Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 46,805 judgments in total from the Sindh High Court.

• Abdul Rahim vs Mst. Sher Bano1991 MLD 1130 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-28
  personal requirementbona fide needrented premisesevictionlandlord-tenant relationshipburden of proofresidential accommodation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Rent Controller's order directing the appellant to vacate the first floor of a building owned by the respondent. The core legal question is whether the respondent established the bona fide personal requirement for the premises, particularly when the tenant argued that the landlord failed to provide sufficient details in the application and that existing accommodation was adequate. The Court held that the landlord's bona fide need is determined by the entire evidence on record, not merely the initial pleadings. It found that the respondent, a family of three, required more than the two rooms currently available to them, especially considering the son's retirement from service and the subsequent loss of employer-provided housing. The Court affirmed that a landlord is not required to plead every minute detail in the application if the evidence subsequently establishes the genuineness of the need. The key principle laid down is that in personal requirement cases, courts must assess the landlord's bona fide need based on the totality of evidence, and a family is entitled to reasonable living space commensurate with their status.

  Questions settled

  • Is a landlord required to plead every minute detail of their personal requirement in the initial ejectment application?
  • Can a court determine the bona fide nature of a landlord's personal requirement based on the entire evidence rather than just the initial pleadings?
  • Does the possession of other premises by a landlord automatically negate a claim of personal requirement for additional space?
  • Is a family entitled to reasonable living space commensurate with their status in the context of a personal requirement claim?
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• Abdul Rahim Khan vs The State1991 MLD 2448 · Sindh High Court · 1991-08-18
  Companies Ordinancejurisdiction of Sessions Judgecriminal trialcompany accountsstatutory interpretationFederal Government notificationCode of Criminal Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from the conviction and sentence of the appellant, Chief Executive of a public limited company, by the Sessions Judge (South) Karachi under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, for failing to file half-yearly accounts. The core legal question was whether a Court of Session has independent statutory jurisdiction under section 476(4) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, to try offences under the Ordinance, or whether such jurisdiction is contingent upon a notification empowering it by the Federal Government pursuant to section 7 of the said Ordinance. The Sindh High Court held that the trial of criminal offences under the Ordinance is governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and that section 476(4) inherently empowers a Court not inferior to that of a Court of Session to try penal offences carrying imprisonment, without requiring any notification under section 7, which applies to civil company matters and the delegation of High Court powers to Civil Courts. The key principle laid down is that statutory provisions conferring criminal jurisdiction on a Court of Session must be interpreted harmoniously to avoid rendering penal provisions redundant, and a direct statutory enactment prevails over the necessity of an executive notification.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Court of Session has jurisdiction to try offences under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, without a notification issued by the Federal Government under section 7 of the Ordinance?
  • Do proceedings relating to the trial of offences under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, fall under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Does section 7 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, apply to criminal trials or exclusively to civil matters relating to companies?
  • Whether subsection (4) of section 476 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, independently empowers a Court of Session to adjudicate upon penal defaults under the statute?
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• Abdul Raheem vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 2225 · Sindh High Court · 1991-07-11Read full judgment →
• Abdul Qadir and another vs The State1991 PLD Karachi 353 · Sindh High Court · 1991-04-24
  pre-arrest bailsurety amountexcessive bailcriminal revisioncustoms offencebail conditions
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application arose from an order of the Special Judge (Customs & Taxation), Karachi, granting pre-arrest bail to the applicants, Abdul Qadir and Muhammad Ibrahim, in a case involving alleged smuggling under the Customs Act, 1969. The applicants challenged the bail condition requiring a surety of Rs. 500,000 each, contending that the amount was excessive and punitive. The core legal question was whether the surety amount fixed by the trial court was reasonable given the circumstances and the nature of the evidence. The High Court observed that the prosecution had admitted no offending goods were recovered from the applicants and that the case was based on suspicion rather than concrete evidence. The Court held that the purpose of surety is to ensure the accused's presence, not to penalize them. Finding the original amount excessive and tantamount to punishment, the Court reduced the surety to Rs. 100,000 each. The key principle laid down is that surety amounts must be fixed with due regard to the accused's means and the nature of the offence, without creating needless impediments to bail.

  Questions settled

  • What is the primary legal objective of requiring an accused to furnish a surety bond?
  • Should the financial means of an accused be considered when fixing the amount of a bail bond?
  • Does the imposition of an excessively high surety amount constitute a form of punishment?
  • Can a High Court reduce the amount of surety fixed by a trial court in a criminal case?
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• Abdul Mubeen Kazi vs Messrs Wahid Rehman Industries (Pvt.) Ltd.1991 MLD 201 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-24Read full judgment →
• Abdul Latif Khan Sheerani vs Messrs Shahid Akhtar & Co. and 11 others1991 CLC 1148 · Sindh High Court · 1990-11-27Read full judgment →
• Abdul Karim and others vs Muhammad Nawab and 4 others1991 CLC 207 · Sindh High Court · 1990-10-14Read full judgment →
• Abdul Jabbar vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 2004 · Sindh High Court · 1990-11-25Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hameed vs Mahmood and 5 others1991 CLC 398 · Sindh High Court · 1990-12-15
  Waqf-alal-AuladMutawalliremoval of Mutawallirendering of accountsmisfeasancebreach of trustSection 12(2) CPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, filed by the applicant, Abdul Hameed, seeking to set aside a decree passed in a suit regarding the management of a Muslim Waqf-alal-Aulad. The applicant, a former Mutawalli, challenged the court's jurisdiction to order him to render accounts, arguing that the Waqf-Deed did not mandate accounting. The core legal question was whether a Mutawalli of a Waqf-alal-Aulad is legally obligated to render accounts and subject to removal by the court for misconduct. The High Court dismissed the application, holding that a Mutawalli is indeed bound to render accounts and may be removed by the court upon proof of misfeasance, breach of trust, or unfitness. The court emphasized that even if a founder directs that a Mutawalli cannot be removed, the court retains the authority to remove them for misconduct. Furthermore, the court noted that suits against a Mutawalli for accounts are not barred by any length of time, and the applicant failed to show good cause for his previous failure to contest the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Mutawalli of a Waqf-alal-Aulad legally obligated to render accounts of the trust property?
  • Can a court remove a Mutawalli for misfeasance or breach of trust despite directions in the Waqf-Deed to the contrary?
  • Is a suit against a Mutawalli for the rendering of accounts barred by the lapse of time?
  • Can a founder remove a Mutawalli after the delivery of possession of the Waqf property?
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• Abdul Hakeem vs (M/s) National Bank of Pakistan(K.L.R. 1991 Labour & Service Cases 39) · Sindh High Court · 1990-11-29Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghafoor vs The State1991 P Cr. L J 752 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-26Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghafoor vs The StateK.L.R. 1991 Criminal Cases 451 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-26Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghafoor and others vs Raeesuddin and another1991 MLD 376 · Sindh High Court · 1990-10-18Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghaffar vs Raees Muhammad Khan and 5 others1991 CLC 185 · Sindh High Court · 1990-08-25
  Second AppealRight of pre-emptionVested rightCode of Civil Procedure 1908Record of RightsJurisdictional valueShafi-i-Jar
  Summary & questions settled

