Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 46,805 judgments in total from the Sindh High Court.

• Muhammad Siddiq vs Province of Sindh Through Home Secretary, Karachi And 2 Other1992 PLD Karachi 358 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-17
  habeas corpuspolice remandillegal detentionjudicial custodymechanical remandSection 167 CrPCpolice tortureblind FIRs
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses multiple habeas corpus petitions and criminal miscellaneous applications challenging the legality of police detention and the mechanical granting of remand orders by magistrates. The core legal questions concern the scope of police powers to arrest without warrant, the judicial nature of remand proceedings, and whether an undertrial prisoner in judicial custody can be transferred to police custody for the investigation of a separate offense. The Court held that police powers to arrest under Section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are not absolute and require reasonable suspicion or evidence. It further ruled that magistrates must not grant remand mechanically; they must scrutinize case diaries and ensure the necessity of detention. While an undertrial prisoner can be remanded to police custody for a new investigation, this must be authorized by a magistrate upon judicial review, not by police action alone. The judgment emphasizes that remand is a judicial function, and failure to strictly comply with Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 constitutes an abuse of power, violating fundamental rights.

  Questions settled

  • Can a police officer arrest a person without a warrant based solely on a blind FIR without evidence?
  • Is a magistrate required to personally examine case diaries before granting a remand order under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can an undertrial prisoner already in judicial custody be remanded to police custody for the investigation of a different offense?
  • Does a magistrate have the authority to grant remand orders at a police station rather than in open court?
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• Muhammad Siddiq vs Abdullah And 2 Others1992 P Cr. L J 858 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-07Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shareef vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1219 · Sindh High Court · 1991-09-23
  Special Courtsuppression of terrorist activitiesjurisdictionKlarnikovright of private defenceattempted culpable homicidesentence reduction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant under section 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, passed by the Judge of the Special Court for Suppression of Terrorist Activities. The core legal questions involved the jurisdiction of the Special Court over the alleged offence and whether the appellant had exceeded his right of private defence. The Sindh High Court held that the Special Court had jurisdiction because the appellant was armed with a Klashnikov, bringing the case within the schedule of the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975. On the merits, the Court found that although the appellant had a right to resist the forcible closure of his shop by a procession, he exceeded the right of private defence by resorting to indiscriminate firing when there was no apprehension of death or grievous hurt. Consequently, the Court converted the conviction from section 307 to section 308 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and reduced the sentence to the period already undergone while maintaining the fine.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere presence of a prohibited bore weapon like a Klashnikov during an incident confer jurisdiction on a Special Court under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of the right of private defence under section 96 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if the plea is supported by circumstances proved by the prosecution even if not specifically raised?
  • Does a shopkeeper have the right to resist an attempt by a mob to forcibly close his shop?
  • When does the use of a firearm in response to a non-violent protest exceed the right of private defence and fall under section 308 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Muhammad Salim Khan, In Re vs Not1992 PLD Karachi 210 · Sindh High Court · 1992-03-16Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saleem vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 35 · Sindh High Court · 1991-09-23Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadique And Another vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 2163 · Sindh High Court · 1992-02-13Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadio vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 2179 · Sindh High Court · 1992-02-13Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sabir Qureshi vs Nadeem Armed Qureshi And Others1992 P Cr. L J 1503 · Sindh High Court · 1992-01-19Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Raza- vs Haji Abdul Ghaffar And 6 Other1992 PLD Karachi 17 · Sindh High Court · 1991-09-09
  temporary injunctionbreach of contractpecuniary compensationspecific performanceinterlocutory reliefcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for a temporary injunction filed by the plaintiff under Order XXXIX Rule 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The plaintiff sought to restrain the defendants from breaching a contract and to preserve leveling work performed on specific plots pending the final disposal of the suit. The core legal question was whether the plaintiff was entitled to a temporary injunction to prevent the alleged breach of contract and preserve the status quo of the work performed. The Court held that the application lacked merit and dismissed it. The ratio of the decision is that where a plaintiff has already quantified their alleged losses and damages in monetary terms, pecuniary compensation constitutes adequate relief, thereby precluding the necessity for an injunction. The Court laid down the principle that the grant of temporary injunctions under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is governed by the principles set forth in Sections 52 to 57 of the Specific Relief Act 1877, specifically regarding the adequacy of pecuniary compensation.

