Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 46,805 judgments in total from the Sindh High Court.

• Gaman vs S.H.O. Datar Dino, Police Station New Foujdari, Shikarpur1993 P Cr. L J 1286 · Sindh High Court · 1993-02-24
  First Information Reportregistration of FIRconstitutional petitioncriminal procedureSindh High Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional matter came before the Sindh High Court through a petition filed by Gaman seeking a direction for the registration of a First Information Report (F.I.R.) regarding an incident that occurred outside the court premises in Shikarpur, resulting in the murder of one Pathan and injuries to Ali Sher. The core legal question was whether a fresh F.I.R. could be registered for the initial murderous attack when an existing F.I.R. (No. 54 of 1992) lodged by the police only covered the subsequent exchange of fire between the rival groups and the police upon their arrival. The court held that since the existing F.I.R. did not detail the prior incident involving the death and injuries, the petitioner was entitled to have his version recorded. The court accordingly dismissed the application as having become infructuous in its initial procedural posture while directing the respondent S.H.O. to record the F.I.R. concerning the earlier incident, laying down the principle that a separate F.I.R. is warranted for a distinct prior transaction not covered by an existing police report.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a separate First Information Report can be registered for an earlier incident when an existing F.I.R. lodged by the police only covers subsequent events?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to the registration of an F.I.R. regarding a cognizable offense when the police refuse to record it?
  • Whether an application seeking the registration of an F.I.R. should be granted if the initial grievance is addressed during the proceedings?
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• FMC Corporation vs The Deputy Registrar of Trade MarksK.L.R. 1993 Civil Cases 351 · Sindh High Court · 1992-09-27Read full judgment →
• Ferring A.B. vs The Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks1993 CLC 2203 · Sindh High Court · 1992-11-29Read full judgment →
• Fazlur Rehman vs Mst. Zohra Nagori1993 CLC 1705 · Sindh High Court · 1992-03-19Read full judgment →
• Fazal Khursheed vs S. Agha Jawed Raza1993 MLD 2183 · Sindh High Court · 1993-02-24Read full judgment →
• Fazal Hussain vs Mahmood Hussain1993 CLC 1076 · Sindh High Court · 1992-06-02
  ex parte evictionsubstituted servicerent proceedingsservice of processrestitutionstatus quo anterent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an ex parte eviction order passed by a Rent Controller against a tenant. The core legal question concerns the validity of substituted service through publication under Order V, Rule 20, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, in circumstances where ordinary service was not properly attempted and the landlord failed to provide the correct address of the premises. The Court held that the Rent Controller’s order for substituted service was unlawful because the statutory prerequisites—specifically that the party was avoiding service or that ordinary service was impracticable—were not met. The Court emphasized that the landlord, who knew the location of his own property, failed to facilitate service, and the bailiff’s failure to locate the premises did not justify bypassing ordinary service. Consequently, the ex parte eviction order was set aside as illegal, and the case was remanded for a fresh decision. The key principle laid down is that the power to order substituted service is a judicial exercise requiring precision; it cannot be invoked mindlessly when ordinary service has not been genuinely attempted or exhausted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Rent Controller order substituted service under Order V, Rule 20, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without first ensuring that ordinary service has been genuinely attempted?
  • Is the power to order substituted service a judicial exercise that requires the satisfaction of specific statutory prerequisites?
  • Does a Rent Controller have the authority to order restitution of possession under the principle of Section 144, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, when an ex parte eviction order is set aside on appeal?
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• Fatima and 3 otherss vs Ishaque1993 MLD 1807 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-17Read full judgment →
• Fateh Ali and another vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1124 · Sindh High Court · 1993-02-15
  post-arrest bailsmugglinggold recoveryprohibitory clausecarrier vs ownerCustoms Act
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicants, Fateh Ali and Abdul Rehman, moved the Sindh High Court for post-arrest bail after being charged in a case involving the recovery of 10,000 tolas of gold from a vehicle in which they were travelling. The core legal question was whether the applicants were entitled to bail given the nature and gravity of the offence under the Customs Act, 1969, and the applicability of the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The court held that while applicant Fateh Ali, claiming ownership of a massive quantity of gold intended for smuggling, fell within the prohibitory clause and was denied bail, co-accused Abdul Rehman was merely a carrier whose case attracted a lesser sentence not falling within the statutory prohibition, thus entitling him to bail. The key principle laid down is that where an accused is prima facie shown to be the owner and principal actor transporting a massive commercial quantity of smuggled gold, bail will be refused, whereas a mere carrier facing a lesser statutory penalty may be granted bail if their case falls outside the prohibitory clause of section 497.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused found transporting a massive commercial quantity of gold is entitled to post-arrest bail under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Does a co-accused acting merely as a carrier of smuggled goods stand on a different footing for the grant of bail compared to the principal owner?
  • When does an offence under section 156(1)(8) of the Customs Act, 1969 attract the prohibitory bar of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
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• Fateh Alam Siddiqui vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1573 · Sindh High Court · 1993-05-16Read full judgment →
• Fasihur Rehman Alvi and others vs Inamur Rehman Alvi1993 PLD Karachi 33 · Sindh High Court · 1992-10-10Read full judgment →
• Farrukh Sultana vs Latif Ahmad1993 MLD 1811 · Sindh High Court · 1992-10-06Read full judgment →
• Farooq Hassan vs Mst. Rizwana Syed1993 CLC 1346 · Sindh High Court · 1987-11-11Read full judgment →
• Fariduddin and anothers vs Muhammad Usman and another1993 CLC 1827 · Sindh High Court · 1992-10-25Read full judgment →
• Farid Khan vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 500 · Sindh High Court · 1992-07-05
  post-arrest bailcustoms smugglinggold smugglingmandatory search provisionsfurther inquiryillegal searchbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a bail application filed by Fareed Khan, who was detained for an offence under section 156(1)(8) of the Customs Act, 1969, in connection with the alleged recovery of gold pieces from his shoes at the airport. The core legal question concerns whether the failure of the seizing officer to comply with the mandatory provisions regarding the option of search before a magistrate or gazetted officer under section 159 of the Customs Act, along with inherent contradictions in the prosecution's case regarding the baggage search, entitles the accused to further inquiry and bail. The Sindh High Court held that non-compliance with section 159 renders the search illegal and that material contradictions regarding the search of a passenger without baggage in the departure lounge create reasonable doubt, bringing the case within the scope of further inquiry. The court laid down the principle that the requirement to inform an accused of the option to be searched before a Magistrate or Gazetted Officer under section 159 of the Customs Act is mandatory, and mechanical compliance or failure to do so vitiates the search, rendering the recovered evidence inadmissible and entitling the accused to bail under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the non-compliance with the provisions of section 159 of the Customs Act, 1969 renders the personal search of an accused illegal?
  • Does a mechanical or false compliance with the requirement of offering a search before a Magistrate or Gazetted Officer vitiate the trial or warrant bail?
  • Whether contradictions regarding the checking of a passenger's baggage in the departure lounge create a case for further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
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• Farid Akhtar Hadi vs Muhammad Latif Ghazi1993 CLC 2015 · Sindh High Court · 1993-05-31
  summary suitpromissory noteleave to defendconsiderationpresumption of considerationadmissibility of documentStamp Actcancellation of stamp
  Summary & questions settled

