Pakistan Case LawLatest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 46,805 judgments in total from the Sindh High Court.
- Muhammad Shah vs The State through A.-G., Sindh and 3 others1990 PLC 331 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-22Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Salimuddin Qureshi vs Sind Bar Council and another1990 MLD 267 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-21Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Salim and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 64 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-21Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Salim and 2 others vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 971 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 sought the quashing of criminal proceedings initiated under Section 11/16 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979, arising from an F.I.R. alleging the kidnapping of a minor girl for illicit intercourse. The core legal question was whether criminal proceedings should continue when the alleged victim, a sui juris adult, voluntarily entered into a valid marriage with the accused prior to the registration of the F.I.R. The High Court held that the evidence, including the victim's statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and medical reports confirming her majority, established that she was a legally wedded wife who married of her own free will. The Court determined that continuing the prosecution would constitute an abuse of the process of the Court and result in unnecessary harassment, as conviction was impossible on the available evidence. Consequently, the Court exercised its inherent powers to quash the proceedings, establishing that where allegations are demonstrably false or legally unsustainable, the High Court must intervene to prevent abuse of process.
Questions settled- Can the High Court quash criminal proceedings under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the evidence indicates no possibility of conviction?
- Does the voluntary marriage of an adult woman to the accused negate a charge of kidnapping under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979?
- Is the continuation of criminal proceedings against an accused considered an abuse of process when the alleged victim consistently supports the accused's version of events?
- Muhammad Sabir and another vs Ghaffar Ahmed and 3 others1990 P Cr. L J 876 · Sindh High Court · 1989-05-21Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Riaz vs The State1990 MLD 622 · Sindh High Court · 1989-07-31Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Ramzan and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 633 · Sindh High Court · 1989-12-17Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Rafiq vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1193 · Sindh High Court · 1989-06-13Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Quadir Hussain vs Controller of Patents and Designs, Government of Pakistan and 2 others1990 MLD 11 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-23Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Qasim and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 2036 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-10Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Qasim alias Ganja vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 21 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves an application filed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking the quashment of preventive proceedings pending against the applicant under Section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 before the Assistant Commissioner and Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The core legal question was whether drug peddlars or persons with vague allegations of being quarrelsome or dangerous fall within the specific categories enumerated under Section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for good behaviour proceedings. The Sindh High Court held that the object of Section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is preventive rather than punitive, and drug peddlars or persons accused of being merely quarrelsome or having vague allegations do not fall within the ambit of clauses (e) or (f) of the said provision. The court laid down the principle that the liberty of a subject cannot be jeopardized merely on a police report asserting that a person is a dangerous criminal without specific instances bringing the case within the mischief of Section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, resulting in the quashment of the proceedings.
Questions settled- Whether drug peddlars fall within the categories of habitual offenders mentioned under Section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Do vague allegations of a person being quarrelsome bring a case within the mischief of clause (e) of Section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- When does the period of security under Section 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 commence in view of Section 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Can proceedings under Section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be sustained merely on a police report opining that an individual is a dangerous criminal?
- Muhammad Nazim vs Mst. Rehana Parveen Begum and 3 others1990 MLD 344 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenged the dismissal of an application to set aside an ex parte decree passed in a family suit for maintenance. The petitioner alleged that he had not engaged the counsel who represented him in the original suit and that the Vakalatnama was a forgery. The lower courts, however, found the petitioner's signatures on the process and legal documents to be genuine, noting that the petitioner failed to take any action against the alleged fraudulent counsel or the plaintiff. The High Court held that the petitioner's failure to pursue remedies against the counsel or raise the issue of service of process in earlier forums constituted vital circumstantial evidence negating his claims. The Court affirmed that concurrent findings of fact regarding the genuineness of signatures and service of process are not subject to interference in constitutional jurisdiction unless perverse. While dismissing the petition, the Court clarified that the respondent's entitlement to maintenance ceased upon the effective date of divorce under the relevant family law, limiting the execution of the decree accordingly.
Questions settled- Can a court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the genuineness of signatures in constitutional jurisdiction?
- Does the failure to take action against an allegedly fraudulent counsel constitute circumstantial evidence against a claim of non-representation?
- Is a wife entitled to maintenance under a decree after the divorce has become effective under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961?
- If a statute provides multiple modes of service of process, is effective service in any of those modes sufficient?
- Muhammad Nasim Qureshi vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1249 · Sindh High Court · 1990-02-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is an application under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking the quashment of proceedings pending before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Nazimabad, Karachi, initiated upon a police report under the Sindh Crimes Control Act, alleging the applicant to be a habitual drunkard, pimp, and goonda. The core legal question was whether vague and general allegations without specific instances of time, date, and place justify proceedings against an individual under the Sindh Crimes Control Act. The Sindh High Court held that the allegations were indeed vague, that pending sub judice cases without prior conviction do not warrant such proceedings against the applicant, and that no grounds existed under section 14 of the Sindh Crimes Control Act. Consequently, the Court allowed the application and quashed the pending proceedings. The key principle laid down is that criminal proceedings under the Sindh Crimes Control Act cannot be sustained on vague and general allegations lacking specific particulars of time, date, and place, especially in the absence of previous convictions.
Questions settled- Can proceedings under the Sindh Crimes Control Act be initiated on vague and general allegations without specific instances of time, date, and place?
- Whether pending sub judice cases without a previous conviction can form a valid basis for proceedings against an individual as a hardened criminal?
- Does the High Court have the power under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash proceedings initiated without sufficient grounds under the Sindh Crimes Control Act?
- Muhammad Mustaqeem and 11 others vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1216 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-15Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Mithal vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 999 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-22Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Mehtab vs Muhammad Ismail and another1990 MLD 1682 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-04Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Kashif Kamal Siddiqui vs Mirza Farooq Baig1990 MLD 1009 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged a Rent Controller's order dismissing an ejectment application filed by a landlord against a tenant on grounds of default and personal bona fide need. The appellant claimed ownership via an alleged oral gift from his father. The core legal questions were whether the appellant, as a purported donee, could maintain an eviction application for personal need, and whether the tenant was estopped from challenging the landlord's title after having previously paid rent. The High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the Rent Controller’s finding that the alleged gift was a mala fide device to secure eviction, as the father had previously litigated for the same property without disclosing any transfer. The Court held that an eviction application based on personal need is maintainable only by the owner. Furthermore, it established that while attornment generally creates an estoppel, a tenant is not precluded from challenging the landlord's title if such attornment was induced by misrepresentation or ignorance of the true facts regarding ownership. The Rent Controller possesses the jurisdiction to scrutinize the genuineness of title claims central to the maintainability of eviction proceedings.
Questions settled- Can a landlord maintain an eviction application on the ground of personal need if the landlord is not the owner of the premises?
