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 is barred by time?
- Can a reference court entertain a reference made by the Collector based on a time-barred application?
- Is the question of limitation under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 exclusively within the domain of the Collector, or can it be examined by the District Judge?
- Messrs M. Wahab-Ud-Din & Sons vs The Controller of Rents and 111971 PLD Peshawar 236 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-05-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This writ petition challenges the appellate judgment of the District Judge, Peshawar, directing the petitioner to vacate a disputed shop premises and hand it over to respondent No. 3. The petitioner, an allottee of evacuee property subsequently purchased by the respondents' predecessor-in-interest, resisted eviction. The core legal questions involved whether a co-owner could independently maintain an eviction application, the retroactivity of statutory protections under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and the loss of statutory tenant protection due to ownership of another shop within the urban/cantonment area. The Peshawar High Court held that a co-owner can maintain the application if other co-owners are impleaded without objection, and that a tenant who owns another shop in the urban or cantonment area loses protection against eviction under the amended statutory provisions. The court laid down the principle that statutory tenancy protections under evacuee legislation are subject to disqualifications such as ownership of alternative property in the same urban area, and that premature suits or applications can be maintained if the cause of action ripens during the pendency of proceedings.
Questions settled- Whether a single co-owner has the locus standi to file an eviction application against a tenant when other co-owners are impleaded as defendants?
- Does a tenant who owns another shop within the same urban or cantonment area forfeit the statutory protection against eviction under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
- Can an eviction application that was premature at the time of its filing be decreed if the cause of action matures during the pendency of the proceedings?
- Does the definition of 'urban area' under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 include a Cantonment?
- Lal Muhammad vs Mst. Niaz Parwara1971 PLD Peshawar 157 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-05-05Read full judgment →
- Khanwada vs The State1971 PLD Peshawar 13 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-12-04Read full judgment →
- Khani Sher vs Secretary Post War Service Reconstruction Fund1971 PLD Peshawar 82 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-05-20Read full judgment →
- Inayatullah vs The State1971 PLD Peshawar 175 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-08-13Read full judgment →
- Haji Niaz Muhammad vs Municipal Committee, Peshawar1971 PLD Peshawar 116 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-05-05Read full judgment →
- Gulabat Khan vs The State1971 PLD Peshawar 7 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-08-10Read full judgment →
- Gul Rasul vs Taza Gul1971 PLD Peshawar 75 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-02-11Read full judgment →
- Federation of Pakistan, Karachi vs Messrs Muhammad Shafi & Sons, Peshawar Cantt1971 PLD Peshawar 93 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
- Falak Sher vs The State1971 PLD Peshawar 108 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-02-15Read full judgment →
- Dost Muhammad Khan vs Imam Bakhsh1971 PLD Peshawar 150 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-06-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This second appeal arose from a pre-emption suit filed by Dost Muhammad against a sale of a house in favor of Imam Bakhsh. The trial court and the first appellate court both dismissed the plaintiff's suit, holding that the vendee had successfully improved his status and equaled his pre-emptive right by obtaining a gift of a contiguous portion of a house. The core legal questions involved whether a gift of an undivided share (mushaa) under Muslim Law is void without delivery of possession, whether a third party stranger to the gift can challenge it on the ground of non-delivery of possession, and from what date a registered gift deed operates under Section 47 of the Registration Act. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the appeal in limine, holding that an irregular gift is not void and can be validated by subsequent delivery of possession, that the issue of delivery of possession can only be raised between the donor and donee or those claiming under them and not by a stranger, and that under Section 47 of the Registration Act, a registered document operates from the time it would have commenced to operate if registration were not required. The key principle laid down is that a third party pre-emptor cannot challenge the validity of a Muslim gift on the ground of non-delivery of possession when the donor supports the gift.
Questions settled- Whether a gift of an undivided share in property is void or merely irregular under Muslim Law?
- Can a third-party stranger to a gift challenge its validity on the ground of non-delivery of possession?
- From what point in time does a registered document operate under Section 47 of the Registration Act?
- Does a vendee defeat a pre-emptor's superior right by acquiring a contiguous property through a gift executed before the institution of the pre-emption suit?
