Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 14,893 judgments in total from the Peshawar High Court.

• Muqarab Khan Panni and 5 others vs Collector Land Acquisition2019 PLJ Peshawar 30 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Muqadar Shah vs StatePLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 552, 2020 YLR 1259, 2019 PHC 348 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-12-05Read full judgment →
• Muqadar Hussain Khan vs Yasir Saadat Khan2019 [M] C.L.R. 1333, 2019 CLC 723 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-11-26Read full judgment →
• Multan Jan vs the State2020 P Cr. L J 88, 2019 PHC 215 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-09-18
  narcotics controlsafe custody of samplessafe transmissionconfession during trialplea of guiltbenefit of doubtcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 9 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 for the alleged transportation of charas. The core legal questions involve the evaluation of safe custody and safe transmission of recovered contraband and FSL samples, the legality of a conviction based on an alleged confession made during trial while in judicial custody, and the proper procedure for recording a plea of guilt. The Peshawar High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the safe custody and safe transmission of the narcotics and samples due to unexplained delays and missing links in evidence, which created serious doubt. Furthermore, the court held that an admission or confession obtained from an accused in judicial custody without adhering to mandatory statutory safeguards and procedural requirements cannot serve as the sole basis for a capital or severe conviction. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the appellant was acquitted of the charge.

  Questions settled

  • Whether failure of the prosecution to prove safe custody and safe transmission of narcotics samples to the FSL vitiates the conviction?
  • Can an admission or statement made by an accused while in judicial custody form the sole basis for a conviction without following mandatory procedural safeguards?
  • Does a plea of guilt after an initial denial of the charge require independent supporting evidence before a conviction can be recorded?
  • Whether a confession recorded on oath is admissible in evidence under criminal law?
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• Mukhtar Ahmad vs Provincial Government2021 CLC 9, 2019 PHC 258 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-09-26Read full judgment →
• Mukarram Khan and 5 others vs Maab Zada and 3 others2019 MLD 1924 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-11-28Read full judgment →
• Mujeeb-ur-Rehman etc vs Mehr-un-Nissa alias Tanzeel Begum etc2019 CLC 1352, 2020 [M] C L R 1595, 2019 PHC 82 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-03-07Read full judgment →
• Mujahid Iqbal vs The State2019 P Cr. L J 1432 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-04-18
  juvenile offenderanti-terrorism courtexclusive jurisdictionpolice custodycriminal revisionjuvenile court
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision and connected writ petition arise from an order passed by the Judge Anti-Terrorism Court, Hazara Division, declining police custody of a juvenile respondent on the ground that the Anti-Terrorism Court lacked jurisdiction to try a juvenile. The core legal question was whether an Anti-Terrorism Court or a Juvenile Court has exclusive jurisdiction to try terrorism offences committed by a juvenile. The Peshawar High Court held that the insertion of the word 'exclusively' in Section 21-G of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, being later in time and supported by Section 14 of the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, gives the Anti-Terrorism Court precedence. Furthermore, pursuant to a notification dated 30.05.2012 issued under Section 4(1) of the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, all Anti-Terrorism Courts were designated to exercise the powers of Juvenile Courts. Consequently, the High Court set aside the impugned order, allowing police custody before the Anti-Terrorism Court. The key principle laid down is that Anti-Terrorism Courts possess the requisite jurisdiction to try juveniles for terrorism-related offences.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Anti-Terrorism Court or a Juvenile Court has exclusive jurisdiction to try terrorism offences committed by a juvenile?
  • Does the insertion of the word 'exclusively' in Section 21-G of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 take precedence over Section 4(3) of the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance 2000?
  • Can Anti-Terrorism Courts exercise the powers of Juvenile Courts pursuant to the federal notification dated 30.05.2012?
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• Muhammad Zahid Khan son of Ameer Ullah vs The State etc2019 PHC 244 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-10-09
  murderappellant acquittalnegative forensic reportpoisoningbenefit of doubtreappraisal of evidencelife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant, Muhammad Zahid Khan, for the murder of his wife under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, alongside a connected revision petition for sentence enhancement and an appeal against the acquittal of co-accused. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt in the absence of direct eyewitness testimony, corroborated motive, and positive forensic evidence regarding the cause of death. The Peshawar High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case, noting that the forensic science laboratory report regarding stomach and liver contents was negative for poison, the complainant's motive lacked evidentiary support, and other resident family members had not implicated the accused. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction and sentence, acquitted the appellant, and dismissed both the sentence enhancement petition and the appeal against the acquittal of the co-accused, reiterating the principle that criminal liability cannot be sustained on presumptions and conjectures in the absence of reliable evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for murder can be sustained under Section 302(b) PPC when the forensic report for poison is negative and no direct eyewitness account is available?
  • Does the natural conduct of an accused husband in immediately shifting his deceased wife to the hospital and participating in funeral rites serve as a circumstance pointing towards his innocence?
  • Can a criminal conviction be based solely on uncorroborated motives and police statements without supporting direct or circumstantial evidence?
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• Muhammad Younis vs District Police Officer, Abbottabad and 2 others2019 MLD 1148 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-11-22Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaseen vs The State and another2019 MLD 350 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-07-27
  post-arrest bailcriminal breach of trustdishonoured chequesmisappropriationfinancial fraudcheating
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by the petitioner, Muhammad Yaseen, who was charged under Sections 420, 467, 109, 489-F, and 408 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner, employed as a Warehouse Incharge for Fatima Fertilizer Company Limited, was accused of misappropriating company fertilizer valued at Rs. 14,10,00,000. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to the concession of bail given the nature of the allegations and the evidence presented. The Court observed that the petitioner had not only misappropriated the goods but had also admitted the company's claim through an affidavit and issued ten cheques totaling Rs. 9,50,00,000, all of which were dishonoured due to insufficient funds. Holding that the case involved a massive financial loss caused by criminal breach of trust, cheating, and fraud, the Court determined that the petitioner did not merit the grant of bail. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that where substantial financial misappropriation is evidenced by admission and dishonoured instruments, the concession of bail is not warranted.

  Questions settled

  • Is a petitioner entitled to bail when there is prima facie evidence of massive financial misappropriation and admission of liability?
  • Does the issuance of dishonoured cheques in the context of misappropriation of company property constitute sufficient grounds to deny bail?
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• Muhammad Yar vs Rehmatullah2019 MLD 1590, 2019 PHC 91 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-01-31Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaqoob and another vs Govt: of KPK through Secretary Land2021 PLC (C.S.) 119, 2019 PHC 394 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-11-27
  Patwari recruitmentservice rulesrecruitment policywrit jurisdictionmerit-based appointmentdepartmental instructionsvested right
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three consolidated writ petitions wherein the petitioners sought appointment as Patwaris based solely on their inclusion in the register of Patwar candidates, challenging the requirement for a competitive recruitment process. The core legal question was whether Patwari appointments are governed by the Land Records Manual or by the prevailing statutory Service Rules mandating a competitive test and interview. The Court held that mere registration as a Patwari candidate does not confer a vested right to appointment. It affirmed that where departmental instructions conflict with statutory rules, the latter must prevail. The Court emphasized that the Government possesses the authority to amend recruitment policies in the public interest, and candidates are subject to the rules in force at the time of appointment rather than at the time of application. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, ruling that appointments must be conducted through a transparent, merit-based process involving written tests and interviews, as required by the current applicable Service Rules, thereby ensuring efficient revenue administration.

  Questions settled

  • Does inclusion in the register of Patwar candidates confer a vested right to appointment?
  • Which prevails in the event of a conflict between departmental instructions in the Land Records Manual and statutory service rules?
  • Is the Government empowered to amend recruitment policies for public posts?
  • Are candidates for public office subject to the recruitment rules in force at the time of application or at the time of appointment?
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• Muhammad Usman vs The State and another2020 P Cr. L J 705, 2019 PHC 410 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-12-18
  post-arrest bailcyber crimemoral turpitudeprohibitory clausejudicial discretionharassmentelectronic crimes
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for post-arrest bail arises from a criminal case registered under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 and the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, involving allegations of harassment and the transmission of objectionable nude photographs via WhatsApp. The petitioner sought bail after being refused relief by the trial court. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to the concession of bail, given the nature of the offence and the argument that the charged offences did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Peshawar High Court held that while bail in offences punishable by less than ten years of imprisonment is generally a rule, this is not an absolute right and remains subject to the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court found the allegations supported by evidence and the petitioner's own statement, noting the offence involved moral turpitude affecting society at large. Consequently, the Court dismissed the bail petition, establishing the principle that judicial discretion to deny bail may be exercised even in non-prohibitory offences where the circumstances justify such departure.

