Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Messrs A.M. Associates vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and others2015 PLJ SC 156, 2015 PLD Supreme Court 21 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-07-09
  arbitration awarddispute adjudication boardICC arbitration rulesarbitrator misconductcoram non judicerule of the court
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which set aside the trial court's judgment making an arbitral award the rule of the court. The appellant contractor and respondent government entered into a road construction agreement containing dispute resolution clauses requiring international arbitration under the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Rules. Following disputes arising from militant disruptions, a Dispute Adjudication Board (DAB) was constituted, but the project director later issued a letter suggesting proceedings under the Arbitration Act 1940. Two members of the DAB conducted arbitration proceedings and issued an award excluding the third member, who was the designated chairman. The Supreme Court examined whether the two members had the jurisdiction and authority to act as an arbitration council and issue a valid award. The Court held that the arbitration proceedings conducted by only two members, bypassing the chairman without his recusal, rendered the arbitration council coram non judice and the resulting award without jurisdiction and vitiated by misconduct. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's setting aside of the trial court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Can an arbitration award passed by only two members of a three-member tribunal in the absence of the chairman be made the rule of the court?
  • Does the exclusion of a designated chairman from arbitration proceedings render the arbitral tribunal coram non judice?
  • Whether an arbitration council improperly constituted in deviation from contractual terms and ICC rules has lawful jurisdiction to pass an award?
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• Member Bor Punjab and anothers vs Mst. Siddiqan through L.Rs. and others2015 SCMR 1721 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-07-24
  Evacuee propertyLand disputeAuction cancellationProperty resumptionJurisdictionRehabilitation CommissionerCustodianAllotmentTitle extinguishmentWrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned an appeal against a High Court judgment regarding land ownership. The land, initially government-owned, was auctioned in 1946, but the government claimed cancellation and resumption due to alleged non-payment by the original purchasers who migrated. Subsequently, the land was treated as evacuee property and allotted to the respondents' predecessor-in-interest in 1966. Revenue authorities later cancelled this transfer, asserting government ownership, which the High Court reversed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the petitioner failed to provide evidence of valid auction terms permitting resumption or a resumption order. The Court reiterated that once property is treated and transferred as evacuee property, its nature can only be challenged before the appropriate forums under evacuee law (Custodian or Notified Officer). Civil courts lack jurisdiction in such matters. If non-evacuee owners do not seek remedy under the relevant evacuee law, their title stands extinguished, and they cannot assert ownership rights after the repeal of evacuee/settlement law.

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• Member Board of Revenue/Chief Settlement Commissioner, Punjab,2015 P.S.C. 761, 2015 PLD Supreme Court 166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-01-22
  evacuee propertyauction purchaseralternate allotmentNotified Officerper incuriumpending proceedingscontractual rightsmandamusconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a 1982 public auction where the respondents were successful bidders for evacuee plots. Despite paying the full bid amount and receiving transfer deeds, the properties were subsequently mutated in favor of a third party following a separate High Court order. The respondents sought allotment of alternate land as compensation, which was initially granted by the High Court in 1998 and later by a Notified Officer in 2006. The Supreme Court was called to determine whether a Notified Officer under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975, possesses the authority to allot alternate land in lieu of auctioned property. The Court held that the rights of an auction purchaser are contractual, governed by the Contract Act, 1872, and the Specific Relief Act, 1877, rather than settlement laws. The Court ruled that the Repealing Act, 1975, does not authorize Notified Officers to make fresh allotments or grant alternate land. Consequently, the High Court's 1998 direction was declared per incuriam, and the subsequent allotment was set aside as a nullity.

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• Member Board of Revenue/Chief Settlement Commissioner, Punjab, Lahore2015 P.S.C. 761 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  evacuee propertyauction purchaseralternate land allotmentNotified Officerper incuriumconstitutional jurisdictionpublic propertycontractual rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan addresses civil appeals concerning the powers and duties of the Notified Officer under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975, specifically regarding whether successful auction purchasers are entitled to the allotment of alternate public land as compensation when defects prevent the transfer of originally auctioned properties. The core legal questions involve the jurisdiction of statutory authorities to allot public property without legal backing, the classification of auction sales as pending proceedings, and the application of discretionary constitutional relief. The Supreme Court held that auction purchasers do not qualify for alternate land under the Repealing Act or the Available Properties Scheme, 1977, as their rights are contractual and such allotments lack statutory authority. The Court laid down the principles that judgments rendered without considering binding statutory provisions are per incurium, that Notified Officers possess no inherent power to grant alternate land outside governing schemes, and that constitutional courts should not interfere with technically flawed administrative orders if those orders achieve a substantially fair and just result regarding public property.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Notified Officer under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975 has the authority to allot alternate land to a successful auction purchaser whose original property could not be transferred?
  • Do the rights conferred on an auction purchaser after the confirmation of an auction sale of evacuee property sound in public law or are they contractual in nature?
  • Can a High Court issue a writ of mandamus directing the allocation of public property without statutory backing or enabling government policy?
  • Whether constitutional courts should interfere with an administrative order that suffers from a legal defect if the order ultimately achieves a just and fair result regarding public assets?
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• Mehmood Khan and otherss vs Government of Balochistan and others2015 SCMR 1428, 2015 KLR S.C. 193, 2015 NLR Revenue 114, 2015 P.S.C. 1414 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-05-27
  illegal allotmentcompulsory acquisitionpublic purposeQuetta Development Authoritystate landbail cancellationmisuse of authority
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners assailed a High Court judgment that disposed of a constitution petition concerning the illegal allotment and subsequent transfer of unutilized state land acquired for a public purpose. The core legal questions involved whether state land acquired for a public project could be sold or leased to private individuals in violation of statutory frameworks, and whether the authorities possessed the legal competence to execute such transfers. The Supreme Court held that the land, having been acquired for a public purpose under the Balochistan Land Acquisition Ordinance, 1979 and reserved for future expansion, could not be alienated to private parties under the Quetta Development Authority Ordinance, 1978 or the Balochistan Land Lease Policy, 2000. The Court affirmed the cancellation of the illegal sale deeds and held that acquired land must be utilized for its designated public purpose and cannot be doled out through fraudulent machinations or misuse of public authority in violation of Article 24 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land acquired for a public purpose under the Balochistan Land Acquisition Ordinance, 1979 can be sold or leased to private individuals for commercial ventures?
  • Does the Quetta Development Authority have the legal competence to dispose of land without complying with mandatory statutory requirements such as public advertisement and offering a prior right to the original owners?
  • Whether state land falling within municipal limits reserved for public sector projects can be leased or alienated in contravention of the Balochistan Land Lease Policy, 2000?
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• Mehmood Khan and Othersmir Maqbool Ahmed Lehrimir Muhammad2015 NLR Revenue 114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-05-27
  compulsory acquisitionpublic purposeillegal allotmentQuetta Development AuthorityBaluchistan Land Lease Policyconstitutional petitionmisuse of authorityproperty rights
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners assailed a judgment of the High Court of Baluchistan that disposed of a constitutional petition concerning the disputed allotment and subsequent sale of a plot of land originally acquired by the Government of Baluchistan for a public purpose under the Baluchistan Land Acquisition Ordinance, 1979. The core legal questions involved whether state land acquired for a public purpose could be illegally transferred, leased, or sold to private individuals in violation of statutory provisions, the Quetta Development Authority Ordinance, 1978, the Baluchistan Land Lease Policy, 2000, and Article 24 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the transaction was tainted with fraud, misuse of authority, and blatant violations of mandatory statutory and constitutional requirements, as the land was reserved for public infrastructure and could not be alienated to private parties or front men. The court upheld the High Court's decision declaring the sale void, cancelling the title deeds, and dismissing the petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether state land acquired for a public purpose under the Baluchistan Land Acquisition Ordinance, 1979 can be legally sold or leased to private individuals?
  • Does the Quetta Development Authority Ordinance, 1978 mandate public advertisement and a right of first refusal to the original owners before disposing of acquired land?
  • Whether an allotment of state land made in contravention of the Baluchistan Land Lease Policy, 2000 is void and illegal?
  • Does the unauthorized commercial sale of land acquired for public infrastructure violate Article 24 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
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• Mehmood Khan and others vs Government of Baluchistan and others2015 KLR S.C. 193 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-05-27
  land acquisitionillegal allotmentmisuse of authoritypublic landQuetta Development Authority
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged a judgment of the High Court of Baluchistan regarding the disputed allotment and transfer of unutilized acquired land originally owned by the predecessor-in-interest of one of the petitioners and acquired under the Baluchistan Land Acquisition Ordinance, 1979, for constructing a bridge by the Quetta Development Authority. The core legal question concerned the legality of the subsequent sale and lease of the unutilized public land to a private respondent by public authorities without following statutory advertisement requirements or offering it back to the original owners. The Supreme Court examined the history of fraudulent allotments, misuse of authority by local government officials, and the lack of statutory compliance. The court held that the sale and allotment of the land were illegal, void, and executed in blatant violation of the law. The key principle laid down is that public land acquired for a specific public purpose cannot be arbitrarily disposed of or sold to private individuals without fulfilling mandatory statutory requirements such as public advertisement and offering the land to its original owners.

