Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 46,805 judgments in total from the Sindh High Court.

• Hakim Mairajuddin through Legal Heirs vs Abdul Rasheed and 2 others2013 CLC 1179 · Sindh High Court · 2013-02-22Read full judgment →
• Hakim Ali vs The State2013 YLR 2169 · Sindh High Court · 2013-03-04
  circumstantial evidenceextra-judicial confessionmurder convictionpointation of dead bodymedical evidencecriminal appealappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for the murder of his wife and her unborn child, sentenced to life imprisonment under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question is whether a conviction can be sustained solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence, specifically an extra-judicial confession to the police, the recovery of the deceased's body at the appellant's pointation, and corroborating medical evidence, in the absence of eyewitnesses. The Court held that the conviction was sound, ruling that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if it forms a complete, consistent, and conclusive chain of events incompatible with any hypothesis of innocence. The Court emphasized that the appellant's voluntary appearance at the police station, his admission of guilt, and the subsequent recovery of the body from his residence, supported by medical reports confirming the cause of death, established his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The principle laid down is that where circumstantial evidence is strong, consistent, and corroborated by medical findings, it constitutes valid grounds for conviction even without direct ocular testimony.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence?
  • Is an extra-judicial confession to the police, followed by the recovery of the body on the accused's pointation, sufficient to establish guilt?
  • Does the absence of eyewitnesses in a murder case necessarily lead to an acquittal if other circumstantial evidence is strong?
  • What is the legal effect of failing to follow specific procedures when examining minor witnesses in a criminal trial?
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• Haji Syed Iqbal Ahmed others vs Sahibzada Syed Liaquat Ali2013 PLD Sindh 494 · Sindh High Court · 2013-01-28Read full judgment →
• Haji Qazi vs The State2013 MLD 1488 · Sindh High Court · 2013-01-06
  Superdarirestoration of vehicleproperty ordercriminal revisionbona fide purchaserindefinite detention
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application concerns the restoration of a vehicle seized by police in connection with a criminal case involving offences under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The applicant, claiming to be a bona fide purchaser, sought the release of the vehicle, which had been detained indefinitely by the trial court in its property order. The core legal question was whether a vehicle involved in a crime could be detained indefinitely by the trial court, particularly when no other claimants existed and the vehicle itself was not the subject of the offence. The High Court held that detaining a vehicle for an indefinite period constitutes an abuse of the process of law. The court set aside the trial court's property order, directing the release of the vehicle to the applicant on Superdari basis, subject to the furnishing of a personal recognizance bond. The key principle laid down is that while a vehicle may be involved in the commission of an offence, it cannot be detained indefinitely by the court, as the law does not permit such prolonged deprivation of property.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court order the indefinite detention of a vehicle involved in a criminal case?
  • Is a bona fide purchaser entitled to the restoration of a vehicle seized in a criminal case if no other claimants exist?
  • Does the law permit the indefinite impounding of property used during the commission of an offence?
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• Haji Naimatullah vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence and anothers2013 PLD Sindh 406 · Sindh High Court · 2012-12-19
  arbitration agreementappointment of arbitratorcontractual interpretationarbitration clausereconstitution of ministrySection 20 applicationsole proprietorship
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, filed by a contractor seeking the court's appointment of an arbitrator to resolve a dispute arising from a construction contract. The contract contained an arbitration clause designating the Secretary of the Ministry of Law, Justice and Human Rights Division as the appointing authority. The plaintiff argued that because the Ministry had been reconstituted and divided, the current Secretary lacked the authority to appoint an arbitrator, necessitating judicial intervention. The defendants contended that the arbitration agreement remained valid and binding, and that the plaintiff was required to follow the contractual mechanism before approaching the court. The Court held that the parties were bound by their agreement and that the reconstitution of a government ministry does not invalidate an arbitration clause. The Court emphasized that courts must interpret contracts to effectuate the parties' intentions rather than nullify them. Consequently, the Court directed the plaintiff to first approach the relevant Secretary for the appointment of an arbitrator, granting liberty to invoke Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, only if the contractual mechanism failed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the reconstitution or division of a government ministry invalidate an arbitration clause designating a specific Secretary as the appointing authority?
  • Can a party invoke Section 20 of the Arbitration Act 1940 to seek judicial appointment of an arbitrator without first exhausting the contractual mechanism for appointment?
  • Is a sole proprietorship required to provide a corporate resolution to file an application for the appointment of an arbitrator?
  • Does the known interest of a designated arbitrator in a government contract invalidate the arbitration agreement on the grounds that the state cannot be a judge in its own cause?
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• Haji Jam and 34 otherss vs Province of Sindh through Dcotando2013 CLC 1332 · Sindh High Court · 2013-04-15Read full judgment →
• Haji Farman Ali Kolachi vs Sessions Judge and 2 others2013 YLR 1302 · Sindh High Court · 2012-08-27
  criminal miscellaneous applicationregistration of FIRjustice of the peaceillegal encroachmentstate functionariesinquiry report
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application challenges an order passed by the Sessions Judge/Justice of the Peace dismissing the applicant's application under Section 22-A(6), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the registration of a criminal case against local government functionaries. The applicant alleged that the proposed accused unlawfully dispossessed him, demolished his house, and took away household articles. The core legal question concerns whether directions for registering a First Information Report against state functionaries should be issued when the inquiry report establishes that the applicant occupied government land without any legal title and the officials were merely removing an illegal encroachment in the performance of their official duties. The Sindh High Court held that the application was rightly dismissed because the allegations were baseless and aimed at harassing state functionaries acting in the lawful discharge of their duties. The key principle laid down is that courts will not encourage frivolous applications seeking police registration of criminal cases against public officials performing official duties regarding the removal of unauthorized encroachments on state property.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Justice of the Peace is justified in refusing to direct the registration of a First Information Report against state officials who removed an illegal encroachment on government land?
  • Can an applicant maintain an application for registration of a criminal case when an independent inquiry report establishes that the allegations against public functionaries are baseless?
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• Haji Abro vs The State2013 MLD 627 · Sindh High Court · 2012-11-20
  criminal revisionsurety bondforfeiture of bondreduction of fineabsconding accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application challenges an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Larkana, whereby the entire surety bond of the applicant was forfeited and a full fine of Rs. 300,000 was imposed upon the applicant for failing to produce the absconding accused. The core legal question concerns the principles and quantum of penalty to be imposed upon a surety under Section 514 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when the accused absconds. The Sindh High Court held that while the entire bond amount can be forfeited, the court's approach should be dynamic and progressive, taking into account the surety's lack of mala fide, absence of personal gain, financial position, and efforts made to trace the accused. The High Court laid down the principle that a balance must be maintained between undue severity and undue leniency to avoid discouraging friends and neighbors from standing surety, and accordingly modified the trial court's order by reducing the fine.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the entire amount of a surety bond must be forfeited when an accused absconds?
  • What factors should a court consider when imposing a penalty on a surety under Section 514 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the appellate or revisional court reduce the forfeiture amount imposed on a surety on humanitarian grounds and lack of personal gain?
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• Haji Abdul Rasool Tunio vs SDO, HESCO; Larkana and others2013 CLC 1064 · Sindh High Court · 2012-12-18Read full judgment →
• Haibat and anothers vs The State2013 YLR 117 · Sindh High Court · 2012-07-31
  post-arrest baildelayed FIRconflicting versionsmedical evidencefurther inquirycriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application arises from a bail petition filed by the applicants, Haibat and Sharbat, involved in Crime No. 143 of 2011 registered at Police Station Thull for offences under sections 302, 109, and 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal questions pertained to whether post-arrest bail should be granted in a case involving a delayed F.I.R., conflicting versions between the police report and a direct complaint, lack of recovery of incriminating articles, and inconclusive medical evidence regarding the cause of death. The Sindh High Court held that where an F.I.R. is significantly delayed, multiple versions exist, no recovery is made from the accused, and ocular testimony lacks support from medical evidence, the case calls for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the court granted bail to the applicants subject to furnishing solvent sureties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail should be granted when the F.I.R. is delayed by twenty days without plausible explanation?
  • Does a conflict between the police report version and a direct complaint version make out a case for further inquiry under criminal law?
  • Is the absence of incriminating recoveries from the accused a valid ground for granting bail?
  • What is the effect on a bail plea when ocular testimony is not supported by medical evidence?
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• Hafiz Muhammad Anees and 3 others vs The State and 4 others2013 P Cr. L J 1482 · Sindh High Court · 2012-11-29
  quashment of FIRAfghan Transit TradeISAF containers scamenquiry reportmalicious prosecutionCustoms Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed seeking the quashment of an F.I.R. registered against the petitioners, who were involved in probing the Afghan Transit Trade containers scam pursuant to directions of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question was whether the addition of a paragraph in an enquiry report identifying specific delinquent officials, done to rectify a previous omission, constituted a criminal act of forgery warranting the registration of a criminal case against the investigating/enquiry officers. The Sindh High Court held that the subsequent report was fully in accord with the mandate given to the petitioners to identify culprits causing huge losses to the national exchequer, and that inserting paragraph-6 merely remedied a legal deficiency in the earlier incomplete report rather than amounting to fraud or forgery. The court laid down the principle that official acts performed by enquiry officers in good faith to fulfill their statutory or mandated obligations by identifying responsible persons cannot be criminalized or subjected to malicious F.I.R.s, and consequently quashed the impugned F.I.R.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the addition of a paragraph to an enquiry report to identify delinquent officials constitutes forgery?
  • Can an F.I.R. registered against enquiry officers for performing official duties in good faith be quashed by the High Court?
  • Does an enquiry report regarding revenue pilferage fulfill its mandate without identifying the responsible officials?
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• Hafiz Mehboob and 6 others vs Province of Sindh through Secretary, Revenue Board of Revenue and 4 others2013 MLD 1602 · Sindh High Court · 2013-05-21Read full judgment →
• Habiburrehman and 7 others vs Viith Additional District Judge, Hyderabad and 2 others2013 C.L.R. 1276, 2013 PLD Sindh 25 · Sindh High Court · 2012-10-05
  ejectmentdefault in rentpersonal bona fide needexpired rent agreementconstitutional jurisdictionfair rentlandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition arises from concurrent findings of the courts below dismissing an ejectment application filed by a landlord against his tenant on the grounds of default in rent payment and personal bona fide need. The core legal questions involved whether a contractual rent enhancement clause of 10% per annum survives after the expiry of the rent agreement and remains enforceable when no fair rent has been determined under the statute, and whether the landlord established his claim for personal bona fide need for his sons. The High Court held that terms of an expired rent agreement continue to operate to the extent they are not repugnant to the rent law, and since no fair rent had been fixed under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979, the 10% annual increase was lawful and binding, constituting a default upon non-payment. The Court further held that the lower courts misread the evidence regarding personal requirement, as the landlord's unshakeable testimony on oath regarding his sons' needs must be accepted in good faith. Consequently, the petition was allowed, setting aside the lower courts' judgments and ordering the tenant's ejectment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the terms of an expired rent agreement regarding rent enhancement continue to operate when no fair rent has been fixed under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  • Can a landlord's claim for personal bona fide need be rejected merely because of minor omissions in the pre-action notice or because the landlord occasionally climbed stairs?
  • Does the High Court possess constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 to set aside concurrent findings of rent tribunals that suffer from misreading and non-reading of evidence?
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• Habib-ur-Rehman and 7 others vs VIlth Additional District Judge, Hyderabad and 2 others2013 C.L.R. 1276 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Habib Metropolitan Bank Ltd vs Mian Abdul Jabbar Gihllin and anothers2013 CLD 88, 2013 PLD Sindh 104 · Sindh High Court · 2012-11-05
  leave to defendrecovery of financefinancial institutionsmortgaged propertystatement of accountselectronic transactionspower of attorneydefaultbanking suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This suit was instituted by Habib Metropolitan Bank Limited for the recovery of Rs. 103,251,994.49 against the defendants following their default on multiple enhanced finance facilities secured by mortgaged properties and personal guarantees. The defendants filed applications for leave to defend under Section 10 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, raising preliminary objections regarding the competency of the person signing the plaint, the admissibility of electronically generated statements of account, and the accrual of the cause of action. The Court held that the plaint was signed by duly authorized attorneys as per Section 9 of the Ordinance and that the merger of Metropolitan Bank into Habib Metropolitan Bank did not invalidate such authority. Furthermore, the Court ruled that electronically generated statements of account are legally valid under the Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002, and do not require manual signatures or stamps. Since the defendants failed to deny the availing of finance or the execution of documents, and failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 10(3), (4), and (5) of the Ordinance, the leave to defend applications were dismissed. The suit was decreed in favor of the plaintiff with costs of funds and an order for the sale of mortgaged properties.