- Dost Mohammad and Another vs The State1971 PLD Peshawar 41 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-09-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal and murder reference arise from the conviction and death sentences of two appellants, Dost Mohammad and Shamshad, handed down by the Additional Sessions Judge, Mardan, under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Amanullah. The core legal questions involved the definition and admissibility of an exculpatory statement as a confession, the evidentiary value of a retracted confession against a co-accused, and the necessity of independent corroboration for convictions based on retracted confessions. The Peshawar High Court held that a statement containing self-exculpatory matter denying participation and alleging protest does not amount to a confession in law. Furthermore, a retracted confession carries significantly less evidentiary weight against a co-accused and cannot be utilized without the fullest corroboration, nor can it corroborate other tainted evidence. The court set aside the murder convictions and death sentences of both appellants, acquitting Shamshad entirely due to lack of corroboration for his retracted confession, and altering Dost Mohammad's conviction to Section 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for concealing evidence after establishing his role in disposing of the deceased's head.
Questions settled- Does a statement containing self-exculpatory matter denying participation in a crime amount to a confession?
- What is the evidentiary value of a retracted confession against a co-accused?
- Can a retracted confession be utilized to corroborate other tainted evidence?
- Is a retracted confession alone sufficient to justify the conviction of its maker without independent corroboration?
- Charsadda Sugar Mills Ltd. vs Government of Pakistan and Others1971 PLD Peshawar 210 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-11-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This writ petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962 was filed by Charsadda Sugar Mills Ltd. challenging the validity of the Excise Duty on Production Capacity (Sugar) Rules, 1966 and the assessment of its production capacity under Section 3 of the Central Excises and Salt Act 1944. The petitioner contended that the rules were framed before the enabling statutory provision came into force, that the assessment was arbitrary and violated the principles of natural justice (audi alteram partem) as no hearing was granted, and that the calculation of working days and rebates was flawed. The Peshawar High Court held that the rules were framed on 11-6-1966, whereas the enabling Section 3(4) of the Act, introduced via the Finance Act 1966, only became effective on 12-6-1966 under the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act 1931. Consequently, the rules were framed without lawful authority. The Court also ruled that assessing authorities must act judicially and provide an opportunity of hearing, and that undisclosed principles of universal application cannot be used to condemn a party. The petition was accepted.
Questions settled- Can statutory rules be validly framed under an enabling provision before that provision has legally come into force?
- Is an administrative or assessing authority bound by the principles of natural justice, specifically the right of hearing, when determining tax liabilities that affect property rights?
- Can a Review Board decide a matter based on 'principles of universal application' that are not disclosed to the affected party?
- How should the 'liquidation period' and 'working days' of a factory be calculated for the purpose of tax abatement and rebate in the absence of explicit statutory definitions?
- Central Government through the Income-- Tax Officer, Dera Ismail1971 PTD 747 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-05-05Read full judgment →
- Central Government through the Income Tar Officer, Dera Ismail1971 PLD Peshawar 153 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This revision application challenged a civil court's order rejecting a preliminary objection regarding the court's jurisdiction to entertain a suit against an income-tax assessment. The respondent had filed a suit seeking a declaration that an assessment order by an Income-tax Officer was illegal, arguing the officer lacked territorial jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether Section 67 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, bars civil court jurisdiction when the Act itself provides a specific appellate machinery to resolve disputes, including those concerning the place of assessment. The Court held that the civil court lacked jurisdiction, as the Act provides a comprehensive mechanism for challenging assessments, including disputes over the place of assessment under Section 64(3). The principle laid down is that when a statute creates rights and liabilities and establishes a specific forum for their adjudication, parties must exhaust those statutory remedies rather than invoking the jurisdiction of civil courts, which is barred by Section 67 of the Income-tax Act, 1922. Consequently, the revision was allowed, and the plaint was ordered to be returned.
Questions settled- Does Section 67 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, bar a civil suit challenging an income-tax assessment order?
- Can a civil court adjudicate a dispute regarding the territorial jurisdiction of an Income-tax Officer to assess a taxpayer?
- Is a taxpayer required to exhaust the appellate machinery provided under the Income-tax Act, 1922, before seeking relief in a civil court?
- Arbab Khan vs Faujdar and 3 Others1971 PLD Peshawar 114 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-03-12Read full judgment →
- Abdur Rehman vs Masdar Ali Khan1971 PLD Peshawar 140 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-03-19Read full judgment →
- Abdur Rehman and 5 Others vs The State and 3 Others1971 PLD Peshawar 61 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-05-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This writ petition challenges an order of the Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, referring a criminal case to a Council-of-Elders under the Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901. The core legal questions concern whether the High Court possesses jurisdiction over administrative orders passed in settled areas regarding occurrences in tribal territories, whether the Deputy Commissioner exercised independent discretion in making the reference, and whether the Home Secretary had the authority to order the retrial of previously acquitted persons. The Court held that it maintains jurisdiction to review orders passed by authorities within its territorial limits, regardless of the location of the underlying occurrence. It ruled the reference invalid, finding that the Deputy Commissioner acted mechanically under the Home Secretary’s directive rather than exercising his own independent discretion. Furthermore, the Court held that the Home Secretary lacked the legal authority to set aside an acquittal and order a retrial. The key principle laid down is that statutory authorities must exercise independent discretion and cannot abdicate their duties by blindly following superior directives.
