Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 46,805 judgments in total from the Sindh High Court.

• Gopaldas vs Riaz Ahmed Qureshi1990 MLD 2212 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-29Read full judgment →
• Gohram vs The State1990 MLD 1580 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-02Read full judgment →
• Glaxo Laboratories. vs Commissioner Of Income TaxPTCL 1990 CL. 364 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-17Read full judgment →
• Glaxo Laboratories vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1990 PTD 54 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-17Read full judgment →
• Girdharilal vs The State1990 MLD 1568 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-08Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Waris vs Riaz Ahmad, Advocate1990 MLD 2300 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-29
  ejectmentdefault in rentchange in ownershippersonal bona fide needservice of noticecommercial premises
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal filed under section 21 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 against the order of the Rent Controller directing the ejectment of the appellant-tenant from commercial premises on the grounds of default in rent payment and the landlord's bona fide personal need for an advocate's office. The core legal questions involved whether the service of notice under section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 was duly proved and whether the landlord's personal need was established despite a prior ejectment order against another tenant. The Sindh High Court held that the service of notice was sufficiently proved by examining the postman, rendering a handwriting expert unnecessary, and that the tenant remained a defaulter in any event. The Court further held that the landlord's personal need was genuine and he was not required to disclose every rented property in his ejectment application. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, upholding the eviction order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether examination of the postman is sufficient to prove service of notice under section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 without referring the disputed A.D. receipt to a handwriting expert?
  • Does an ejectment application itself serve as sufficient notice of a change in ownership under section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Is a landlord required to disclose in an ejectment application all other properties rented out to different tenants when claiming personal bona fide need?
  • Does the mere obtaining of a favourable ejectment order against another tenant extinguish a landlord's right to seek eviction of the current tenant when possession has not yet been delivered?
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• Ghulam Murtaza Rajpur and another vs Secretary, Pakistan Medical1990 PLC (C.S.) 661 · Sindh High Court · 1989-07-26Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Murtaza Qureshi vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 323 · Sindh High Court · -
  pre-arrest bailanticipatory bailplea of alibimurderFIRcriminal procedureharassment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for pre-arrest bail by an accused charged with murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question is whether the applicant is entitled to anticipatory bail when he raises a plausible plea of alibi supported by official documentation and sworn testimony, despite his name appearing in the FIR. The Sindh High Court held that the applicant was entitled to bail, finding that the distance between the crime scene and the location of the applicant at the time of the incident made his presence at the scene highly improbable. The Court emphasized that a plea of alibi supported by credible evidence cannot be dismissed merely because the accused is named in the FIR. The key principle laid down is that the provisions for anticipatory bail under Section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are intended to protect innocent individuals from harassment and disgrace caused by motivated or trumped-up charges, necessitating a judicial assessment of all evidence rather than relying solely on the FIR.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea of alibi supported by official testimony justify the grant of pre-arrest bail despite the accused being named in the FIR?
  • What is the primary objective of granting anticipatory bail under Section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the mere mention of an accused's name in an FIR preclude the court from considering a plea of alibi for the purpose of bail?
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• Ghulam Muhammad and 8 others vs Sijawal Hussain and 7 others1990 MLD 2412 · Sindh High Court · 1990-08-27Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain vs The State and others1990 MLD 1092 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-29Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Haider vs The STATEOpponent1990 MLD 1164 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-19Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Siddique vs District Magistrate Thatta at Makli and another1990 MLD 2243 · Sindh High Court · 1990-06-28Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Ahmed vs Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and 2 others1990 PLC (C.S.) 385 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-31
  termination of serviceworkmanstanding ordersindustrial relationsreinstatementback benefitslabour law
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Head Clerk, challenged the termination of his services, which was effected via a letter stating only that his services were "no longer required." The Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal upheld the termination. The core legal question was whether the phrase "services no longer required" constitutes a valid, explicit reason for termination under the mandatory requirements of Standing Order 12(3) of the West Pakistan Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. The High Court held that the termination order was illegal and of no legal effect. The court reasoned that Standing Order 12(3) mandates that an order of termination must explicitly and clearly state the reasons for the action to enable the workman to challenge it effectively. A vague statement like "services no longer required" is merely an expression of employer whim, not a reason, and fails to satisfy the statutory requirement. Consequently, the court declared the termination illegal, ordered reinstatement, but denied back benefits as the petitioner had been gainfully employed elsewhere.

