Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 46,805 judgments in total from the Sindh High Court.

• Wasi Mazhar Nadvi vs Province of Sindh and others2000 CLC 1776 · Sindh High Court · 2000-02-02Read full judgment →
• Waseem Langra vs The State2000 MLD 666 · Sindh High Court · 1999-12-13
  post-arrest bailidentification paraderule of consistencydelayed statementabsconsionmurder trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This bail application was filed by the applicant/accused, Waseem Langra, who is facing trial for murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to post-arrest bail given the lack of identification in the F.I.R., the absence of an identification parade, the questionable value of delayed statements, and the principle of consistency regarding a co-accused who had already been granted bail. The Court held that the applicant was entitled to bail. The judgment reasoned that the F.I.R. did not identify the assailants, and the complainant's subsequent statement, recorded with a significant delay, lacked evidentiary value. Furthermore, the failure to conduct an identification parade, despite the complainant not knowing the accused, weakened the prosecution's case. Additionally, the prosecution failed to prove absconsion, and the rule of consistency applied as a co-accused had already been enlarged on bail. The key principle laid down is that where culprits are unnamed in the F.I.R., an identification parade is a necessary procedural check against false implication.

  Questions settled

  • Is an identification parade necessary when the accused is not named in the F.I.R. and is unknown to the complainant?
  • Does the rule of consistency entitle an accused to bail if a co-accused in the same case has already been granted bail?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 after a delay of more than two months?
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• Waseem Ahmed alias Pasha vs The State2000 YLR 84 · Sindh High Court · 1999-12-08
  post-arrest bailabsconsionfurther inquiryacquittal of co-accusedcriminal liabilitymurderattempt to murder
  Summary & questions settled

  This bail application concerns an accused, Waseem Ahmed alias Pasha, charged under Sections 302 and 324 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for his alleged involvement in a shooting incident resulting in death and injury. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to post-arrest bail despite allegations of his absconsion and the severity of the charges. The Sindh High Court held that the applicant was entitled to bail, noting that his case was at par with a co-accused who had already been acquitted on merits. The court observed that the FIR did not specifically attribute the fatal shot to the applicant, but rather to another co-accused. Furthermore, the court established the principle that while absconsion is a relevant factor, it is not an absolute bar to bail when the prosecution's case requires further inquiry or fails to prima facie connect the accused to the offense. Consequently, the court granted bail subject to the furnishing of a surety bond.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absconsion of an accused automatically disentitle them from the grant of bail?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail if their case is at par with a co-accused who has already been acquitted?
  • Can bail be granted in cases involving offenses punishable with death or life imprisonment if the prosecution case requires further inquiry?
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• Warner Brothers vs Imtiaz and 3 others2000 P Cr. L J 752 · Sindh High Court · 1997-11-03
  criminal acquittal appealacquittal under section 249-Acopyright violationrecovery witnessesretrial
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal acquittal appeal filed under section 417(2-A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 against the order of the trial court acquitting the respondents under section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a case relating to copyright violations under the Copyright Act, 1992. The core legal question was whether an accused can be acquitted under section 249-A prior to recording prosecution evidence on the assumption that recovery witnesses are interested and their testimony would not lead to a conviction. The Sindh High Court held that the trial court erred in acquitting the respondents without giving the prosecution an opportunity to examine the material witnesses and prove the allegations, as the charge could not be deemed groundless prematurely. The appeal was allowed, the acquittal order was set aside, and the matter was remanded back to the trial court for retrial.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be acquitted under section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 before the prosecution is given an opportunity to record evidence?
  • Whether recovery witnesses being allegedly interested persons justifies a premature acquittal under section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an acquittal order sustainable when passed without any material or evidence before the trial court to justify that there is no probability of conviction?
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• Waris and 2 others vs The State2000 P Cr. L J 642 · Sindh High Court · 1999-10-25
  post-arrest baildelay in F.I.R.further inquirybenefit of doubtattempted murdermedico-legal report
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Sindh High Court through a bail application filed by three applicants seeking pre-trial release in a criminal case involving allegations of assault and firearm injuries. The core legal questions revolve around the effect of an unexplained delay in lodging the First Information Report, the significance of bypassing local medical facilities for treatment elsewhere, and whether the case warrants further inquiry under criminal jurisprudence. The Court held that an unexplained delay of over thirty-six hours in lodging the F.I.R., coupled with the injured person first going home instead of seeking immediate medical or police assistance and traveling to a distant hospital, creates circumstances that entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt at the bail stage. The Court established that where the prosecution fails to provide a plausible explanation for significant delay and where the medical and surrounding circumstances raise doubt regarding the immediate seriousness of the occurrence, the case falls within the ambit of further inquiry, making the accused persons eligible for bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay of over thirty-six hours in lodging the First Information Report entitle an accused to bail?
  • Can the bypassing of a local hospital for a distant medical facility affect the credibility of the prosecution case at the bail stage?
  • Whether contradictions in the medico-legal report and police statements make a case one of further inquiry under criminal law?
  • Is delay in reporting a crime always fatal to the prosecution, or does it depend on the presence of a reasonable explanation?
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• Wali Muhammad vs The State2000 P Cr. L J 145 · Sindh High Court · 1999-08-05
  post-arrest bailattempted murderabetmentnegative roleconnivanceheinous crime
  Summary & questions settled

  This case involves a post-arrest bail application filed by Wali Muhammad, who was implicated along with his son Irfan for offences punishable under sections 324 and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following an incident where the applicant's daughter-in-law was set on fire after being doused with kerosene oil. The core legal question was whether the applicant, who allegedly played a passive yet instigative and conniving role by witnessing the act without intervening or informing authorities, was entitled to post-arrest bail. The Sindh High Court held that the applicant's negative role, connivance, and failure to assist the victim or report the crime disentitled him to bail, considering the seriousness of the injuries and the clear intention to commit murder. The court dismissed the application, affirming that bail must be evaluated based on the specific facts and circumstances of each case rather than generalized precedents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused who plays a passive or negative role by witnessing a crime without intervening can be refused post-arrest bail?
  • Does failure to report a cognizable offence or assist the victim implicate a family member as an accomplice for the purpose of bail?
  • Are precedents regarding simple injuries on non-vital parts applicable to cases involving direct attempts to burn a person alive?
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• Wali Ahmed Khan vs Karachi Development Authority through Chairman2000 PLC (C.S.) 806 · Sindh High Court · 2000-02-01
  service tribunalouster of jurisdictionabatement of suitterms and conditions of servicecivil servantcorporation employeeKDA
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses an application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for the abatement of a civil suit filed by a former employee of the Karachi Development Authority (K.D.A.) seeking declarations, damages, and reinstatement. The core legal question was whether the insertion of Section 2-A into the Service Tribunals Act 1973 ousted the jurisdiction of civil courts over service disputes of employees of corporations established under federal laws, causing pending suits to abate. The court held that the Karachi Development Authority, established under Presidential Order No. 5 of 1957, falls within the ambit of Section 2-A, making its employees deemed civil servants and vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the Service Tribunal. Consequently, pending suits regarding terms and conditions of service stand abated by operation of law. The key principle laid down is that the introduction of Section 2-A into the Service Tribunals Act 1973 ousts the jurisdiction of civil courts over employment disputes of covered corporate entities, resulting in the statutory abatement of pending proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the insertion of Section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act 1973 oust the jurisdiction of civil courts in service matters of corporate bodies established by federal laws?
  • Whether pending civil suits relating to the terms and conditions of service of employees of statutory corporations stand abated upon the enactment of Section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act 1973?
  • Is the Karachi Development Authority considered an authority or corporation established under a Federal Law for the purposes of Section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act 1973?
  • Do Service Tribunals possess exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate upon disputes regarding the terms and conditions of service of employees deemed to be civil servants under Section 2-A?
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• Wakeel Ahmad Siddiqui vs The State2000 P Cr. L J 735 · Sindh High Court · 1999-01-11
  post-arrest bailnarcotics smugglingcontrolled deliveryhashish recoverystatutory barprohibitory clause
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal miscellaneous application filed by the applicant Waqeel Ahmed Siddiqui seeking post-arrest bail after being refused the same by the trial Court for an offence under section 9 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal question involved whether the applicant, prima facie connected to a drug syndicate exporting a large quantity of hashish under the guise of fruit and vegetables and barred by statutory provisions, was entitled to the concession of bail. The Sindh High Court dismissed the bail application, holding that a prima facie case was established against the applicant linking him to the exported consignment containing hashish, recoveries were made from his possession, and the offence was punishable with death, attracting the prohibitory clause and the statutory bar under section 51 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The key principle laid down is that where there is prima facie evidence connecting an accused to large-scale narcotics trafficking punishable with death and hit by statutory bail bars, bail will be refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be granted to an accused charged with an offence under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 punishable with death?
  • Does Section 51 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 create a bar in granting bail to an accused prima facie connected with narcotics smuggling?
  • Whether deep scrutiny and appraisal of evidence can be undertaken at the bail stage?
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• Wajid ALI/Accused vs The State2000 MLD 1572 · Sindh High Court · 2000-03-02
  post-arrest bailmisappropriationpublic servantembezzlementrestitutioncriminal breach of trust
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a bail application filed by an accused, a public servant, facing charges of misappropriation of government wheat bags and forgery of records under sections 409, 477-A, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The core legal question was whether the accused was entitled to bail given that the entire amount allegedly misappropriated by him had been deposited into the government treasury prior to or immediately following the registration of the First Information Report. The Court held that the accused was entitled to bail, noting that the investigation was complete, the challan had been submitted, and the accused was no longer required for police investigation. Furthermore, the Court distinguished the applicant's case from his co-accused, emphasizing that the deposit of the embezzled amount mitigated the grounds for continued detention. The key principle laid down is that where an accused has deposited the entire alleged embezzled amount and the prosecution's evidence is secured, there are no reasonable grounds to believe the accused is guilty, warranting the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the deposit of the entire allegedly embezzled amount by a public servant constitute sufficient grounds for the grant of bail?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail when the investigation is complete and the challan has been submitted to the court?
  • Can an accused be granted bail if his case is distinguishable from co-accused who have not made restitution?
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• United Bank Ltd. vs Golden Textile Mills Ltd. and 7 others2000 CLC 819 · Sindh High Court · 1999-08-26
  novation of contractguarantor liabilityletter of creditmark-upbanking recoveryforeign exchange fluctuationcoextensive liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a suit for recovery filed by a bank against a company and its guarantors regarding an irrevocable letter of credit-cum-letter of guarantee. The core legal questions were whether subsequent undertakings signed by company directors constituted a novation of the original agreement, thereby binding the company to enhanced liability for foreign exchange fluctuations, and whether the guarantors' liability could be extended beyond the original agreement terms. The Court held that the subsequent undertakings created a valid obligation on the company to pay the rupee equivalent of the bills, effectively substituting the relevant term in the original agreement. However, the Court ruled that the bank could not unilaterally charge mark-up without a specific agreement. Furthermore, the Court held that under Section 133 of the Contract Act 1872, guarantors are discharged from liability for any alterations made to the original contract without their conscious consent, thus limiting their liability to the original agreed amount. The suit was decreed against the principal debtor for the full amount, while the guarantors' liability was capped at the original contract sum.

  Questions settled

  • Does a subsequent undertaking signed by company directors regarding payment obligations constitute a novation of the original contract?
  • Can a bank charge mark-up on forced demand finance in the absence of a specific agreement between the parties?
  • Is a guarantor liable for enhanced obligations resulting from alterations to the original contract made without their conscious consent?
  • Does the failure to place a company rubber stamp on an undertaking invalidate the document if it is otherwise signed by a director?
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• United Bank Limited vs Muhammad Sharfuddin2000 MLD 456 · Sindh High Court · 1999-04-28Read full judgment →
• United Bank Limited vs A.Z. Hashmi (Pvt.) Limited and 8 others2000 CLC 1438 · Sindh High Court · 1999-10-07
  execution proceedingspublic auctionauction purchaserconfirmation of salebanking courtdecree-holdermortgaged property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an order of the Banking Court dismissing an application by the appellant bank to withhold the auction process of mortgaged properties after the auction had already been conducted and confirmed. The core legal question was whether a decree-holder, having initiated execution proceedings through public auction, could unilaterally halt the process to negotiate a private settlement with the judgment-debtor after the auction purchasers had fulfilled all legal requirements, including payment and confirmation of sale. The High Court held that the trial court correctly dismissed the application. The ratio decidendi is that once a court-ordered public auction is lawfully conducted, the purchase price is paid, and the sale is confirmed, the auction purchaser acquires vested rights that cannot be disturbed merely to accommodate a belated settlement between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor. The court affirmed that judicial discretion in execution proceedings cannot be exercised arbitrarily to undermine the stability of judicial sales, emphasizing that auction proceedings must follow the established legal course without interference once rights have accrued to third-party purchasers.