  This Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 arose from a pre-emption suit. The primary legal question was whether the right to file a Second Appeal is a vested right that remains unaffected by subsequent amendments to Section 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which increased the valuation threshold for such appeals. Additionally, the Court examined whether the pre-emptor had sufficiently established ownership of the adjoining land to exercise the right of pre-emption. The Court held that the right of appeal is a substantive right that vests at the time of the institution of the suit. Consequently, because the suit was filed before the amendment to Section 102, the right to file a Second Appeal remained intact and was not barred by the new valuation threshold. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the pre-emptor's ownership, noting that the appellant failed to rebut the presumption of truth attached to the Record of Rights under the Sindh Revenue Code. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right to file a Second Appeal vest in a party at the time of the institution of the suit?
  • Does an amendment to Section 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, increasing the valuation threshold for appeals, apply retrospectively to suits instituted before the amendment?
  • Is an entry in the Record of Rights presumed to be true under the Sindh Revenue Code until the contrary is proved?
  • Can a respondent who has not filed an appeal against a judgment and decree assail its legality or propriety?
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• Abdul Ghaffar Khan vs The State1991 MLD 1823 · Sindh High Court · 1991-05-16Read full judgment →
• Abdul Aziz vs Shaikh Muhammad Rafiq1991 MLD 1316 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-07Read full judgment →
• Abdul Aziz vs Inayat Ali1991 MLD 344 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-14Read full judgment →
• Abdul Aziz vs Ahmed and another1991 CLC 957 · Sindh High Court · 1990-11-25
  ejectmentsublettinghanding over possessionlandlord and tenantrent appealSindh Rented Premises Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a landlord's appeal against the dismissal of his rent case seeking the eviction of his tenant and alleged sub-tenant from residential premises on the ground of subletting. The core legal question was whether allowing another person to reside in the demised premises and obtaining utility connections in that person's name constitutes subletting or handing over of possession under the relevant rent legislation. The Sindh High Court held that the phrase "handed over the possession" requires a complete transfer or surrender of possession whereby the tenant divests himself of the premises, and merely allowing a relative or another person to live with the tenant as a family member does not amount to subletting or unlawful handing over of possession. The Court accordingly dismissed the appeal, establishing that co-residence without divesting possession does not furnish a ground for eviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does allowing another person to reside in a rented premises with the tenant constitute subletting?
  • What is the legal meaning of "handed over the possession" under section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Whether mere utility connections in the name of a co-resident prove the existence of a sub-tenant?
  • Can a tenant be evicted for subletting when the tenant has not divested himself of the possession of the rented premises?
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• A.C.T. Industries (Pvt.) Ltd.s vs Additional Secretary to Government of Pakistan Ministry of Finance (Central Board of Revenue) Karachi and 2 others1991 CLC 1530 · Sindh High Court · 1990-12-23Read full judgment →
• A. Razak Adamjee and another vs Messrs Datari Construction1991 MLD 1112 · Sindh High Court · 1990-12-20
  public nuisanceanticipatory injunctionmulti-storeyed buildingeasement rightsbuilding controlvested rightprivacy
  Summary & questions settled

  This representative suit was filed under section 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 by residents of K.D.A. Scheme No. 5 (Clifton), Karachi, seeking a declaration and permanent injunction against the construction of a multi-storeyed building by Defendant No. 1, alleging it would constitute a public nuisance, cause overpopulation, and violate privacy and easement rights. The core legal question was whether an anticipatory injunction against a potential public nuisance caused by high-rise construction can be granted, and whether the building plans and subsequent additional floors approved by the Karachi Building Control Authority were legal and valid. The Sindh High Court held that while anticipatory injunctions against a nuisance can be granted if the injury is practically certain, general apprehensions do not suffice, and construction strictly within approved limits does not constitute a nuisance. The court held that the initial approval for ground plus five storeys was valid and created a vested right, but the subsequent approval for the 6th and 7th floors was unlawful and violative of easements. The suit was accordingly decreed in part, restraining construction beyond ground plus five storeys.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an anticipatory injunction can be granted to restrain a threatened public nuisance?
  • Can a negative declaration be sought under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 in respect of a matter not concerning the status or character of the plaintiffs?
  • Whether the approval of additional floors on a building plan after final approval violates building regulations and private easements?
  • Does an owner acquire a legally vested right upon acting on duly approved building plans?
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• (M/s). Coffee Shop vs National Bank of PakistanK.L.R. 1991 Civil Cases 405 · Sindh High Court · 1991-02-06Read full judgment →
• (M/s) Kohinoor Marble Industries Limited through A.S. Quraishi(K.L.R. 1991 Labour & Service Cases 80) · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• (Mst). Hena Tayub vs Iind Senior Civil Judge and AnotherK.L.R. 1991 Civil Cases 629 · Sindh High Court · 1990-10-18Read full judgment →
• Zulfiquar Ali and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 822 · Sindh High Court · 1989-01-16
  post-arrest bailstatutory delayhardened criminalfourth provisoaffidavits of witnessesjudicial precedent
  Summary & questions settled