- Is a tenant estopped from challenging a landlord's title if the attornment was made under a misrepresentation of ownership?
- Does a Rent Controller have the jurisdiction to examine the genuineness of an alleged gift of property when determining the maintainability of an eviction application?
- Can a person who is not the owner of the property maintain an eviction application under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 for personal need?
- Muhammad Ismail vs Ghous Bux and another1990 P Cr. L J 2013 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal miscellaneous application was filed by the complainant, Muhammad Ismail, seeking the cancellation of pre-arrest bail granted to respondent No. 1, Ghous Bux, a Headmaster who was implicated in Crime No. 79 of 1989 under sections 302, 34, and 114 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 13-D of the Arms Ordinance 1965. The core legal question was whether the pre-arrest bail granted by the Additional Sessions Judge was justified and warranted cancellation, particularly regarding the scope of pre-conditions for pre-arrest bail and the consideration of the merits of the case. The Sindh High Court held that the conditions for pre-arrest bail laid down in previous precedents are illustrative rather than exhaustive, and merits of the case can be touched while granting pre-arrest bail. The Court ruled that since the respondent was a Government servant attributed only with instigation and his arrest would cause unjustified disgrace and potential suspension on evidence making out a case for further inquiry, no exception could be taken to the lower court's order. The application for cancellation of bail was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether the conditions laid down for the grant of pre-arrest bail are exhaustive or illustrative?
- Can the merits of a criminal case be touched while considering an application for pre-arrest bail?
- Whether pre-arrest bail granted to an accused should be cancelled when no misuse of the concession of bail is shown and the evidence makes out a case of further inquiry?
- Muhammad Ishtiaq and anothers vs Prince Glass Works Ltd. and another1990 MLD 916 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-02Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Ishaque vs The State1990 MLD 1519 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-08Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Ibrahim vs The State1990 PLD Karachi 250 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This revision application was filed under Section 439 and Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, challenging an order of a Special Court constituted under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, which rejected the applicant's request to recall a witness. The core legal question was whether a revision application is maintainable against an order passed by a Special Court established under the 1975 Act. The Court held that the revision application was not maintainable. The ratio decidendi is that a Special Court constituted under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, is not an inferior or subordinate court to the High Court for the purposes of revision under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court affirmed that the 1975 Act, particularly Section 7 and Section 10, explicitly limits the High Court's jurisdiction, excluding the power to revise sentences or proceedings of the Special Court, except as specifically provided by the Act. Consequently, the High Court lacks the authority to exercise revisional or inherent powers over such proceedings.
Questions settled- Is a Special Court constituted under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, a court subordinate to the High Court for the purposes of revision?
- Does the High Court have the authority to exercise revisional jurisdiction under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 against an order of a Special Court established under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975?
- Do the provisions of the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, override the general revisional powers of the High Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Muhammad Nawaz Khan vs The State and another1990 P Cr. L J 986 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-25Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Haroon vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1994 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-13Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Hanif vs The State and 2 others1990 P Cr. L J 975 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-02Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Farouk Dossa vs Mrs. Qudsia Dossa and 2 others1990 MLD 2016 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance regarding an agreement to purchase a flat. The defendants, having offered the property to the plaintiff and his brothers, subsequently refused to execute the sale deed, objecting to the plaintiff’s nomination of his son as the purchaser and claiming the plaintiff breached the agreement by seeking to purchase the property individually rather than jointly. The court held that the defendants' refusal was unjustified. It determined that in the absence of a contractual prohibition against assignment, a purchaser is entitled to nominate a third party, and the seller cannot unilaterally reject such a nominee. Furthermore, the court affirmed that co-promisees may validly assign their interests to one of their number, who may then enforce the contract specifically. The court emphasized that the defendants' attempt to cancel the contract was mala fide, as the plaintiff had complied with the terms of the offer. Consequently, the court decreed specific performance, directing the defendants to execute the sale deed in favor of the plaintiff.
Questions settled- Can a purchaser nominate a third party to purchase property under a contract of sale if the agreement does not expressly prohibit assignment?
- Is a contract of sale enforceable by one co-promisee if other co-promisees have assigned their interests to that individual?
- Does a seller have the legal right to reject a nominee of the purchaser in the absence of a contractual clause restricting assignment?
- Muhammad Farooq and 3 others vs State Bank of Pakistan through the Assistant Director Control Department, State Bank of Pakistan, Central Directorate, KarachiComplainant1990 MLD 293 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-21Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Bux vs The State1990 MLD 1996 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-14Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Ayub Memon vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 41 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a criminal miscellaneous application by Muhammad Ayub Memon and Qasim Soomro seeking post-arrest bail in a case registered under section 399 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Joharabad, relating to the alleged preparation for dacoity. The core legal question was whether merely sitting in a graveyard while armed with deadly weapons constitutes preparation for committing dacoity under the law. The Sindh High Court held that the evidence collected by the police—showing only that the applicants were found sitting in a graveyard and possessed weapons—was insufficient to establish an offence under section 399, P.P.C., as mere possession of weapons without proof of a design or conspiracy to commit dacoity does not amount to preparation. Consequently, the Court ruled that the case fell within the scope of further inquiry under subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, laying down the principle that mere presence with weapons does not satisfy the legal requirements of preparation for dacoity without showing an underlying intention or plan to commit the crime, thereby entitling the accused to bail.
Questions settled- Does merely sitting in a graveyard while armed with weapons constitute preparation for committing dacoity under section 399 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Whether possession of firearms alone is sufficient to establish an offence of making preparation for committing dacoity?
- When does a criminal case fall within the purview of further inquiry for the grant of bail under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Muhammad Ashraf vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 765 · Sindh High Court · 1989-05-28Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Ashraf vs Muhammad Tahir and 6 others1990 MLD 2399 · Sindh High Court · 1990-08-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal, filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, challenged the dismissal of a pre-emption suit by the Senior Civil Judge, Sukkur. The core legal question was whether the appellant had performed the mandatory Talab-e-Mowasibat (immediate demand) with the requisite promptitude under Islamic law to sustain his claim of pre-emption. The court held that the appeal must fail, affirming the trial court's decision. Evidence established that the appellant delayed the Talab-e-Mowasibat by approximately thirty minutes to gather witnesses, failing to assert the right immediately upon learning of the sale. The court laid down the principle that under Sunni law, the right of pre-emption is of a feeble nature, requiring the Talab-e-Mowasibat to be made with the utmost promptitude; any delay, even of minutes or seconds, defeats the right. Furthermore, the court clarified that the cause of action for pre-emption accrues upon the completion of the sale, determined by the parties' intention and execution of the sale deed, rather than the date of registration.
Questions settled- Does a delay of thirty minutes in making the Talab-e-Mowasibat defeat the right of pre-emption?