  Questions settled

  • Can a decree-holder stop an auction process after the sale has been confirmed and the purchase price paid?
  • Does an executing court have the discretion to cancel a validly conducted auction sale to facilitate a private settlement between the parties?
  • What rights are acquired by an auction purchaser upon the confirmation of a judicial sale?
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• Umar Zaib vs Messrs Pakistan Beverages2000 PLC 583 · Sindh High Court · 2000-03-16
  industrial relationslabour appellate tribunalstay orderreinstatementconstitutional petitionback benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an employee, challenged an order of the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal suspending the operation of a Labour Court's reinstatement order beyond the statutory twenty-day period. The core legal question was whether the Appellate Tribunal could maintain a stay order on a Labour Court's decision beyond twenty days from filing the appeal under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The Sindh High Court held that any order staying the operation of a Labour Court's decision stands automatically vacated after twenty days if the appeal is not decided within that period, making the impugned order without jurisdiction. The court also clarified its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, holding that it cannot substitute its own judgment for that of a tribunal when striking down an illegal order. The petition was allowed to the extent of declaring the impugned stay order without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a stay order passed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal against a Labour Court's decision lapses after twenty days under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Does keeping an order in abeyance amount to staying the operation of the order under section 38 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Can the High Court substitute its own judgment for that of a subordinate court or tribunal while exercising constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
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• Umar alias Laili vs The State2000 YLR 2396 · Sindh High Court · 2000-05-01
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirygeneral allegationscriminal shelterHudood Ordinancebail application
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the accused, Umar alias Laili, who was facing trial under Section 216-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 21(2) of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979. The prosecution alleged that the accused was a 'Patharidar' of cattle, providing shelter and assistance to criminals. The core legal question was whether the accused was entitled to bail given the nature of the allegations and the evidence presented in the F.I.R. The High Court observed that the allegations were general in nature, lacking specific instances of criminal conduct, and noted that no incriminating material was recovered from the accused's possession. Conceding that there was no evidence against the applicant, the State did not oppose the bail. Consequently, the Court held that the case necessitated further inquiry as contemplated under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court granted bail, establishing the principle that where allegations are vague and lack specific evidentiary support, the case falls within the scope of further inquiry, warranting the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of specific instances in an F.I.R. regarding the harboring of criminals justify a grant of bail?
  • Is a case eligible for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the allegations are general and lack incriminating evidence?
  • Can bail be granted when the State concedes that there is no evidence against the accused?
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• Tubbasam Ahmed Qureshi vs The State2000 P Cr. L J 105 · Sindh High Court · 1999-03-17
  bail applicationpre-arrest bailembezzlementmisappropriationforgerycheatingbreach of trustprohibitory clauseprima facie casegravity of offence
  Summary & questions settled

  This bail application concerned an applicant facing trial for offences under Sections 420, 421, 468, 470, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, involving alleged embezzlement and misappropriation of Rs. 10,000,000 from his employer. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to bail, particularly considering the gravity of the offence despite it not being punishable with death or life imprisonment, and the duration of custody. The Sindh High Court dismissed the bail application, upholding the decisions of the lower courts. The court held that bail is not automatically granted in cases not punishable by death, life imprisonment, or ten years, emphasizing that courts must consider the gravity of the offence and make a tentative assessment of evidence to determine if a prima facie case is made out. The court found that the applicant's case fell within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, due to the serious nature of the allegations and the strong prima facie evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Is bail automatically granted in cases not punishable by death, life imprisonment, or ten years?
  • Can a court refuse bail in cases not falling under the prohibitory clause if a prima facie case is established?
  • When does the period of delay proviso under Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 become available to an applicant?
  • What factors should a court consider when assessing a bail application for offences involving breach of trust and misappropriation?
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• Treasurer of Charitable Endowment for Pakistan vs Inamur Rehman2000 CLC 135 · Sindh High Court · 1998-05-20Read full judgment →
• Trading Corporation of Pakistan vs Nidra Handelscompagnie B.V. And AnotherK.L.R. 2000 Civil Cases 176 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Trading Corporation of Pakistan vs Intercontinental Oceanic2000 CLC 1892 · Sindh High Court · 1999-02-26
  short-landing of cargocarrier liabilitybulk oil cargoship's manifoldtransportation lossesCustoms Act 1969ship agent liabilityHague Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two consolidated suits concerning claims for short-landing of bulk oil cargo against ship owners and their agents. The core legal questions addressed were the determination of the carrier's liability, the point at which delivery occurs for liquid bulk cargo, and the extent of the carrier's responsibility for losses occurring after discharge. The court held that the carrier's responsibility terminates once the cargo passes the ship's manifold, as the shore tanks are under the control of the consignee or terminal operators. Consequently, the carrier is not liable for losses occurring after the cargo leaves the ship's manifold. Furthermore, the court established that "transportation losses"—specifically 0.5% for inflammable oil and 0.25% for edible oil—are internationally accepted standards for which the carrier is not liable. The court also clarified that the liability of a ship's agent under the Customs Act, 1969, is secondary and co-extensive with the carrier, arising only after the carrier's liability is established. The suits were dismissed as the plaintiffs failed to prove the carrier's liability for the alleged shortages.

  Questions settled

  • Does the carrier's responsibility for bulk oil cargo extend beyond the ship's manifold to the shore tanks?
  • What is the legal effect of 'transportation losses' in bulk oil cargo claims?
  • Is the liability of a ship's agent under Section 55 of the Customs Act, 1969, independent or secondary to the carrier's liability?
  • At what point does the delivery of liquid bulk cargo occur in a contract of carriage by sea?
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• The Wellcome Foundation Limited vs Messrs Karachi Chemical2000 YLR 1376 · Sindh High Court · 1988-09-21
  trade mark infringementpassing offinterim injunctiondeceptive similaritypharmaceutical preparationregistered trade mark
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves an application by the plaintiff seeking a temporary injunction to restrain the defendants from manufacturing, supplying, stocking, and selling their pharmaceutical preparation under the mark 'KAYPOL' or using labels and packaging deceptively similar to the plaintiff's registered trade mark 'CALPOL'. The core legal questions concern whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case of trade mark infringement and passing off, and whether phonetic or visual similarity between the rival marks is likely to deceive or cause confusion among purchasers, notwithstanding the defendants' registration of their product under the Drugs Act, 1976. The Sindh High Court held that the plaintiff possessed an exclusive statutory right to use its registered trade mark, that the rival marks exhibited striking visual, phonetic, and overall structural similarities capable of deceiving unwary purchasers, and that registration under the Drugs Act provides no immunity against trade mark infringement claims. The court made the interim injunction absolute, restraining the defendants from using the infringing mark and packaging during the pendency of the suit. The key principles laid down are that trade mark infringement is determined by the overall impression and general similarities of rival marks rather than side-by-side comparison, and that health-related drug registration does not override proprietary trade mark rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the registration of a medicine under the Drugs Act, 1976 immunises a party against claims of trade mark infringement?
  • Does a prima facie case of trade mark infringement entitle the plaintiff to an interim injunction?
  • How is deceptive similarity between rival trade marks to be determined by the court?
  • What constitutes an infringement of an exclusive right to use a registered trade mark under Section 21 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940?
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• The State vs Muhammad Babar Lodhi and anothers2000 P Cr. L J 1044 · Sindh High Court · 1999-08-27
  acquittal appealrecovery of armsindependent mashirsburden of proofpolice witnessesappreciation of evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This acquittal appeal was filed by the State under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, challenging the judgment of the Anti-Terrorism Court which acquitted the respondents of charges under Section 302/34 and Section 392/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and Section 13-D of the Arms Ordinance 1965. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven the guilt of the respondents beyond reasonable doubt given the evidentiary deficiencies. The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the acquittal. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case, noting that the confession was not recorded in accordance with law, the last seen evidence was tainted, and the recovery of incriminating items was not supported by independent, reliable evidence. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that where independent witnesses are available in a populated area, the reliance solely on police witnesses for recoveries is insufficient to sustain a conviction, particularly when corroborative evidence like police departure entries is absent. The judgment reinforces the principle that the burden of proof remains on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on the testimony of police witnesses when independent witnesses were available in a populated area?
  • Is the recovery of a weapon reliable if the prosecution fails to produce police departure entries to prove the presence of the recovering officers?
  • Does a confession not recorded in accordance with the law constitute admissible evidence against an accused?
  • What is the effect of failing to join independent witnesses during a recovery in a thickly populated area?
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• The State vs Bashir Ahmad Chaudhry and others2000 PLD Karachi 198 · Sindh High Court · 2000-03-22
  criminal appealacquittal appealmaintainabilityCentral Law Officerslocus standicustoms lawstatutory authorization
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involved a series of criminal appeals and miscellaneous applications filed by the State and the Federal Government challenging various acquittal and bail orders passed by the Special Judge (Customs and Taxation), Karachi. The core legal question was whether these proceedings were competently instituted, given that they were not signed or filed by the Central Law Officers designated under the relevant statutes. The respondents contended that under Section 4-A of the Central Law Officers (Amendment) Act, 1985, only specific officers—namely Additional Attorneys-General, Deputy Attorneys-General, and Standing Counsel—are authorized to institute and conduct proceedings on behalf of the Federal Government. The Court, relying on established Supreme Court precedents and the principle of delegatus non potest delegare, upheld the preliminary objection. It held that the appeals were not legally filed as they lacked the requisite authorization from the designated Law Officers. Consequently, the Court dismissed all the appeals as not maintainable, affirming that strict compliance with statutory authorization requirements is mandatory for the valid institution of legal proceedings by the Federal Government.

  Questions settled

  • Are appeals filed by persons other than the designated Central Law Officers on behalf of the Federal Government maintainable?
  • Does the Central Law Officers (Amendment) Act 1985 restrict the authority to institute legal proceedings on behalf of the Federal Government to specific law officers?
  • Can an acquittal appeal filed by an unauthorized person be considered legally instituted?
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• The State through AdvocateGeneral/ Public Prosecutor, Sindh vs Shahid2000 P Cr. L J 1781 · Sindh High Court · 2000-12-16
  appeal against acquittalpresumption of innocencemisreading of evidencealibidelayed reportinganti-terrorism courtcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The State filed an appeal against the judgment of the Anti-Terrorism Court, which acquitted the respondents of murder charges under Sections 302, 109, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution's case rested on the testimony of alleged eyewitnesses who surfaced seventeen days after the incident, provided no explanation for their presence at the scene, and failed to report the crime immediately. Conversely, the accused presented evidence of their presence at their respective workplaces during the time of the occurrence. The High Court reviewed the principles governing appeals against acquittal, emphasizing that an acquittal reinforces the presumption of innocence, and appellate interference is warranted only if the trial court's judgment is perverse, artificial, or results in a gross miscarriage of justice. Finding the trial court’s reasoning cogent and the prosecution's evidence unreliable, the High Court held that the acquittal was consistent with the safe administration of criminal justice. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • What is the standard of interference by an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal?
  • Does the acquittal of an accused by a trial court enhance the presumption of innocence?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with an acquittal judgment if the trial court's reasoning is sound and not perverse?
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• The State through AdvocateGeneral, Sindh_Public Prosecutor, Karachi vs Shamshurrehman alias Shamoo Dakoo alias Khalid2000 YLR 902 · Sindh High Court · 1999-11-11
  Anti-Terrorism Actcriminal revisionpersonal enmityjurisdictionmaintainabilitysessions courtspecial court
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition was filed by the State against the order of the Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court, transferring certain special cases to the Sessions Court. The core legal questions involved whether an offence committed out of personal or family enmity attracts the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and whether a criminal revision is maintainable against an interlocutory order of an Anti-Terrorism Court under the statutory scheme. The High Court held that a murder committed due to personal or family enmity, rather than to create terror or a sense of fear in the public, does not fall within the scope of sections 6 and 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. Furthermore, the court held that revisions under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 are inconsistent with sections 25 and 31 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, rendering interlocutory orders unchallengeable by way of revision. The key principles laid down are that crimes stemming from private vendettas must be tried by ordinary courts, and that only appeals against final judgments of conviction or acquittal are permitted under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997.