  Questions settled

  • Whether unutilized land acquired for a public purpose can be sold to a private individual without public advertisement?
  • Does an authority have the power to lease out land belonging to another statutory body without proper legal title?
  • Whether an allotment of public land made through concealment of material facts and misuse of executive authority is sustainable in law?
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• Mazhar Iftikhar and others vs Shahbaz Latif and others2015 PLD Supreme Court 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-09-22
  sentence remissionNational Accountability Ordinanceconstitutional validityper incuriamfundamental rightsdiscriminatory legislationprecedent
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the entitlement of prisoners convicted under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 to sentence remissions, specifically addressing the validity of Section 10(d) of the Ordinance, which prohibits such remissions. The core legal question is whether the statutory prohibition on remissions for these convicts remains enforceable or if it was rendered void by judicial precedent. The Supreme Court held that the High Court of Sindh, in the case of Saleem Raza v. The State, had correctly declared Section 10(d) of the Ordinance as ultra vires the Constitution for being discriminatory, a decision that attained finality. The Court clarified that its subsequent decision in Nazar Hussain v. The State endorsed this position, effectively overruling contrary observations made in Shah Hussain v. The State, which were deemed per incuriam. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's judgment, ruling that the statutory bar on remissions for convicts under the Ordinance is void under Article 8(1) of the Constitution, thereby entitling such convicts to remissions.

  Questions settled

  • Is Section 10(d) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, which prohibits remissions for convicts, constitutionally valid?
  • Does the judgment in Nazar Hussain v. The State (PLD 2010 SC 1021) override the observations made in Shah Hussain v. The State (PLD 2009 SC 460) regarding remissions for NAB convicts?
  • Are convicts under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 entitled to remissions in their sentences?
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• Matter regarding publishing/printing incorrect version of Section 23 ofK.L.R. 2015 Supreme Court 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  statutory publicationrule of lawPakistan Codeaccess to justiceconstitutional obligationlegislative disseminationadministrative negligence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the failure of Federal and Provincial governments to maintain and publish accurate, consolidated, and accessible versions of the laws of Pakistan, resulting in widespread legal uncertainty and erroneous private publications. The core legal question addressed is whether the state holds a mandatory obligation to provide the public with accurate, consolidated, and easily accessible statutes. The Court held that the state bears a primary, non-delegable responsibility to ensure that all applicable laws are readily available in both hard copy and digital formats. Finding the current state of statutory publication inadequate and detrimental to the administration of justice, the Court issued comprehensive directives. These mandate the Federation and Provinces to compile and publish official 'Codes' featuring alphabetical indices, cross-referencing, and amendment footnotes. Furthermore, the Court established the principle that the absence of accurate, accessible statutes undermines the rule of law and contributes to lawlessness. Consequently, governments must implement regulatory regimes to ensure the accuracy of law publications and fulfill their constitutional obligations regarding the dissemination of laws in national and provincial languages.

  Questions settled

  • Does the state have a legal obligation to provide the public with an accurate and consolidated version of the laws?
  • Can the government be held responsible for the lack of accessible and error-free statutory publications?
  • Is there a constitutional requirement for the translation of laws into national and provincial languages?
  • Does the failure to provide accessible laws contribute to lawlessness?
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• Mansoor Sharif Hamid and others vs Shafique Rehman and others2015 SCMR 1172 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-02-24
  amenity plot conversionhousing scheme layout planKarachi Development Authorityretrospective application of lawpublic interestvested rightsurban planning
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment declaring the relocation of an amenity plot in a private housing settlement as an illegal conversion under Article 52-A of the Karachi Development Authority Order, 1957. The core legal question was whether the appellant’s 1987 layout plan, which relocated a clinic, violated statutory prohibitions on amenity plot conversion. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the High Court incorrectly applied the 1994 amendment to the KDA Order retrospectively to a 1987 plan. The Court reasoned that the relocation occurred during the initial planning stage, before any third-party rights were established or the scheme was occupied, and did not reduce the total amenity area. The Court established that the strict enforcement of Article 52-A, designed to protect public interest and infrastructure in developed housing schemes, does not apply rigidly to layout plan amendments made during the embryonic planning stage where no public rights have vested and infrastructure capacity remains unaffected. Consequently, the High Court’s judgment was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Does the prohibition against converting amenity plots under Article 52-A of the Karachi Development Authority Order 1957 apply retrospectively to layout plans approved before the 1994 amendment?
  • Can a landowner relocate an amenity plot within a private housing scheme during the planning stage without violating Article 52-A of the Karachi Development Authority Order 1957?
  • Does the requirement for public notice and objection under Article 52-A of the Karachi Development Authority Order 1957 apply to layout plan amendments made before any third-party rights are created or the scheme is occupied?
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• Mansoor Sharif Hamid & others vs Shafique Rehman & others2015 SCMR 1172, 2015 PLJ SC 750 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-02-24
  amenity plotconversion of land uselayout planprivate housing schemeKarachi Development Authority Orderhigh-rise buildingthird-party rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenged the judgment of the High Court of Sindh which had declared the relocation of an amenity plot within a private housing settlement as an unlawful conversion contrary to Article 52-A of the Karachi Development Authority Order, 1957. The core legal question was whether the alteration and relocation of an amenity plot in a layout plan during the embryonic or planning stage of a private housing scheme, prior to public notification or the acquisition of third-party rights, attracts the strict procedural requirements and prohibitions regarding conversion of amenity plots. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that the statutory restrictions on land conversion are intended to protect public interest and infrastructure when third-party rights or resident communities are affected. The Court laid down the principle that where the relocation of an amenity plot occurs at the planning or implementation stage before public use or the accrual of proprietary rights, and complies with land usage ratios without injuring public convenience, the strict procedural bars against conversion do not apply retrospectively or prematurely.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the relocation of an amenity plot within a private housing settlement during its planning stage constitutes an unlawful conversion under Article 52-A of the Karachi Development Authority Order, 1957?
  • Can the statutory prohibition against the conversion of amenity plots enacted in 1994 be applied retrospectively to layout plan alterations approved in 1987?
  • Do members of the public who acquire property in a neighboring scheme long after the approval of a layout plan have vested rights to challenge internal relocations made during the embryonic stage of a private settlement?
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• Mandi Hassan alias Mehdi Hussain and another vs Muhammad Arif2015 NLR Civil 176, 2015 P.S.C. 676, 2015 PLD Supreme Court 137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-11-17
  civil revisionnon-prosecutionrestoration applicationlimitation periodresiduary articleinherent jurisdictionSection 115 CPCArticle 181 Limitation Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether an application for the restoration of a civil revision petition dismissed for non-prosecution is governed by a specific 30-day limitation period or the residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The appellants' civil revision was dismissed at the motion stage for non-prosecution, and their restoration application, filed after eight months, was dismissed by the High Court as time-barred. The Supreme Court clarified that revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC is a valuable right of an aggrieved party, not a mere privilege. It held that while the CPC lacks specific provisions for the dismissal and restoration of revisions (unlike suits or appeals), courts may exercise inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 CPC to restore such matters. Consequently, as no specific Article in the Limitation Act applies to such applications, the residuary Article 181 applies, prescribing a three-year limitation period. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case for a decision on the merits of the restoration application.