- Is the right of pre-emption lost if the Talab-e-Mowasibat is not made immediately upon knowledge of the sale?
- Does the cause of action for pre-emption accrue on the date of the execution of the sale deed or the date of registration?
- Muhammad Ashraf and 3 others vs The State1990 MLD 99 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-19Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Ameen vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 84 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal under Section 410 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was filed by the appellant challenging his conviction and sentence under Sections 489-B and 489-C of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, ordered by the Sessions Judge (South), Karachi, for allegedly dealing in and possessing counterfeit prize bonds. The core legal questions involved whether the search of the appellant's premises complied with the mandatory statutory safeguards under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether the testimony of stock search witnesses and an unreliable decoy witness could sustain a criminal conviction. The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant. The Court held that Section 103 applies when a place or shop is searched, requiring respectable local inhabitants as recovery witnesses to guard against fabrication. Since the prosecution relied on a stock FIA witness who committed perjury and a suspended officer under corruption charges as a decoy witness, the case against the appellant was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Questions settled- Does Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to the search of a shop or business premises?
- Can a conviction be legally sustained on the evidence of a stock witness who repeatedly acts as a recovery witness for investigative agencies?
- What is the evidentiary value of a search conducted without associating respectable inhabitants of the locality as required by Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Muhammad Ali vs The State1990 MLD 65 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-08Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Akbar and 10 others vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 50 · Sindh High Court · 1989-06-14Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Ahmad vs Pakistan and others1990 PLC (C.S.) 185 · Sindh High Court · 1986-02-18Read full judgment →
- Muhammad Achar vs The State1990 PLD Karachi 314 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arises from the judgment of the Sessions Judge convicting the appellant under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentencing him to death with a fine and compensation for the murder of Master Ghulam Sarwar. The core legal questions involve the reliability of related eye-witnesses, the weight to be given to medical evidence regarding the distance of firing vis-a-vis ocular testimony, and the validity of recoveries made in non-compliance with Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Sindh High Court held that where ocular testimony directly contradicts medical evidence regarding the presence of charring and the distance of firing, and where recovery witnesses are not from the local area as mandated by statute, the prosecution's case becomes highly doubtful. The court laid down that medical evidence based on exact observation must prevail over inconsistent ocular testimony, that recoveries from outside the locality without local mashirs are unreliable, and that the benefit of such doubts must be given to the accused, leading to the acquittal of the appellant.
Questions settled- Whether closely related eye-witnesses can be relied upon without independent corroboration in a murder trial?
- Does medical evidence regarding the distance of firing prevail over inconsistent ocular testimony?
- What is the evidentiary value of recoveries made in violation of the requirement to associate respectable inhabitants of the locality as search witnesses under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Whether prompt lodging of a First Information Report can cure fundamental contradictions between ocular and medical evidence?
- Mst. Tauqir Fatima vs Iqbal Mehdi Shah and another1990 P Cr. L J 342 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, was filed by a mother seeking the recovery of her seven-month-old son from his paternal grandparents. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court possesses jurisdiction to adjudicate child custody matters under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, or if such disputes are exclusively reserved for the Family Court or Guardian Judge. The Court held that while the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 provides the primary forum for custody disputes, the High Court retains jurisdiction under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to intervene in exceptional cases where custody has been disturbed illegally or improperly. Recognizing the infant’s tender age and the mother’s entitlement under personal law, the Court granted interim custody to the mother, directing the Guardian Judge to decide the permanent custody suit within six months. The judgment establishes that Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 proceedings are summary in nature and do not overlap with, but rather complement, the jurisdiction of the Guardian Judge, serving as an efficacious, speedy remedy in urgent situations without prejudicing final adjudication by the competent court.
Questions settled- Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to determine the custody of a minor?
- Are the proceedings under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 mutually exclusive?
- Can the High Court grant interim custody of a minor in a habeas corpus petition pending a final decision by a Guardian Judge?
- Mst. Sayyeeda Khatoon vs Ma Agha1990 MLD 1715 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-26Read full judgment →
- Mst. Sarwari vs The State and 2 others1990 P Cr. L J 1008 · Sindh High Court · 1989-12-17Read full judgment →
- Mst. Sardari Begum vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1473 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-27Read full judgment →
- Mst. Sardaran Bibi vs The State1990 PLD Karachi 233 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This revision application concerns the interpretation of Section 249 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the liability of a surety after proceedings against an accused are stopped. The applicant, who stood surety for two accused persons, sought the return of her surety documents after the Magistrate stopped the proceedings under Section 249, Cr.P.C. The Sessions Court rejected the application, reasoning that the accused had not been acquitted and thus the surety remained liable. The High Court held that the stoppage of proceedings under Section 249, Cr.P.C. effectively discharges the accused from the requirement of regular court attendance, thereby terminating the surety's liability. The Court reasoned that a surety cannot be held liable for an indefinite period when the accused is no longer required to appear before the court. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order and directed the return of the surety documents, establishing the principle that the release of an accused under Section 249, Cr.P.C. brings the surety's obligation to produce the accused to an end.
Questions settled- Does the stoppage of proceedings under Section 249 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 terminate the liability of a surety?
- Is a surety entitled to the return of surety documents when proceedings against the accused are stopped under Section 249 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Does the release of an accused under Section 249 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 require the continued presence of the accused in court?
- Mst. Sardaran Bibi and anothers vs Allahdino1990 PLD Karachi 227 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 challenged an order of the Additional District Judge rejecting an application for the restoration of an appeal dismissed in default as barred by limitation under Article 168 of the Limitation Act 1908. The core legal question was whether an appeal could be legally dismissed for default under Order XLI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the appellant's advocate merely reported 'no instructions' without following the mandatory procedure for termination of vakalatnama and obtaining the leave of the court under Order III, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and the Sindh Civil Court Rules. The Sindh High Court held that an advocate's appointment continues until determined in accordance with the law, and a mere oral statement of 'no instructions' does not terminate the engagement or constitute non-appearance of the appellant. Consequently, the dismissal order was void and inoperative, meaning the restoration application fell under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 governed by the residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 rather than Article 168. The appeal was allowed, and the original appeal was restored for a decision on merits.
Questions settled- Can an advocate effectively terminate their engagement by merely reporting no instructions in court without complying with the statutory procedure for withdrawal?
- Whether an appeal can be dismissed for default of appearance under Order XLI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the appellant's counsel is present in court but reports no instructions?
- What limitation article applies to an application for the restoration of an appeal dismissed via a void order of dismissal for default?
- Does an advocate's appointment continue through appellate proceedings arising from a suit unless formally terminated with the leave of the court?