  Questions settled

  • Does the fact that an offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, create an absolute right to bail?
  • Can a court deny bail in cases punishable by less than ten years imprisonment if the offence involves moral turpitude?
  • Is the concession of bail subject to the specific facts and circumstances of each individual case?
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• Muhammad Usman Khan 8 and others vs Secretary Home Department, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar and 5 others2019 PLC (C.S.) 380 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-08-24
  Constitutional jurisdictionAppointment in abeyanceTerms and conditions of serviceArticle 212 barMisuse of authorityRule of lawCivil servantsPolice department recruitment
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges the respondents' decision to hold the appointment notifications of the petitioners, who were appointed as Assistant Sub-Inspectors, in abeyance. The core legal question is whether the respondents possessed the lawful authority to suspend these appointments indefinitely without any statutory basis, and whether the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain this matter despite the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution. The Court held that the respondents acted without lawful authority, as no provision in the Police Rules or the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants Act, 1973, permits holding an appointment order in abeyance. The Court determined that this issue did not concern the "terms and conditions of service" and thus fell within its constitutional jurisdiction. The judgment establishes that public authorities must act strictly in accordance with the law, and arbitrary administrative actions lacking statutory backing constitute a misuse of power. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order, emphasizing that all state functionaries are bound by the Constitution and the law of the land.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 to challenge an administrative order holding an appointment notification in abeyance, or is it barred by Article 212?
  • Does any provision in the Police Rules or the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants Act, 1973, authorize a competent authority to hold an appointment order of a civil servant in abeyance?
  • Is an administrative action taken without any statutory basis or lawful authority subject to judicial review under the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
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• Muhammad Umair vs the State & another2020 P Cr. L J 653, 2020 PHC 44, 2019 PHC 420 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-12-26
  post-arrest bailunnatural sexual intercoursechild at riskfurther inquiryDNA testdelay in FIR
  Summary & questions settled

  This post-arrest bail petition was filed by the accused-petitioner, a minor, who was charged under Section 377-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Sections 50 and 53 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Child Protection and Welfare Act 2010. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner attempted to subject the complainant's son to unnatural sexual intercourse. The Peshawar High Court observed that there was an unexplained three-day delay in lodging the FIR, the medical report did not support the commission of any sexual act, and no DNA samples were collected as mandatorily required under Section 164-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Furthermore, the Court held that the victim did not prima facie fall within the statutory definition of a 'child at risk' under Section 2(1)(e) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Child Protection and Welfare Act 2010, rendering the applicability of Sections 50 and 53 a matter of further inquiry. Consequently, the Court allowed the petition and granted bail to the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Child Protection and Welfare Act 2010 apply if the victim does not fall under the definition of a 'child at risk' under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act?
  • Is the collection of DNA samples under Section 164-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandatory in cases involving sexual offences?
  • Can post-arrest bail be granted under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when there is an unexplained delay in lodging the FIR and the medical report does not support the prosecution's allegations?
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• Muhammad Siyar son of Ghulam Habib vs The State etc2019 PHC 280 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-11-04Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shoaib vs Muhammad Ayub and 9 others2019 MLD 195 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-09-06
  rejection of plaintspecific performanceunregistered agreement to selldeclaratory suitimmovable propertycivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a civil revision petition challenging the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which rejected the plaintiff's plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The plaintiff had filed a suit for declaration, permanent injunction, and cancellation of documents based on an unregistered agreement to sell regarding immovable property. The core legal question was whether a suit for declaration is maintainable on the basis of an unregistered agreement to sell. The Peshawar High Court held that an unregistered agreement to sell does not confer any title, right, or interest in immovable property. Consequently, a suit for declaration under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 is not the appropriate remedy. The court affirmed that the only competent legal course for the plaintiff is to institute a suit for specific performance to enforce the contract. The revision petition was dismissed, upholding the rejection of the plaint, while noting the plaintiff's right to file a fresh suit for specific performance if so advised.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit for declaration maintainable on the basis of an unregistered agreement to sell regarding immovable property?
  • Does an unregistered agreement to sell confer any title or interest in immovable property?
  • What is the appropriate form of suit for a purchaser seeking to enforce an agreement to sell immovable property?
  • Can a court reject a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the suit is filed in an incompetent form?
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• Muhammad Shareef vs The State and another2019 PHC 344 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-11-22Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadiq son of Hikmat Khan vs Government of Khyber2020 PLC (C.S.) 331, 2019 PHC 248 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-10-16
  constitutional petitioncivil servants appointmentbowl policydepartmental selection committeestatutory rulesward orderlyinitial recruitment
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the Peshawar High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, seeking to declare the appointment of respondent No.4 as a Ward Orderly in the District Headquarter Hospital, Hangu, illegal and to direct his own appointment to the post. The core question was whether the appointment of Class-IV employees through a 'Bowl Policy' (lucky draw system), not sanctioned by statutory rules or the advertisement, was lawful. The court held that appointments made in deviation from statutory provisions and through an alien procedure like a lucky draw are void and a nullity. The court noted that the 'Bowl Policy' mandated by a previous High Court judgment had been set aside by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in CPLA Nos. 105-P & 179 of 2018. Consequently, the petition was allowed, directing the respondents to consider the petitioner for appointment if otherwise eligible, as statutory rules like the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotions and Transfer Rules), 1989 must strictly govern recruitment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether appointments of Class-IV civil servants can be made through a 'Bowl Policy' or lucky draw system not provided in the statutory rules?
  • Does deviation from statutory provisions of law in the appointment of civil servants render the appointment void?
  • What is the effect of the Supreme Court setting aside the High Court's 'Bowl Policy' judgment on pending and past recruitment processes?
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• Muhammad Sadiq and Faridullah vs The state etc2019 PHC 270 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-10-10Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Riaz Swati District Education Officer (Male) Battagram2019 PLC (C.S.) 1306 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-04-25
  constitutional petitionPublic Service Commissionadditional marksmerit listseniority listlacheswrit jurisdictiondiscretionary relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the Peshawar Public Service Commission's decision to award two additional marks to respondent No. 3 for an additional qualification (M.A. Management Studies) after the initial merit list for the post of Executive District Officer (BPS-19) had been finalized and recommendations issued. The petitioner contended that the Commission lacked the authority to alter the merit list once it had become functus officio and that the degree did not qualify for additional marks. The Court held that while the Commission may have technically acted after its mandate was complete, the award of marks rectified a manifest omission, as the respondent was legally entitled to those marks under the Public Service Regulations, 2003. Consequently, the Court refused to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction, noting that the action did not occasion injustice. Furthermore, the Court dismissed the petition on the grounds of laches, as the petitioner failed to challenge the seniority list for several years, during which time other incumbents had been promoted based on that list.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court refuse to set aside an administrative order if the order, though technically irregular, rectifies a manifest omission and causes no injustice?
  • Does the principle of laches apply to a constitutional petition challenging a seniority list after several years and subsequent promotions?
  • Is the Public Service Commission empowered to award additional marks for a qualification after the initial merit list has been recommended to the government?
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• Muhammad Qadeer vs The State etcPLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 1306, 2019 PHC 322 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-11-26
  retracted confessionjudicial confessioncircumstantial evidencecall data recordmurder referencedeath sentenceQatl-e-Amdstatement of accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and murder reference arise from a judgment of the Sessions Judge, Hangu, convicting the appellants, Muhammad Qadeer and Mst. Robina Ashraf, for the Qatl-e-Amd of the deceased Rizwan Ahmad under section 302(b) PPC, alongside a conviction of Muhammad Qadeer under section 15 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, 2013. The prosecution case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, call data records, and judicial confessions made by both appellants after they were linked to the crime through text messages and mobile data. The core legal questions involved the sufficiency and voluntariness of retracted judicial confessions, the mandatory scope of questioning under section 342 Cr.P.C., and whether circumstantial evidence sufficiently corroborated the confessions. The Peshawar High Court held that retracted judicial confessions, once proven voluntary and truthful, can form the basis of a conviction without necessarily requiring independent corroboration, though strong circumstantial evidence—including mobile phone records, medical reports, and the recovery of the weapon—did in fact corroborate the confessions here. The appeals were dismissed, and the death sentence of Muhammad Qadeer was confirmed.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be convicted solely on the basis of a retracted judicial confession?
  • Whether the failure to put a specific preliminary question in a statement under section 342 Cr.P.C. vitiates the trial or causes prejudice to the accused?
  • What is the evidentiary value of call data records (CDR) in corroborating a judicial confession in a circumstantial murder case?
  • Does a retracted confession require mandatory independent corroboration before it can be relied upon for a conviction?
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• Muhammad Parvaiz vs State through A.A.G., K.P.K. and anotherPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 840, 2019 YLR 2213 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-12-03
  criminal appealabductionillegal marriagecircumstantial evidenceretracted confessioncall data recordbenefit of doubtacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 365-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for allegedly inducing a married woman to contract an illegal marriage, resulting in a sentence of life imprisonment. The core legal question concerns whether a conviction under Section 365-B can be sustained solely on the basis of hearsay evidence, unverified call data records, and a retracted confessional statement of an acquitted co-accused without independent corroboration. The Peshawar High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish a complete, unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence, that hearsay testimony and unauthenticated call records are inadmissible, and that a retracted confession of an acquitted co-accused cannot serve as substantive evidence against the appellant without strong independent corroboration. The court established key principles regarding the strict standard of proof required in cases resting on circumstantial evidence, the inadmissibility of unverified electronic data, and the limited evidentiary value of a co-accused's retracted confession. Consequently, the appeal was accepted, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted on the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for abduction and illegal marriage be sustained solely on the basis of hearsay evidence?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a retracted judicial confession made by an acquitted co-accused against the remaining appellant?
  • Can unverified call data records without the testimony of an authorized cellular company representative be relied upon to prove a criminal charge?
  • Is an accused bound by admissions made by their counsel during the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses?
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• Muhammad Nawaz son of Abdul Nawab vs The State etc2019 PHC 250 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-10-16
  murdercircumstantial evidencebenefit of doubtfsl report delayweapon recoverycriminal appealacquittalocular account
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Sessions Judge/ASJ Nowshera, whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the double murder of his sister and another person, and sentenced to imprisonment for life. The core legal question before the Peshawar High Court was whether the prosecution had proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt based on the available direct and circumstantial evidence. The court held that the prosecution miserably failed to establish the appellant's guilt, noting that neither the complainant nor the mother of the deceased were eyewitnesses, the arrest and weapon recovery were highly doubtful and unnatural, and the firearm empties and weapon were sent to the forensic laboratory with an unexplained delay of eleven days. Consequently, the High Court set aside the conviction and sentence, acquitting the appellant of the charges. The key principle laid down is that in a case resting on circumstantial evidence, the links in the chain must be complete and unbroken connecting the accused to the crime, and any missing link or reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case must be resolved in favor of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the uncorroborated testimony of non-eyewitnesses and hearsay reports are sufficient to sustain a conviction on a capital charge?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a crime weapon and empties sent to the forensic laboratory after an unexplained delay?
  • Does the recovery of bloodstained articles and post-mortem reports alone prove the identity of the culprit in a murder case?
  • What standard of circumstantial evidence is required to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt?
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• Muhammad Naveed vs District Education Officer and 3 others2019 PLC (C.S.) 1223 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-12-10
  primary school teacher appointmentconstitutional jurisdictionsubordinate legislation ultra viresmerit-based appointmentlocus poenitentiaelegitimate expectationexecutive policy restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an office order regarding the appointment of a Primary School Teacher (PST) and a provincial policy restricting candidates to applying for a maximum of five schools within a union council. The core legal question was whether the executive or subordinate authority could formulate a policy restricting applications to a limited number of schools when the parent statute mandated appointments strictly on merit without such limitations. The Peshawar High Court held that the policy restricting candidates to five schools was discriminatory, irrational, and ultra vires Section 3 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Appointment, Deputation, Posting and Transfer of Teachers, Lecturers, Instructors and Doctors) Regulatory Act, 2011, and struck it down. However, the court declined to disturb the appointment of the already appointed respondent, invoking the principles of locus poenitentiae and legitimate expectation since the respondent was not at fault. The key principles laid down are that subordinate legislation or executive policy cannot enlarge, restrict, or conflict with the scope of the parent statute, and that appointments to public posts must strictly follow statutory merit without arbitrary limitations.

