Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 46,805 judgments in total from the Sindh High Court.

• Mrs. Salma Noorani vs In re: Winding Up of Mandiviwala Estates Limited1991 MLD 2675 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-30Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Razia Aizazuddin and anothers vs Assistant Commissioner, South, Magistrate First Class, Karachi and 2 others1991 MLD 1277 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-21Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Nagma Jawed vs Miss Shirin N. Essa and another1991 PLD Karachi 305 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-07Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Janna T Bi Khan vs Messrs National Motors Co.1991 CLC 1950 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-27
  Sale of Goods ActSpecific goodsDeliverable stateContractual priceUnilateral price increaseStorage chargesAuthorized agentPower of attorney
  Summary & questions settled

  This suit for declaration and injunction arose from a dispute regarding a contract for the import and assembly of 12 Bedford truck chassis. The plaintiff challenged the defendants' unilateral demand for increased local charges for engines, tyres, and assembly. The core legal question was whether the defendants were entitled to these enhanced charges and subsequent storage fees despite the plaintiff's adherence to the original contract price. The Court held that the contract was governed by Section 21 of the Sale of Goods Act 1930, as the seller was required to perform specific acts to put the goods in a deliverable state. Consequently, property in the goods did not pass until such acts were completed and the buyer received notice. The Court found the defendants failed to prove proper notice of the price increase or that the goods were in a deliverable state. Accordingly, the defendants were not entitled to the enhanced charges or storage fees, as the delivery delay resulted from their own conduct. The suit was decreed in favor of the plaintiff.

  Questions settled

  • Does the property in specific goods pass to the buyer under the Sale of Goods Act 1930 before the seller performs the necessary acts to put the goods in a deliverable state?
  • Can a seller unilaterally increase the price of goods under a contract without providing proper notice to the buyer?
  • Is a plaint signed and filed by a general attorney holding a valid power of attorney legally competent under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Are storage charges recoverable by a seller when the delay in delivery is caused by the seller's own unjustified demand for enhanced charges?
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• Mrs. Firdousi Begum vs Jameeluddin1991 MLD 1062 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-14Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Benazir Bhutto vs The Federation of Pakistan and others1991 MLD 2622 · Sindh High Court · 1991-07-14
  disqualification for membershipmisconductequal protection of lawpresidential referencespecial courtcaretaker prime ministerconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 was filed by former Prime Minister Mrs. Benazir Bhutto challenging the validity of the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Disqualification for Membership) Order, 1977 (P.O. 17 of 1977) along with certain rules framed thereunder, and seeking to declare pending presidential references before Special Courts as discriminatory and incompetent. The core legal questions involved the constitutionality of P.O. 17 of 1977 vis-a-vis fundamental rights, equality before law, executive immunity, and alleged conflicts with Articles 4, 25, 63, and 248 of the Constitution. The Sindh High Court held that P.O. 17 of 1977 is a valid piece of legislation creating a special tribunal for trying misconduct of high public office holders, that the proceedings are civil in nature rather than criminal, and that the references filed by the President on the advice of the Caretaker Prime Minister were competent and lawful. The Court struck down Rule 7 of the disqualification rules regarding adjournment limits as inoperative, but upheld the remainder of the statutory order and rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Disqualification for Membership) Order, 1977 (P.O. 17 of 1977) is violative of the fundamental right to equal protection of law under Article 25 of the Constitution?
  • Does the immunity provided under Article 248 of the Constitution extend to acts amounting to misconduct under P.O. 17 of 1977?
  • Whether a Caretaker Prime Minister is competent to tender advice to the President for filing references under P.O. 17 of 1977?
  • Are proceedings before a Special Court under P.O. 17 of 1977 classified as criminal proceedings or civil proceedings?
  • Whether the definition of misconduct in P.O. 17 of 1977 suffers from vagueness or constitutes an excessive delegation of legislative power?
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• Mrs. Ameta Fernandas vs Mst. Saran Bai alias Kaneez Fatima1991 CLC 1858 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-13Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Almas Abdul Rehman Bhamani vs Begum Hamida Nizam1991 PLD Karachi 315 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-07Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Afia Baig vs Messrs Pakistan State Oil Company Ltd.1991 PLD Karachi 239 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-30
  default in payment of rentevictiontime-barred rentburden of proofwaiverestoppelrent appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This First Rent Appeal is directed against an order of the Rent Controller dismissing the appellant-landlady's eviction application against the respondent-tenant running a petrol pump on the demised plot. The core legal questions involved whether time-barred rent extinguishes the right to seek eviction on the ground of default, how the burden of proof operates regarding non-payment of rent, and whether the Controller possesses discretionary power to refuse eviction under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 once default is established. The Sindh High Court held that while the remedy to recover time-barred rent may be barred, the right itself continues to exist, and a landlord can still seek eviction for default. Furthermore, once the landlord asserts non-payment on oath, the burden shifts to the tenant to prove payment. The Court laid down that Section 15(2) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 does not create a discretionary jurisdiction for the Controller; upon proof of default and fulfillment of statutory conditions, the landlord is mandatorily entitled to an order of eviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation bar on the recovery of time-barred rent preclude a landlord from seeking the eviction of a tenant on the ground of default?
  • How does the burden of proof shift between the landlord and tenant regarding the non-payment of rent in eviction proceedings?
  • Does Section 15(2) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 create discretionary jurisdiction for the Rent Controller to refuse eviction once default is established?
  • What constitutes waiver by conduct in the context of enforcing a landlord's right to demand rent or property tax shares?
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• Momin Khan Afridi vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 1325 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-04Read full judgment →
• Molasses Trading & Export Company (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Ministry, Islamabad and 2 others1991 CLC 1673 · Sindh High Court · 1990-12-30Read full judgment →
• Moizur Rehman vs Mrs. Fakhra Javed1991 PLD Karachi 452 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-27
  rented premisesejectmentpersonal bona fide requirementrent defaultgood faithnuisancelease in perpetuitysubletting rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an eviction order passed by the Rent Controller against the appellant on grounds of rent default, personal bona fide requirement, and nuisance. The High Court held that the Rent Controller erred in disregarding evidence of rent payment, emphasizing that while the burden of proof lies on the tenant, the Controller must consider all ocular and documentary evidence, not just specific postal endorsements. Regarding personal requirement, the Court determined that while a lease in perpetuity requires a registered instrument under the Transfer of Property Act 1882, a landlord’s claim of "good faith" is subject to judicial scrutiny. The Court ruled that a landlord cannot ignore contractual commitments, such as an unqualified right to transfer tenancy granted by a predecessor, and attempting to evict a tenant in violation of such terms constitutes a lack of good faith. Finally, the Court held that the allegation of nuisance failed, as the landlord did not prove the board caused actual nuisance to neighbors. The appeal was allowed, and the eviction order was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Rent Controller disregard evidence of rent payment simply because postal money orders lack a 'refused' endorsement?
  • Does a landlord's failure to acknowledge a predecessor's contractual commitments regarding tenancy transfer rights negate the 'good faith' requirement for eviction?
  • Is a lease in perpetuity valid without a registered instrument under the Transfer of Property Act 1882?
  • What constitutes sufficient proof of nuisance by a tenant to justify eviction under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
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• Mohiuddin Ansari vs Muhammad Arif Siddiqui1991 CLC 72 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-27
  Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979bona fide personal requirementres judicataejectment applicationproof of documentsQanun-e-Shahadatmaintenance of parentsinterpretation of own occupation
  Summary & questions settled

