Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 46,805 judgments in total from the Sindh High Court.

• Civil Aviation Authority vs Messrs Aer Rianta International and 32017 CLC 1461 · Sindh High Court · 2014-12-02Read full judgment →
• China Harbour Engineering Company Ltd. through Liu Ce vs Pakistan2017 PTD 1852 · Sindh High Court · 2015-07-24Read full judgment →
• (1) Cherat Cement Company Limited (2) Ghazanfar Ali and another vs (1)2017 SHC 292 · Sindh High Court · 2017-07-28Read full judgment →
• Chairman, Mari Gas Co. Ltd. and 2 others vs Abdul Rehman2017 YLR 2504 · Sindh High Court · 2016-03-22Read full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Ashraf vs Hafeez-Ur-Rehman and another2017 YLR 1525 · Sindh High Court · 2015-11-30Read full judgment →
• (1) CDR. ( R ) Mansoob Ali Khan (2) Adil Rashid (3) Brigadier (Retd) Kamran2019 CLC 1444, 2017 SHC 393 · Sindh High Court · 2017-12-11
  constitutional jurisdictionmaintainability of writ petitionstatutory bodyterms and conditions of serviceconversion of civil suitmaster and servantPTCL
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Sindh High Court addresses a batch of intra-court appeals and constitutional petitions arising from civil suits filed by employees of statutory bodies, specifically the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL) and Port Qasim Authority, challenging disciplinary actions and termination of service. The core legal questions involved whether civil suits filed by employees of statutory bodies regarding their terms and conditions of service can be converted into constitutional petitions and heard by a Division Bench, and whether PTCL and Port Qasim Authority constitute 'persons' performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation under Article 199 of the Constitution. The court held that High Courts possess the inherent power to convert one kind of proceeding into another to prevent injustice and that PTCL and Port Qasim Authority are statutory bodies performing public functions, making them amenable to the constitutional writ jurisdiction. The key principles laid down include that employees governed by statutory service rules can invoke constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 against statutory corporations and that courts are not barred from converting civil suits into writ petitions in appropriate circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether civil suits filed by employees of statutory bodies relating to their terms and conditions of service having statutory service rules can be converted into constitutional petitions?
  • Whether a writ could be issued against the Respondent Port Qasim Authority under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Whether Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited is a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation under Article 199 of the Constitution?
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• Brig. Retd. Arif Mahmud Malik vs Karachi International Container2017 PLC (C.S.) 914 · Sindh High Court · 2016-01-04
  master and servantwrongful terminationdamages for breach of contractemployment contractnotice periodburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a civil suit for recovery and damages filed by a former employee against a private terminal company for alleged wrongful termination of a three-year employment contract. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of a suit for damages under the master and servant relationship, whether the termination breached any oral assurances of job security, and the reasonableness of the notice period provided in the contract. The court held that since the employment was governed by master and servant principles without statutory backing, the plaintiff could not claim reinstatement but could maintain a suit for damages, though he failed to prove any extra-contractual assurances. However, the court held that a thirty-day notice period was unreasonably short for a senior executive in the private sector, determining that a one-hundred-and-twenty-day notice period or payment in lieu thereof was reasonable. Consequently, the suit was partly decreed, granting the plaintiff the salary for the remaining ninety days after accounting for the thirty days already paid.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee maintain a suit for damages upon termination of service where the relationship is governed by the principle of master and servant?
  • Whether an employee can claim damages for breach of contract based on uncorroborated oral assurances of job security that contradict the written appointment letter?
  • Is the reasonableness of a contractual notice period examinable by a court in a private employment contract?
  • What constitutes a reasonable notice period for the termination of a senior executive contract in the absence of a statutory framework?
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• Bishop Ejaz Inayat vs Rt. Rev. Alexander John Malik and 7 others2017 PLD Sindh 528 · Sindh High Court · 2016-12-30
  rejection of plaintdeclaratory suitecclesiastical matterslocus standispecific reliefcause of actionclean hands doctrine
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application under Order VII, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, seeking the rejection of a plaint filed by the plaintiff against the Church of Pakistan and its officials. The core legal questions were whether the plaintiff had a valid cause of action to challenge the internal ecclesiastical affairs and elections of the Church, and whether the suit for declaration and injunction was maintainable under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877. The Court held that the plaint failed to disclose a cause of action, as the plaintiff did not demonstrate that his own legal character or property rights were in jeopardy. Furthermore, the Court determined that civil courts should not interfere in purely ecclesiastical or religious matters unless civil rights are directly infringed. Emphasizing that declaratory relief is discretionary and requires the plaintiff to approach the court with clean hands, the Court found the plaintiff’s conduct unconscionable. Consequently, the Court rejected the plaint, affirming that the suit was a futile exercise and an abuse of the legal process.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil court interfere in the internal ecclesiastical affairs and elections of a religious body?
  • Does a plaintiff have a cause of action to seek a declaration under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 if their own legal character or property rights are not in jeopardy?
  • Under what circumstances can a court reject a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is a plaintiff entitled to discretionary relief if they approach the court with unclean hands?
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• Bashir vs The State2017 P Cr. L J 1298 · Sindh High Court · 2016-11-10
  narcoticsheroin recoveryofficial witnessessection 103 Cr.P.C.CNS Actcriminal appealsub-section 9(c)
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Special Court-II (CNS) Karachi, whereby the appellant was convicted under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the possession of twenty kilograms of heroin and sentenced to life imprisonment with a fine. The core legal questions involved the credibility of official witnesses in the absence of private mashirs, the applicability of section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, to narcotics cases, and the sufficiency of evidence. The Sindh High Court held that the testimony of excise officials, when trustworthy and corroborated by a positive chemical report, is sufficient for conviction, especially given that section 25 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, excludes the application of section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The court laid down that official witnesses are competent witnesses like any others and that public reluctance to act as mashirs does not vitiate recovery proceedings, modifying only the default sentence for the fine while dismissing the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of excise or police officials can be relied upon without independent corroboration in narcotics cases?
  • Does section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, apply to searches and arrests made under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • What is the effect of the public's reluctance to act as mashirs on the validity of a recovery under narcotics laws?
  • Can a conviction under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, be sustained solely on the evidence of official witnesses supported by a positive chemical report?
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• Bashir Ahmed vs Khalid Sibghatullah & othersPLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Karachi) 1042 · Sindh High Court · 2016-05-17
  criminal acquittal appealpresumption of double innocencedirect complaintcriminal intimidationcheatingmiscarriage of justiceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal acquittal appeal challenged an order of the trial court acquitting the respondents in a direct complaint case involving allegations of cheating and criminal intimidation under Sections 420 and 506(2) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The complainant alleged that after purchasing agricultural land, the respondents failed to provide possession and subsequently threatened him with weapons. The trial court acquitted the respondents, relying on official duty certificates indicating they were stationed elsewhere during the alleged incident, concluding that the charge was groundless and conviction unlikely. The High Court reviewed the matter, noting that the complainant failed to demonstrate any misreading or non-reading of evidence. The Court affirmed that an order of acquittal creates a presumption of double innocence, which cannot be disturbed unless the acquittal is shown to be fanciful, erroneous, or a miscarriage of justice. Finding the trial court's reasoning sound and the complainant's allegations implausible given the respondents' official positions, the High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order of acquittal create a presumption of double innocence that requires strong grounds to overturn?
  • Can a trial court acquit an accused under Section 249-A or Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the charge is groundless and conviction is unlikely?
  • Is an appellate court permitted to interfere with an acquittal order if the appellant fails to demonstrate that the trial court's reasoning was fanciful or erroneous?
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• Basar & others vs The State Complainant: Fakhar-ul-Jamil2017 SHC 134 · Sindh High Court · 2017-02-13Read full judgment →
• Barkat Ali (deceased) through Legal Heirs and 6 others vs Mohammad2017 MLD 1339 · Sindh High Court · 2015-10-08Read full judgment →
• Bankers Equity Limited and 5 others vs Messrs Pangrio Sugar Mills Ltd.2017 CLD 1148 · Sindh High Court · 2017-02-20Read full judgment →
• Bank of Punjab through Attorney vs Dewan Salman Fiber Limited2017 CLD 451 · Sindh High Court · 2016-08-25Read full judgment →
• Bank Alfalah Limited vs Interglobe Commerce Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. and 5 others2017 PLJ Karachi 85 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Bakht Siddique and 61 others vs Federation of Pakistan and Others2017 PLC (C.S.) 1192 · Sindh High Court · 2017-06-01
  regularization of servicewrit jurisdictioncontract employeespublic sector companyemployer-employee relationshipconstitutional petitionPakistan State Oil
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns constitutional petitions filed by employees seeking regularization of their services at Pakistan State Oil Company Ltd. (PSO). The core legal questions were whether PSO is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, and whether contract employees, ostensibly hired through a third-party contractor, are entitled to regularization under the Government of Pakistan's Office Memorandum dated 29.08.2008. The Court held that PSO, being a public sector company controlled by the Government, performs functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation and is therefore subject to writ jurisdiction. On the merits, the Court determined that where an employer retains control over the means and method of work, an employer-employee relationship exists regardless of the contractual arrangement. Consequently, the Court directed the respondent to consider the petitioners for regularization, applying the principle that long-serving contract employees in public sector entities, who work under the direct supervision of the company, are entitled to be treated as employees of that company.