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• Malik Muzaffar Ahmed vs Majlis-e-llmi Society through Muhammad Zubair2015-SCP-139, 2016 P.S.C. 166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-12-15
  pre-emptionstatutory interpretationlegislative intentcharitable propertyrejection of plaintdrafting omissionWaqf property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that rejected the appellant's plaint in a pre-emption matter. The core legal question was whether the omission of the word 'purchase' in Section 23 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, meant that property purchased for charitable or religious purposes was not exempt from the right of pre-emption. The Supreme Court held that the omission was an inadvertent drafting error that, if read literally, would defeat the legislature's clear intent to protect such properties. Applying established canons of statutory interpretation, the Court held that it has the authority to supply such omissions to render a statute workable and sensible. Consequently, the Court ruled that the word 'purchase' must be read into Section 23 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991. The principle laid down is that courts may supply necessary words in a statute where a literal construction leads to absurdity or defeats the manifest purpose of the enactment, ensuring the law remains purpose-oriented and consistent with legislative intent.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court supply an omitted word in a statute to give effect to the legislative intent?
  • Is property purchased for charitable or religious purposes exempt from the right of pre-emption under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991?
  • Does the omission of the word 'purchase' in Section 23 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, render such property subject to pre-emption?
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• Malik Muhammad Kazim and Others Malik Muhammad Azam and Others2015 NLR Civil 528 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-04-22
  banking suitleave to appear and defendconditional leavemortgage securityfraudulent depositrecovery of loancivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two civil appeals filed against an appellate decree of the High Court, which had partially modified a Banking Court's decree in a suit for recovery of Rs. 33 million filed by Al-Baraka Islamic Bank Ltd. The core legal question was whether the defendants, who alleged that their title deeds were fraudulently deposited by their tax consultant, Sh. Asif Salam, were entitled to leave to appear and defend the suit. The Supreme Court observed that the defendants' allegations of fraud and forgery, when weighed against the circumstances of the case—including the significant delay in the defendants seeking the return of their title deeds—warranted a deeper examination of the merits. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's decree and granted the appellants conditional leave to appear and defend the suit, subject to the cash deposit of Rs. 20 million with the respondent Bank within 30 days. The principle laid down is that where a defendant raises a plausible plea of fraud regarding the deposit of security documents, conditional leave to defend may be granted to ensure a fair trial, provided the defendant satisfies the court's conditions.

  Questions settled

  • Can a defendant be granted conditional leave to appear and defend a banking suit when alleging that security documents were deposited fraudulently?
  • Does the failure to deposit a court-ordered amount within a specified timeframe result in the dismissal of an appeal?
  • Is a delay of several years in seeking the return of title deeds a relevant factor for a Banking Court to consider when evaluating an application for leave to defend?
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• Malik Javed Akhtar vs The State, Etc.s2015 NLR Criminal 309 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-03-06
  pre-arrest bailcriminal breach of trustentrustmentpublic servantinvestigationbona fide
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Islamabad High Court, which had refused pre-arrest bail to the petitioner in a case registered under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the ingredients of the offence under Section 409, specifically the element of 'entrustment' as contemplated by Section 405, were prima facie satisfied, given that the petitioner was neither a public servant nor a broker. Upon review, the Supreme Court observed that the applicability of Section 409 appeared suspect due to the lack of evidence regarding entrustment. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioner had already joined the investigation, rendering the police's insistence on arrest potentially lacking in bona fides. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and granted pre-arrest bail to the petitioner. The judgment reinforces the principle that pre-arrest bail may be granted where the applicability of the charged penal provision is prima facie doubtful and the accused has cooperated with the investigation process.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of the status of a public servant or broker make the application of Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 prima facie suspect?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be granted when the accused has already joined the investigation and the necessity for arrest is questionable?
  • Is the element of 'entrustment' under Section 405 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 a necessary prerequisite for invoking Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Malik Javaid Iqbal vs The State and others2015 PLD Supreme Court 250 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-02-18
  post-arrest bailChallan caseprivate complaintstatutory interpretationcriminal procedurebail cancellationremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that granted post-arrest bail to an accused in a Challan case solely because a private complaint regarding the same incident was pending. The core legal question was whether the pendency of a private complaint constitutes a valid statutory ground for bail in a connected Challan case. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s reasoning lacked statutory sanction. The Court clarified that bail in non-bailable offences must strictly adhere to the parameters defined in Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court emphasized that courts cannot invent grounds for bail outside the statute, and the pendency of a private complaint does not justify detention being deemed "without trial" in the Challan case. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter to the High Court for a fresh decision on the merits of the case. The principle laid down is that bail must be granted strictly within the statutory framework of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Is the pendency of a private complaint a valid ground for granting post-arrest bail in a connected Challan case?
  • Can a court grant bail on grounds not provided for in Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What are the statutory grounds for granting post-arrest bail in non-bailable offences under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Makhna and Two Others vs Ghulam Shabir and Others2015 NLR Revenue 9 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-10-04
  concurrent findings of factreappraisal of evidencepermanent injunctionpossession suitcivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' civil revision against concurrent findings of the lower courts. The dispute originated from a suit for permanent injunction and possession regarding 23 kanals and 10 marlas of land, which the trial court decreed in favor of the respondent based on evidence, including the testimony of a Patwari and a report from a Local Commission. The appellate court affirmed this decree, and the High Court subsequently dismissed the petitioners' civil revision. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts warranted interference in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate any illegality in the impugned judgment. Emphasizing that the reappraisal of evidence is generally impermissible at the stage of a petition for leave to appeal where concurrent findings of fact exist, the Court dismissed the petition, thereby upholding the lower courts' decisions.