  Questions settled

  • Are temporary injunctions under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 governed by the principles of the Specific Relief Act 1877?
  • Can an injunction be granted where the alleged loss or damage is quantifiable in monetary terms?
  • Is a plaintiff entitled to an injunction to prevent a breach of contract when pecuniary compensation provides adequate relief?
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• Muhammad Rahim and 6 others vs Board of Revenue, Sindh and 4 others1992 CLC 1040 · Sindh High Court · 1991-11-04Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafique vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 2119 · Sindh High Court · 1992-06-16
  circumstantial evidenceSection 164 statementSection 265-J Cr.P.C.right to cross-examinationbenefit of doubtmurder convictionadmissibility of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a conviction for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question is whether statements recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be admitted as substantive evidence under Section 265-J of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the accused was not provided with prior notice or an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. The Court held that the conviction could not be sustained. It ruled that for Section 164 statements to be admissible as substantive evidence under Section 265-J, the accused must receive prior written notice and a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine, which did not occur in this case. The Court further affirmed that in cases relying on circumstantial evidence, the failure of one link in the chain destroys the entire case. Consequently, the Court found the evidence insufficient, extended the benefit of doubt to the appellant, set aside the conviction, and ordered his acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be treated as substantive evidence under Section 265-J without prior notice to the accused?
  • Is the mere presence of a dead body in the house of the accused sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder?
  • Does the failure of one link in a chain of circumstantial evidence invalidate the entire prosecution case?
  • Is a prior written notice required for the accused to effectively exercise the right of cross-examination during the recording of statements under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Muhammad Rafique Alias Qasso vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 576 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-27Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafiq vs Divisional Engineer, P.W. Railway and others1992 CLC 786 · Sindh High Court · 1987-11-08
  civil revisionconcurrent findingsrailway landencroachmentdeclaration and permanent injunctionhumanitarian grounds
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition is directed against the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts dismissing the petitioner's suit for declaration and permanent injunction regarding a piece of railway land where he had raised a hutment. The petitioner, a former railway employee who lost both legs in an accident during duty and was declared unfit for service, claimed he was permitted by a railway official to occupy the land and use it as a shop for livelihood. The trial court and the appellate court dismissed the suit, holding that the petitioner had no legal title or valid allotment order for the disputed land. The core legal question was whether the concurrent factual findings of the lower courts regarding the lack of title could be disturbed in revisional jurisdiction. The High Court held that concurrent findings of fact cannot be disturbed in revision unless they are perverse or contrary to the record, and since the petitioner admittedly held no allotment order, the judgments were maintained. The High Court, however, granted the petitioner one year to vacate and suggested he approach railway authorities for humanitarian accommodation.