  Questions settled

  • Does the phrase 'services no longer required' satisfy the requirement to provide explicit reasons for termination under Standing Order 12(3) of the West Pakistan Standing Orders Ordinance 1968?
  • Is an employer required to disclose the specific reasons for termination in the written order itself, even if those reasons are later established in evidence?
  • Can a court deny back benefits to a wrongfully terminated employee who was gainfully employed during the period of their termination?
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• Ghulam Abbas vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 88 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-06Read full judgment →
• Ghazanfar Ali and another vs Cherat Cement Company and another1990 MLD 1696 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-08Read full judgment →
• G. M. Khan vs Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and 2 others1990 PLC 272 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-03Read full judgment →
• Fouj Ali and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 995 · Sindh High Court · 1989-07-02Read full judgment →
• Firdous Barkat Ali vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 967 · Sindh High Court · 1989-06-13Read full judgment →
• Farooq A. Ghaffar and 3 others vs Muhammad Amin Sultani and another1990 P Cr. L J 984 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-06Read full judgment →
• Fakir Ali vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 72 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-03Read full judgment →
• Faiz Muhammad vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1243 · Sindh High Court · 1990-02-22Read full judgment →
• Export Processing Zones Authority, Karachi vs The StateK.L.R. 1990 Labour & Service Cases 38 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-23Read full judgment →
• Executive Director and 2 others vs Moatabar Khan and 3 others1990 PLC 798 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-27Read full judgment →
• Evergreen Industries vs Assistant Director, Labour, West Division and 2 others1990 PLC 750 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-10Read full judgment →
• Eruch Maneckji and another vs Commissioner of Income-Tax, Karachi1990 PTD 572 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-29Read full judgment →
• Emirates Bank International Ltd. vs Super Drivein Ltd. and 8 others1990 MLD 538 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-28
  leave to defendbanking companies ordinanceverification of pleadingsoaths actcorporate mergerlimitation periodguarantor liabilitycivil procedure code
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns applications for leave to defend in recovery suits filed by a bank against principal debtors and guarantors. The defendants challenged the bank's merger, the authority of the bank's attorneys to institute proceedings, the limitation period, and the validity of the verification of the plaints. The court held that the merger of the foreign banks was valid and that the bank's attorneys were duly authorized under Order XXIX, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Regarding limitation, the court determined that the period commenced when the contract was breached, not when the goods were released. Crucially, the court ruled that following the amendment to the Oaths Act by Ordinance XXVII of 1981, a Muslim must verify pleadings on oath rather than solemn affirmation; thus, the existing verification was defective. Consequently, the court granted the defendants conditional leave to defend, provided they furnish security for the claimed amounts and rectify the verification of the plaints within one month. The judgment clarifies procedural requirements for corporate litigation and the mandatory nature of oaths for Muslim deponents in pleadings.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Muslim required to verify pleadings on oath rather than solemn affirmation following the amendment to the Oaths Act?
  • Does the limitation period for a suit against a guarantor commence from the date of the breach of contract?
  • Is a resolution of the Board of Directors strictly necessary to authorize an attorney to file a suit on behalf of a corporation under Order XXIX, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Emirates Bank International Ltd. vs Messrs Oosman Brothers and 91990 MLD 1779 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-30
  foreign judgmentrecovery of loansBanking Companies Ordinancesuit for recoveryex parte decreecause of actionleave to defend
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a suit for recovery of money filed by a bank against defendants based on a foreign judgment obtained in Dubai, with an alternative claim under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether a suit based on a foreign judgment is maintainable in Pakistan, and whether the provisions of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, apply to such a suit. The Court held that a decree-holder has three options upon obtaining a foreign judgment: executing it under Section 44-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (if applicable), filing a suit based on the foreign judgment as a cause of action, or filing a suit on the original cause of action. The Court determined that the plaintiff could pursue both the foreign judgment and the original cause of action simultaneously. Finding that the defendants were duly served and failed to appear or seek leave to defend, the Court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff, establishing that a foreign judgment does not preclude a suit on the original cause of action.

  Questions settled

  • What are the three courses of action available to a decree-holder upon obtaining a foreign judgment?
  • Does a foreign judgment extinguish the original cause of action?
  • Can a suit be filed simultaneously on the basis of a foreign judgment and the original cause of action?
  • Does the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979 apply to a suit based on a foreign judgment?
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• Ejaz Hussain alias Ejaz Ahmed and another vs Messrs Hotel Jabees Ltd.1990 PLC 643 · Sindh High Court · 1990-02-04
  retrenchmentlast-in-first-outlabour lawtermination of serviceindustrial disputereinstatementStanding Orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This Constitution petition challenged an order of the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal regarding the termination of the petitioners' services by the respondent establishment. The core legal question was whether the employer complied with the 'last-in-first-out' principle mandated by Standing Order 13 during retrenchment, specifically concerning the categorization of employees across multiple business units. The High Court held that the Tribunal misinterpreted the evidence. Admissions by the respondent's witness confirmed that room-bearers, waiters, and bearers across the employer's various business concerns (Hotel Jabees, Funland, Playland, and Kababish) belonged to the same category. Consequently, the employer failed to comply with Standing Order 13 by not retrenching the junior-most employees across all these units before terminating the petitioners. The Court established that for retrenchment purposes, all employees of a specific category within an establishment must be treated as a single body, regardless of their specific work location. Furthermore, the Court held that an illegal termination cannot be legalized by a subsequent offer of re-employment. The impugned order was set aside, and the Labour Court's reinstatement order was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of 'last-in-first-out' under Standing Order 13 require an employer to consider all employees of a specific category across all business units of an establishment for retrenchment purposes?
  • Can an illegal termination of service be cured by a subsequent offer of re-employment under Standing Order 14?
  • Whether an employer can treat employees at different business branches as separate categories to avoid the 'last-in-first-out' rule when those employees perform the same nature of work?
  Read full judgment →
• Eastern Federal Insurance Co. vs Muhammad Iqbal1990 PLD Karachi 307 · Sindh High Court · 1990-02-04Read full judgment →
• Dr. Asaf Hussain Jafri vs K. B. Bhutto, ADVOCATEContemner1990 PLD Karachi 173 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-31
  contempt of courtprofessional misconductadvocate and clientconfidential communicationconsent orderquasi-criminal proceedingsbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves contempt proceedings initiated against an advocate (the alleged contemner) upon a complaint by his client alleging that the advocate improperly consented to a remand order in a rent appeal without authorization. The core legal questions concern whether the advocate committed contempt of court through a letter explaining the background of the consent order to his client, and whether the communication enjoyed privilege as a confidential professional communication. The Sindh High Court held that the contempt charge was not established, as the advocate acted under a genuine misunderstanding of the proceedings and the letter did not scandalize the court or impute improper motives, but merely provided a factual explanation to his client. Furthermore, the court emphasized that contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal, requiring all doubts to be resolved in favor of the accused, and that courts should not be used by litigants to settle private scores or vendettas against their counsel. The key principles laid down include that private correspondence between an advocate and a client explaining judicial proceedings in good faith does not constitute contempt, and the benefit of doubt in quasi-criminal contempt matters must be extended to the alleged contemner.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an advocate's letter to a client explaining the circumstances of a consent order amounts to contempt of court?
  • Should the benefit of doubt in quasi-criminal contempt proceedings be extended to the alleged contemner when divergent versions exist?
  • Are private communications between an advocate and a client protected as confidential under the law of evidence?
  • Can contempt proceedings be utilized by a litigant to settle private grievances or vendettas against their counsel?
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• Dr. Ali Gul and others vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 393 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-05Read full judgment →
• Dr. Akhtr Hussain vs S.M. Hanif and 2 others1990 MLD 1652 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-16
  specific performanceres judicatajoinder of claimswithdrawal of suitrejection of plaintcause of actioncivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a suit for specific performance, possession, and cancellation of documents filed by the plaintiff against the defendants. The plaintiff had previously filed a suit regarding the same property but omitted the prayer for specific performance, despite having knowledge of the breach of contract and the defendants' subsequent sale of the property to a third party. The plaintiff subsequently withdrew the first suit unconditionally without seeking permission to file a fresh one, while the current suit was already pending. The core legal question was whether the present suit for specific performance is barred by law due to the plaintiff's failure to include this relief in the previous suit and the subsequent unconditional withdrawal of that suit. The Court held that the suit is barred under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The ratio establishes that a plaintiff must include the whole claim arising from a cause of action in a single suit. Failure to do so, or withdrawing a suit without leave to file a fresh one, precludes the plaintiff from subsequently suing for the omitted relief, as per the principles of res judicata and the mandatory joinder of claims.