  Questions settled

  • Can an executive policy or rule restrict a candidate from applying to all available vacancies when the parent statute mandates appointments strictly on merit?
  • Whether subordinate legislation or policy can enlarge or restrict the scope of the parent statute under which it is framed?
  • Can an appointment made under a defective policy be disturbed where the beneficiary is not at fault, under the principles of locus poenitentiae and legitimate expectation?
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• Muhammad Mushtaq Qureshi and others vs Government of Khyber2019 KLR Labour & Service Cases 271, 2019 PLC (C.S.) 565 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-01-31
  service lawdisciplinary proceedingsautonomous bodiesstatutory interpretationwrongful dismissalservice rulescivil servants
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns writ petitions filed by employees of the defunct Provincial Urban Development Board (PUDB) challenging their dismissal from service. The core legal question was whether the petitioners' disciplinary proceedings were validly conducted under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government Servants (Efficiency and Disciplinary) Rules, 2011, or if they were exclusively governed by the Provincial Urban Development Board Service Rules, 1978. The Court held that the 2011 Rules were inapplicable to the petitioners. Relying on Section 6 of the dissolution Ordinance No. XVI of 2002, which mandated that employees be dealt with under the 1978 Rules, the Court concluded that the dismissal orders were illegal and void ab initio. The judgment establishes the principle that when a statute prescribes a specific manner for performing an act, it must be followed strictly. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that merely adopting government disciplinary rules does not alter the status of employees of autonomous bodies to that of civil servants, nor does it override their specific statutory service regulations. Consequently, the impugned dismissal orders were set aside, with liberty granted to the authorities to initiate proceedings under the correct 1978 Rules.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees of the defunct Provincial Urban Development Board governed by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government Servants (Efficiency and Disciplinary) Rules, 2011?
  • Does the adoption of government disciplinary rules by an autonomous body automatically confer civil servant status upon its employees?
  • Can disciplinary proceedings initiated under inapplicable rules be sustained as valid?
  • Does Section 6 of the dissolution Ordinance No. XVI of 2002 mandate the application of the Provincial Urban Development Board Service Rules, 1978, to former board employees?
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• Muhammad Lehrasif vs The State and another2019 P Cr. L J 318 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-10-03
  criminal reviewreview petitioninherent jurisdictionfinality of judgmentcriminal appealanti-corruption
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal review petition was filed before the Peshawar High Court seeking review of its previous order dated 15.09.2014, which had dismissed the petitioner's criminal appeal against his conviction under section 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 5(2) of the PC Act. The core legal question was whether a High Court possesses the inherent jurisdiction or statutory power under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to review or alter its final judgment passed in criminal appellate jurisdiction. The Court held that the right to review is a substantive right that must be expressly conferred by statute, and that Section 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 explicitly bars a criminal court from altering its judgment once signed and pronounced, save for correcting clerical errors. The Court further clarified that inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 do not extend to reviewing a final judgment on merits or rehearing an appeal. Consequently, the review petition was dismissed as not maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does a High Court have the inherent power to review or alter its final judgment in criminal appellate jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether Section 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 bars a criminal court from altering or reviewing its judgment after it has been signed and pronounced?
  • Is the right to seek a review of a judicial decision considered a substantive right that requires express statutory provision?
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• Muhammad Khursheed vs State etc.2019 MLD 2053, PLJ 2019 Cr.C. 706 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-12-14
  guilty pleanarcotics possessionrevisional jurisdictionquantum of sentencefirst offenderProhibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 1979criminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court under Articles 3 and 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, following the appellant's plea of guilty regarding the possession of 720 grams of charas. The core legal questions concerned whether an appeal is maintainable against a conviction based on a guilty plea and the extent to which an appellate court may interfere with the quantum of the sentence. The Court held that under Section 412 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, an appeal against a conviction based on a guilty plea is barred, except regarding the legality or extent of the sentence. Furthermore, the Court determined that a second appeal is not maintainable, though it exercised its revisional jurisdiction under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to convert the proceedings. The key principle laid down is that while a guilty plea limits appellate grounds, the court may exercise revisional powers to reduce a sentence in the interest of justice, particularly for a first-time offender who is the sole breadwinner.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appeal maintainable against a conviction based on a plea of guilty under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can an appellate court convert a non-maintainable second appeal into a revision petition under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • To what extent can a court interfere with a sentence imposed upon an accused who has pleaded guilty?
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• Muhammad Khan vs The State2019 YLR 226 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-08-28
  post-arrest bailnarcoticscontraband recoveryvehicle searchdriver liabilityprohibitory clauseCNSA
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Peshawar High Court through a post-arrest bail petition filed by the accused Muhammad Khan under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following the recovery of two kilograms of heroin and two kilograms of charas from secret cavities of a vehicle he was driving. The core legal questions involve whether a driver can be held liable for narcotics recovered from a vehicle's secret cavities and whether potential sentencing can be speculated upon at the bail stage. The court held that the driver cannot be absolved of liability when contraband is transported in a vehicle under his control, and that speculative sentencing or guess-work regarding quantum of punishment cannot be undertaken at the bail stage. The key principles laid down are that a driver is prima facie liable for narcotics found within the vehicle he drives, and that cases involving prohibitory clauses of the criminal procedure law generally do not warrant bail when a prima facie case exists.