  Questions settled

  • Does a murder committed due to personal or family enmity attract the provisions of sections 6 and 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Is a criminal revision maintainable against an interlocutory order passed by an Anti-Terrorism Court in view of sections 25 and 31 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • What is the effect of section 31 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 on the applicability of sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• The State through AdvocateGeneral, Sindh_Public Prosecutor, Karachi vs Haji Lal Muhammad alias Laloo and 3 others2000 P Cr. L J 1434 · Sindh High Court · 1999-11-26
  appeal against acquittalabduction for ransomhostile witnesspolice testimonyrecovery mashirpresumption of innocenceanti-terrorism
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal was filed by the State challenging the acquittal of the respondents by the Special Court (Anti-Terrorism) in a case relating to abduction for ransom. The core legal question was whether the order of acquittal passed by the trial court warranted interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal, given that the abductees and recovery mashirs did not support the prosecution case, and the sole reliance was placed on police testimony. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that in an appeal against acquittal, the presumption of innocence is doubled, and an appellate court will not interfere unless the trial court's judgment is perverse, arbitrary, or based on a complete misreading of evidence leading to a miscarriage of justice. The key principle laid down is that where star witnesses (abductees) and recovery witnesses fail to support the prosecution and turn hostile, uncorroborated testimony of police officials is insufficient to overturn an acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • What are the governing principles for an appellate court when hearing an appeal against an acquittal?
  • Can an accused be convicted solely on the uncorroborated testimony of police officials when the primary abductees and recovery mashirs fail to support the prosecution case?
  • Does the failure of abductees to identify the accused persons warrant the dismissal of an appeal against acquittal?
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• The State through AdvocateGeneral, Sindh, Karachi vs Dr. Khalid Moin and 3 others2000 YLR 2668 · Sindh High Court · 2000-05-23
  Anti-Terrorism ActCriminal RevisionMaintainabilitySpecial CourtFinality of JudgmentOverriding Effect
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a Criminal Revision Application filed by the State challenging an order passed by the Anti-Terrorism Court No. 2, Karachi. The core legal question before the Sindh High Court was whether a Criminal Revision application is maintainable against an order passed by an Anti-Terrorism Court under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The Court held that the application was not maintainable. Relying on the statutory scheme of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, the Court observed that Section 31 of the Act explicitly mandates the finality of judgments and orders passed by the Anti-Terrorism Court, subject only to the result of an appeal. Furthermore, the Court determined that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, specifically Sections 435 and 439, are inconsistent with the special procedure established by the Act, which provides a limited appellate mechanism under Section 25. The Court laid down the principle that the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 is a special law with an overriding effect, and its provisions regarding the finality of orders and the specific appellate process preclude the filing of revision applications against interlocutory or other orders of the Anti-Terrorism Court.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Criminal Revision application maintainable against an order passed by an Anti-Terrorism Court?
  • Do the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 regarding revision apply to proceedings under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Does Section 31 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 bar the filing of a revision application against an order of an Anti-Terrorism Court?
  Read full judgment →
• The State through Advocate General, Sindh vs Dildar and 2 others2000 YLR 334 · Sindh High Court · 1999-11-12
  appeal against acquittalanti-terrorismhostile witnessappreciation of evidencepresumption of innocenceabductioncircumstantial evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal acquittal appeal was filed by the Advocate-General, Sindh, against the judgment of the Judge, Anti-Terrorism, Hyderabad Division, acquitting the respondents of charges under section 365-A and 392 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerned whether an order of acquittal passed by a trial court could be set aside based on circumstantial evidence when the primary victims and material witnesses failed to support the prosecution case and exonerated the accused. The Sindh High Court held that the trial court rightly acquitted the respondents, as the principal witnesses turned hostile and the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to establish guilt, while an appellate court will not interfere with an acquittal unless the impugned judgment is perverse, arbitrary, or based on a complete misreading of evidence. The key principle laid down is that an order of acquittal carries double presumption of innocence, and an appellate court shall be extremely slow to interfere unless the conclusions of the trial court are manifestly unreasonable or perverse.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances will an appellate court interfere with an order of acquittal?
  • Does the failure of abductees and material witnesses to support the prosecution case warrant setting aside an acquittal?
  • What is the evidentiary weight of an identification parade where the witness was previously shown the accused in police custody?
  • Whether circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to overturn a trial court's judgment of acquittal.
  Read full judgment →
• The State through Additional AdvocateGeneral, Sindh_Public Prosecutor vs Anis Bawani and 2 others2000 P Cr. L J 1418 · Sindh High Court · 2000-03-29
  anti-terrorism appeallocus standilimitation periodspecial statuteoverriding effectacquittal appealstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal filed by the State against an acquittal order passed by a Special Court of Anti-Terrorism. The core legal questions were whether an Additional Advocate-General or Public Prosecutor is competent to file an appeal under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and whether the limitation period prescribed by the Act can be extended under the Limitation Act, 1908. The Court held that the appeal was not maintainable because section 25(4) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, exclusively empowers the Attorney-General or Advocate-General to file such appeals upon government direction, excluding other officers. Furthermore, the Court held that the appeal was time-barred, as the 15-day limitation period prescribed by the special statute prevails over the general provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908. The key principle laid down is that the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, is a special law with an overriding effect, and its specific procedural requirements regarding the authority to file appeals and limitation periods supersede the general provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and the Limitation Act, 1908.

  Questions settled

  • Is an Additional Advocate-General or Public Prosecutor competent to file an appeal against an acquittal under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Does the limitation period prescribed in the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, prevail over the general provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • Can the delay in filing an appeal under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, be condoned under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • Does the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, override the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, in case of inconsistency?
  Read full judgment →
• Tharo vs The State2000 MLD 1595 · Sindh High Court · 2000-01-07
  criminal appealmurderidentification paradebenefit of doubtrecovery of weaponballistic reportocular testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant for the murder of Muhammad Murad alias Sadawah. The core legal question is whether the prosecution successfully established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly given the reliance on ocular testimony and recovery evidence. The Court held that the prosecution failed to meet this burden. The identification parade was found legally flawed due to a joint procedure for multiple accused, an insufficient ratio of dummies, and an unexplained delay. Furthermore, the recovery of the weapon was deemed unreliable due to significant delays and procedural irregularities in sending ballistic evidence for forensic analysis. The Court emphasized that in the absence of reliable identification and corroborative evidence, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of the doubt. Consequently, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted. The principle laid down is that where identification procedures are procedurally defective and recovery evidence is tainted by delay and mishandling of ballistic samples, such evidence cannot form the basis of a criminal conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Is an identification parade valid if it is conducted jointly for multiple accused with an insufficient ratio of dummies?
  • Does a delay in sending crime empties and the recovered weapon to a ballistic expert undermine the reliability of the recovery evidence?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on ocular testimony when the identification process is procedurally flawed and the recovery evidence is unreliable?
  Read full judgment →
• Tasnim and another vs Rustom Ali and others2000 CLC 364 · Sindh High Court · 1999-01-14
  companies ordinanceoppression and mismanagementwinding upalternative remedyshare valuationcantonments rent restrictionpersonal bona fide needejectment of tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment from the law reports addresses two distinct matters: a company law appeal regarding the winding-up and management of a hospital, and a rent restriction appeal concerning tenant ejectment. In the first matter, the Sindh High Court examined whether minority shareholders could be ordered to sell their shares to the majority under section 290 of the Companies Ordinance 1984 as an alternative to winding up a hospital company experiencing internal disputes. The Court held that winding up a functioning medical facility would prejudice the public interest and patients, and that section 290 empowers courts to order share purchases to keep the company alive and resolve oppression. Setting aside the company judge's dismissal, the Court directed the minority to transfer their shares based on valuations previously agreed upon. In the second matter, the Lahore High Court evaluated an ejectment petition under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act 1963, ruling that a tenant claiming statutory protection for hotel premises must prove express written consent from the landlord, and that a premature ejectment petition matures once the required notice period elapses during proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court order the sale of minority shares to majority shareholders under section 290 of the Companies Ordinance 1984 as an alternative to winding up a company?
  • Whether public interest and the operational continuity of a vital medical institution prevent the winding up of a company under company law?
  • Is a tenant running a hotel entitled to the protection of two years' prior notice under section 17(4) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act 1963 without proving written consent from the landlord?
  • Can a premature ejectment petition be maintained and decided on merits if the statutory notice period matures during the pendency of the proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Tanveer Hussain alias Kobra vs The State and 2 others2000 P Cr. L J 1169 · Sindh High Court · 1999-06-29
  quashment of proceedingsSindh Crimes Control Actgeneral allegationsmandatory provisionscriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous petition was filed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the quashment of proceedings pending before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and Tribunal under section 14 of the Sindh Crimes Control Act. The core legal question was whether general allegations and labelling a person as a terrorist without specifying dates, times, or places of incidents, and without complying with mandatory procedural provisions, could sustain proceedings under the Sindh Crimes Control Act. The Sindh High Court held that the proceedings were initiated in mechanical fashion in violation of the mandatory provisions of sections 5 and 6 of the said Act, as no specific incidents were quoted in the police report. Consequently, the court accepted the petition and quashed the pending proceedings against the applicant. The key principle laid down is that general allegations and mere labelling of a person as a terrorist or dangerous without specific particulars and adherence to mandatory statutory procedures do not constitute sufficient grounds to initiate proceedings under the Sindh Crimes Control Act.