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• Habib Metropolitan Bank Limited, Karachi vs Mian Abdul Jabbar Gihllin And Another2013 P.C.T.L.R. 294 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Habib Bank Ltd. And 5 Other vs Federation Of Pakistan2013 PTD 1659, PTCL 2013 CL. 679 · Sindh High Court · 2013-05-31Read full judgment →
• Habib Bank Ltd vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Revenue2013 PTD 1659 · Sindh High Court · 2013-05-31Read full judgment →
• Habib Bank Limited, UAE vs Highway General Trading Co., LLC, UAE And 42013 P.C.T.L.R. 327 · Sindh High Court · 2012-02-07Read full judgment →
• Gulsher and 2 others vs The State2013 YLR 298 · Sindh High Court · 2012-04-18
  suspension of sentencestatutory delaybail pending appealappellate discretionSection 426 CrPCcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application under Section 426, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking suspension of sentence and grant of bail pending appeal for three appellants convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the appellants were entitled to bail due to the statutory delay in the disposal of their appeal, given that the appeal had been pending for over two years without a final decision. The court examined the order sheets and determined that the delay was not solely attributable to the appellants, as many adjournments were due to court congestion, lack of time, or other procedural reasons. The court held that the appellants were entitled to bail under the statutory provisions, as they were not hardened or desperate criminals and the delay was not occasioned by their acts or omissions. The court affirmed that while deciding such applications, it must avoid a deep appraisal of evidence or merits, focusing instead on the statutory criteria for bail and the cause of delay.

  Questions settled

  • Is it mandatory for the High Court to examine the merits of a case in depth when deciding an application for suspension of sentence under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a conviction be set aside while exercising jurisdiction under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 based on a reappraisal of evidence?
  • Does the statutory right to bail due to delay in the disposal of an appeal apply if the delay is not solely attributable to the applicant?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a complainant's affidavit exonerating the accused after a conviction has already been recorded?
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• Gul Muhammad and another vs The State2013 P Cr. L J 52 · Sindh High Court · 2012-01-10
  anti-terrorism court jurisdictiontransfer of casedefinition of terrorismstriking terrorWatan Card distributionflood reliefpublic servant interference
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves an application for the transfer of a criminal case from the Anti-Terrorism Court to an ordinary court, arising out of an F.I.R. registered under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The core legal question was whether an altercation and stone-throwing incident by a frustrated crowd of flood-affected citizens gathered to collect Watan Cards, which resulted in injuries to police personnel and damage to vehicles, constituted 'terrorism' under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The Sindh High Court held that not every disruption, interference, or act of violence against a public servant constitutes terrorism; the statutory requirement of striking terror and creating a sense of fear or insecurity in society was lacking, as the mob had assembled lawfully for relief items and the incident stemmed from mismanagement rather than a design to create terror. The court laid down the principle that the motivation, object, and design behind an act must be evaluated to determine if it falls under anti-terrorism laws, and minor or local scuffles lacking the essential nexus of 'terrorism' must be tried by ordinary courts rather than Anti-Terrorism Courts.

  Questions settled

  • Does every act of violence or interference with the duties of a public servant attract the definition of terrorism under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • What factors must a court consider to determine whether a particular offense is triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court or an ordinary court?
  • Does an altercation and scuffle arising out of a frustrated crowd gathered for relief items like Watan Cards constitute an act of terrorism?
  • Can a case lacking the essential nexus of creating a sense of fear, insecurity, or terror in society be legitimately tried by an Anti-Terrorism Court?
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• Gui. Shah Jehan vs The State2013 MLD 959 · Sindh High Court · 2013-01-22
  superdarirelease of vehiclenarcotics traffickingControl of Narcotic Substances Actcriminal revisionconfiscation of vehicle
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application was filed by the applicant seeking the release on superdari of an Isuzu bus involved in a narcotics case registered under Section 9-C of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, after a huge quantity of charas and opium was recovered from its secret cavity. The core legal question was whether the applicant, claiming to be the registered owner, was entitled to the release of the vehicle used in drug trafficking despite evidence showing he had sold it to the convicted accused on installments via an agreement recovered from the vehicle. The Sindh High Court held that the applicant was not entitled to the return of the vehicle on superdari because the vehicle was actively used in the transportation of narcotics and the applicant's complicity and transfer of ownership after the incident distinguished his case from precedents protecting innocent owners, lessors, or rental companies. The court laid down the principle that an owner who sells the vehicle to the accused or fails to establish complete disconnection and lack of knowledge regarding its use in narcotics transport cannot claim interim custody under superdari.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a vehicle used in the transportation of narcotics can be released on superdari to a claimant whose ownership is disputed or who sold the vehicle to the accused?
  • Does Section 74 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 prohibit the release of a vehicle involved in narcotics trafficking to an owner unconnected with the crime?
  • Is an applicant entitled to the return of a vehicle on superdari when an agreement recovered from the vehicle reveals it was sold to the convicted accused?
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• Government of Sindh through Secretary Home Department and anothers2013 CLC 804 · Sindh High Court · 2010-09-23Read full judgment →
• Glaxo Smith Kline Pakistan Limited through Group Industrial Relations2013 PLC 183 · Sindh High Court · 2012-09-25
  habitual late attendancemisconductshow-cause notice limitationindustrial relationsback benefitsreinstatementadvisory lettersprospective legislation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition arises from the dismissal of respondent No. 3 (a workman) from service by the petitioner company on charges of habitual late attendance. The grievance petition filed by the workman under section 46 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002 was allowed by the Labour Court, and his reinstatement with full back benefits was ordered. An appeal by the company was dismissed by the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal. The Sindh High Court examined whether the Labour Appellate Tribunal retained jurisdiction following the promulgation of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2011, and whether the show-cause notice was barred by time under Standing Order 15(4) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The Court held that substantive industrial welfare legislation is prospective in operation, meaning pending proceedings remain competent under the law prevailing when they were initiated. On merits, the Court held that for 'habitual' misconduct like late attendance, cumulative past incidents can be cited alongside a final incident occurring within the statutory one-month limitation period prior to the show-cause notice, and advisory letters do not constitute formal punishment or closed transactions. The petition was allowed, and the orders of the Labour Court and Appellate Tribunal were set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2011 applies retrospectively to abate or transfer pending proceedings initiated under previous enactments?
  • Does a show-cause notice based on habitual late attendance become time-barred under Standing Order 15(4) if the final instance of late coming falls within one month of the notice while previous instances span a longer period?
  • Whether the issuance of advisory letters or warnings constitutes formal punishment or renders past acts a closed transaction barring subsequent disciplinary action?
  • What constitutes 'habitual' late attendance amounting to misconduct under industrial employment standing orders?
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• Ghulam Rasool others vs The State2013 PLD Sindh 214 · Sindh High Court · 2012-12-04
  criminal revisionexamination of accusedprivate counselpublic prosecutorincriminating evidencetrial court discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application was filed by the complainant challenging the trial court's order declining to include a specific proposed question in the statements of the accused recorded under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Cr.P.C.). The complainant's private counsel argued that the proposed question was a crucial piece of prosecution evidence that must be put to the accused to avoid remand on appeal. The State opposed the application, arguing that the trial court has the sole discretion to determine necessary questions and that a private counsel cannot bypass the Public Prosecutor. The Sindh High Court dismissed the revision application, holding that under Section 342 Cr.P.C., it is the exclusive domain of the trial court to put questions it deems necessary to enable the accused to explain incriminating circumstances. Furthermore, under Section 493 Cr.P.C., the Public Prosecutor remains in charge of the case, and a private counsel engaged by the complainant can only act under their assistance and cannot independently move such applications.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a private counsel engaged by a complainant can independently file an application to add questions to the statement of an accused under Section 342 Cr.P.C. without the consent of the Public Prosecutor?
  • Does the trial court have exclusive discretion under Section 342 Cr.P.C. to determine which questions are necessary to be put to the accused?
  • What is the legal status and role of a private counsel engaged by a complainant in relation to the Public Prosecutor under Section 493 Cr.P.C. during a trial?
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• Ghulam Rasool and others vs Mst. Hidayat Khatoon and others2013 PLJ Karachi 238 · Sindh High Court · 2013-04-15Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool and anothers vs The State2013 YLR 1779 · Sindh High Court · 2013-04-22
  suspension of sentencepost-conviction bailmisinterpretation of lawsentencing errorabetmentcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for the suspension of sentences and grant of bail pending appeal by two appellants, Ghulam Rasool and Khair Muhammad, who were convicted by the trial court. The core legal question was whether the appellants were entitled to suspension of sentence under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, given the apparent legal errors in the trial court's sentencing. The Court observed that the trial court had imposed sentences based on a misinterpretation of the law, specifically regarding Section 114 and Section 511 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, treating them as independent penal provisions rather than enabling or ancillary sections. The Court held that the trial court failed to apply the relevant provisions correctly, resulting in novel and potentially illegal sentencing. Consequently, the Court found sufficient grounds to suspend the sentences and granted bail to the appellants pending the final disposal of their appeal. The principle laid down is that trial courts must exercise caution and not interpret enabling provisions of the Penal Code in a cursory manner, as they are not independent sources of punishment.