  Questions settled

  • Can a driver be absolved from criminal liability if contraband is recovered from secret cavities of the vehicle he is driving?
  • Whether sentencing categorization or guess work can be undertaken by a court at the bail stage?
  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail when the offense falls within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Muhammad Javed vs The State and another2019 YLR 1208 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-10-16
  murder referencequantum of sentencemitigating circumstancesunproven motivecapital punishmentlife imprisonmenteyewitness testimonycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and connected murder reference arose from a judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant for murder and other offences under the Pakistan Penal Code and sentencing him to death on two counts. The core legal questions involved whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through ocular and circumstantial evidence, and whether the quantum of death sentence was legally justified in the absence of a proven motive and in light of mitigating circumstances. The Peshawar High Court held that the eyewitness testimony was trustworthy, natural, and corroborated by medical and circumstantial evidence, thus upholding the conviction for the murders. However, concerning the sentence, the court held that failure of the prosecution to prove the alleged motive, coupled with the precedent set regarding a co-accused in the same crime, warranted withholding the death penalty. The key principle laid down is that while concurrent ocular testimony and corroborative evidence can sustain a murder conviction, an unproven motive, uncertainty regarding fatal blows among multiple assailants, and the need for extreme caution in capital punishment justify reducing a sentence of death to imprisonment for life.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the unproven motive of the prosecution can serve as a mitigating circumstance to reduce a sentence of death to imprisonment for life?
  • Can a conviction for Qatl-i-Amd be maintained on the basis of consistent and trustworthy ocular accounts corroborated by medical and circumstantial evidence after a lapse of several years?
  • Whether the death sentence should be withheld by way of abundant caution where multiple assailants are involved and it is not clear which specific assailant caused the fatal injury?
  • Is a delay in lodging the First Information Report fatal to the prosecution's case when satisfactorily explained by the peculiar facts and circumstances?
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• Muhammad Hussan vs The State & another2020 YLR 360, 2019 PHC 224 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-09-11Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Haroon Abbasi vs Jamil Rabbani2019 YLR 671 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-12-04Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Dost and 3 others vs Circle Officer Anti-Corruption2019 MLD 1469 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-11-19Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bilal son of Muhammad Rasool vs The State etc2019 PHC 320 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-11-21
  retracted confessioncircumstantial evidenceright of private defensejuvenile offendercriminal appealsentence enhancementjudicial confessionforensic evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and connected revision petition arose from the conviction of the appellant under Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased, resulting in a ten-year rigorous imprisonment sentence. The core legal question concerned the evidentiary value of a retracted judicial confession in the absence of ocular witnesses, and whether the appellant’s claim of self-defense against sexual assault justified a lesser sentence or acquittal. The Court held that the conviction was sound, finding the appellant's judicial confession voluntary and sufficiently corroborated by medical evidence, recovery of the crime weapon, and forensic reports. Although the appellant claimed he acted to prevent sodomy, the Court ruled that by targeting the deceased's skull, the appellant exceeded the right of private defense. The Court affirmed the principle that a retracted confession, if found voluntary and truthful, can sustain a conviction even without independent corroboration, though corroboration is preferred as a matter of caution. Consequently, the Court dismissed both the appeal and the revision petition, maintaining the original sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained based on a retracted judicial confession if it is found to be voluntary and corroborated by other evidence?
  • Does the right of private defense extend to using lethal force when the accused targets a vital part of the deceased's body?
  • In a case involving both a confession and other evidence, can the court accept only the portion of the confession that supports the prosecution's case?
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• Muhammad Azeem vs The State & another2019 PHC 34 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-01-28Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam and 01 other vs Muhammad Shafiqullah Chakriyal and 03 others2019 CLC 1690, 2019 PHC 90 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-01-17Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arshad Abbasi and 3 others vs Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) through Secretary and 5 others2019 YLR 1481 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-11-29Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ahmad Khan Bittani vs The Government of Khyber2020 CLC 78, 2019 PHC 212 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-09-05Read full judgment →
• Muhamma Gul vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief2019 PLD Peshawar 184 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-06-04
  writ jurisdictionalternate remedyexhaustion of remediesfood safety authoritymaintainabilityconstitutional petitiondismissal in limine
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, bakery owners, challenged fines imposed by the Food Safety Authority through constitutional petitions filed directly in the High Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court should exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, when an alternate statutory remedy exists. The Court held that the petitions were not maintainable because the petitioners failed to exhaust the efficacious remedy of filing an appeal before the Chief Secretary, as explicitly provided under Section 16(2) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Food Safety Authority Act, 2014. The Court emphasized that writ jurisdiction is not intended to bypass statutory hierarchies or render them redundant. Absent proof of jurisdictional error, lack of authority, or flagrant disregard for natural justice, the High Court will not entertain petitions where an alternate remedy is available. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed in limine, with liberty granted to the petitioners to pursue their statutory right of appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, when an alternate statutory remedy is available?
  • Is a writ petition maintainable if the petitioner has failed to exhaust the appellate remedy provided under Section 16(2) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Food Safety Authority Act, 2014?
  • Under what circumstances can the High Court bypass an alternate statutory remedy in a constitutional petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Mubarrak Shah & others vs Rahim Khan & others2019 CLC 1806, 2020 KLR Civil Cases 315, 2019 PHC 154 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-03-25Read full judgment →
• Mst. Tuharat Firdos vs Imtiaz Khan2019 PHC 54 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-03-13Read full judgment →
• Mst. Tuharat Firdos vs Imtiaz Khan and 2 others2019 CLC 1562 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-03-13
  dissolution of marriagekhularestitution of conjugal rightsdowerreciprocal benefitsirretrievable breakdownwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenged the concurrent findings of lower courts which dismissed the petitioner's suit for dissolution of marriage and granted the respondent's suit for restitution of conjugal rights. The petitioner alleged cruelty and oral divorce, neither of which was substantiated by the record. The core legal question concerned whether the marriage should be dissolved on the ground of khula despite the failure to prove specific grounds of cruelty, and how to adjudicate the return of dower benefits. The High Court held that while the petitioner failed to prove cruelty, the irretrievable breakdown of the marital relationship necessitated dissolution on the ground of khula. Regarding the return of benefits, the Court rejected a rigid application of full restoration, emphasizing that the court may adjust financial matters based on reciprocal benefits and the parties' circumstances. Consequently, the Court dissolved the marriage, ordering the return of cash and gold ornaments but allowing the petitioner to retain the house, balancing the equities between the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Can a marriage be dissolved on the ground of khula when specific allegations of cruelty are not proven?
  • Is the return of all dower benefits mandatory upon the grant of khula?
  • Can a court adjust the return of benefits in a khula decree based on the principle of reciprocal benefits?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sherinai etc vs Zareen etc2021 KLR Revenue Cases 32, 2020 YLR 1643, 2019 PHC 314 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-11-04Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saba Gul vs Govt etc2020 CLD 251, 2020 PLJ Peshawar 51, 2019 PHC 366 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-11-27Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rifat Rana vs Rashid Mehmood and 4 others2019 PLD Peshawar 230 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-04-22
  quashment petitionbreach of peaceimmovable property disputerevisiontitle disputeforcible dispossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal quashment petition was filed by the petitioner to challenge the order of the Sessions Judge, Bannu, which had set aside the Judicial Magistrate's order and dismissed the petitioner's complaint under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. were maintainable in a dispute between co-heirs over immovable property where a civil suit had been previously pending and no specific date of forcible dispossession was mentioned. The Peshawar High Court held that the revisional court rightly set aside the magistrate's order as Section 145 has a limited scope meant solely to avert an immediate breach of the peace and cannot be utilized to settle title disputes, claims of inheritance, or private property rights between siblings, especially when the application lacked a specific date of dispossession. The court laid down the principle that the existence of a dispute regarding immovable property is not per se sufficient to attract Section 145, Cr.P.C., and such summary proceedings cannot substitute for remedies under the Specific Relief Act 1877 or the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005.