  Questions settled

  • Whether general allegations of being a terrorist without specific particulars of time, date, and place are sufficient to initiate proceedings under the Sindh Crimes Control Act?
  • Are the provisions of sections 4, 5, and 6 of the Sindh Crimes Control Act mandatory in nature?
  • Can criminal proceedings initiated in a mechanical manner without application of mind by the Tribunal be quashed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Taha vs The State2000 P Cr. L J 1322 · Sindh High Court · 1999-12-16
  Anti-Terrorism Courtquashment of proceedingsjurisdiction of High CourtSection 561-A CrPCscheduled offencesbailfinality of orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal miscellaneous application seeking the quashment of proceedings pending before an Anti-Terrorism Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The applicant, a juvenile accused in a case involving charges under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sought release on the grounds that co-accused had been acquitted in the same matter. The core legal question was whether the High Court possesses the jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash proceedings or release an accused person in a case triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court. The Court held that it lacked such jurisdiction, emphasizing that Section 30(3) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 explicitly bars any court other than the Anti-Terrorism Court from granting bail or otherwise releasing an accused in cases triable under that Act. The Court affirmed that all orders passed by an Anti-Terrorism Court, other than final judgments of conviction or acquittal, are final and not subject to interference by the High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash proceedings pending before an Anti-Terrorism Court?
  • Can a court other than an Anti-Terrorism Court grant bail or release an accused in a case triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court?
  • Are interlocutory orders passed by an Anti-Terrorism Court subject to revision or quashment by the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Zeeshan Hussain Kazmi vs The State and 3 others2000 P Cr. L J 645 · Sindh High Court · 1999-08-26
  quashment of proceedingsinherent powersabsconderproclaimed offenderbail jumpingfirst information reportprima facie case
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application was filed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking the quashment of proceedings in Sessions Case No. 198 of 1998 and F.I.R. No. 443 of 1996 registered at Police Station Clifton, Karachi. The applicant, a former police official, was nominated in the third F.I.R. relating to an incident where multiple lives were lost during a police encounter involving Mir Murtaza Bhutto. The core legal questions involved whether proceedings can be quashed under section 561-A when the accused is an absconder and proclaimed offender, and whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction to stifle an ongoing trial where a prima facie case is made out. The Sindh High Court held that an unexplained, prolonged abscondence disentitles an accused to relief under procedural or substantive law, and a fugitive from law cannot invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. The Court established that section 561-A powers are extraordinary, are to be exercised sparingly, and cannot be used to override express provisions of law, evaluate evidence, or bypass the ordinary course of trial when a prima facie case exists. The application was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is an application for quashment of proceedings under section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 maintainable when the accused is an absconder and a declared proclaimed offender?
  • Can the High Court exercise its inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to evaluate and assess evidence or determine the guilt or innocence of an accused during an ongoing trial?
  • Does the non-nomination of an accused in earlier F.I.Rs. or subsequent changes in the investigation agency constitute sufficient grounds for quashing criminal proceedings?
  • Whether an unexplained long-term abscondence disentitles an accused to relief under the procedural and substantive law.
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Sharaf Ali Shah vs Syed Liaquat Ali Shah2000 CLC 1646 · Sindh High Court · 1999-01-11
  summary suitsecuritysuretycivil revisioninterpretation of statutescompliance with court orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision application challenged orders passed by the Additional District Judge, Khairpur, in a summary suit, wherein the trial court directed the respondent to furnish security. The applicant contended that the trial court erred by accepting a surety instead of the security originally ordered, arguing this constituted a violation of the court's directive. The respondent maintained that the security furnished, which included a bond executed by a surety, fully complied with the court's order and that the terms 'security' and 'surety' are legally interchangeable in this context. The High Court dismissed the revision application, holding that the trial court had indeed accepted security, not merely a surety. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the principle that the term 'security' is comprehensive and generally encompasses a guarantee provided by a surety, as it is intended to make the recovery of money more assured. Consequently, the Court found the applicant's objection to be misconceived and upheld the trial court's acceptance of the security provided.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'security' in the context of legal proceedings exclude the guarantee provided by a surety?
  • Can a surety bond be considered valid security in a summary suit?
  • Is a revision application maintainable against an order accepting security in a summary suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Shabbir Ahmed vs Sheikh Muhammad Ashraf2000 CLC 1786 · Sindh High Court · 2000-01-12Read full judgment →
• Syed Nazir Hussain Shah vs The State2000 PLD Karachi 84 · Sindh High Court · 1999-04-28
  quashment of proceedingsabuse of process of courtcustoms dutyprinciple of consistencyinherent powerscriminal procedureFederal Investigation Agency
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves an application filed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking the quashment of criminal proceedings pending against the applicant, a Deputy Collector of Customs, before a Special Judge. The core legal question revolves around whether the continuation of criminal proceedings constitutes an abuse of the process of the court when investigative agencies, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Justice and Law have concluded that the accused did not contravene any law, no duties were leviable on the goods in question, and co-accused facing identical allegations have already had their proceedings quashed. The court held that allowing the prosecution to proceed under such circumstances would result in a futile trial and harassment, amounting to an abuse of the court's process. The ratio decidendi establishes that where evidence against an accused is weak, investigating authorities have placed the accused in column No. 2 as not sent up for trial, and co-accused in identical circumstances have been exonerated, the principle of consistency and the securing of the ends of justice warrant the quashment of proceedings under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Whether criminal proceedings can be quashed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the investigating agency concludes that the accused did not contravene any law?
  • Does the principle of consistency apply to quash proceedings against an accused whose case is identical to co-accused who have already been discharged or whose proceedings were quashed?
  • Is the continuation of a trial an abuse of the process of the court where the evidence is insufficient and acquittal is certain?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Muhammad Sohail vs Khawaja Mushfaq Ahmad Ghori2000 CLC 1715 · Sindh High Court · 1999-09-14Read full judgment →
• Syed Khurshid Ali and 3 otherss vs Syed Abi Ali and 5 others2000 YLR 1787 · Sindh High Court · 2000-05-07Read full judgment →
• Syed Jawad Ahmed vs The Chief Controller, Karachi Building Control2000 CLC 978 · Sindh High Court · 1999-05-26Read full judgment →
• Syed Gohar Ali Shah vs The State and 6 others2000 P Cr. L J 1180 · Sindh High Court · 1999-08-23
  Section 145 proceedingsinherent jurisdictionquashment of proceedingsproperty disputebreach of peacepossession of immovable propertycriminal trespass
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 sought to quash proceedings initiated under Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and to de-seal a disputed property. The core legal question was whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash ongoing Section 145 proceedings regarding a property dispute where conflicting claims of possession and title existed. The Court dismissed the application, holding that the impugned order did not suffer from legal or factual infirmity. The Court determined that the inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A is extraordinary and should be exercised sparingly to prevent abuse of process, not to circumvent the due process of law or to evaluate evidence that is yet to be presented. The Court affirmed that civil remedies, such as the eviction of tenants, cannot be circumvented by invoking criminal proceedings. Furthermore, the Magistrate’s role under Section 145 is limited to determining possession and preventing breach of peace, not deciding title. The Court refused to interfere at the initial stage where a prima facie case existed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash proceedings where an alternate adequate remedy is available?
  • Is the jurisdiction of a Magistrate under Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 ousted by the pendency of civil proceedings regarding the same property?
  • Does a landlord have the right to invoke Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to evict a tenant?
  • What is the scope of a Magistrate's authority under Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the determination of title versus possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Fazil Ali Shah vs Syed Zaheer Hussain2000 CLC 839 · Sindh High Court · 1999-11-12Read full judgment →
• Syed Fariduddin vs Karachi Development Authority through Director-2000 PLC (C.S.) 88 · Sindh High Court · 1998-08-24
  date of birth correctionservice recordssuperannuationFasli calendarKarachi Development Authorityappellate court dutyburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant filed a revision application challenging an appellate court judgment that reversed a trial court decree in his favor regarding the correction of his date of birth in his service records. The core legal question was whether the applicant's date of birth, originally recorded in the 'Fasli' calendar format from his matriculation certificate, was correctly established as 10th November 1934, entitling him to continued service until the age of superannuation, rather than the date (2-11-1931) unilaterally imposed by his employer, the Karachi Development Authority. The High Court held that the applicant provided sufficient, unrebutted evidence—including his matriculation certificate and passport application—to establish his date of birth, while the employer failed to provide any evidence to the contrary. The court emphasized that when a party adduces sufficient evidence to explain their date of birth and there is no rebuttal, the claim must be accepted. Additionally, the court ruled that an appellate court must properly discuss evidence and record findings of fact rather than relying on assumptions or extraneous matters.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employer unilaterally alter an employee's date of birth in service records without sufficient evidence?
  • Is an appellate court required to discuss evidence and record findings of fact in its judgment?
  • Does the failure of an employer to rebut documentary evidence regarding an employee's date of birth entitle the employee to the relief claimed?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Babar Hussain Rizvi vs State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan2000 CLC 541 · Sindh High Court · 1999-12-13Read full judgment →
• Syed Asif Ali Naqvi vs The State2000 MLD 984 · Sindh High Court · 1999-08-26
  post-arrest bailbank embezzlementabsconsionspecial courtcriminal breach of trust
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal bail application before the Sindh High Court filed by Syed Asif Ali Naqvi, who was facing trial before the Special Court (Offences in Banks) for bank embezzlement under sections 409 and 477-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The core legal question was whether the accused was entitled to post-arrest bail considering the gravity of the offence, the alleged embezzlement of bank funds, and his subsequent absconsion. The High Court dismissed the bail application, holding that there were reasonable grounds to believe the accused was prima facie guilty of the offence. The court established that under section 5(6) of the Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance 1984, which overrides the general provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, bail must be refused when reasonable grounds exist connecting the accused to a crime punishable with imprisonment for life.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be refused under the Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance 1984 when there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is guilty of an offence punishable with imprisonment for life?
  • Do the provisions of the Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance 1984 override the general provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in matters of bail?
  • Does absconsion following the detection of a cash shortfall constitute a reasonable ground to refuse post-arrest bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Adil Hussain vs Mst. Majda2000 CLC 1982 · Sindh High Court · 1998-12-16
  ejectmentwilful defaulttentative rent orderdenial of relationshiplandlord and tenantburden of proofrent deposit
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal under section 21 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 challenged the order of the Rent Controller dismissing the appellant-landlord's ejectment application against the respondent's deceased husband on the ground of wilful default. The core legal questions involved whether the tenant committed wilful default in rent payment, whether the denial of the landlord-tenant relationship was mala fide, and whether the tentative rent order was complied with. The Sindh High Court held that the tenant's subsequent inconsistent denial of the landlord-tenant relationship was contumacious and mala fide, that the tentative rent order was deliberately not complied with by short-depositing the amount, and that the tenant failed to prove payment or valid deposit of rent. The court laid down the principle that a tenant's mala fide denial of the landlord's title warrants eviction without requiring further inquiry into default, that strict compliance with tentative rent orders is mandatory, and that an unexecuted cheque counterfoil without the landlord's signature does not constitute proof of rent payment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant's inconsistent and subsequent denial of the landlord-tenant relationship constitutes a contumacious and mala fide act warranting eviction?
  • Is a tenant required to strictly comply with a tentative rent order even if the tenant calculates a minor difference in arrears?
  • Can unsigned cheque counterfoils serve as valid proof of rent payment to a landlord?
  • Does a landlord discharge the initial burden of proving default merely by stating on oath that rent was not received for the disputed period?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Abdul Qayyum vs The State2000 MLD 842 · Sindh High Court · 1999-04-28
  post-arrest bailnarcotics controlstatutory bar on bailinterpretation of penal statutesfundamental rightspersonal liberty
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment deals with a post-arrest bail application filed by the applicant accused, an Assistant Director of the Federal Investigation Agency, who was charged under sections 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, and 15 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 in connection with the alleged export of hashish. The core legal question was whether the statutory bar against granting bail under section 51 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 ousted the jurisdiction of the courts under sections 496, 497, and 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Relying on the Supreme Court precedent in Gulzaman Khan v. The State, the Sindh High Court held that notwithstanding the bar in section 51 of the Act regarding offences punishable with death, the powers of the superior courts to grant bail remain unaffected, particularly under section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The court established that penal provisions restricting personal liberty must be interpreted strictly in favour of preserving liberty, and since the prosecution failed to connect the accused prima facie to the crime, bail was granted.

  Questions settled

  • Does section 51 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 completely bar the High Court and Sessions Court from granting bail in narcotics cases punishable with death?
  • Whether the powers of the court under section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 are excluded by section 51 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • How should provisions of a penal statute that encroach upon the liberty of a subject be construed?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Abdul Majeed vs Secretary, Ministry of Religious Affairs and Minorities, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad And OtherK.L.R. 2000 Civil Cases 199 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Syed Abdul Majeed vs Secretary, Ministry of Religious Affairs and Minorities, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 2 others2000 MLD 1470 · Sindh High Court · 1999-04-13Read full judgment →
• Suzuki Motorcycle Pakistan Limited vs Tariq Jawed2000 CLC 1093 · Sindh High Court · 1999-02-18
  territorial jurisdictionrecovery suitex parte decreeoriginal civil jurisdictioncause of actioncommercial suit
  Summary & questions settled