  This bail application concerns two applicants, Zulfiqar Ali and Muhammad Bachal, facing trial for murder and property offences. The applicants sought post-arrest bail primarily on grounds of statutory delay in trial and on merits, citing affidavits from prosecution witnesses and Mashirs exonerating them. The Court examined the fourth proviso to Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which denies bail on grounds of delay to hardened, desperate, or dangerous criminals. While acknowledging conflicting judicial interpretations regarding whether an accused must be a previous convict to fall under this category, the Court noted that the Supreme Court of Pakistan had previously granted bail in similar circumstances in the case of Gul Khan and others. Following the Supreme Court's precedent, the Court held that the applicants were entitled to bail due to the statutory delay in their trial. Furthermore, the Court found merit in the applicants' case, noting that prosecution witnesses had sworn affidavits exonerating them. Consequently, the Court granted bail to both applicants, subject to the furnishing of bail bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Does the fourth proviso to Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 require an accused to be a previous convict to be classified as a 'hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal'?
  • Can bail be granted on the basis of affidavits sworn by prosecution witnesses exonerating the accused?
  • What factors may a court consider when forming a tentative opinion on whether an accused is a 'hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal' under the fourth proviso to Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Zulfiqar Ahmed Mehar vs Syed Johar Hussain Kazmi1990 MLD 1860 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-02Read full judgment →
• Zar Muhammad vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1756 · Sindh High Court · 1990-02-10
  youthful offenderjuvenile justiceSindh Children Actage determinationremand for retrialcriminal trial procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, Zar Muhammad, was convicted by the IInd Additional Sessions Judge, South Karachi, for an offence under section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and sentenced to life imprisonment. The appellant challenged this conviction, contending that he was a child at the time of the incident and should have been tried under the provisions of the Sindh Children Act, 1955, rather than the ordinary criminal procedure. The core legal question was whether the trial court erred in failing to apply the Sindh Children Act, 1955, given the appellant's age. The High Court found that medical evidence confirmed the appellant was under 16 years of age at the time of the offence. Consequently, the Court held that the trial and subsequent sentencing were illegal as they bypassed the mandatory protections afforded to youthful offenders under the Sindh Children Act, 1955. The conviction and sentence were set aside, and the matter was remanded to the trial court for a fresh trial in accordance with the provisions of the Sindh Children Act, 1955.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to try a youthful offender under the Sindh Children Act, 1955, render a conviction and sentence illegal?
  • Is a person under the age of 16 at the time of an offence entitled to be tried under the Sindh Children Act, 1955?
  • Can an appellate court remand a case for a fresh trial if the original trial was conducted without applying the mandatory provisions of the Sindh Children Act, 1955?
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• Zahoor Ahmed vs The Trustees of Port Trust of Karachi1990 PLC 14 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-23Read full judgment →
• Zahid Hussain vs The State and 8 others1990 P Cr. L J 1209 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-20
  quashment of proceedingsSection 561-A Cr.P.C.Section 195(1)(c) Cr.P.C.forged documentsoriginal vs copycognizance of offenceSection 265-K Cr.P.C.
  Summary & questions settled

  This application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 sought the quashment of criminal proceedings pending before a Sessions Judge, alleging that the cognizance of the offence was barred under Section 195(1)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The applicant argued that the alleged offences (forgery/fraud) related to documents produced in a civil suit, requiring a complaint from the court rather than a private complaint. The respondent raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the application, contending the applicant should have first approached the trial court under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that while it is proper to approach the trial court first, the High Court's powers under Section 561-A are co-extensive, and it may entertain such applications directly. On merits, the Court held that the bar under Section 195(1)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applies only when the original document is produced or given in evidence. Since only copies were produced in the civil proceedings, the statutory bar was not triggered. The application was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the power to entertain an application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 directly, even if the applicant has not first approached the trial court under Section 265-K?
  • Does the bar under Section 195(1)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply when only a copy of a document, rather than the original, is produced or given in evidence in court?
  • What are the essential requirements that must be satisfied to invoke the bar under Section 195(1)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Zahid Aziz vs Province of Sind and others1990 MLD 76 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-15Read full judgment →
• Zafar Iqbal vs Mst. Anwari Begum and 2 others1990 PLD Karachi 225 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-30Read full judgment →
• Zafar Iqbal vs Government of Sindh and others1990 P I. C (C.S.) 676 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-04Read full judgment →
• Zafar Hussain vs Muhammad Amin and others1990 P Cr. L J 1928 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-27
  public nuisancequashment of proceedingsrevisional jurisdictiontea-shop nuisancekerosene oil stovesCode of Criminal Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an application under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 filed by the applicant seeking quashment of an order passed by the Sessions Judge, Karachi (South), which had set aside a magistrate's order under section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 directing the respondent to stop using kerosene oil stoves in his tea-shop on the ground of public nuisance. The core legal question was whether the operation of a licensed tea-shop using kerosene oil stoves inside the premises constitutes a public nuisance under section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 read with section 268 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and whether a second revision or quashment application is maintainable after the dismissal of a prior revision. The Sindh High Court held that the ingredients of public nuisance were not met, as no law or regulation was violated, the activity was common and licensed, and no neighborhood residents complained. Furthermore, the court held that an aggrieved party who has already invoked revisional jurisdiction cannot subsequently maintain an application under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the operation of a tea-shop using kerosene oil stoves inside the premises constitute a public nuisance under section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can an application under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be maintained after the dismissal of a revision application by the Sessions Court?
  • What are the essential legal requirements to establish a public nuisance in connection with a trade or occupation under section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Zafar And Associates, [M/s.] Karachi. vs The Commissioner Of Income TaxPTCL 1990 CL. 192 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Yar Muhammad vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1736 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-01
  contempt of courtsubordinate court jurisdictionjudicial misconductfreedom of the presscriminal revisionSection 228 PPCcontempt of court act
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application challenges the conviction of a newspaper reporter by a Civil Judge for contempt of court regarding a published news item. The core legal question was whether a subordinate court possesses the jurisdiction to convict a person for contempt of court for publishing a news report alleging judicial misconduct, and whether the cited statutory provisions were applicable. The High Court held that the conviction was illegal and without jurisdiction. The Court clarified that subordinate courts only have jurisdiction to punish for contempt under Section 228 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, specifically when an insult or interruption occurs in the face of the court during judicial proceedings. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Contempt of Court Act 1976 does not grant subordinate courts general jurisdiction to punish for contempt of this nature, as such powers are reserved for the High Court and Supreme Court. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, establishing that subordinate courts cannot assume jurisdiction for contempt outside the narrow scope of Section 228, Pakistan Penal Code 1860.