  Questions settled

  • Can concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts be disturbed in a civil revision petition without showing them to be perverse or contrary to the record?
  • Does a person occupying railway land without a valid allotment order have a legal title to maintain a suit for declaration and permanent injunction?
  • May a court grant time to vacate premises on humanitarian grounds while dismissing a revision petition against concurrent judgments?
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• Muhammad Panah And Another vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 2049 · Sindh High Court · 1992-06-01Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nisar vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 2237 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-10Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nazeer vs Master Muhammad Gul And Another1992 P Cr. L J 674 · Sindh High Court · 1992-09-01Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Naeem and another vs M/s. Karimi Bidi Works through1992 CLC 2499 · Sindh High Court · 1992-09-07
  tentative rent orderstriking off defencedefault in rent depositSindh Rented Premises Ordinancerent appealconsent order
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the order of the Rent Controller striking off the defence of the appellants (tenants) and directing them to hand over vacant possession of the premises to the respondent (landlord) under section 16(2) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the tenants' deposit of rent in a previous miscellaneous rent case instead of the current ejectment proceedings—despite a consent order requiring deposit in the latter—constituted a mere technical default or a contumacious non-compliance. The Sindh High Court held that after consenting to deposit rent in the current proceedings and complying for a period, the tenants' subsequent reversion to depositing rent in the old case without permission was a deliberate defiance of the court order, not a technical mistake, particularly as the plea of a bona fide mix-up lacked evidentiary support. The court affirmed that non-compliance with a tentative rent order properly attracts the striking off of the tenant's defence and eviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does depositing rent in a previous miscellaneous case instead of the current rent case, in violation of a consent order, constitute a default under section 16(2) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  • Whether a tenant's unexplained shift in depositing rent after complying with a tentative rent order amounts to contumacious non-compliance justifying the striking off of defence?
  • Can a factual plea of a bona fide mistake in depositing rent be accepted without supporting evidence or affidavit from the tenant?
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• Muhammad Naeem Akhtar and 2 others vs The Speaker, Sindh Provincial1992 CLC 2043 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-30
  constitutional petitionresignation of member of assemblySpeaker's powersvoluntary resignationprovincial assemblymaintainabilitycrossing the floor
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Sindh High Court addresses a constitutional petition filed by Muhammad Naeem Akhtar and two others challenging the acceptance of their resignations from the Sindh Provincial Assembly by the Speaker. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of the petition under Article 199 of the Constitution in view of Article 69, whether Article 64 of the Constitution of Pakistan requires acceptance of a resignation by the Speaker to take effect, and whether the petitioners' resignations were voluntary. The court held that the petition is maintainable and not barred by Article 69, and distinguished Article 64 of the Pakistan Constitution from the Indian Constitution's Article 190(3)(b), clarifying that Article 64 does not require the Speaker's formal acceptance for a resignation to become effective and for the seat to fall vacant. However, the Speaker must hold an inquiry if there are doubts or representations regarding the genuineness or voluntary nature of the resignation. The court found that the petitioners failed to establish coercion and had not informed the Speaker that their resignations were defective or unauthorized. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition challenging the acceptance of a member's resignation by the Speaker of a Provincial Assembly is maintainable under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does Article 64 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 require the formal acceptance of a resignation by the Speaker for the seat to become vacant?
  • When is the Speaker of the Provincial Assembly required to hold an inquiry regarding the genuineness or voluntary nature of a member's resignation?
  • Does the bar under Article 69 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 apply to the action of the Speaker in accepting a member's resignation?
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• Muhammad Mostkeem and 2 others vs Abdullah Jan1992 CLC 2469 · Sindh High Court · 1992-08-23Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Juman vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1922 · Sindh High Court · 1992-03-30Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Jamal through his Legal Heirs vs Haji Shamsuddin and 21992 MLD 666 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-30Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Jalil Khan vs Mst. Dilshad Begum and 8 others1992 CLC 2105 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-02Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ismail Khan vs The State1992 MLD 595 · Sindh High Court · 1991-07-15Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ishaq vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 746 · Sindh High Court · 1991-06-04Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Irshad vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1225 · Sindh High Court · 1991-11-04Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Irshad vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 756 · Sindh High Court · 1991-11-04Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 2092 · Sindh High Court · -
  murderdeath sentence confirmationsuppression of material factsinterested witnessesbenefit of the doubtrecovery of crime weaponnon-examination of investigating officerfalsus in uno falsus in omnibus
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and confirmation case arise from a judgment of the IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Karachi (East), convicting the appellant under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentencing him to death for the murder of Hafiz Muhammad Din, while acquitting the co-accused. The core legal questions involved the credibility of interested eyewitnesses who suppressed material facts concerning cross-injuries to the accused and the burning of a vehicle, the validity of recoveries made in violation of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and the applicability of the principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus when co-accused are acquitted upon the same evidence. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt due to the suppression of genesis of the incident, lack of independent corroboration, flawed recoveries, and the non-examination of the material Investigating Officer. The court declined to confirm the death sentence, allowed the appeal, and acquitted the appellant, laying down that an accused is not required to establish his innocence and that withholding material facts by eyewitnesses and failure to prove recoveries through independent local mashirs entitles the accused to the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the suppression of material facts and cross-injuries by eyewitnesses discredits their testimony in the absence of independent corroboration?
  • Does the failure to associate independent local witnesses render recoveries under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 legally nugatory?
  • Whether an accused person can be convicted on the same evidence which has been disbelieved with regard to a co-accused without strong corroboration?
  • What is the effect of the prosecution's failure to examine the material Investigating Officer on the proof of the case?
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• Muhammad Ilyas vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1234 · Sindh High Court · 1991-10-16Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Idrees vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1287 · Sindh High Court · 1991-08-04Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Idrees vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 2106 · Sindh High Court · 1992-07-06Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ibrahim vs M.Y. Corporation through General Manager1992 CLC 1703 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-27Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ibraheem vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 572 · Sindh High Court · 1987-12-02Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hashim and 10 others vs Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal1992 PLC 52 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-08Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 664 · Sindh High Court · 1991-08-15Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Fikree and vs Muhammad Fikree and 3 others.PTCL 3992 CL. 322 · Sindh High Court · 1990-11-06Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Fikree and 3 others vs Fikree Development Corporation Ltd.1992 MLD 668 · Sindh High Court · 1990-11-06
  Companies Ordinanceshare transferres judicatalachesmismanagementcorporate governanceSection 290
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed under Section 290 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, by shareholders alleging that the company’s directors engaged in unauthorized share transfers, conducted meetings without a proper quorum, and mismanaged funds through thriftless expenditure. The respondents contended that the petition was misconceived, time-barred, and barred by the principle of res judicata. The Court held that the grievances regarding share transfers had already been adjudicated in previous judicial applications, rendering the current claims barred by res judicata. Furthermore, the Court observed that the significant delay in challenging historical irregularities warranted dismissal on the grounds of laches. Regarding the allegations of financial mismanagement, the Court found the petitioners' reliance on the auditor's report insufficient to prove thriftless expenditure. The Court clarified that Section 290 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, is designed to ensure company affairs are conducted in accordance with the law and the company's articles, rather than serving as a mechanism to resolve private inter-se disputes between shareholders. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as misconceived and lacking merit.