  The plaintiff, a manufacturer of motorcycles, instituted a recovery suit against the defendant, its appointed dealer at Gujranwala, for the recovery of an outstanding balance of Rs.1,698,756 representing the price of motorcycles supplied on credit. The defendant was duly served through substituted service but failed to appear and defend the proceedings. The plaintiff led oral and documentary evidence, including statements of account, acknowledgment letters, a dishonoured cheque, and delivery challans, which remained unrebutted. The court examined the issue of territorial jurisdiction given that delivery occurred at Gujranwala, but concluded that because the dealership was approved, orders were received, and invoices and challans were prepared at Karachi, a part of the cause of action arose within Karachi. Holding that the provisions of Section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 remove the restrictions of Sections 16, 17, and 20 for the High Court in its original civil jurisdiction, the court found it possessed territorial jurisdiction and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff with markup and costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction is restricted by Sections 16, 17, and 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the approval of a contract and preparation of invoices at Karachi constitute a part of the cause of action sufficient to confer territorial jurisdiction on the Sindh High Court?
  • What is the effect of the defendant failing to appear and rebut the plaintiff's evidence in a recovery suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Sultana Jafery vs Muhammad Ali Abidi through his Legal Heirs2000 CLC 997 · Sindh High Court · 1999-10-14Read full judgment →
• Suleman and anothers vs Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Larkana and anothers2000 P Cr. L J 886 · Sindh High Court · 1999-11-22
  Sindh Crimes Control Actnon-bailable warrantsquashment of proceedingsvague allegationshabitual offenderscriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicants challenged the issuance of non-bailable warrants against them by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and Tribunal, Larkana, initiated on a police report under section 14 of the Sindh Crimes Control Act. The core legal question was whether non-bailable warrants could be issued straightaway and proceedings initiated based on vague allegations without complying with mandatory statutory provisions requiring summons and delivery of copies of the report. The Sindh High Court held that the proceedings and non-bailable warrants were illegal and without lawful authority, noting that the Tribunal failed to comply with sections 5 and 6 of the Act by issuing warrants without summons or reasons, and that the police report contained merely vague allegations. The court laid down the principle that vague allegations and non-compliance with mandatory provisions regarding summons and reports under the Sindh Crimes Control Act render proceedings and non-bailable warrants liable to be quashed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether non-bailable warrants can be issued straightaway without first issuing summons under the Sindh Crimes Control Act?
  • Are vague allegations of being a habitual offender and thief sufficient to initiate proceedings under section 14 of the Sindh Crimes Control Act?
  • Whether failure to supply a copy of the police report to the persons proceeded against vitiates proceedings under the Sindh Crimes Control Act?
  Read full judgment →
• State through AdvocateGeneral, Sindh vs Muhammad Tauseef alias2000 P Cr. L J 1729 · Sindh High Court · 1999-11-30
  acquittal appealcircumstantial evidencedouble presumption of innocencemurderrecoveryanti-terrorism
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an acquittal appeal filed by the State against the judgment of the Special Court (Anti-Terrorism), which acquitted the respondents of charges under sections 302, 460, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question involved whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to overturn the double presumption of innocence attached to the respondents' acquittal. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution's case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence and uncorroborated recoveries, such as ornaments not mentioned in the F.I.R. and a weapon not identified by the witness, which failed to form an unbroken chain pointing exclusively to the guilt of the accused. The court reiterated that an appellate court will be extremely slow to interfere with an acquittal judgment unless it is perverse, arbitrary, or based on a complete misreading of evidence leading to a miscarriage of justice. Finding no such infirmity in the trial court's judgment, the High Court dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal where the trial court's view is plausible and based on the evidence?
  • What is the evidentiary value of recoveries of stolen articles not mentioned in the initial First Information Report?
  • What standards must circumstantial evidence meet to form the basis of a criminal conviction?
  • What are the governing principles for setting aside an acquittal order in a criminal appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan vs Wafaqi Mohtasib, Federal Ombudsman Secretariat, Islamabad and another2000 CLC 1593 · Sindh High Court · 1998-11-30
  Wafaqi MohtasibFederal Ombudsmansub judicejurisdictionconstitutional petitionmaladministrationstatutory corporation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by the State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan challenging an order passed by the Wafaqi Mohtasib (Federal Ombudsman) as without jurisdiction and illegal. The core legal question was whether the Wafaqi Mohtasib could assume jurisdiction and investigate a matter that was already sub judice before a court of competent jurisdiction. The Sindh High Court held that the assumption of jurisdiction by the Wafaqi Mohtasib was wholly without lawful authority, given the clear statutory bar under the proviso to section 9 of the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983, which prohibits the Mohtasib from investigating matters sub judice before any court or judicial tribunal. The court laid down the principle that while parties may amicably settle their disputes out of court despite a pending decree, the Wafaqi Mohtasib lacks the legal authority to enquire into such agreements or enforce compliance when the underlying matter is already sub judice in judicial proceedings, and the availability of a representation to the President does not oust the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Wafaqi Mohtasib has jurisdiction to investigate or inquire into matters that are sub judice before a court of competent jurisdiction?
  • Does the filing of a representation to the President against an order of the Wafaqi Mohtasib oust the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199?
  • Can the Wafaqi Mohtasib enquire into an out-of-court settlement agreement and enforce compliance when the underlying dispute has resulted in a final decree and is pending in execution proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan vs Mrs. Surraya Sajjad2000 CLC 1813 · Sindh High Court · 1999-10-22
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentwater chargesdefinition of rentstatutory tenantlease agreementjudicial bias
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from an order of the Rent Controller dismissing an ejectment application filed by the appellant landlord against the respondent tenant on the ground of default in payment of rent, specifically regarding unpaid pro-rata water charges. A preliminary objection regarding judicial bias was raised and overruled, holding that an advocate appearing against a party in past unrelated cases does not establish personal bias. On the merits, the core legal question was whether the statutory definition of rent under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 automatically makes water charges payable by a tenant regardless of the lease agreement terms. The court held that water charges are included in rent only when they are otherwise payable by the tenant under the agreement or legal obligation, and the statute does not independently shift the burden onto the tenant. Furthermore, the terms of an expired lease agreement continue to govern the tenancy unless found repugnant to the statute. The appeal was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the statutory definition of rent under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 automatically makes water charges payable by a tenant in the absence of an agreement?
  • Does a judge's past appearance as counsel against a party in unrelated cases constitute valid grounds for recusal on the basis of bias?
  • Do the terms of an original lease agreement continue to remain effective after the expiry of the tenancy term?
  • Are water charges classified as taxes or fees, and how does that affect the landlord's liability under a lease agreement?
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• State Bank of Pakistan vs Chiragh Sun Engineering Ltd. and anothers2000 YLR 1198 · Sindh High Court · 1999-04-08
  banking court jurisdictioninterlocutory appealdamages in tort and contractBanking Companies OrdinanceLaw Reforms Ordinancepersona designataexclusive jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance challenged an interlocutory order passed by a Single Judge of the Sindh High Court exercising jurisdiction under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 in a suit for accounts, specific performance, and damages. The core legal questions involved whether a suit combining claims for damages in tort and breach of contract falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Banking Court, whether an interlocutory appeal is maintainable against an order passed under the Act of 1997, and whether a nominated Judge of the High Court functions as a persona designata requiring formal notice of transfer. The Sindh High Court dismissed the appeal in limine, holding that ancillary claims in tort do not oust the exclusive jurisdiction of the Banking Court established for banking disputes, that no appeal lies against interlocutory orders under section 21(5) of the Act of 1997, and that the High Court exercises special jurisdiction under the statute rather than through a persona designata.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal lies against an interlocutory order passed by a Banking Court under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997?
  • Does the inclusion of a claim for damages in tort oust the exclusive jurisdiction of the Banking Court in a suit arising out of a finance facility agreement?
  • Is a Single Judge of the High Court nominated to hear cases under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 acting as a persona designata?
  • Whether prior suits pending before the enactment of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 require a formal notice of transfer under section 9(3) when already before the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Southern Gas Co. Ltd. and another vs Dr. Abdul Rashid Pirzada and others2000 CLC 414 · Sindh High Court · 1999-10-13Read full judgment →
• Soofi Abdul Qadir vs The State and others2000 P Cr. L J 520 · Sindh High Court · 1999-09-02
  cancelled class F.I.R.police report under section 173 Cr.P.C.Executive Magistrate jurisdictionseparation of judiciary from executivequashing of orderinherent powers under section 561-A Cr.P.C.cognizance of offences
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition addresses whether an Executive Magistrate is competent to concur with a police report submitted under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to dispose of a First Information Report (F.I.R.) as a cancelled class. The Sindh High Court examined the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the Police Rules 1934, and the impact of the separation of the judiciary from the executive via the Legal Reforms Ordinance 1996 and Legal Reforms Act 1997. The court held that an Executive Magistrate is not competent to take cognizance of or deal with offences that are triable exclusively by the Court of Session rather than an Executive Magistrate under the statutory scheme. Consequently, orders passed by Executive Magistrates concurring with police cancellation reports in such cases are without jurisdiction, coram non judice, and liable to be quashed. The key principle laid down is that the competence of a Magistrate to deal with an F.I.R. cancellation report is strictly tied to their legal jurisdiction to take cognizance of and try the specific offences involved, and orders passed by lacking magistrates are amenable to being set aside under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Executive Magistrate is competent to concur with a police report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to dispose of an F.I.R. as cancelled for offences exclusively triable by the Court of Session?
  • Does an order passed by a Magistrate concurring with a police report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 constitute an order passed by a criminal court inferior so as to be revisable under sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the High Court invoke its inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to set aside an illegal F.I.R. cancellation order passed without jurisdiction?
  • What is the effect of the separation of the judiciary from the executive on the powers of Executive Magistrates to take cognizance of criminal offences under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Sono Khan vs Sikander and anothers2000 P Cr. L J 614 · Sindh High Court · 1999-10-07
  cancellation of bailsubsequent bail applicationfresh groundsabsconsionjudicial discretioncriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed by the complainant seeking cancellation of bail granted to the respondent/accused by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Larkana, in a case registered under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the trial court acted legally in granting bail on a subsequent application based on grounds (such as lack of recovery and the accused's physical disability) that were either available during the first bail application or were based on the trial court's own medical assessment without expert evidence. The Sindh High Court held that the bail order was patently illegal and factually incorrect. The Court reaffirmed the principle established in The State v. Zubair and 4 others (PLD 1986 SC 173) that subsequent bail applications must be based on fresh grounds arising after the dismissal of the first plea, and that grounds available earlier are presumed to have been considered and rejected. Consequently, the Court set aside the bail order, holding that where a bail order is fundamentally flawed, it must be recalled regardless of whether the accused misused the bail privilege.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court grant bail on a subsequent application based on grounds that were available during the first bail application?
  • Is a trial court authorized to determine an accused's physical capability to commit an offense based on its own observation rather than expert medical evidence?
  • Does the absence of misuse of bail privilege prevent a court from cancelling bail that was granted through a patently illegal order?
  • What is the legal requirement for maintaining a subsequent bail application after the dismissal of a previous one?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohail Bhadki vs Syed Fakhrealam Zaidi2000 CLC 992 · Sindh High Court · 1999-08-30Read full judgment →
• Sohail Ahmed vs The State2000 P Cr. L J 235 · Sindh High Court · 1999-03-18
  post-arrest bailcommon intentioninstigationtentative assessmentcapital punishmentblood feudcriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the applicant, Sohail Ahmed, who is facing trial for offences under sections 302 and 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the applicant, who allegedly instigated the firing but did not personally discharge a firearm, was entitled to bail given the circumstances of the incident. The Court held that the applicant was not entitled to bail, finding reasonable grounds to believe he was prima facie guilty. The Court emphasized that the absence of a direct overt act, such as firing a weapon, does not automatically entitle an accused to bail, particularly when common intention to commit murder is evident. The principle laid down is that individual liability must be determined based on the specific facts of each case, and that enmity between parties acts as a double-edged weapon, serving as a potential motive rather than a ground for automatic bail. The Court further noted that a deep appraisal of evidence is impermissible at the bail stage, which requires only a tentative assessment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a direct overt act, such as firing a weapon, automatically entitle an accused to bail in a case involving common intention?
  • Is the existence of enmity between parties a sufficient ground for the grant of bail?
  • What is the scope of judicial inquiry into evidence at the stage of considering a bail application?
  Read full judgment →
• Societe Des Produits Nestle S.A. through Vice President vs Rafique2000 CLC 1045 · Sindh High Court · 1999-05-17Read full judgment →
• Sindh Road Transport Corporation and others vs Sher Muhammad2000 PLC 161 · Sindh High Court · 1999-05-25
  compulsory group insurancemedically unfitpermanent workmannatural disabilityWorkmen's Compensationbeneficial constructionconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by the Sindh Road Transport Corporation challenging an order of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation directing the employer to pay group insurance and medical expenses to the legal heir of a deceased permanent employee who was declared medically unfit due to weak eyesight. The core legal question was whether a permanent employee suffering from a natural disability or incapacity is entitled to claim group insurance compensation under Standing Order 10-B of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, despite the omission of the word 'disability' in clause (4) thereof. The High Court held that applying the rule of beneficial construction, natural disability is covered under Standing Order 10-B, requiring the employer to pay compensation if it fails to insure the employee, consistent with authoritative rulings of the superior courts. The court dismissed the petition with additional compensation for delay and cautioned against citing overruled judgments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee suffering from a disability arising out of natural causes is entitled to claim compensation under Standing Order 10-B of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Does the omission of the word 'disability' from clause (4) of Standing Order 10-B disentitle a workman from claiming group insurance for natural incapacity?
  Read full judgment →
• Sindh Engineering (Pvt.) Ltd. through Managing Director vs Otis2000 CLC 1524 · Sindh High Court · 2000-03-24
  rejection of plaintwithdrawal of suitbar of fresh suitsplitting of claimscause of actiondamagescivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The defendants filed applications for the rejection of the plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in a suit for recovery of damages. The core legal question was whether a subsequent suit for damages is barred under Order 23, Rule 1 and Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when an earlier suit based on the same cause of action and claiming similar damages was unconditionally withdrawn without obtaining permission to file a fresh suit. The Sindh High Court held that the subsequent suit was barred both by the unconditional withdrawal of the previous suit under Order 23, Rule 1 and by the failure to include or reserve claims under Order 2, Rule 2. The court established the principle that an unconditional withdrawal of a suit precludes the plaintiff from instituting a fresh suit on the same cause of action, and that a party cannot split claims or bring a subsequent action for reliefs omitted or previously claimed arising from the exact same cause of action without leave of the court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unconditional withdrawal of a suit under Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 precludes the plaintiff from filing a fresh suit on the same cause of action?
  • Does Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 bar a subsequent suit for damages when such relief was part of a previously filed and withdrawn suit?
  • Can a plaintiff invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel to circumvent the statutory bars contained in Order 23, Rule 1 and Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Whether a plaint is liable to be rejected under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if the suit appears from the statements therein to be barred by law?
  Read full judgment →
• Sikandar Ali vs The State2000 MLD 197 · Sindh High Court · 1999-02-24
  Superdaricustody of vehiclecriminal revisionsnatched vehiclelocus standiinterim custody
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application challenged an order by the IXth Additional Sessions Judge, Karachi, which refused to grant custody of a snatched vehicle on Superdari to the applicant. The core legal question was whether the trial court erred in denying custody of the vehicle to the purchaser, despite the registered owner confirming the sale and the applicant being in possession at the time of the theft. The High Court held that the trial court's reasoning was inconsistent, as it denied the registered owner's application because he had sold the vehicle, while simultaneously denying the purchaser's application for lack of ownership proof. The Court emphasized that when there are no competing claimants and the registered owner supports the purchaser's claim, custody should be granted to the person in possession at the time of the incident. The key principle laid down is that courts must avoid technicalities and red-tapism regarding the custody of perishable or valuable property (Superdari) to prevent damage or loss, ensuring that justice is served promptly to maintain public confidence in the judicial system.