  Questions settled

  • Is the reappraisal of evidence permissible in a petition for leave to appeal where there are concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in the absence of any demonstrated illegality in the impugned judgment?
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• Mahmood Shah vs Syed Khalid Hussain Shah, etc.2015 PLJ SC 616 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-03-19
  succession mutationlimitation periodco-ownershiprevenue recordFederal Shariat Courtinheritance rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had maintained the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts in favor of the respondents. The core legal questions examined were whether a civil suit challenging a succession mutation was barred by time due to entries in the revenue record, and whether the suspension of a Federal Shariat Court judgment declaring a statutory provision un-Islamic operates indefinitely. The Supreme Court held that where co-heirs become co-owners upon the demise of their propositus, the preparation of every new record of rights confers a fresh cause of action, meaning no length of time extinguishes their rights, and that declarations by the Federal Shariat Court cannot affect previous operations of law or successions taking place before the effective date. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether entries in the revenue record confer a fresh cause of action in suits involving co-heirs and co-owners?
  • Does the suspension of a Federal Shariat Court judgment upon appeal operate indefinitely to allow cases to be decided under laws declared un-Islamic?
  • Can a declaration by the Federal Shariat Court affecting a statutory provision invalidate successions taking place before the effective date of the declaration?
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• Mahmood Shah vs Syed Khalid Hussain Shah, Etc.s2015 NLR Civil 308 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-03-19
  inheritancesuccessionlimitationco-ownersrevenue recordMuslim Family Laws OrdinanceFederal Shariat Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which maintained lower court decrees in a suit concerning inheritance and succession. The core legal questions were whether a suit challenging a mutation is time-barred when revenue records exclude certain heirs, and whether the declaration of Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 as un-Islamic by the Federal Shariat Court invalidates successions occurring prior to that declaration. The Supreme Court held that co-heirs are co-owners of the property of their propositus upon death, meaning their rights do not extinguish with time, and new entries in revenue records confer a fresh cause of action. Furthermore, the Court held that even if a provision is declared un-Islamic, such a declaration cannot affect the previous operation of law or successions that occurred before the effective date of that declaration. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the rights of co-heirs remain protected regardless of revenue mutations, and that the impugned judgments were in conformity with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the exclusion of an heir from a mutation record bar a subsequent suit for inheritance due to the law of limitation?
  • Does a declaration by the Federal Shariat Court that a law is un-Islamic invalidate successions that occurred prior to that declaration?
  • Do co-heirs become co-owners of property immediately upon the death of the propositus regardless of revenue record entries?
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• Mahmood Shah vs Syed Khalid Hussain Shah, etc. Civil Appeal No. 734 of 2010,2015 PSC 1531 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  inheritanceco-ownershiplimitationmutationMuslim Family Laws OrdinanceFederal Shariat Courtsuccession
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that upheld lower court decrees regarding inheritance rights. The core legal questions concerned whether a suit challenging a mutation of succession sanctioned decades prior was time-barred, and whether Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961, having been declared un-Islamic by the Federal Shariat Court, could be applied to pending cases. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the suit was not time-barred because co-heirs are deemed co-owners upon the death of the propositus. Consequently, the preparation of new revenue records confers a fresh cause of action, and no length of time extinguishes such proprietary rights. Regarding the second issue, the Court ruled that even if a provision is declared un-Islamic, such a declaration does not affect the previous operation of law or successions occurring before the effective date of the declaration under Article 203D of the Constitution. The Court affirmed that the rights of co-heirs remain protected regardless of revenue mutations, and the impugned judgments were in conformity with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the preparation of new revenue records confer a fresh cause of action for co-heirs challenging a mutation of succession?
  • Can a suit for inheritance by a co-heir be dismissed as time-barred based on the date of the original mutation?
  • Does a declaration by the Federal Shariat Court that a provision is un-Islamic affect successions that took place prior to that declaration?
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• Mahmood Shah vs Syed Khalid Hussain Shah and others2015 PLJ SC 616, 2015 SCMR 869, 2015 NLR Civil 308 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-03-19
  successionproperty rightslimitationtime-barred suitco-ownersco-heirsmutationFederal Shariat CourtMuslim Family Law Ordinanceconstitutional law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, with leave of the Supreme Court, challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that upheld lower court decrees concerning property succession. The primary legal questions were whether a civil suit filed in 1998, challenging a 1978 mutation, was time-barred, and the effect of the Federal Shariat Court's declaration that Section 4 of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance was un-Islamic on past transactions. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It held that the suit was not time-barred because co-heirs become co-owners immediately upon the propositus's demise, and their possession is deemed on behalf of all. Each new record of rights confers a fresh cause of action, preventing the extinguishment of proprietary or possessory rights by time. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the Federal Shariat Court's declaration against Section 4 of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, even if affirmed, would take effect from March 31, 2000, under Article 203D of the Constitution, and thus could not affect previous operations of law or successions occurring before that date.

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• Lucky Cement Ltd., having its offices at Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan vs Commissioner Income Tax, Zone Companies, Circle-52015 P.C.T.L.R. 1147 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  income from other sourcesbusiness incomeMemorandum of Associationtaxation of surplus fundsinterpretation of statutesprohibitory clauseIncome Tax Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned whether interest income earned by a company from investing surplus funds during the construction phase of its primary cement manufacturing plant constituted "income from business" or "income from other sources" under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The Supreme Court, by a majority, held that such income is taxable as "income from other sources." The Court reasoned that the company’s Memorandum of Association must be interpreted as a whole. Specifically, a "notwithstanding" clause (Clause 37) that expressly prohibited the company from engaging in the business of investment overrode other permissive clauses (Clause 6) that authorized the company to invest its money. The Court established the principle that where a company’s constitutional documents contain a clear prohibitory clause against engaging in investment as a business, income generated from such investments cannot be classified as business income, regardless of the company's commercial prudence in utilizing idle funds. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed, affirming that the income fell under the residuary head of "income from other sources."

  Questions settled

  • Whether income earned from the investment of surplus funds by a company during the construction of its primary plant constitutes business income or income from other sources?
  • Does a prohibitory clause in a Memorandum of Association override permissive clauses regarding investment activities?
  • Can a company claim that investment income is business income if its Memorandum of Association expressly prohibits the business of investment?
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• Lucky Cement Ltd. vs Commissioner Income Tax, Zone Companies, Circle-5, Peshawar2015 PTD 2210 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-07-10
  income taxincome from other sourcesbusiness incomememorandum of associationtax assessmentsurplus fundsstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This tax appeal concerned whether income generated from the investment of surplus funds by a company during the construction phase of its cement plant should be classified as "income from business" or "income from other sources" under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The appellant argued that its Memorandum of Association (MOA) permitted such investments as a business activity. The Court, by a majority, held that the income must be classified as "income from other sources." The ratio established that the MOA must be construed as a whole. Specifically, a prohibitory clause in the MOA, which explicitly restricts the company from engaging in the business of investment, finance, or leasing, overrides permissive clauses that might otherwise authorize such activities. Consequently, even if a company possesses the power to invest surplus funds, if the MOA expressly prohibits the company from indulging in the business of investment, the resulting income cannot be characterized as business income for tax purposes. The principle laid down is that the specific prohibitory language in a corporate charter dictates the tax characterization of income derived from non-core activities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether income earned from the investment of surplus funds by a company during the construction phase of its primary project constitutes business income or income from other sources?
  • Does a prohibitory clause in a company's Memorandum of Association override permissive clauses regarding the nature of business activities for tax purposes?
  • Can interest income earned on surplus funds be treated as business income if the company's Memorandum of Association expressly prohibits the business of investment?
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• Lucky Cement Ltd vs Commissioner Income Tax, Zone Companies, Circle-5, Peshawar2015 P.C.T.L.R. 1147, 2015 PTD 2210, 2015 SCMR 1494, 2015 CLD 1482 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-07-10
  income taxincome from businessincome from other sourcesMemorandum of Associationcompany lawstatutory interpretationsurplus fundsinvestment incometaxation of companiestax appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether income derived by a cement manufacturing company from investing its surplus funds during the plant's construction phase constituted "income from business" or "income from other sources" for tax purposes. The appellant company argued that its Memorandum of Association (MOA) permitted such investments as an independent business activity (Clause 6 read with Clause 36). The revenue department contended that a prohibitory clause (Clause 37) in the MOA, precluding the company from undertaking "investment business," meant such income fell under "other sources." By a majority of 2:1, the Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the High Court and Income Tax Tribunal's decision. The majority held that despite general authorization for investment, Clause 37, prefixed with "Notwithstanding," explicitly barred the company from indulging in the "business of investment." Therefore, the income generated from these surplus funds, prior to the commencement of the primary cement business, was correctly assessed as "income from other sources" under Section 30(2)(b) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The ruling emphasized that the classification depends on whether the activity is part of the company's normal business, not merely an authorized power.