  This suit was filed by the plaintiff under Order XXXVII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for the recovery of Rs. 2,20,400 based on a promissory note executed by the defendant. The court granted leave to defend, and the defendant raised defences of forgery, lack of consideration, fraud, and the inadmissibility of the promissory note under the Stamp Act 1899 due to improper cancellation of stamps. The core legal questions pertained to the execution of and consideration for the promissory note, as well as whether an instrument admitted in evidence can subsequently be challenged for being insufficiently stamped. The High Court found that the defendant admitted his signatures on the note and failed to prove fraud or rebut the statutory presumption of consideration under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881. Holding that once a document is admitted in evidence, Section 36 of the Stamp Act 1899 creates an absolute bar against challenging its admissibility on stamping grounds, the High Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff.

  Questions settled

  • Can a document once admitted in evidence be subsequently challenged on the ground that it was insufficiently stamped or that the stamps were not properly cancelled?
  • Who bears the burden of proof when an execution of a promissory note is admitted but fraud and lack of consideration are alleged?
  • Does Section 36 of the Stamp Act 1899 bar a court from questioning the admissibility of an instrument on stamping grounds after it has been marked as an exhibit?
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• Faiz vs Sh. Nizamuddin1993 MLD 1753 · Sindh High Court · 1992-02-24Read full judgment →
• Faisal Spinning Mills Limited, Karachi vs State Bank of Pakistan, Karachi1993 PLD Karachi 360 · Sindh High Court · 1993-02-17
  exchange risk coveragevested rightsretrospective operationexecutive discretionState Bank of PakistanFE Circularsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged the State Bank of Pakistan's refusal to extend exchange risk coverage benefits to the petitioner, a cotton yarn spinning unit. The petitioner had exercised its option for exchange risk coverage under FE Circular No. 60 and No. 7, which the respondent initially accepted. Subsequently, the respondent issued FE Circular No. 75, which modified the calculation formula, effectively withdrawing benefits previously available to the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the respondent could retrospectively apply this new circular to deprive the petitioner of a vested right. The Court held that once the petitioner exercised its option and the respondent accepted it, a vested right accrued. Relying on established jurisprudence, the Court ruled that executive authorities cannot, through subsequent notifications or circulars, retrospectively take away or abridge rights that have already vested in citizens. Consequently, the Court declared the respondent's action to be without lawful authority, affirming that the petitioner was entitled to the benefits under the earlier circulars, as the subsequent modification could not operate retrospectively to the petitioner's detriment.