  Questions settled

  • Is a public sector company like Pakistan State Oil Company Ltd. amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does an employer-employee relationship exist between a company and workers hired through a third-party contractor if the company retains control over the means and method of work?
  • Can the National Industrial Relations Commission determine or order the regularization of contract employees in a public sector organization?
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• (1) Bakht Siddique and 61 others (2) Amanullah Tamimy (3) Syed Farhat2017 PLC (C.S.) 1192, 2017 SHC 273 · Sindh High Court · 2017-06-01
  regularization of servicecontract employeesmaintainability of constitutional petitionpublic sector companyemployer-employee relationshipthird-party contractor
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses multiple constitutional petitions filed by employees seeking regularization of their services in Pakistan State Oil Company Ltd (PSO) based on an Office Memorandum dated 29.08.2008 issued by the Government of Pakistan. The core legal questions involve whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan is maintainable against PSO, and whether contract or wage-based workers rendering long-term services—including through third-party contractors—are entitled to regularization. The Sindh High Court held that PSO is a public sector company performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation and is thus amenable to writ jurisdiction. On merits, the court ruled that employees continuously working on permanent posts under the direct or indirect control of the company are entitled to regularization in light of settled precedents and the Government's policy. The petitions were disposed of with a direction to the Chief Executive Officer of PSO to consider the petitioners for regularization without discrimination.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan is maintainable against Pakistan State Oil Company Ltd?
  • Does an employer-employee relationship exist between a company and workers supplied through a third-party contractor when the company exercises supervision and control?
  • Are contract employees and wage-based workers continuously serving on permanent posts entitled to regularization under the Office Memorandum dated 29.08.2008?
  • Does the National Industrial Relations Commission have exclusive jurisdiction to determine regularization claims, barring the High Court's writ jurisdiction?
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• Bashir Ahmed through Special Attorney vs Mst. Fatima Begum and 32017 YLR 453 · Sindh High Court · 2016-09-29
  concurrent findings of factconstitutional jurisdictionrent evictionlandlord and tenantcivil revisionabuse of processburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a Civil Revision Application and a Constitutional Petition challenging concurrent findings of lower courts regarding the ownership and possession of a property. The applicant sought a declaration of ownership, alleging that the respondents fraudulently obtained title documents. Conversely, the respondents contended that the applicant had sold the property to them, subsequently entering into a tenancy agreement, and had defaulted on rent payments. The trial courts and appellate forums consistently found that the applicant had validly transferred the property and was a tenant in default. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, could interfere with concurrent findings of fact established by subordinate courts. The Court held that the applicant failed to discharge the burden of proof and that the evidence supported the respondents' claim of ownership and tenancy. The Court affirmed the principle that High Court constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked as a substitute for a second appeal or revision to challenge concurrent findings of fact, particularly in rent matters where statutory remedies are limited. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 allow for a second appeal or revision against an appellate order?
  • Is a party entitled to relief when they fail to discharge the burden of proof regarding property ownership?
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• Aziz-Ur-Rehman Chaudhry vs Pakistan International Airlines2017 PLC (C.S.) 745 · Sindh High Court · 2015-05-29
  constitutional petitionmaster and servantservice mattersmaintainabilitypension benefitswrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a retired employee of the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC), filed this constitutional petition seeking the implementation of various internal circulars regarding pension benefits and the recalculation of his pension arrears. The core legal question was whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, is maintainable for an employee of the PIAC to enforce terms and conditions of service. The respondent contended that the petition was not maintainable because the service rules of the corporation are non-statutory, creating a relationship governed by the principle of 'master and servant.' The Court held that the petition was not maintainable. Relying on established precedents from the Supreme Court, the Court affirmed that PIAC service rules are not statutory, as they were not framed under Section 30 of the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Act 1956 with the required government approval. Consequently, the relationship is contractual, and service-related grievances must be pursued through a court of competent jurisdiction rather than through writ jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed, with liberty granted to the petitioner to approach the appropriate forum.

  Questions settled

  • Is a constitutional petition under Article 199 maintainable for service-related grievances of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation employees?
  • Are the service rules and regulations of the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation considered statutory?
  • Does the principle of master and servant apply to the employment relationship between the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation and its employees?
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• Aziz ur Rehman vs Rashid Ahmed and Other2017 SHC 343 · Sindh High Court · 2017-10-31Read full judgment →
• Azhar Jawaid vs Federation of Pakistan & others2017 SHC 95 · Sindh High Court · 2017-01-13
  Armed Forces inductioncivil servicequota allocationjudicial restraintgovernment policyEstacodeinter-services quota
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged the recommendation of the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) for the induction of an Armed Forces officer into the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP). The petitioner, an officer from the Pakistan Navy, argued that the apportionment of vacancies among the three Armed Forces branches (Army, Navy, and Air Force) based on a 1991 meeting's minutes violated the policy laid out in Serial No. 244 of the Estacode, which governs the induction of Armed Forces officers into civil service. The core legal question was whether the inter-services quota allocation was illegal or ultra vires to the established policy. The Court held that the policy decision regarding the distribution of vacancies among the three services was a valid, equitable, and long-standing administrative arrangement that did not violate the Estacode. The Court affirmed that courts exercise judicial restraint regarding government policy unless it is proven mala fide or violates fundamental rights. The principle laid down is that administrative authorities may devise reasonable, non-discriminatory modalities for vacancy distribution to ensure equitable representation, provided such measures do not contravene the primary governing rules.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Federal Public Service Commission or the government devise an inter-services quota for the induction of Armed Forces officers into civil service?
  • Does the allocation of vacancies among the Army, Navy, and Air Force violate the policy set out in Serial No. 244 of the Estacode?
  • Is a petition challenging the criteria for selection maintainable if the Federal Public Service Commission lacks the authority to change that criteria?
  • To what extent can the High Court interfere with government policy decisions regarding service structure and vacancy distribution?
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• Azhar Jawaid through Attorney vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary and 3 others2017 PLC (C.S.) 929 · Sindh High Court · 2017-01-13
  civil serviceArmed Forces inductionPolice Service of Pakistaninter-services quotaEstacodeFederal Public Service Commissiongovernment policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was brought before the Sindh High Court to challenge the recommendation of the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) for the induction of respondent No. 4 into the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP) from the Armed Forces quota, bypassing the petitioner whose merit position was higher. The core legal questions involved whether the inter-services apportionment formula for allocating Armed Forces induction vacancies among the Army, Navy, and Air Force agreed upon in a 1991 meeting violated the governing policy (Estacode Sl. No. 244), and whether the petition was maintainable in light of alternative statutory remedies under the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977. The court held that the 1991 apportionment formula was a fair, equitable, and approved mechanism that did not violate the governing policy, and that the petition was maintainable as the FPSC lacked jurisdiction to review policy criteria. The court laid down the principle that the judiciary will exercise judicial restraint and not interfere with government policies or service allocation modalities unless they are proven to be mala fide, discriminatory, or violative of fundamental rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the inter-services apportionment formula for allocating civil service vacancies among the Army, Navy, and Air Force violates Estacode Sl. No. 244?
  • Whether an aggrieved candidate is required to exhaust statutory review before the Federal Public Service Commission when challenging the underlying selection criteria or apportionment formula itself?
  • Under what circumstances can the High Court interfere with a government policy regarding service induction and quota allocation?
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• Azhar Hayat vs Chairman Karachi Port Trust and 2 others2017 PLC (CS.) 632 · Sindh High Court · 2016-03-22
  re-employment on contractpermanent absorptionarmed forces officers in civil servicevested rightlocus poenitentiaeboard resolutioncontractual appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition arose from a dispute regarding the terms of re-employment of a retired Pakistan Navy officer as General Manager (Operations) in the Karachi Port Trust (K.P.T.). The petitioner contended that he was entitled to permanent absorption based on a K.P.T. Board resolution, whereas the respondents maintained that his re-employment was strictly on a contract basis pursuant to the applicable Joint Service Instructions and government rules. The core legal question was whether a retired armed forces officer of a senior rank could be permanently absorbed into a civil post, and whether a board resolution could override statutory rules and create a vested right under the principle of locus poenitentiae. The court held that officers of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and above, including Rear Admirals, are eligible only for contractual re-employment under Joint Service Instructions (JSI 4/85) and the ESTACODE, and cannot be permanently absorbed into civil service. The court further held that a board resolution is merely a proposal and does not create a vested right, and that the principle of locus poenitentiae cannot be invoked to perpetuate an illegality or a benefit granted in violation of law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a retired senior officer of the armed forces can be permanently absorbed into a civil post under the applicable rules?
  • Does a board resolution recommending permanent absorption create a vested right for a public employee?
  • Can the principle of locus poenitentiae be invoked to protect an appointment or benefit granted in violation of law?
  • What is the tenure and nature of re-employment for retired armed forces officers of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and above in civil organizations?
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• Ayaz Ahmed Memon vs Pakistan Railways, Ministry of Railways2017 PLJ Karachi 30 · Sindh High Court · 2016-10-18Read full judgment →
• Ayaz Ahmed Memon vs Pakistan Railways through Chairman and 82017 PLJ Karachi 30, 2017 PLC (C.S.) 226 · Sindh High Court · 2016-10-18
  regularization of servicecontractual employmentpermanent postexploitation of laborconstitutional petitionfundamental rightsservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition concerns the regularization of the petitioner, who was appointed as an Assistant Programmer (BPS-16) on a contract basis in 2004. Despite the permanent nature of the post and a previous court order directing the assessment of his suitability for permanent absorption, the respondents failed to regularize his services, continuing his contract for over a decade. The core legal question is whether a contractual employee serving for a significant duration against a permanent post is entitled to regularization, and whether the state's failure to do so constitutes prohibited exploitation. The Court held that the petitioner is entitled to regularization, characterizing the prolonged contractual engagement against a permanent post as a form of exploitation. The Court emphasized that public functionaries must act in good faith and in accordance with the law. Key principles established include the state's obligation under the Constitution to eliminate exploitation, ensure social and economic justice, and provide equitable treatment to employees, as well as the principle that long-term service against a permanent post creates a legitimate expectation of regularization.