Questions settled- Does the High Court have jurisdiction to review an order passed by a Deputy Commissioner in a settled area if the underlying occurrence took place in a tribal territory?
- Can a Deputy Commissioner refer a case to a Council-of-Elders under the Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901 based solely on a directive from the Home Secretary without exercising independent discretion?
- Does the Home Secretary have the legal authority under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1963 to set aside an order of acquittal and direct a retrial?
- Is an accused person entitled to a hearing before a reference is made to a Council-of-Elders under the Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901?
- Abdullah vs The State and Another1971 PLD Peshawar 147 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-06-15Read full judgment →
- Zardad vs The State1970 PLD Peshawar 6 · Peshawar High Court · 1969-07-29Read full judgment →
- The State vs Ghulam Jaffar Etc.1970 PLD Peshawar 134 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-01-16Read full judgment →
- The State vs Fazal Ahmad and Anothers1970 P Cr. L J 633 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-02-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This State appeal under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was filed against the acquittal of two respondents charged under Section 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the respondents shot and injured the complainant in his courtyard, with identification established via torchlight and voice recognition. The trial court acquitted the respondents, noting the existence of pending litigation between the parties, medical evidence indicating charring marks consistent with a self-inflicted wound from close range, and discrepancies in the site plan. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that identification by torchlight and voice in a dark night is highly unreliable. The Court reiterated that an appellate court will not interfere with an acquittal unless the trial court's appreciation of evidence is perverse, foolish, or speculative. Finding the trial court's reasoning sound and based on the evidence, the High Court maintained the acquittal.
Questions settled- Is identification of an accused by torchlight during a dark night considered sufficient and reliable evidence for a conviction?
- Can an accused person be safely identified solely by their voice in a criminal trial?
- Under what circumstances will an appellate court interfere with and set aside an order of acquittal passed by a trial court?
- Sattar K14an and Another vs The State1970 PLD Peshawar 185 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-04-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal and murder reference arose from the conviction and death sentences of two appellants, Sattar Khan and Habibullah, under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Bhangi Khan. The prosecution relied on ocular evidence of two uncles of the deceased, a written dying declaration, and the retracted judicial confessions of both appellants. The High Court analyzed the credibility of the ocular witnesses, noting their close relationship to the deceased and their absence from the dying declaration. The Court also found the dying declaration suspicious due to omissions and inconsistencies. Regarding the confessions, the Court held that Sattar Khan's statement was exculpatory and did not amount to a confession, and that common intention was not established in what appeared to be a sudden fight. However, Habibullah's retracted confession was found to be voluntary and corroborated by the recovery of a blood-stained dagger. Consequently, the Court acquitted Sattar Khan by giving him the benefit of doubt, but dismissed Habibullah's appeal, confirming his conviction and death sentence.
Questions settled- Does an exculpatory statement that denies active participation in the main criminal act amount to a confession under the law?
- Can a retracted judicial confession form the sole basis of conviction without corroboration under the rule of prudence?
- Whether common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be inferred in a sudden fight?
- Is the mere youth of an accused a sufficient mitigating circumstance to avoid the death penalty in a brutal murder case?
- Saadullah Khan and 6 Other vs Mir Piayo Khan and 14 Other1970 PLD Peshawar 150 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-03-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment addresses three second appeals arising out of a suit for declaration of sharia shares in property left by an ancestor, Akbar Khan, who died in 1912. The property was initially subject to customary life estates held by female heirs, which ended upon the death of the last surviving life-estate holder, Mst. Sherina, in 1952. The appellants contended that the suit filed in 1955 was barred by time, incompetent for lack of a prayer for possession under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877, barred by res judicata, estoppel, and Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and that the shares were incorrectly calculated. The High Court held that upon the termination of a life estate in 1952, inheritance opens under Shariat and female heirs become co-sharers; thus Article 141 of the Limitation Act 1908 applies, making the 1955 suit timely. Possession of one co-sharer inures to all in the absence of ouster, rendering a declaratory suit without a prayer for possession competent. Finding a prior judgment binding as res judicata, the Court modified the lower appellate court's decree to adjust the specific legal shares accordingly while dismissing the remaining contentions.