  Questions settled

  • Is a purchaser of a vehicle entitled to its custody on Superdari when the registered owner confirms the sale and there are no other claimants?
  • Can a trial court deny custody of a vehicle to both the registered owner and the purchaser based on contradictory reasoning?
  • What is the duty of a court regarding the preservation of valuable or perishable property involved in criminal proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Shouban and 3 others vs Shakeel Ahmed Jamall A.S.-I. and 10 others2000 P Cr. L J 1209 · Sindh High Court · 2000-02-10
  constitutional petitionillegal detentionpolice harassmentcustody of adult femaleNikahnamastatement under section 164 Cr.P.C.
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by the petitioners seeking to declare the police action of raiding their houses, arresting family members, and detaining them without a search warrant as illegal, unlawful, and a misuse of police powers, allegedly done to compel the production of Mst. Bilqees, whose custody had already been legally granted to petitioner No. 1 by a Civil Judge and F.C.M. after she contracted a valid marriage. The core legal question concerned the legality of police harassment and detention when the alleged abductee had already recorded her statement under section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and her custody was lawfully handed over to her husband. The court disposed of the petition after recording that copies of the Nikahnama, the section 164 statement, and other relevant documents were supplied to the respondents/investigating agency, rendering the physical appearance of the alleged abductee before the investigating officer unnecessary unless prior permission of the court is obtained. The key principle laid down is that once a competent judicial magistrate has determined the free will and valid marriage of an adult female and restored her custody to her husband, police harassment and arbitrary detention for investigation purposes are unwarranted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether police can harass and detain family members of a newly married couple when the adult female has already recorded her statement under section 164 Cr.P.C. admitting a valid marriage?
  • Can the police demand the physical appearance of an alleged abductee for investigation after her custody has been lawfully determined and handed over to her husband by a judicial magistrate?
  • Under what circumstances can an investigating officer examine an alleged abductee whose custody has been restored to her husband by a court order?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Dil Khoso vs The State2000 P Cr. L J 1748 · Sindh High Court · 2000-01-15
  post-arrest bailbank fraudforged chequeprima facie casenon-bailable offencecivil litigationcriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a bail application filed by an accused bank employee facing charges under sections 420, 467, 471, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, regarding the fraudulent encashment of a forged cheque. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to bail given the allegations of his active role in facilitating the fraud, the existence of parallel civil litigation, and the delay in registering the First Information Report. The Sindh High Court dismissed the bail application, holding that a prima facie case existed against the applicant due to his unusual conduct in authorizing a payment without proper authority and failing to detect the forgery. The court affirmed that the pendency of civil litigation does not automatically entitle an accused to bail in criminal proceedings, and that a delay in lodging an FIR is not always fatal to the prosecution's case at the bail stage, especially when the evidence suggests prima facie complicity in non-bailable offences.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pendency of civil litigation between the parties constitute a sufficient ground for the grant of bail in a criminal case?
  • Is a delay in the registration of an FIR always fatal to the prosecution's case for the purpose of bail?
  • Can an accused claim an indefeasible right to bail in cases involving non-bailable offences?
  • Should a court conduct a deep examination of evidence while deciding a bail application?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaukat Mehmood and anothers vs The State2000 P Cr. L J 1752 · Sindh High Court · 2000-01-05
  post-arrest bailnarcotics controlColumn II reporttentative assessmentinvestigating agency opinionrecovery of charas
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a bail application filed by two accused persons facing trial under sections 14 and 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, relating to the alleged recovery of 80 kilograms of charas. The core legal questions pertained to whether the accused were entitled to bail on the grounds of being placed in Column II by the Anti-Narcotic Force during investigation, conflicting challans, and alleged police enmity. The Sindh High Court held that the opinion of an investigating agency is not binding upon the courts, and the trial court is legally competent to join accused persons placed in Column II upon examining the available material. The court further held that a huge quantity of narcotics was recovered from the applicants, and deeper appreciation of evidence is not warranted at the bail stage. Consequently, the bail application was dismissed, establishing that an investigating agency's report declaring an accused innocent does not fetter the trial court's power to take cognizance and refuse bail based on tentative assessment of incriminating material.

  Questions settled

  • Is the opinion of an investigating agency or police officer regarding the innocence of an accused binding upon the trial court?
  • Can a trial court legally join as co-accused persons who were placed in Column II by the investigating agency under section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the recovery of a huge quantity of narcotic substances bar the grant of bail on a tentative assessment?
  • Whether the evidence of prosecution witnesses can be discarded at the bail stage merely on the allegation of being stock-witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaukat Hayat vs Superintendent, Central Prison, Karachi2000 P Cr. L J 1905 · Sindh High Court · 2000-05-01
  commutation of sentenceconcurrent sentenceslife imprisonmentSection 382-B Cr.P.C.executive amnestyconstitutional petitionOffence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by a convict seeking a direction to the prison authorities to treat his commuted sentence of life imprisonment as running concurrently with another sentence of life imprisonment awarded under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979. The petitioner also sought the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether a death sentence, commuted to life imprisonment via an executive amnesty order, should automatically run concurrently with other sentences imposed in the same trial. Relying on the precedent established in Bashir v. The State, the Court held that an executive order of commutation takes effect forthwith, thereby requiring the commuted life sentence to run concurrently with other sentences awarded in the same trial. However, the Court declined to grant the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, ruling that such relief cannot be claimed independently of the final judgment of the appellate court. The principle laid down is that commuted sentences operate concurrently with existing sentences, but statutory benefits like Section 382-B must be sought within the appellate judgment itself.

  Questions settled

  • Does an executive order commuting a death sentence to life imprisonment take effect concurrently with other sentences imposed in the same trial?
  • Can the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be claimed independently of the final appellate judgment?
  • Does the Court have the power to direct that sentences for multiple offences tried at one trial run concurrently?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaukat and another vs The State2000 YLR 2001 · Sindh High Court · 1999-12-16
  car robberypolice encounteridentification paradeanti-terrorismcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Anti-Terrorism Court convicting the appellants for car robbery, police encounter, and illegal possession of arms. The core legal questions involve the credibility of the identification parade, the reliability of police encounters and recoveries, and the applicability of terrorism-related charges. The court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt through consistent ocular testimony, corroborating evidence from an identification parade supervised by a Judicial Magistrate, and unchallenged recoveries. The court affirmed the convictions but modified the sentence, ruling that a life imprisonment sentence under the Anti-Terrorism Act was excessively harsh for the proved facts and reducing it to fourteen years rigorous imprisonment. The key principle laid down is that credible identification by eyewitnesses corroborated by prompt reporting and unimpeached recoveries sustains a conviction, though appellate courts retain the discretion to calibrate disproportionate sentences.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an identification parade conducted through a Judicial Magistrate with sufficient dummies is legally sustainable?
  • Can a conviction for robbery be sustained on the basis of unblemished eyewitness testimony and prompt reporting?
  • Whether life imprisonment under the Anti-Terrorism Act is disproportionate for a standard car robbery without aggravating features?
  Read full judgment →
• Sharif vs The State2000 P Cr. L J 562 · Sindh High Court · 1999-08-18
  aircraft hijackingdeath sentence confirmationextortioncircumstantial evidenceconfessional statement before policeappreciation of evidencecriminal conspiracy
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of criminal appeals and a confirmation case arising from the hijacking of a PIA Fokker aircraft from Gwadar, which was landed at Hyderabad airport through the ingenuity of the flight captain. Three appellants (Shahsawar, Shabbir, and Sabir) were apprehended at the spot by law enforcement agencies after demanding ransom and fuel, and were subsequently convicted and sentenced to death under sections 402-B and 365-A read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. A fourth appellant (Sharif) was implicated for alleged conspiracy and facilitation at Turbat Airport. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution successfully proved the case against the three actual hijackers beyond a shadow of doubt through consistent ocular testimony of the flight captain, passengers, and officials, alongside recovery of weapons at the spot. However, regarding the fourth appellant Sharif, the Court held that the evidence was insufficient, resting merely on inadmissible police confessions and unverified circumstances. Consequently, the convictions and death sentences of the three principal hijackers were maintained, while the appeal of Sharif was accepted, and he was acquitted of the charges.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the uncorroborated confessional statement of an accused made before a police officer is admissible in evidence under Article 38 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • Does the non-compliance with the procedural requirement of recording a statement under section 342 in the judge's own handwriting vitiate the trial if no prejudice is caused to the accused?
  • Can a conviction for conspiracy and facilitation be sustained solely on the basis of suspicion and inadmissible police statements without independent corroboration?
  • Whether the testimony of official witnesses and the flight captain is sufficient to maintain a conviction for hijacking when the accused are apprehended at the spot?
  Read full judgment →
• Shankar Lal vs The State2000 P Cr. L J 2061 · Sindh High Court · 2000-08-02
  habitual offenderquashment of proceedingsSection 110 CrPCpreventive detentionpolice reportgood behaviour bond
  Summary & questions settled

  This application sought the quashment of proceedings initiated under Section 110/55 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Rohri. The core legal question was whether proceedings under Section 110, Cr.P.C. could be sustained based on vague, general allegations of habitual criminality supported solely by police reports and police witnesses. The Court held that the proceedings were unsustainable and ordered their quashment. The ratio established is that the expression 'habitual' under Section 110, Cr.P.C. requires proof of numerous specific instances of criminal conduct, not merely one or two isolated incidents or vague accusations. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that evidence of reputation must be derived from the local community or neighborhood, and relying exclusively on police officials to establish such reputation is insufficient. Additionally, the Court clarified that the mere pendency of criminal cases or past acquittals does not constitute sufficient grounds to initiate proceedings under Section 110, Cr.P.C.

  Questions settled

  • Can proceedings under Section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be initiated based solely on vague and general allegations?
  • Is the evidence of police officials alone sufficient to establish a person as a habitual offender under Section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the mere pendency of criminal cases against an individual justify initiating proceedings under Section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Shakeel vs The State2000 P Cr. L J 313 · Sindh High Court · 1999-05-05
  post-arrest bailsodomyunnatural offencemoral turpitudeprima facie casedelay in FIR
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a bail application filed by the accused, Shakeel, who is facing trial for offences under sections 377, 506-B, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleges that the accused, along with accomplices, abducted a minor boy at gunpoint and committed sodomy upon him. The trial court had previously dismissed the applicant's bail request. Before the High Court, the applicant sought bail, while the State opposed the application. Upon reviewing the record, the Court noted that the medical examination corroborated the victim's account of the unnatural offence. The Court observed that the delay in lodging the First Information Report was adequately explained and that the case did not appear to stem from prior enmity. Emphasizing the gravity of the offence involving moral turpitude, the Court held that there were prima facie reasonable grounds to believe the accused was guilty. Consequently, the Court dismissed the bail application, maintaining that the accused was not entitled to relief at this stage of the proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delay in lodging an FIR automatically entitle an accused to the grant of bail?
  • Is the mere assertion of enmity by an accused sufficient to establish a case for bail?
  • Can bail be granted in a case involving an offence of moral turpitude where medical evidence corroborates the prosecution's allegations?
  Read full judgment →
• Shakeel Ahmad vs The State2000 P Cr. L J 116 · Sindh High Court · 1999-02-22
  post-arrest bailabscondencemisuse of bailfugitive from lawprohibitory clause
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal bail application filed by the accused Shakeel Ahmad facing trial under sections 324 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 arising out of FIR No. 82 of 1995. The core legal question is whether an accused who has absconded and remained absent from court proceedings after being granted bail is entitled to the concession of post-arrest bail. The Sindh High Court dismissed the bail application, holding that unexplained abscondence for a prolonged period disentitles an accused person to the concession of bail as it thwarts the course of justice and constitutes a misuse of bail. The key principle laid down is that a fugitive from law loses normal procedural and substantive rights regarding bail, and prolonged unexplained abscondence disentitles the accused to bail even if the offense does not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Does unexplained abscondence disentitle an accused person to the concession of post-arrest bail?
  • Can an accused who has misused the concession of bail by remaining absent be granted bail?
  • Does a fugitive from law lose normal rights available under procedural and substantive law regarding bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahzada Muhammad Mateen Siddiqui vs Shaikh Qayamuddin Siddiqui2000 CLC 942 · Sindh High Court · 1998-10-31Read full judgment →
• Shahnawaz and others vs The State2000 P Cr. L J 630 · Sindh High Court · 1999-10-06
  post-arrest bailstatutory delaydesperate and dangerous criminalpolice encounterarms recoverycriminal conspiracy
  Summary & questions settled