  Questions settled

  • Is Section 114 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 an independent penal provision that allows for a separate sentence?
  • Can Section 511 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be treated as an independent section for the purpose of awarding punishment?
  • Does a trial court's failure to correctly apply provisions of the Penal Code constitute a ground for the suspension of sentence under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Ghulam Rasool alias Bhoro vs The S.Tate2013 MLD 1315 · Sindh High Court · 2013-04-30
  criminal appealacquittalcommon intentionhostile witnessburden of proofanti-terrorismreasonable doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Anti-Terrorism Court, Badin, which convicted the appellant, Ghulam Rasool alias Bhoro, for murder and attempted murder under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established the appellant's guilt and his common intention with co-accused to commit the alleged crimes. Upon review, the Sindh High Court found that the prosecution's case rested on the testimony of eyewitnesses who either turned hostile or explicitly testified that the appellant did not participate in the firing and was not present at the scene. The court held that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving the case beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the court emphasized that Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, regarding joint liability, is a rule of evidence rather than a substantive offense and cannot be invoked without sufficient proof of participation. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 create a substantive offense or is it merely a rule of evidence?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the primary eyewitnesses explicitly state the accused was not present at the scene of the crime?
  • What is the effect on the prosecution's case when the complainant is declared hostile and fails to identify the accused?
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• Ghulam Nabi Shah vs Pakistan International Airlines Corporation2013 PLC (C.S.) 768 · Sindh High Court · 2012-12-07
  temporary injunctiondate of birth correctionsuperannuationmaster and servantestoppelnon-joinder of necessary partydeclaratory suitcontract of personal service
  Summary & questions settled

  This common order by the Sindh High Court disposed of interlocutory applications under Order XXXIX, Rules 1, 2, and 4, C.P.C., filed in a suit for declaration, damages, and permanent injunction. The plaintiff, an employee of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC), sought to restrain PIAC from retiring him based on his matriculation certificate's recorded date of birth, claiming a corrected date of birth pursuant to an ex parte civil court decree obtained against an educational board without impleading PIAC. The High Court observed that the relationship between PIAC and its employees is governed by the principle of master and servant, and contracts of personal service cannot be specifically enforced under Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. The Court held that a decree obtained against a third party without joining the employer is not binding on the employer, and an employee who voluntarily entered his date of birth at the time of appointment and remained silent for decades is barred by estoppel from seeking belated correction on the eve of superannuation. Finding no prima facie case, balance of convenience, or irreparable harm, the Court dismissed the injunction application.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil court decree for correction of date of birth binding on an employer who was not made a party to the suit?
  • Can a contract of personal service be specifically enforced against an employer under Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877?
  • Is an employee barred by the principle of estoppel from seeking a correction in date of birth at the time of superannuation after maintaining silence throughout service?
  • Whether an employee of a statutory corporation whose service is governed by master and servant principle can seek an injunction to prevent retirement based on employment records?
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• Ghulam Nabi Narejo and 3 others vs The State2013 P Cr. L J 499 · Sindh High Court · 2012-12-07
  criminal appealfair trialprocedural illegalityremand of caserecording of evidencepresence of accusedabsconding accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the convictions and sentences imposed by the trial court for murder and related offenses. The core legal question was whether the trial court could lawfully rely on prosecution evidence recorded in the absence of one accused—who had absconded and was later arrested—without re-recording that evidence in his presence. The High Court held that the conviction and sentence were unsustainable. It ruled that Section 353 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandates that evidence must be taken in the presence of the accused. The trial court's failure to re-record evidence after the accused's arrest, or to establish that the witnesses were unavailable under Section 512, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 or Article 47 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, vitiated the trial. The court established the principle that where a trial is vitiated by procedural illegality regarding one accused, the entire case must be remanded for a fresh trial of all accused to ensure a fair and impartial process, rather than conducting a partial retrial.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recording of prosecution evidence in the absence of an accused violate the mandatory provisions of Section 353 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a trial court rely on evidence recorded in the absence of an accused after his arrest without re-recording such evidence?
  • When a retrial is ordered due to procedural illegality regarding one accused, must the case be remanded for all co-accused?
  • Under what conditions can evidence recorded in the absence of an absconding accused be used against him upon his arrest?
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• Ghulam Mustafa vs The State2013 P Cr. L J 7 · Sindh High Court · 2012-07-31
  illegal weapon possessionrecovery witnessballistic expert reportcriminal appealreasonable doubtArms Ordinancepolice investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 13(d) of the Arms Ordinance, 1965, for the alleged illegal possession of a Kalashnikov. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, particularly given the defense's contention of false implication and the absence of independent corroboration. The High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case. The court emphasized that the failure to associate independent witnesses from the locality, as mandated by Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and the omission to send the recovered weapon to a ballistic expert for verification, created significant doubts regarding the recovery. Additionally, the prosecution's failure to produce official arrival and departure entries to verify police movement further undermined the credibility of the police version. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant, reiterating the principle that any reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case must be resolved in favor of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to associate independent witnesses during a search violate the mandatory provisions of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a conviction under the Arms Ordinance 1965 sustainable if the recovered weapon is not sent to a ballistic expert for verification?
  • Does the non-production of official arrival and departure entries in a police recovery case render the prosecution's version doubtful?
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• Ghulam Mustafa vs Chacellor, Mehran University of Engineering and Technology, Jamshoro at Karachi and 3 others2013 PLC (C.S.) 1300 · Sindh High Court · 2013-05-02
  compulsory retirementback-benefitsmisconductreinstatementconstitutional petitionservice tribunaldepartmental inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed before the Sindh High Court by an employee of the Mehran University of Engineering and Technology seeking payment of salary and treatment of the compulsory retirement period as a duty period following a series of departmental proceedings and an earlier reinstatement. The core legal question was whether an employee, whose initial dismissal/compulsory retirement was set aside on technical grounds and who was subsequently found guilty of misconduct in fresh proceedings but given a lesser punishment of demotion rather than dismissal, is legally entitled to back-benefits and salary for the period spent out of service. The court held that since the petitioner was not honourably acquitted, his guilt was established in the fresh inquiry, and he failed to challenge the departmental order or prove he remained unemployed during the relevant period, he was not entitled to back-benefits or salary for the compulsory retirement period. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that back-benefits are not automatically granted upon reinstatement unless there is an honourable acquittal and specific proof of non-employment.

  Questions settled

  • Is an employee entitled to back-benefits and salary for the period of compulsory retirement when reinstated following a remand order that did not result in an honourable acquittal?
  • Whether an employee found guilty of misconduct in a fresh departmental inquiry, but awarded a lesser penalty of demotion, can claim salary for the intervening period spent out of service.
  • Can the High Court exercise its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 to grant back-benefits where the petitioner previously withdrew a similar petition without pressing it and failed to challenge the departmental order before the competent forum?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mustafa alias Mushtaq Ali vs The State2013 P Cr. L J 860 · Sindh High Court · 2012-10-25
  narcotic substancesbenefit of doubtrecovery proceedingspolice mala fideschemical examiner reportindependent corroborationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 9(b) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, by the Special Judge, Larkana, for the alleged possession of 600 grams of charas. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully proved the recovery beyond reasonable doubt, given allegations of police mala fides and procedural irregularities. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution's case was highly doubtful and set aside the conviction. The Court identified several fatal flaws: a four-day unexplained delay in sending the sample to the Chemical Examiner; a discrepancy between the prosecution's claim of sending one piece of charas and the Chemical Examiner's report noting five pieces; the failure to produce the original police departure entry; and the absence of independent witnesses despite the recovery occurring in a public place. The Court established the principle that where serious mala fides are alleged against police officials, their testimony requires independent corroboration. Furthermore, it emphasized that a single circumstance casting doubt on the prosecution's case is sufficient to warrant acquittal, particularly when recovery procedures lack transparency.

  Questions settled

  • Does a four-day delay in sending a narcotic sample to the Chemical Examiner create a fatal doubt in the prosecution's case?
  • Is the testimony of police officials sufficient to sustain a conviction when serious mala fides are alleged against them without independent corroboration?
  • Can a conviction be maintained when there is a material discrepancy between the quantity of narcotics allegedly seized and the quantity received by the Chemical Examiner?
  • Is the absence of independent witnesses in a public recovery sufficient to render the prosecution's case doubtful?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Murtaza vs The State2013 YLR 566, 2013 P.C.T.LR. 626 · Sindh High Court · 2012-08-15
  post-arrest baildishonour of chequedishonest intentionguarantor liabilitycheatingcriminal breach of trustprohibitory clause
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a bail application filed by the accused, Ghulam Murtaza, who was charged under Sections 420, 489-F, and 506 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the applicant, having acted as a guarantor for an accused employee by issuing cheques and entering into a settlement agreement to secure the employee's release, was entitled to bail after the cheques were dishonoured and the agreement was not fully executed. The court held that the applicant's conduct, specifically the issuance of cheques with dishonest intent to deceive the complainant, disentitled him to the concession of bail. The court distinguished the applicant's case from precedents where bail was granted, noting that the applicant's actions demonstrated a clear dishonest intention. The key principle laid down is that the offence of dishonestly issuing cheques, which causes significant hardship to business transactions, must be dealt with strictly, and bail may be refused even if the offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, depending on the conduct of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to bail as a matter of right if the offence charged does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the issuance of a cheque with dishonest intent, which is subsequently dishonoured, constitute sufficient grounds to deny bail in a case of cheating?
  • Can an accused who acts as a guarantor for another party and subsequently dishonours the payment instrument be held liable for dishonest intention in a bail application?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain vs The State2013 MLD 1645 · Sindh High Court · 2012-11-22
  post-arrest bailmurdercommon intentionovert actfurther inquirycriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the applicant, Ghulam Hussain, who was charged under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the applicant, who was alleged to be armed with a hatchet but did not perform any overt act during the commission of the murder, was entitled to bail given the circumstances of the case. The Court held that the applicant was entitled to bail, reasoning that while the applicant was named in the F.I.R., no specific overt act was attributed to him, and the weapon he allegedly carried was not used. Furthermore, the Court noted the presence of admitted enmity between the parties, the lack of independent witnesses regarding the arrest, and the fact that the applicant had been incarcerated for over a year. The key principle laid down is that where an accused is not assigned a specific overt act in a murder case and there is evidence of enmity, the case warrants further inquiry, justifying the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to bail when the F.I.R. attributes no overt act to them despite being present at the crime scene?
  • Does the existence of admitted enmity between parties constitute a ground for further inquiry in a bail application?
  • Can bail be granted where the prosecution fails to associate independent witnesses with the arrest of the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Fareed vs Station House Officer, Police Station Sangi and anothers2013 P Cr. L J 117 · Sindh High Court · 2012-09-25
  Justice of PeaceSection 22-A Cr.P.C.registration of FIRcognizable offencecivil disputepolice commentsSection 154 Cr.P.C.
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal application challenged an order of the 1st Additional Sessions Judge/Justice of Peace, Sukkur, which dismissed the applicant's application under Section 22-A, Cr.P.C. for registration of an FIR regarding armed threats. The Justice of Peace had dismissed the application based on a police report and the existence of a civil property dispute between the parties. The core legal questions were whether an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace can dismiss a Section 22-A application due to pending civil disputes or police comments without independently assessing whether a cognizable offence was disclosed. The Sindh High Court held that under Section 22-A(6), Cr.P.C., the Justice of Peace exercises administrative powers and must independently determine if a cognizable offence is disclosed without probing information veracity or relying solely on police reports. Pending civil disputes do not bar criminal registration if a cognizable offence is alleged. Setting aside the impugned order, the Court allowed the application and permitted the applicant to approach the SHO for recording his statement under Section 154, Cr.P.C.