  Questions settled

  • Is a contractual employee serving for a long period against a permanent post entitled to regularization?
  • Does the retention of an employee on a contract basis against a permanent post for a significant duration constitute prohibited exploitation under the Constitution?
  • Are public functionaries obligated to ensure social and economic justice for employees under the principles of policy?
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• Atta Abbas Zaidi vs Chairman, National Accountability Bureau (NAB)2017 PLD Sindh 120 · Sindh High Court · 2016-10-02
  post-arrest bailstatutory delayhardship bailNational Accountability Bureauconstitutional petitionexpeditious trialcorruption
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a constitutional petition filed by Atta Abbas Zaidi seeking post-arrest bail on statutory grounds of delay in National Accountability Bureau (NAB) Reference No. 27 of 2015, relating to corruption and corrupt practices under the National Accountability Ordinance 1999. The core legal questions addressed by the Sindh High Court were whether statutory bail based on delay is applicable in NAB cases, and under what circumstances an accused person can be granted bail on hardship grounds due to inordinate trial delays. The Court held that statutory bail on account of delay is no longer applicable in NAB cases in view of Section 9(b) of the National Accountability Ordinance 1999 and recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, but bail can be granted in hardship cases where prolonged detention without trial conclusion violates the right to a speedy trial under Article 10A of the Constitution. The Court laid down the principle that while statutory delay provisions do not apply to NAB proceedings, the superior courts may grant discretionary bail in hardship cases by evaluating factors such as the duration of custody, absence of delay attributable to the accused, likelihood of trial completion, and the constitutional guarantee of an expeditious trial.

  Questions settled

  • Is bail on statutory grounds of delay available in cases under the National Accountability Ordinance 1999?
  • Can the High Court grant bail in National Accountability Bureau cases under its constitutional jurisdiction on the ground of hardship due to inordinate delay?
  • What factors are considered by the court to determine whether a National Accountability Bureau case qualifies as a hardship case for the grant of bail?
  • Does prolonged pre-trial detention without conclusion of trial violate the right to an expeditious trial under Article 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Associated Textile Consultants (Pvt) Ltd & Atc Technology Consultants2017 SHC 369 · Sindh High Court · 2017-11-22Read full judgment →
• Associated Constructors Ltd vs Malir Development Authority and another2017 MLD 1822 · Sindh High Court · 2015-01-29Read full judgment →
• Aslam Surhiani and another vs The State2017 P Cr. L J 174 · Sindh High Court · 2016-03-10
  Anti-Terrorism Actkidnappinglife imprisonmentforfeiture of propertycriminal appealconviction challenge
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the conviction and sentencing of the appellants, Aslam Surhiani and Muhammad Suleman, by the Anti-Terrorism Court, Hyderabad, for an offense under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The appellants were convicted for their alleged involvement in a kidnapping case registered under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following the recovery of a vehicle and subsequent police investigation. The trial court sentenced both appellants to life imprisonment along with the forfeiture of their movable and immovable properties, granting them the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The prosecution's case rests on a sequence of events involving the recovery of a stolen vehicle, the registration of an FIR, and a subsequent police operation based on intelligence reports regarding the whereabouts of an abductee. The matter concerns the sufficiency of evidence and the legality of the conviction under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, specifically regarding the application of terror-related charges in the context of the alleged abduction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recovery of a vehicle and subsequent police intelligence regarding an abductee satisfy the requirements for a conviction under Section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Is the forfeiture of movable and immovable property a mandatory sentence for a conviction under Section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Can the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be applied to sentences of life imprisonment imposed under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
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• Askari Bank Limited vs Syed Zulfiqar Rizvi2017 CLD 1298 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-17Read full judgment →
• Asif Zangejo Jatoi vs The StatePLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Karachi) 308 · Sindh High Court · 2016-04-15
  post-arrest bailineffective firingfurther inquiryattempted murderpolice encountercriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This application for post-arrest bail concerns charges under Sections 324 and 353 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, arising from an alleged armed encounter between the applicant and police. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to bail given the prosecution's allegations of firing versus the applicant's claim of false implication. The Court held that the applicant was entitled to bail, determining that the case required further inquiry. The ratio of the decision rests on the fact that despite the prosecution's claim of an exchange of fire, no police personnel sustained injuries, nor was any police vehicle damaged, rendering the allegations of attempted murder tentative. Additionally, the Court noted that the challan had been submitted, the applicant was no longer required for investigation, and the prosecution witnesses were exclusively police officials. Consequently, the Court established that in circumstances where firing allegations are ineffective and lack corroborating physical evidence of harm to the complainant party, the case warrants further inquiry, justifying the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does an allegation of firing at police without causing any injury or property damage warrant further inquiry for the purpose of bail?
  • Is a case for bail made out when the challan has been submitted and the accused is no longer required for investigation?
  • Can bail be granted when all prosecution witnesses are police officials?
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• Asif vs The State2017 MLD 1917 · Sindh High Court · 2017-03-22Read full judgment →
• Asif Ali Zangejo Jatoi vs The State2017 MLD 46 · Sindh High Court · 2016-04-20
  post-arrest bailineffective firingfurther inquirypolice encountercommon intentioncriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This bail application arose from the refusal of the Additional Sessions Judge, Larkana, to grant post-arrest bail to the applicant, who was charged under Sections 324 and 353 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for an alleged encounter with police. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to bail given the prosecution's allegations of firing upon police officers. The High Court observed that despite the prosecution's claim of an exchange of fire involving numerous rounds, no police personnel sustained injuries, nor was any police vehicle damaged. The applicant, however, had sustained a firearm injury. The Court held that because the firing was ineffective and no injuries were caused to the police party, the case against the applicant required further inquiry. Furthermore, the Court noted that the offence under Section 353 was bailable, the investigation was complete, and the prosecution witnesses were police officials, minimizing the risk of evidence tampering. Consequently, the Court granted post-arrest bail, establishing that ineffective firing in an alleged encounter, absent injury to the complainant party, constitutes grounds for further inquiry under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Does ineffective firing during an alleged encounter with police constitute grounds for further inquiry under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an offence under Section 353 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 considered bailable?
  • Does the absence of injury to police personnel during an alleged shootout entitle an accused to bail?
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• Ashir Azeem vs Federation of Pakistan through Federal Secretary, Information, Broadcasting and National Heritage and 8 others2017 PLD Sindh 1 · Sindh High Court · 2016-09-06
  Motion Pictures OrdinanceCensor BoardFilm DecertificationEighteenth AmendmentProvincial AutonomyAudi Alteram PartemFundamental RightsFreedom of Expression
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged a federal notification declaring the Urdu feature film "Maalik" uncertified and banning its exhibition across Pakistan under Section 9(2)(a) of the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979. The core legal questions involved whether the Federal Government retained the power to uncertify films in provinces that had enacted their own legislation following the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment, and whether the decertification order was vitiated due to mala fides and a failure to afford an opportunity of hearing. The Sindh High Court held that following the abolition of the concurrent legislative list by the Eighteenth Amendment and subsequent provincial legislation (such as the Sindh Motion Pictures Act, 2011), the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979 stood repealed in its application to the provinces of Sindh and Punjab, applying only within the Federal Capital under Entry 58 of the Federal Legislative List. The court further held that action under Section 9(2)(a) of the Ordinance requires prior notice and an opportunity of hearing in accordance with the principles of natural justice (audi alteram partem), and the impugned mechanical decertification without recording statutory satisfaction was unlawful. The notification banning the film was accordingly quashed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Government retains the power to uncertify a film under the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979 in provinces that have enacted their own legislation on the subject following the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment?
  • Does Section 9(2)(a) of the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979 implicitly require the issuance of a show-cause notice and an opportunity of hearing prior to the decertification of a film?
  • Can Entry 58 of the Federal Legislative List sustain the application of federal censorship laws across the provinces after the omission of the concurrent legislative list?
  • Is an order of decertification passed by the Federal Government sustainable when the authority fails to record independent satisfaction regarding the statutory grounds enumerated in the proviso to Section 9(2)(a) of the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979?
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• Ashique Ali vs Province of Sindh through Home Secretary Government2017 MLD 1232 · Sindh High Court · 2016-01-22Read full judgment →
• Artistic Denim Mills Ltd. vs Federal Board of Revenue and others2017 PTD 730 · Sindh High Court · 2016-07-15
  customs duty exemptionsales tax exemptionpower generation machineryin-house power generationtax clarificationcivil court jurisdictionstatutory interpretationtaxing statute
  Summary & questions settled