  Questions settled

  • Can an executive authority retrospectively take away rights that have vested in a citizen through a subsequent notification?
  • Does a circular issued by the State Bank of Pakistan create a vested right once an option is exercised and accepted?
  • Is the discretion vested in an executive officer circumscribed by the scope and object of the law that creates it?
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• F.M.C. Corporation vs The Deputy Registrar Trade Marks, Government1993 PLD Karachi 24 · Sindh High Court · 1992-09-27Read full judgment →
• Emirates Bank International vs United Exports Limited and 8 others1993 PLD Karachi 661 · Sindh High Court · 1993-08-08
  summary suitleave to defendservice of summonsservice by publicationbanking recoverylimitationcondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 for condonation of delay in filing applications for leave to appear and defend a summary suit instituted under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979. The core legal questions revolved around the validity and effect of service of summons by publication under Rule 8 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Rules 1980, the necessity of a formal order holding such service good to trigger limitation, and whether delay in filing supporting affidavits for leave to defend could be condoned. The Sindh High Court held that service by publication under Rule 8 cannot be considered effective unless an order holding such service good has been formally passed by the Court or the Registrar, from which date limitation begins to run. The Court further laid down that the discretionary powers under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 allow for the acceptance of belated affidavits to prevent parties from being unjustly debarred from their defense in summary suits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether service of summons by publication under Rule 8 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Rules 1980 becomes effective without a formal order of the Court or Registrar holding such service good?
  • Can the time for filing an application for leave to appear and defend under Order 37 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 run from the date of publication if no formal order declaring service good has been passed?
  • Is the court empowered to accept a belated affidavit filed in support of an application for leave to defend in a summary suit?
  • Whether Rule 8 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Rules 1980 is intra vires the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979 and the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Emirates Bank International Limited, Karachi vs Adamjee Industries1993 CLC 489 · Sindh High Court · 1992-12-10
  interim injunctioncontempt of courtcivil contemptinherent powersstatus quo antebreach of injunctionCode of Civil Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a suit for recovery where interim injunctions were issued restraining the defendant from disposing of assets. An intervenor bank, claiming a pledge over certain goods, subsequently sold them, leading to applications for punitive action for contempt. The core legal questions were whether Order 39, Rule 2(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applies to disobedience of injunctions issued under Order 39, Rule 1, and whether the court could invoke inherent powers under Section 151 to address such breaches. The Court held that Order 39, Rule 2(3) encompasses disobedience of orders under both Rules 1 and 2, and that Section 151 allows the court to address procedural lacunae to ensure justice. The Court affirmed that knowledge of an order suffices for contempt liability, regardless of formal service. Consequently, the Court ordered the intervenor to deposit the sale proceeds of the goods into the court, pending further adjudication on the contempt applications and the underlying ownership of the assets, emphasizing that restoration of the status quo ante is a valid judicial exercise in such circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Does Order 39, Rule 2(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to the disobedience of an injunction granted under Order 39, Rule 1?
  • Can the court exercise inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to address the breach of an interim injunction?
  • Is formal service of a court order a prerequisite for establishing liability in contempt proceedings, or is knowledge of the order sufficient?
  • Can a court order the restoration of the status quo ante or the deposit of sale proceeds as a remedy for the breach of an interim injunction?
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• Emirate Bank International vs Dost Muhammad Cotton Mills1993 MLD 54 · Sindh High Court · 1992-03-12
  banking recoveryleave to defendlimitation periodsubstituted servicesummons by publicationcondonation of delaysummary procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil suit was instituted for the recovery of Rs. 59,516,984.73 by the plaintiff bank under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, naming a principal borrower and several guarantors as defendants. The core legal questions involved whether Article 181 or Article 159 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act applies to applications for leave to appear and defend suits filed under the Ordinance, whether service by publication under Rule 8 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Rules requires proof of actual knowledge by the defendant, and whether sufficient cause was shown for condonation of delay. The Sindh High Court held that Article 159 governs the period of limitation for leave to defend applications under the Ordinance, that service by publication under Rule 8 is valid and effective without needing to prove the defendant read the specific newspaper, and that the defendants failed to provide sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The Court established that the residuary Article 181 applies strictly to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure, while summary suits under the special Ordinance are strictly bound by the ten-day limitation period under Article 159.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Article 181 of the Limitation Act applies to applications other than those under the Code of Civil Procedure?
  • Does Article 159 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act apply to suits filed under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979?
  • Is service by publication under Rule 8 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Rules, 1980 dependent upon the defendant avoiding service or having actual knowledge of the newspaper publication?
  • What is the binding effect of conflicting judgments rendered by Benches of varying numerical strength in the Supreme Court?
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• Elite D. Silva vs Dilawar Hussain1993 CLC 361 · Sindh High Court · 1992-01-25
  ex parte decreesetting aside ex parte decreeprocedural irregularitypre-admission noticeCode of Civil Procedurerevision applicationservice of notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision application challenges the dismissal of an application to set aside an ex parte decree. The applicant contended that the trial court erroneously accepted a waiver of notice from an unauthorized advocate, leading to an ex parte decree without proper service. The appellate court subsequently dismissed the applicant's appeal solely for failing to serve a pre-admission notice under Order 43, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The High Court held that the trial court failed to address the merits of the applicant's claim regarding the unauthorized appearance and lack of service. Furthermore, the High Court ruled that the appellate court erred in dismissing the appeal on a technicality, as the respondent's appearance upon the court's pre-admission notice cured the defect of non-service. Emphasizing that procedural forms should not defeat the ends of justice where the substance is satisfied, the Court set aside both lower orders and remanded the matter to the trial court for a decision on the merits of the application to set aside the ex parte decree.

  Questions settled

  • Does the appearance of a respondent upon a court-issued pre-admission notice cure the failure to serve a prior notice under Order 43, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can an appellate court dismiss an appeal solely on the technical ground of non-service of pre-admission notice when the respondent has already appeared?
  • Is an ex parte decree sustainable when the trial court accepts a waiver of notice from an advocate who was not authorized to represent the defendant?
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• Ebrahim Rehman Bhai Presswala vs Mst. Saifiya Bai and 3 others1993 CLC 1720 · Sindh High Court · 1992-02-17Read full judgment →
• Dr. Mrs. Azra Ali vs Arif Ali1993 PLD Karachi 683 · Sindh High Court · 1993-08-15Read full judgment →
• Dr. Moula Bux Jamali vs Pakistan Employees Cooperative Housing1993 CLC 740 · Sindh High Court · 1990-11-22Read full judgment →
• Dr. M. A. Mahboob and another vs Mrs. Nawab Begum1993 MLD 1276 · Sindh High Court · 1992-03-25Read full judgment →
• Dr. Afzal Ahmed Khan vs Mst. Anwari Begum1993 MLD 1710 · Sindh High Court · 1992-09-27Read full judgment →
• Dooso alias Dost Muhammad vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 394 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-28Read full judgment →
• Directorate of Small Industries, Government of Balochistan through Sales Manager, Karachi Airport, Karachi vs Civil Aviation Authority through Director General and another1993 MLD 1836 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-25Read full judgment →
• Din Muhammad and another vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1383 · Sindh High Court · 1992-10-19Read full judgment →
• Dilawar Hussain and 6 others/DecreeHolders vs The Province of Sindh1993 PLD Karachi 578 · Sindh High Court · 1993-05-31
  land acquisitionexecution proceedingsadditional compensationsolatiumretrospective legislationexecuting court powersintervening statutory amendments
  Summary & questions settled