  Questions settled

  • Is an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace required to form an independent opinion on whether a cognizable offence is disclosed without relying solely on police reports?
  • Does the existence of a civil or private dispute between parties bar the registration of an FIR under Section 22-A Cr.P.C. if a cognizable offence is alleged?
  • Are the powers exercised by an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace under Section 22-A Cr.P.C. administrative or judicial in nature?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Akbar Jatoi vs Muhammad Ameen & 4 othersPLJ 2013 Cr.C. (Karachi) 279 · Sindh High Court · 2013-01-31
  transfer of criminal caseanti-terrorism courtreasonable apprehensionwitness protectionbail absconderscriminal administration of justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal transfer application was filed by the complainant Ghulam Akbar Jatoi seeking the transfer of a Special Case involving murder and anti-terrorism charges from the Anti-Terrorism Court in Khairpur to Jacobabad, alleging threats to life from absconding accused persons. The core legal question was whether the case should be transferred on the ground of reasonable apprehension of harm to the complainant and witnesses. The Sindh High Court held that the apprehension claimed was vague and unsupported by police reports or prior applications for protection, and that the convenience of the accused outweighs that of the complainant. Consequently, the Court dismissed the transfer application while directing the trial court to provide adequate police protection and escort to the complainant and witnesses during their attendance at hearings. The key principle laid down is that while a transfer cannot be ordered on vague and unverified apprehensions of threats, the administration of criminal justice requires the state and trial courts to ensure complete safety and police escorts for witnesses testifying in heinous crime trials.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal case be transferred from one district to another solely on the basis of vague and unverified allegations of threats from absconding accused?
  • Does the convenience of the accused and his witnesses outweigh the convenience of the complainant in matters of case transfer?
  • What measures must a trial court take to ensure the safety of witnesses who claim a threat to their lives during the prosecution of heinous offences?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghazi and 3 others vs The State2013 YLR 164 · Sindh High Court · 2012-06-11
  post-arrest bailpre-arrest bailfurther statementfurther inquirydelayed FIRmala fidetentative assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from criminal bail applications filed by the applicants seeking post-arrest and pre-arrest bail in respect of a crime registered under sections 302 and 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns whether bail should be granted to accused persons whose names were not mentioned in the initial FIR and were only implicated through further statements recorded nearly four months after the incident, amidst allegations of mala fide and prior criminal litigation. The Sindh High Court held that where accused persons are implicated belatedly through supplementary statements and questions regarding the evidentiary value of such statements arise, the case falls within the scope of further inquiry under subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, entitling the accused to bail. The key principle laid down is that delay in naming accused persons in supplementary statements, coupled with arguable mala fide and lack of eyewitnesses to the actual crime, warrants the grant of bail as the matter requires further inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused person whose name does not appear in the initial FIR and is only brought in through a belated supplementary statement is entitled to bail?
  • Does the introduction of names through a delayed further statement after several months make out a case of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be granted where serious allegations of mala fide and prior criminal litigation between the parties are raised?
  • What is the evidentiary value of further statements recorded months after the registration of the FIR at the bail stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Fida Hussain vs The State2013 P Cr. L J 1237 · Sindh High Court · 2012-12-19
  narcotics possessionbenefit of doubtchemical examiner reportrecovery witnessspy informationprocedural lapseacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged his conviction under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the possession of 1100 grams of charas. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven its case beyond reasonable doubt, given the procedural lapses in the investigation. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution's case was riddled with doubt. Specifically, the court noted the failure to associate independent witnesses from the locality despite having prior spy information, the failure to produce the original police station departure/arrival entries, the absence of evidence regarding the dispatch of the narcotics to the Chemical Examiner, and an unexplained 13-day delay in sending the samples for analysis. Furthermore, the Chemical Examiner's report was not properly produced in evidence. The court reaffirmed the principle that any doubt in the prosecution's case must be resolved in favor of the accused. Consequently, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to associate independent witnesses in a case based on spy information create reasonable doubt?
  • Is an unexplained delay in sending narcotic samples to the Chemical Examiner fatal to the prosecution's case?
  • Can a conviction be sustained if the Chemical Examiner's report is not formally produced in evidence?
  • What is the effect of failing to produce original police station roznamcha entries regarding departure and arrival?
  Read full judgment →
• Fida Hussain through Attorney vs Executive Engineer2013 PLC (C.S.) 106 · Sindh High Court · 2012-10-17
  public interest litigationenvironmental protectionencroachmentpublic healthdrainage systemconstitutional petitionright to lifegreen belt
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition concerned the management of a drainage system in Larkana City, where the petitioner challenged the unauthorized construction of a new drain and the encroachment upon land designated as a green belt. The core legal questions addressed whether public functionaries are obligated to maintain a healthy environment and prevent encroachments on public land, and whether the court could intervene to protect public health. The court held that public functionaries have a mandatory duty to perform their functions with prudence and vigilance to ensure public safety and environmental hygiene. Relying on the principle that 'prevention is better than cure,' the court emphasized that the right to life under Article 9 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 includes the right to a healthy environment, free from hazards like pollution and open drains. Consequently, the court disposed of the petition based on the respondent's undertaking to cover the drain with concrete slabs and to coordinate with law enforcement to remove illegal encroachments, affirming that such matters constitute valid public interest litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right to life under Article 9 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 encompass the right to a healthy environment?
  • Can the High Court issue directions to public authorities to remove encroachments on public land under its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Are public functionaries legally obligated to proactively manage drainage systems to prevent health hazards and pollution?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Mustafa vs The State and anothers2013 P Cr. L J 294 · Sindh High Court · 2012-07-06
  inherent powersquashing of proceedingsrevisional jurisdictionalternative remedyacquittalmaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  In this criminal miscellaneous application, the applicant assailed the order of the trial court dismissing his application under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a criminal case arising from a property dispute and sale agreement. The core legal question was whether an order dismissing an acquittal application under Section 249-A can be directly challenged before the High Court by invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, bypassing the revisional remedy before the Sessions Court under Sections 439 or 439-A. The Sindh High Court held that the application under Section 561-A was not maintainable because the inherent powers of the High Court cannot be utilized as an alternate or additional remedy when a specific statutory remedy by way of revision is available before the Sessions Court. The key principle laid down is that where an aggrieved person has an adequate and specific remedy available under the law, such as a revision petition before the Sessions Court, invoking the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is barred.

  Questions settled

  • Is an application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 maintainable against an order dismissing a Section 249-A application when a remedy under Section 439 or Section 439-A is available before the Sessions Court?
  • Can the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be used as an alternate or additional remedy?
  • Does bypassing the Sessions Court's revisional jurisdiction render a criminal miscellaneous application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 incompetent?
  Read full judgment →
• Fayyaz Ali and 7 others vs Province of Sindh through Secretary Services, General Administration and Coordination Department, Karachi and 2 others2013 PLC (C.S.) 592 · Sindh High Court · 2012-03-13
  equal pay for equal workupgradation of postsdiscrimination in pay scalesfundamental rightsconstitutional petitionterms and conditions of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by Data Processing Assistants (BS-12) employed in the Finance Department, Government of Sindh, seeking upgradation to Basic Scale 16 on the principle of parity and non-discrimination, as similarly qualified counterparts performing identical duties in other provincial and federal departments had been granted BS-16. The core legal question was whether denying equal pay scales to identically placed public servants across departments violates the equality clause under Article 25 of the Constitution. The Sindh High Court allowed the petition, holding that persons holding similar posts with similar duties and qualifications should not be treated differently without a reasonable classification. The Court ruled that where disparate pay treatment constitutes unconstitutional discrimination, the High Court possesses the jurisdiction under constitutional remedies to direct the removal of such discrimination, even if it incidentally results in the upgrading of posts. The principle laid down is that public servants identically placed in qualifications and duties must be treated equally in pay and status, and the State is obligated to eliminate arbitrary disparities in the terms of public employment.