  Questions settled

  • Does the unconditional withdrawal of a suit without permission to file a fresh one bar a subsequent suit for the same cause of action?
  • Is a plaintiff required to include all claims arising from a single cause of action in one suit under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a plaintiff sue for specific performance in a second suit if they omitted that relief in a previous suit concerning the same transaction?
  • Under what circumstances is a plaint liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Dr. Abu Baker Mumal vs Karachi Gymkahana Club through (President)1990 MLD 1708 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-12Read full judgment →
• Dr. Abdul Sattar vs Abdur Rahim and 3 others1990 P Cr. L J 630 · Sindh High Court · 1989-12-13Read full judgment →
• Dr. Abdul Jabbar Khattak and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1708 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-13
  quashment of proceedingssanction for prosecutioncognizance of offencenon-cognizable offenceoffences against the Stateprotracted trialcriminal conspiracy
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an application under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking the quashment of proceedings pending against the applicants under sections 120-B, 121, and 124 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 before the Additional Sessions Judge, Karachi Central. The core legal question revolves around whether the trial court could legally take cognizance of these offences without a formal complaint authorized by the Central or Provincial Government pursuant to sections 196 and 196-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and in the absence of a police report for non-cognizable offences. The Sindh High Court held that the offences were non-cognizable, the police investigation and submission of challan without proper sanction and complaint were illegal, and the taking of cognizance was ab initio void. The court laid down the principle that mandatory statutory bars regarding sanction and complaint for offences against the State must be strictly adhered to, and non-compliance goes to the root of the entire matter, rendering proceedings null and void. Additionally, the court noted that dragging the accused through a protracted trial for nearly a decade without examining a single witness warrants quashment without reserving liberty for fresh proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court take cognizance of offences under Chapter VI of the Pakistan Penal Code without a formal complaint authorized by the Central or Provincial Government?
  • Whether an investigation conducted by the police into a non-cognizable offence without statutory sanction is a nullity in the eye of law?
  • Does the failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 render the entire proceedings ab initio void?
  • Can criminal proceedings be quashed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 on the ground of inordinate delay and protracted trial lasting nearly a decade without progress?
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• Dr. Abdul Ghani Sidduqui vs Government of Sindh through Secretary, Local Bodies, Housing '& Town Planning and others1990 MLD 773 · Sindh High Court · 1989-07-02Read full judgment →
• Dr. a, Razzak Kazi vs Commissioner of Income-Tax, Hyderabad1990 PTD 810 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-17Read full judgment →
• Dost Muhammad vs Mst. Ramzan Bibi and 9 others1990 MLD 1667 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-12Read full judgment →
• Dost Muhammad and others vs Ghulam Nabi and others1990 MLD 164 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-06Read full judgment →
• Dodo vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 2019 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-24Read full judgment →
• Divisional Superintendent Railways vs The Chairman Sindh Labour1990 PLC 350 · Sindh High Court · 1989-05-24Read full judgment →
• District Manager, K.T.C. and others vs Sharafatullah1990 PLC 140 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-23Read full judgment →
• Din Muhammad vs Province of Sind through Home Secretary and 21990 P Cr. LJ 605 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Dhani Bux and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1293 · Sindh High Court · 1989-03-01Read full judgment →
• Design Group of Pakistan vs Clifton Cantonment Board1990 MLD 2010 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-31
  arbitration actfunctus officioremoval of arbitratormisconduct of arbitratornamed arbitratorsetting aside awardsubstitution of arbitrator
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from an application under section 8(2) of the Arbitration Act 1940 concerning consultancy services and an arbitration clause designating the President of the Clifton Cantonment Board as sole arbitrator. After disputes arose, an initial application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act 1940 was granted, but subsequent delays, ex-parte proceedings, and an award issued after expiry prompted the court to set aside the award. The core legal questions involved whether an arbitrator becomes functus officio after making an award, whether an application under section 8 of the Arbitration Act 1940 could be treated as one for removal under section 11 of the Arbitration Act 1940, and whether the court could substitute a new arbitrator despite a named/designated arbitrator clause. The Sindh High Court held that while an arbitrator generally becomes functus officio after making an award, the court retains the power to remove a named arbitrator for misconduct and appoint a substitute under section 11 of the Arbitration Act 1940. The principle laid down is that where a named arbitrator has misconducted themselves and cannot be expected to render impartial justice, technicalities in pleadings should not obstruct justice, permitting the court to treat a section 8 application as a section 11 application for the removal and replacement of the arbitrator.