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• Lt.-Col. (Rtd.) Ghazanfar Abbas Shah vs Mehr Khalid Mehmood Sargana2015 SCMR 1585 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-05-27
  election petitionverification of pleadingsoath commissionersummary dismissalrepresentation of the people actpresumption of official actsmandatory complianceaffidavit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the Election Tribunal's dismissal of an election petition due to defective verification under the Representation of the People Act, 1976. The core legal question concerns whether an election petition lacking proper verification—specifically missing the date, place, and explicit certification of oath administration—is liable for summary dismissal, and whether an accompanying affidavit can cure such defects. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the verification requirements for election petitions are mandatory and stringent. The Court affirmed that non-compliance with Section 55(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, necessitates summary dismissal under Section 63. While the Court applied the presumption of official acts under Article 129(e) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, to save the current petition from dismissal based solely on the Oath Commissioner's omission, it established a prospective rule: future petitions must explicitly endorse the administration of oath, or they will be liable for dismissal. Additionally, the Court clarified that a flawed affidavit cannot cure a fundamentally defective verification in election proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is the verification of an election petition a mandatory requirement under the Representation of the People Act, 1976?
  • Can a defective verification of an election petition be cured by an accompanying affidavit?
  • Does the failure of an Oath Commissioner to explicitly certify the administration of an oath invalidate an election petition?
  • What are the consequences of non-compliance with the verification requirements of an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1976?
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• Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Jamshaid Gulzar and another vs Federation of Pakistan2015 PLC (C.S) 505 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-06-25
  retrospective legislationvested rightstenure of officecolourable legislationlegislative competenceFederal Public Service Commissionservice protection
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the validity of the Federal Public Service Commission (Amendment) Act, 2006, which curtailed the tenure of the Chairman and Members of the Federal Public Service Commission from five years to three years. The appellants, former Chairman and Members, challenged the retrospective application of this amendment, arguing it violated their vested rights, was a colourable exercise of legislative power, and was mala fide. The core legal question was whether the legislature, through the Act, could validly curtail the tenure of sitting members with retrospective effect, notwithstanding their initial appointment terms. The Supreme Court held that the legislature possesses plenary power to enact laws with retrospective effect by clear intendment. The Court found that the language of the Act, including the non-obstante clause and the deeming provision, explicitly mandated retrospective application. Consequently, the Court ruled that the appellants' vested rights were effectively superseded by the valid legislative enactment. The key principle laid down is that while the legislature's motives are generally irrelevant if it acts within its competence, it may validly take away vested rights through legislation if it does so with clear, express, or implied retrospective intent.

  Questions settled

  • Can the legislature validly curtail the tenure of a statutory office holder with retrospective effect?
  • Does the doctrine of colourable legislation apply when the legislature acts within its constitutional competence?
  • Can vested rights be taken away by a legislative enactment that explicitly provides for retrospective operation?
  • Does the General Clauses Act 1897 protect rights against a subsequent legislative amendment that explicitly intends to operate retrospectively?
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• Lt. Col. (Retired) Ghazanfar Abbas Shah vs Mehr Khalid Mehmood2015 SCMR 1585, 2015 PLJ SC 893, 2015 P.S.C. 1214 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-05-27
  election petitionverification of pleadingsOath Commissioneraffidavit attestationRepresentation of the Peoples Actsummary dismissalmandatory provisions
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under Section 67(3) of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1976 challenged the judgment of the Election Tribunal dismissing the appellant's election petition for defective verification under Section 55(3) and Section 63 of the Act. The core legal questions involved whether the election petition and its supporting affidavit complied with mandatory verification and attestation requirements, and whether omissions by the Oath Commissioner regarding the administration of oath rendered the petition fatally defective. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the election petition and affidavit indeed suffered from substantial flaws, lacking proper identification, dates, and explicit attestation of oath administration, which under election laws cannot be treated as a mere curable irregularity after the limitation period. However, invoking the presumption of official acts under Article 129(e) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 for past cases, the Court ruled that future election petitions must explicitly ensure the Oath Commissioner endorses the physical administration of oath. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the dismissal of the election petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an election petition lacking proper verification in terms of Section 55(3) of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1976 is liable to be summarily dismissed?
  • Can a defective verification in an election petition be cured by a supporting affidavit when both documents lack mandatory attestation details?
  • Whether the omission of an Oath Commissioner to expressly mention the administration of oath invalidates an election petition filed under the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1976?
  • Does the presumption of correctness of official acts under Article 129(e) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 apply to cure omissions in the attestation of election petitions by Oath Commissioners?
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• Liberty Papers Ltd., Etc. vs Human Rights Commission of Pakistan2015 NLR Civil 13 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-09-17
  defamationdamagesterritorial jurisdictioncause of actionsocieties registrationfreedom of expressiondignity of mannewspaper circulation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges a judgment of the High Court of Balochistan which reduced a defamation damages decree against the appellants from five million rupees to one million rupees. The core legal questions involved the competence of the plaintiff organization to sue under the Societies Registration Act, the territorial jurisdiction of courts in defamation suits where a newspaper is circulated, the establishment of cause of action, and the principles governing the assessment of general and aggravated damages for defamation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the plaintiff had established jurisdiction and cause of action in Quetta through unchallenged evidence of newspaper circulation and readership, and that the reduced damages were justified given the gravity of the unverified and defamatory publication against the organization and its office bearers. The Court laid down that jurisdiction in defamation actions lies both where the newspaper is published and where it circulates, that failure to cross-examine witnesses on circulation establishes the cause of action, and that constitutional protections of human dignity and reputation prohibit unbridled freedom of expression that violates professional journalistic ethics.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a society registered under the Societies Registration Act 1860 can sue in the absence of rules and regulations authorizing specific office bearers?
  • Does the territorial jurisdiction for filing a defamation suit arise where a defamatory newspaper is circulated and read, in addition to the place of publication?
  • Can un-cross-examined testimony regarding newspaper distribution and readership in a specific locality successfully establish a cause of action for territorial jurisdiction?
  • What categories of damages are recoverable under the Defamation Ordinance 2002 for injury to reputation and feelings?
  • Does the constitutional right to freedom of expression override the constitutional protection afforded to human dignity and reputation under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Liberty Papers Ltd. etc vs Human Rights Commission of Pakistan2015 PLJ SC 173 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-09-17
  defamationjurisdictioncause of actiondamagesfreedom of expressiondignity of manmedia ethics
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that reduced a defamation damages award from five million to one million rupees against a newspaper publisher. The core legal questions concerned the jurisdiction of the trial court in defamation suits involving inter-provincial publication, the locus standi of the respondent organization to sue, and the principles governing the assessment of defamation damages. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision, affirming that a defamation suit may be instituted where the defamatory material is published or circulated, as this constitutes a part of the cause of action under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court held that the publisher bears the burden of proving diligent fact-checking and adherence to professional ethics to rebut claims of malice. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that constitutional rights to freedom of expression are not absolute and are subject to the inviolable right to dignity and reputation. It concluded that the appellants failed to justify their conduct or produce evidence, and reaffirmed that media entities must operate within the bounds of professional ethics and the law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a defamation suit be filed in a jurisdiction where the newspaper is circulated even if the publisher resides elsewhere?
  • Does the publication of defamatory material in a specific jurisdiction constitute a 'cause of action' for the purpose of territorial jurisdiction?
  • What is the burden of proof on a publisher to rebut claims of malice in a defamation suit?
  • Are the constitutional rights to freedom of expression and access to information absolute in the context of defamation?
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• Liberty Papers Ltd. and others vs Human Rights Commission of Pakistan2015 PLD Supreme Court 42 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-09-17
  defamationdamagesterritorial jurisdictioncause of actionfreedom of expressiondignity of mannewspaper publicationaggravated damages
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the judgment of the High Court of Balochistan which reduced a defamation damages decree against the appellants from five million to one million rupees. The core legal questions involved whether a suit for defamation can be instituted at the place where the defamatory material is circulated and cause of action arises, the competence of the plaintiff to file the suit, and the principles governing the award of general and aggravated damages for defamation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that territorial jurisdiction in defamation cases lies both where the newspaper is published and where it is circulated, and that the unproven defamatory publication coupled with lack of diligence establishes malice justifying damages. The key principles laid down include the interpretation of territorial jurisdiction under Section 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in defamation suits, the constitutional protection afforded to human dignity and reputation under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, and the standards of professional ethics required of the media.