  The tenant appealed against an order of the Rent Controller directing his ejectment under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 on the grounds of the landlord's bona fide personal requirement for himself, his wife, daughter, son, and mother. The appellant raised pleas of res judicata based on a previous dismissed application, improper exclusion of defense witnesses, lack of formal proof of medical records, and the non-applicability of personal requirement provisions to the landlord's mother.

  The Sindh High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that res judicata did not apply because the cause of action differed from the previous application. It further ruled that while documents must be strictly proved under the Qanun-e-Shahadat if disputed, the landlord's medical ailment was sufficiently established through oral testimony and family evidence. Moreover, the expression 'his own occupation' in Section 15(2)(vii) must be given a liberal interpretation based on social, moral, and Islamic obligations, thereby covering the residential needs of dependent parents residing with the landlord.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of res judicata bar a subsequent ejectment application under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 when founded upon a different cause of action?
  • Can a party in rent proceedings dispense with the requirements of the Qanun-e-Shahadat regarding the formal proof and admissibility of disputed documents merely by annexing them to an affidavit in evidence?
  • Does the phrase 'his own occupation' under Section 15(2)(vii) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 encompass the residential requirement of the landlord's dependent mother?
  • Can a party summon witnesses under Section 19(4) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 without first producing their affidavits in evidence or establishing that they refused to provide them?
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• Mohiuddin Ahmed vs Mst. Noor Aisha Khatoon1991 MLD 1054 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-28Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Zubair and Other vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary and OtherK.L.R. 1991 Civil Cases 368 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mohammad Yousaf & Another vs Mohammad Ibrahim KhandwaniK.L.R. 1991 Civil Cases 587 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-27Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Ibrahim vs Zeenat Bibi and others1991 CLC 1967 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-03
  rent appealex parte orderservice of processpublic holidaywritten replyejectmentnatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  These first rent appeals arose from ejectment orders passed ex parte against multiple tenants by the Rent Controller. The processes were originally returnable on a date subsequently declared a public holiday, and the Controller proceeded ex parte on the following day. The tenants' counsel asserted he had appeared in the morning and undertaken to file his power, but the Controller noted only the landlords' presence in the diary sheet. The High Court examined the validity of the service of process under Section 19 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979. It held that service on minors or female family members did not constitute proper service under the applicable equitable principles of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the penal provisions of Section 19(2) of the Ordinance, which bar the Controller from recalling an ex parte order, apply strictly only when a notice explicitly requiring a written reply within fifteen days has been served and defaulted upon. Since the notices did not contain this requirement, and proceeding ex parte on the day following a public holiday without manifest contumacy violated natural justice, the ex parte and subsequent eviction orders were void. The appeals were allowed, and the cases were remanded.

  Questions settled

  • Does service of process on a minor child or a female family member constitute valid service on a tenant under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  • Can a Rent Controller pass a non-recallable ex parte order under Section 19(2) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 if the issued notice did not explicitly require the tenant to file a written reply?
  • What is the legal effect of proceeding ex parte on the day immediately following a declared public holiday without establishing contumacious neglect by the respondent?
  • How should a court resolve a factual controversy when counsel asserts making an appearance but the court diary sheet does not record it?
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• Mohammad Hassan vs Manzoor Ahmed & AnotherK.L.R.1991 Criminal Cases 591 · Sindh High Court · 1991-07-21Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Anwar vs The Sindhh Labour Appellate Tribunal at Karachi(K.L.R. 1991 Labour & Service Cases 160) · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Modern Textile Mills Ltd, KARACHIs vs National Shipping Corporation1991 PLD Karachi 275 · Sindh High Court
  limitationshort-landingcarrier liabilitycargo damagesuit barred by timeKarachi Port Trust Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a suit for compensation filed by the plaintiffs against a carrier, an insurance company, and the Karachi Port Trust for the short-landing and damage of imported textile machinery. The core legal questions concerned whether the suit was barred by time under Article 31 and Article 86 of the Limitation Act, and whether a suit against the Karachi Port Trust was barred under Section 87 of the Karachi Port Trust Act. The Sindh High Court held that the limitation period for filing the suit against the carrier commenced upon the discharge of goods and issuance of the short-landing certificate, and that ongoing correspondence or conditional extensions of time by the carrier could not legally extend the statutory limitation period. Consequently, the court concluded that the suit against all defendants was barred by limitation and dismissed the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Does ongoing correspondence regarding a cargo claim extend the statutory period of limitation for filing a suit against a carrier?
  • When does the period of limitation under Article 31 of the Limitation Act commence in a suit for compensation for non-delivery of goods?
  • Whether a suit filed against the Karachi Port Trust without compliance with Section 87 of the Karachi Port Trust Act is barred by time?
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• Modern Textile Mills Ltd vs National Shipping Corporation and OtherK.L.R. 1991 Civil Cases 572 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-17Read full judgment →
• Mobeen Ahmad Siddiqui vs The Chairman, Sindh Labour Appellate1991 PLC 780 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-18
  Industrial Relations Ordinancegrievance petitionSection 25-Anursing homeexclusion of establishmentlabour lawconstitutional petitionStanding Orders Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 challenges an order of the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, which set aside a Labour Court decision reinstating the petitioner. The core legal question concerns whether a nursing home, as an establishment for the treatment of sick and infirm persons, is excluded from the application of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, thereby rendering a grievance petition under Section 25-A of said Ordinance non-maintainable. The Court held that the respondent nursing home falls squarely within the exclusion provided by Section 1(3)(f) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Consequently, the Court ruled that the grievance application was incompetent. The key principle laid down is that establishments maintained for the care of sick and infirm persons are excluded from the operation of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Furthermore, the procedural mechanism for redressing individual grievances under Section 25-A of the Ordinance is unavailable to employees of such excluded establishments, as the right to invoke that section is contingent upon the Ordinance's applicability.