  This execution proceeding arises from a long-standing land acquisition matter dating back to 1960 for the establishment of Korangi Township in Karachi, which culminated in a final determination of enhanced compensation by the Supreme Court in 1987. The core legal question concerns whether the decree-holders are entitled to the benefit of intervening statutory amendments—specifically the 15% per annum solatium under section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 introduced by the Land Acquisition (Sindh Amendment) Ordinance 1984, and the rate of interest under section 28—during the execution stage. The Sindh High Court held that while an executing Court generally cannot go behind a decree, it is competent to take cognizance of changed circumstances, mould relief, and apply self-executory mandatory statutory provisions like section 28-A that do not require prior judicial intervention. The court laid down the principle that section 28-A creates an absolute, mandatory right to a solatium that applies prospectively to pending proceedings, provided it does not reopen past and closed transactions where compensation was already fully paid prior to the amendment.

  Questions settled

  • Can an executing Court take into consideration a change in law or intervening statutory amendments when executing a decree?
  • Whether the solatium introduced under section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 is self-executory and payable without a formal prior order of the Court?
  • Do amendments introduced via the Land Acquisition (Sindh Amendment) Ordinance 1984 apply to pending proceedings and unclosed transactions?
  • To what extent can past and closed transactions involving compensation already paid prior to an amendment be reopened in execution?
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• Diamond Foods Industries Limited vs The Assistant Registrar of Trade1993 CLC 2196 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-07Read full judgment →
• Daud through Legal Heirs vs Syed Wali Raza and 7 others1993 MLD 1798 · Sindh High Court · 1992-03-19Read full judgment →
• Dabinovic (Monaco) Sa.M. Authorised Agent of Nafin Naviera-Y1993 MLD 1587 · Sindh High Court · 1993-03-15Read full judgment →
• Crient Straw Board & Paper Mills Limited vs Commissioner of Income-K.L.R. 1993 Tax & Custom Cases 17 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited vs Messrs1993 CLC 2217 · Sindh High Court · 1993-02-03
  summary suitleave to defendlimitation periodservice of summonssubstituted servicepromissory noteCode of Civil Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment from the Sindh High Court addresses a summary suit filed under Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for the recovery of a loan, alongside an application by the defendants for leave to appear and defend. The core legal questions involved whether the application for leave to defend was time-barred due to service by publication, and whether a defendant can challenge the maintainability of a summary suit before obtaining leave to defend. The court held that the ten-day limitation period for filing an application for leave to defend does not begin upon mere publication unless summons in Form 4 accompanied by a copy of the plaint are properly served. Consequently, the defendants' application was found within time without requiring condonation of delay. Furthermore, the court held that the defendants made out a prima facie case for leave to defend given the nature of the underlying documents, granting them permission to defend upon furnishing security.

  Questions settled

  • Does the ten-day limitation period for filing an application for leave to defend a summary suit start running from the date of publication when summons and a copy of the plaint are not served in Form 4?
  • Can a defendant challenge the maintainability of a summary suit before obtaining leave to defend?
  • Is an application for condonation of delay required when the limitation period for leave to defend has not commenced due to improper service?
  • Does Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply strictly to negotiable instruments or other loan documents as well?
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• Controller of Insurance vs Pakistan International Insurance1993 PLD Karachi 72 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Controller of Insurance vs Pakistan International InsuranceK.L.R. 1993 Tax and Custom Cases 98 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner of Sales Tax, Central. Zone Karachi vs M/s. CaptainPTCL 1993 CL. 285 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Paracha Textile Mills Limited ,1993 PTD 1208 · Sindh High Court · 1987-09-17Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Zone C, Karachi vs M/s. AgriculturalPTCL 1993 CL. 52 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax vs Javed Khaliq1993 PTD 730 · Sindh High Court · 1993-01-20Read full judgment →
• Colgate-Palmolive (Pakistan) Ltd. vs Assistant Registrar II of Trade1993 MLD 625 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-03Read full judgment →
• Civil Aviation Authority, Karachi vs M/s. Data International (Data1993 PLD Karachi 700 · Sindh High Court · 1993-01-31
  civil revisionlease versus licencerevocable licencerejection of plainttemporary injunctionCivil Aviation AuthorityEasements Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 arose from a dispute regarding the cancellation of a licence granted by the Civil Aviation Authority for operating a left-behind luggage facility at Karachi Airport. The core legal question was whether the agreement constituted a lease or a revocable licence under the Easements Act 1882, and whether a suit for declaration and injunction was maintainable in light of bar of jurisdiction and lack of legal right. The Sindh High Court held that the agreement was a revocable licence rather than a lease, since no interest in immovable property was transferred and the licensee lacked the right to assign or transfer without consent, thereby rendering section 60 of the Easements Act inapplicable. The Court laid down the principle that the substance of a written instrument determines whether it is a lease or licence, that a licence creating no property interest is revocable, and that a plaint disclosing no cause of action or barred by law must be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908.