  This bail application was filed on behalf of four accused persons involved in a criminal case arising from a police encounter and preceding attack, seeking post-arrest bail on the ground of statutory delay in the conclusion of the trial under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether the applicants were entitled to the concession of bail on the ground of statutory delay, notwithstanding the exceptions disqualifying desperate, hardened, or dangerous criminals. The Sindh High Court held that applicants Nos. 2 to 4, owing to the gravity of the allegations involving a prolonged armed encounter with the police, use of heavy weaponry like rocket launchers, and their conduct, fell within the exclusionary category of desperate and dangerous criminals disentitled to bail on statutory delay. However, applicant No. 1, having been arrested prior to the police encounter and not being a participant therein, was granted bail. The key principle laid down is that the manner of the commission of an offense, as reflected in the FIR allegations, can be examined to determine whether an accused qualifies as a desperate, hardened, or dangerous criminal under the provisos of section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused person alleged to have engaged in a prolonged armed encounter with the police using heavy weaponry qualifies as a desperate or dangerous criminal disentitled to bail on the ground of statutory delay?
  • Can the allegations contained in the FIR be looked into by the court to determine if an applicant falls within the category of desperate or hardened criminals under the fourth proviso to section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does an accused person arrested prior to a subsequent police encounter involving co-accused share the disqualification of being a desperate criminal based on acts attributed solely to the encounter?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahid Hussain vs The State2000 P Cr. L J 747 · Sindh High Court · 1999-09-14
  post-arrest bailnarcotics smugglingmens reahandwriting expert reportcontrol of narcotic substancescomplicitybail cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a bail application filed by the applicant, Shahid Hussain, who was serving as an Examining Officer and whose bail was earlier rejected by the Special Judge, Malir, Karachi in relation to a case involving the transportation of 800 kilograms of hashish recovered at Toronto Airport, Canada, under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal question concerns whether the applicant was entitled to the concession of post-arrest bail given the existence of a handwriting expert's report connecting him to the shipping documents and the statutory bar under section 51 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The Sindh High Court held that notwithstanding the handwriting expert's report, there remained scope for examining the question of mens rea and whether the applicant signed the documents in routine performance of duties without knowledge of the contents, thereby entitling him to bail in the absence of direct evidence of complicity with the main accused. The key principle laid down is that where the primary evidence against a public servant accused under the narcotics laws is a handwriting expert's report, the possibility of an innocent or routine performance of official duties without criminal intent can warrant the grant of post-arrest bail, subject to cancellation if further evidence of complicity emerges during trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused public servant charged under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 is entitled to bail when the primary evidence against him is a handwriting expert's report regarding official documents?
  • Does section 51 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 absolutely bar the grant of bail in all circumstances where an offence is punishable with death?
  • Can the question of mens rea regarding the routine performance of official duties form a ground for granting post-arrest bail in narcotics cases?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaheen Construction Co. through Managing Partner_Attorney vs Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and 5 others2000 MLD 1660 · Sindh High Court · 1999-09-21Read full judgment →
• Shahanshah Hussain vs M/s. Thai Airways International Limited2000 C.L.R. 751 · Sindh High Court · 1999-12-01Read full judgment →
• Shahanseah Hussain vs Messrs Thai Airways International Limited2000 MLD 1454 · Sindh High Court · 1999-12-01
  limitationcarriage by airextinguishment of rightdamagesair ticketdelayed flight
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a civil suit for the claim of damages arising from an international air travel dispute where the plaintiff failed to reach the final destination of Tokyo within time due to an alleged failure by the defendant airline to provide onward booking. The core legal question addressed by the court is whether the plaintiff's suit for damages is barred by limitation under Rule 29 of the Schedule of the Carriage by Air (International Convention) Act, 1966. The court held that the suit was patently time-barred because Rule 29 prescribes a strict two-year limitation period—reckoned from the date of arrival at the destination, the date the aircraft ought to have arrived, or the date the carriage stopped—which extinguishes the right itself rather than merely barring the remedy, and the suit was filed well beyond this statutory period. The key principle laid down is that the time limit provided under Rule 29 of the Schedule of the Carriage by Air (International Convention) Act, 1966 extinguishes the substantive right to claim damages if an action is not brought within two years, operating independently of the general provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the period of limitation provided under Rule 29 of the Schedule of the Carriage by Air (International Convention) Act, 1966 extinguishes the right itself or merely the remedy?
  • From which date does the two-year limitation period for bringing an action for damages under Rule 29 of the Schedule of the Carriage by Air (International Convention) Act, 1966 begin to run when the passenger reaches the destination through alternative arrangements?
  • Does the general law of limitation apply to a suit for damages governed by the Carriage by Air (International Convention) Act, 1966?
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• Shah Muhammad and 3 others vs The State2000 P Cr. L J 390 · Sindh High Court · 1998-11-12
  criminal appealocular testimonyinterested witnessbenefit of doubtballistic reportcorroborationmurderattempted murder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentences of four appellants for murder and attempted murder under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution established the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt based on ocular testimony and recovery evidence. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case. The court found the ocular testimony unreliable, noting the witnesses were interested and inimical, and their presence at the scene was highly doubtful due to inconsistencies regarding the alleged transportation method. Furthermore, the court discarded the recovery evidence because the ballistic report was delayed by over eighteen months, rendering it unreliable. The court also observed a conflict between the ocular testimony and medical evidence, as no bullet injuries were identified on the victims. Consequently, the court established the principle that where the prosecution relies on interested witnesses, independent corroboration regarding the identity and complicity of each accused is mandatory. Finding the evidence insufficient, the court extended the benefit of doubt to the appellants and acquitted them.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for a capital offence be sustained solely on the testimony of interested and inimical witnesses without independent corroboration?
  • Does a significant delay in sending crime empties to a ballistic expert render the recovery evidence unreliable?
  • Is medical evidence sufficient to corroborate ocular testimony when there is a conflict regarding the nature of injuries?
  • Does the abandonment of the alleged motive at the trial stage weaken the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Shah Jahan vs The State2000 YLR 135 · Sindh High Court · 1999-04-19
  post-arrest bailnarcoticscharasfurther inquiryprohibitory clausevehicle driverexcise police
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal bail application arises from Crime No. 03 of 1999 registered at Excise Police Station, Karachi West, under Article 3/4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Zard) Order, 1979 (referred to as P.E.H.O.). The core legal question is whether the applicant, who was driving the vehicle in which a co-accused was found carrying contraband Charas, is entitled to post-arrest bail when no recovery was made directly from his possession and the maximum punishment for the offense is five years. The Sindh High Court held that the applicant is entitled to bail as his case falls within the scope of further inquiry, no contraband was recovered from him, he inflicted no injuries, and the offense does not fall within the prohibitory clause of the relevant law. The court laid down the principle that where an accused is merely driving a vehicle, no recovery is effected from his person, and the offense does not attract the prohibitory clause, bail ought to be granted.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail when no contraband is recovered from his direct possession?
  • Does an offense punishable with five years' rigorous imprisonment fall within the prohibitory clause?
  • Whether a driver of a vehicle can be admitted to bail when contraband is recovered from a co-accused passenger whose case requires further inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Shafiquddin vs The State2000 YLR 1037 · Sindh High Court · 1999-08-19
  post-arrest bailsuppression of material factsbail on medical groundsprofessional misconductdacoity
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application arises out of a bail plea filed by the applicant Shafiquddin, who is facing trial under sections 395, 397, 398, 353, and 412 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in connection with an F.I.R. registered at Police Station Jamshed Quarters, Karachi. The core legal questions involved whether bail could be granted on fresh grounds of sickness when a previous bail application had already been dismissed on merits by the High Court, and whether the medical condition warranted bail. The Sindh High Court held that the applicant suppressed the material fact that his earlier bail application had been dismissed on merits, which constitutes professional misconduct and reprehensible practice. Furthermore, the court held that the medical report did not establish that the applicant could not be treated in a jail hospital or government hospital or that his continued detention was life-threatening. The court dismissed the bail application, affirming the trial court's order directing that the accused be treated in a government hospital of his choice while in custody. The key principle laid down is that suppression of a prior bail dismissal constitutes professional misconduct, and medical grounds for bail require a showing that adequate treatment is unavailable in custody.

  Questions settled

  • Does the suppression of the dismissal of a previous bail application in a bail petition amount to professional misconduct?
  • Can bail be granted on medical grounds when the medical report fails to show that adequate treatment cannot be provided in a government hospital while in custody?
  Read full judgment →
• Shabbir Ahmed and another vs Nazir Ahmed and others2000 MLD 702 · Sindh High Court · 1999-10-22Read full judgment →
• Senator Asif Ali Zardari vs The State2000 MLD 921 · Sindh High Court · 1999-05-25
  police remandAnti-Terrorism Courtjudicial custodyjurisdictionprocedural irregularityhabeas corpuscriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision application challenges the legality of a remand order passed by a Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court, granting police custody of the applicant, Senator Asif Ali Zardari, in a murder case. The core legal questions were whether the Special Judge had the jurisdiction to grant remand when the case was pending before another court, whether the application for remand was filed by a competent authority, and whether the mandatory procedural requirements for remand were satisfied. The Court held that the impugned order was illegal and without jurisdiction. It found that the police failed to approach the designated Administrative Judge, violating the statutory scheme for case assignment. Furthermore, the Court held that the application for remand was filed by a DSP, who is not a 'Public Prosecutor' under the relevant Act, and that the order failed to record mandatory reasons, was passed without the accused being present, and ignored the fact that the accused was already on bail in the same matter. The judgment reaffirms that remand is a judicial proceeding requiring strict compliance with procedural safeguards, including the recording of reasons and the presence of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Special Judge of an Anti-Terrorism Court grant police remand in a case pending before another court without proper assignment by the Administrative Judge?
  • Is a Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) competent to apply for police remand under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, or must such application be made by a Public Prosecutor?
  • Does a remand order passed without recording reasons and without the presence of the accused satisfy the requirements of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a litigant demand that a case be heard by a Bench of their own choice?
  Read full judgment →
• Sayed Shahan Aurangzeb vs Principal of Liaquat Medical College And Chairman Selection Board, L.M.C. Jamshoro And OtherK.L.R. 2000 Civil Cases 154 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Sarwar and anothers vs The State2000 P Cr. L J 1894 · Sindh High Court · 2000-05-09
  post-arrest bailhouse trespasscommon intentionprohibitory clausecriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a bail application filed by two accused persons, Sarwar and Kouro, who were charged alongside a co-accused, Ali Hassan, for house trespass, theft, and causing injury to the complainant. The applicants contended that since no specific injury was attributed to them, their case warranted further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The State opposed the application, arguing that the accused acted in concert, were armed, and were responsible for the injuries sustained by the complainant during the commission of the offence. The Court held that the First Information Report was lodged promptly, specific roles were assigned to each accused, and the applicants were present and armed during the incident. Consequently, the Court determined that there were reasonable grounds to believe the accused were guilty, and the case fell within the prohibitory clause of the relevant bail provision. The Court concluded that the trial court exercised its discretion properly in refusing bail, citing the need to address the increasing tendency of such offences and the lack of evidence for false implication.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a specific injury attributed to an accused person automatically entitle them to bail under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be refused when the accused are named in a promptly lodged First Information Report with specific roles assigned to them?
  • Is the presence of an accused at the scene of a crime while armed sufficient to deny bail even if they did not inflict the primary injury?
  Read full judgment →
• Sanaullah vs Home Secretary, Government of Sindh, Karachi and 32000 YLR 2537 · Sindh High Court · 1998-11-10Read full judgment →
• Sana Farman Khokhar vs The State and anothers2000 YLR 2515 · Sindh High Court · 2000-04-24
  contempt of courtterritorial jurisdictionguardianshipmala fideminor custodysubordinate judiciary
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a contempt of court application filed against a Guardian Judge for allegedly failing to implement a High Court order regarding visitation rights for a minor. The core legal question was whether the Guardian Judge committed contempt by returning the case file for lack of territorial jurisdiction instead of passing the directed orders. The High Court held that the Guardian Judge acted correctly and within the law. The court reasoned that a subordinate judge cannot be held in contempt for declining to exercise jurisdiction over a matter where the minor does not reside within the court's territorial limits, as any order passed without such jurisdiction would be a nullity. Furthermore, the court noted that the applicant had previously challenged the Guardian Judge's order through an appeal, which was subsequently withdrawn, indicating mala fide intent in pursuing the contempt proceedings. The court established that a subordinate court is not in contempt for refusing to act in excess of its territorial jurisdiction, regardless of general directions from a superior court, as statutory jurisdictional requirements remain paramount.

  Questions settled

  • Can a subordinate court be held in contempt for returning a case file due to a lack of territorial jurisdiction?
  • Does a High Court directive to pass an order override the statutory requirement that a court must have territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate a guardianship matter?
  • Is a contempt application maintainable when the applicant has previously challenged the impugned order through an appeal and subsequently withdrawn it?
  Read full judgment →
• Samuel Tennent vs The State through Assistant Director, F.I.A. (C.B.C.), Karachi2000 YLR 1 · Sindh High Court · 1998-11-12
  post-arrest bailforgerycheatingfurther inquirydocumentary evidenceprohibitory clausebail as a right
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the applicant, Samuel Tennent, who was charged with forgery and cheating in connection with the alleged transmission of forged bank guarantees to a co-accused. The core legal questions were whether the prosecution had established reasonable grounds to believe the applicant was guilty, whether the case fell within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether the reliance on photocopies and the delay in finalizing the investigation warranted bail. The Court held that the applicant was entitled to bail, determining that the case required further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court emphasized that where the prosecution's case rests on documentary evidence already in its possession, the risk of tampering is minimal. Furthermore, it established that photocopies of documents are insufficient to sustain a charge of forgery, and that in cases not falling within the prohibitory clause, the grant of bail is a right, while refusal is an exception.