  Questions settled

  • Does an arbitrator become functus officio after making an award?
  • Can an application filed under section 8 of the Arbitration Act 1940 be treated as an application for removal under section 11 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • Can the court substitute a new arbitrator in place of a named or designated arbitrator when misconduct is established?
  • Under what circumstances can a court refuse to refer a dispute back to a previously appointed named arbitrator?
  Read full judgment →
• Crescent Pak. Industries (Pvt.) Limited vs Government of Pakistan and others1990 PTD 29 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-19
  sales tax exemptionvested rightsLetters of Creditretrospective effectcharging provisionsrecovery machinerycustoms duty
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an industrial importer, challenged the withdrawal of a sales tax exemption and the retrospective imposition of sales tax at 12-1/2% on imported tallow via a notification dated 26-6-1988, issued under Section 7 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951. The petitioner had previously obtained an import licence and opened Letters of Credit on 18-6-1988 when the goods enjoyed exemption under an earlier notification. The primary question was whether the newly inserted Section 31-A of the Customs Act, 1969, by virtue of Section 3(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, negated the petitioner's vested rights under the principle in Al-Samrez Enterprise. The High Court held that Section 3(5) of the Sales Tax Act merely adopts the recovery and machinery provisions of the Customs Act, not its charging nature. Section 31-A of the Customs Act applies exclusively to duties and not to sales tax. Consequently, the withdrawal of exemption could only operate prospectively and could not defeat the petitioner's accrued vested rights.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 3(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951 incorporate Section 31-A of the Customs Act, 1969 so as to defeat vested rights regarding sales tax exemptions?
  • Does the machinery provision for recovery under Section 3(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951 alter the inherent nature of sales tax into a customs duty?
  • Can an executive notification withdrawing a sales tax exemption under Section 7 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951 operate retrospectively to affect rights acquired upon opening Letters of Credit?
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• Crescent Pak Indus Tries (Pvt) Limited. vs Government Of Pakistan And OtherPTCL 1990 CL. 457 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Continental Textiles Mills Ltd vs Commissioner for Workmen's1990 PLC 254 · Sindh High Court · 1989-05-20Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Sales Tax vs Pakistan Welding Electrode1990 PTD 411 · Sindh High Court · -
  sales tax exemptionwelding electrodesmachinery and spare partstax referencestatutory notification interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This tax reference matter before the Sindh High Court arose from assessment proceedings for the years 1970-71 to 1975-76, wherein the respondent claimed sales tax exemption on manufactured welding electrodes under SRO 125(1)/70 dated 29-06-1970. The Sales Tax Officer rejected the claim, but the Appellate Commissioner and subsequently the Appellate Tribunal allowed the exemption. The Department sought a reference under section 17(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, challenging the interpretation of the notification regarding whether welding electrodes qualified as articles for use with machinery. The Court noted concessions by counsel regarding specific assessment years due to subsequent amendments by SRO 3(1)/75. The core legal question concerned the interpretation of the notification and whether welding electrodes qualified for exemption. The Court held that since the Tribunal had made a finding of fact—un-challenged in the proceedings—that welding electrodes are articles used with machinery, the respondent was entitled to the claimed exemption. The Court affirmed the Tribunal's view, establishing that articles listed in the notification qualify if they function as articles for use with machinery.

  Questions settled

  • Whether welding electrodes qualify for sales tax exemption under SRO 125(1)/70 as articles for use with machinery?
  • Can an appellate tribunal's unchallenged finding of fact regarding the use of an article be disturbed in a reference under section 17(1) of the Sales Tax Act 1951?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Sales Tax vs Messrs Philips Electrical Industries Ltd.1990 PTD 688 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-14Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone, ---B---, Karachi vs Esso1990 PTD 787 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-08Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone `C' vs Messrs Muhammad1990 PTD 151 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-18
  bad debtscapital expenditureincome tax referenceremand orderfinality of ordersbusiness expenditureassessee
  Summary & questions settled