  Questions settled

  • Does an agreement to establish a facility on open space create a lease or a licence?
  • Whether a licence permitting the construction of a building becomes an irrevocable licence under section 60 of the Easements Act 1882?
  • Can documents filed along with the plaint be examined for the purpose of rejecting a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is a civil court competent to grant an interim injunction restraining the government from taking possession under the Central Government Lands and Buildings Recovery of Possession Ordinance 1965?
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• Ch. Muhammad Akram Bhatti vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Islamabad and another1993 MLD 627 · Sindh High Court · 1992-08-25Read full judgment →
• Central Cotton Mills Ltd. vs Naveed Textile Mills Ltd. and others1993 MLD 42 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-13Read full judgment →
• Central Cotton Mills Ltd vs Naveed Textile Mills Ltd. and othersPTCL 1993 CL. 305 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-13Read full judgment →
• Caltex Oil Pakistan Limited vs Mst. Yasmin1993 CLC 1978 · Sindh High Court · 1993-06-23Read full judgment →
• Brig. Muhammad Muzaffar vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Cabinet Division, Islamabad and 4 others1993 CLC 775 · Sindh High Court · 1992-01-02Read full judgment →
• Bolan Coastal Shipping & Water Transport Industry, Karachi vs Government of Pakistan through Central Board of Revenue, Karachi and 2 others1993 MLD 953 · Sindh High Court · 1993-01-12Read full judgment →
• Bhooralal vs Ma. Ansari and another1993 MLD 238 · Sindh High Court · 1992-11-01Read full judgment →
• Begum Anwari Khanum Shaikh vs M/s. Passcon (Pvt.) Ltd. and another1993 MLD 1555 · Sindh High Court · 1993-03-07Read full judgment →
• Bcci vs Ali Asbestos and others1993 CLC 913 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-24Read full judgment →
• Barrister Rashid Akhtar Qureshi vs The Province of Sindh through Secretary, Excise and Taxation, Government of Sindh, Karachi and another1993 MLD 2466 · Sindh High Court · 1992-12-23Read full judgment →
• Banqu E INDOSUEZs vs Rehmani Brothers1993 CLC 1257 · Sindh High Court · 1991-12-01
  Section 12(2) CPCdoctrine of mergerappellate jurisdictionbanking recoverypreliminary decreeclerical errorexecution of decree
  Summary & questions settled

  The defendants filed an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 seeking to recall a judgment and decree passed in a suit for recovery of a loan under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979, alleging lack of jurisdiction and fraud. Additionally, the plaintiff filed an application under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to amend the decree to include a preliminary decree. The core legal questions were whether an application under Section 12(2) is maintainable in the trial court after an appeal has been dismissed, and whether a decree can be amended under Section 152 to include relief not originally prayed for. The Court held that the application under Section 12(2) was not maintainable because the trial court's judgment merged into the appellate court's judgment upon dismissal of the appeal, necessitating the application be filed before the appellate court. Furthermore, the Court dismissed the application under Section 152, ruling that the provision only allows for correcting accidental omissions, not for granting relief that was never requested or intended in the original decree.

  Questions settled

  • Is an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 maintainable before the trial court after the judgment has been challenged in an appeal?
  • Does the doctrine of merger apply to a trial court's judgment when an appeal against it has been dismissed?
  • Can a court amend a decree under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to include a preliminary decree if the original prayer did not seek one?
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• Bahar Qureshi and 2 others vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 496 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-20Read full judgment →
• Badar Iqbal vs The Speaker, Sindh Provincial Assembly and 3 others1993 PLD Karachi 312 · Sindh High Court · 1993-03-17
  resignation of memberwithdrawal of resignationprovincial assemblyduresslachesbye-electionconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by a Member of the Provincial Assembly of Sindh challenging a notification issued by the Speaker that declared his seat vacant following his alleged resignation. The petitioner contended that his undated resignation letter had been obtained under duress by his party leadership and that, prior to the resignation letter reaching the Speaker, he had formally withdrawn it via a letter received by the Speaker on February 26, 1991. The resignation letter itself was received by the Speaker on February 27, 1991, who immediately gave it effect. The respondent argued that the petition was barred by laches as it was filed thirteen months later, during which time a bye-election was held and a new member elected. The High Court held that a resignation can only take effect if it reaches the competent authority, and if it is withdrawn by the maker before it reaches the Speaker, it becomes ineffective. The Court further held that laches is an equitable bar and should not be applied to perpetuate injustice, especially where the petitioner was forced to remain abroad. The petition was allowed, and both the notification and the subsequent bye-election were declared void.

  Questions settled

  • Can a member of a Provincial Assembly withdraw their resignation before it reaches the Speaker?
  • Does a resignation letter obtained under duress become effective if the maker communicates its withdrawal to the Speaker before the resignation letter is received?
  • Should a constitutional petition be dismissed on the ground of laches if the delay in filing was caused by the petitioner being forced to remain outside the country?
  • Can the bar of laches be invoked in discretionary constitutional jurisdiction if its application would result in perpetuating an injustice?
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• Azizuddin through his L.Rs, vs Muhammad Anwar and 2 others1993 MLD 1424 · Sindh High Court · 1993-01-10Read full judgment →
• Azhar Hussain Alvi vs (Mst.) Khursheed AkhtarK.L.R. 1993 Civil Cases 26 · Sindh High Court · 1992-03-12Read full judgment →
• Azeemuddin (deceased) through his Legal Heirs vs Mst. Hamida Begum1993 PLD Karachi 50 · Sindh High Court · 1992-09-17
  default in rentpersonal bona fide needpartnership firm tenanttender of rentejectment appealrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an order of ejectment passed by a Rent Controller under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, on the grounds of default in rent and personal bona fide need. The core legal questions involve determining the actual tenant where a partnership firm is claimed to be the lessee, whether the deposit of rent in court without prior tender to the landlord constitutes a valid tender under section 10 of the Ordinance, and whether personal need is established when the sons for whom premises are claimed are already in salaried employment. The Sindh High Court held that the tenancy vested in the individual partner in whose name receipts were issued, not the subsequently formed partnership firm, and that voluntary deposit of rent in court without a prior lawful tender or refusal by the landlord does not absolve the tenant from default. However, personal need was negatived as the sons were already gainfully employed. The eviction order was maintained solely on the ground of default in rent.