- Mst. Mariam Bibi and anothers vs Mst. Ayesha Bibi and 5 others1990 MLD 920 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-26Read full judgment →
- Mst. Mariam Bi and 2 others vs The Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Religious and Minority Affairs and 4 others1990 PLD Karachi 427 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This case came before the Full Bench of the Sindh High Court upon a reference to resolve a conflict of opinion regarding the interpretation of section 10 of the Evacuee Trust Property (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975, specifically concerning the validation of transfers of urban evacuee trust properties. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners had purchased a property in an open public auction held by the Settlement Authorities in 1964, utilizing a compensation book through an agreement of association, and was issued a Provisional Transfer Order. No Permanent Transfer Deed was ever issued. Subsequently, authorities declared the property to be an evacuee trust property attached to a Dharamshala and thus void ab initio, demanding rent and initiating cancellation proceedings under the Act. The core legal question was whether a Provisional Transfer Order coupled with full payment of the transfer price satisfies the statutory requirements for validation under section 10 of the Evacuee Trust Property (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975, even in the absence of a Permanent Transfer Deed issued prior to June, 1968, and whether such an auction purchase constitutes a transfer in satisfaction of a verified claim. The court held that a Provisional Transfer Order is distinct from a Permanent Transfer Deed and cannot attain its status. For validation under section 10(1)(b) of the Act, both a bona fide transfer in satisfaction of a verified claim and the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed prior to June, 1968, are mandatory and cumulative conditions. Since the property was an evacuee trust property excluded from the compensation pool, the auction purchase by a non-claimant was void, and the lack of a Permanent Transfer Deed prior to the cut-off date precluded validation. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether a Provisional Transfer Order can be treated as equivalent to a Permanent Transfer Deed for the purposes of validation under section 10 of the Evacuee Trust Property (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975?
- Does the purchase of an urban evacuee trust property by a non-claimant in an auction through an agreement of association with a claimant constitute a transfer in satisfaction of a verified claim under the Evacuee Trust Property (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975?
- Are the requirements of a bona fide transfer and the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed prior to June, 1968, mandatory for validating the transfer of an urban evacuee trust property under section 10 of the Evacuee Trust Property (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975?
- Whether immovable evacuee properties attached to charitable, religious, or educational trusts could legally form part of the compensation pool under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
- Mst. Khalida Rehman and 2 others vs Muhammad Aqil and another1990 MLD 60 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-15Read full judgment →
- Mst. Irshad Fatima vs Aijaz Nassar1990 MLD 1758 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-30Read full judgment →
- Mst. Hamida Mullick vs Syed Mushfiq Ali Zaidi1990 MLD 325 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-05Read full judgment →
- Mst. Ghulam Fatima and 3 otherss vs Talib Hussain and 3 others1990 MLD 1782 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves two civil miscellaneous applications filed by the plaintiffs seeking an extension of time to pay deficient court-fees and amendment of a judgment passed under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, where the suit had been decreed in favor of the widow and minor children of the deceased. The core legal question was whether the High Court retained jurisdiction to extend the time for payment of court-fees or amend the judgment after a conditional decree had been passed stating that the plaint would stand rejected upon default of payment within thirty days. The court held that because the default clause was self-operating and the prescribed period had elapsed without payment, the decree became operative of its own force, rendering the court functus officio with no remaining seizin over the matter. The key principle laid down is that where a judgment or decree directs that a suit or plaint shall stand dismissed or rejected upon default of payment within a specified time, the provision operates automatically, and the court lacks power under sections 148, 149, or 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to enlarge the time once that period has expired.
Questions settled- Whether a court has the power to extend the time for payment of court-fees under section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 after the expiry of the period originally fixed by a self-executing decree?
- Does a court become functus officio once it pronounces a judgment containing a conditional clause that the plaint shall stand rejected upon default of payment within a specified time?
- Can an appellate or trial court modify a decree or enlarge time under section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the default clause operates automatically of its own force?
- Mst. Bismillah Bano and 9 others vs The Member, Board of Revenue1990 MLD 977 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-21Read full judgment →
- Mst. Baboo Jana vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 326 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a criminal miscellaneous application filed by applicant Mst. Baboo Jana seeking post-arrest bail after being apprehended at Karachi Airport with over five kilograms of heroin powder, leading to a case registered under the Customs Act, 1969. The core legal questions involved whether a female accused and a sick, elderly person facing a non-bailable offence falling within the prohibitory clause is entitled to bail as a matter of judicial discretion under the first proviso to section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and how expert medical reports should be evaluated by the courts. The Sindh High Court held that being a woman and an elderly sick person suffering from hypertension, osteoarthritis, and piles, combined with inadequate jail hospital facilities, her case warranted the grant of bail. The court laid down the principle that the first proviso to section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, empowers courts to exercise sound judicial discretion in favor of women, minors, and sick or infirm persons, even in heinous cases, and that a judge is not bound to surrender judicial judgment blindly to expert medical opinions lacking cogent reasoning.
Questions settled- Whether a woman accused of an offence falling within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, is generally entitled to the grant of bail as a matter of sound judicial discretion?
- Is a court legally bound to surrender its judgment blindly to an expert medical board report regarding the health condition of an accused person?
- Whether inadequate medical facilities in a jail hospital for an elderly and sick accused can be a ground for releasing the accused on bail under the first proviso to section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
- Mst. Akhtarunnisa Begum vs Dr. Surayya Matin and others1990 MLD 1821 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-10Read full judgment →
- Mst. Aasia vs Mashhud Ahmed and another1990 P Cr. L J 847 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This application under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, was filed by a mother seeking the recovery and custody of her two minor children of tender age, alleging that their father deceitfully removed them and wrongfully confined them outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The core legal question involved whether a High Court can exercise habeas corpus jurisdiction for the custody of minors under Section 491, Cr.P.C., or if the matter falls exclusively within the domain of the Guardian Judge under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. The Sindh High Court held that the remedies under Section 491, Cr.P.C. and the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 are not mutually exclusive, and in exceptional cases of illegal or improper removal of minors of tender age, the High Court can exercise its summary jurisdiction to restore custody to the lawful guardian without prejudice to regular adjudication by a Guardian Judge. The court established that a mother's right of hizanat is superior for infants and that removing minors to defeat court proceedings is illegal.
Questions settled- Whether a petition under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is maintainable for the custody of minor children?
- Do the remedies under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 overlap or exclude each other?
- Can the High Court order the restoration of custody of minors of tender age removed outside its territorial jurisdiction?
- What is the extent of the High Court's power to deal with minors in habeas corpus proceedings?