  Questions settled

  • Can Section 290 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, be invoked to settle private inter-se disputes between shareholders?
  • Does the principle of res judicata apply to petitions under Section 290 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, when the subject matter has been previously adjudicated?
  • Can a petition under Section 290 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, be dismissed on the grounds of laches due to significant delay in challenging historical irregularities?
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• Muhammad Farooq And 2 Others vs The State--1992 P Cr. L J 834 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-13
  quashment of proceedingsinherent jurisdictioncheatingcivil nature of disputeabuse of processcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This application was filed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the quashment of criminal proceedings pending before a trial court. The applicants, accused of cheating under Section 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, argued that the dispute was purely civil in nature, evidenced by pending civil litigation, and that the criminal proceedings were an abuse of process. The core legal question was whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings when a prima facie case exists and the accused alleges the matter is civil. The Court held that the inherent power under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C. is not an alternative to the ordinary course of criminal procedure and should be used sparingly. It determined that since there was prima facie evidence connecting the applicants to the crime, it would be premature to stifle the prosecution. The Court established that the mere existence of a civil suit does not bar criminal proceedings, and quashment is inappropriate where the allegations, if believed, constitute an offence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of a pending civil suit between the parties automatically bar the continuation of criminal proceedings?
  • Can the High Court exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash proceedings where a prima facie case is established?
  • Is it appropriate for the High Court to evaluate the credibility of witnesses at the stage of a quashment application?
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• Muhammad Chottey Khan vs Muhammad Munir Khan And 2 OtherPLD 1992 Karachi160 · Sindh High Court · 1992-03-09Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bashir vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 1191 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-23Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bashir vs The StateK.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases 160 · Sindh High Court · 1991-08-07Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Banaras vs The State And 3 Other1992 PLD Karachi 135 · Sindh High Court · 1991-12-08Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Anwar vs The State and anothers1992 P Cr. L J 1766 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-25Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Anwar And Another vs Federation of Pakistan And 2 Others1992 P Cr. L J 2505 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-20Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amjad vs The Commissioner of Income Tax and 2 others1992 PTD 513 · Sindh High Court · 1992-01-02
  income tax assessmentself-assessment schemerectification of assessmentreopening of assessmenttax evasionstatutory barjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged the issuance of notices under Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, by the Income Tax Department to reopen assessment proceedings for the petitioner. The petitioner had initially filed returns under the self-assessment scheme, which were processed under Section 59(1), and subsequently rectified under Section 156 of the Ordinance. The core legal question was whether the Department could invoke Section 65 to reopen an assessment after a rectification order had already been passed. The Sindh High Court held that the impugned notices were issued without jurisdiction and were of no legal effect. The Court reasoned that once an assessment under Section 59(1) is rectified under Section 156, the assessment is deemed determined under the Ordinance. Consequently, the bar contained in Section 65(1)(c) applies, prohibiting further reopening of the assessment. The Court further affirmed that where all facts were fully disclosed and considered during the initial assessment, there is no scope for interference under Section 65, as the assessment is a concluded transaction. The petitions were allowed, and the impugned notices were quashed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Income Tax Department reopen an assessment under Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 after a rectification order has been passed under Section 156?
  • Does an order of rectification under Section 156 of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 merge with the original assessment order?
  • Is the reopening of an assessment under Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 permissible when all facts were fully disclosed and considered during the initial assessment?
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• Muhammad Amjad vs The Commissioner of Income Tax and 2 othersPTCL 1992 CL. 386 · Sindh High Court · 1992-01-02Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amin vs Karachi Building Control Au Thority1992 CLC 691 · Sindh High Court · 1991-05-26
  demolition noticeprospective operationretrospective applicationrejection of plaintpre-suit noticemala fidebuilding controlcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant challenged a demolition notice issued by the Karachi Building Control Authority regarding a building completed in 1977, prior to the promulgation of the Sindh Building Control Ordinance, 1979. The trial court and appellate court had rejected the applicant's plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, citing the failure to serve a mandatory pre-suit notice under Section 20-A of the Ordinance. The High Court, in this revision application, held that the Sindh Building Control Ordinance, 1979, operates prospectively and does not apply to structures completed before its enforcement. Consequently, the Authority lacked jurisdiction to issue demolition notices for such pre-existing buildings. Furthermore, the Court established that the statutory requirement for pre-suit notice under Section 20-A is not absolute; it applies only to acts performed within the scope of the Ordinance. Such notice is not required where the Authority acts in bad faith or engages in a colorable exercise of power. Accordingly, the impugned orders were set aside, and the suit was remanded for trial on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Sindh Building Control Ordinance, 1979, apply retrospectively to buildings completed before its promulgation?
  • Is a pre-suit notice under Section 20-A of the Sindh Building Control Ordinance, 1979, mandatory for suits challenging acts done in bad faith or colorable exercise of authority?
  • Can a plaint be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, for want of statutory notice if the act complained of falls outside the scope of the governing statute?
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• Muhammad Ali Tehrany vs Mst. Fozia a Khtar Ali1992 CLC 2068 · Sindh High Court · 1992-06-28Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Abid vs The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Jamshed Quarters1992 P Cr. L J 2363 · Sindh High Court · 1992-07-05Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Abdullah vs Government of Pakistan Through Secretary, Ministry Of Finance, Islamabad And 3 Other1992 PLD Karachi 266 · Sindh High Court · 1992-02-11
  sales tax exemptionvested rightsirrevocable letters of creditfiscal liabilityconcluded contractscustoms dutystatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the demand for sales tax by Customs authorities on imported goods. The petitioner had opened irrevocable letters of credit and shipped goods while an exemption notification was in force. Subsequently, a new notification withdrew this exemption, and authorities demanded sales tax on the consignments. The core legal question was whether the withdrawal of a tax exemption via a subsequent notification could retrospectively affect vested rights acquired by importers through concluded contracts, and whether Section 31-A of the Customs Act, 1969, applied to sales tax levies. The Court held that the demand for sales tax was illegal. Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the Court ruled that the Federal Government cannot, by withdrawing exemptions, enhance fiscal liability on concluded contracts evidenced by irrevocable letters of credit. Furthermore, the Court held that Section 31-A of the Customs Act, 1969, relates specifically to customs duty and cannot be invoked to protect the levy of sales tax. Section 3(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, merely provides machinery for collection and does not alter the nature of the tax or import substantive provisions like Section 31-A into sales tax law.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Federal Government withdraw a tax exemption to retrospectively enhance fiscal liability on contracts concluded via irrevocable letters of credit?
  • Does Section 31-A of the Customs Act 1969 apply to the levy of sales tax?
  • Does Section 3(5) of the Sales Tax Act 1951 incorporate the substantive provisions of the Customs Act 1969 into the Sales Tax Act 1951?
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• Muhammad Arshad Jalil vs Pakistan Defence Officers Housing1992 PLD Karachi 304 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-14
  allotment cancellationregistered lease deedright of audiencenatural justicehousing authoritycooperative societies
  Summary & questions settled