Questions settled- Does Article 141 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to suits for possession by Muslim legal heirs upon the death of a female holding a limited life estate?
- Can a co-sharer maintain a suit for a mere declaration under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 without seeking possession where there has been no actual ouster?
- Does Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 bar a subsequent suit for inheritance where the earlier suit was based on a distinct cause of action regarding a gift?
- Muhammad Yusaf vs Sikandar1970 PLD Peshawar 160 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-04-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This reference before the Full Bench of the Peshawar High Court arose from a second appeal concerning a suit for possession by pre-emption of agricultural land comprising multiple contiguous Khasra numbers. The core legal question was whether a pre-emptor claiming a right of pre-emption on the ground of vicinage or contiguity under section 12 of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, 1950 must own land contiguous to all Khasra numbers sold under a single transaction, or whether a right of pre-emption accrues to the entire block of land if the pre-emptor owns land contiguous to only one of the several Khasra numbers. Reviewing land revenue laws, settlement manuals, and precedents, the Court held that a holding or parcel of land divided into various Khasra numbers for survey and crop-inspection convenience constitutes a single integral property rather than multiple distinct properties. The Court concluded that an owner of contiguous property is entitled to pre-empt the entire compact block of sold land even if their property adjoins only one of the constituent Khasra numbers.
Questions settled- When a compact block of agricultural land comprising more than one Khasra number is sold, does the right of pre-emption of an owner of property contiguous to only one Khasra extend to the entire block under section 12 of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act 1950?
- Does each Khasra number in an agricultural holding constitute a separate and distinct property for the purposes of pre-emption?
- Is it a pre-requisite qualification for a pre-emptor claiming under the ground of contiguity to own land touching all Khasra numbers included in a single sale transaction?
- Mst. Sardar Begum vs Mst. Sherin Taja1970 PLD Peshawar 194 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-06-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This Letters Patent Appeal arose from execution proceedings in which the respondent-decree-holder attached immovable property, and the appellant filed objections under Order XXI Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 based on a registered gift deed. The objection application was dismissed in default, and a subsequent application for restoration was withdrawn. Although the executing Court initially directed that the attachment continue while consigning the execution to the record room, the decree-holder subsequently applied for fresh attachment, which the Court granted, indicating that the original attachment had been abandoned. The High Court held that while an order dismissing an objection under Order XXI Rule 58 for default is an adverse order requiring a suit under Order XXI Rule 63 within one year under Article 11 of the Limitation Act 1908, the abandonment and cessation of the original attachment relieved the claimant of the necessity to file such a suit. The fresh attachment gave rise to a new cause of action to object and institute a suit.
Questions settled- Does an order dismissing an objection to attachment in default under Order XXI Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 constitute an adverse order requiring a suit under Order XXI Rule 63 within one year?
- Does the abandonment and cessation of an attachment by the decree-holder relieve a claimant of the obligation to file a suit under Order XXI Rule 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 within one year of an adverse order?
- Where a decree-holder applies for and obtains a fresh attachment after an earlier attachment has ceased, can an objector file fresh objections or a suit contesting the new attachment despite failing to challenge the earlier adverse order?
- Lal Muhammad and Another vs Mst. Niaz Parwara1970 PLD Peshawar 52 · Peshawar High Court · 1969-11-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision petition addresses the applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to the execution of decrees passed by Family Courts under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964. The core legal question was whether a Family Court can apply provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to execute a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights. The Peshawar High Court held that while special procedure is provided for money decrees, decrees for restitution of conjugal rights and other non-money decrees are to be executed in the manner provided for in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as otherwise such decrees would remain unenforceable. The petition was accepted and the order of the appellate court setting aside the attachment was reversed.
Questions settled- Do the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 apply to the execution of non-money decrees passed by a Family Court?
- How are decrees for the restitution of conjugal rights passed by a Family Court to be executed?