- Mst. Aalima Ahmed vs The State and another1990 P Cr. L J 989 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-20Read full judgment →
- Mrs. Yasmeen Lari vs Registrar, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal1990 PTD 967 · Sindh High Court · 1990-07-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These constitutional petitions were filed by a husband and wife challenging the selection of their income tax returns for detailed scrutiny through a computer ballot under the Self-Assessment Scheme, the subsequent assessment and remand orders by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, and the transfer of their appeals between Commissioners of Income Tax. The core legal question addressed by the court was whether constitutional petitions under Article 199 are maintainable when an equally adequate and efficacious alternative remedy by way of a reference to the High Court exists under section 136 of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979. The Sindh High Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the statutory reference procedure under section 136 provides a comprehensive and adequate remedy capable of addressing questions of law, including jurisdictional errors, findings based on surmises, and matters of statutory construction, and that the High Court is fully competent to grant interim and ancillary relief in such references. Consequently, constitutional intervention is unwarranted unless exceptional circumstances of blatant mala fides or complete absence of jurisdiction are conclusively established.
Questions settled- Whether constitutional petitions under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan are maintainable when an adequate alternative remedy by way of reference is available under section 136 of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979?
- Does the scope of a reference under section 136 of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979, encompass questions of law arising from findings of fact based on conjectures, surmises, or no evidence?
- Is the remedy by way of a tax reference under section 136 of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979, rendered inadequate due to procedural bottlenecks or lack of power to grant interim relief?
- Mrs. Sabiha Shahid Raza vs Ahmad Construction Company (Private)1990 PLD Karachi 191 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a petition filed under Section 309 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 for the winding up of the respondent company on the ground that it is unable to pay its debts. The core legal question involves whether the petitioner, an allottee of a flat claiming refund and damages, fulfilled the mandatory statutory requirements of notice and debt under Section 306 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 to maintain a winding-up petition. The court held that the statutory notices issued by the petitioner were uncertain, ambiguous, and failed to comply with the thirty-day requirement under Section 306(a), and that the petitioner could not invoke Section 306(b) as she was not a decree-holder. The key principle laid down is that a statutory demand notice under the winding-up provisions must be clear, unambiguous, and strictly compliant with the statutory timeframes and formal requirements, and any defect renders the winding-up petition defective ab initio.
Questions settled- What are the essential legal requirements for a valid statutory demand notice under Section 306(a) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984?
- Can a person who is an allottee of property with disputed claims maintain a winding-up petition as a creditor without a clear and unambiguous debt?
- Does the provision relating to unsatisfied execution under Section 306(b) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 extend to creditors who are not decree-holders?
- What is the consequence of failing to provide the mandatory thirty-day notice period under Section 306(a) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 prior to filing a winding-up petition?
- Mrs. Majeeda Fatima vs District Magistrate and Deputy Commissioner, District Central, Karachi and 3 others1990 PLD Karachi 470 · Sindh High Court · 1990-08-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner challenged the detention of her husband under Section 3(1) of the Sindh Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960, issued by the District Magistrate, Karachi Central, ordering his detention for 30 days. The detention was based on a police report asserting vague grounds that the detenu had nefarious designs, created unrest, and instigated people against the Government, without detailing specific instances. The High Court considered whether executive satisfaction under Section 3 must be objective and substantiated by sufficient material subject to judicial review. The Court held that the statutory satisfaction must be objective rather than subjective, precluding authorities from acting arbitrarily. The High Court possesses the constitutional authority to review the underlying material to ensure lawful exercise of power. Since the respondents submitted no counter-affidavit, produced no supporting material, and relied on vague allegations without specific instances, the detention order lacked judicious application of mind. Consequently, the High Court quashed the detention order and ordered the detenu's immediate release.
Questions settled- Whether the satisfaction of the detaining authority under Section 3 of the Sindh Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960 must be objective in nature based on concrete material rather than subjective?
- Can the High Court in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction require the executive authority to disclose the material underlying a preventive detention order?
- Is a preventive detention order legally sustainable if it is based on vague and general allegations without any specific instances or supporting material?
- Mrs. Mah-E-Rukh and 24 others vs The Literacy and Mass Education1990 PLC (C.S.) 628 · Sindh High Court · 1989-07-12Read full judgment →
- Momen Khan vs Thestate1990 P Cr. L J 951 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-21Read full judgment →
- Molasses Trading & Export Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Government of Pakistan1990 MLD 893 · Sindh High Court · 1989-12-05Read full judgment →
- Molasses Trading & Export Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Govemment Of PakistanPTCL 1990 CL. 669 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- Mohabbat vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 73 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal was filed before the Sindh High Court against the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Sukkur, convicting the appellant under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of a passenger inside a bus. The prosecution's case rested on the testimony of two police officials stationed at a nearby check post who chased and apprehended the appellant immediately after the shooting, recovering a licensed gun and cartridges. Although the civilian eye-witnesses (the bus driver, cleaner, and conductor) turned hostile, the High Court held that the testimony of police officials is reliable and cannot be discarded solely due to their official status. The Court further held that under Article 17 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984, the quality of evidence prevails over quantity, and no specific number of witnesses is required to prove a murder charge. Finding the circumstantial evidence, medical reports, and positive ballistic expert report sufficient to establish guilt, the High Court maintained the conviction and dismissed the appeal.
Questions settled- Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on the testimony of police officials when civilian eye-witnesses turn hostile?
- What are the essential requirements to establish an offence based entirely on circumstantial evidence?
- Is a court bound to accept the opinion of a medical expert if the reasoning behind that opinion is not cogent?
- Does the delay in dispatching a crime weapon and empties to a ballistic expert automatically invalidate the expert's report?
- Miss Mahenau Agha vs United Liner Agencies of Pakistan Limited and 121990 PLD Karachi 198 · Sindh High Court · 1989-12-21Read full judgment →
- Miss Karin Scheppei vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 977 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-10Read full judgment →
- Miss Asma Usmani vs University of Karachi and another1990 MLD 2120 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-15Read full judgment →
- Misri Khan vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1023 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-09Read full judgment →
- Miskeen Shah vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 60 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The applicant, facing trial under Article 3/4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, sought post-arrest bail on the ground of statutory delay after a previous bail application was dismissed with directions for an expedited trial within three months. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to bail as of right due to continuous detention exceeding one year without the trial being concluded, where the delay was not occasioned by the accused. The Sindh High Court held that since the applicant had been in continuous custody for over a year for an offence not punishable with death and had not contributed to the delay, he satisfied the requirements of the third proviso to section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court laid down the principle that when statutory conditions regarding delay are fulfilled, the concession of bail must be granted as of right rather than as a matter of grace, notwithstanding the gravity of the allegations or the quantity of contraband recovered.
Questions settled- Is an accused entitled to bail as of right when continuous detention exceeds one year for an offence not punishable with death?
- Does failure to conclude a trial within the directed timeframe constitute a ground for statutory bail?
- Can bail be refused solely on the ground of recovery of a huge quantity of contraband when statutory conditions for delay are met?