  The dispute in this matter relates to the arbitrary cancellation of the allotment and registered lease deed of a plot situated in the Pakistan Defence Officers Cooperative Housing Society Limited, which was originally allotted to the petitioner's father and subsequently transferred to the petitioner and his brother via a registered gift deed. The core legal question is whether the respondents could lawfully cancel the allotment and lease deed under Section 17 of the Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority Order, 1980, without issuing a notice or granting a hearing to the affected parties, and whether the power to cancel allotments extends to canceling registered leases. The Sindh High Court held that the impugned cancellation order was passed without lawful authority and of no legal effect, as the power contained in proviso (i) to Section 17 does not extend to the cancellation of leases and grants of land executed under clause (c) of Section 17. Furthermore, the court laid down the principle that the requirement of issuing a notice and providing an opportunity of being heard must be read into a statute even when the enactment does not contain an explicit provision to that effect.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order cancelling a plot allotment and lease deed can be passed without issuing a notice or affording an opportunity of hearing to the affected parties?
  • Does the power of the Executive Board to cancel allotments under proviso (i) to Section 17 of the Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority Order, 1980 extend to the cancellation of registered leases and grants of land?
  • Is the requirement of issuing a notice to be read into a statute even when there is no specific provision for it in the enactment?
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• Mubarak Hussain Siddiqui And Another vs Sajjad Hassan Khan And Another1992 PLD Karachi 167 · Sindh High Court · 1992-02-24
  quashment of proceedingsinherent jurisdictionpublic servantcooperative society officersjurisdiction of magistrateanti-corruptionprevious sanction of Registrar
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves an application filed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking the quashment of direct criminal proceedings pending before an Additional City Magistrate for offences under sections 420, 465, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions revolved around whether the jurisdiction of ordinary courts is barred under section 70-A of the Cooperative Societies Act 1925, whether prior sanction of the Registrar under section 63(3) of the said Act is required for all prosecutions or only for specific offences under the Act, and whether officers of a cooperative society deemed to be public servants under section 65-B of the Act are exclusively triable by a Special Judge Anti-Corruption. The Sindh High Court held that while section 70-A does not bar ordinary criminal complaints of this nature, and the prior sanction under section 63(3) is strictly limited to offences defined under sections 60, 61, and 62 of the Act, the applicants as officers of the cooperative society are public servants under section 65-B and thus exclusively triable by a Special Judge Anti-Corruption. Consequently, the court declared the cognizance taken by the Magistrate without jurisdiction and set aside the proceedings, clarifying that the order does not bar prosecution before a competent court.