  Questions settled

  • Does a tenancy vest in a partnership firm when rent receipts are historically issued in the name of an individual partner?
  • Does the deposit of rent in court without a prior tender to the landlord constitute a valid tender under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Is personal bona fide need established for sons who are already gainfully employed in salaried services?
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• Azeem Baig vs Syed Abdul Anis1993 MLD 1823 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-03Read full judgment →
• Azad Friends & Company vs Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks1993 PLD Karachi 571 · Sindh High Court · 1992-11-15Read full judgment →
• Austin Nichols & Co. vs The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, Karachi1993 PLD Karachi 129 · Sindh High Court
  trade mark registrationinvented worddistinctivenesstotality of impressionrefusal of registrationtrade mark appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks' refusal to register the trade mark "Orangina" featuring a bottle and whirl device. The Registrar had rejected the application, contending the word was not "invented" and the mark lacked essential particulars. The core legal question was whether the mark, when viewed in its entirety, qualified for registration under the Trade Marks Act. The court held that while "Orangina" is a trivial variation of "Orange" and thus not an "invented word," the Registrar erred by failing to assess the mark's "totality of the impression." The court determined that the combination of the word with the specific bottle and whirl device rendered the mark distinctive under the Act. Consequently, the court set aside the refusal and directed the Registrar to proceed with the registration process. The key principle established is that when evaluating a trade mark comprising a word and a device, the Registrar must consider the get-up as a whole to determine its distinctiveness, rather than analyzing components in isolation.

  Questions settled

  • Is the word 'Orangina' considered an invented word under the Trade Marks Act?
  • Does the assessment of a trade mark's distinctiveness require consideration of the mark's totality of impression rather than its individual components?
  • Can a trade mark be registered under the Trade Marks Act if it is not an invented word but possesses distinctiveness through its overall design?
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• Aurang Zaib vs M/s. Alhaider Construction Company through1993 PLD Karachi 397 · Sindh High Court
  mutation proceedingsrecord of rightsrevenue officers jurisdictioncivil disputesummary proceedingsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenged orders passed by revenue authorities regarding the mutation and cancellation of entries in the Record of Rights concerning agricultural land. The core legal question revolved around the scope and jurisdiction of revenue officers in summary mutation proceedings when a dispute involving intricate questions of title or an agreement to sell arises between competing claimants. The Sindh High Court held that mutation proceedings under the Sindh Land Revenue Act, 1967 are summary in nature, and revenue officers lack jurisdiction to resolve complex civil disputes or usurp the functions of a competent Civil Court. The Court laid down the principle that once revenue authorities determine that a dispute is of a civil nature, they must refrain from deciding complex title issues or recording contradictory findings, and must leave such matters to a court of civil jurisdiction. The impugned orders were declared passed without lawful authority and the matter was remanded for a fresh decision.

  Questions settled

  • Do revenue officers have the jurisdiction to resolve intricate questions of title and complex civil disputes during summary mutation proceedings under the Sindh Land Revenue Act, 1967?
  • What is the legal recourse for revenue officers once they determine that a mutation dispute before them is purely of a civil nature?
  • Are mutation proceedings under sections 42 to 45 of the Sindh Land Revenue Act, 1967 summary in nature?
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• Atiuddin vs Saleem Karim1993 MLD 410 · Sindh High Court · 1992-03-04Read full judgment →
• Associated Agencies Ltd. and another vs Industrija Masina/Tractora1993 PLD Karachi 459 · Sindh High Court · 1993-03-22
  arbitrationstay of suitstep in the proceedingsjoint venture agreementsummary suitleave to defendmodification of contract
  Summary & questions settled