- Mirza Mubarak Ahmed Nusrat vs The State and another1990 P Cr. L J 1097 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-17Read full judgment →
- Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Ltd. vs District Council, Tharparkar and 21990 MLD 317 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners challenged the imposition of export tax and toll by District Councils on goods produced within the province but destined for delivery in other provinces of Pakistan, arguing that such levies violate the freedom of trade and commerce. The core legal question was whether local export taxes imposed by district councils on goods leaving the province contravene the constitutional guarantees of freedom of inter-provincial trade under Article 151 of the Constitution of Pakistan. The court held that while general export taxes for local revenues are permissible, imposing taxes or restrictions on goods manufactured or produced in one province and intended to be transported to another province directly violates Article 151(3) of the Constitution. The court laid down the principle that what cannot be done directly by the provincial legislature cannot be done indirectly through delegated powers to local authorities, and inter-provincial trade must remain free from discriminatory provincial or local taxation unless protected by specific constitutional exceptions requiring presidential consent.
Questions settled- Does the imposition of an export tax by a district council on goods destined for another province violate Article 151 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
- Is intra-provincial trade protected under the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse guaranteed by Article 151(1) of the Constitution of Pakistan?
- Can a restriction or tax prohibited at the provincial legislative level be validly imposed through delegated powers at a subordinate local level?
- How should the determination of goods leaving a province and the issue of tax refunds be handled when interim constitutional orders have been granted?
- Mir Ali and 3 others vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 2042 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-19Read full judgment →
- Mian Muhammad Mansha vs Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central1990 PTD 244 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-07Read full judgment →
- Mian Muhammad Mansha vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Central ZonePTCL 1990 CL. 698 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- Mian Muhammad Anwar Monno O and 2 others vs Kotri Textile Mills Ltd.1990 MLD 348 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-07Read full judgment →
- Mian Muhammad Anwar and 2 others vs Mian Muhammad Waqar1990 P Cr. L J 353 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was filed by the applicants seeking the quashment of criminal proceedings pending against them under Section 448 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The applicants and the respondent are partners in a business whose premises are the subject of a pending civil suit, wherein a temporary status quo order had already been passed. The respondent subsequently filed a private criminal complaint alleging criminal trespass. The core legal question was whether criminal proceedings can be maintained when the dispute is purely of a civil nature and lacks any definite accusation of a criminal character. The Sindh High Court held that initiating criminal proceedings on a complaint that does not disclose a distinct criminal offence, but rather a civil dispute, constitutes an abuse of the process of the court. Consequently, the Court accepted the application and quashed the criminal proceedings, laying down the principle that civil litigation must not be converted into criminal prosecution to harass parties or settle private disputes.
Questions settled- Can criminal proceedings be quashed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the underlying dispute is purely of a civil nature?
- Whether a private complaint that does not contain any definite accusation of a criminal nature constitutes an abuse of the process of the court?
- What is the duty of a Magistrate under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 before issuing process in a private complaint arising from a business or civil dispute?
- Messrs. F. Rahimtoola Ltd. through its Directors and others vs Government of Sindh through Secretary, Ministry of Excise and Taxation, Sindh Secretariat, Karachi and others1990 MLD 2226 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- Messrs Zain Packaging Industry Ltd. vs Commisioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone, Karachi1990 PTD 407 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- Messrs Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan Limited vs Sindh Labour1990 PLC 268 · Sindh High Court · 1989-12-09Read full judgment →
- Messrs Usman Textile Mills Ltd. vs Assistant Collector of Central1990 PLD Karachi 324 · Sindh High Court · 1989-04-27Read full judgment →
- Messrs United Bank Limited vs Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central1990 PTD 257 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-16Read full judgment →
- Messrs TM Oil Industries Limited vs Messrs Bengal Oil Mills Ltd.1990 MLD 877 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The plaintiffs filed a suit for damages following the defendants' failure to deliver rape-seed oil-cake under two contracts. The defendants contended that the contracts were frustrated because their mill was nationalized and taken over by the government under the Hydrogenated Vegetable Oil Industry (Control and Development) Ordinance 1973, rendering performance impossible. The court addressed whether the defendants remained liable despite the government takeover. Holding in favor of the defendants, the court ruled that the contracts were frustrated by operation of law. Since the government had assumed control of the mill before the delivery deadline and the plaintiffs' exercise of their option, the defendants were effectively prevented from performing their obligations. Consequently, the defendants were absolved of liability. The court further noted that the plaintiffs failed to adequately prove the quantum of damages, as they relied on hearsay evidence and suppressed relevant documentation. The judgment affirms that the doctrine of frustration applies when an unforeseen event, such as government intervention, renders contract performance impossible, automatically terminating the agreement without fault. The suit was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Does the doctrine of frustration apply when a contract becomes impossible to perform due to government nationalization of a business?
- Is a defendant liable for breach of contract if the government takes over their business, rendering performance impossible?
- Does the burden of proof lie with the plaintiff to establish the quantum of damages in a breach of contract suit?
- Can a contract be considered frustrated if the impossibility of performance occurs due to an unforeseen government order?
- Messrs Sultan Textile Mills Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone `A'1990 PTD 241 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment by the Sindh High Court addresses Income Tax Cases relating to an assessee engaged in manufacturing cotton yarn for the assessment years 1973-74 and 1974-75. The core legal question revolved around whether there was sufficient evidence or material on record to support the Income Tax Officer's rejection of trading results and the Tribunal's estimation of sales and gross profit rates of 17.5% and 20.5% respectively. The Court held that the Tribunal fixed the gross profit rates merely on presumptions rather than on the basis of definite material or cogent evidence on record. The key principle laid down is that tax authorities and Tribunals cannot estimate sales and apply gross profit rates based on mere presumptions without supporting evidence or cogent material on the record.
Questions settled- Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case was there any basis for applying 17-1/2% and 20-1/2% as the rate of profit on the estimated sales for the assessment years 1973-74 and 1974-75 respectively?
- Whether the Tribunal was legally justified in estimating sales and directing the application of a specific rate of gross profit on estimated sales without supporting evidence?
- Can the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal fix gross profit rates merely on presumptions rather than on definite material or cogent evidence on record?