  Questions settled

  • Does section 70-A of the Cooperative Societies Act 1925 bar the jurisdiction of ordinary criminal courts to entertain a direct complaint for offences under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is the previous sanction of the Registrar under subsection (3) of section 63 of the Cooperative Societies Act 1925 required for prosecuting all offences or only for specific offences defined under sections 60, 61, and 62 of the said Act?
  • Are officers of a cooperative society deemed to be public servants under section 65-B of the Cooperative Societies Act 1925 exclusively triable by a Special Judge Anti-Corruption?
  • Does taking cognizance of scheduled offences against cooperative society officers by an ordinary Magistrate render the proceedings without jurisdiction?
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• Mst. Zubaida Khatoon Alias Aqleema Khatoon Alias Parveen vs Saadullah A. Siddiqui and 4 others1992 P Cr. L J 690 · Sindh High Court · 1992-09-01
  habeas corpusminor custodysuckling ageguardians and wardsillegal detentioninterim custody
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a habeas corpus petition filed under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 by the applicant mother seeking the recovery of her two minor children from the custody of her husband and sons. The core legal question concerned the appropriate exercise of High Court jurisdiction under Section 491, Cr.P.C. regarding the custody of minors of tender age vis-a-vis the remedies available under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. The Sindh High Court held that while habeas corpus proceedings are summary and ordinarily guardianship disputes should be resolved by a Guardian Judge, the High Court possesses efficacious jurisdiction under Section 491 to restore illegally or improperly disturbed custody of minors. The court laid down that for an infant of suckling age, the mother is entitled to interim custody, whereas for an older minor whose custody involves disputed questions of fact regarding abandonment and welfare, the arrangement should be determined without prejudice to a final adjudication by the competent Guardian Judge.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise jurisdiction under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in matters of minor custody?
  • Are the remedies under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 mutually exclusive?
  • What order can the High Court pass regarding the custody of a minor brought before it in habeas corpus proceedings?
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• Mst. Zohra Alam vs District Judge, Karachi South and 2 others1992 MLD 64 · Sindh High Court · 1991-10-01Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zaitoon Begum vs Ghulam Rasool1992 CLC 1743 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-15Read full judgment →
• Mst. Surayya Begum vs Abdul Rahman and 2 others1992 CLC 676 · Sindh High Court · 1991-11-13Read full judgment →
• Mst. Surayya Begum vs Abdul Rahman And 2 OtherK.L.R. 1992 Civil Cases 334 · Sindh High Court · 1991-11-13Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sughra Kausar vs Muhammad Siddique Manan Alias MuhammadK.L.R.1992 Civil Cases 343 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mst. Shah Khanum vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 2402 · Sindh High Court · 1990-12-18Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saman Seema Habib and 5 others vs Nadaria Transport Services1992 CLC 950 · Sindh High Court · 1991-09-29Read full judgment →
• Mst. Salma Abbasi and another vs Ahmed Suleman and others1992 MLD 746 · Sindh High Court · 1987-05-02Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sabira Sultana vs Zafarullah Khan and another-1992 P Cr. L J 2150 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-20Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sabihia And Another vs Moosa And AnotherK.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases 155 · Sindh High Court · 1991-06-16Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rashida Begum vs Assistant Controller, Estate Duty, Karachi1992 PTD 1001 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-09
  estate dutyrepeal of statuteGeneral Clauses Actvalidation of proceedingsgift taxassessment of estateFinance Ordinancestatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This reference under Section 59A(1) of the Estate Duty Act, 1950, concerns the assessment of estate duty for the estate of a deceased person. The core legal questions involved the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, to proceedings initiated after the repeal of the Estate Duty Act, 1950; the validity of such proceedings under the Finance Ordinance, 1982; and the inclusion of gifted properties in the deceased's estate under Section 9 of the Estate Duty Act, 1950. The Court held that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, did not save proceedings initiated post-repeal where no prior proceedings existed. However, the Court affirmed that the Finance Ordinance, 1982, effectively validated these proceedings. Regarding the gifted property, the Court established that Section 9 of the Estate Duty Act, 1950, requires both that the gift occurred within five years of death and that gift tax was unpaid. Since gift tax was paid, the gifted property was improperly included in the estate.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, save proceedings initiated after the repeal of the Estate Duty Act, 1950, when no proceedings were pending at the time of repeal?
  • Do the Finance Ordinance, 1982, and the Finance Ordinance, 1979, collectively validate estate duty proceedings initiated after the repeal of the Estate Duty Act, 1950?
  • Can property gifted within five years of death be included in the estate of the deceased under Section 9 of the Estate Duty Act, 1950, if gift tax has been paid on that property?
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• Mst. Naseem Khatoon and 6 others vs Mst. Tasneem Farzana1992 CLC 1091 · Sindh High Court · 1991-09-10Read full judgment →
• Mst. Najma Qureshi and others vs Muhammad Aqeel Qureshi and others1992 CLC 1639 · Sindh High Court · 1986-05-18Read full judgment →
• Mst. Najma Begum vs Ghulam Rasool1992 CLC 1739 · Sindh High Court · 1992-04-15Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mukhtar Begum vs Fida Hussain and another1992 CLC 1314 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-07Read full judgment →
• Mst. Muhammadi Begum vs S. Salauuddin Ahmad1992 PLD Karachi 86 · Sindh High Court · 1992-09-29