  Questions settled

  • Is an establishment maintained for the treatment or care of sick and infirm persons excluded from the application of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Can an employee of an establishment excluded from the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 maintain a grievance petition under Section 25-A of the same Ordinance?
  • Does the reference to Section 25-A in the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 allow for grievance petitions if the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is otherwise inapplicable?
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• Mithan vs Senior Member, Board of Revenue and 2 others1991 CLC 1131 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-01Read full judgment →
• Miss Shahla Raza vs The StateK.L.R 1991 Criminal Cases 519 · Sindh High Court · 1991-05-20Read full judgment →
• Miss Shahla Raza vs The State1991 MLD 1814 · Sindh High Court · 1991-05-20
  post-arrest bailbail for womenconfession of co-accusedfurther inquirymurderprohibitory clause
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a bail application filed by Miss Shahla Raza, who was charged under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for her alleged involvement in a murder case. The core legal question was whether the applicant, a woman, was entitled to bail despite the serious nature of the offense and the existence of confessional statements from co-accused implicating her. The Court held that the applicant was entitled to bail, confirming her interim bail. The ratio of the decision rests on two primary principles: first, that under the first proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the grant of bail to a woman is a rule rather than an exception, and discretion should be exercised in her favor absent compelling circumstances; and second, that the prosecution's case, relying solely on the confessional statements of co-accused, did not prima facie connect the applicant to the crime, as a conviction cannot be based on such confessions alone, thereby necessitating further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Is the grant of bail to a woman in a murder case considered a rule under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a conviction be based solely on the confessional statement of a co-accused?
  • Does the mere mention of an accused's name in a co-accused's confession constitute sufficient grounds to deny bail?
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• Miss Sabra Sultana vs The Secretary, Home Department, Government1991 CLC 1943 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-24Read full judgment →
• Mirza Ghulam Muhammad vs Shafqat Ali Khan1991 CLC 945 · Sindh High Court · 1989-04-17Read full judgment →
• Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Limited vs District Council, Tharparkar1991 MLD 715 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-09
  Rawangi Mahsoolexport taxinter-provincial tradeconstitutional viresvalidation actDistrict Councilfreedom of trade
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges the imposition and recovery of export tax, known as Rawangi Mahsool, by the District Council on sugar manufactured within its territorial limits and exported outside the Province of Sindh, as well as the constitutional vires of the Sindh Local Government (Amendment and Rawangi Mahsool Validating) Act, 1989 (Sindh Act II of 1990) which sought to validate the underlying taxing notification notwithstanding court judgments. The core legal questions concern whether the export tax violates the freedom of inter-provincial trade under Article 151 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, and whether a provincial legislature can validate a tax or notification that is ultra vires the Constitution. The Sindh High Court held that taxation on goods exported from one province to another acts as a deterrent to free trade and directly offends Article 151(3), and that the Provincial Assembly cannot validate through legislation any tax, notification, or action that is ultra vires the Constitution. The court declared the impugned notification and Section 3 of Sindh Act II of 1990 to be ultra vires the Constitution to the extent they authorize the levy of Rawangi Mahsool on goods exported outside the Province of Sindh.

  Questions settled

  • Does the levy of export tax or Rawangi Mahsool on goods exported from one province to another violate Article 151 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is a Provincial Assembly competent to validate through legislation a tax, notification, or action that is ultra vires the Constitution?
  • Does taxation on the movement of goods constitute a restriction on the free flow of trade and commerce under constitutional law?
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• Mir Ghulam NAB! Talpur vs Manager, Auqaf Tharparkar and 4 others1991 MLD 340 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-05Read full judgment →
• Mir Azad Khan and others vs Messrs Sui Gas Transmission Company1991 PLC 180 · Sindh High Court · 1990-02-17Read full judgment →
• Mir Abdul Aziz vs Francis Chai Hai Phan1991 CLC 1793 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-31Read full judgment →
• Mian Manzoor Ali vs Asadullah1991 CLC 2011 · Sindh High Court · 1991-08-05Read full judgment →
• Metro Garments Industries vs Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and 21991 PLC 768 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-26Read full judgment →
• Messrs Water and Power Development Authority- vs Messrs National1991 MLD 1090 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-24Read full judgment →
• Messrs Vaseem Construction Co. vs The Province of Sindh and 3 others1991 MLD 2047 · Sindh High Court · 1991-05-30Read full judgment →
• Messrs Vaseem Construction Co. vs Province of Sindh through Secretary to Government of Sindh, Communication and Works Department, Karachi, and 4 others1991 CLC 1081 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-12
  arbitration awardumpirerule of the courtlimitation periodwaiverres judicatafindings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil matter arises from a dispute over a construction contract for a hospital block in Karachi, which led to arbitration proceedings and the subsequent rendering of an award by an Umpire granting monetary claims and interest to the plaintiff. The defendants assailed the award before the Sindh High Court through multiple objections. The core legal questions involved whether the filing of the award was time-barred, whether an award rendered after the expiry of the court-fixed time limit without extension is invalid, whether objections to arbitration could be re-agitated despite prior consent orders, and whether an increased claim submitted before the arbitrators was beyond reference. The Court held that limitation periods do not apply when an arbitrator files the award themselves, that participation in proceedings waives objections regarding time limits, that the principle of res judicata bars re-litigating defences not raised in prior court proceedings, and that objections not raised before the arbitrators are deemed waived. The Court accordingly dismissed the objections and made the award the rule of the court, establishing principles regarding waiver of procedural lapses in arbitration and the finality of factual findings made by an umpire.

  Questions settled

  • Whether there is any period of limitation prescribed in the Limitation Act for arbitrators or an Umpire to cause an award to be filed in court?
  • Can a party that participates in arbitration proceedings after the expiry of the time fixed by the court subsequently object to the award on the ground of expired time?
  • Does the principle of res judicata bar a defendant from raising objections before an Umpire that were or could have been raised in proceedings for the appointment of arbitrators?
  • Can a defendant raise an objection regarding an increased claim for the first time before the High Court when no such objection was taken before the arbitrators or the Umpire?
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• Messrs United Bank Ltd- vs Mrs. Rehmat and another1991 MLD 1803 · Sindh High Court · 1991-05-12
  leave to defendcondonation of delaysubstituted servicebanking recoveryforgery of mortgagelimitation periodpublication of summons
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose out of recovery suits filed by United Bank Ltd. against the principal debtors and defendant No. 2 as mortgagor under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979. Defendant No. 2, an Iraqi national, sought condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and unconditional leave to defend under Order XXXVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, asserting that her property title deeds were fraudulently misused by her advocate and that her signatures on mortgage documents were forged while she was abroad. The plaintiff bank contended that service by newspaper publication was valid and her leave application was time-barred. The High Court held that while service by publication under Rule 8 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Rules 1980 is valid, no specific limitation period is prescribed for filing a Section 5 condonation application, attracting Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 (three-year limitation). Condoning the delay and finding plausible, disputed factual questions regarding forgery, the court granted unconditional leave to defend.