  Questions settled

  • Does a subordinate court have the jurisdiction to punish for contempt of court for the publication of a news item?
  • Under what circumstances can a subordinate court punish an individual for contempt of court?
  • Is the publication of a report regarding a complaint filed against a judge considered contempt of court?
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• Yameen Kumhar vs The State1990 PLD Karachi 275 · Sindh High Court · 1990-02-28
  recovery of armsSection 103 Cr.P.C.mashircriminal appealpolice investigationappreciation of evidenceillegal recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under the Pakistan Arms Ordinance 1965 for the recovery of illegal arms. The core legal question concerns the validity of the recovery and the mandatory application of Section 103, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, regarding the requirement of independent, local witnesses (mashirs). The High Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant, holding that the prosecution failed to prove the recovery beyond reasonable doubt. The court established that while Section 103 technically applies to Chapter VII searches, it embodies a fundamental rule of prudence and justice applicable to all police recoveries during investigations to prevent fabrication. The court ruled that police officers cannot bypass this requirement based on mere convenience. Because the investigating officer had pre-procured the mashirs rather than utilizing independent local witnesses, and because the finger-print evidence was unreliable given the disputed recovery, the prosecution's case was deemed insufficient. The judgment emphasizes that recovery witnesses must be independent, respectable, and preferably from the locality, and any deviation requires valid justification by the prosecution.

  Questions settled

  • Is Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to recoveries made by police during the investigation of a crime?
  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on the testimony of an investigating officer when the recovery witnesses were pre-procured?
  • Does the failure to associate local witnesses during a recovery render the recovery evidence unreliable?
  • Is the finger-print expert's report sufficient to prove recovery if the recovery itself is disbelieved?
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• West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation vs Commissioner of Income Tax (West), Karachi and 4 othersPTCL 1990 CL. 735 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Wazir Ahmad vs S.H.O. Police Station, Mehboob Kalhoro and others1990 P Cr. L J 2006 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-26
  registration of FIRcognizable offenceconstitutional petitionalternative remedyclean handspolice inactionprivate complaint
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, was filed seeking a direction to the S.H.O. to register a First Information Report (F.I.R.) regarding alleged cognizable offences of abduction, wrongful confinement, and looting committed by a police party. The core legal question was whether a police officer is mandatorily bound to register an F.I.R. upon information of a cognizable offence, and whether constitutional jurisdiction should be invoked when alternate remedies exist or when the petitioner lacks clean hands. The Sindh High Court held that the provisions of Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are mandatory, obligating a police officer to register an F.I.R. upon disclosure of a cognizable offence without judging its truthfulness. However, the court dismissed the petition in limine, establishing that writ relief is discretionary and will be denied where the petitioner makes contradictory statements, fails to approach the court with clean hands, or has an adequate alternate remedy through a direct private complaint before a Magistrate under Section 190 read with sections 200 to 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, particularly where evidence is already available with the complainant.

  Questions settled

  • Is it mandatory for a police officer to register an F.I.R. under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when information discloses a cognizable offence?
  • Can a police officer refuse to record an F.I.R. on the ground that the police suspect the information is false?
  • Does the availability of an alternate remedy under sections 190 and 200 to 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 bar the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Will a constitutional petition be dismissed if the petitioner makes contradictory statements and fails to approach the court with clean hands?
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• Waheed alias Siraj vs The State1990 MLD 1536 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-26Read full judgment →
• United Bank Ltd vs Messrs S. G. Rauf and Company and 2 others1990 PLD Karachi 312 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-04
  leave to defendsummary suitlimitation periodservice of summonsrefusal of registered postbanking recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves an application for leave to defend a summary suit under Order XXXVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, alongside a preliminary objection raised by the plaintiff that the application was barred by limitation having been filed beyond the statutory ten-day period from the service of summons. The core legal question is whether the application for leave to defend was time-barred, considering multiple modes of service including newspaper publication, registered post with acknowledgment due, and bailiff service, and whether a postal endorsement of refusal constitutes valid service. The court held that the defendants were validly served by registered post on the date of postal endorsement of refusal, making the application for leave to defend clearly time-barred in the absence of any application for condonation of delay under the Limitation Act 1908. Consequently, the application for leave to defend was dismissed and a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff. The key principle laid down is that a postal endorsement of refusal of summons sent by registered post constitutes prima facie proof of service, and limitation for filing an application for leave to defend runs from such effective service.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application for leave to defend filed beyond ten days of the service of summons is barred by limitation?
  • Does a postal endorsement of refusal of a registered post summon constitute prima facie proof of service under the Code of Civil Procedure?
  • Can a court entertain an application for leave to defend filed out of time without a formal application for condonation of delay under the Limitation Act?
  • What is the legal effect of the dismissal of an application for leave to defend in a summary recovery suit?
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• United Bank Limited /M/s. J. vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Central ZonePTCL 1990 CL. 716 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Umer Din and 6 others vs Messrs Gulf Airlines1990 PLC 304 · Sindh High Court · 1989-04-30Read full judgment →
• Umar vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1663 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-26Read full judgment →
• Umar Khan vs Nasim Raza and others1990 MLD 1062 · Sindh High Court · 1990-02-18
  civil revisionrestoration of petitiondismissal for non-prosecutioninherent powerssufficient causelegal representativesabatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for the restoration of a civil revision petition that was previously dismissed for non-prosecution. The core legal question was whether a High Court possesses the jurisdiction to restore a revision petition dismissed for default, given the absence of an express provision in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 analogous to those governing the restoration of suits or appeals. The respondent contended that such restoration was not maintainable due to the lack of specific statutory authority. The Court, after reviewing conflicting precedents, held that while the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 does not explicitly provide for the restoration of revision petitions, the inherent power of the Court to dismiss a matter for non-prosecution carries with it the corresponding inherent jurisdiction to restore it, provided sufficient cause is demonstrated. Relying on Supreme Court authority, the Court affirmed that it maintains discretionary jurisdiction to restore such petitions. Finding that the applicant established sufficient cause regarding the death of the original petitioner and the subsequent lack of knowledge of proceedings, the Court allowed the application for restoration.