  benami transactionbenamidarburden of proofsource of considerationhusband and wifecivil revisionconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision application arose from a property dispute between a husband and wife concerning houses in Muslim Town, North Karachi. The core legal question was whether the suit property, purchased and held in the name of the wife, was a benami transaction or her independent property acquired through her own sources. The trial court and the first appellate court concurrently found that the husband was the real owner who provided the purchase money and financed the construction, while the wife was merely a benamidar with no independent source of income. Upholding these concurrent findings of fact, the High Court dismissed the revision application, reaffirming that High Courts will not interfere with concurrent findings of subordinate courts under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code unless such findings are perverse, based on no evidence, or suffer from misreading of evidence. The key legal principle laid down is that a purchase of property in India by a husband in the name of his wife is presumed to be a benami transaction where the source of consideration flows from the husband and the wife lacks independent means, as the English law presumption of advancement does not apply.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a property purchased in the name of a wife by her husband is to be regarded as a benami transaction in the absence of independent sources of income?
  • Does the English law presumption of advancement apply to a purchase of property made by a husband in the name of his wife in Pakistan?
  • Under what circumstances can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact of subordinate courts in civil revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • What are the principal tests for determining whether a transaction is benami?
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• Mst. Muhammadi Begum vs S. Salahuddin AhmadK.L.R. 1992 Civil Cases 220 · Sindh High Court · 1991-08-29Read full judgment →
• Mst. Laila Bai and others vs Mst. Gul Bano and others1992 CLC 1643 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-25Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hajiani Momin Bai vs Mst. Razia Sultana1992 CLC 684 · Sindh High Court · 1991-10-20Read full judgment →
• Mst. Feroza Hajiani And Another vs Abdul Razzak And AnotherK.L.R. 1992 Civil Cases 273 · Sindh High Court · 1991-12-12Read full judgment →
• Mst. Dilbar Jan vs Khan Muhammad1992 P Cr. L J 683 · Sindh High Court · 1991-05-14
  habeas corpuscustody of minorHizanatsummary proceedingsguardianshiptender age
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, was filed by a mother seeking the recovery of her two-year-old son from the custody of her former husband. The applicant alleged that the respondent forcibly removed the child from her custody during the pendency of a maintenance suit. The respondent contested the claim, asserting that the custody was voluntarily transferred to him pursuant to a Jirga decision. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in summary habeas corpus proceedings, could order the restoration of a minor's custody where the legality of the detention is disputed. The Court held that while the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 provides the ordinary forum for custody disputes, the High Court possesses jurisdiction under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to intervene in exceptional cases of illegal or improper detention. Emphasizing that a mother's custody is generally paramount for a child of tender age, the Court allowed the petition, directing the restoration of the child to the mother, while noting that the respondent could pursue a final adjudication before a competent Guardian Judge.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise jurisdiction under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to determine the custody of a minor?
  • Are proceedings under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 mutually exclusive?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to decide disputed questions of fact regarding custody in summary habeas corpus proceedings?
  • Is the High Court's order under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding minor custody final or subject to adjudication by a Guardian Judge?
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• Mst. Darya Khatoon vs The State1992 MLD 713 · Sindh High Court · 1992-01-06Read full judgment →
• Mst. Am1na Parekh and others vs Ahmed Parekh and others1992 CLC 2492 · Sindh High Court · 1987-01-15Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Shushma vs District Magistrate, Thatta, and others1992 CLC 895 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-24
  Permanent Residence CertificateDomicile Certificateaudi alteram partemnatural justiceshow cause noticeindependent application of mindcancellation of PRCwithout lawful authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment by the Sindh High Court addresses constitutional petitions challenging the cancellation of Domicile Certificates and Permanent Residence Certificates (PRCs) issued to the petitioners. The District Magistrate, Thatta, cancelled the certificates pursuant to directions issued by the Home Department, Government of Sindh, which relied on an inquiry report by the Additional Commissioner. The legal question before the court was whether an administrative authority can validly cancel issued domicile certificates and PRCs at the behest of a superior department without exercising independent discretion and without affording the affected persons a hearing. The High Court held that the District Magistrate failed to apply his independent mind and merely acted under orders from the Home Department. Furthermore, no show-cause notice or opportunity of hearing was granted to the petitioners prior to cancellation. The Court laid down that orders passed without independent application of mind and in violation of the principles of natural justice (audi alteram partem) are illegal, without jurisdiction, and of no legal effect.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order cancelling a Domicile Certificate or Permanent Residence Certificate valid if passed without issuing a show-cause notice or providing an opportunity of hearing?
  • Can an issuing authority validly cancel a domicile certificate merely on the direction of a superior department without applying its own independent mind?
  • Is the principle of audi alteram partem applicable to administrative decisions that adversely affect a party's legal rights even in the absence of an express statutory provision?
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• Mrs. Shamshad Anwar vs Lam Ahmed1992 CLC 2077 · Sindh High Court · 1992-02-12Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Nuzhat Shoukat vs Superintendent, Central Jail, Karachi1992 PLD Karachi 108 · Sindh High Court · 1991-11-03Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Naz Shaukat Khan and 3 others vs Mrs. Yasmin R. Minhas and another1992 CLC 2540 · Sindh High Court · 1992-08-31
  interim injunctionprivate nuisancerestrictive covenantresidential housing societybuilding schemeeasementary rightspublic nuisance
  Summary & questions settled