  Questions settled

  • What limitation period applies to an application for condonation of delay filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 where no specific period is provided?
  • Whether service by publication under Rule 8 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Rules 1980 is treated as valid service on a defendant?
  • Does an allegation of forged mortgage documents supported by travel evidence justify granting unconditional leave to defend under Order XXXVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Messrs Ulbricht's Pakistan Ltd. vs Deputy Collector-II, Central Excise1991 PTD 551 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-02
  constitutional petitionsales tax recoverycentral exciseno evidencewrit jurisdictionjurisdiction of authoritiesevasion of taxesadjudication proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition before the Sindh High Court challenged adjudication orders passed by Central Excise and Land Customs authorities demanding sales tax and imposing penalties on a manufacturer of plastic products. The core legal questions involved whether an adjudication finding based on no evidence and ignoring repeated directions to verify disputed weighments is sustainable under writ jurisdiction, and whether Central Excise authorities possessed jurisdiction to levy or recover sales tax on goods exempt from excise duty under the relevant statutory framework. The court held that findings of fact based on no evidence, complete misreading, or ignoring material evidence are without lawful authority, and that since the goods were exempt from excise duty and no requisite direction from the Central Board of Revenue existed under proviso (b) of section 3(4) of the Sales Tax Act 1951, the authorities lacked jurisdiction. The key principles laid down are that High Courts can interfere with factual findings in writ jurisdiction when they are based on no evidence or disregard material facts, and that excise authorities cannot recover sales tax on exempt goods without a specific direction from the Central Board of Revenue pursuant to the Sales Tax Act 1951.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with a finding of fact by a tribunal in writ jurisdiction when the finding is based on no evidence?
  • Do Central Excise authorities have jurisdiction to recover sales tax on goods that are exempt from the payment of central excise duty without a specific direction from the Central Board of Revenue?
  • Whether proceedings initiated and orders passed in the total absence of evidence and by ignoring material directions of appellate authorities are sustainable in law?
  • Whether an adjudication order relying on a disputed weighment sheet, where the department refused to carry out fresh weighments, can be upheld?
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• Messrs State Assoclates vs Messrs Farben Industrial Development1991 CLC 424 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-31
  garnishee proceedingsexecution of decreeattachment of debtbank guaranteebills of exchangeholder in due courseCode of Civil Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This execution application concerns the attachment of funds held by a garnishee-bank under a bank guarantee to satisfy a decree against the judgment-debtor. The core legal question is whether the bank's obligation constitutes an attachable "debt" under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, particularly when the judgment-debtor allegedly negotiated bills of exchange to third parties, potentially extinguishing their interest. The Court held that while a debt must be an existing, perfected, and absolute obligation to be attachable, the garnishee's claim regarding third-party interests via negotiated bills of exchange raises factual disputes that cannot be summarily decided. Consequently, the Court ruled that the matter requires the recording of evidence to determine if the debt remains owing to the judgment-debtor or if valid third-party rights have intervened. The key principle laid down is that while bank guarantees are generally enforceable, an attachment order is valid only if the debt is currently owed to the judgment-debtor; if the debt has been lawfully assigned or extinguished prior to attachment, it is not attachable.

  Questions settled

  • What constitutes an existing, perfected, and absolute debt capable of attachment under Order 21, Rule 46 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the attachment of funds held under a bank guarantee constitute a dishonor of the bank's international commitment?
  • Can a court attach a debt that has been allegedly assigned to third parties through the negotiation of bills of exchange?
  • Is notice of an execution application required for a garnishee when the execution is filed within one year of the decree?
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• Messrs Shahab Industries Ltd: Karachi vs The Commissioner of Income-1991 PTD 463 · Sindh High Court · 1990-08-30
  Income tax referencerejection of account booksgross profitorder of remandAppellate Tribunal discretiontrading results
  Summary & questions settled

  This tax reference matter arises from an order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal under Section 66(1) of the Income Tax Act, where the assessee challenged the Tribunal's decision to set aside an assessment order and remand the case for a fresh assessment instead of accepting the declared trading results. The core legal question was whether the Appellate Tribunal acted legally in setting aside the assessment order and remanding the case rather than accepting the assessee's trading results after rejecting the Income Tax Officer's grounds for discarding the account books. The Sindh High Court held that the Tribunal, having reversed the reasons given by the Income Tax Officer for rejecting the books of accounts and having found purchases and sales verifiable, lacked justification to remand the case solely on the view that the declared gross profit was low, especially when trading results for preceding years had been accepted. The court established the principle that an appellate tribunal cannot arbitrarily or routinely order a remand when a complete picture is before it and no further elucidation of facts is required, and it must exercise its judicial discretion according to legal principles rather than private opinion.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal acted legally in setting aside the assessment order instead of accepting the trading results of the assessee?
  • Can the Appellate Tribunal order a remand of an assessment case when the grounds for rejecting the assessee's account books have already been reversed?
  • Does a low declared gross profit rate alone justify an order of remand by the Appellate Tribunal for a fresh assessment?
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• Messrs Shadman International (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi vs Income-Tax1991 PTD 387 · Sindh High Court · 1990-10-29
  constitutional jurisdictionincome tax assessmentreopening of assessmentfresh informationalternative remedySection 65 Income Tax Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the issuance of a notice under Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, by the Income-tax Officer, which sought to reopen the petitioner's tax assessment for the year 1985-86. The petitioner argued that the reopening was without jurisdiction as no new information existed to justify the action. The core legal question was whether the information regarding the comparative market value of an adjacent plot, received by the department after the initial assessment, constituted fresh information sufficient to invoke the power to reopen an assessment. The Court held that the report provided by the Survey and Collation Wing regarding the adjacent plot constituted new factual information, thereby validating the Income-tax Officer's jurisdiction to issue the notice. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that constitutional jurisdiction should not be exercised to bypass the hierarchy of tribunals established under the special statute, particularly when the impugned action is not patently without jurisdiction or mala fide. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, directing the petitioner to pursue available appellate remedies.