  Questions settled

  • Whether proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are maintainable for resolving title disputes or claims of inheritance between family members?
  • Can a complaint under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be sustained when the application fails to disclose the specific date or period of alleged dispossession?
  • Whether the High Court can interfere under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 with a revisional order setting aside a magistrate's order under Section 145 where no jurisdictional error is shown?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rifat Rana vs Rashid Mahmood & 4 othersPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 1388 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-04-22
  quashment petitionbreach of peaceimmovable property disputeSection 145 CrPCillegal dispossessioncivil litigationjurisdiction of Magistrate
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal quashment petition challenges an order passed by the Sessions Judge, Bannu, which set aside a Judicial Magistrate's order and dismissed the petitioner's complaint filed under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are maintainable when a dispute involves claims of title or possession between family members and lacks evidence of an imminent breach of peace. The Court held that the revisional order was correct and dismissed the petition. It reasoned that Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is designed exclusively to prevent an immediate breach of peace and cannot be utilized as a substitute for civil litigation to resolve title disputes or claims of illegal dispossession, for which remedies exist under the Specific Relief Act 1877 or the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005. The Court emphasized that without a clear threat to public peace, a Magistrate lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate property disputes under this provision, especially where the application fails to establish the requisite timeline of dispossession.

  Questions settled

  • Can proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be used to adjudicate title disputes or claims of illegal dispossession?
  • Does a Magistrate have jurisdiction under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in the absence of an imminent breach of peace?
  • Is a complaint under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 maintainable when the application fails to specify the date or period of alleged dispossession?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Maryam and another vs Managing Director Elementary Education2019 PLC (C.S.) 1463 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-10-22
  regularization of servicecontract employeesservice regulationsconstitutional petitionright to educationabsorptionstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the refusal of the Elementary Education Foundation to regularize the services of the petitioners, who were employed as Community School Teachers. The core legal question was whether the petitioners, employed on a contract basis, qualified for regularization under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Elementary Education Foundation Employees (Terms and Conditions of Service) Regulations, 2013. The respondents contended that the Regulations applied only to regular employees, not project staff, and that the petitioners' services were terminated upon the closure of their schools. The Court held that the Regulations defined "employee" without distinguishing between regular and project staff. Consequently, as the petitioners were employees on the commencing day of the Regulations, they were entitled to absorption under Paragraph-10. Furthermore, the Court found the termination of services violated a prior restraining order and Article 25-A of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The Court set aside the termination orders and directed the regularization of the petitioners' services, establishing that statutory regulations governing service conditions must be applied strictly according to their text without reading in exclusions not explicitly provided.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employer distinguish between regular and project employees for regularization purposes if the governing regulations do not explicitly provide for such a distinction?
  • Does the closure of a school and subsequent termination of staff violate a court's restraining order issued during the pendency of a petition?
  • Are contract employees who were in service on the commencing day of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Elementary Education Foundation Employees (Terms and Conditions of Service) Regulations, 2013 entitled to absorption under Paragraph-10?
  • Does the closure of community schools by a state foundation conflict with the constitutional mandate of providing free and compulsory education under Article 25-A?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Khalida Bibi and another vs Muhammad Naeem2019 CLC 1204 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-12-03Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kalsoom Bibi vs Javed Iqbal and others2019 PHC 402 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-12-05Read full judgment →
• Mst. Irum-un-Nisa and 8 others vs Mst. Naz Parver and another2019 [M] C.L.R. 1321 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-12-11Read full judgment →
• Mst. Irum UN Nisa and 8 others vs Mst. Naz Parver and another2019 CLC 335 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-12-11Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hajira Bibi vs Civil Admin Officer, Paf Base, Peshawar and 2 others2020 PLC (C.S.) 692, 2020 PLJ Peshawar 45, 2019 PHC 346 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-12-04
  missing government employeepensionary benefitsconstitutional petitionenforced disappearancefundamental rightsfamily pensionQanun-e-Shahadat
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition concerns the entitlement of the family of a missing Pakistan Air Force civilian employee to pensionary benefits and medical facilities. The petitioner sought relief after her husband went missing in 2016, requesting the release of his salary and restoration of family benefits. The core legal question was whether the family of a missing government servant is entitled to pensionary benefits before a formal declaration of death, particularly when the employee has been missing for over twelve months. The Court held that the petition should be allowed, ruling that pensionary benefits are not a bounty of the State but a fundamental right. Relying on the principle that an employee missing for over twelve months qualifies for family pension under applicable rules, and following Supreme Court precedent regarding the determination of a probable date of absence/death, the Court directed the respondents to process and revise the petitioner's pensionary benefits within two months. The judgment establishes that the family of a missing government servant is entitled to financial support and benefits when the employee has been missing for the prescribed statutory period.

  Questions settled

  • Is the family of a missing government employee entitled to pensionary benefits before a formal declaration of death?
  • Can a court determine a probable date of absence for a missing government employee to facilitate the calculation of pensionary benefits?
  • Does the right to pension constitute a fundamental right for a civil servant?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hajira Bibi vs Abidullah & others2019 PHC 179 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-05-06Read full judgment →
• Mst. Gulfama vs Mst. Jamsheda etc2019 CLC 1483, 2019 PHC 88 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-01-28Read full judgment →
• Mst. Gul Nasreen and 2 others vs Mir Zaman and 4 others2019 CLC 847 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-10-08
  civil revisionsection 12(2) CPCrecording of evidencemortgage rightsex-parte decreefraud and misrepresentationremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises from a judgment and order passed by the District Judge, Mansehra, whereby a petition filed under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was allowed. The core legal question involved the propriety of deciding a petition under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 involving disputed factual controversies without recording evidence. The Peshawar High Court held that while recording evidence is not mandatory in every case under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, where the case involves factual inquiries and disputed questions of fact, the parties must be provided a proper opportunity to produce oral and documentary evidence. The court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter back to the trial court for a fresh decision after recording evidence and affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties, laying down the principle that mechanical disposal of applications involving disputed facts without factual inquiry is contrary to the administration of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether recording of evidence is mandatory in every case arising under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a court decide a petition under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 involving controversial and disputed questions of fact without recording pro and contra evidence?
  • What is the proper course of action for a revisional court when the trial court passes an order in a summary manner without conducting a necessary factual inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Farukh Sultan vs Haji Muhammad Younas and 6 others2019 YLR 1578 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-11-26Read full judgment →
• Mst. Afsheen Atiq vs State through Advocate General & 2 othersPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 1418 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-04-15
  forfeiture of propertyanti-smugglingburden of proofdower propertytainted assetscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Special Judge, Customs, Taxation and Anti-Smuggling, whereby the appellant's residential house was forfeited to the Federal Government under the Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1977, following allegations of assets acquired through smuggling by her husband. The core legal question concerns whether the appellant successfully discharged the burden of proof to establish independent, lawful ownership of the property through her dower and sale of personal jewellery. The Peshawar High Court held that the appellant failed to establish a legal source of income, as the documentary evidence regarding her dower, sale receipts, and prior house sale contradicted her claims and revealed the property to be tainted assets derived from her husband's illegal income. Consequently, the High Court dismissed both connected appeals, laying down the principle that failure to satisfactorily discharge the statutory burden of proof regarding legitimate acquisition of assets under the anti-smuggling laws warrants the forfeiture of such property to the State.