  This High Court Appeal challenged an order passed by a learned Single Judge dismissing the appellants' application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940 for stay of a recovery suit. The core legal questions involved whether a subsequent protocol modifying outstanding dues superseded the original joint venture agreements containing arbitration clauses, and whether the appellants had taken steps in the proceedings amounting to an abandonment of their right to seek arbitration. The Sindh High Court held that the protocol was merely a minor modification of the original agreements rather than a substitution, and therefore the arbitration clauses continued to apply. It further held that applying for leave to appear and defend under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 alongside seeking a stay under Section 34 does not constitute a step in the proceedings or waiver of arbitration rights. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the suit proceedings were stayed pending arbitration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an arbitration clause in an original agreement survives a subsequent protocol modifying outstanding payment terms?
  • Does applying for leave to appear and defend in a summary suit under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 constitute a step in the proceedings barring relief under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • When can an appellate court interfere with the discretion exercised by a trial court under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • Does a dispute regarding outstanding dues under a protocol fall within the scope of the arbitration clause contained in the foundational joint venture agreements?
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• Asmat Sultana Begum through her Legal Heirs vs Inspector of Schools, Southern Zone, Karachi, and 6 others1993 CLC 761 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-28Read full judgment →
• Asif Ali Zardari vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 781 · Sindh High Court · 1993-01-31
  post-arrest bailstatutory delayretrospective operation of statutesvested rightssuppression of terrorist activitiesarms ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicants, Asif Ali Zardari and Ali Bux Abbasi, facing trial before Special Courts for Suppression of Terrorist Activities, sought post-arrest bail on the ground of continuous detention exceeding the statutory periods under the third proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. During the pendency of their applications, Ordinance No. XV of 1992 was promulgated, omitting the third and fourth provisos of Section 497(1). The core legal question was whether the amending Ordinance operated retrospectively to take away the right to seek bail in pending proceedings, and whether such right constituted a substantive or vested right. The Sindh High Court held that procedural statutes or amendments are generally prospective unless a clear contrary intention is expressed, and that a valuable statutory right to apply for and obtain bail upon fulfilling conditions had already accrued to the applicants. The Court held that the amending Ordinance did not affect pending proceedings or accrued rights. Consequently, the High Court granted post-arrest bail to both applicants.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the amendment to Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 by Ordinance XV of 1992, omitting the third and fourth provisos, operates retrospectively to affect pending bail applications?
  • Does the right to seek bail under the third proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 constitute a substantive or vested right that survives the repeal of the provision?
  • Whether inordinate and unjustified delay in the conclusion of a trial can be considered as a ground for granting bail under Section 497 or Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether the provisions of Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding bail on the ground of delay apply to trials before Special Courts under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act 1975?
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• Asif Ali Zardari vs Special Judge (Offences in Banks) And OtherK.L.R. 1993 Criminal Cases 28 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-04Read full judgment →
• Asif Ali vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 493 · Sindh High Court · 1992-06-29Read full judgment →
• Ashraf Himayati vs The State1993 MLD 2337 · Sindh High Court · 1992-11-08Read full judgment →
• Ashraf Ali vs Registrar, N.E.D. University of Engineering & Technology, Karachi and another1993 CLC 1278 · Sindh High Court · 1991-11-05Read full judgment →
• Arshad Nadim vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1817 · Sindh High Court · 1993-05-15Read full judgment →
• Arm Brothers Plastic Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks, Karachi1993 CLC 2363 · Sindh High Court · 1992-07-25Read full judgment →
• Ardeshir Cowasjee, Karachi and 4 others vs Messrs Multiline1993 PLD Karachi 237 · Sindh High Court · 1992-09-02
  constitutional petitionlocus standiaggrieved personbuilding regulationsunauthorized constructiondemolitionhigh-rise buildingcompounding of offence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the construction of a multistoreyed building consisting of nine floors besides the ground floor in the Frere Town Area of Karachi by respondent No. 1, permitted by the Karachi Building Control Authority in contravention of the Karachi Buildings and Town Planning Regulations, which restricted constructions in the area to a ground floor and two upper storeys. The core legal questions involved the locus standi of residents of the same area who are not immediate neighbors to maintain a constitutional petition, the statutory force of the Regulations, the power of the authorities and the Chief Minister to compound or regularize violations or permit deviations, and the applicability of natural justice principles. The Sindh High Court held that residents of the locality have locus standi as aggrieved persons if their interests or amenities are prejudicially affected, that the Regulations have statutory force, that neither the Karachi Building Control Authority nor the Chief Minister has the power to condone or regularize high-rise constructions exceeding permissible height or storeys in violation of the Regulations, and that major alterations cannot be permitted without observing natural justice. The petition was allowed and the building approvals were declared without legal effect.

  Questions settled

  • Whether residents of a locality residing away from an immediate building site have locus standi to maintain a constitutional petition against unauthorized high-rise construction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Do the Karachi Buildings and Town Planning Regulations possess statutory force under the Sindh Buildings Control Ordinance 1979?
  • Whether the Karachi Building Control Authority or the Chief Minister has the legal authority to condone or regularize building constructions that violate the maximum permissible height and number of storeys prescribed by the Regulations?
  • Does the power to compound offences under Section 19 of the Sindh Buildings Control Ordinance 1979 and Regulation 16 of the Karachi Buildings and Town Planning Regulations include the power to regularize illegal structural deviations?
  • Are principles of natural justice applicable to administrative proceedings involving major alterations in building regulations affecting residents of a locality?
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• Ardeshir Cowasjee and 9 others vs Muhammad Naqi Nawab and 51993 PLD Karachi 631 · Sindh High Court · 1993-07-14
  temporary injunctionprivate nuisancerestrictive covenantbuilding schemeresidential areacommon vendorinjunction against school
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an application by the plaintiffs seeking an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendants from opening and running a school at a property situated in a residential area of Karachi, on the ground that it would cause a private nuisance and breach restrictive covenants in the lease. The core legal questions involved whether the plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded material facts of apprehended nuisance, whether the suit was barred under Section 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 as a public nuisance, and whether neighboring property owners deriving title from a common vendor can enforce restrictive covenants inter se under equity. The Sindh High Court held that the plaintiffs successfully established a prima facie case of private nuisance and showed that the area was subject to a general development scheme with mutual restrictive covenants. The court granted the temporary injunction, laying down the principle that residents in close proximity who suffer direct and substantial interference with their enjoyment of land can enforce restrictive covenants in equity, independent of contractual privity, and that two or more wrongs do not make a right.

  Questions settled

  • Can a private individual sue for nuisance without the sanction of the Advocate-General under Section 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Do neighboring property owners deriving title from a common vendor have the right in equity to enforce restrictive covenants inter se?
  • Whether the establishment of a school in a purely residential area constitutes an actionable private nuisance?
  • Does the mere presence of a consulate or a Montessori school in a locality destroy the basic residential character of the area?
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• Anwarul Haq vs State Oil Company Ltd.1993 CLC 1565 · Sindh High Court · 1992-10-05Read full judgment →
• Anwar Khattak vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1932 · Sindh High Court · 1992-06-01Read full judgment →
• Anwar Jawaid Khan vs N.E.D. University of Engineering & Technology, Karachi and 15 others1993 CLC 1246 · Sindh High Court · 1991-08-27Read full judgment →
• Anwar Ahmed Khan vs Mst. Rachal Joseph1993 MLD 1666 · Sindh High Court · 1992-10-11Read full judgment →
• Anthony George vs The StateK.L.R. 1993 Tax & Custom Cases 24 · Sindh High Court · 1992-08-17Read full judgment →
• Anjum Parvez Qureshi vs Baber Sultan1993 CLC 1823 · Sindh High Court · 1993-01-03Read full judgment →
• Anisurrehman vs Haji Abdul Majeed & Company and 4 others1993 CLC 1283 · Sindh High Court · 1991-10-20Read full judgment →
• Anis Ahmed vs Tasawar Jahangir1993 CLC 1759 · Sindh High Court · 1992-11-15Read full judgment →
• Anis Abbas Jalali vs Abdul Wahid1993 CLC 1970 · Sindh High Court · 1991-10-07Read full judgment →
• Anees Iqbal vs Jehan Ara Yusuf Ali1993 PLD Karachi 516 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-25Read full judgment →
• Amjad Khan vs Mst. Mariam1993 CLC 175 · Sindh High Court · 1992-08-24
  rent appealpersonal bona fide requirementgood faithevictionburden of prooflandlord-tenant dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the order of the Rent Controller directing the eviction of the appellant-tenant from the premises in dispute on the ground of the respondent-landlady's personal bona fide requirement. The core legal question was whether the landlady had established her personal requirement for the premises in good faith, given the tenant's contention that she already possessed sufficient accommodation and that her claim was mala fide. The Court held that the landlady successfully demonstrated her bona fide requirement by providing evidence that she and her family were living in unauthorized, miserable conditions in a 'juggi' (shanty), whereas the tenant failed to provide credible evidence to the contrary. The Court affirmed the Rent Controller's decision, emphasizing that once a landlord establishes the reasonableness of their need, the onus shifts to the tenant to prove mala fides or dishonesty. The judgment clarifies that 'good faith' under the relevant rent laws requires that the demand for possession be made honestly, a state of mind inferred from evidence and conduct rather than mere assertion.