  This reference arose from an income tax dispute concerning the allowability of bad debts claimed by an assessee company for advances made to two industrial concerns that failed to commence operations. The Revenue contended these advances constituted capital expenditure, not deductible business expenses. The core legal question was whether the Revenue could re-agitate the nature of these expenditures after a prior remand order by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal had already determined they were made in the course of the assessee's business. The Sindh High Court held that the Tribunal's earlier remand order, which explicitly rejected the characterization of these advances as capital expenditure, had attained finality as the Revenue failed to challenge it. Consequently, the Revenue was precluded from re-litigating the nature of the expenditure. The Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision, ruling that the assessee was entitled to claim the advances as bad debts under the relevant statutory provisions, as the factual findings regarding the business nature of the advances and their irrecoverability were established. The principle of finality of unappealed findings in remand orders was upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Revenue re-agitate a finding regarding the nature of expenditure after a remand order has attained finality?
  • Are advances made by a company to promote new industrial concerns deductible as bad debts under the Income-tax Act, 1922?
  • Does an unappealed finding in a remand order by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal bind the Assessing Officer in subsequent proceedings?
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• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Zone vs Messrs Hilal Steel1990 PTD 570 · Sindh High Court · 1990-02-11Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Karachi vs Messrs United Liner1990 PTD 829 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-19Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Muhammad Bana1990 PTD 579 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-26Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Messrs Lever Brothers Pakistan Ltd.1990 PTD 385 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-15Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax vs Messrs Bank of Tokyo Ltd.1990 PTD 406 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-15Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax Central Zone, `A', Karachi vs Messrs1990 PTD 414 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-31Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax Central Zone, Karachi vs Mir Khalilur1990 PTD 404 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-07Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax Central Zone, Karachi vs Messrs Karachi1990 PTD 413 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-23Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax Central Zone `A' vs Messrs Chemdyes1990 PTD 248 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-15
  income taxbonus allowancemercantile system of accountingprovision for bonusincome tax act 1922
  Summary & questions settled

  This reference application under section 136(1) of the Income-tax Ordinance arises from a dispute regarding the disallowance of a provision for bonus made by the respondent assessee for the assessment year 1974-75. The core legal question is whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified under section 10(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act 1922 in allowing a deduction for bonus entered as a provision in the books of account of an assessee employing the mercantile system of accounting, without actual cash disbursement during the relevant accounting period. The Sindh High Court held that under the mercantile system of accounting, the term 'paid' as defined in section 10(5) of the Income-tax Act 1922 includes liabilities incurred according to the accounting method, meaning a provision for bonus is permissible for allowance even if not physically disbursed in that year, distinguishing it from cash-based accounting cases. The court answered the reconstituted question in the affirmative, upholding the Tribunal's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in terms of section 10(2)(x) to give allowance of a provision made by the assessee for payment of bonus in its books of account without having paid it?
  • Does the term 'paid' under section 10(5) of the Income-tax Act 1922 include amounts incurred according to the mercantile method of accounting?
  • Does a provision for bonus qualify for tax exemption under section 10(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act 1922 when an assessee employs the mercantile accounting system?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central Zone vs Messrs Hilal Steel IndustriesPTCL 1990 CL. 917 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central Karachi. vs M/s. United LinerPTCL 1990 CL. 989 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner Of Income Tax vs Messrs Lever Brother Pakistan Limited.PTCL 1990 CL. 848 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-15Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Of Income Tax Central Zone 'A'. vs Messrs ChemdyesPTCL 1990 CL. 789 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Chapal Builders vs Income-Tax Officer and another1990 PTD 62 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-27
  Self-Assessment Schemeincome taxconcealmentaccounting systemsconstitutional petitionfiscal statutesassessment year
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an Income-tax Officer's order removing the petitioner's case from the Self-Assessment Scheme for the assessment year 1987-88. The Department had alleged concealment based on the petitioner's inconsistent accounting practices regarding plot purchase expenditures and electricity payments. The core legal question was whether the Department could summarily exclude an assessee from the Self-Assessment Scheme without a definitive, recorded finding of 'concealment' as required by the Scheme's provisions. The Court held that while the Department is entitled to seek explanations for accounting inconsistencies, the mere existence of discrepancies does not automatically constitute 'concealment' sufficient to trigger exclusion from the Scheme. The Court emphasized that 'concealment' requires a positive act of intentional suppression for fraudulent gain. Consequently, the impugned order was quashed for lacking the necessary prerequisite finding of concealment. The Court established that the Department must provide a proper hearing and record a clear finding of concealment before depriving an assessee of the benefits of the Self-Assessment Scheme, while affirming the Department's authority to scrutinize accounting practices.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere existence of accounting inconsistencies in a tax return constitute 'concealment' under the Self-Assessment Scheme?
  • Is a formal, recorded finding of concealment a mandatory prerequisite for removing a case from the purview of the Self-Assessment Scheme?
  • Can an assessee be deprived of the benefits of the Self-Assessment Scheme without being afforded a proper hearing regarding alleged accounting discrepancies?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 to review an order removing a case from the Self-Assessment Scheme where no alternative remedy exists?
  Read full judgment →
• Chapal Builders vs Income Tax Officer and anotherPTCL 1990 CL. 778 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-27Read full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Ashraf vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 347 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-31
  quashment of proceedingsarms ordinanceunlawful possessiondelivery of armsinterlocutory interferenceabuse of process of law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an application under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking the quashment of criminal proceedings pending against the applicant under section 16(b) of the West Pakistan Arms Ordinance 1965. The applicant's nephew inadvertently carried the applicant's licensed revolver in their luggage through an airport screening counter without the applicant's knowledge or voluntary delivery. The Magistrate had previously refused an acquittal application under section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 on the ground that it was premature before framing a charge. The core legal question is whether temporary, unwitting carriage of a licensed weapon by a third party constitutes delivery and unlawful possession under section 16(b) of the West Pakistan Arms Ordinance 1965, and whether proceedings can be quashed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Sindh High Court held that the temporary and innocent possession by a relative without intent or voluntary delivery does not constitute an offence under the Ordinance, and the Magistrate erred in holding that section 249-A cannot be invoked before framing a charge. The court laid down the principle that High Courts will interfere at an interlocutory stage to quash proceedings when allegations are groundless and constitute an abuse of the process of law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Magistrate acquit an accused under section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 before a formal charge has been framed?
  • Does the temporary and unwitting carriage of a licensed firearm by a third party constitute delivery of arms under section 16(b) of the West Pakistan Arms Ordinance 1965?
  • When will the High Court interfere under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 at an interlocutory stage of criminal proceedings?
  • Does temporary possession of a weapon without intent to use it divest the licensee of legal possession?
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• Cawas A. Noshirwani vs MRs, Meher S. Mobed1990 MLD 846 · Sindh High Court · 1989-12-17Read full judgment →
• Capt. Rizwan Ahmed vs m.v. Al Aida and 2 others1990 MLD 1205 · Sindh High Court · 1989-01-11Read full judgment →
• C.I.T. Central Zone `A', Karachi vs Messrs Eastren Federal Union1990 PTD 409 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-29Read full judgment →
• C.I.T. Central Zone a, Karachi vs Messrs Royal Insurance Co.1990 PTD 402 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-22Read full judgment →
• Buxal and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 2001 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-24Read full judgment →
• Brooke Bond Pakistan Limited vs Karachi Metropolitan Corporation1990 MLD 905 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-16Read full judgment →
• Before Syed Sajjad Ali Shah, CJ In re: Reference Made by Sessions Judge,1990 P Cr. L J 1687 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-22
  territorial jurisdictionvenue of trialjail trialprovincial government powersSessions Judgetransfer of casescriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a reference by the Sessions Judge, Larkana, seeking High Court permission to conduct the trial of a dangerous prisoner, Hasoo alias Muhammad Hassan, within the District Jail, Khairpur, due to administrative directives from the Home Department. The accused faced 18 pending cases, with territorial jurisdiction split between Larkana and Shikarpur. The core legal question was whether the High Court's intervention is required to transfer cases or set the venue of trial in jail for an accused across different territorial jurisdictions. The Court held that no High Court intervention is necessary because the Provincial Government possesses the statutory authority to determine the venue of trial, including holding court sittings within jails, and to nominate Sessions or Additional Sessions Judges to try cases outside their standard territorial jurisdiction. Relying on Sections 9, 178, and 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the Court affirmed that the Provincial Government is fully empowered to issue notifications for such arrangements, provided they do not conflict with High Court transfer orders under Section 526.