  Questions settled

  • Does the reliance on photocopies of documents in a forgery case constitute sufficient evidence to deny bail?
  • Is bail a right when the alleged offences do not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the fact that the prosecution's evidence is entirely documentary and in their custody justify the grant of bail?
  • Can a case be considered one of 'further inquiry' under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the investigation is delayed and lacks direct evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Saleem Chang vs The State2000 PLD Karachi 70 · Sindh High Court · 1999-06-07
  statutory delaypost-arrest bailrule of consistencyforged bail orderabscondencediscretionary reliefdouble murder
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal bail application filed before the Sindh High Court seeking post-arrest bail on the ground of statutory delay in the conclusion of the trial in a double murder case. The core legal question involves whether an accused is entitled to statutory bail despite a significant delay in the trial when there are allegations of the accused manipulating his release through a forged Supreme Court bail order and subsequent absence. The court held that while the rule of consistency applied and the applicant otherwise met the criteria for statutory delay, his conduct involving release on a forged bail order and subsequent unauthorized absence disentitled him to discretionary relief of bail. The court laid down the principle that the conduct of an accused, specifically regarding abscondence or abuse of the process of law by utilizing forged orders, outweighs the statutory delay ground, thereby disentitling them to the discretionary concession of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does an accused's release on a forged bail order and subsequent absence disentitle them to statutory bail?
  • Whether the rule of consistency applies when considering bail on the ground of statutory delay?
  • Can abscondence or misuse of the court process bar an accused from receiving discretionary relief of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Salahuddin and 42 others vs Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and 22000 PLC 661 · Sindh High Court · 1999-11-19
  labour lawtermination of servicesclosure of establishmentstanding ordersre-organizationindustrial disputeeconomic reasons
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the orders of the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and the Labour Court, which dismissed the petitioners' applications under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, regarding the termination of their services and the closure of the respondent's establishment. The core legal question was whether the employer violated Standing Order 11-A of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, by terminating employees and closing the establishment without prior permission, particularly in light of the 1976 amendment. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that while seeking permission under Standing Order 11-A is mandatory to protect workmen, the respondent's closure was justified by economic circumstances following the disintegration of the USSR. The Court found no evidence of mala fide and noted that the Labour Court’s order granting permission to close had attained finality. The Court affirmed that an employer may apply for closure permission simultaneously with other steps in the winding-up process, and that the absence of mala fide and the finality of a prior judicial order granting closure permission renders such termination lawful.

  Questions settled

  • Does the requirement for prior permission under Standing Order 11-A of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, prohibit an employer from initiating other steps to wind up a business simultaneously?
  • Can an employer terminate employees for re-organization under Order 12 of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, in the absence of mala fide?
  • Is a petition maintainable against a closure order that has already attained finality and was not challenged in higher forums?
  Read full judgment →
• Saifullah and another vs Ch. Ghulam Ghous2000 CLC 1841 · Sindh High Court · 2000-05-06
  landlord and tenant relationshipeviction applicationco-sharer maintainabilitypower of attorney evidencestatutory tenancydefault in rentreview limitationrestoration of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This Rent Appeal before the High Court of Sindh arose from eviction proceedings initiated by the appellants/landlords against the deceased respondent under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The trial Court had dismissed the eviction application upon finding no landlord-tenant relationship. The central legal questions addressed were: whether a person in occupation of property without an adverse title becomes a tenant by operation of law where the owner establishes title; whether a co-sharer can maintain eviction proceedings independently; whether a comprehensive power of attorney includes implied authority to adduce evidence; and whether objections to a restoration order treated as a review application were barred by limitation. The High Court held that where property ownership is proved by record of rights and the occupant claims no adverse title, the occupant is a tenant by fiction of law bound to pay rent. It further affirmed that a co-sharer may seek ejectment alone, an attorney with broad litigation powers is impliedly authorized to give evidence, and the review objections were time-barred. The appeal was accordingly allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an occupant of property who does not claim adverse title become a tenant by operation of law when the owner establishes title?
  • Can a single co-sharer initiate and maintain eviction proceedings against a tenant without joining other co-owners?
  • Does a general power of attorney authorizing an agent to prosecute actions implicitly confer authority to give evidence on behalf of the principal?
  • Can an objection to a court order restoring an appeal be treated as a review application if filed beyond the statutory period of limitation without explaining the delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Sahibdino and others vs The State2000 P Cr. L J 191 · Sindh High Court · 1999-04-21
  murderocular and medical contradictionbenefit of the doubtballistic expert reportcommon intentioncriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal is directed against the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Ratodero, whereby the appellants were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment under Section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question revolves around the reliability of the ocular testimony in the face of material contradictions between the eye-witness accounts and the medical evidence, as well as unexplained delays in sending crime empties for ballistic examination. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution miserably failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt due to sharp differences between the number of alleged gunshots and the injuries noted in the medical report, alongside doubtful recovery evidence. Consequently, the High Court accepted the appeal, set aside the convictions and sentences, and acquitted the appellants on the principle of benefit of the doubt, laying down that material contradictions between ocular and medical evidence prove fatal to the prosecution's case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether material contradictions between ocular testimony and medical evidence are fatal to the prosecution's case?
  • Does an unexplained delay in sending crime empties to the Ballistic Expert render the prosecution's recovery evidence doubtful?
  • Can the accused be convicted when the medical report reflects fewer injuries than the number of alleged gunshots fired by multiple accused persons?
  Read full judgment →
• Saeed Khan vs The State2000 P Cr. L J 361 · Sindh High Court · 1999-05-08
  post-arrest bailcustoms smugglingforeign currencyeconomic reformscurrency declaration
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under section 156(1)(8)(14) of the Customs Act, 1969, after being apprehended at the airport for carrying Indian currency concealed under his clothing without making a declaration. The core legal question involved whether the recovery of the currency fell within the permissible limits and general permissions governing the carriage of foreign exchange under the relevant legal framework. The Sindh High Court held that under the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992, and the applicable State Bank notifications, individuals were permitted to take out foreign currency equivalent up to US $10,000. Since the recovered Indian currency was within this permitted threshold and covered by general permission, the bail plea merited consideration. Consequently, the court confirmed the bail granted to the applicant. The key principle laid down is that the carriage of foreign currency or its equivalent within the statutory ceiling limits under the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992 does not constitute an offense warranting the withholding of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the carriage of foreign currency within the prescribed ceiling of US $10,000 falls within the general permission under the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992?
  • Does the recovery of Indian currency below the equivalent of US $10,000 justify the refusal of post-arrest bail under the Customs Act, 1969?
  Read full judgment →
• Sabir Mehmud Bhatti ' vs Chairman, Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal , . (2000 PLC 476 · Sindh High Court · 2000-02-08
  workmanindustrial relationsgrievance petitionsupervisory dutiesburden of proofconstitutional petitionlabor appellate tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was directed against the judgment of the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, which reversed the Labour Court's order and held that the petitioner, an Assistant Purchasing Manager, was not a 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The core legal question was whether the petitioner performed duties of a manual or clerical nature, or whether his role was supervisory and managerial, thereby excluding him from the definition of a workman. The High Court held that the petitioner's duties, as evidenced by the record including his job description and promotional applications, involved supervisory functions, independent application of mind, and discretion rather than manual or clerical work. The Court affirmed that the initial burden of proving status as a workman lies heavily on the employee, which the petitioner failed to discharge. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, establishing that the nature of duties performed at the time of termination determines the status of a workman under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.

  Questions settled

  • Who bears the initial burden of proof to establish that an employee falls within the definition of a workman?
  • Does an Assistant Purchasing Manager performing supervisory duties qualify as a workman under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • What is the real test for determining whether an employee is a workman at the time of termination?
  • Is a grievance petition under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 maintainable by an employee holding a managerial or supervisory position?
  Read full judgment →
• Sabir Hussain and 3 others vs The State2000 P Cr. L J 1777 · Sindh High Court · 2000-03-22
  post-arrest bailkidnappingOffence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinancefurther inquirystatement under section 164 Cr.P.C.
  Summary & questions settled

  This application arises out of criminal proceedings where the applicants/accused faced trial under section 16 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 for allegedly kidnapping the complainant's daughter. The core legal question was whether the applicants were entitled to post-arrest bail given the circumstances of the case, including the alleged abductee's statement under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the absence of marks of violence, a delayed F.I.R., and the applicability of penal provisions. The court held that the case of the applicants necessitated further inquiry, as the alleged abductee stated she left voluntarily to marry the main accused, and the offence was not punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or for ten years. Consequently, the court granted bail to the applicants, laying down the principle that where the victim's statement and surrounding circumstances create doubt regarding the applicability of restrictive penal clauses and suggest a consensual marriage, the case falls within the scope of further inquiry warranting the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the accused are entitled to post-arrest bail when the alleged abductee denies kidnapping in her statement under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Does a belated F.I.R. without plausible explanation constitute a ground for further inquiry under bail jurisprudence?
  • Whether an offence not punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or for ten years warrants the grant of bail when culpability requires determination at trial?
  Read full judgment →
• S.M.Ismail Naqvi and 238 others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Government of Pakistan and another2000 PLC (C.S.) 1135 · Sindh High Court · 2000-02-15
  Service Tribunals ActService of PakistanConstitutional validityStatutory corporationsCivil servantWrit jurisdictionService mattersUltra vires
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, employees of the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation, challenged their premature retirement and the non-payment of benefits. Initially invoking the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, they amended their petition to challenge the constitutional validity of Section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, which had been inserted by the Service Tribunals (Amendment) Act XVII of 1997. The core legal question was whether Section 2-A, which deems employees of statutory corporations to be civil servants and subjects them to the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal, is ultra vires the Constitution. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that Section 2-A is a valid piece of beneficial legislation. The Court affirmed that Parliament has the authority under Article 260 to declare services as "Service of Pakistan." Furthermore, the Court held that the provision does not impair rights but merely alters the forum for redress, and that the classification of public sector employees as civil servants is rational given the public trust involved. Consequently, the High Court lacks jurisdiction under Article 212.

  Questions settled

  • Is Section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, unconstitutional for classifying employees of statutory corporations as civil servants?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to hear service matters involving employees of statutory corporations?
  • Can the legislature validly declare service under a statutory corporation to be "Service of Pakistan" under Article 260 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the Service Tribunal have the authority to award monetary relief to employees of statutory corporations under Section 5(1) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• S.K. Abdul Aziz vs Mahmoodul Hassan and others2000 CLC 1967 · Sindh High Court · 1998-12-03
  negotiable instrumentpresumption of considerationsuit for recoverysummary suitrebuttal of evidencewritten agreementQanoon-e-Shahadat
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the dismissal of a suit for recovery of Rs. 2,40,000 filed under Order XXXVII, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The appellant claimed the amount was a friendly loan advanced to the respondents, evidenced by a promissory note and receipt. The respondents contended the documents were security for the purchase of other assets and were subsequently cancelled by a later agreement. The core legal question was whether the respondents successfully rebutted the statutory presumption of consideration attached to the negotiable instruments. The Court held that the respondents failed to discharge the heavy burden of rebutting the presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881. The Court found the respondents' evidence inconsistent and contradictory, noting that they attempted to contradict the terms of a written agreement in violation of Article 103, Qanoon-e-Shahadat 1984. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgment, decreed the suit in favor of the appellant, and established that a party cannot lead evidence to contradict the terms of a written document.

  Questions settled

  • Does a promissory note carry a presumption of consideration under the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881?
  • Can a party lead oral evidence to contradict the terms of a written agreement under the Qanoon-e-Shahadat 1984?
  • Does the burden of proof lie on the defendant to rebut the presumption of consideration for a negotiable instrument?
  Read full judgment →
• S.I.T.E. vs Muhammad Waqar Mango2000 CLC 1510 · Sindh High Court · 1999-10-28Read full judgment →
• S. Baqar Zaheer Rizvi vs Secretary, Housing and Works Division, Governmentof Pakistan, Islamabad and 3 others2000 PLC (C.S.) 1151 · Sindh High Court · 1999-04-17
  constitutional jurisdictionservice tribunalpromotioneligibility vs fitnessterms and conditions of servicejudicial reviewdepartmental inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the promotion of respondents Nos. 2-4 to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer (BS-17) by the Housing and Works Division, alleging they lacked the requisite qualifications and obtained their degrees through misconduct. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to adjudicate these promotions, or if the matter fell exclusively under the Service Tribunal's jurisdiction per Article 212. The Court held that while "fitness" for promotion is a subjective assessment reserved for departmental authorities and excluded from judicial review, "eligibility"—the possession of prescribed qualifications—is a term of service. Where a civil servant is denied consideration despite possessing eligibility, or where unqualified candidates are promoted, the High Court may intervene. However, as the instant case involved complex factual disputes regarding misconduct and the validity of academic degrees, the Court declined to resolve these issues directly. Instead, it directed the departmental authority to conduct an inquiry and decide the matter on merits after hearing all parties, thereby affirming that the High Court will not adjudicate disputed questions of fact.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 to adjudicate a service matter involving the eligibility of a civil servant for promotion?
  • Is there a legal distinction between 'fitness' for promotion and 'eligibility' for promotion regarding the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal?
  • Can the High Court resolve disputed questions of fact, such as allegations of misconduct and the validity of academic degrees, in a constitutional petition?
  • Does the bar under Section 4(1)(b) of the Service Tribunals Act 1973 extend to cases where a candidate's eligibility is challenged?
  Read full judgment →
• S. Altaf Hussain vs Duty Free Shops (Pvt.) Limited2000 YLR 2021 · Sindh High Court · 2000-05-18Read full judgment →