  Questions settled

  • Does a High Court have the inherent jurisdiction to restore a civil revision petition dismissed for non-prosecution?
  • Is the restoration of a revision petition dependent on the existence of specific provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a legal representative apply for the restoration of a revision petition if the original petitioner died during the pendency of the proceedings?
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• Umar Gul Khattak vs Inspector General of Police, NWFP, Peshwar EtcK.L.R. 1990 Labour & Service Cases 46 · Sindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Trustees of the Port of Karachi vs Gujranwala Steel Industries and another1990 CLC 197 · Sindh High Court · 1989-05-23
  rejection of plaintcause of actionport trust dueshard feesship breakingstatutory notificationcivil court jurisdictionamendment of pleadings
  Summary & questions settled

  The plaintiffs, Trustees of the Port of Karachi, instituted suits for the recovery of 'Hard Fees' for successive periods against the defendants for utilizing plaintiffs' foreshore and hard areas to break up a stranded, unserviceable ship named m.v. 'Trauggut' which ran aground at Clifton beach. The defendants filed applications under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 seeking rejection of the plaints for lack of cause of action, contending inter alia that no specific area had been demarcated and notified by the Deputy Conservator as required under Note 6 of Table IX of the notification issued pursuant to Section 43-B of the Karachi Port Trust Act 1886. The Sindh High Court examined the statutory provisions, the meaning of 'notified', and the necessity of a public declaration or follow-up notification. The court held that without the mandatory demarcation and notifying of the specific areas under the relevant rules, no statutory right to claim such fees vests in the plaintiffs, thereby disclosing no cause of action. Consequently, the court rejected the plaints in all the suits under Order 7 Rule 11, while clarifying that the plaintiffs were at liberty to institute fresh proceedings on different grounds such as compensation for use and occupation of land.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the jurisdiction of civil courts is impliedly barred where a statute creates new rights and provides a summary tribunal for their enforcement?
  • Can a plaint be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for lack of cause of action when the mandatory statutory notification required for levying fees has not been issued or pleaded?
  • What constitutes a valid 'notification' or 'notifying' under a statutory provision when the power is exercised by a public functionary?
  • Whether a belated oral request for the amendment of a plaint can cure a fundamental lack of cause of action in proceedings under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• TM Mahal Hotels Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan through the Secretary1990 MLD 290 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-01Read full judgment →
• The State vs Zaida Khan and others1990 MLD 2066 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-30Read full judgment →
• The State vs Zahid Rasool1990 P Cr. L J 340 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-11
  bail cancellationconcurrent jurisdictionhumanitarian groundscustoms offenceprocedural propriety
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application by the State seeking the cancellation of bail granted to the respondent by the Special Judge (Customs and Taxation), Karachi, in a case registered under the Customs Act, 1969. The respondent had initially been refused bail but subsequently secured release on humanitarian grounds upon a second application. The core legal question was whether the State could bypass the trial court and approach the High Court directly for bail cancellation, and whether humanitarian grounds constitute a valid basis for granting bail in such matters. The Court held that while the High Court and the Special Judge possess concurrent jurisdiction regarding bail cancellation, it is a desirable practice to first approach the court that granted the bail unless compelling circumstances exist to bypass it. Citing established precedents, the Court emphasized that the trial court should be the primary forum for such applications. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the State's application for cancellation of bail, directing the applicant to approach the trial court first if so advised.

  Questions settled

  • Is it procedurally required to approach the trial court for bail cancellation before moving the High Court when jurisdiction is concurrent?
  • Does the existence of concurrent jurisdiction allow an applicant to bypass the lower court for bail cancellation without showing compelling circumstances?
  • Can bail be granted solely on humanitarian grounds in a customs-related criminal case?
  Read full judgment →
• The State vs The Special Judge (Customs) and others1990 P Cr. L J 53 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-28Read full judgment →
• The State vs Muhammad Rafi and another1990 P Cr. L J 1042 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-04Read full judgment →
• The State vs Messrs Kalco Pharma and 4 others1990 P Cr. L J 865 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-13Read full judgment →
• The State vs Ali Akbar Sabzoi1990 P Cr. L J 1729 · Sindh High Court · 1989-06-11Read full judgment →
• The State vs Adnan Ansari and others1990 MLD 303 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-19Read full judgment →
• The Karachi Catholic Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. vs Mrs. Daphne1990 MLD 2232 · Sindh High Court · 1990-07-16Read full judgment →
• The Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Islamabad vs Rizvia Cooperative Housing Society Ltd1990 MLD 912 · Sindh High Court · 1989-12-09Read full judgment →
• The Director of Industries and Mineral Development vs Dada Bhoy1990 MLD 301 · Sindh High Court · 1989-02-20
  arbitration awardmisconduct of arbitratorcontractual interpretationC&F valuesetting aside awardreasoned award
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a suit challenging an arbitration award issued against the defendants, M/s. Dadabhoy Hormusjee & Sons, regarding alleged overcharging of commission fees by the plaintiffs, the Directorate of Industries and Mineral Development. The core legal question was whether the arbitrator correctly interpreted the contractual term "C&F Value" and whether the failure to consider relevant evidence constituted misconduct. The court found that the arbitrator ignored a crucial "Tender Notice" document that clarified the definition of "C&F Value," which the plaintiffs themselves had adopted in subsequent contracts. The court held that the arbitrator's failure to consider this material evidence, combined with the statutory obligation to provide reasoned awards, amounted to legal misconduct. Consequently, the court set aside the arbitration award. The key principle laid down is that an arbitrator's failure to address evidence that goes to the root of a dispute, particularly when there is a statutory requirement to provide reasons for an award, constitutes misconduct sufficient to set aside the award under the Arbitration Act, 1940.