  Questions settled

  • Does treating public servants holding similar posts with identical qualifications and duties differently in pay scales without reasonable classification violate Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does a claim for pay parity with identically placed officials in the same or other organizations fall under the bar of Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 regarding terms and conditions of service?
  • Can the High Court direct the removal of unjustified discrimination in pay scales even if it results in the upgradation of posts?
  • Whether public employment permits the State to treat identically placed public servants differently in the matter of pay?
  Read full judgment →
• Fateh Muhammad Kobhar vs Sabzal and 4 others2013 P Cr. L J 374 · Sindh High Court · 2012-05-09
  acquittal appealmedical evidenceocular testimonybenefit of doubtpresumption of innocenceKaro-Kariconflict of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal acquittal appeal was filed against the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Ghotki, which acquitted four respondents of charges under Sections 302, 147, and 148 PPC. The prosecution alleged that the accused, motivated by an 11-year-old 'Karo-Kari' dispute, ambushed and shot the deceased at sunrise. The High Court, upon reappraisal of the evidence, found significant contradictions between the ocular testimony and the medical evidence regarding the number of shots fired, the direction of the fire, and the distance of the assailants. Furthermore, the medical officer's estimation of the time of death conflicted with the prosecution's stated time of occurrence. The Court held that when ocular evidence is inconsistent with medical evidence, the benefit of doubt must be extended to the accused as a matter of right. The Court reaffirmed that the presumption of innocence is doubled upon acquittal and appellate courts should only interfere if the trial court's judgment is perverse, arbitrary, or based on a complete misreading of evidence. Finding no such defects, the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether ocular evidence can be discarded if it is found to be materially inconsistent with medical evidence?
  • What is the scope of an appellate court's power to interfere with a judgment of acquittal?
  • Does the failure to examine the Investigating Officer or Mashir constitute a ground for remanding a case after a significant lapse of time?
  • Whether the presumption of innocence is reinforced or 'doubled' following an acquittal by a trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Farooq Shah vs The State2013 P Cr. L J 688 · Sindh High Court · 2012-11-30
  dishonest issuance of chequecheque bouncingfulfillment of obligationcriminal revisionrevisional jurisdictionfraudulent transaction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application was filed under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 against the appellate judgment upholding the applicant's conviction under section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for dishonestly issuing cheques that were subsequently dishonoured. The core legal question revolved around whether the ingredients of section 489-F, PPC, including the dishonest issuance of a cheque towards the repayment of a loan or fulfillment of an obligation, were duly satisfied by the prosecution. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution successfully proved the issuance of cheques, the existence of an underlying business obligation, and the subsequent dishonour, while the applicant failed to establish any statutory exception. Consequently, the court dismissed the revision application and upheld the conviction and reduced sentence. The key principle laid down is that where a cheque is issued to fulfill a business obligation or refund money under a failed transaction and is dishonoured upon presentation, the offence under section 489-F, PPC is complete unless the accused discharges the burden of proving bank fault or prior arrangements for encashment.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential preconditions for attracting the provisions of section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the issuance of a cheque as security for a business deal or transaction fall within the ambit of fulfilling an obligation under section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Upon whom does the burden of proof lie to establish that arrangements were made with the bank to ensure a cheque would be honoured under section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Under what circumstances can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of subordinate courts in its revisional jurisdiction under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Farooq Ahmed vs The State2013 YLR 998 · Sindh High Court · 2012-11-05
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirypolice encountertentative assessmentbenefit of doubtprohibitory clause
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal bail application filed by Farooq Ahmed seeking post-arrest bail in Crime No. 221 of 2012 registered at Police Station A Section Kandhkot under sections 353, 324, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question revolves around whether the applicant is entitled to bail when an alleged police encounter involving sophisticated weapons resulted in no injuries or property damage, and the case rests entirely on police witness testimony. The Sindh High Court held that the case calls for further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as the absence of injuries despite a prolonged exchange of gunfire renders the application of section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code doubtful at the tentative stage, and bail should not be withheld as a form of punishment. The court laid down the principle that tentative assessment of the record indicating reasonable doubt regarding the participation of the accused warrants the grant of bail, adhering to the rule of bail and not jail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted when a police encounter results in no injuries or property damage from either side?
  • Does the absence of injuries in an alleged shootout with firearms create a case of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be refused merely on the ground that the accused is nominated in the first information report for an offence falling within the prohibitory clause?
  Read full judgment →
• Farid Virani and anothers vs Feroz Virani2013 PLD Sindh 386, 2013 CLD 1361 · Sindh High Court · 2013-03-20
  partnership at willdissolution of partnershipstay of proceedingsarbitration clauseappointment of receiverSection 34 Arbitration Actpartnership accounts
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a suit for accounts, appointment of a receiver, and damages following the dissolution of a partnership firm, "Agha's Super Market." The defendant filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940 seeking to stay the proceedings, relying on an arbitration clause in the partnership deed. The core legal question was whether the court should compel arbitration despite the dissolution of the partnership and the defendant's own initiation of a separate, overlapping lawsuit. The court held that the application for a stay should be dismissed. It determined that the partnership was a "partnership at will," which was validly dissolved via notice under Section 43 of the Partnership Act 1932. The court emphasized that it retains discretion under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940 to refuse a stay, particularly where allegations of fraud, coercion, and misrepresentation are involved, and where the defendant’s own conduct in filing a separate suit rendered the arbitration clause unworkable. The ruling establishes that complex disputes involving serious allegations and the need for judicial oversight, such as receivership, are better adjudicated by the court than by arbitration.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court refuse to stay proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940 when serious allegations of fraud and misrepresentation are involved?
  • Does the filing of a separate lawsuit by a party regarding the same subject matter render an arbitration clause unworkable?
  • Is a partnership at will effectively dissolved upon the service of a written notice of dissolution under Section 43 of the Partnership Act 1932?
  • Does the court have the discretion to refuse a stay of proceedings even if an arbitration clause exists in the partnership agreement?
  Read full judgment →
• Faizan vs The StateK.L.R. 2013 Criminal Cases 76 · Sindh High Court · 2011-01-14
  post-arrest bailineffective firingfurther inquirypolice encounterdacoitycriminal assault
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal bail application arises from an order passed by the Sessions Judge, Shikarpur, declining bail to the applicant who was implicated in Crime No. 174/2010 registered under Sections 395, 324, 353, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Khanpur. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to post-arrest bail given that the case involved ineffective firing by the accused, absence of injuries to any police personnel or private persons, and no recovery of robbed articles from the applicant's direct possession. The Sindh High Court held that the case called for further inquiry within the meaning of section-based considerations, noting that all prosecution witnesses were police personnel, no private complainant existed, and the firing was ineffective. Consequently, the court confirmed the grant of post-arrest bail to the applicant, laying down the principle that where an accused is alleged to have made ineffective firing without causing any injuries and the matter requires further inquiry, bail ought to be granted.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail when the allegations involve ineffective firing and no injuries are sustained by anyone?
  • Does a case where all prosecution witnesses are police personnel and there is no private complainant warrant further inquiry for the purpose of bail?
  • Can bail be granted when no robbed articles are recovered from the personal possession of the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Faisal Noor and others vs Registrar High Court of Sindh, Karachi and others2013 PLC (C.S.) 614 · Sindh High Court · 2010-08-16
  constitutional petitionmaintainabilityjurisdiction of High Courtfundamental rightsjudicial appointmentadditional district and sessions judgequalification
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves constitutional petitions filed by individuals challenging the decision of the High Court of Sindh placing objections on their candidature for the posts of Additional District and Sessions Judges for lacking the requisite six years of practice or judicial service. The core legal questions relate to the maintainability of a constitutional petition under Article 199 against the High Court and whether the qualifications prescribed under the Islamabad Judicial Service Rules, 2011 could be imported into the province of Sindh. The court held that a constitutional petition under Article 199 is not maintainable against the High Court, as the High Court falls within the definition of a excluded 'person' under Article 199(5) of the Constitution, and that rules framed by another jurisdiction cannot be applied to Sindh unless expressly adopted. The key principle laid down is that writ petitions are incompetent against the administrative or non-judicial actions of a High Court, and eligibility criteria for judicial appointments are strictly governed by the specific rules applicable to the respective province.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 is maintainable against a High Court?
  • Does the definition of 'person' under Article 199(5) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 exclude the High Court from being subject to a writ jurisdiction?
  • Can rules and qualifications prescribed for judicial service in Islamabad be automatically applied to provincial judicial service appointments in Sindh without explicit statutory adoption?
  Read full judgment →
• F.T. Selnes vs Mega International Commercial Bank and 3 others2013 CLD 362 · Sindh High Court · 2012-07-30Read full judgment →
• Exide Pakistan Limited, Karachi Through Its Finance Director And Company2013 P.C.T.LR. 1077 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Evergreen College of Education. Hingorja through Administrator vs Shah Abdul Latif University, Khairpur through Registrar and 2 others2013 PLJ Karachi 59, 2013 MLD 681 · Sindh High Court · 2012-12-24Read full judgment →
• Evergreen College of Education, Hingorja through its Administrator, Khairpur vs Shah Abdul Lath_ University, Khairpur through its Registrar and others2013 PLJ Karachi 59 · Sindh High Court · 2012-12-24Read full judgment →
• Engr. Inam Ahmad Osmani vs Federation of Pakistan and others2013 MLD 1132 · Sindh High Court · 2012-11-28
  review applicationconsent orderrecounting of votesPakistan Engineering CouncilVakalatnamaconcealment of factsjurisdictionArticle 199
  Summary & questions settled

  This review application was filed under Section 114, Order XLVII Rule 1, Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and Rule 49, Chapter VII of the Sindh Chief Court Rules (O.S.), seeking recall of a consent order dated 26-7-2012 passed by the High Court of Sindh, which directed the recounting of votes for the office of Senior Vice Chairman, Pakistan Engineering Council (PEC). The applicant argued that his counsel lacked authority to consent to recounting and that the court lacked jurisdiction under Article 199(5) of the Constitution because another High Court had previously stayed the recounting. The High Court dismissed the review application. The Court held that the Vakalatnama executed by the applicant granted broad authority to his advocate to compromise or take lawful actions. Furthermore, the applicant was personally present in court during the proceedings and consented to the recounting. The Court noted that the stay order from the other High Court was obtained by concealing pending proceedings. The Court reiterated that the scope of review is strictly limited and cannot serve as an appeal against consent orders.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a consent order can be recalled in review on the ground that counsel lacked specific mandate when the executed Vakalatnama confers full authority to act and compromise?
  • Whether a High Court order directing vote recounting is rendered without jurisdiction under Article 199(5) of the Constitution when an interim order was obtained from another High Court through concealment of material facts?
  • Can review jurisdiction under Order XLVII Rule 1 C.P.C. be exercised to correct an alleged erroneous view of fact or law that properly forms the subject of an appeal?
  • Whether un-rebutted statements made in a counter-affidavit must be accepted as true when no affidavit-in-rejoinder is filed by the applicant?
  Read full judgment →
• Emirates Global Islamic Bank Limited vs Muhammad Abdul Salam Khan2013 CLD 1291 · Sindh High Court · 2012-12-21
  recovery of financeMurabaha facilityleave to defendmarkupcharity fundpenalty clausemortgaged propertyfinancial institution
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a suit filed by a financial institution under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, for the recovery of Rs.101,224,142.00, comprising the principal amount, agreed profit, and an amount claimed as charity. The defendant failed to file an application for leave to defend within the statutory period, and subsequent applications seeking condonation of delay and recall of orders were dismissed. The core legal questions involved the entitlement of the plaintiff to the claimed profit and whether an amount claimed as 'charity' under a penal clause in the agreement for delayed repayment is legally recoverable under the Ordinance. The court held that upon dismissal of the application for leave to defend, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for the admitted principal amount and the agreed profit calculated for the agreed period, but rejected the claim for charity, ruling that compulsory charity clauses act as void penalty clauses not permissible under the law. The court decreed the suit for the principal amount and agreed profit along with cost of funds and ordered the sale of mortgaged and pledged properties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a financial institution is entitled to an automatic decree upon the dismissal of the defendant's application for leave to defend under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can a financial institution claim compulsory charity or penalty charges for delayed repayment under a financing agreement?
  • Whether markup can be granted beyond the agreed period or at a rate higher than agreed between the parties?
  • Does charity fall within the definition of 'finance' or 'obligation' under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• Elite Publishers Limited and 3 otherss vs Soneri Bank Limited2013 CLD 1995 · Sindh High Court · 2013-02-22Read full judgment →
• Eidan Khan vs S.H.O. Police Station Kambhra and anothers2013 P Cr. L J 1883 · Sindh High Court · 2013-02-22
  second F.I.R.cognizable offenceJustice of Peacecriminal administration of justiceabuse of processregistration of F.I.R.
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal application challenged an order of the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace/Sessions Judge, Ghotki, which declined to direct the registration of a second First Information Report (F.I.R.) regarding a murder incident. The applicant sought to register a second F.I.R. for the same incident, despite an existing F.I.R. already lodged by the victim's widow, citing apprehensions that the widow might compromise with the accused. The core legal question was whether a second F.I.R. is permissible when the version of the incident is identical to an existing F.I.R. already under investigation. The Court dismissed the application, holding that the law focuses on the information of a cognizable offence rather than the identity of the informant. The Court ruled that since the investigation was already underway based on the initial F.I.R., registering a second F.I.R. for the same incident would be an abuse of the process of law. The key principle established is that two F.I.Rs. for the same incident cannot prevail, and the mere apprehension of a complainant compromising a case does not justify the registration of a second F.I.R.