  Questions settled

  • Is the High Court's intervention required to set the venue of a trial inside a jail for an accused facing cases in multiple districts?
  • Does the Provincial Government have the authority to direct that a Court of Session hold its sittings at a specific place, including a jail?
  • Can the Provincial Government nominate an Additional Sessions Judge to try cases outside their territorial jurisdiction?
  • What are the limitations on the Provincial Government's power to order cases to be tried in different Sessions divisions?
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• Before Muhammad Mazhar Haji Ghulam Hussain vs The State and anotherOpponents1990 PLD Karachi 267 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-01Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmed vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 780 · Sindh High Court · 1981-09-07Read full judgment →
• Barkatullah and another vs The State and another1990 P Cr. L J 993 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-28Read full judgment →
• Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd. vs The Banking Tribunal for Sindh and Balochistan and 2 others1990 MLD 309 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-19
  Banking Tribunaljoinder of necessary partyOrder 1 Rule 10 CPCconstitutional jurisdictionArticle 199pre-judging issuebanking suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an order passed by the Banking Tribunal for Sindh and Baluchistan, whereby the Tribunal declined the joinder of an alleged beneficiary as a party to a banking recovery suit. The core legal question was whether the Banking Tribunal erred in refusing the application for impleading a party under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that doing so would amount to pre-judging an already framed issue. The Sindh High Court held that the Tribunal acted illegally and with material irregularity, ruling that the principles of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to the Tribunal, that non-joinder of parties should not defeat a suit, and that the framing of an issue regarding a necessary party does not preclude their subsequent joinder. The key principle laid down is that judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals are duty-bound to implead necessary parties for complete adjudication, and a refusal to do so is amenable to constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the principles of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to proceedings before the Banking Tribunal?
  • Does the framing of an issue regarding the absence of a party preclude the subsequent joinder of that party under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
  • Does the bar under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to a person who was not a party to the previous suit?
  • Is the refusal of a sub-constitutional tribunal to join a necessary party amenable to correction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
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• Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd. vs Messrs1990 MLD 130 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-24
  amendment of judgmentaccidental slip or omissionmortgage suitbanking recoverypreliminary decreeprocedural law
  Summary & questions settled