  This common judgment by the Sindh High Court addresses several consolidated suits filed by industrial entities engaged in the manufacture and export of textile products, challenging tax demands and seeking an interpretation regarding their entitlement to import duty and sales tax exemptions on generating sets under Schedule V of the Customs Act, 1969 and Schedule VI of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The core legal question revolves around whether Entry No. 11 of the Fifth Schedule of the Customs Act extends the exemption concession to power-generating machinery used for in-house consumption, or whether it is restricted solely to independent power producers supplying electricity externally, as claimed by the Federal Board of Revenue through an executive clarification dated December 5, 2014. The Court held that the civil suits are maintainable notwithstanding Section 217 of the Customs Act, since the tax demands were raised without issuing mandatory show-cause notices under Section 32 or Section 80. On merits, the Court ruled that Entry No. 11 is plain and unambiguous, containing no restriction against in-house power generation, and that the FBR cannot add conditions or supply omissions through executive clarifications. The suits were consequently decreed in favor of the plaintiffs, setting aside the impugned clarification and demands.

  Questions settled

  • Whether civil suits challenging tax demands issued without statutory show-cause notices are barred under Section 217 of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Does Entry No. 11 of the Fifth Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969 restrict customs duty exemptions solely to independent power projects selling electricity externally, or does it include in-house power generation?
  • Is the Federal Board of Revenue competent to add conditions or restrictive definitions to statutory entries through executive clarifications?
  • Can an explanation appended specifically to a distinct entry in a statutory schedule be construed to apply to other separate entries within the same schedule?
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• Aroma Travel Services(Pvt.) Ltd. through Director and 4 others vs Faisal2017 YLR 1579 · Sindh High Court · 2017-01-30
  rejection of plaintspecific performanceoral contractconsensus ad idemterritorial jurisdictionarbitration clausedominus litismisjoinder of causes of action
  Summary & questions settled

  This suit was brought by the plaintiffs seeking specific performance, declaration, injunction, and damages, based on an alleged oral agreement and extensive negotiations for a 25% shareholding in a local company (defendant No. 2) in exchange for financing exceeding Rs. 120 million. The defendants moved for rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the C.P.C., arguing that no concluded contract existed, the court lacked territorial jurisdiction over foreign defendants, and the presence of foreign arbitration clauses in draft agreements ousted the court's jurisdiction. The court dismissed the application, holding that for the purposes of Order VII, Rule 11, only the averments in the plaint and accompanying documents are to be considered, and facts must be presumed true. The court ruled that an oral contract is valid and enforceable under Section 10 of the Contract Act, 1872, provided it is proved by satisfactory evidence. Furthermore, pleas regarding arbitration clauses were deemed mutually destructive to the defense that no contract existed. The court concluded that the matter involved triable issues requiring evidence.

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• Arif Oosman vs Habib Bank Limited through Recoveries and Litigation2017 CLD 1176 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-30Read full judgment →
• Arbab A. Munir vs Mackinno NS Mackenzie and Company through2017 PLC (C.S.) 409 · Sindh High Court · 2016-01-27
  pension rightsinterim injunctionrestrictive covenantsfreedom of tradeemployment contractretrospective applicationnon-disclosure agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for an interim injunction filed by a former employee against his former employer, seeking to restrain the defendant from withholding pension benefits. The core legal questions were whether the defendant could withhold pension payments based on a non-compete/non-disclosure clause in the employment contract and whether a subsequently amended pension rule could be applied retrospectively to the plaintiff. The court held that the defendant failed to demonstrate that the plaintiff had disclosed any trade secrets or confidential information. Furthermore, the court determined that the defendant could not enforce restrictive covenants to prevent the plaintiff from engaging in his profession, as such restrictions would violate the fundamental right to freedom of trade and business. Additionally, the court ruled that the amended pension rule could not be applied retrospectively to deprive the plaintiff of his accrued pensionary rights. The key principle laid down is that restrictive employment covenants cannot be used to unreasonably restrain an individual from earning a livelihood, and vested pension rights cannot be extinguished by retrospective amendments to company rules.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employer withhold pension benefits based on a non-compete clause if no trade secrets were disclosed?
  • Does a restrictive covenant in an employment contract that prevents an individual from practicing their profession violate the constitutional right to freedom of trade?
  • Can a company retrospectively apply an amended pension rule to deny benefits to a former employee who resigned before the amendment?
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• Arabian Gulf Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive vs Province2017 YLR 262 · Sindh High Court · 2014-12-22Read full judgment →
• Apna TV Channel (Private) Limited through General Manager and 32017 CLC 199 · Sindh High Court · 2016-11-28Read full judgment →
• Anwar Yahya and 3 others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary2017 PTD 1069 · Sindh High Court · 2016-08-09
  capital gains taxsecuritiesvested rightsretrospective legislationfiscal statutecharging provisionincome taxstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions challenged the retrospective application of amendments made to Section 37A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, by the Finance Acts of 2014 and 2015, which altered the taxation of capital gains on securities. The petitioners argued that they acquired vested rights based on the tax regime existing at the time of share acquisition. The High Court rejected the argument that rights vest at the time of acquisition, noting that capital gains are unknowable until disposal. However, the Court held that the proviso to Section 37A(1), which exempted securities held for over a year, created a vested right for any shares that reached that holding period before the proviso's omission on July 1, 2014. Furthermore, the Court identified an irreconcilable inconsistency between the substantive charging provision and the First Schedule's Table for the tax year 2015. Applying the principle that the charging section prevails over the schedule, the Court declared that capital gains on shares held for over 12 months and disposed of between July 2014 and June 2015 could not be taxed.