- Khan Bahadur Mian Feroz Shah (Represented by 10 Heirs) vs The Commissioner of Income Tax, North Zone, (West Pakistan), Lahore1970 PLD Peshawar 83 · Peshawar High Court · 1969-10-30Read full judgment →
- Khalil Khan vs The State1970 PLD Peshawar 24 · Peshawar High Court · 1969-07-15Read full judgment →
- Karim Bakhsh vs Mst. Mubarik Jan1970 PLD Peshawar 169 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-03-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought to challenge a decree of dissolution of marriage granted by a Family Court, which had upheld a prior dissolution by a Conciliation Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court, under its power of superintendence and control over subordinate courts pursuant to Article 102 of the Constitution of 1962, could interfere with the findings and decrees of a Family Court, particularly when the statute governing Family Courts restricts appeals. The Court held that while Article 102 empowers the High Court to supervise and control subordinate courts to ensure the proper administration of justice, this power is administrative and judicial in nature, intended to maintain the purity of the judicial process rather than to function as a substitute for appellate or revisional jurisdiction for the benefit of private litigants. The Court established that Article 102 does not grant parties a right to seek relief against adverse judgments; rather, it is a tool for the High Court to correct systemic errors. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere with the Family Court's decree, noting that the petitioner's attempt to re-litigate a concluded matter subverted the legislative intent of finality in family disputes.
Questions settled- Is a Family Court constituted under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964 a court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Article 102 of the Constitution of 1962?
- Does the power of superintendence under Article 102 of the Constitution of 1962 allow the High Court to act as a court of appeal or revision for the benefit of private litigants?
- Can the High Court exercise its power of superintendence under Article 102 of the Constitution of 1962 to interfere with a decree of a Family Court where the statute provides for finality of such decrees?
- Haji Muhammad Hussain vs The State1970 PLD Peshawar 58 · Peshawar High Court · 1969-10-06Read full judgment →
- Ghulam Qadir vs The State1970 PLD Peshawar 99 · Peshawar High Court · 1969-11-13Read full judgment →
- Firdus Khan vs Sayid Azam Shah and 14 Other1970 PLD Peshawar 141 · Peshawar High Court · 1969-06-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This second appeal arises from a suit for the redemption of mortgaged land. The core legal questions involve whether a co-mortgagor can maintain a redemption suit for the entire estate, whether an unregistered mortgage deed coupled with a revenue mutation creates a valid interest or can be received in evidence, whether objections to the mode of proof of documents can be raised for the first time in appeal, and whether an appellate court can interfere with a decree suo motu without an appeal or cross-objections. The Peshawar High Court held that a co-mortgagor can sue to redeem the entire estate to avoid multiplicity of suits, that an unregistered mortgage requiring registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act is inadmissible in evidence under Section 49 and cannot be validated by mutation proceedings, that objections to the mode of proof cannot be raised for the first time in appeal, and that an appellate court lacks jurisdiction to modify a decree suo motu without an appeal or cross-objections. The appeal was accepted and a preliminary decree for redemption was granted.
Questions settled- Can a co-mortgagor maintain a suit for the redemption of the entire mortgaged estate?
- Does an unregistered mortgage deed requiring registration create a valid interest or become admissible in evidence through mutation proceedings?
- At what stage must an objection to the mode of proof of a document be raised?
- Can an appellate court interfere with a trial court decree suo motu without an appeal or cross-objections being filed?
- Feroz Din vs Sheikh Ahmad1970 PLD Peshawar 54 · Peshawar High Court · 1969-10-17Read full judgment →
- Chanan Din vs Gulzar Muhammad Khan and Another1970 PLD Peshawar 94 · Peshawar High Court · -Read full judgment →
- Abdul Majid Khan (Represented by Heirs) vs Shahzada Asif Jah1970 PLD Peshawar 37 · Peshawar High Court · 1969-06-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns two pre-emption suits involving the sale of agricultural land where the vendee attempted to improve his status during the pendency of the litigation to defeat the pre-emptors' claims. The core legal question was whether a vendee-defendant can defeat a pre-emption suit by acquiring property or improving their status through exchange deeds after the institution of the suit, and whether the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption (West Pakistan Amendment) Act, 1967, applies to such pending matters. The High Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the 1967 Amendment, which introduced a bar against improvements in a vendee's status after the institution of a pre-emption suit, effectively precluded the appellant from defeating the respondents' superior rights. The Court established that while the amendment was technically placed in Section 17, its manifest legislative intent was to resolve the controversy regarding post-suit status improvements; therefore, such improvements cannot be used to divest a pre-emptor of their subsisting right of pre-emption at the time of the decree.
Questions settled- Can a vendee improve their status after the institution of a pre-emption suit to defeat the plaintiff's claim?
- Does the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption (West Pakistan Amendment) Act 1967 apply to pre-emption suits pending at the time of its commencement?
- Does an improvement in the status of a vendee-defendant after the institution of a suit for pre-emption affect the right of the pre-emptor-plaintiff?