  The plaintiff bank filed a suit for the recovery of a loan under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 read with Orders 34 and 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, seeking a money decree along with a preliminary decree for the sale of mortgaged properties. The trial court partially decreed the suit for the monetary amount but inadvertently omitted to grant the relief concerning the mortgaged properties in the judgment. The plaintiff filed an application under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 seeking an amendment of the judgment and decree to include the relief relating to the mortgages. The defendants opposed the application, arguing that the omission was intentional and that the plaintiff should file a fresh suit. The court held that an accidental slip or unintentional omission by the court in failing to grant a relief clearly prayed for and warranted by the circumstances can and should be corrected under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and that parties should not suffer due to an oversight of the court. Consequently, the application was allowed and the judgment and decree were amended.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court amend its judgment and decree under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to include a relief claimed in the plaint that was omitted due to an oversight?
  • Whether the omission to grant a relief prayed for in the plaint is to be treated as an implied refusal or an accidental slip correctable by the court?
  • Does the power of the court under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to correct accidental slips or omissions carry any time limitation?
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• Balagamwala Oil Mills (Pvt.) Ltd vs Shakarchi Trading A.G. and 2 others1990 PLD Karachi 1 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-05
  Mareva injunctionattachment before judgmentinterim injunctionunliquidated damagesletter of creditinherent powerscivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal is directed against an order passed by a learned Single Judge dismissing the appellant's applications for an interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and for attachment before judgment under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in a suit for unliquidated damages arising from a breach of contract. The core legal questions before the court were whether an interlocutory or Mareva-style injunction can be granted in respect of unliquidated damages, whether the court can issue such injunctions beyond the strict confines of Order XXXIX using inherent powers or Section 94(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and whether payments under letters of credit can be restrained. The Sindh High Court held that while the court possesses inherent powers under Section 151 and Section 94(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to issue interlocutory orders in the interest of justice beyond the strict provisions of Order XXXIX, the appellant failed to make out a proper case. The court held that unliquidated damages cannot form the basis of a Mareva injunction and that payments under negotiable letters of credit cannot be restrained without grave cause or established fraud. The appeal was accordingly dismissed in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court grant an interim injunction under its inherent powers or Section 94(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in circumstances not strictly covered by Order XXXIX?
  • Whether a Mareva injunction can be granted in a suit claiming unliquidated damages where the exact amount due is yet to be adjudicated?
  • Can the court restrain the operation of a negotiable letter of credit or stop bank remittances between international trade counterparts on account of a contractual breach regarding different transactions?
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• Bakht Nasir vs Chairman, Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and 2 others1990 PLC 791 · Sindh High Court · 1989-12-04Read full judgment →
• Bakhshal and others vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1 · Sindh High Court · 1988-12-21
  split judgmentocular evidenceinterested witnesscorroborationrecovery of crime weaponsearch mashirmotivebenefit of doubtdeath reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This case concerns a criminal appeal and death reference arising from a judgment of the Sessions Judge, Khairpur, convicting three appellants under Section 302/34, PPC and sentencing them to death for the murder of Atta Muhammad, alongside related convictions under Section 13(E) of the Arms Ordinance, 1965 and Section 324, PPC. The prosecution alleged that the appellants forcibly dragged the deceased out of a residence, shot him, stabbed him, and struck him with a lathi over a past murder vendetta. The Sindh High Court delivered a split decision. Sajjad Ali Shah, J. acquitted all three appellants by extending the benefit of doubt, finding the ocular testimony contradictory, uncorroborated, and compromised by delayed statements and procedural non-compliance under Section 103, Cr.P.C. Qaiser Ahmed Hamidi, J. agreed only to acquit the lathi-wielding appellant (Shah Wali) on benefit of doubt, but upheld the conviction and death sentences of Bakhshal and Jani, holding their guilt proved via prompt FIR and reliable ocular testimony. Due to the split opinion, the matter was referred to the Chief Justice for nomination of a referee Judge.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on the testimony of interested eye-witnesses without independent corroboration?
  • What is the evidentiary effect of non-compliance with the requirements of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 during the recovery of crime weapons?
  • Does an unexplained delay in recording a witness's statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 render their testimony unreliable?
  • How is a criminal appeal resolved when a two-judge High Court bench differs on the guilt of the accused?
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• Bahadur Ali vs The State and another1990 MLD 1120 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-24Read full judgment →
• Badal and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 31 · Sindh High Court · 1989-04-13
  statutory baildelay in trialthird provisonon-bailable offencecriminal procedurebail application
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a bail application filed under the third proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, based on the statutory entitlement to bail for an accused detained for over two years in a case involving capital punishment. The core legal question is whether an accused is entitled to mandatory bail under this provision if the trial delay is partially attributable to the accused's own actions, such as seeking adjournments or filing transfer petitions. The Court held that the third proviso does not create an absolute right to bail if the accused has contributed to the delay. While acknowledging that some courts have allowed for the condonation of 'good faith' delays, the Court affirmed that the slightest delay attributable to the accused can disqualify them from the mandatory benefit of the third proviso. Ultimately, the Court declined to grant bail, directing the applicants to approach the trial court to assess the overall delay and conduct in the context of the trial's progress. The key principle established is that the third proviso is not an arithmetic rule; any delay caused by the accused, even if seemingly justified, necessitates a careful, case-specific evaluation rather than automatic entitlement.