  Questions settled

  • Does a court where a defamatory newspaper is circulated have jurisdiction to entertain a suit for damages for defamation?
  • What constitutes a cause of action in a defamation suit involving widely circulated print media?
  • Under what heads of damages can compensation be awarded in a defamation action under the Defamation Ordinance 2002?
  • Can unverified and unethical reporting by a media publisher establish malice by implication in a defamation suit?
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• LDA through its D.G. and others vs Ms. Imrana Tiwana and others2015 P.S.C. 1360 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-07-08
  local governmentdevolution of powerconstitutional interpretationvires of statuteenvironmental impact assessmentsignal free corridorurban planning
  Summary & questions settled

  This case involves appeals arising from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which struck down numerous provisions of the Lahore Development Authority Act 1975 as unconstitutional, halted the Signal Free Corridor Project, and directed inquiries against officials. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the scope of Article 140A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 regarding local governments, the division of executive and legislative authority between provincial and local governments, and the validity of environmental approvals under the Punjab Environmental Protection Act 1997. The Supreme Court held that while Article 140A mandates meaningful devolution of political, administrative, and financial responsibility to local governments, it does not strip the provincial government of its legislative and executive authority under Articles 137 and 142. The Court ruled that provincial statutes and local government laws must be construed harmoniously, and provisions cannot be struck down merely based on abstract concepts or the spirit of the Constitution without violating its express text. Furthermore, in the absence of elected local governments due to a political vacuum, the provincial agency could execute the project. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals, upheld the project subject to conditions, and set aside the striking down of the statutory provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Article 140A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 strips the provincial government and assembly of their legislative and executive authority under Articles 137 and 142?
  • Can a statute be declared unconstitutional and struck down based on abstract principles or the spirit of the Constitution without violating its letter?
  • Whether the provincial government can execute development projects within a local government's domain during a political vacuum when elected local governments are not in existence?
  • Does Section 46 of the Lahore Development Authority Act 1975 render the statute void to the extent of any inconsistency with local government legislation?
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• Land Acquisition Collector, G.S.C., N.T.D.C., (WAPDA), Lahore and another vs Mst. Surraya Mehmood Jan2015 P.S.C. 498, 2015 SCMR 28 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-09-29
  land acquisitionmarket valuecompulsory acquisition chargespublic purposepotential valueWAPDAcompensation enhancement
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from land acquisition proceedings initiated in 1977 for the extension of a WAPDA grid station. The Land Acquisition Collector originally awarded compensation at Rs. 6,000 per marla with 15% compulsory acquisition charges. The Referee Court enhanced the rate to Rs. 8,000 per marla and increased the compulsory acquisition charges to 25%, a decision upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court examined two primary issues: the valuation of the land and the applicable rate of compulsory acquisition charges under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Regarding valuation, the Court affirmed the concurrent findings, noting that market value must consider potential use, strategic location, and contemporaneous sales. On the second issue, the Court clarified the distinction between acquisitions for 'public purpose' and those for a 'company'. It held that even if the beneficiary is a company (like WAPDA), if the acquisition serves a public purpose, the statutory charges are 15%. The 25% rate applies only to acquisitions for a company's private use. Consequently, the Court maintained the valuation but reduced the compulsory charges to 15%.

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• Land Acquisition Collector, G.S.C., N.T.D.C. (WAPDA), Lahore and another vs Mst. Surraya Mehmood Jan, Peshawar Cantt2015 P.S.C. 498 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  land acquisitioncompulsory acquisition chargesmarket value determinationpotential valuepublic purposeWAPDAcompensation enhancement
  Summary & questions settled

  This Civil Appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the enhancement of compensation and the rate of compulsory acquisition charges for land acquired in Kasur for the extension of a 132 K.V. Grid Station by WAPDA. The core legal questions pertained to the proper determination of market value and potential value of acquired land under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, and whether compulsory acquisition charges under Section 23(2) should be awarded at 15% or 25% when the acquiring body is a statutory entity or company acquiring land for a public purpose. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of fact regarding the enhanced compensation rate of Rs. 8,000 per marla, finding it backed by objective market evidence, location potential, and past valuations. However, the Court partly allowed the appeal by reducing compulsory acquisition charges from 25% to 15%, holding that the determining factor under Section 23(2) is the purpose of acquisition; where land is acquired for a public purpose—even if acquired for a company—the statutory rate is 15%, whereas 25% applies solely where acquisition is made simpliciter for a company's private use.