  Questions settled

  • Does the receipt of new comparative market data regarding property values constitute fresh information sufficient to reopen a tax assessment under Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979?
  • Can a constitutional petition be maintained to challenge a tax assessment notice when the petitioner has an alternative remedy of appeal available under the relevant statute?
  • Under what circumstances will the High Court exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to interfere with proceedings before income tax authorities?
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• Messrs Sh. Muhammad Amin & Co. vs The Provincial Industrial1991 CLC 684 · Sindh High Court · 1990-11-29
  territorial jurisdictionbreach of contractdamages for breachearnest moneyalteration of contractoriginal civil jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two intra-court appeals arising from a decree in a suit for recovery of damages for breach of a contract for the purchase of sugar. The core legal questions involved were whether the Sindh High Court possessed territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit, whether the buyer was justified in repudiating the contract on the ground of inferior quality of goods, and how damages and earnest money ought to be computed and adjusted. The court held that the High Court had territorial jurisdiction because the contract was altered and the delivery terms were modified with the consent of the plaintiff's head office located within its jurisdiction, that the buyer failed to prove that the goods supplied were of a different quality than normally produced, and that the earnest money deposited could not be forfeited in the absence of an explicit forfeiture clause and was rightly adjusted against the awarded damages. The key principle laid down is that a contract modification occurring at a specific location provides a valid basis for territorial jurisdiction regarding its breach, and that an earnest money deposit cannot be forfeited upon breach unless expressly agreed upon, but is to be treated as an advance payment subject to adjustment against damages.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a suit for breach of a contract that was modified within its local limits?
  • Does a buyer have the legal right to repudiate a contract on the ground of inferior quality when the original contract contains no specific description of the quality of goods?
  • Whether an amount paid as earnest money can be legally forfeited in the event of a contract breach in the absence of an express forfeiture stipulation?
  • How is the market price on the date of breach determined for the assessment of damages when delivery dates are extended by mutual consent?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Service Sales Corporation, Lahore (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Government of Pakistan, Central Board of Revenue1991 PTD 525 · Sindh High Court · 1990-11-14Read full judgment →
• Messrs Sasta Autos vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 3 others1991 MLD 1582 · Sindh High Court · 1990-12-18
  constitutional petitionalternative remedyunder-invoicingcustoms dutynormal priceburden of proofbill of entryjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition before the Sindh High Court challenged an order passed by customs authorities alleging under-invoicing of imported Menthol Crystals and demanding short-levied duties. The core legal questions involved whether a constitutional petition is maintainable when an alternative remedy exists, how the normal price of imported goods must be determined under the relevant statutes, whether reliance on outdated invoices and prices from other countries is lawful, and upon whom the burden of proof lies to establish misdeclaration. The Court held that the rule requiring the exhaustion of alternative remedies is a matter of judicial discretion and does not bar writ jurisdiction where the impugned order is wholly without jurisdiction or violates mandatory statutory provisions. The Court ruled that under the Customs Act, the normal price must be determined based on the value in the country of export at the relevant time, and the department cannot rely on undisclosed evidence or shift the initial onus of proof onto the importer. The case was remanded for a fresh decision in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the availability of an alternative remedy bars the High Court from entertaining a constitutional petition against an order passed without jurisdiction?
  • How is the normal price of imported goods required to be determined under sections 25 and 30 of the Customs Act 1969?
  • Does the burden of proof lie on the importer to prove the correctness of a declared price or on the customs department to establish an untrue declaration?
  • Can the customs authorities rely on historical invoices from past years and price data from countries other than the country of export to assess under-invoicing?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Sandoz (Pakistan) Limited vs Shahid Iqbal Khan1991 PLD Karachi 347 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-01
  court-feesrefund of court-feesrepugnant to injunctions of Islamconstitutional petitionprospective directivesSindh Finance Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This application was moved by the plaintiff seeking a refund of court-fees paid in excess of the maximum limit of Rs.15,000 under the Court Fees Act, 1870, following amendments introduced by sections 4 and 6 of the Sindh Finance Act, 1990. The core legal question was whether the plaintiff was entitled to a retrospective refund of court-fees based on a previous Division Bench judgment holding the Sindh Finance Act amendments repugnant to Islamic injunctions and violative of the Constitution. The court held that since the previous judgment did not grant a formal declaration of invalidity but only issued prospective administrative directives to regulate court working pending a final Supreme Court verdict, the plaintiff could not claim a refund at this stage. The application was accordingly rejected, with liberty to the plaintiff to file a fresh application if the Supreme Court ultimately declares the provisions void.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an amendment to the Court Fees Act can be declared void on the ground of repugnancy to Islam under Article 199 of the Constitution prior to a final verdict by the Supreme Court?
  • Are directives issued by a High Court regarding the calculation of court-fees prospective or retrospective in nature?
  • Is a plaintiff entitled to a refund of excess court-fees paid under amended statutory provisions when the court has only issued prospective directives ignoring the amendments rather than declaring them invalid ab initio?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ramzan & Sons through its Proprietor vs Income-Tax Officer, Zone _B_, Karachi1991 PTD 503 · Sindh High Court · 1990-11-13Read full judgment →
• Messrs Platinum Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Messrs State Life Insurance1991 MLD 1256 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-10Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakland Scientific Production vs Messrs Pioneer Insurance1991 PLD Karachi 414 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-24
  verification of plaintpower of attorneyirregularity in pleadingsinsurance claimexhibited documentsremand of suitprocedural defect
  Summary & questions settled

  This regular first appeal was preferred against the judgment and decree of the Senior Civil Judge dismissing the appellant's suit for recovery of insurance claim. The trial court had dismissed the suit on two grounds: first, that the plaint was signed and verified by an attorney whose power of attorney was executed eight days after the plaint's presentation; and second, that documentary evidence (insurance papers, correspondence, and survey report) could not be accepted because their authors were not examined. The High Court reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the failure to sign a plaint properly or its signing by an unauthorized person is a mere technical irregularity under Order VI, Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which can be cured at any subsequent or appellate stage without necessitating a separate formal application. Furthermore, documents exhibited in evidence without objection cannot be rejected solely because the authors were not examined. The impugned decree was set aside and the suit remanded.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the signing and verification of a plaint by an attorney prior to the formal execution of a power of attorney is a fatal defect or a curable irregularity?
  • Can a defect in the signing of a pleading under Order VI, Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be rectified at a subsequent or appellate stage without a formal application?
  • Can documents produced and exhibited in evidence without objection be rejected solely on the ground that their authors were not examined as witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan Tobacco Limited vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance,1991 PTD 355 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-31Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited vs Government of Pakistan1991 PTD 345 · Sindh High Court
  reassessmentchange of opinionincome taxconstitutional jurisdictionstatutory remedyperquisiteswrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged assessment orders and notices issued under Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance regarding perquisites and export rebates. The petitioner argued that the reassessment was based on a mere change of opinion regarding material already available during the original assessment. The Court examined whether the assessing officer had applied their mind during the initial assessment. It held that where an assessment is framed mechanically without a conscious application of mind, the assessing officer is entitled to initiate reassessment proceedings under Section 65 upon receiving new information. The Court further addressed the maintainability of the petition, ruling that because the petitioner had participated in the reassessment proceedings and the dispute required factual investigation, the constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 could not be invoked to bypass existing statutory appellate remedies. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, directing the petitioner to exhaust the remedies provided under the Income Tax Ordinance, while permitting the appellate authorities to consider condoning the limitation period if an appeal were filed within two weeks.