  Questions settled

  • Does the third proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 grant an absolute right to bail after two years of detention regardless of the reasons for trial delay?
  • Can an accused be granted bail under the third proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if they have contributed to the delay in trial proceedings?
  • Is a bail application based on the third proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 required to be heard by the same judge who rejected a previous bail application on merits?
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• Babar and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1067 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-21Read full judgment →
• Aziz Ahmed vs Karachi Municipal Corporation through Mayor of Karachi1990 PLC (.C.S.) 16 · Sindh High Court · 1989-03-06Read full judgment →
• Atta Muhammad vs Aziz Gul and another1990 PLD Karachi 236 · Sindh High Court · 1989-06-22Read full judgment →
• Atlas Autos Limited vs Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and another1990 PLC 373 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-28
  dismissalmisconductrefusal to receive charge-sheetwilful insubordinationdomestic inquiryreinstatementback benefitslabor appellate tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Atlas Autos Limited, invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the Sindh High Court to challenge an order of the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal which had set aside the dismissal of respondent No. 2 and ordered his reinstatement with full back benefits. Respondent No. 2 was dismissed from service following a domestic inquiry for allegedly refusing to receive a charge-sheet, a suspension letter, and subsequent notices, which the management treated as misconduct. The core legal question was whether an employee's refusal to receive a charge-sheet or communication from the employer constitutes 'wilful insubordination or disobedience of any lawful and reasonable order of a superior' or an act subversive of discipline under Standing Order 15(3) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The High Court held that refusal to receive a charge-sheet does not fall under clause (a) or clause (h) of Standing Order 15(3) and cannot be construed as wilful insubordination or an act subversive of discipline warranting dismissal. The constitutional petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee's refusal to receive a charge-sheet constitutes wilful insubordination or disobedience under Standing Order 15(3)(a) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Does the refusal by a workman to accept a written communication or charge-sheet from his employer amount to an act subversive of discipline under Standing Order 15(3)(h)?
  • Can an employer lawfully dismiss an employee for refusing to accept service of departmental notices without such act falling under the enumerated categories of misconduct?
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• Atlas Autos Limited and others vs National Industrial Relations1990 PLC (C.S.) 369 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Atlas Autos Limited and 5 others vs National Industrial Relations1990 PLD Karachi 362 · Sindh High Court
  National Industrial Relations Commissionunfair labour practicede facto doctrinepart-time membersjurisdictionIndustrial Relations Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This common judgment by the Sindh High Court disposes of five constitutional petitions challenging proceedings initiated before the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) under section 22-A(8)(g) read with section 15 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, on the ground that the Commission was not properly constituted at the relevant time. The core legal questions involved whether the NIRC can include part-time members, whether its functions are exclusively judicial, whether the appointment of members violated statutory provisions, and the application of the de facto doctrine to judicial appointments. The Court held that the functions of the Commission are three-fold comprising advisory, executive, and judicial powers, and that the appointment of part-time members is not prohibited and is in consonance with the spirit of the Ordinance. The Court further held that even if an appointment is defective, the de facto doctrine saves the judgments and actions of a tribunal member holding office under colour of lawful authority, preventing collateral attacks on judicial titles in litigation between private parties. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the functions of the National Industrial Relations Commission under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 are exclusively judicial?
  • Does the appointment of part-time members to the National Industrial Relations Commission violate section 22-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Whether the validity of the appointment of a judge or a member of a tribunal can be challenged collaterally in proceedings between private litigants?
  • What is the legal effect of a defective appointment of a member of a tribunal under the de facto doctrine?
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• Asmat Ali Khan and 5 others vs Manzoor Ahmed and another1990 MLD 2222 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-29Read full judgment →
• Asad Ahmed Siddiqui vs Mst. Wilayati Begum through L.Rs1990 MLD 2247 · Sindh High Court · 1990-07-12Read full judgment →
• Army Welfare Food Industries vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary Finance and 3 othersPTCL 1990 CL. 863 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Arbab Khan vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 649 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-17
  interim custodyseized propertysuperdaricriminal misconductprevention of corruptiontitle disputerevision application
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision application challenges the dismissal of an application for the release of currency seized by the F.I.A. from the residence of an accused charged under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The core legal question is whether a Criminal Court, acting under Section 516-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, is empowered to adjudicate complex questions of title or ownership regarding seized property during the pendency of a criminal trial. The Court dismissed the revision, holding that the trial court correctly refused to release the money. The key principle laid down is that Section 516-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, is designed solely for regulating the interim custody of property produced before a court, not for determining disputed titles. Criminal courts lack the jurisdiction to resolve ownership claims, which must be decided by a competent Civil Court. While interim custody orders are judicial and discretionary, they cannot be used to bypass the necessity of establishing title through proper evidence in civil proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Criminal Court have the jurisdiction to determine questions of title or ownership of property under Section 516-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the order for interim custody of property under Section 516-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandatory or discretionary?
  • Which forum is competent to adjudicate the ownership of property seized during a criminal investigation?
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• Anwar Khattak vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 38 · Sindh High Court · 1989-06-26Read full judgment →
• Anno or Textile Mills Ltd. vs The Superintendent of Central Excise and1990 MLD 914 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Annoor Textile Mills Ltd vs The Superintendent Of Central Excise And LandPTCL 1990 CL. 884 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Anjuman Bahboodeniswan Gizri (Regd.) vs Government of Sindh1990 MLD 927 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-23Read full judgment →
• Amir Sardar vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 414 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-17
  bailcash securitybail bondsuretycriminal procedurejudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant, Amir Sardar, challenged an order passed by the IInd Additional Sessions Judge (West), Karachi, which granted him bail in two separate criminal cases but mandated the furnishing of cash surety in the sum of Rs. 50,000 for each case. The core legal question before the Sindh High Court was whether a trial court possesses the legal authority to compel an accused to deposit cash security as a condition for bail. The High Court held that the order demanding cash surety was illegal. Relying on established precedents, the Court clarified that the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, specifically Sections 499 and 513, contemplates the execution of personal bonds with sureties rather than the compulsory deposit of cash. While a court may accept cash if voluntarily offered by an accused under Section 513, it cannot insist upon it. Consequently, the High Court modified the trial court's order, permitting the applicant to be released upon furnishing bail bonds with sureties instead of the previously ordered cash security.

  Questions settled

  • Is a trial court legally empowered to insist on cash security as a condition for granting bail?
  • Does the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 authorize a court to demand cash in lieu of a bail bond?
  • Under what circumstances can a court accept cash security for bail?
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