  The plaintiffs, residents of a housing society, sought an interim injunction to restrain the defendant from operating a school in a residential bungalow, alleging nuisance and violation of restrictive covenants. The core legal questions concerned whether the school's operation constituted an actionable nuisance, whether neighbors could enforce restrictive covenants regarding residential use, and whether the suit was barred by Section 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for lack of the Advocate-General's consent. The Court held that the plaintiffs established a prima facie case, confirming the interim injunction. It ruled that restrictive covenants limiting land use to residential purposes are enforceable by neighbors if they arise from a common building scheme. Furthermore, the Court determined that a private nuisance causing specific injury to neighbors is actionable independently of public nuisance provisions, meaning the consent of the Advocate-General is not required. The judgment emphasizes that while schools are socially beneficial, they cannot be established in residential areas if they infringe upon the rights of neighbors to peaceful enjoyment of their property, particularly when such use violates established restrictive covenants.

  Questions settled

  • Can neighbors enforce restrictive covenants regarding the residential use of land against another plot holder?
  • Is the consent of the Advocate-General required under Section 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for a suit alleging private nuisance?
  • Does the operation of a school in a residential area constitute an actionable nuisance despite the social utility of education?
  • What are the criteria for establishing a prima facie case for a temporary injunction in a nuisance dispute?
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• Mrs. Maqbool Begum And Another vs The State and 4 others-1992 P Cr. L J 1240 · Sindh High Court · 1992-06-17Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Farida vs Mohsin Tayyabali and others1992 CLC 91 · Sindh High Court · 1987-01-22Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Farida Mirza. vs The Income Tax Officer, P.I.A.Employees Salary Circle I, Zone 'D'Karachi and 3 othersPTCL 1992 CL. 352 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mrs. Farida Mirza vs The Income Tax Officer, P.Ia. Employees Salary1992 PTD 173 · Sindh High Court · 1991-11-14Read full judgment →
• MRS. Farida Mirza vs Income Tax Officer, Salary Circle I, Zone 'D'K.L.R. 1992 Tax & Custom 34 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mrs Gulshan Adamjee and 5 others vs The Muslim Commercial Bank1992 CLC 962 · Sindh High Court · 1991-09-25Read full judgment →
• Moulvi Sher Muhammad vs The Statek.L.R. 1992 Criminal Cases 145 · Sindh High Court · 1991-11-05Read full judgment →
• Moula Bux vs Manzoor Hussain And Others1992 P Cr. L J 1967 · Sindh High Court · 1992-05-18Read full judgment →
• Moin Ul Islam vs The State and others-1992 P Cr. L J 1641 · Sindh High Court · 1991-11-07Read full judgment →
• Moharram Buledi vs The State1992 P Cr. L J 916 · Sindh High Court · 1991-06-10Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Zak! Ahmed vs Mohammad Mohsin and 2 othersRespondnets1992 CLC 1114 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-22Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Shahid Hussain vs Saeeda and another1992 CLC 1013 · Sindh High Court · 1991-11-11Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Samiuddin vs Soofi Mohammad AliK.L.R. .1992 Civil Cases 127 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-19Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Sabir vs The StateK.L.R. 1991 Criminal Cases 24 · Sindh High Court · 1991-06-01Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Arshad Jalil vs Pakistan Defence Officers HousingK.L.R. 1992 Civil Cases 460 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mohammad Abobakar vs Government of Sindh And OtherKLR.1992 Criminal Cases 158 · Sindh High Court · 1991-08-21Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Abdullah vs Government of Pakistan And OtherK.L.R. 1992 Tax & Custom Cases 79 · Sindh High Court · 1992-02-11Read full judgment →
• Mohamed Nasir Farooqi vs Mst. Zubaida and 2 others1992 CLC 1086 · Sindh High Court · 1991-11-13
  rent restrictionstriking off defencetentative rent orderwilful defaultdue processright of hearingremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an order passed by the Additional Controller of Rents (Cantonment), Karachi, which struck off the appellant's defence under Section 17(9) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, due to alleged non-compliance with a tentative rent order. The appellant had been directed to withdraw rent previously deposited with another Rent Controller and re-deposit it with the Cantonment Controller. The appellant filed an application to facilitate this transfer but, before that application could be heard, the Rent Controller struck off the defence based solely on an accountant's report indicating non-payment, without providing the appellant an opportunity to explain the delay. The Sindh High Court held that the penal provision of Section 17(9) requires a finding of 'wilful default.' Consequently, the Court ruled that the Rent Controller erred by passing the order without affording the appellant a fair opportunity to explain the circumstances or defend against the application. The impugned order was set aside, and the case was remanded for disposal in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Rent Controller strike off a tenant's defence under Section 17(9) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, without providing the tenant an opportunity to explain the alleged default?
  • Is a finding of 'wilful default' a necessary prerequisite for striking off a defence under Section 17(9) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963?
  • Does the failure to provide an opportunity to explain a delay in rent payment render an order striking off a defence procedurally improper?
  Read full judgment →
• Mobile Eye Service of Pakistan vs Director SocialK.L.R. 1992 Civil Cases 549 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mobile Eye Service of Pakistan Karachi vs Director Social1992 PLD Karachi 183 · Sindh High Court
  consent ordercompromise decreereview applicationfraud and misrepresentationcounsel authorityinherent powerscivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an application seeking review of a previous consent judgment passed by a Division Bench of the High Court on the basis of a compromise between the parties. The core legal question addressed is whether a consent order or compromise decree passed by a court can be reviewed, recalled, or set aside under section 114, Order XLVII Rule 1, section 12(2), or section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the sole ground that the counsel appearing for a party lacked specific authority to enter into a compromise. The Sindh High Court held that a consent order cannot be set aside merely because counsel lacked authority, unless clear and distinct fraud or misrepresentation amounting to deception of the court or party is established. The court ruled that an advocate's lack of internal authorization is a matter strictly between the advocate and the client and does not vitiate a consent order absent fraud. The key principle laid down is that consent orders enjoy a high degree of finality and cannot be reopened through review or inherent powers unless the statutory grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, or jurisdictional defect are rigorously proved.

  Questions settled

  • Can a consent order passed by a court be reviewed under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 merely because counsel lacked authority to compromise?
  • Whether the provisions of section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 can be invoked to set aside a compromise order in the absence of established fraud or misrepresentation?
  • Does an advocate entering into a compromise without specific authorization render the consent decree voidable by the court under its inherent powers under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • What constitutes sufficient ground for recalling a consent order based on a compromise reached by parties' counsel in court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mjhammad Usman vs Messrs the Taj Company Ltd.1992 CLC 1737 · Sindh High Court · 1991-05-13Read full judgment →