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• Anwar Ahmed and others vs Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority2017 SHC 319 · Sindh High Court · 2017-09-12Read full judgment →
• Anwar Zaman vs The State2017 MLD 32 · Sindh High Court · 2016-06-10
  post-arrest bailnarcotics possessionprohibitory clausefurther inquirypolice witnessescriminal antecedentspresumption of innocence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by an accused charged under Sections 6 and 9(b) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 for the alleged possession of 500 grams of charas. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to bail given the nature of the recovery, the lack of private witnesses, and the existence of prior criminal cases. The Sindh High Court held that the applicant was entitled to bail. The court reasoned that the offence charged did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and the investigation was complete with the challan already submitted. Furthermore, the court affirmed that the mere registration of other criminal cases, without conviction, does not negate the presumption of innocence or justify the refusal of bail. The key principle laid down is that where an offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause and the prosecution case relies solely on police evidence, the accused is entitled to bail pending trial, provided the case requires further inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere registration of other criminal cases against an accused justify the refusal of bail?
  • Does an offence under Section 9(b) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail when the prosecution case rests entirely on police evidence and the investigation is complete?
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• Anoop Kumar and 3 others vs Federation of Pakistan through Director2017 MLD 1402 · Sindh High Court · 2016-05-26Read full judgment →
• Amjad Hussain vs National Accountability Bureau through Chairman2017 YLR 1 · Sindh High Court · 2016-04-27
  post-arrest bailpecuniary jurisdictionNational Accountability BureauStandard Operating Procedureoverlapping jurisdictionvoluntary returnplea bargainsales tax refund fraud
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose out of a post-arrest bail application filed by the petitioner, who was accused in a National Accountability Bureau (NAB) reference of obtaining fraudulent Sales Tax Refunds amounting to Rs. 4,374,792/- using fake invoices. The primary legal questions addressed by the Sindh High Court were whether the NAB had proper pecuniary jurisdiction over minor or petty corruption cases, and how overlapping jurisdictions among anti-corruption agencies like the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) and Provincial Anti-Corruption Establishments (ACE) should be resolved. The High Court affirmed that the primary purpose of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 (NAO) is the recovery of large-scale ill-gotten wealth rather than petty penal prosecution. Consequently, the court judicially endorsed NAB's Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) setting a general threshold of Rs. 100 million for NAB cases, subject to the Chairman's discretion to initiate or transfer lower-value cases under Section 18(d) NAO. Turning to the bail application, the court held that reasonable grounds linked the petitioner to the alleged crime and dismissed the post-arrest bail petition while directing an expeditious trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 have an overriding effect over other anti-corruption statutes like the FIA Act, 1974?
  • Whether the National Accountability Bureau can transfer corruption cases involving amounts below its pecuniary threshold to other investigating agencies?
  • Does the Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau hold discretion to take cognizance of a corruption case regardless of the monetary amount involved?
  • Should post-arrest bail be granted under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 where tentative assessment shows reasonable grounds linking the accused to corruption?
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• Amjad Ali vs The State2017 Y LR 594 · Sindh High Court · 2016-12-05
  extortionanti-terrorismsentencing discretionmitigating circumstancesfirst-time offenderreformationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals filed by appellants convicted by the Anti-Terrorism Court for extortion and illegal possession of arms. The core legal question was whether the appellants, having been convicted of offences under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 and the Sindh Arms Act 2013, were entitled to a reduction in their sentences based on mitigating factors such as being first-time offenders and their conduct in custody. The court maintained the convictions but modified the sentences, reducing them to the period already served. The judgment holds that while the administration of criminal justice must balance deterrence and retribution with reformation, courts should exercise discretion in favour of reformation for first-time offenders, particularly when the offences are not capital in nature and the accused have demonstrated satisfactory conduct. The court emphasized that sentencing must be judicious, and while deterrence is essential to maintain societal peace, it should not preclude leniency when mitigating circumstances exist, such as the lack of prior criminal history and the potential for rehabilitation.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court reduce a sentence to the period already undergone if the accused is a first-time offender and the offence is not capital?
  • Does the failure to properly exhibit case property and examine it during the trial constitute a mitigating factor for sentencing?
  • Is it permissible for a trial court to conduct a joint trial for scheduled and non-scheduled offences if they have a nexus?
  • What is the judicial criterion for balancing the twin objectives of deterrence and reformation in criminal sentencing?
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• Amir Ahmed through Legal Heirs vs Z.A. Khan through duly Constituted2017 YLR 1365 · Sindh High Court · 2016-05-05Read full judgment →
• Ameer Ali vs The State and 2 others2017 YLR 946 · Sindh High Court · 2016-08-17Read full judgment →
• Ameen vs The State2017 MLD 1514 · Sindh High Court · 2016-11-03
  narcotics possessionchemical examiner reportpolice witness testimonydirectory vs mandatory rulesrecovery of narcoticsdelay in chemical analysisControl of Narcotic Substances Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the possession of five kilograms of Charas. The core legal questions concerned whether the conviction could be sustained despite the absence of independent witnesses, the reliance solely on police testimony, and a delay in dispatching the seized narcotics to the chemical examiner. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court affirmed that police officials are as competent as private witnesses, and the absence of independent witnesses at odd hours does not render a recovery doubtful. Furthermore, the Court established that the 72-hour timeframe for sending samples to a chemical examiner under the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, is directory rather than mandatory. Consequently, a delay in dispatching samples is not fatal to the prosecution's case unless the accused demonstrates that the evidence was tampered with or manipulated during the transit period.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to associate independent witnesses at the time of recovery invalidate a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997?
  • Is the testimony of police officials sufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of private witnesses?
  • Is the requirement to send narcotic samples to the chemical examiner within 72 hours under the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules 2001 mandatory or directory?
  • Does a delay in sending seized narcotics to the chemical examiner automatically render the prosecution's case doubtful?
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• Amanullah---Appellant vs Inamullah and 5 others---Respondents2017 M LD 1699 · Sindh High Court · 2016-12-20Read full judgment →
• Amanullah vs StatePLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Karachi) 302 · Sindh High Court · 2016-05-30
  suspension of sentencepost-conviction bailconcurrent sentencesappellate discretionjail rollcorruption offences
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail pending appeal filed by the appellant, Amanullah, who was convicted and sentenced for various offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The core legal question was whether the appellant, having already served a major portion of his concurrent sentences, was entitled to suspension of sentence and release on bail pending the final adjudication of his appeal, given the likelihood of delay in the appellate process. The Court, upon reviewing the jail roll, observed that the appellant had served a significant portion of his sentence and that the remaining unexpired term was relatively short. Relying on established precedents regarding the suspension of sentences where the appeal is unlikely to be heard in the near future, the Court held that the appellant should be enlarged on bail. The key principle laid down is that where an appellant has served a substantial part of their sentence and the final disposal of the appeal is expected to take considerable time, the court may exercise its discretion to suspend the sentence and grant bail.