  Questions settled

  • What criteria and evidence must courts consider when determining the market value and potential value of land under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
  • Whether compulsory acquisition charges under Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 are payable at the rate of 15% or 25% when land is acquired for a statutory corporation or company for a public purpose?
  • Under what circumstances is a landowner entitled to 25% compulsory acquisition charges under Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
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• Lahore Development Authority vs Bashir A. Malik, etc2015 PLJ SC 61 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-09-12
  completion certificatebuilding deviationsconstitutional jurisdictiondisputed questions of factwrit petition converted to suitdevelopment authoritydelay in administrative action
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal, arising from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, addressed whether a statutory development authority could withhold a completion certificate for a commercial building for decades over minor, compoundable internal deviations and subsequently demand penalty payment at enhanced current rates. The respondents had applied for a completion certificate in 1983, and a penalty of Rs.33,992 was calculated by a survey inspector, but the authority failed to issue a challan, leading to protracted litigation. The Lahore High Court and a minority view in the Supreme Court held that the authority could not benefit from its own delay to charge enhanced rates, dismissing the appeal. However, by a majority decision of two to one, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that because the material facts regarding the approval of the penalty by the competent authority were seriously disputed in the pleadings, the constitutional petition involved disputed questions of fact requiring a plenary trial, and accordingly converted the writ petition into a civil suit for adjudication after recording evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 can be invoked to resolve seriously disputed questions of fact regarding the approval of a building penalty?
  • Can a public authority withhold a completion certificate for decades over minor compoundable deviations and subsequently demand a penalty at enhanced current rates?
  • Whether a writ petition involving factual controversies can be converted into a civil suit for adjudication after recording evidence?
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• Lahore Development Authority through D.-G. and others vs Ms. Imrana2015 P.S.C. 1360, 2015 SCMR 1739 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-07-08
  Local Government SystemConstitutional interpretationDevolution of powersEnvironmental Impact AssessmentStatutory interpretationJudicial reviewLahore Development AuthorityProvincial legislative authorityFundamental RightsHarmonious construction
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court heard appeals challenging a Lahore High Court judgment that struck down several provisions of the Lahore Development Authority Act, 1975, and halted the Signal Free Corridor Project. The High Court had ruled that these provisions violated Article 140A of the Constitution (Local Government System) and fundamental rights, and that the project required an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals, holding that constitutional provisions, including Articles 137, 142, and 140A, must be harmoniously construed, and that Article 140A mandates devolution but does not strip the Provincial Government of its legislative and executive authority. The Court emphasized that the power to strike down statutes must be exercised with extreme caution. It found that the LDA Act, 1975, and the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013, should be read complementarily. The Court also held that the Signal Free Corridor Project, being a rebuilding/reconstruction of existing roads, did not require an EIA under the Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency (Review of IEE and EIA) Regulations, 2000. Given the absence of elected Local Governments, the project's initiation and execution by LDA were deemed valid. The Court directed the immediate constitution of Advisory Committees under the Punjab Environmental Protection Act, 1997, and expunged disparaging remarks made by the High Court against senior counsel.

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• Lahore Bacho Tehrik vs Dr. Iqbal Muhammad Chauhan, etc2015 P.S.C. Crl. 763 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-08-05
  public interest litigationpublic trust doctrineheritage urban parkenvironmental impact assessmentconsent ordertraffic managementcontempt of court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application by the Government of Punjab seeking permission to further widen the Lahore Canal Bank Road, involving the removal of trees and encroachment on the greenbelt, following a previous Supreme Court judgment that declared the area a Public Trust and Heritage Urban Park. The core legal question was whether this proposed widening violated the previous consent judgment and the Lahore Canal Heritage Park Act, 2013. The Court held that the project was permissible, finding that the previous judgment did not create an absolute bar to future infrastructure development necessary for public good. It determined that the project aligned with the overall recommendations of the earlier Mediation Committee and that the government had satisfied the statutory requirements for environmental impact assessments and advisory approvals under the Act. The Court established that in public interest litigation under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, the Court retains inherent jurisdiction to revisit or clarify its orders to address evolving public needs, provided the project serves a public purpose and includes adequate environmental mitigation measures, such as tree replacement.

  Questions settled

  • Does a consent order in public interest litigation preclude the Supreme Court from granting future permissions for infrastructure projects?
  • Can the Doctrine of Public Trust be invoked to prohibit infrastructure development that serves a public purpose?
  • Does the Lahore Canal Heritage Park Act, 2013, impose an absolute prohibition on construction or infrastructure development within the Heritage Park?
  • Is the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 limited by the principles of estoppel or waiver?
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• Lahore Bachao Tehrik vs Dr. Iqbal Muhammad Chauhan and others2015 SCMR 1520, 2015 P.S.C. Crl. 763 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-08-05
  public interest litigationpublic trust doctrineenvironmental lawheritage parkconsent ordertraffic congestionjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application by the Government of Punjab seeking permission to further widen the Lahore Canal Bank Road, involving the removal of trees and encroachment on the greenbelt, which had previously been declared a 'Heritage Urban Park' and a 'Public Trust' in a 2011 Supreme Court judgment. The core legal question was whether this project, which deviated from the Mediation Committee's original recommendations adopted in the 2011 consent judgment, violated the Lahore Canal Heritage Park Act, 2013, and the doctrine of public trust. The Court held that the project was permissible, reasoning that the previous judgment did not preclude the Court from exercising its jurisdiction under Article 184(3) to address evolving public needs, such as alleviating severe traffic congestion that had rendered the road hazardous. The Court established that public trust resources can be utilized for public purposes, provided environmental impacts are mitigated. It further clarified that the Act's prohibitions are not absolute and allow for development if procedural requirements, such as environmental impact assessments and committee approvals, are satisfied.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court permit development in a protected public trust area despite a prior consent judgment prohibiting such activity?
  • Does the doctrine of public trust absolutely prohibit the use of protected greenbelt areas for public infrastructure projects?
  • Can a court exercise its jurisdiction under Article 184(3) to revisit or clarify a previous judgment in public interest litigation?
  • Are the prohibitions against construction in the Lahore Canal Heritage Park Act 2013 absolute or subject to exceptions?
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• Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Bar Council through Chief Secretary vs Mukhtar2015 SCMR 997 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-10-03
  Bar Council enrolmenttransfer of practiceBenevolent Fund contributionGeneral Welfare FunddiscriminationArticle 25 Constitutionprovincial bar council rulesstatutory rule-making power
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil appeal by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Bar Council challenging a Peshawar High Court judgment that allowed respondent No. 1's writ petition. Respondent No. 1, previously enrolled with the Sindh Bar Council, relocated his legal practice to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and applied for enrolment with the petitioner Bar Council. He challenged the demand for enrolment fee, General Welfare Fund, and Benevolent Fund contributions as discriminatory under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, claiming such fees were not charged by other provincial bar councils. The High Court struck down the demand as discriminatory. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court judgment, and dismissed the writ petition. The Supreme Court held that each provincial Bar Council is an autonomous statutory body empowered to frame its own rules. Rules framed by one provincial Bar Council cannot be invalidated for lack of conformity with those of another province, nor does variation between provincial rules constitute discrimination under Article 25 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Can the rules framed by one Provincial Bar Council be declared discriminatory and struck down merely because they differ from the rules framed by another Provincial Bar Council?
  • Does Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan apply to create parity between the statutory rules of different provincial autonomous bodies?
  • Is an advocate transferring legal practice from one province to another liable to pay enrolment fees and benevolent fund contributions required by the receiving Provincial Bar Council's rules?
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• Khuda Bakhsh vs The State2015 P.S.C. (Crl.) 326 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-01-15
  narcotic substancesrepresentative samplechemical examiner reportquantum of sentencecharasreduction of sentencecriminal appealcontrolled substance
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Balochistan High Court which maintained the appellant's conviction under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, and the sentence of life imprisonment for the recovery of 170 kilograms of charas. The core legal question was whether the appellant could be held liable for the entire quantity of narcotics recovered when samples from each packet were not separately sealed and sent for chemical analysis, and whether the sentence of life imprisonment was proportionate for the proved quantity. The Supreme Court held that since only a single 2-kilogram parcel was sent to the laboratory without separate representative samples from each packet, the appellant could only be held liable for two kilograms. The Court laid down that to sustain a conviction based on bulk quantities, representative samples from each packet must be separately sealed and tested. Consequently, while upholding the conviction under Section 9(c), the Court reduced the sentence of life imprisonment to eight years rigorous imprisonment keeping in view the quantity, the type of narcotic substance, and that it was a first offence.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be held liable for the entire bulk quantity of narcotics recovered when separate samples from each packet were not separately sealed and sent for chemical analysis?
  • Whether the failure to send separately sealed samples from different seized packets restricts the conviction and sentence to the quantity actually verified by the chemical examiner report?
  • Does the type of narcotic substance and the exact quantity recovered affect the quantum of sentence within the statutory range provided under Section 9 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • When does the mandatory proviso requiring life imprisonment under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, get attracted?
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• Khuda Bakhsh vs State2015 P.S.C. (Crl.) 326, 2015 SCMR 735, 2015 PLJ SC 566 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-01-15
  narcoticsrepresentative samplechemical examiner reportsentencing policycharasreduction of sentenceControl of Narcotic Substances Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the conviction and life imprisonment sentence of the appellant for transporting 170 kilograms of cannabis (charas) under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The prosecution alleged recovery from secret compartments in a vehicle driven by the appellant. The core legal question concerned whether the entire recovered quantity could be attributed to the accused when the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report confirmed receipt of only one representative sample parcel rather than separate samples from each of the 170 packets. The Supreme Court, relying on the precedent in Ameer Zeb v. State, held that it is unsafe to rely on prosecution testimony for the entire quantity unless representative samples are taken from every packet and separately analyzed. Consequently, the Court maintained the conviction under Section 9(c) but limited the liability to the two kilograms actually tested by the FSL. The Court further observed that sentencing under Section 9(c) should be proportionate to the quantity and type of narcotic, reducing the sentence from life imprisonment to eight years' rigorous imprisonment.