  Questions settled

  • Is the registration of a second F.I.R. permissible for the same incident when an investigation is already ongoing?
  • Does the identity of the informant determine the validity of a F.I.R. under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a second F.I.R. be directed solely based on the apprehension that the original complainant might compromise the case?
  Read full judgment →
• Eidal Khan Metlo vs Imam Ali alias Bali and anothers2013 P Cr. L J 526 · Sindh High Court · 2012-08-09
  Anti-Terrorism ActJurisdiction of Special CourtPolice picket attackCriminal revisionTerrorismActus reusSense of insecurity
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application challenged an order by the Anti-Terrorism Court, Larkana, which transferred a case involving the murder of a police constable at a police picket to an ordinary Sessions Court. The trial court had reasoned that because the FIR and witness statements did not explicitly mention an intent to create fear or insecurity in the general public, the case did not fall under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The High Court examined whether an attack on police officials performing their duties constitutes terrorism. The Court held that the "action" itself is the primary determinant for jurisdiction under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, rather than the subjective intent or specific witness testimony regarding public fear. It ruled that an armed assault on a police picket inherently creates a sense of insecurity and lawlessness, thereby falling within the scope of the Act. Consequently, the High Court set aside the transfer order, affirming that such acts of violence against law enforcement personnel are triable by the Anti-Terrorism Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does an attack on a police picket constitute an act of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Is the explicit mention of an intent to create public fear in an FIR a prerequisite for invoking the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Does the 'action' of the accused take precedence over the 'design' or intent when determining jurisdiction under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Raheela Magsi vs Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and 22013 CLC 1420 · Sindh High Court · 2012-10-08Read full judgment →
• Dr. Pirzada Jamaluddin A. Siddiqui vs Federation Of Pakistan Through Secretary Ministry Of Education, Islamabad2013 P.C.T.L.R. 416 · Sindh High Court · 2011-04-06Read full judgment →
• Dr. Ghulam Hussain and 3 others vs Ahmed Nawaz and 8 others2013 PLJ Karachi 147, 2013 MLD 1845 · Sindh High Court · 2013-03-13Read full judgment →
• Dr. Babar Hussa in vs S.H.O., Police Station City Courts, Karachi and anothers2013 P Cr. L J 1002 · Sindh High Court · 2013-03-13
  quashing of orderregistration of FIREx-Officio Justice of Peaceabuse of process of lawcognizable offencemalicious complainthigh court inherent powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application was filed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking to set aside an order of the District and Sessions Judge/Ex-Officio Justice of Peace and to direct the Station House Officer to register a First Information Report against more than fifty advocates, including bar association office-bearers and female advocates, based on allegations of abduction, maltreatment, and robbery. The core legal question was whether the High Court or the Justice of Peace should compel the registration of a criminal case when the allegations are found to be vague, contradictory, malicious, and unsupported by any cognizable offence. The Sindh High Court dismissed the application, holding that an SHO is not obliged to register an FIR where no cognizable offence is made out and where the complaint is mala fide and designed to harass counsel representing a victim in an unrelated criminal trial. The court laid down the principle that discretionary powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 will not be exercised to direct FIR registration or interfere with an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace's order when a complaint is manifestly false, frivolous, and tainted with ulterior motives.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Station House Officer is bound to register an F.I.R. under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the complaint does not disclose a cognizable offence?
  • Can the High Court exercise its inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to direct the registration of a criminal case on a manifestly false and malicious complaint?
  • Whether an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace is justified in refusing to direct the registration of an F.I.R. where the allegations are vague, contradictory, and unsupported by any material evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Abdul Saboor vs Assistant Engineer, Telephone, Digital Satellite2013 YLR 443 · Sindh High Court · 2012-10-01Read full judgment →
• Dr. Abdul Rauf vs Federation of Pakistan through Interior Secretary and others2013 P Cr. L J 1671 · Sindh High Court · 2013-05-02
  constitutional petitionregistration of FIRalternate remedyEx-Officio Justice of Peacefugitive from lawpolice investigationrestraint of arrest
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, seeking directives for foolproof security, registration of an F.I.R. against proposed accused, and restraint on arrest along with other reliefs relating to documents allegedly signed under duress during imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the High Court should directly exercise its constitutional jurisdiction for the registration of an F.I.R. and restrain police investigation when an efficacious alternate remedy under sections 22-A and 22-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 was available before the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, and considering the petitioner's status as an absconder. The Sindh High Court dismissed the petition, holding that where concurrent jurisdiction vests and a more speedy alternate remedy under sections 22-A and 22-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 is available before the Sessions Judge acting as Justice of Peace, a petitioner must approach the subordinate forum first as a matter of judicial propriety. Furthermore, the court held that it cannot interfere in police investigations or restrain the arrest of a petitioner who is a fugitive from law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 for the registration of an F.I.R. is maintainable when an alternate remedy under sections 22-A and 22-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 is available before the Sessions Judge?
  • Can the High Court interfere in police investigations or restrain the arrest of an accused person who is a fugitive from the law?
  • Does a fugitive from justice lose normal rights guaranteed by procedural and substantive law?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Abdul Aziz vs Ind C & FJ/JM South and another2013 YLR 676 · Sindh High Court · 2012-11-14
  quashment of proceedingspolice reportB-class reportre-investigationcognizancejudicial discretiondishonoured cheques
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three Criminal Miscellaneous Applications filed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the quashment of criminal proceedings. The applicant, accused in multiple FIRs involving dishonoured cheques, challenged the trial court's refusal to accept a police report filed under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which recommended disposing of the cases in 'B' Class following a re-investigation that deemed the complaints false. The core legal question was whether a Magistrate is bound to accept a police report submitted under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 that recommends the disposal of a case, or whether the Magistrate retains the discretion to disagree with the police findings and take cognizance of the matter. The Court held that a Magistrate is not bound by the conclusions of the police and must apply an independent judicial mind to the material presented. Consequently, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision to decline the 'B' Class report, ruling that the Magistrate acted within their legal competence in refusing to accept the police's re-investigation findings.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Magistrate legally bound to accept a police report submitted under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does a Magistrate have the authority to disagree with the conclusions reached by an Investigating Officer in a re-investigation report?
  • Can the High Court exercise jurisdiction under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without the applicant first moving the trial court under section 249-A or 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Doulat vs The State2013 PLD Sindh 223 · Sindh High Court · 2012-12-20
  retracted confessionjudicial confessionbenefit of doubtsole eyewitnesscriminal appealprocedural irregularitymurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and life imprisonment of the appellant for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns the validity of a conviction based on a retracted judicial confession and the sole testimony of an eyewitness. The Court held that the conviction was unsustainable due to significant procedural lapses in recording the confession, specifically the Magistrate's failure to ensure the accused was not returned to the custody of the police officers who produced him, and the failure to follow mandatory procedural safeguards. Additionally, the Court found the sole eyewitness testimony unreliable and uncorroborated, noting that the witness's conduct was inconsistent with human nature. The Court reiterated the principle that a retracted confession recorded without strict compliance with procedural requirements lacks legal sanctity, and unexplained delays in recording such confessions are fatal. Emphasizing that the prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court held that any reasonable doubt entitles the accused to acquittal as a matter of right. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Does a judicial confession lose its legal sanctity if the accused is returned to the custody of the police officers who produced him?
  • Is a conviction sustainable based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness?
  • What are the mandatory procedural requirements for a Magistrate when recording a judicial confession under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does an unexplained delay in recording a judicial confession render it inadmissible or unreliable?
  Read full judgment →
• District Coordination Officer, Sukkur and 8 others vs Khan2013 MLD 1369 · Sindh High Court · 2013-01-07Read full judgment →
• Dhani BUXothers vs Viadditional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad and 22013 PLD Sind 183 · Sindh High Court · 2012-11-28
  illegal dispossessionrendition of accountsagricultural producehareiscriminal revisionrelease of amount
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application is directed against the order of the Trial Court whereby an application for the release of the sale price of agricultural produce deposited with the court accountant was disposed of. The core legal question involved was whether the Trial Court committed any illegality, gross irregularity, or infirmity in refusing to release the entire deposited amount to either the complainant or the accused hareis (farmers), holding instead that the matter pertained to rendition of accounts best resolved by a civil court. The Sindh High Court held that the Trial Court's order was legally sound and suffered from no ambiguity or infirmity, noting that both landlord and hareis were entitled only to their respective shares and that the dispute over accounts fell outside the scope of the criminal proceedings under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, particularly after the complaint itself had already been dismissed. The key principle laid down is that where a dispute over agricultural produce and accounts arises between a landlord and hareis following the dismissal of an illegal dispossession complaint, the proper forum for the settlement of accounts is a civil court rather than criminal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court acts illegally by refusing to release the entire sale proceeds of agricultural produce to either the landlord or the hareis in proceedings under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005?
  • Is a civil court the competent forum to resolve controversies regarding the rendition of accounts between a landlord and hareis?
  • Whether an order declining to release deposited sale proceeds without a proper settlement of accounts suffers from any illegality, gross irregularity, or infirmity?
  Read full judgment →
• Deen MUHAMMADthrough Legal Heirs vs Abdur Rab and anothers2013 MLD 549 · Sindh High Court · 2012-11-05Read full judgment →
• Deedar vs Abdullah and anothers2013 P Cr. L J 1593 · Sindh High Court · 2012-05-02
  recall of witnessesSection 540 Cr.P.C.cross-examinationcriminal revisionstate-appointed counseltrial procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenged an order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Larkana, which dismissed the applicant's request under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to recall prosecution witnesses for further cross-examination. The applicant, previously represented by state-appointed counsel, sought to recall witnesses after engaging private counsel, arguing that material questions were omitted during the initial cross-examination. The Court examined whether the mere change of counsel or a general claim of omitted questions justified recalling witnesses under Section 540. The High Court held that the power to recall witnesses under Section 540 is not a routine matter and cannot be used to fill lacunae in the prosecution or defense case. Finding that the witnesses had already been cross-examined at length by the state-appointed counsel and that the applicant failed to identify specific material points requiring further examination, the Court affirmed the trial court's order. The principle established is that recalling witnesses is discretionary and requires showing specific necessity or grave irregularity, rather than being a right triggered by a change in legal representation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a witness be recalled for further cross-examination under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 solely due to a change in defense counsel?
  • Is the power to recall witnesses under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 a matter of routine or subject to specific justification?
  • Does the failure to put specific material questions during initial cross-examination automatically entitle an accused to recall prosecution witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Daniyal M. Aslam vs Muhammad Wasam Khan and another2013 YLR 510 · Sindh High Court · 2012-10-01
  superdarycase propertypower of reviewcriminal revisiondisposal of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from two criminal revision applications filed against orders passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Karachi East regarding the custody of a generator under Section 516-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question concerns whether a criminal court, having once passed an order for the release of case property on superdary, can subsequently review, modify, or recall its own order and pass another conflicting order in the same matter. The court held that a criminal court has no inherent power of review under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and that once an order for the disposal of property is passed and finalized, it cannot be subsequently altered or reviewed. The key principle laid down is that orders passed regarding the disposal of case property are final, and subsequent orders reviewing or recalling such earlier decisions without statutory backing are illegal and void.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a criminal court has the power to review its own order passed under Section 516-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can an order for the release of case property on superdary be recalled or modified after it has been finalized?
  • Does passing a subsequent conflicting order regarding the same case property amount to an illegal review of the earlier order?
  Read full judgment →
• Dalda Foods (Pvt) Limited through National Administration Manager vs Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, Karachi through Member and 161 others2013 PLC 118 · Sindh High Court · 2012-09-28
  industrial relationsreinstatementstay orderdirectory provisionback-benefitsconstitutional petitionlabour appellate tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges an order passed by the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal in an industrial dispute concerning the reinstatement of workers. The core legal question revolves around the interpretation of the proviso to subsection (9) of section 55 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008, specifically whether the twenty-day time limit prescribed for the Tribunal to decide an appeal against a reinstatement order, upon granting a stay, is mandatory or directory, and whether the stay order automatically lapses upon the expiry of that period. The Sindh High Court held that the prescribed period is directory in nature, designed to infuse a sense of urgency, and that the Tribunal retains the power to grant interim relief and manage adjournments while ensuring neither party abuses the process to prolong litigation. The Court further ruled that the Tribunal acted within its jurisdiction in requiring the employer to furnish a bank guarantee and secure current salaries to protect the workers' interests. Consequently, the constitutional petition was dismissed with directions for the Tribunal to expeditiously decide the pending appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the twenty-day period prescribed under section 55(9) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008 for deciding an appeal against a reinstatement order is mandatory or directory?
  • Does an interim stay order granted by the Labour Appellate Tribunal automatically stand vacated upon the expiry of twenty days if the appeal is not decided?
  • Can the Labour Appellate Tribunal require an employer to furnish a bank guarantee or deposit back-benefits as a condition for granting interim relief?
  • Whether an appeal is a continuation of original proceedings giving the appellate court all powers available to the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Cummins Sales and Service (Pakistan) Limited through Authorized2013 CLD 291 · Sindh High Court · 2012-09-07
  foreign arbitral awardsstay of suitarbitration agreementanti-suit injunctionmandatory stayNew York Conventiondistribution agreementrepeal of ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a suit for permanent injunction and damages filed by a Pakistani distributor against foreign manufacturers following the termination of dealership and distribution agreements. The defendants moved an application under Sections 3 and 4 of the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Ordinance, 2009 (now the Act of 2011), seeking a stay of the suit in favor of London-based arbitration as stipulated in the agreements. The core legal questions were whether the expiry of a temporary Ordinance during the pendency of proceedings invalidated the application, and whether the court retained the discretion to refuse a stay on grounds of convenience or location of evidence. The High Court of Sindh held that upon the expiry of an Ordinance, the previously repealed law (the 1937 Act) is revived, and subsequent legislation (the 2011 Act) protects pending proceedings. Crucially, the Court ruled that unlike Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940, the 2011 Act is mandatory; courts must stay proceedings and refer parties to arbitration unless the agreement is null, void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed. Consequently, the suit was stayed and the dispute referred to arbitration.