  Questions settled

  • Can a sentence be suspended and bail granted pending appeal if the appellant has already served a major portion of their sentence?
  • Does the likelihood of delay in the final adjudication of an appeal justify the suspension of a sentence?
  • Should a sentence be suspended when the remaining unexpired portion of a concurrent sentence is short?
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• Altamash Medical Society through Secretary vs Dr. Anwar Ye Bin Ju and 9 others2017 MLD 785 · Sindh High Court · 2016-12-16Read full judgment →
• Altaf Hussain vs Gulzar Ahmed Khushikh and 5 others2017 YLR 2528 · Sindh High Court · 2014-10-03Read full judgment →
• Altaf Hussain vs Aftab Ahmad2017 YLR 365 · Sindh High Court · 2016-05-24Read full judgment →
• Alpha Insurance Co. Ltd. through Authorized Representative vs Messrs2017 CLD 1091 · Sindh High Court · 2016-12-30Read full judgment →
• Allied Bank Limited through Attorney and another vs Liaquatali and 22017 PLC 207 · Sindh High Court · 2017-06-14
  workmanmanagerial capacitygrievance applicationlimitation periodpower of attorneylabor appellate tribunalindustrial relations ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two constitutional petitions arising from a judgment of the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, which had set aside a Labour Court order and directed the reinstatement of an employee without back benefits. The core legal questions involved were whether the employee's grievance application was barred by time and whether a bank manager holding a power of attorney and exercising administrative control qualified as a 'workman' under the labor laws. The Sindh High Court held that the employee's grievance notice and subsequent application were indeed time-barred, and further held that the nature of his duties, reinforced by a power of attorney granting him administrative and supervisory powers, established that he was employed in a managerial or administrative capacity rather than as a workman. Consequently, the High Court set aside the Appellate Tribunal's judgment, allowed the bank's petition, and dismissed the employee's petition. The key principle laid down is that the status of an employee as a workman is determined primarily by the actual nature of their duties and functions rather than mere designation, but an employee claiming to be a workman while holding a managerial post bears the burden of proof, which cannot be discharged without reliable substantive evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a bank manager holding a power of attorney and exercising administrative control over staff qualifies as a workman under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002?
  • What is the prescribed limitation period for bringing a grievance before a Labour Court after serving a grievance notice under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002?
  • Does the power of hiring and firing solely determine the status of an employee as an employer or a workman?
  • Upon whom lies the burden of proof to establish that an employee with a managerial designation is actually a workman?
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• Allah Wadhayo vs Qurban Ali and 3 others2017 PLD Sindh 604 · Sindh High Court · 2017-04-26
  criminal acquittal appealpoints for determinationappellate court proceduredouble presumption of innocenceCode of Criminal Procedureexpedited disposal of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal acquittal appeal challenged a judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Gambat, which had acquitted the respondents of charges under sections 380 and 457 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appellant contended that the appellate judgment was flawed because it failed to record points for determination, allegedly violating section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and because the appeal was decided within five days. The Court held that section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, located in Part VI, applies to trial court proceedings, not appellate courts, which are governed by Part VII of the same Code. Consequently, there is no statutory obligation for an appellate court to record points for determination. Furthermore, the appellant failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the expedited disposal of the appeal. Finding no perversity, arbitrariness, or speculation in the impugned judgment, and noting the double presumption of innocence favoring the respondents, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appellate court legally required to record points for determination in its judgment under section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to appellate court proceedings?
  • Does the disposal of an appeal within five days automatically invalidate the judgment without proof of prejudice?
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• Ali Sufyan & another vs Waheeda Aslam & others2017 SHC 131 · Sindh High Court · 2017-04-12Read full judgment →
• Ali Muhammad and another vs Faizullah and another2017 PTD 1407, 2017 PLD Sindh 488 · Sindh High Court · 2016-12-16Read full judgment →
• Ali Muhammad alias Allan---Applicant vs The State---Respondent2017 P Cr. L J 1711 · Sindh High Court · 2016-10-05
  post-arrest bailhighway robberyterrorismprohibitory clausedeeper appreciation of evidencecriminal encounter
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant sought post-arrest bail in a case involving charges under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, arising from a highway robbery, the murder of a bus passenger, and an armed encounter with police. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to bail given the allegations and the nature of the offence. The Sindh High Court dismissed the bail application, holding that sufficient material existed on record to connect the applicant to the crime. The Court determined that the accused's actions, which caused public panic and alarm, constituted terrorism. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that deeper appreciation of evidence is not permissible at the bail stage. It affirmed the principle that while each case must be decided on its own facts, courts may decline bail even for offences outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if exceptional circumstances exist. The Court concluded that the applicant failed to demonstrate a case for further inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Does an act of highway robbery involving firing on a passenger bus and police personnel constitute terrorism?
  • Is deeper appreciation of evidence permissible at the bail stage?
  • Can a court decline bail for offences not falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Ali Hassan through L.Rs, and 6 others vs Kausuri Begum and another2017 YLR 405 · Sindh High Court · 2016-05-23Read full judgment →
• Ali Gohar Chandio vs Mst. Hawa and 5 others2017 PLD Sindh 606 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-30Read full judgment →
• Ali Dino and another vs The State2017 P Cr. L J 578 · Sindh High Court · 2016-09-22
  appellate jurisdictionHudood lawsOffences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) OrdinanceFederal Shariat Courtcriminal appealforum of appealconviction under P.P.C.
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a conviction and sentence under section 396, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, where the initial FIR was registered and the charge framed under sections 17(3) and 17(4) of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the appellate jurisdiction lies with the High Court or the Federal Shariat Court when the final conviction is under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, despite the trial being conducted under Hudood laws. The Court held that the forum of appeal is determined by the nature of the accusation and the offence for which the accused was charged and tried, rather than the final result of the trial. Relying on section 24 of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, the Court established that if a trial is conducted for an offence under the Ordinance and a sentence exceeding two years is awarded, the appeal lies exclusively to the Federal Shariat Court, regardless of the ultimate conviction provision.

  Questions settled

  • Does the appellate jurisdiction lie with the High Court or the Federal Shariat Court when an accused is convicted under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 but was charged and tried under the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979?
  • Is the forum of appeal determined by the final conviction or by the nature of the offence for which the accused was originally charged and tried?
  • Does an appeal against a sentence exceeding two years for an offence under the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 lie to the Federal Shariat Court?
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• Ali Akber vs Director General, National Accountability Bureau2017 YLR 1045 · Sindh High Court · 2016-10-19Read full judgment →
• Ali Akbar vs Noor Ahmed and 4 others2017 MLD 1215 · Sindh High Court · 2016-10-17Read full judgment →
• Aleemuddin S/O Abdul Qavi vs Balban Hameed & Ors2017 SHC 136 · Sindh High Court · 2017-04-18
  Illegal Dispossession Actcivil disputeproperty demarcationforcible dispossessioncriminal revisionland grabbers
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application challenges the order of the Sessions Judge, Malir, Karachi, which dismissed the applicant's complaint under Section 3 and 4 of the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005 concerning a plot of land. The core legal question was whether the trial court was justified in declining to take cognizance and dismissing the complaint on the grounds that the dispute involved property demarcation issues of a civil nature and lacked the essential ingredients of the offence, such as specific allegations of forcible dispossession. The Sindh High Court held that the trial court's finding was just and proper, noting that the complaint failed to disclose the basic ingredients of the statute, including the date and manner of forcible dispossession, and that the applicant had not been in possession of the un-demarcated plot for decades. The court laid down the principle that penal provisions of the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005 cannot be invoked to resolve unresolved property demarcation disputes or civil title controversies lacking evidence of illegal and forcible dispossession by property grabbers.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a complaint under the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005 is maintainable when the basic ingredients of forcible dispossession and the date of dispossession are missing?
  • Can a criminal revision application be sustained against the dismissal of a complaint where the underlying dispute pertains to property demarcation and civil title?
  • Whether the court is competent to decide on the maintainability or cognizance of a complaint under the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005 while an application for interim relief is pending?
  Read full judgment →
• Alam Zaib s/o Gul Bakhti Shah vs The State2017 SHC 58 · Sindh High Court · 2017-03-21Read full judgment →
• Al-Tamash Medical Society through Secretary vs Dr. Anwar Ye Bin Ju2017 MLD 785, 2017 PLJ Karachi 51 · Sindh High Court · 2016-12-16Read full judgment →
• Al-Riaz (Pvt.) Ltd. through Director and another vs Muhammad Ismail and 3 others2017 SHC 278, 2017 PTD 1981 · Sindh High Court · 2017-07-14Read full judgment →
• Al-Riaz (Pvt.) Limited and another vs Muhammad Ismail and others2017 SHC 278 · Sindh High Court · 2017-07-14Read full judgment →
• Aijaz-Ul-Haq vs The State2017 PLD Sindh 67 · Sindh High Court · 2016-03-14
  bail suretybail bondsurety documentscriminal procedurecontractual obligationcustody of accusedforfeiture of bond
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application by a prospective surety seeking the return of property documents submitted to the court as security for an accused's bail. The core legal question was whether a mere offer to stand surety, supported by an affidavit and property documents, creates a binding legal obligation on the surety even if the court has not formally accepted the offer or executed a bail bond. The Court held that the release of an accused on bail is a legal act requiring the formal execution of a bond by the surety to the satisfaction of the court. An affidavit is not a substitute for a bond, and an offer to stand surety remains an unaccepted proposal until formally accepted and followed by the execution of a bond. Consequently, because no bond was executed, the surety incurred no liability, and the court ordered the return of the documents. The principle established is that the custody of an accused is only transferred to a surety upon the formal acceptance of the surety and the execution of a valid bond under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mere affidavit offering to stand surety create a binding legal obligation for the production of an accused?
  • Is an affidavit a valid substitute for a bail bond under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a court withhold surety documents if the offer to stand surety was never formally accepted and no bond was executed?
  • At what point does the custody of an accused legally transfer to a surety?
  Read full judgment →
• Aijaz Hussain and 4 others vs Muhammad Pannah2017 YLR 533 · Sindh High Court · 2016-03-26Read full judgment →
• Ahsan Bangash alias Junaid vs The State2017 P Cr. L J 509 · Sindh High Court · 2016-05-13
  dying declarationchild witnessmitigating circumstancescommutation of death sentenceburn injuriesqatl-i-amdchemical examiner report
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and death reference arise from the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant, Ahsan Bangash alias Junaid, under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of his wife by setting her on fire after sprinkling petrol, resulting in her death, and sentencing him to death. The core legal questions involved the reliability of the deceased's dying declaration recorded without a Magistrate, the evidentiary value of testimony from a child witness, and the existence of mitigating circumstances justifying the commutation of the death sentence. The Sindh High Court held that the dying declaration was voluntary, corroborated by medical and chemical evidence, and that the child witness's testimony was trustworthy. However, taking into account mitigating factors such as the appellant's immediate repentance, his own 38% burn injuries sustained while trying to extinguish the fire, and the fact that he was the sole surviving parent of three minor children, the court laid down the principle that such circumstances in a heat-of-passion domestic dispute warrant the commutation of a death sentence to imprisonment for life.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a dying declaration recorded by a police officer in the presence of witnesses without a magistrate or formal doctor's certificate is admissible and reliable?
  • Can the uncorroborated testimony of a child witness of tender age be made the basis of a conviction in a murder trial?
  • Does an accused's attempt to extinguish the fire and subsequent sustaining of burn injuries constitute a mitigating circumstance for converting a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Whether the failure to conduct a formal post-mortem examination is fatal to the prosecution's case when death by extensive burns is established through medical and circumstantial evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmed Nawaz. Jagirani vs Sindh Industrial Trading Estate Ltd. through Managing Director2017 CLC 40, 2017 PLJ Karachi 24 · Sindh High Court · 2016-09-09
  rejection of plaintmaster and servantcivil servantstatutory rulesdamagesjurisdictiondemotion
  Summary & questions settled