- Messrs Sultan Chemical Industries vs Government of Pakistan and 31990 MLD 313 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-09Read full judgment →
- Messrs Sterling Plywood Industries vs Collector Of CustomsPTCL1990 CL. 859 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- Messrs Shamim Brothers Limited vs The C.I.T. Central, Karachi1990 PTD 885 · Sindh High Court · 1982-04-05Read full judgment →
- Messrs Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan Ltd. vs Karachi1990 PLD Karachi 186 · Sindh High Court · 1989-12-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves a constitutional petition filed by the Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan Limited against the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation and another, challenging the demand of Octroi on rice and allied articles brought within municipal limits. The core legal question is whether the petitioner Corporation, being wholly owned by the Federal Government, is entitled to tax immunity under Article 165 of the Constitution of Pakistan in respect of its property and assets, and whether regulatory Octroi rules apply to such movement. The Sindh High Court held that by lifting the veil of incorporation, the assets and property of the petitioner Corporation in substance belong to and vest in the Federal Government, thereby qualifying for constitutional tax exemption under Article 165. However, the Court ruled that such exemption does not grant absolute and unbridled freedom from regulatory procedures, and the Corporation must still comply with procedural safeguards, warehousing provisions, and certification rules under the Municipal Committees Octroi Rules 1964 to prevent tax evasion.
Questions settled- Whether a wholly owned federal corporation can claim tax exemption under Article 165 of the Constitution of Pakistan in respect of its property?
- Does lifting the veil of incorporation reveal that the assets of the Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan vest in the Federal Government?
- Are the properties of the Federal Government exempt from municipal taxation such as Octroi under the Sindh Local Government Ordinance, 1979?
- Can constitutional jurisdiction be invoked directly when an impugned action is manifestly without jurisdiction, bypassing alternative remedies?
- Messrs Ramzan Ice and Cold Storage vs Karachi Elect_____ Ric1990 MLD 999 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-18Read full judgment →
- Messrs R.C.D. Ball Bearings Limited vs The Sindh Labour Appellate1990 PLC 3 · Sindh High Court · 1989-02-27Read full judgment →
- Messrs National and Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs Arshad Ali Khalid Qureshi1990 PLD Karachi 436 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This application was filed under Order IX Rule 13 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on behalf of defendant No. 2 to set aside an ex parte judgment and decree passed against him. The core legal questions involved whether the failure of a counsel to notice a case in the cause list constitutes sufficient cause for absence, and whether an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is maintainable when a judgment is passed on merits in the absence of a party. The court held that the omission of the counsel's name from the weekly cause list, leading to a failure to note the hearing date, constituted a sufficient cause for absence, and that a judgment passed in the absence of a party is ex parte notwithstanding that it was considered on merits. The key principle laid down is that minor lapses and human errors by a counsel in noting cause lists can be condoned as sufficient cause under Order IX Rule 13, and a judgment delivered in the absence of the defendant is considered ex parte even if the court proceeded to decide the issues on merits.
Questions settled- Whether the failure of a counsel to notice a case in the cause list constitutes sufficient cause for absence under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Is an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 maintainable when a judgment has been passed on merits in the absence of the defendant?
- Does a judgment passed in the absence of a party qualify as an ex parte judgment notwithstanding the fact that the court considered the issues on merits?
- Messrs Nadir Brothers vs Haji Muhammad and another1990 MLD 1720 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-15Read full judgment →
- Messrs Mustafa Prestressed, R.C.C. Pipe Works Limited, Karachi vs Commissioner of Sales Tax (Investigation), Karachi1990 PTD 974 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-23Read full judgment →
- Messrs Mumtaz Steel Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. through Managing Director1990 PLD Karachi 335 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, challenged the elections of the Pakistan Steel Rerolling Mills Association held on 28-11-1989, on grounds of alleged manipulation of votes and wrongful rejection of proxies. The respondents raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petition, contending that sections 9 and 12 of the Trade Organization Ordinance, 1961, provide an adequate alternative statutory remedy and forum for resolving disputes concerning trade organization elections. The Sindh High Court held that since the Trade Organization Ordinance, 1961, establishes a complete machinery for redressing grievances relating to the elections and management of trade organizations, including matters concerning proxies, the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked prematurely before exhausting available statutory remedies. Consequently, the petition was dismissed in limine, with a direction to the Director of Trade Organizations to decide the petitioner's representation within a stipulated timeframe.
Questions settled- Can a constitutional petition be maintained against the election of a trade organization when the Trade Organization Ordinance, 1961 provides an adequate alternative remedy?
- Does the Trade Organization Ordinance, 1961 provide complete machinery for resolving election grievances including proxy irregularities?
- Is a suit or petition challenging the validity of a trade organization's acts barred without first exhausting statutory remedies and arbitration mechanisms?
- Messrs Middle East Bank Ltd. vs Zubair Ahmed Khan Afghani1990 MLD 909 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a revision application filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, challenging an order of the Banking Tribunal for Sindh, which rejected the plaintiff's application to amend their plaint under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question was whether a revision application is maintainable before the High Court against an interlocutory order passed by a Banking Tribunal established under the Banking Tribunals Ordinance 1984. The Court held that the Banking Tribunals Ordinance 1984 is a special statute that provides a self-contained procedure. It noted that while Section 9 of the Ordinance provides for appeals against decrees, it contains no provision for revision or review, and Section 10 grants finality to the Tribunal's orders, effectively ousting the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain revision petitions. The Court affirmed the principle that the power of revision is a substantive right that must be expressly conferred by statute; in the absence of such conferment, the High Court lacks jurisdiction to scrutinize orders of the Banking Tribunal.
Questions settled- Is a revision application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 maintainable against an order passed by a Banking Tribunal?
- Does the Banking Tribunals Ordinance 1984 confer revisional jurisdiction upon the High Court?
- Are orders passed by a Banking Tribunal, other than those appealable under Section 9 of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance 1984, immune from scrutiny by the High Court?
- Messrs M.R.Sons vs M/s. Junaid Associates (Private) Ltd.1990 PLD Karachi 387 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil suit for pre-emption was filed by the plaintiffs (Messrs M.R. Sons) against the defendant (M/s. Junaid Associates (Private) Ltd.) in respect of an adjoining property situated on Tariq Road, Karachi. The plaintiffs claimed pre-emption rights as adjoining owners under Islamic (Muhammadan) Law. The defendant resisted the suit, contending that both parties held mere leasehold rights, the suit property was commercial, and pre-emption laws were inapplicable. The core legal questions pertained to whether pre-emption rights apply to leasehold properties and whether such rights extend to commercial buildings in large urban areas. The High Court of Sindh held that while perpetual, heritable, and transferable leasehold rights may satisfy the requirement of ownership (milk) for pre-emption purposes, the right of pre-emption cannot be enforced in respect of commercial properties. The court reasoned that the principle of pre-emption is grounded on preventing inconvenience from a disagreeable neighbour to protect domestic family privacy, which does not apply to commercial properties or plots governed by co-operative society bye-laws. Consequently, the suit was dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether the right of pre-emption under Muhammadan Law applies to commercial properties?
- Can a holder of permanent, heritable, and transferable leasehold rights claim a right of pre-emption as an owner?
- Whether the Islamic law of pre-emption applies to plot transfers governed by the bye-laws of a co-operative housing society?