  Questions settled

  • What is the legal effect of the expiry of a temporary Ordinance on pending applications filed under its provisions when a successor Act is subsequently promulgated?
  • Does the Court possess the discretion to refuse a stay of proceedings under the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 on grounds of balance of convenience or location of evidence?
  • Whether the mandatory referral to arbitration under Section 4 of the Act of 2011 overrides the discretionary powers previously available under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940?
  • Can a party avoid an arbitration clause in an expired agreement if the parties continued their commercial relationship on the same terms after the expiry date?
  • Does Section 202 of the Contract Act prevent the unilateral termination of a dealership agreement that was originally executed for a fixed term?
  Read full judgment →
• Crescent Leasing Corporation Limited through Constituted Attorney vs Messrs Sarhad Goods Transport Company and 3 others2013 CLD 854 · Sindh High Court · 2012-12-19Read full judgment →
• Companies Ordinance, 1984 for Confirming the Reduction in Capital:2013 CLD 2156 · Sindh High Court · 2013-07-05
  reduction of share capitalcompanies ordinancespecial resolutionstate bank of pakistanminimum capital requirementcapital restructuringcompany law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition brought under section 97 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 by a banking company seeking confirmation of a reduction in its share capital. The core legal question concerns whether the court should confirm the reduction of share capital approved by the company's shareholders through a special resolution to comply with minimum capital requirements prescribed by the State Bank of Pakistan and to offset accumulated losses. The court held that since all requisite statutory formalities, including the approval of shareholders, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, and the State Bank of Pakistan, have been duly satisfied without any objection from creditors or shareholders, and the reduction does not involve the diminution of any liability in respect of unpaid share capital or payment to any shareholder, the petition ought to be granted. The court laid down the principle that the extent and amount of capital reduction is primarily a domestic matter for the company, and the court will confirm it provided the scheme is fair, equitable, protects the interests of creditors and minority shareholders, and fulfills statutory requirements.

  Questions settled

  • Can a company reduce its share capital by special resolution to comply with minimum capital requirements prescribed by the State Bank of Pakistan?
  • Whether the court has the discretion to dispense with the addition of the words 'and reduced' to a company's name upon confirming a reduction in share capital?
  • What factors must the court consider when deciding whether to confirm a reduction in a company's share capital?
  • Does a reduction of share capital require the consent or discharge of debts of objecting creditors before the court grants confirmation?
  Read full judgment →
• Companies Ordinance 1984 and Metro Cash and Carry Pakistan2013 CLD 7 · Sindh High Court · 2012-06-11Read full judgment →
• Companies Ordinance 1984 and ICI Pakistan Limited and another_ In the matter of Judicial Miscellaneous vs Not2013 CLD 68 · Sindh High Court · 2012-05-17Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Of Income Tax (Companies Zone-I), Karachi vs Ibm Semea, Karachi2013 P.C.T.L.R. 353 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue-II, Karachi vs Royal International2013 PTD 1614 · Sindh High Court · 2013-01-22Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-IV vs Messrs Pakistan Services2013 PTD 368 · Sindh High Court · 2012-11-15Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-III, Karachi vs Messrs General Tyre2013 PTD 387 · Sindh High Court · 2012-12-04Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-III, Karachi vs Messrs Adam Sugar2013 PTD 556 · Sindh High Court · 2013-01-23Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Karachi vs Messrs KASSIMMessrs2013 PTD 1420 · Sindh High Court · 2013-05-07
  minimum taxcarry forwardtax adjustmentresident companynet lossfiscal statute interpretationtax incentiveincome tax reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This income tax reference application was filed by the Inland Revenue Department against an order of the Appellate Tribunal regarding the interpretation of Section 113(2)(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The respondent taxpayer, a resident company, declared net losses for the tax years 2007 and 2008 but paid minimum tax under Section 113(1). In 2009, the taxpayer sought to carry forward and adjust the excess minimum tax paid in those loss-making years against its current liability. The Taxation Officer rejected the claim, but the Tribunal allowed it, holding that 'actual tax payable' could include zero. The High Court set aside the Tribunal's order, ruling that Section 113(2)(c) only applies where tax is actually payable or paid under the normal regime. The Court held that an amount of zero or a negative loss cannot be regarded as 'tax payable' for the purpose of calculating an excess. The Court reaffirmed that fiscal statutes must be interpreted strictly according to their plain language, and any ambiguity in a benefit-conferring provision (analogous to an exemption) must be resolved against the taxpayer.

  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Ltu, Karachi vs Karachi Shipping (Pvt)2013 PTD 1592 · Sindh High Court · 2013-02-13Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Karachi vs M/s. Centre FormanagementPTCL 2013 CL. 452 · Sindh High Court · 2012-09-05Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Karachi vs Messrs E.N.I. Pakistan (M) Ltd., Karachi2013 PTD 508 · Sindh High Court · 2012-11-20
  rectification of mistakemistake apparent from recordSection 221 Income Tax Ordinancereference applicationre-appraisal of evidencereviewincome tax appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This reference application before the Sindh High Court arose from an order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (Pakistan) Karachi, which upheld an order of the Commissioner Income Tax (Appeals) declining the revenue department's rectification application under Section 221 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The core legal question was whether the failure of an appellate forum to consider a prior departmental decision or tribunal precedent constituted a 'mistake apparent from record' subject to rectification under Section 221. The High Court affirmed the findings of the lower forums, holding that the issue involved complex re-appraisal of facts, agreements, and evidence, making it highly debatable. The court held that the scope of rectification is strictly confined to mistakes that are obvious, self-evident, and floating on the surface without requiring a long-drawn process of reasoning or re-investigation. Consequently, Section 221 cannot be invoked as an alternate or substitute for an appeal, revision, or review, leading to the dismissal of the reference application in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Does a debatable issue requiring re-investigation and re-appraisal of evidence fall within the scope of a mistake apparent from record under Section 221 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can a rectification application under Section 221 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 be used as a substitute for an appeal, revision, or review?
  • Whether the non-consideration of a tribunal precedent by an appellate authority constitutes an error apparent from record rectifiable under Section 221 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Karachi vs Messrs Centre for Management Sciences, Karachi2013 PTD 1 · Sindh High Court · 2012-09-05Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Messrs Quality Textile Mills Ltd2013 PTD 2095 · Sindh High Court · 2013-05-31
  Income Tax Ordinance 2001Income Tax Rules 2002apportionment of expenditurespresumptive tax regimenormal tax regimeexport saleslocal salesRule 231Rule 13tax deductions
  Summary & questions settled