  Questions settled

  • Can an assessing officer initiate reassessment proceedings under Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance if the original assessment was made mechanically without a conscious application of mind?
  • Does the doctrine of 'change of opinion' preclude reassessment if the initial assessment order failed to address the specific items in question?
  • Is a constitutional petition under Article 199 maintainable when the petitioner has already participated in the reassessment proceedings and has access to adequate statutory remedies?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan State Oil Co. Ltd. vs The Chairman, Sindh Labour1991 PLC 811 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-04Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan Press International vs Muhammad Abdul Chohan and 2 others1991 PLC 818 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-03Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan Insurance Corporation vs Pakistan Shipping Lines1991 PLD Karachi 271 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-21Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pak Resources Insurance Company Ltd. vs Messrs Compagnia Di1991 MLD 706 · Sindh High Court · 1990-12-23Read full judgment →
• Messrs Packages Ltd.---Applicants vs The Commissioner of Income-1991 PTD 1049 · Sindh High Court · 1991-08-29Read full judgment →
• Messrs Oriental Shipping Co Ltd., Karachi vs Panaghia Odigitria and 21991 MLD 148 · Sindh High Court · 1990-08-16
  admiralty jurisdictionsuit in remmaritime liennecessariesadmissibility of evidencesecondary evidenceship breakingchange of ownership
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a suit for the recovery of disbursements and agency fees filed by a shipping agent against a vessel and its owners. The plaintiff claimed expenses incurred for provisions, crew wages, and other services provided to the vessel. The core legal questions were whether the plaintiff had sufficiently proven the alleged expenses through admissible evidence and whether an admiralty suit in rem for necessaries is maintainable against a vessel after its ownership has transferred to a new purchaser. The Court held that the suit was not maintainable. It found that the plaintiff failed to prove the alleged payments, as only inadmissible photostat copies of vouchers were produced without secondary evidence or proof of the originals' loss. Furthermore, the Court held that in admiralty law, a suit in rem for necessaries cannot be enforced against a vessel if its ownership has changed prior to the filing of the suit, absent a maritime lien. As the vessel had been transferred to the new owner before the suit was filed, the claim against the vessel was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit in rem for the recovery of necessaries maintainable against a vessel after its ownership has changed?
  • Are photostat copies of vouchers and receipts admissible as evidence when the originals are not produced and no foundation for secondary evidence is laid?
  • Does a claim for agency fees and disbursements constitute a maritime lien enforceable against a vessel after its transfer to a new owner?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Nizam Impex through Partner Muhammad Arif vs The Government1991 PLD Karachi 208 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-14
  regulatory dutycustoms dutyad valoremultra viresimport licensestatutory interpretationdelegated legislation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the imposition of a 40% regulatory duty on imported welding electrodes by the Federal Government. The core legal question was whether the Government acted within its statutory authority under Section 18(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, by imposing an ad valorem regulatory duty on goods that already carried a fixed per-unit duty in the First Schedule of the Act. The Court allowed the petition, holding that the notification imposing the duty was ultra vires and illegal. Relying on the Supreme Court's precedent in M/s. Yousaf Re-Rolling Mills, the Court established the principle that the Federal Government’s power to levy regulatory duty under Section 18(2) is constrained by the nature of the existing duty in the First Schedule. Where a fixed per-unit duty is prescribed, the Government lacks the discretion to impose an ad valorem regulatory duty; such ad valorem levies are permissible only for articles lacking a fixed per-unit duty. Consequently, the impugned notification was declared invalid as it exceeded the statutory limits of delegated authority.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Federal Government impose an ad valorem regulatory duty on goods that are subject to a fixed per-unit duty under the First Schedule of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Does Section 31-A of the Customs Act, 1969, have the effect of taking away vested rights regarding customs duty exemptions?
  • Is the Federal Government's power to levy regulatory duty under Section 18(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, restricted by the method of duty assessment prescribed in the First Schedule?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs National Food vs The Commissioner of Income-Tax1991 PTD 850 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-22Read full judgment →
• Messrs National Cables (Pvt.) Ltd. vs The Additional Secretary, Ministry of Finance and 2 others1991 PTD 654 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-10Read full judgment →
• Messrs Nagina Cotton Mills Limited vs The Collector of Central1991 PTD 522 · Sindh High Court · 1990-09-19Read full judgment →
• Messrs Muhammadi Industries vs Federation of Pakistan through Additional Secretary, Ministry of Finance,1991 PTD 511 · Sindh High Court · 1990-11-08Read full judgment →
• Messrs Mandviwalla Motors Limited, Karachi vs The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone B', Karachi1991 PTD 683 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-21Read full judgment →
• Messrs Kohinoor Marble Industries Limited vs Mirza Zamir Baig and another1991 PLC 408 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-21Read full judgment →
• Messrs Kausar & Co. vs Messrs Universal Insurance Co. (Pvt.) Ltd.1991 MLD 1774 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-11
  rented premiseslandlord and tenantrepairsrent controllercommissioner's reportcross-examinationjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a tenant's application for repairs under section 12 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, which was dismissed by the Rent Controller. The core legal question was whether a tenant can seek court-ordered repairs in the absence of a written tenancy agreement and whether the Controller correctly evaluated the evidence, including a Commissioner's report. The High Court held that the Controller erred in dismissing the application solely due to the lack of a written agreement. The Court clarified that while section 12(1) of the Ordinance makes the landlord's obligation to repair subject to any existing agreement, the absence of such an agreement does not preclude a tenant from seeking repairs. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the Controller improperly disregarded the Commissioner's neutral report by over-relying on the tenant's failure to cross-examine the landlord's witness. The judgment establishes that the Controller has discretion to grant or refuse repairs based on factors like cost versus rent, but must exercise this discretion judicially rather than arbitrarily, and that eviction proceedings are extraneous to the merits of a repair application.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a written tenancy agreement preclude a tenant from seeking repairs under section 12 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  • Is the Rent Controller's discretion to grant or refuse repairs under section 12 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 absolute?