  Questions settled

  • Does an arbitrator's failure to consider a material piece of evidence constitute misconduct?
  • Is an arbitrator legally required to provide reasons for their award under the Arbitration Act, 1940?
  • Does the failure of an arbitrator to address matters going to the root of a dispute amount to misconduct?
  Read full judgment →
• Tehsin Ahmad Mehmoodi vs Pakistan Steel Mills Company Ltd.1990 MLD 1132 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-30
  earned leave encashmentleave salaryresignationservice rulesnotice periodseverance of employmentcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision application arose from a suit filed by an ex-employee of Pakistan Steel Mills Company Limited (PASMIC) claiming encashment of 90 days' accumulated earned leave. The trial court decreed the suit, but the lower appellate court reduced the decree to seven days' encashment. The applicant had submitted a resignation letter requiring 90 days' notice and subsequently applied for 90 days' earned leave while still in service, which the employer refused in writing before accepting the resignation.

  The High Court examined Rules 44 and 45 of the PASMIC Service Rules. It held that while Rule 44(1) restricts leave encashment during subsisting service, Rule 44(2) creates an explicit exception when leave is applied for and refused in writing during service. Once refused, the right to encashment immediately crystallizes. Furthermore, after severance of employment, encashment is not barred. The Court set aside the lower appellate court's decree, holding the employee entitled to encashment of the full 90 days' leave without interest.

  Questions settled

  • Does the refusal in writing of an employee's earned leave application while still in service entitle the employee to encashment of such leave under service rules prohibiting encashment during service?
  • Does the submission of a resignation letter terminate an employee's service before the resignation is formally accepted by the employer?
  • Does a service rule stopping the earning of leave upon service of a termination notice prevent the encashment of leave already accumulated prior to the notice?
  • Is an employer permitted to disallow leave encashment while simultaneously deducting payment in lieu of the unserved notice period upon accepting a resignation?
  Read full judgment →
• Tarique Anwar vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1141 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-10Read full judgment →
• Tanvir Textile Mills Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1990 PTD 254 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-16
  income taxcotton wastagereference applicationrejection of accountsshort productionspinning millSindh High Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves four direct references filed under section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act 1922 by the applicant spinning mill against the assessment orders for the years 1973-74 to 1976-77, concerning the rejection of declared wastage and results by the income tax authorities. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal was justified in confirming the rejection of the declared results and fixing a uniform rate of production based on alleged short production of cotton yarn. The Sindh High Court answered the primary question in the negative, holding that where the account books are genuine, free from substantial mistakes, and no defects are found in purchases or sales, the tax department cannot reject the declared wastage figures or the accounts merely for want of stage-wise production records, especially when the additions made by the assessing officer lead to the absurd result where total production and wastage exceed raw material consumed. The key principle laid down is that account results and declared wastage cannot be arbitrarily rejected or subjected to a uniform production formula in the absence of tangible discrepancies in the taxpayer's books.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Tribunal was justified in confirming the rejection of declared result merely on the ground of alleged short production?
  • Can the tax department reject account books and wastage figures solely because stage-wise production records are not maintained?
  • Is the application of a uniform formula for production wastage sustainable when it results in total production exceeding the raw material consumed?
  Read full judgment →
• Tanvir Textile Mills Ltd. vs Commissioner Of Income TaxPTCL 1990 CL. 728 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-16Read full judgment →
• Tanvir Taqvi vs Pakistan Broad Casting Corporation and others1990 PLC 1 · Sindh High Court · 1989-03-19Read full judgment →
• Taj Muhammad alias Tajan vs The State1990 MLD 1156 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-13Read full judgment →
• Taj Mahal Hotels Limited. vs Federation Of Pakistan Through The SecretaryPTCL 1990 CL. 375 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Tahir vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1198 · Sindh High Court · 1989-06-15
  post-arrest bailsection 302 PPCminoritydetermination of ageossification testradiological examinationfirst proviso to section 497(1) CrPCschool leaving certificate
  Summary & questions settled