  Questions settled

  • Whether forfeiture of property under the Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1977 can be sustained when the claimant fails to prove a legal source of income?
  • Does the burden of proof shift to the accused under the Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1977 to establish lawful acquisition of assets?
  • Can a claim of ownership based on dower and sale of personal jewelry succeed without corroborative and unimpeachable documentary evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Moulvi Muhammad Rafique and another vs Malik Munsif and others2019 [M] C.L.R. 1361 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-10-06Read full judgment →
• Mosawar Khan vs Govt of KPK & others2019 PHC 62 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-01-29Read full judgment →
• Momin vs The State and another2019 PHC 316, 2020 PLD Peshawar 70 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-11-07
  juvenile justiceunnatural offenseframing of chargespecial law vs general lawoverriding effectremand for de-novo trialchild protection
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal under Section 18 of the Juvenile Justice System Act 2018 challenges the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge IV/Judge Juvenile Court, D.I. Khan, whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. The FIR had been registered under Section 377 PPC read with Section 53 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Child Protection and Welfare Act 2010; however, the trial court framed charges solely under Section 377 PPC. The Peshawar High Court addressed whether framing charges under general penal law while omitting the relevant special law provision violates statutory procedure. The High Court held that under Section 61 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Child Protection and Welfare Act 2010, the special law possesses an overriding effect over general provisions such as Section 377 PPC. Reaffirming that special law prevails over general law and later statutes supersede earlier ones, the High Court set aside the conviction and remanded the case for a de-novo trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether special law provisions override general criminal law provisions when both address the same offense against a child?
  • Does Section 53 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Child Protection and Welfare Act 2010 prevail over Section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • What is the effect on a conviction when the trial court omits to frame a charge under an applicable special law containing an overriding clause?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Tahir and 3 others vs Ghulam Mohammad and others2019 CLC 1862 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-11-07Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Rahim Shah & others vs Muhammad Ghamash & others2019 MLD 1745, 2019 PLJ Peshawar 143, 2019 PHC 118 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-03-13Read full judgment →
• Mira Jan vs Mir Abbas, etc2019 PHC 68 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-02-13Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Tariq Shah vs StatePLJ 2019 Cr.C. 593, 2019 PHC 1 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-01-14Read full judgment →
• Messrs Wahid Builders and Techno Time Construction Company2019 MLD 107 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-08-28Read full judgment →
• Momin Khan son of Asim Khan vs The State etc2020 P Cr.L J 1322, 2019 PHC 278 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-10-30
  dying declarationcriminal appealacquittaleyewitness credibilityadverse inferencemedical evidencemurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and life imprisonment of the appellant for murder and attempted murder. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of the dying declaration, the credibility of the sole remaining eyewitness, and whether the prosecution successfully proved the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court held that the prosecution's case was fundamentally flawed due to significant contradictions in the eyewitness testimony and the failure to adhere to established legal protocols for recording a dying declaration. The Court observed that the deceased's severe head injuries rendered the alleged dying declaration highly suspect, and the prosecution failed to provide corroborating evidence. Furthermore, the withholding of an independent injured witness warranted an adverse inference against the prosecution. Consequently, the Court set aside the trial court's judgment and acquitted the appellant. The key principle laid down is that a dying declaration, while admissible, is a weak form of evidence requiring close scrutiny and corroboration, and must be recorded in strict compliance with procedural rules to be considered reliable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to produce an independent injured witness warrant an adverse inference under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • What are the essential legal requirements for a dying declaration to be considered reliable evidence?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the medical evidence contradicts the alleged dying declaration regarding the victim's capacity to speak?
  • Is a dying declaration sufficient to sustain a conviction without independent corroboration?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Gas Masters CNG Station vs Federation of Pakistan and others2019 PLJ Peshawar 113, 2019 PTD 25 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-03-22
  Federal Tax OmbudsmanjurisdictionmaladministrationIncome Tax Ordinance 2001tax refundappellate remedyCNG stationsstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  These writ petitions challenged an order by the President of Pakistan, which set aside recommendations made by the Federal Tax Ombudsman (FTO) regarding tax refund claims and penalties imposed on CNG stations. The core legal question was whether the FTO possesses jurisdiction to investigate and issue recommendations concerning tax refund claims and penalties when specific appellate remedies are available under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the FTO lacks jurisdiction where the subject matter—specifically tax assessment, refund claims, or penalties—is appealable under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Court affirmed that the FTO's jurisdiction is expressly barred under Section 9(2) of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000, where legal remedies of appeal, review, or revision are available under relevant legislation. The judgment established the principle of harmonious interpretation, ensuring that the FTO's mandate to investigate maladministration does not render statutory appellate mechanisms redundant or create a parallel, conflicting judicial hierarchy.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Tax Ombudsman have jurisdiction to investigate matters where legal remedies of appeal are available under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the imposition of penalties and the denial of tax refunds constitute maladministration amenable to the jurisdiction of the Federal Tax Ombudsman?
  • Can the Federal Tax Ombudsman issue binding recommendations on matters that are subject to statutory appeal processes under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Abid Foundry through authorized representative and another vs Pakistan through Federal Secretary, Finance and Revenue Division, Islamabad and 5 others2019 PTD 1652 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-04-03
  25th Constitutional AmendmentFATA mergertax exemptionelectricity bills tax collectionexemption certificateIncome Tax Ordinance 2001advance taxwithholding tax
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of twenty-four connected writ petitions filed by industrial units located in the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) challenging the inclusion of income tax, sales tax, extra tax, and further tax in their electricity bills. Following the merger of FATA into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa via the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 2018, the Federal Government issued S.R.O. Nos. 1212(I)/2018 and 1213(I)/2018 granting temporary fiscal exemptions until June 30, 2023. The central legal question was whether residents and businesses in the defunct FATA were required to obtain exemption certificates under Section 159 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, to avoid advance tax collection on electricity consumption. The Peshawar High Court held that the notifications granted explicit exemption from the applicability of specific statutory provisions—specifically Division-III of Part-V, Chapter-X, and Chapter-XII of the Ordinance—rather than mere conditional tax exemptions. Consequently, the Court declared the collection of advance taxes on electricity bills illegal and ruled that no exemption certificates under Section 159 are required for statutory provisions rendered inapplicable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 apply to industrial units in erstwhile FATA following the 25th Constitutional Amendment in light of S.R.O. 1213(I)/2018?
  • Does a taxpayer require an exemption certificate under Section 159 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 when statutory provisions governing tax collection are made entirely inapplicable by notification?
  • Can advance tax on electricity consumption under Section 235 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 be levied on businesses granted statutory immunity from withholding tax provisions?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehtab vs State and anotherPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 74 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-02-27
  criminal appealarms ordinancerecovery of weaponfirearms expert reportjudicial confessionillegal weapons
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant-convict Mehtab challenged his conviction and sentence under Section 13 of the Arms Ordinance passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-II, Abbottabad, vide judgment dated 05.06.2015, arising from FIR No. 1057 registered at Police Station Cantt: Abbottabad. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully proved the recovery of the weapon and the guilt of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt under Section 13 of the Arms Ordinance. The Peshawar High Court held that the prosecution successfully established the recovery of the pistol from the crime scene where the appellant and the deceased were present, supported by the production of the weapon's license by the appellant's father and a positive Firearms Expert report, as well as the appellant's judicial confession. The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction and sentence. The key principle laid down is that where the recovery of a weapon from the crime scene is corroborated by forensic evidence, license ownership, and credible witness testimony, the conviction under the Arms Ordinance is sustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the recovery of a weapon from the crime scene is sufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 13 of the Arms Ordinance when corroborated by forensic evidence and a judicial confession?
  • Does the production of a weapon's license by the accused's father aid the prosecution in proving a charge under the Arms Ordinance?
  • Whether minor discrepancies during the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses are sufficient to set aside a conviction under the Arms Ordinance?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehboob Sultan vs Managing Director, FDC, Phase-v, Hayatabad, Peshawar and 3 others2019 PLC (C.S.) 587 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-07-10
  higher grade payofficiating allowancecivil servantown pay and scaleconstitutional petitionservice lawremuneration
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an Assistant Manager (BPS-17) in the Forest Development Corporation, sought constitutional jurisdiction to claim salary and allowances for the post of Deputy Director (BPS-18), which he held from 30.3.1998 to 30.6.2008. The respondent corporation contended that the petitioner was posted in his own pay and scale and had accepted the condition that such posting would not confer rights to higher pay or seniority. The core legal question was whether a civil servant performing duties of a higher post is entitled to the pay of that post, notwithstanding a condition in the posting order restricting remuneration to the employee's original pay scale. The Court held that the petitioner was entitled to the salary and allowances of the higher post (BPS-18) for the duration he performed those duties. Relying on established jurisprudence, the Court affirmed that a civil servant discharging the functions of a higher grade is entitled to the pay attached to that post, and conditions in a posting order restricting such pay are inconsequential and legally unenforceable.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil servant entitled to the salary of a higher post if they performed the duties of that post despite being posted in their own pay and scale?
  • Does a condition in a posting order restricting an employee to their original pay scale bar them from claiming the salary of a higher post they actually occupied?
  • Can a civil servant claim higher grade pay for a period during which they discharged the functions of that higher post?
  Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Ali s vs The State etc2019 PHC 9, 2019 P Cr. L J 899, PLJ 2019 Cr.C. 380 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-01-28
  post-arrest bailjuvenile justicebailable offenceunnatural offencemajor offenceminor offencefurther inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by a juvenile accused of attempting to commit an unnatural offence under the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and offences under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Child Protection and Welfare Act, 2010. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, being a juvenile under the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, was entitled to be treated as an accused of a bailable offence pursuant to Section 6(3) of the said Act. The Court held that the petitioner, as a juvenile, falls within the protective ambit of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018. The Court determined that the offences charged, when analyzed under the definitions of 'major' and 'minor' offences provided in the Act, mandate that the juvenile be treated as if accused of a bailable offence. Furthermore, the Court found that the prosecution's case lacked sufficient evidentiary support, rendering the charges a matter of further inquiry. Consequently, the Court allowed the bail petition, establishing the principle that Section 6(3) of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, confers a mandatory right to be treated as accused of a bailable offence for juveniles.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 6(3) of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, mandate that a juvenile accused of a major or minor offence be treated as if accused of a bailable offence?
  • Does an attempt to commit an offence under Section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, fall within the definition of a major offence under the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018?
  • Is a juvenile entitled to bail when the prosecution lacks eyewitness testimony or medical evidence to support the charges?
  Read full judgment →
• Mati-Ullah and another vs Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Service2019 PLJ Peshawar 172 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Masud Ur Rehman, Superintendent, Central Prison, Peshawar vs Amjad2019 PLC (C.S.) 70 · Peshawar High Court
  contempt of courtcivil service promotiondeferment of promotionexecutive domainSenior Management Coursetrichotomy of powersrecruitment rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose out of a contempt of court petition filed under Article 204 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, seeking action against the respondents for alleged non-compliance with a prior High Court order directing them to consider the petitioner for promotion to the post of Inspector General of Prisons (BPS-20). The legal core questions before the High Court were whether deferment of a promotion case constitutes contempt of court when the employer considers the candidate as directed, and whether the government possesses the executive authority to enhance qualifications or mandate additional administrative training for promotion. The Peshawar High Court held that once the competent authority considers a civil servant's promotion case pursuant to judicial directions, the court's order stands complied with, rendering contempt proceedings infructuous. Furthermore, the court held that deferment is not a punishment and that framing recruitment rules, altering promotion criteria, or mandating courses like the Senior Management Course falls within the executive's policy domain under the principle of trichotomy of powers, which courts cannot usurp. Consequently, the contempt petition was dismissed and show-cause notices were recalled.