  This High Court appeal was filed against an order of a learned Single Judge of the Sindh High Court rejecting the appellant's plaint in a civil suit under Order VII, Rule 11 of the C.P.C. The appellant, an employee of Sindh Industrial Trading Estate (SITE) Ltd., had challenged his demotion and sought damages. The Single Judge had erroneously rejected the plaint on the ground that the appellant was a civil servant and the suit was barred under Article 212 of the Constitution. The Division Bench observed that SITE Ltd. is a company limited by guarantee with no statutory rules of service, meaning the relationship between the employer and employee is governed by the principle of master and servant. Consequently, its employees are not civil servants and have no recourse to the Service Tribunal, making a civil suit the competent remedy. Since the respondent subsequently issued a corrigendum restoring the appellant to his original post, the court set aside the impugned order and disposed of the appeal in terms of the corrigendum.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees of a state-owned company limited by guarantee without statutory rules of service can be classified as civil servants?
  • Does the Service Tribunal have jurisdiction over employees whose relationship with their employer is governed by the principle of master and servant?
  • Can a civil suit for declaration, injunction, and damages be maintained by an employee of a non-statutory government-controlled corporation against their demotion?
  • What material may be looked into by the court for the purposes of rejection of a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the C.P.C.?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmed Nawaz Jagirani vs Sindh Industrial Trading Estate Ltd. (S.I.T.E.)2017 PLJ Karachi 24 · Sindh High Court · 2016-09-09
  rejection of plaintmaster and servantcivil servantstatutory rules of servicecause of actiondemotionjurisdiction of civil court
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges an order passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court rejecting a plaint filed by the appellant against Sindh Industrial Trading Estate Ltd. (S.I.T.E.) regarding an illegal demotion, a declaration of valid promotion, and damages. The core legal questions involved whether the appellant was a civil servant, whether the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, and whether the plaint disclosed a cause of action. The court held that S.I.T.E. has no statutory rules of service, its employees are not civil servants, the relationship between the parties is governed by the principle of master and servant, and the suit was maintainable. Furthermore, during the pendency of the appeal, a corrigendum was issued restoring the appellant to his previous position. The court set aside the impugned order and disposed of the appeal in terms of the subsequent resolution of the controversy.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the employees of Sindh Industrial Trading Estate Ltd. (S.I.T.E.) qualify as civil servants under the law?
  • Does the non-existence of a cause of action concomitantly mean that a suit is barred by law under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can an employee of an organization lacking statutory rules of service maintain a civil suit for redress of grievances based on master and servant relationship?
  • Whether the jurisdiction of the High Court in a civil suit filed by an employee of a state-owned company is barred under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Aftab Ahmed vs District Judge And 2 others2017 MLD 2012 · Sindh High Court · 2015-01-09Read full judgment →
• Adil Khan vs Secretary to Government of Pakistan Ministry of Defence, Pakistan and 2 others2017 MLD 937 · Sindh High Court · 2016-11-29Read full judgment →
• Additional Director, Directorate General of Intelligence and Investigation-FBR, Regional Office, Karachi vs Member (Technical), Customs, Federation Excise and Sales Tax and another2017 PTD 1278 · Sindh High Court · 2016-08-24Read full judgment →
• Additional Collector of Customs vs Muhammad HussainPTCL 2017 CL. 16 · Sindh High Court · 2016-08-15Read full judgment →
• Add Oil (Private) Limited & another vs Null2017 SHC 344 · Sindh High Court · 2017-10-13Read full judgment →
• Adamjee Polycraft Limited and 3 others vs National Investment Trust2017 CLD 380 · Sindh High Court · 2016-10-04
  banking recoverycontract of guaranteesponsor's undertakingco-extensive liabilityprincipal debtorsuretyinvestment agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This first appeal, filed under Section 21 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, challenged a banking court decree for the recovery of Rs. 24,959,375 against the appellants. The core legal question was whether a 'Sponsor's Undertaking' executed by the appellant directors constituted a valid contract of guarantee, thereby rendering them personally liable for the company's debt upon default. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Sponsor's Undertaking was an integral part of the main investment agreement. Consequently, the appellants functioned as sureties, and their liability was co-extensive with that of the principal debtor (the company). The Court established that where a sponsor's undertaking is a mandatory condition of an investment agreement, the sponsors become sureties under Section 126 of the Contract Act, 1872. Furthermore, their liability is co-extensive with the principal debtor under Section 128 of the same Act, rendering them jointly and severally liable for the outstanding debt upon the company's default. The judgment emphasizes that such undertakings must be read in conjunction with the main agreement.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Sponsor's Undertaking executed by company directors constitute a valid contract of guarantee under the Contract Act, 1872?
  • Is the liability of a surety co-extensive with that of the principal debtor in the absence of a contrary provision in the contract?
  • Should a Sponsor's Undertaking be read in isolation or in conjunction with the main investment agreement to determine the liability of the sponsors?
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• Adam A. Muchhadda vs Captain (R) H.A. Rahim2017 SHC 1, 2017 MLD 1105 · Sindh High Court · 2017-03-10Read full judgment →
• Adam A. Muchhadda vs Captain (R) H. A. Rahim2017 SHC 1 · Sindh High Court · 2017-03-10Read full judgment →
• Abul Hassan and another vs Assistant Executive Engineer and 3 others2017 YLR 1266 · Sindh High Court · 2016-12-29Read full judgment →
• Abu Bakar vs Iind Additional Sessions Judge, Dadu and 2 others2017 YLR 1248 · Sindh High Court · 2016-02-01Read full judgment →
• Abu Bakar Bin Abdul Qadir and another vs Laeeq Ahmed and others2017 SHC 275 · Sindh High Court · 2017-07-07Read full judgment →
• Abrar Hussain vs VIIth A.D.J. South at Karachi & Ors2017 SHC 358 · Sindh High Court · 2017-11-24Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rab alias Ali Akber and others vs The State and another2017 SHC 230 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-31
  Anti-Terrorism Actjurisdictionpersonal enmityterrorismtarget killingpublic paniccriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision application challenged an order of the Anti-Terrorism Court, which had declined an application under Section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, regarding the transfer of a murder case to an ordinary court. The core legal question was whether a murder case involving prior personal enmity and blood feuds could be tried by an Anti-Terrorism Court. The Court held that the existence of personal enmity does not automatically exclude a case from the ambit of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The Court affirmed the Anti-Terrorism Court's jurisdiction, noting that the accused had planned the murder, followed the victims from another city, and executed the crime in a public place during the day, thereby creating a sense of fear and insecurity in the public. The key principle laid down is that to determine jurisdiction, courts must assess the motivation, object, design, or purpose behind the act, and the manner of its execution, rather than solely relying on the presence of personal vendetta.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of personal enmity or blood feud automatically exclude a case from the jurisdiction of an Anti-Terrorism Court?
  • What criteria should a court apply to determine if an offence falls within the ambit of Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Can an act of murder committed in a public place after chasing the victims be classified as terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