  • Can a Rent Controller ignore a neutral Commissioner's report solely because a party failed to cross-examine a witness?
  • Does the pendency of an eviction petition affect the merits of a tenant's application for repairs under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Karamker (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Mst. Akhtar Bano1991 MLD 2141 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-13Read full judgment →
• Messrs Kamran Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Government of Pakistan1991 PTD 517 · Sindh High Court · 1990-06-12Read full judgment →
• Messrs Javed Garments INDUSTRIESs vs Messrs Grain Lodge Limited1991 MLD 1232 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-09Read full judgment →
• Messrs Industrial Engineering Ltd., Karachi vs The Assistant1991 PTD 562 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-09Read full judgment →
• Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. vs Messrs Golden Plastic (Pvt.) Ltd.1991 MLD 124 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-24
  winding upcommercial insolvencystatutory noticebanking companyunable to pay debtssuspension of businessdiscretion of court
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for the winding up of the respondent company was filed by a creditor banking company under Section 309 of the Companies Ordinance 1984, asserting that the respondent was unable to pay its outstanding debts. The respondent contested the petition, disputing the exact quantum of the debt and raising a preliminary objection that the statutory notice of demand served by the petitioner was invalid. The High Court of Sindh held that the notice of demand was invalid as it failed to strictly comply with the statutory requirements of Section 306(1)(a) of the Ordinance, noting that such provisions must be strictly construed. However, the Court observed that an invalid notice does not bar a winding-up petition if the petitioner can independently prove commercial insolvency under Section 306(1)(c). On the merits, the Court determined that the respondent was not commercially insolvent as its assets were sufficient, its business suspension was temporary and satisfactorily explained, and the debt dispute was of substance. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, reserving the petitioner's right to pursue other remedies.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an invalid statutory notice under Section 306(1)(a) of the Companies Ordinance 1984 completely bars a creditor from maintaining a winding-up petition?
  • What constitutes 'commercial insolvency' for the purpose of winding up a company under Section 306(1)(c) of the Companies Ordinance 1984?
  • Does the temporary suspension of business due to a labor dispute satisfy the requirements for winding up under Section 305(c) of the Companies Ordinance 1984?
  • Can a winding-up order be made as a matter of right upon mere proof of an unpaid debt, or is it subject to the equitable discretion of the Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs H.M. Abdullah vs The Income-Tax Officer, Circle-v, West Zone, Karachi1991 PTD 217 · Sindh High Court
  self-assessment schemechange of opinionreopening of assessmentprivileged documentsquasi-judicial discretionincome tax noticecommand performance
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges notices issued under section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance and subsequent assessment proceedings by the Income Tax Officer. The core legal questions involve whether the reopening of assessment under section 65 was barred due to a 'change of opinion', whether internal departmental correspondence is privileged, and whether an Income Tax Officer can abdicate independent quasi-judicial judgment by blindly following directions from a superior officer under section 7 of the Ordinance. The Sindh High Court held that since the initial assessments under the self-assessment scheme were made mechanically without applying the mind, the rule against a 'change of opinion' did not apply, rendering the section 65 notices valid. Furthermore, internal tax assessment files do not constitute privileged state affairs under Articles 6 and 7 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. However, while section 7 permits seeking general guidance in complicated cases, an assessing officer must act independently in quasi-judicial proceedings and cannot be dictated to by superiors. The court consequently upheld the validity of the section 65 notice but declared the subsequent assessment proceedings void for lack of independent application of mind, directing a fresh assessment by another Income Tax Officer.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the reopening of an assessment under section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance is barred by the rule of change of opinion when the original assessment was framed under the self-assessment scheme without applying the mind?
  • Do internal departmental notes and correspondence between an Income Tax Officer and an Inspecting Assistant Commissioner constitute privileged state documents under Articles 6 and 7 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Can an Income Tax Officer seek binding directions or instructions from a superior administrative authority regarding the merits of an assessment under section 7 of the Income Tax Ordinance, compromising their quasi-judicial independence?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ghandhara Nissan (Pvt) Ltd, an Other vs Ghulam Rabbani and Other(K.L.R. 1991 Labour & Service Cases 29) · Sindh High Court · 1990-11-21Read full judgment →
• Messrs English Biscuit Manufacturers Ltd, vs The Assistant Collector, Central Excises & Land Customs,1991 PTD 478 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-30Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ebrahim Bros. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone B', Karachi1991 PTD 374 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-10Read full judgment →
• Messrs Coffee Shop vs National Bank of Pak I3 an1991 MLD 793 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-06Read full judgment →
• Messrs Coffee Club and 4 others vs Pakistan National Shipping1991 MLD 644 · Sindh High Court · 1990-12-31Read full judgment →
• Messrs Capgas (Private) Ltd. Karachi vs Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources through Directorgeneral, Gas, Islamabad and another1991 MLD 2493 · Sindh High Court · 1991-08-19Read full judgment →
• Messrs Balagamwala Oil Mills vs Messrs Shakarchi Trading A.G., and others1991 CLC 2071 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-08
  temporary injunctionattachment before judgmentbreach of contractprima facie caseforeign companycivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two applications filed by the plaintiff seeking a temporary injunction and attachment before judgment against the defendants in a suit for damages arising from an alleged breach of contract. The plaintiff, having contracted with a foreign company for the purchase of goods, alleged that the defendant failed to perform, causing financial loss. The core legal questions were whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case for a temporary injunction and whether grounds existed for attachment before judgment under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court held that where a claim for damages requires evidence to be led to establish the breach, a prima facie case cannot be determined solely on pleadings and documents, thus precluding temporary injunctions. Furthermore, the Court held that the mere fact that a defendant is a foreign company with no assets in Pakistan, or the allegation that funds are being remitted abroad, is insufficient for attachment before judgment without satisfying the specific statutory requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure, especially when the plaintiff was aware of the defendant's lack of local assets at the time of contracting.