- Messrs Khas Traders vs Registrar, Trade Unions and another1990 PLC 351 · Sindh High Court · 1989-02-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenged the registration of a trade union by the Registrar of Trade Unions, alleging that the union failed to meet statutory membership requirements and that its office-bearers included unauthorized outsiders. The petitioner sought to invalidate the registration under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The Court held that a certificate of registration issued by the Registrar serves as conclusive evidence of the union's valid registration. Furthermore, the Court determined that disputed questions of fact regarding union membership and the status of workmen cannot be adjudicated within the scope of constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, as the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 provides a specific, self-contained machinery for such grievances. The Court also ruled that the petitioner lacked the necessary locus standi to challenge the registration at this stage, as mere registration does not immediately affect the employer's rights until the union seeks status as a Collective Bargaining Agent. Consequently, the petition was dismissed in limine.
Questions settled- Is a certificate of registration issued by the Registrar of Trade Unions conclusive evidence of the fact that the union has been duly registered?
- Can the High Court adjudicate disputed questions of fact regarding union membership in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction?
- Does an employer have the locus standi to challenge the registration of a trade union before the union has sought status as a Collective Bargaining Agent?
- Does the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 provide an exclusive remedy for challenging the registration of a trade union?
- Messrs Kamran Industries Limited vs Deputy Collector, Central Excise1990 PTD 605 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-25Read full judgment →
- Messrs Jugotekstil Impex, 61001, Lubijana Yugosa La Via vs Messrs Shams1990 MLD 857 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This High Court appeal challenged a single judge's order refusing to make a 'Foreign Award' a rule of the court. The primary legal questions concerned whether a 'Foreign Award' is chargeable with stamp duty under the Stamp Act 1899, whether the arbitration agreement was novated, and whether the arbitration clause was too vague to be enforceable. The Court held that a 'Foreign Award' under the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act 1937 does not qualify as an 'Award' under Article 12 of the Stamp Act 1899, and thus is not chargeable with stamp duty. Regarding novation, the Court found that since the pre-conditions for the subsequent agreement were not satisfied, the original agreement remained operative. Finally, the Court affirmed that the arbitration clause was inherently vague and unworkable because it provided alternative forums without specifying the mechanism for selection, rendering the resulting award unenforceable. The key principle established is that fiscal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the subject, and 'Foreign Awards' are distinct from domestic awards under the Stamp Act 1899.
Questions settled- Is a 'Foreign Award' under the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act 1937 chargeable with stamp duty under Article 12 of the Stamp Act 1899?
- Can an arbitration clause providing alternative forums without a selection mechanism be enforced?
- Does a subsequent contract that fails to meet its own pre-conditions operate as a novation of an earlier contract under Section 62 of the Contract Act 1872?
- Can a delay in filing an appeal be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 due to a bona fide mistake of counsel regarding the appellate forum?
- Messrs Jennings Private School vs Income-Tax Officer, Salary Circle-1990 PTD 873 · Sindh High Court · 1990-06-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenged the validity of a notice issued by an Income-Tax Officer under Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, seeking to reopen an assessment for the year 1984-85. The petitioner, an educational institution, argued that all relevant material, including sale deeds and loan documents, had been fully disclosed during the original assessment process, and that the reopening was based on a mere change of opinion rather than new, definite information. The core legal question was whether the Income-Tax Officer could invoke Section 65 to reopen an assessment when no new facts had emerged and the original assessment was finalized after the assessee disclosed all material facts. The Court held that the notice was without lawful authority. It established that the power to reopen an assessment under Section 65 requires 'definite information' and cannot be exercised based on a mere change of opinion or suspicion where the assessing authority had previously scrutinized the same material. Consequently, the Court declared the impugned notices and subsequent proceedings void and of no legal effect.
Questions settled- Can an Income-Tax Officer reopen an assessment under Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 based solely on a change of opinion regarding previously disclosed facts?
- Does the existence of an alternate remedy under the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 absolutely bar a High Court from exercising jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Is the requirement of 'definite information' a mandatory condition precedent for initiating proceedings under Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979?
- Can an assessment finalized under the self-assessment scheme be reopened under Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 without the discovery of new material facts?
- Messrs Independent Newspapers Corporation Limited, Karachi vs Implementation Tribunal for Newspaper Employees Government of Pakistan and 3 others1990 PLC 612 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-11Read full judgment →
- Messrs Hamdard Dawakhana (Waof) Pakistan vs The Commissioner of Income Tax Central Zone-B, Karachi and1990 PTD 955 · Sindh High Court · 1990-06-18Read full judgment →
- Messrs Gul Ahmed Textile Mills Ltd. vs The Collector of Customs1990 MLD 126 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This Constitutional petition challenged an order by the Assistant Collector of Customs demanding payment of short-levied customs duty on imported Polyester Staple Fibre. The core legal questions were whether a declaration under Section 3 of the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act 1931 could validly apply to a reduction in customs duty, and whether the availability of departmental remedies barred the invocation of constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Court held that a declaration under the 1931 Act is strictly limited to the imposition or increase of taxes; it cannot apply to reductions or remissions. Consequently, the initial reduction was ultra vires, and the recovery order was upheld. Regarding jurisdiction, the Court established that where a serious question of law requires interpretation, constitutional jurisdiction may be invoked directly, as departmental remedies are inadequate for determining legal questions. The principle laid down is that the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act 1931 does not authorize declarations for tax reductions, and sub-constitutional tribunals cannot be the final judges of their own jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Can a declaration under Section 3 of the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act 1931 be issued for a reduction in customs duty?
- Does the availability of departmental remedies bar the invocation of constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 when a serious question of law is involved?
- Is a declaration under the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act 1931 limited only to the imposition or increase of taxes?
- Messrs Finest Corporation vs The Collector of Customs, Appraisement and 2 others1990 PLD Karachi 338 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves a constitutional petition filed against the orders of customs authorities and the revisional authority dismissing the petitioners' appeal regarding the confiscation of a detained consignment and imposition of penalties. The core legal question was whether the petitioners had the requisite knowledge or reason to believe under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969, regarding the misdeclaration and wrong shipment of imported goods. The Sindh High Court held that the concurrent findings of the customs tribunals were based on proper appreciation of facts and circumstances, establishing that the petitioners had reason to believe the goods were misdescribed. The court laid down the principle that 'knowledge' under Section 32 of the Customs Act, being a state of mind, is often difficult to prove by direct evidence and must generally be established through circumstantial evidence and the likelihood of the offender having reason to believe the act constituted a violation.
Questions settled- Whether knowledge or reason to believe under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969 can be established through circumstantial evidence?
- Can a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 be used to conduct a detailed inquiry into disputed questions of fact?
- Whether the revisional authority under the Customs Act, 1969 is legally bound to afford a personal hearing at a specific location despite the party's absence?