  This post-arrest bail application was filed by applicant Tahir, who was accused along with co-accused under Sections 302, 34, and 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Muhammad Akram. The prosecution alleged that the applicant, along with co-accused, dragged the deceased into a banana garden and inflicted fatal hatchet blows on his head, supported by eyewitness statements, recovery of a bloodstained hatchet, and corroborative medical evidence. On the merits, the High Court found sufficient prima facie material linking the applicant to the crime. On the plea of minority under the first proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the applicant relied on a school certificate showing his age below 16 years, whereas a court-ordered medical/radiological examination assessed his age at about 18 years at the time of examination (making him over 16 and a half years at the time of occurrence, even allowing a one-year margin of error). The Sindh High Court held that the medical certificate based on radiological tests was preferable to the school certificate, and even allowing a margin of error, the applicant was over 16 years old. Furthermore, minor status alone does not entitle an accused to bail as a matter of right when grave, specific roles and incriminating recoveries exist. The bail application was accordingly rejected.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a radiological/medical report assessing age takes precedence over a school certificate when determining an accused person's age for bail under the first proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does being under sixteen years of age automatically entitle an accused person to bail as a matter of right under the first proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • How should the margin of error in an ossification/radiological age certificate be applied when assessing whether an accused is below sixteen years of age for bail purposes?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Saleemul Haq and another vs Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 2 others1990 PLD Karachi 439 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-19Read full judgment →
• Syed Mazhar Ali Shah vs Shah Muhammad1990 MLD 1070 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-08
  ex parte decreeservice of summonsdue serviceCode of Civil Procedure 1908limitation periodspecific performancerevision applicationprocedural irregularity
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision application challenges an appellate court's order setting aside an ex parte decree for specific performance. The core legal question was whether the defendant was "duly served" with summons, thereby justifying the setting aside of the ex parte decree under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The High Court held that the trial court failed to comply with mandatory procedural requirements, specifically Order 5 Rule 10-A regarding service by registered post and Rule 19 regarding the examination of the serving officer on oath. Furthermore, the bailiff’s reliance on the plaintiff’s agent to identify the defendant violated Rule 105 of the Sindh Civil Court Rules, rendering the service invalid. The Court affirmed that "duly served" implies strict adherence to legal formalities, not merely indirect knowledge. Consequently, the ex parte decree was correctly set aside, and the matter was remanded for trial. The principle established is that procedural mandates for service are essential for due process, and failure to comply renders an ex parte decree liable to be set aside within the limitation period calculated from the date of the defendant's knowledge.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to send summons by registered post acknowledgement due, as required by Order 5 Rule 10-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, invalidate service?
  • Is an ex parte decree liable to be set aside if the serving officer fails to be examined on oath under Order 5 Rule 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a serving officer rely on the assistance of the plaintiff or their agent to identify the defendant during the service of summons?
  • When does the limitation period for an application to set aside an ex parte decree commence if the defendant was not duly served?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Israr Ali vs Mst. Ahmedi Begum and others1990 MLD 1834 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-20
  malicious prosecutionsuit for damageswithdrawal of criminal complaintlimitation periodcivil revisionburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a civil revision application filed under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 against the concurrent judgments of the lower courts dismissing the applicant's suit for damages for malicious prosecution. The core legal questions involve whether the lower courts erred in failing to record findings on all issues when the negative finding on the primary issue of malicious prosecution was decisive, whether the ingredients of malicious prosecution were established where a criminal complaint was withdrawn pursuant to a compromise, and whether the suit was barred by limitation. The Sindh High Court held that the plaintiff failed to prove the essential ingredients of malicious prosecution—specifically, that the prosecution was malicious and without reasonable and probable cause, given that the complaint was withdrawn mutually rather than decided on merits and followed by a successful civil suit by the respondent for recovery of dowry. Furthermore, the Court held that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 22 of the Limitation Act 1908. The revision application was accordingly dismissed in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court is legally required to record separate findings on all issues when a negative finding on the primary issue of malicious prosecution fully disposes of the suit?
  • Can an action for malicious prosecution succeed where the underlying criminal complaint was dismissed as withdrawn pursuant to a compromise between the parties rather than adjudicated on merits?
  • What is the applicable limitation period for filing a suit for damages for malicious prosecution under Pakistani law?
  • Whether the essential ingredients of malicious prosecution include the absence of reasonable and probable cause alongside the presence of malice?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Asghar Imam vs Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and 2 others1990 PLC 346 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-29
  back benefitswrongful dismissalreinstatementIndustrial Relations Ordinanceconstitutional jurisdictionLabour Appellate Tribunaldisciplinary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges an order of the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal which, while reinstating the petitioner, denied him back benefits based on alleged negligence. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal could deny back benefits on grounds of negligence that were not part of the original disciplinary charges against the employee. The Court held that once a dismissal is declared wrongful and reinstatement is ordered, the denial of back benefits must be legally justified. It established that the denial of back benefits should only be based on whether the workman earned or could have earned income during the period of dismissal, which could then be set off against the salary due. The Court emphasized that the Tribunal is obligated to decide matters in accordance with law rather than personal notions of justice. Consequently, because the alleged negligence was not part of the original charge, the Tribunal’s denial of back benefits was declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect, entitling the petitioner to the withheld benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Labour Appellate Tribunal deny back benefits to a reinstated employee based on grounds not included in the original disciplinary charge sheet?
  • What is the legal criterion for denying back benefits to an employee whose dismissal is found to be wrongful?
  • Is a Labour Appellate Tribunal’s discretion to award or deny back benefits subject to judicial review if the decision is not based on relevant legal principles?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Akbar Ali vs Zonal Municipal Committee (East), Karachi1990 PLC (C.S.) 23 · Sindh High Court · 1989-01-17Read full judgment →
• Sultan Industries vs The Authority under Payment of Wages Act and another1990 PLC 357 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-29Read full judgment →
• Sultan Ali vs The State1990 MLD 2070 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-10Read full judgment →
• Sultan Ahmed Geelani vs Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Ltd.1990 PLC 11 · Sindh High Court · 1989-05-18Read full judgment →
• Suhno vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 779 · Sindh High Court · 1979-07-03Read full judgment →
• State Bank of Pakistan: In re vs Not1990 MLD 1838 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-12Read full judgment →
• State Bank of Pakistan vs Wali Muhammad and 3 others1990 P Cr. L J 997 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-17Read full judgment →
• State Bank of Pakistan through The Senior Deputy Director Banking1990 P Cr. L J 854 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-28Read full judgment →
• State Bank of Pakistan through The Banking Officer--Complainant vs Messrs Raza Enterprises (Regd.) and 2 others1990 P Cr. L J 317 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-31Read full judgment →
• State Bank of Pakistan through Banking Officer, Banking Control1990 P Cr. L J 583 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-16Read full judgment →
• Soomar and another vs The State1990 MLD 1077 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-30Read full judgment →
• Sohno vs The State and another1990 P Cr. L J 1190 · Sindh High Court · 1990-02-15
  joinder of accusedColumn 2 of challancognizance of offenceCourt of Session jurisdictioncriminal revisionLaw Reforms Ordinance 1972
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision application challenged an order by the Sessions Judge, Shikarpur, which directed the joinder of the applicant as an accused in a pending murder trial, despite the applicant having been placed in Column 2 of the police challan. The core legal question was whether a Court of Session, once seized of a case, possesses the jurisdiction to summon and join as an accused a person whose name was placed in Column 2 of the police report, or if such power is restricted to a Magistrate. The Court held that upon the submission of a challan to the Court of Session, the Court becomes seized of the entire criminal transaction and the case as a whole. Consequently, the Court of Session is competent to summon any person implicated in the offence, regardless of their placement in the police report. The principle laid down is that the Court of Session, having taken cognizance of the offence, has the authority to join additional accused persons connected with the case and issue process against them.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Court of Session have the jurisdiction to join as an accused a person whose name was placed in Column 2 of the police challan?