  This reference application was filed by the Department challenging an order of the Appellate Tribunal regarding the tax year 2007 under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The taxpayer, a manufacturer and seller of cotton yarn engaged in both local sales (Normal Tax Regime) and export sales (Presumptive Tax Regime), argued that apportionment of expenses should be governed by Rule 231 of the Income Tax Rules, 2002. The Department contended that section 67 read with Rule 13 of the 2002 Rules governed the proration of expenditures. The High Court analyzed the legislative history and genesis of Rule 231 (originating from Rule 216 of the 1982 Rules) and held that Rule 231 had an entirely different purpose concerning computation of export profits for tax relief under prior law and did not apply to apportioning deductions. Instead, section 67 read with Rule 13 applied, requiring identifiable expenses incurred for a specific class of income to be allocated directly to that class. Consequently, the High Court answered the reference in favour of the Department.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Rule 231 of the Income Tax Rules, 2002 applies to the apportionment and proration of expenditures between export sales and local sales?
  • Whether the apportionment of expenditures between income subject to the normal tax regime and the presumptive tax regime is governed exclusively by Section 67 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 read with Rule 13 of the Income Tax Rules, 2002?
  • Whether identifiable expenses incurred solely in relation to local sales are fully allowable against income under the normal tax regime rather than being prorated between local and export sales?
  Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs vs Nazeer Ahmed2013 PTD 649 · Sindh High Court · 2012-10-17Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs through Additional Collector of Customs, Karachi2013 PTD 392 · Sindh High Court · 2012-11-25
  Customs ActTerminal Operatorcustodian of goodsillegal removalmens reareference jurisdictionpenaltyclandestine removal
  Summary & questions settled

  This reference application before the Sindh High Court arose from a dispute regarding the alleged clandestine removal of imported goods from the custody of a Terminal Operator at Port Muhammad Bin Qasim. The Customs authorities alleged that the respondent, as custodian, was liable for penalties under Section 156(1)(43) of the Customs Act, 1969, after two containers were found empty during examination. The Appellate Tribunal had previously set aside the penalties, finding no evidence of illegal removal or tampering. The High Court examined whether the Terminal Operator could be penalized without proof of mens rea or direct evidence of removal. The Court held that concurrent findings of fact by lower appellate forums, which established that the department failed to prove the involvement of the custodian or the actual removal of goods, could not be disturbed in reference jurisdiction. The Court reaffirmed that penal provisions under Section 156(1) require a high degree of proof and clear evidence of involvement, and that reference jurisdiction under Section 196 is limited to questions of law rather than factual controversies.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Terminal Operator can be penalized under Section 156(1)(43) of the Customs Act, 1969, for the removal of cargo without evidence of mens rea or direct proof of involvement?
  • Does the High Court have the jurisdiction under Section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969, to interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Appellate Tribunal?
  • Is a custodian of imported goods liable for penalties if the Customs department fails to establish that the containers were discharged at the terminal with goods and subsequently removed?
  • What degree of proof is required to impose penal action against an accused under the penal provisions of the Customs Act, 1969?
  Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs and another vs Ibrahim -Fibers-Ltd. through General Manager (Import)2013 PTD 2025 · Sindh High Court · 2013-07-17Read full judgment →
• Coca Cola Mazdoor Union through General Secretary vs Registrar of Trade Unions, Sindh and 3 others2013 PLC 206 · Sindh High Court · 2012-02-14
  Collective Bargaining AgentIndustrial Relations Act 2008workman statusreferendumgrievance petitiontermination of serviceindustrial dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra-Court Appeal challenged a judgment setting aside an order that allowed 53 former employees, whose grievance petitions were pending before the Labour Court, to participate in a referendum for the Collective Bargaining Agent (CBA). The core legal question was whether individuals whose employment has ceased, but who are challenging their termination or resignation in court, qualify as "workmen" under the Industrial Relations Act, 2008, for the purpose of voting in a CBA referendum. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that these individuals are not "workmen" until their grievance petitions are adjudicated in their favor. The Court reasoned that the mere pendency of a grievance petition does not confer the status of a "workman" or convert the dispute into an "industrial dispute" for the purposes of the Act. The principle established is that the right to participate in a CBA referendum is restricted to those currently in active service, and terminated employees cannot cast a vote merely based on the expectation of reinstatement or the pendency of their individual grievance petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees whose services have been terminated and who have pending grievance petitions considered 'workmen' for the purpose of voting in a Collective Bargaining Agent referendum?
  • Does the pendency of an individual grievance petition under the Industrial Relations Act 2008 automatically convert a dispute into an 'industrial dispute'?
  • Can a former employee participate in a referendum for a Collective Bargaining Agent before their grievance petition is decided in their favor?
  Read full judgment →
• Civil Aviation Authority of Pakistan through Airport Manager vs Sindh2013 PTD 2048 · Sindh High Court · 2013-07-10Read full judgment →
• Chief Resident Representative WAPDA vs Messrs Transglobe Shipping2013 CLD 1213 · Sindh High Court · 2012-11-30Read full judgment →
• Chettan vs Ghulam Hussain and 2 others2013 YLR 2032 · Sindh High Court · 2013-02-08
  bail cancellationpost-arrest baildacoityfurther inquirycase property
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application was filed against the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, whereby the accused respondents were granted post-arrest bail in a case involving an alleged attempted dacoity and recovery of a pistol. The core legal question before the court was whether strong and exceptional grounds existed to warrant the cancellation of post-arrest bail granted by the trial court. The Sindh High Court dismissed the application, holding that the considerations for granting bail are entirely different from those for cancelling it, and once bail is granted, strong and exceptional grounds are required to deprive the accused of liberty. The court observed that the complainant failed to demonstrate any patent illegality, perversity, or miscarriage of justice in the impugned bail order, noting discrepancies such as the non-production of the case property (motorcycle) and an unexplained delay of eighteen hours in lodging the First Information Report. The key principle laid down is that post-arrest bail once granted by a competent court will not be interfered with or cancelled absent exceptional circumstances and demonstrable perversity in the lower court's exercise of discretion.

  Questions settled

  • What are the distinct considerations required for the cancellation of post-arrest bail compared to its initial grant?
  • Does the failure to produce case property before the trial court affect the assessment of a bail matter?
  • Whether strong and exceptional grounds must be demonstrated to deprive an accused person of post-arrest liberty once granted?
  Read full judgment →
• Chand Muhammad vs The State2013 YLR 781(2) · Sindh High Court · 2012-09-14
  illegal dispossessioninquiry reportimpartial investigationrevision applicationpossession disputeagreement to sell
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision application arises from an order passed by the VIth Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The applicant alleged that the respondent illegally and unlawfully occupied the subject property after failing to complete the sale agreement and pay the balance consideration. The core legal question concerned the legality and impartiality of the inquiry/investigation report conducted pursuant to the application under sections 3 and 4 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, which had concluded that the matter was of a civil nature and that possession was handed over voluntarily. The Sindh High Court held that the inquiry report was one-sided, relied on interested witnesses related to the respondent, and failed to examine the applicant's witnesses or establish how possession was transferred. The Court set aside the improper inquiry report and the impugned order, directing a fresh, impartial investigation by the concerned officer-in-charge as prescribed under the law, emphasizing that investigation reports must not contain unsolicited proposals or conclusions, as taking cognizance and deciding the matter remains the exclusive prerogative of the Sessions Judge.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an inquiry report under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, based on the examination of interested witnesses and ignoring the applicant's witnesses, is sustainable?
  • Can an Investigating Officer include proposals or conclusions regarding the civil or criminal nature of a dispute in an investigation report under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005?
  • Does the burden lie upon the respondent to establish how and in what manner they came into possession of the subject property?
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• Ch. Fazal Muhammad vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence and 5 others2013 CLC 606 · Sindh High Court · 2012-10-04Read full judgment →
• Captain Syed Warasat Hussain vs Muhammad Ahad Saad2013 PLD Sindh 513 · Sindh High Court · 2013-04-17Read full judgment →
• Captain Salim Bilal vs Pakistan International Airline Corporation2013 PLC (C.S.) 1212 · Sindh High Court · 2013-05-03
  Constitutional petitionMaster and servantContractual obligationsLoss of license insuranceDiscriminationArticle 199Article 25Insurance policy interpretationPermanent medical unfitnessPublic body
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition concerned a pilot's claim for compensation under a loss of license insurance policy against Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC) after being declared permanently medically unfit. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of a constitutional petition under Article 199 for contractual obligations governed by a master-servant relationship, the interpretation of "illness" within the insurance policy, and whether the denial of compensation constituted discrimination under Article 25 of the Constitution. The High Court held that while contractual obligations in a master-servant context are generally not enforceable via Article 199, the court retains jurisdiction under Article 199(1)(c) to enforce fundamental rights, such as non-discrimination, against a public body like PIAC, even if the claim is grounded in contractual terms. The court further ruled that the respondents had misconstrued the definition of "illness" in the insurance policy, emphasizing that coverage provisions should be interpreted broadly and exclusion clauses narrowly. The court directed PIAC to convene a committee as per the agreement to reconsider the petitioner's case, applying the correct interpretation of "illness," and to address the alleged discrimination by reviewing the cases of other pilots who received compensation.

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• Budho vs The State2013 YLR 1349 · Sindh High Court · 2012-11-29
  unlicensed weaponarms ordinancepolice evidencebenefit of doubtrecovery witnessescriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under section 13/D of the Arms Ordinance, wherein he was sentenced to five years rigorous imprisonment and a fine for allegedly possessing an unlicensed Kalashnikov with live bullets. The core legal question revolves around whether a conviction for arms possession can be sustained solely on the uncorroborated and contradictory testimony of police officials, without complying with mandatory provisions regarding independent witnesses for recovery. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt due to material contradictions in police testimony and the failure to associate independent private mashirs under section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The court established that the onus remains strictly on the prosecution to prove its case on its own strength, and a single infirmity creating a reasonable doubt entitles the accused to an acquittal. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for illegal arms possession be sustained solely on the uncorroborated testimony of police officials?
  • What is the legal effect of failing to associate private independent mashirs during recovery proceedings under section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the burden of proof shift to the accused to prove false implication when the prosecution evidence is doubtful?
  • Is a single infirmity in prosecution evidence sufficient to extend the benefit of doubt and result in the acquittal of an accused?
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• Boc Pakistan Limited, Karachi vs National Gases (Pvt.) Limited, Karachi2013 PLJ Karachi 130 · Sindh High Court · 2013-01-18Read full judgment →