  Questions settled

  • What is the legal definition of 'good faith' in the context of a landlord's claim for personal requirement?
  • Does the burden of proof shift to the tenant once a landlord establishes the reasonableness of their need for personal use?
  • Can a landlord's claim for personal requirement be defeated by a witness statement that lacks specific details regarding the landlord's current living conditions?
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• Amir Ali vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 457 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-30Read full judgment →
• Amir Ahmed vs Irshad Ahmed1993 CLC 1074 · Sindh High Court · 1993-01-13
  ejectment applicationlandlord-tenant relationshipownership disputerent controllerspecific performancefraudulent title
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two First Rent Appeals filed by an appellant against a common order of the Rent Controller, which dismissed his ejectment applications against two tenants. The core legal question was whether a landlord can maintain an ejectment application against tenants when the landlord's title to the property is disputed and has been found to be fraudulent by civil courts. The Court held that the relationship of landlord and tenant did not exist because the appellant failed to establish ownership of the property. The appellant had falsely represented himself as the owner, while the actual owner was a third party, Z.A. Khan, who had purchased the plot in an open auction. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the ejectment applications, emphasizing that a landlord must prove their title to the property to succeed in an ejectment claim. The key principle laid down is that in rent proceedings, a landlord must satisfy the Rent Controller regarding their ownership of the disputed property; failing such proof, the relationship of landlord and tenant cannot be established, and the ejectment application must be dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Must a landlord prove ownership of the property to maintain an ejectment application against a tenant?
  • Does the relationship of landlord and tenant exist if the landlord has fraudulently misrepresented their title to the property?
  • Can a Rent Controller dismiss an ejectment application if the landlord fails to establish title to the disputed premises?
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• Amin Akhtar Jami vs Jahangir Alam1993 MLD 1530 · Sindh High Court · 1993-04-17Read full judgment →
• American Telephone and Telegraph Company vs The Assistant1993 PLD Karachi 144 · Sindh High Court · 1992-12-17Read full judgment →
• Ament Geb Hofmann vs The State1993 P Cr. L J 1429 · Sindh High Court · 1992-12-29Read full judgment →
• Amanullah Silk Mills vs Federal Government of Pakistan through Joint1993 CLC 357 · Sindh High Court · 1992-02-06Read full judgment →
• Amanullah and another vs The State1993 MLD 533 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-28Read full judgment →
• Amanullah and another vs Shamimul Haq and another1993 MLD 1994 · Sindh High Court · 1992-12-20Read full judgment →
• Aman Ullah Khan vs Mehar Ellahi And 14 OtherK.L.R. 1993 Civil Cases 49 · Sindh High Court · 1992-01-12Read full judgment →
• Alnoor Education Society through Naeem Moyuddin, Karachi vs K.1993 CLC 1798 · Sindh High Court · 1992-09-13
  evictionrented premisesstructural alterationsimpairment of value and utilitybreach of lease conditionsSindh Rented Premises Ordinancelandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an eviction order passed by a Rent Controller regarding a rented bungalow. The core legal question was whether the tenant's unauthorized structural alterations, including converting a verandah into a room and constructing additional rooms in open spaces, constituted grounds for eviction under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The court upheld the eviction, ruling that these acts materially impaired the utility and value of the premises. The court established that the statutory language 'likely to impair' does not require proof of actual, permanent damage, but merely a tendency to impair the property's value or utility. It further held that structural alterations changing the nature and character of the premises are actionable even if theoretically reversible, as the assessment must be made in the present. Finally, the court affirmed that violating an express covenant in a lease deed regarding structural changes constitutes a breach of the conditions of the lease, independently warranting eviction under the Ordinance.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'likely to impair' in the context of rented premises require proof of actual permanent damage to the property?
  • Do structural alterations that are reversible still constitute grounds for eviction if they change the nature and character of the premises?
  • Does the violation of an express covenant in a lease deed regarding structural changes constitute a breach of the conditions of the lease under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Must a landlord prove that both the value and the utility of the rented premises have been impaired to secure an eviction order?
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• Allah Ditta vs The StateK.L.R. 1993 Shariat Cases 88 · Sindh High Court · 1993-09-09Read full judgment →
• Allah Bux Laghari vs The State and another1993 P Cr. L J 408 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-10Read full judgment →
• Allah Bachayo vs The State1993 MLD 1411 · Sindh High Court · 1992-10-29Read full judgment →