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• Abdul Wahid vs Deedar Ali Issran and others2017 SHC 391 · Sindh High Court · 2017-12-29Read full judgment →
• Abdul Waheed vs M. Naseer-ud-din2017 SHC 13 · Sindh High Court · 2017-03-24Read full judgment →
• Abdul Wahab through Legal Heirs vs Abdul Rasheed and others2017 PLD Sindh 56 · Sindh High Court · 2016-05-23Read full judgment →
• Abdul Sattar Mandokhel vs Administrator (CDGK)2017 SHC 328 · Sindh High Court · 2017-09-06Read full judgment →
• Abdul Sattar Dadabhoy and 2 others vs Director-General, National2017 PLD Sindh 331 · Sindh High Court · 2016-10-05
  National Accountability Ordinance 1999Accountability Courtclosure of investigationSection 9(c) NAOjudicial reviewconstitutional jurisdictioncheck and balance
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an Accountability Court's order rejecting the National Accountability Bureau's (NAB) application to close an investigation against the petitioners under Section 9(c) of the National Accountability Ordinance 1999. The core legal question concerned whether the Accountability Court acts merely as a rubber stamp for the Chairman NAB’s closure decision and whether the Court’s approval power under Section 9(c) is contingent upon the accused being in custody. The Court held that the Accountability Court is not a rubber stamp; the legislative intent behind Section 9(c) is to provide a check and balance on the Chairman’s powers. The Court must apply its judicial mind to the investigation material and issue a speaking order. The custody status of the accused is a separate, secondary limb of Section 9(c) and does not limit the Court's authority to review closure applications. While the Court cannot compel the Chairman to file a reference, it may provide non-binding recommendations. The impugned order was set aside and remanded for reconsideration regarding the nature of the dispute.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Accountability Court have the jurisdiction to reject the Chairman NAB's application to close an investigation under Section 9(c) of the National Accountability Ordinance 1999?
  • Is the Accountability Court's power to approve or reject the closure of an investigation under Section 9(c) of the National Accountability Ordinance 1999 dependent on whether the accused is in custody?
  • Can an Accountability Court direct the Chairman NAB to file a reference after rejecting an application to close an investigation?
  • What is the scope of the Accountability Court's role when reviewing an application to close an investigation under Section 9(c) of the National Accountability Ordinance 1999?
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• Abdul Rehman vs The Chairman National Accountability Bureau & others2017 SHC 140 · Sindh High Court · 2017-02-20Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rehman and 8 others vs Lal Muhammad and 2 others2017 YLR 2341 · Sindh High Court · 2016-04-05Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rahim vs Ali Bux and 4 others2017 P Cr. L J 228 · Sindh High Court · 2016-06-28
  acquittal appealbenefit of doubtdouble presumption of innocenceocular evidencemedical evidence contradictionSection 103 Cr.P.C.torchlight identification
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal acquittal appeal was filed by the complainant challenging the judgment of the VI-Additional Sessions Judge, Larkana, which acquitted the respondents of offences under Sections 147, 148, 302, 114, and 149, P.P.C., by extending the benefit of doubt. The core legal issues revolved around whether the trial court correctly appraised the evidence, whether contradictions between ocular testimony and medical evidence rendered the prosecution case doubtful, and whether grounds existed to overturn the acquittal. The High Court observed substantial contradictions among eye-witnesses regarding the role of accused and seats of injuries, non-examination of independent witnesses, failure to produce the torchlight used for night identification, non-compliance with Section 103, Cr.P.C. during recoveries, and conflict with medical findings. Holding that an acquitted accused enjoys a double presumption of innocence that can only be disturbed if the judgment is perverse, arbitrary, or based on misreading of evidence, the High Court found no illegality and dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • What standard of proof and grounds are required for an appellate court to interfere with a trial court's judgment of acquittal?
  • Does an uncorroborated identification made via torchlight during the dark hours of the night constitute reliable evidence for conviction?
  • What is the effect of material contradictions between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the nature and seat of injuries?
  • Does the failure to associate independent witnesses from the locality under Section 103, Cr.P.C. render recovery evidence inadmissible or unreliable?
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• Abdul Qadir vs Province of Sindh and others2017 SHC 323 · Sindh High Court · 2017-09-26Read full judgment →
• Abdul Qadir alias Fauji vs The State and another2017 YLR 2284 · Sindh High Court · 2016-03-17
  dacoity with murderdeath referenceexamination of accusedincriminating evidenceprocedural defectremand for retrial
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and death reference arose from the conviction and death sentence of the appellant under Section 396 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the IVth Additional Sessions Judge, Karachi (West). The prosecution alleged that the appellant, along with co-accused, committed a dacoity during which a resident was shot and killed. On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial court failed to put critical incriminating evidence to him during his examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, including the recovery of the weapon, forensic reports, and specific eyewitness accounts. The High Court of Sindh observed that putting all incriminating circumstances to an accused is a mandatory statutory requirement to ensure a fair trial. Failing to do so constitutes a grave illegality that cannot be cured under Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the High Court set aside the conviction, rejected the death reference, and remanded the case to the trial court for retrial from the stage of recording the statement under Section 342.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a piece of incriminating evidence not put to an accused during their examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be used to sustain their conviction?
  • Does the failure of a trial court to put material prosecution evidence to the accused during their Section 342 examination constitute a curable irregularity under Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What is the legal consequence of a trial court conducting a casual or cursory examination of an accused in a case entailing the death penalty?
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• Abdul Majeed vs Syed Shahid Hussain Shah and another2017 YLR 1739 · Sindh High Court · 2016-09-26
  pre-arrest bailcancellation of bailinstigationcommon intentionprohibitory clausecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application was filed by the complainant seeking the cancellation of pre-arrest bail granted to the respondent by the Sessions Judge, Larkana, in a murder case registered under sections 302, 337-H(2), 114, 147, 148, 149, and 504 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the pre-arrest bail granted to the respondent should be cancelled based on the allegation of instigation and the respondent's presence at the crime scene. The Court held that the bail should not be cancelled, noting that the specific role of firing the fatal shot was attributed to a co-accused, not the respondent, and that the respondent had not misused the concession of bail. The Court reaffirmed the principle that the considerations for the cancellation of bail are distinct from those for the grant of bail. It held that once bail is granted by a competent court, it cannot be recalled without evidence of extraordinary circumstances, such as the misuse of the bail concession, the likelihood of absconding, or the tampering with prosecution evidence, none of which were established in this case.

  Questions settled

  • Are the considerations for the cancellation of bail different from those required for the grant of bail?
  • What are the essential factors that must be established to justify the cancellation of bail once it has been granted by a competent court?
  • Does the mere allegation of instigation in an FIR, without evidence of misuse of bail, justify the cancellation of pre-arrest bail?
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