  Questions settled

  • Does deferring a civil servant's promotion case after considering them pursuant to a court order amount to contempt of court?
  • Does the government have the executive power to enhance qualifications and standards for civil service promotion?
  • Can a civil servant claim a vested right in the terms and conditions for promotion to a higher post?
  • Does the judiciary have the jurisdiction to interfere with or alter executive recruitment policies under the principle of trichotomy of powers?
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• Masoom Jan vs Federation of Pakistan2020 PLD Peshawar 1, 2019 PHC 284 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-11-05Read full judgment →
• Mashad Ali son of Awan Ali vs The State etc2019 PHC 286 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-11-06
  dying declarationocular evidencemitigating circumstancemotivesentence enhancementinterested witnesscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant for the murder of Maroof Ali, while the State seeks enhancement of the sentence to death. The core legal questions concern the reliability of the deceased's dying declaration, the credibility of an interested witness, and whether the prosecution's failure to prove the alleged motive constitutes a mitigating factor for sentencing. The Court held that the conviction was sound, relying on the dying declaration, which was corroborated by consistent ocular testimony and medical evidence. Regarding the sentence, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision, ruling that because the prosecution failed to prove the alleged motive, the death penalty was not warranted, and the sentence of life imprisonment remained appropriate. The judgment reiterates that a dying declaration, if found truthful, requires no corroboration, and that the testimony of a close relative cannot be discarded solely on the basis of relationship if it is otherwise trustworthy. Furthermore, the failure to establish a motive serves as a valid mitigating circumstance in determining the quantum of sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a dying declaration be acted upon without corroboration?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove the alleged motive serve as a mitigating circumstance for sentencing?
  • Can the testimony of a close relative be discarded solely on the ground of their relationship to the deceased?
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• Maroof & others vs Daud & others2020 YLR 95, 2019 PLJ Peshawar 137 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-11-19Read full judgment →
• Maple Leaf Cement Factory Limited vs Federal Investigation Agency2019 YLR 2296 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-02-27Read full judgment →
• Manzi Gul son of Said Nabi, r/o Ali Masjid Jamrud, District Khyber vs The2019 PHC 350 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-12-16
  post-arrest bailnarcotic substancesFSL report tamperingrecovery of narcoticsjudicial noticedisciplinary actioncriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a case involving the recovery of 21 kilograms of heroin from a vehicle under his control, registered under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. During proceedings, the court identified significant discrepancies in the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report, which had been tampered with to change the substance identification from 'Chars' to 'heroin'. Despite conflicting testimonies from the Director of FSL and the Government Analyst regarding the substance's nature and the report's integrity, the court observed that the petitioner was apprehended red-handed with a substantial quantity of narcotics. The recovery was corroborated by the seizing officer and witnesses under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The court held that the manipulated FSL report, while warranting a serious departmental inquiry, did not entitle the petitioner to bail given the strong ocular evidence of possession. The bail petition was dismissed, and the court directed the Inspector General of Police to initiate disciplinary action against the delinquent officials involved in the tampering.

  Questions settled

  • Does a manipulated or contradictory Forensic Science Laboratory report automatically entitle an accused to bail in a narcotics case?
  • Can the court deny bail when there is strong ocular evidence of recovery despite irregularities in the forensic report?
  • What is the scope of the court's authority to direct departmental inquiries against officials involved in tampering with evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzar Khan vs NAB through Chairman NAB, Islamabad & two others2020 P Cr. L J 136, 2019 PHC 190 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-08-19
  bailNational Accountability Ordinancepublic at largejurisdiction of NABabsconsioncheatingaccountability court
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former government employee, sought bail in a National Accountability Bureau (NAB) reference alleging he defrauded 27 individuals of Rs. 44.414 million through a tractor booking scheme. The core legal question was whether the petitioner’s alleged actions constituted an offence of cheating the “public at large” under Section 9(a)(ix) of the National Accountability Ordinance 1999, thereby justifying NAB’s jurisdiction, and whether the petitioner was entitled to bail despite prior absconsion. The Court held that the number of affected persons (27) did not meet the threshold of “public at large,” relying on Supreme Court precedents and NAB’s own Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) which quantify this term as involving more than 50 persons and amounts exceeding Rs. 100 million. Consequently, the Court found a serious question regarding NAB’s jurisdiction, which constitutes a valid ground for bail. The principle laid down is that where there is a serious question regarding the jurisdiction of an investigating agency, such as the failure to meet statutory conditions precedent for cognizance, it provides sufficient grounds for the grant of bail, even if the accused had previously absconded.

  Questions settled

  • Does the number of affected persons in a fraud case constitute 'public at large' under Section 9(a)(ix) of the National Accountability Ordinance 1999 if the count is below 50?
  • Can an accused be denied bail solely on the ground of prior absconsion if the case is otherwise fit for bail?
  • Does a serious question regarding the jurisdiction of an investigating agency constitute a valid ground for the grant of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Zafrullah vs The State and another2019 MLD 906, 2019 PHC 48 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-01-31Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Jalil vs Federal Secretary for Defense, Islamabad and 7 others2019 CLC 127 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-09-05
  constitutional petitioncontractual obligationswrit jurisdictionalternative remedymaintainabilitycivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, seeking to enforce contractual obligations arising from an agreement dated 28.11.2017 for the construction and operation of a petrol pump and allied facilities. The core legal question was whether a constitutional petition is maintainable for the enforcement of purely contractual rights and obligations. The Peshawar High Court held that contractual rights, commitments, and obligations must be enforced through courts of ordinary jurisdiction and should not be interfered with by the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction. The court established the key principle that a breach of contract or failure to honour obligations arising out of a private agreement cannot be adjudicated or remedied within the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, and the aggrieved party must avail the normal remedy of a civil suit.