  Questions settled

  • Can a temporary injunction be granted when the claim for damages requires evidence to be led to establish a breach of contract?
  • Is the fact that a defendant is a foreign company with no assets in Pakistan sufficient ground for attachment before judgment?
  • Does the knowledge of a plaintiff regarding a defendant's lack of assets in Pakistan at the time of contracting affect the grant of attachment before judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs B.P. Biscuit Factory Ltd., Karachi vs The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone a, Karachi1991 PTD 835 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-04Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ashrafi (Private) Ltd. through Managing Director Sharafat Ali1991 MLD 1101 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-04
  suit for damagesbreach of contractparol evidence rulevoid contractsuperstructure principleattachment of propertyexecution of decreeproof of damages
  Summary & questions settled

  The plaintiffs filed a civil suit for recovery of Rs. 14,51,000 as damages for alleged breach of contract regarding the financing and development of a commercial plot. The plaintiffs had entered into an agreement to purchase the plot from a transport syndicate and subsequently executed a second agreement assigning their rights to the deceased defendant. However, the plot was attached and auctioned by the court in execution of decrees against the syndicate. The primary legal questions were whether oral evidence could be led to contradict written contract terms, whether the second agreement was enforceable, and whether the plaintiffs had established lost profit damages. The High Court dismissed the suit, holding that under Article 103 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, oral evidence cannot override terms of a written contract. Furthermore, applying the principle in Yousuf Ali v. Muhammad Aslam Zia, since the underlying agreement with the syndicate was void, the subsequent superstructure of rights under the second agreement was also void. Finally, the plaintiffs failed to discharge the burden of proving damages with concrete evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can oral evidence be admitted to contradict or vary the written terms of an admitted contract under Article 103 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • What is the effect on a subsequent derivative contract when the primary underlying agreement on which it is based is declared void?
  • Does a private transfer or contract for sale of property subject to court attachment convey any legal rights or bind the property under Section 64 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • On whom does the burden of proof lie to establish the precise quantum of damages resulting from an alleged breach of contract?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Asbestos Cement Industries Ltd. vs The Superintendent, Central1991 PTD 506 · Sindh High Court · 1990-12-10Read full judgment →
• Messrs Agencies Corporation vs The Central Board of Revenue and others1991 MLD 1486 · Sindh High Court · 1989-07-01Read full judgment →
• Messrs A.R. Khan & Sons (Pvt.) Ltd. and 22 others vs The Registrar of Trade Unions, Karachi and 2 others1991 PLC 846 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mehran Sugar Mills Ltd. vs Sindh Employees' Social Security1991 PLC 310 · Sindh High Court · 1990-08-29Read full judgment →
• Mehboob Pictures vs The Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Culture Archaeolgy, Sports and Tourism, Islamabad and another1991 CLC 1436 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-27Read full judgment →
• Mehboob Ali vs The State1991 MLD 2455 · Sindh High Court · 1991-08-21
  smugglinghostile witnesscustoms offenceadverse inferencecriminal appealappreciation of evidenceF.I.R. evidentiary value
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for smuggling gold under the Customs Act, 1969. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly given that key witnesses were declared hostile and the F.I.R. omitted certain details. The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction and sentence. The court held that a witness declared hostile does not necessarily lose credibility, and their testimony remains admissible if corroborated by other evidence. Furthermore, the court clarified that the F.I.R. is not a substantive statement of the prosecution's case, and the omission of a witness's name therein is not fatal to the prosecution. Finally, the court affirmed that an adverse inference must be drawn against an accused who fails to testify on oath under Section 340(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, reinforcing the necessity for the accused to rebut the prosecution's case when afforded the opportunity.

  Questions settled

  • Does a witness declared hostile automatically lose their credibility in a criminal trial?
  • Is the absence of a witness's name in the F.I.R. fatal to the prosecution's case?
  • What is the effect of an accused's failure to testify on oath under Section 340(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehboob Ahmed vs The State and 5 others-1991 P Cr. L J 792 · Sindh High Court · 1991-12-11Read full judgment →
• Masjid-E-Rizwan through Haji Abdul Salam vs Niazuddin1991 MLD 1351 · Sindh High Court · 1990-12-04Read full judgment →
• Mashkoor Hasan vs Janna T Bibi1991 CLC 933 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-24Read full judgment →
• Marine Fisheries Department, Karachi vs Nusratullah, Managing1991 PLD Karachi 301 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-27Read full judgment →
• Marine Fisheries Department Versus Nusratullah Marine FisheriesK.L.R. 1991 Criminal Cases 463 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Maqbool Hussain vs Haji Muhammad Ashraf1991 MLD 1134 · Sindh High Court · 1986-10-20
  Section 9 suitSpecific Relief Actappointment of receivertemporary injunctionpreservation of propertyCode of Civil Procedurepossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns applications for the appointment of a receiver and temporary injunctions in a suit for possession filed under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877. The core legal question was whether a court is empowered to grant temporary injunctions or appoint a receiver in a suit instituted under Section 9, given the statute's limited scope and the bar on appeals against its orders. The Court held that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, specifically Order 39 and Order 40, are not excluded in such suits. The ratio is that a court must possess the authority to preserve the property in dispute to prevent it from being wasted, altered, or destroyed, thereby ensuring that any eventual decree for possession is not rendered futile or infructuous. The key principle laid down is that while Section 9 restricts the scope of the suit to possession, it does not strip the court of its procedural authority to protect the subject matter of the litigation through interim measures pending final adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court appoint a receiver in a suit filed under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877?
  • Is a court empowered to grant a temporary injunction in a suit for possession instituted under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877?
  • Does the bar on appeals in Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 prevent the application of Order 39 and Order 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain Wassan vs The StateK.L.R. 1991 Criminal Cases 425 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-21Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain Wassan vs The State1991 PLD Karachi 261 · Sindh High Court · 1991-03-21Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain vs Mst. Naheed Akhtar and 14 others1991 MLD 724 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-17Read full judgment →
• Manager Central Cotton Mills (Pvt) Ltd vs Mahmood Ahmed(K.L.R 1991 Labour & Service Cases 38) · Sindh High Court · 1990-11-17Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Anwar vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 2335 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-20Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Anwar vs The State1991 PLD Karachi 351 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-23
  recall of witnesscross-examinationjudicial discretioncriminal revisionsmugglingengagement of counselfair trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This Special Criminal Revision Application filed under Section 185-F of the Customs Act 1969 challenged an order of the Special Judge (Customs & Taxation), Karachi, which dismissed the applicant's application under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking to recall a prosecution witness for cross-examination. The applicant faced trial under Section 156(1)(8) of the Customs Act 1969 for heroin smuggling. On the day the witness was examined, the applicant's counsel was unable to cross-examine him due to being engaged before a Division Bench of the High Court. The High Court set aside the trial court's order, directing that the witness be recalled for cross-examination. The court held that cross-examination is a fundamental right crucial to uncovering the truth, and judicial discretion under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 must be exercised soundly rather than arbitrarily. An accused should not be penalized or prejudiced in defence due to the genuine professional engagement of counsel.

  Questions settled

  • How should judicial discretion under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be exercised when deciding an application to recall a witness for cross-examination?
  • Can an accused person be deprived of the right to cross-examine a material prosecution witness due to the pre-occupation of defence counsel in another court?
  • Whether technical non-appearance of counsel warrants the refusal of an application under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to recall an essential witness?
  Read full judgment →
• Mahmood Shariff vs Mst. Tehseen Iqbal and another1991 CLC 972 · Sindh High Court · 1991-01-27Read full judgment →
• Mahfooz Khan through Legal Heirs vs Mst. Zubeda Khatoon1991 MLD 1854 · Sindh High Court · 1991-05-02Read full judgment →
• M.Z. Haq vs Mst. Umtul Hamid Begum and 3 others1991 CLC 1036 · Sindh High Court · 1990-12-11Read full judgment →