  • Does the Court of Session become seized of the entire criminal transaction upon receiving a challan?
  • Is the power to summon an accused person restricted to a Magistrate, or does it extend to the Court of Session?
  Read full judgment →
• Sindh Employees Social Security Institution vs Employer, Premier1990 PLC 6 · Sindh High Court · 1989-06-03
  social security contributioncontract labourestablishment liabilityWest Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinancecorporate identityemployer liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a decision by the Social Security Court, which had exempted the respondent, Premier Tobacco Industries Ltd., from paying social security contributions for workers engaged through contractors. The core legal questions were whether the respondent establishment remained liable despite changes in its corporate name and management, and whether an employer is statutorily obligated to pay social security contributions for employees hired via independent contractors. The High Court held that the establishment's identity persists regardless of changes in ownership or management; once an establishment is notified under the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965, the liability continues. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that an employer is liable for social security contributions for all workers engaged in or in connection with the work of the establishment, regardless of whether they are employed directly or through contractors. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the lower court's decision, and restored the Commissioner's order requiring the respondent to pay the outstanding contributions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the liability of an establishment to pay social security contributions cease upon a change in its name or management?
  • Is an employer liable to pay social security contributions for workers engaged through independent contractors?
  • Do employees continue to be covered under the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965, if they work in connection with the establishment despite changes in the employer's identity?
  Read full judgment →
• Sikandar vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 396 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-08
  murderdying declarationoral dying declarationocular testimonyinterested witnesscriminal appealbenefit of doubtsection 342 CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the III Additional Sessions Judge (East), Karachi, convicting the appellant under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for committing the murder of the deceased by means of a dagger, resulting in a sentence of imprisonment for life. The core legal questions involve the assessment of ocular testimony, the evidentiary value of written and oral dying declarations, the necessity of corroboration for interested witnesses, and the legal implications of failing to put incriminating circumstances to the accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the presence of the alleged eye-witnesses, that the dying declaration was uncorroborated and recorded under suspicious circumstances without medical certification, and that material evidence was omitted from the examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the court accepted the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and ordered the immediate release of the appellant on the principle that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Can an uncorroborated dying declaration recorded after considerable delay and in the absence of a medical certificate form the sole basis for a murder conviction?
  • Whether the failure to put material incriminating circumstances to an accused person under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiates the reliance upon such evidence?
  • Is the testimony of a related eye-witness reliable when it is contradicted by other prosecution witnesses and the initial police report?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a weapon recovery when independent mashirs fail to support the police version?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 755 · Sindh High Court · 1989-01-10Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad alias Shera vs The State1990 PLD Karachi 271 · Sindh High Court · 1990-02-28
  possession of automatic weaponrecovery mashirfinger-print expertexpiry of ordinancepending proceedingsspecial courtappellate remand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from the judgment of the Special Court (Suppression of Terrorist Activities) Karachi convicting the appellant under section 13B(b) of the Pakistan Arms Ordinance 1965 and sentencing him to four years' rigorous imprisonment. The core legal questions involved whether the recovery of the weapon (a sten gun) was proven through proper mashirs despite non-compliance with strict locality requirements, and whether the Special Court retained jurisdiction to decide the case after the amending Ordinance creating the offense had expired by efflux of time. The Sindh High Court held that the evidence of the recovery mashir was reliable as his presence was naturally explained at a bus stop, and that the proceedings were saved under Article 264 of the Constitution upon the expiry of the Ordinance because the lis was pending continuously through appellate remand. The key principle laid down is that the expiry of an Ordinance by efflux of time constitutes a repeal for the purposes of Article 264 of the Constitution, thereby saving pending legal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of a recovery mashir who is not a resident of the immediate locality can be relied upon when the arrest takes place near a busy public place?
  • Does the expiry of an amending Ordinance by efflux of time operate as a repeal for the purpose of invoking the saving provisions of Article 264 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Are pending legal proceedings saved under Article 264 of the Constitution of Pakistan when a case is remanded by an appellate court and reheard after the temporary law under which it was instituted has expired?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Khan vs Messrs Masjideallama Iqbal Colony1990 MLD 965 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-28Read full judgment →
• Sher Hayder vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1143 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-12Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Saadi vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 973 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-23Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Khurshid Anwar vs The State1990 MLD 620 · Sindh High Court · 1989-03-13Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Ghulam Rasool vs Karamat Hussain and another1990 P Cr. L J 844 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-27Read full judgment →
• Shaukat Hayat and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 217 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-24Read full judgment →
• Shahmurad Sugar Mills Ltd. vs The Union Council, Jhoke Sharif and 21990 MLD 305 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-07Read full judgment →
• Shahid Javed vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1153 · Sindh High Court · 1984-03-07Read full judgment →
• Shahid Agency [M/s.]. vs Collector Of Customs (Appraisement) AndPTCL 1990 CL. 381 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Shahabuddin. vs Inspecting Assistant Commissioner Of Income Tax, Range-I, West Zone, Karachi And 4 OtherPTCL 1990 CL. 153 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Shah Nawaz vs The State1990 MLD 40 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-18Read full judgment →
• Shafqat Ali alias Furqan vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 961 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-20Read full judgment →
• Shafiullah vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 769 · Sindh High Court · 1989-02-07Read full judgment →
• Shafi Muhammad and others vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1157 · Sindh High Court · 1989-06-22Read full judgment →
• Shabbir Hussain Shah and another vs The State1990 MLD 1055 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-11Read full judgment →
• Sayphire Textile Mills Ltd. and 9 others vs Government of Sindh and others1990 PLD Karachi 402 · Sindh High Court · 1990-02-28
  export taxRawangi Mahsoolinter-provincial movement of goodsintra-provincial export taxlegislative competenceDistrict Councilconstitutional law
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Sindh High Court addresses constitutional petitions filed by various textile mills and manufacturing companies challenging the levy, assessment, and collection of export tax and 'Rawangi Mahsool' by District Council Dadu and the Government of Sindh. The core legal questions involved the legislative competence of provincial and local authorities to levy export taxes in light of the Federal Legislative List and Article 151 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, which guarantees freedom of trade and commerce. The Court held that customs duties on exports abroad and sales taxes on goods imported and exported fall within the exclusive legislative competence of the Federation under entries 43 and 49 of the Federal Legislative List. Furthermore, export taxes on inter-provincial movement of goods violate Article 151 of the Constitution and are unconstitutional. However, the Court ruled that export taxes and 'Rawangi Mahsool' on intra-provincial movement of goods are constitutionally valid and saved by the Sindh Councils (Validation of Tax) Ordinance 1982 and the Sindh Local Government Ordinance 1979, and that the People's District Councils Export Rules 1976 continue to apply. Relief of restraint was granted against extra-provincial levies.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Legislature has exclusive competence to levy export duties and sales taxes on goods exported from or imported into Pakistan?
  • Does an export tax or Rawangi Mahsool on the inter-provincial movement of goods violate Article 151 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Are District Councils legally competent to levy export taxes or Rawangi Mahsool on the intra-provincial movement of goods within a province?
  • Do the People's District Councils Export Rules 1976 continue to apply under the savings provisions of the Sindh Local Government Ordinance 1979?
  Read full judgment →