  Questions settled

  • Can contractual obligations arising from an agreement be enforced through a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable for the redressal of a breach of contract?
  • What is the appropriate remedy under the law for the enforcement of contractual rights and commitments?
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• Malik Iftikhar etc vs Syed Abid Hussain2020 YLR 895, 2019 PHC 326 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-10-03Read full judgment →
• Land Acquisition Collector, NHA Abbottabad and 4 others vs Banaras Khan2019 [M] C.L.R. 1328 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Lal Sahib Gul vs Zia-ud-Din etc2019 KLR Revenue Case 47, 2019 PLJ Peshawar 128, 2019 YLR 2385, 2019 PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2019-02-11Read full judgment →
• Khyber Khan vs Shahid Zaman2019 P Cr. L J 979, PLJ 2019 Cr.C. 383, 2019 PHC 7 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-01-24
  acquittal appealdouble presumption of innocencedying declarationmedical evidence contradictionbenefit of the doubtocular accountmurder trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court acquitting the respondent of a murder charge under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution's case rested on an ocular account, medical evidence, and a dying declaration. Upon review, the High Court found multiple discrepancies, noting that the medical evidence and site plan contradicted the eyewitness testimony regarding the trajectory of the firearm injury. Furthermore, the court observed that the dying declaration lacked essential legal safeguards, including medical certification of the deceased's consciousness and orientation at the time it was made, as well as non-compliance with the procedures outlined in the Police Rules 1934. The court reiterated that an acquittal judgment earns a double presumption of innocence which cannot be disturbed unless shown to be perverse or resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Finding the prosecution's case fraught with reasonable doubts, the appellate court upheld the acquittal and dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with an acquittal judgment that enjoys the presumption of double innocence without cogent and tangible evidence?
  • What are the essential legal requirements for a dying declaration to be safely relied upon by a court of law?
  • Does non-compliance with the procedural requirements for recording a dying declaration under the Police Rules 1834 render it untrustworthy?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the medical evidence and the site plan directly contradict the ocular account provided by the prosecution?
  Read full judgment →
• Khurshid vs the State2020 MLD 352, 2019 PHC 198 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-09-17Read full judgment →
• Khial Badshah vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through District2019 CLC 1401, 2019 PHC 134 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-03-11Read full judgment →
• Khadim Nabi son of Muhammad Umar vs The State etc2019 PHC 236 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-10-02
  murdercapital punishmentenhancement of sentencerelated witnesseseyewitness accountmotivemitigating circumstancescriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and connected revision petition arise from a judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased and sentencing him to imprisonment for life, while the complainant sought enhancement of the sentence to death. The core legal questions involved the credibility of related eyewitnesses, the corroborative value of medical and circumstantial evidence, and the existence of mitigating circumstances justifying a lesser sentence than death. The Peshawar High Court held that the ocular account furnished by the complainant and an eyewitness was trustworthy, natural, and confidence-inspiring, and was sufficiently corroborated by prompt lodging of the FIR, medical evidence, and a proven land dispute serving as motive. The court ruled that mere relationship to the deceased does not disqualify a natural witness. Finding no mitigating circumstances and concluding that the murder was premeditated, the court dismissed the appellant's appeal, allowed the revision petition, and enhanced the sentence from imprisonment for life to the normal penalty of death. The key principle laid down is that reliable ocular testimony from natural witnesses is sufficient for a capital conviction without mandatory independent material corroboration, and the absence of mitigating circumstances warrants the normal death penalty for premeditated murder.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of eyewitnesses related to the deceased can be discarded solely on the ground of their relationship when their presence is natural and their testimony is confidence-inspiring?
  • Does the failure to send crime empties to the Forensic Science Laboratory vitiate an otherwise established prosecution case based on trustworthy ocular testimony?
  • Whether a pre-planned murder stemming from a land dispute leaves room for mitigating circumstances to warrant a lesser sentence than death?
  • Can the appellate court enhance a sentence of life imprisonment to the normal penalty of death in the absence of valid reasons given by the trial court for awarding the lesser sentence?
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• Karam Shah & others vs Provincial Secretary Forest KPK & others2020 CLC 1085, 2019 PHC 330 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-10-10Read full judgment →
• Kabal Khan & others vs Rehmanzay & others2020 MLD 1230, 2019 PHC 388 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-10-04Read full judgment →
• Jibran Rasheed vs Siraj Ul Haq and another2019 YLR 2891 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-08-10
  post-arrest baildishonoured chequeprohibitory clausebusiness transactionlesser punishmentcriminal breach
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition is directed by the petitioner seeking post-arrest bail in case FIR registered under section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, relating to the dishonouring of a cheque given in a business transaction. The core legal question before the Peshawar High Court was whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail when the offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and arises from a business dispute. The High Court allowed the petition and granted bail to the petitioner, holding that the offence under section 489-F carries a maximum punishment of three years imprisonment or fine, which does not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and where alternate sentences are provided, the lesser punishment must be considered. The key principles laid down are that bail in such cases is a rule and refusal an exception, that disputes arising from business transactions lean towards civil nature, and that the mere pendency of other criminal cases without conviction is insufficient to deny liberty.

  Questions settled

  • Does an offence under section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is bail to be granted as a rule when an offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Which punishment is to be considered for the purpose of bail when an offence provides for alternate sentences of imprisonment or fine?
  • Can bail be refused solely on the ground that other criminal cases are pending against the accused without proof of conviction?
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• Jehangir vs StatePLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 489, 2019 PHC 412 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-12-27Read full judgment →
• Jawad son of Muzafar vs The State etc2020 YLR 1462, 2019 PHC 238 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-10-03
  criminal appealmurderfalsus in uno falsus in omnibusbenefit of doubteyewitness credibilityacquittalappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for the murder of the deceased under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, given the contradictions in the evidence and the trial court's inconsistent treatment of the co-accused. The Peshawar High Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant, holding that the prosecution's case was riddled with significant doubts regarding the timing of the FIR and the presence of eyewitnesses. The Court emphasized that the trial court erred by convicting the appellant while acquitting a co-accused on the same set of evidence, which violates the principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. The Court reaffirmed that once a witness is found to have deliberately lied on a material aspect, their testimony cannot be relied upon. Consequently, the Court held that the benefit of doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused, as conviction requires unimpeachable evidence and certainty of guilt.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court convict an accused based on evidence that it has already disbelieved to acquit a co-accused?
  • Does the rule of 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus' require the rejection of testimony from a witness found to have lied on a material aspect?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when there are significant, unexplained delays in reporting the crime and contradictions regarding the presence of eyewitnesses?
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• Javed Khan etc vs The State etc2019 P Cr. L J 1756, 2019 PLJ Peshawar 156, 2019 PHC 78 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-03-04
  constitutional petitiondischarge of accusedpolice reportinvestigating officerjudicial magistratecognizance of offencefurther investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, impugning an order passed by the Judicial Magistrate whereby the recommendation of the investigating officer to discharge the accused was turned down, and further investigation was ordered. The core legal question was whether a magistrate is bound by the police report recommending discharge of an accused and whether a magistrate can direct further investigation or disagree with the police report. The Peshawar High Court held that a police report submitted under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is not binding on the court, and the determination of guilt or innocence is the exclusive domain of the courts of law. The court ruled that a magistrate is fully competent to disagree with the investigating officer's report, take cognizance of the offence, or direct further investigation. Consequently, the petition was dismissed in limine, upholding the impugned order of the Judicial Magistrate.

  Questions settled

  • Is a police report recommending the discharge of an accused binding on a magistrate?
  • Can a magistrate direct further investigation or disagree with the report of an investigating officer?
  • What is the scope of a magistrate's powers upon receiving a report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Javed and others vs State2019 PHC 186 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-08-01Read full judgment →
• Javed Akhtar and 8 others vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, through Secretary Local Bodies_Government, Peshawar and 5 others2019 CLC 1185 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-10-25Read full judgment →
• Jahan Daraz alias Jahan Gully vs Khan Bahadar and another2020 KLR Criminal Cases 361, 2019 MLD 1283 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-06-07
  post-arrest bailabscondencemurderfugitive from lawcriminal trialSection 302 PPCbail refusal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous bail application concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by an accused charged under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the complainant's brother. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who had been absconding for approximately twenty years following the incident, was entitled to the concession of bail despite the merits of the case and the commencement of the trial. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the bail application, holding that the petitioner was not entitled to bail. The court reasoned that the petitioner was specifically nominated in a promptly lodged FIR, his presence was supported by eyewitnesses, and the medico-legal report corroborated the prosecution's version. Crucially, the court established the principle that a fugitive from law loses certain procedural and substantive rights, and noticeable abscondence disentitles an accused to the concession of bail, regardless of the case's merits. Furthermore, the court noted that bail is generally discouraged when the trial has already commenced and charges have been framed.

  Questions settled

  • Does noticeable abscondence disentitle an accused to the concession of bail regardless of the merits of the case?
  • Should bail be granted when the trial has already commenced and the charge has been framed?
  • Does a fugitive from law lose normal rights granted by procedural and substantive law?
  Read full judgment →
• Ishtiaq Hussain Shah vs Mushtaq Hussain Shah and another2020 [M] C L R 1134, 2019 MLD 314 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-12-11Read full judgment →
• Iqbal Rabbani and 3 others vs Noor Ul Ain and 2 others2019 MLD 401 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-10-05Read full judgment →