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• Khan Afsar vs Afsar Khan and otherss2015 SCMR 311 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-10-20
  pre-emptionTalb-i-IshhadTalb-i-Muwathibatservice by postregistered cover acknowledgment dueKhyber Pakhtunkhwa pre-emption law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal assails the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench, which dismissed the appellant's pre-emption suit. The appellant had instituted a suit for pre-emption regarding certain lands, alleging that the actual sale price was lower than the registered amount, and claimed to have fulfilled the requirements of Talb-i-Muwathibat and Talb-i-Ishhad. The core legal question was whether the mere dispatch of a notice of Talb-i-Ishhad by registered post suffices under section 13(3) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987, or whether actual service or receipt by the vendee under registered cover acknowledgment due is mandatory, rendering general provisions of the General Clauses Act inapplicable. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that pre-emption is governed by its specific statute which requires notice under registered cover acknowledgment due to apprise the vendee, and mere dispatch or receipt by a third party does not satisfy the mandatory legal requirement. The key principle laid down is that the special provisions of pre-emption law regarding Talb-i-Ishhad override general statutory presumptions of service by post, making actual service or a valid presumption arising from refusal/non-acceptance imperative.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere dispatch of a notice of Talb-i-Ishhad satisfy the requirements of section 13(3) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987?
  • Is the general law of service by post under the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956 applicable to pre-emption suits governed by the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987?
  • Does receipt of the Talb-i-Ishhad notice by a third party rather than the vendee constitute valid service under pre-emption law?
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• Khan Afsar vs Afsar Khan and others2015 SCMR 311, 2015 PLJ SC 212 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-10-20
  pre-emptionTalb-i-Ishhadservice of noticeregistered cover acknowledgment duestatutory interpretationvendee
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had dismissed a pre-emption suit. The appellant had filed the suit seeking to pre-empt land sold to the respondent, claiming he had performed the requisite Talb-i-Muwathibat and Talb-i-Ishhad. The core legal question was whether the statutory requirement of Talb-i-Ishhad under Section 13(3) of the N.W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987 is satisfied by the mere dispatch of a registered notice, or if actual service upon the vendee is mandatory. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the specific provisions of the N.W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987 override the general provisions of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956. The Court determined that the phrase 'registered cover acknowledgment due' necessitates that the notice actually reaches the vendee. Because the acknowledgment receipt was signed by a third party rather than the vendee, the Court concluded that the mandatory notice requirement was not fulfilled, thereby defeating the pre-emption claim.

  Questions settled

  • Does the requirement of 'registered cover acknowledgment due' under Section 13(3) of the N.W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987 require actual service of notice upon the vendee?
  • Can the general provisions regarding 'service by post' in the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956 override the specific notice requirements of the N.W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987?
  • Is the mere dispatch of a notice sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Talb-i-Ishhad in a pre-emption suit?
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• Khalid lqbal and 2 others vs Mirza Khan and another2015 PSC 110 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  second criminal review petitiondeath sentence commutationfinality of judgmentlife expectancy doctrineSupreme Court Rules 1980writ jurisdictiondouble jeopardy
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners filed a second criminal review petition and related proceedings seeking to commute their death sentences to life imprisonment. They argued that because they had already served the equivalent of a life sentence during the pendency of their appeals, they were entitled to relief under the principles of life expectancy and curative justice, citing precedents like Dilawar Hussain. The core legal questions were whether a second review petition is maintainable, whether a death sentence can be commuted solely because the convict served a full life term during the pendency of legal remedies, and whether Supreme Court judgments can be challenged via writ petitions. The Court held that a second review petition is barred by Order XXVI, Rule 9 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980. It further held that once a judgment attains finality after the exhaustion of legal remedies, it cannot be re-agitated. The Court established that serving a sentence during the pendency of an appeal does not automatically entitle a convict to commutation, nor does it violate constitutional protections against double jeopardy.

  Questions settled

  • Is a second criminal review petition maintainable before the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
  • Does the fact that a convict has served a full term of life imprisonment during the pendency of legal remedies automatically entitle them to commutation of a death sentence?
  • Can a judgment of the Supreme Court be challenged through a writ petition filed in a High Court?
  • Does the enhancement of a sentence by an appellate court constitute double jeopardy under Article 13(a) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Khalid Iqbal and 2 otherss vs Mirza Khan and others2015 PLJ SC 482, 2015 PSC 110, 2015 PLD Supreme Court 50 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-11-26
  second review petitiondeath sentenceexpectancy of lifecomplete justiceper incuriamfinality of judgmentdouble jeopardycommutation of sentenceinherent jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a second criminal review petition and a civil appeal challenging the maintenance of death sentences. The primary legal question was whether a convict who has served a period equivalent to life imprisonment during the pendency of legal proceedings or due to executive delay in execution is entitled to commutation of a death sentence under the doctrine of expectancy of life. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that once a conviction and sentence have attained finality after the exhaustion of all legal remedies, including the first review, a second review petition is expressly barred under Order XXVI Rule 9 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980. The Court clarified that while it possesses inherent powers under Articles 184(3), 187, and 188 of the Constitution to revisit per incuriam judgments to ensure complete justice, such powers are not a matter of right for parties to re-agitate settled issues. The principle of expectancy of life is a factor for judicial discretion during trial or appeal but does not automatically entitle a condemned prisoner to commutation after finality of judgment.

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• Khalid Iqbal & others vs Mirza Khan and others2015 PLJ SC 482 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  second review petitioncapital punishmentlife expectancyquantum of sentencefinality of judgmentwrit petition against supreme courtdouble jeopardyper incuriam
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan addresses the competency of second criminal review petitions and collateral challenges filed by convicts under sentence of death, who seek the commutation of their capital punishment to life imprisonment on the ground that they have already undergone a period of incarceration equal to or exceeding twenty-five years during the pendency of their legal remedies. The core legal questions involve whether a second review petition is maintainable against a final judgment of the Supreme Court, whether a writ petition is competent against a judgment of the apex court, and whether serving out a full term of life imprisonment during appellate proceedings automatically mandates the commutation of a death sentence based on the doctrines of life expectancy or double jeopardy. The Court held that a second review petition is expressly barred by the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, that a High Court cannot issue a writ against the Supreme Court under the Constitution, and that prolonged incarceration resulting from executive delays or the pendency of legal remedies does not, by itself, furnish a ground to reopen a final conviction or mitigate a death sentence unless supported by other mitigating circumstances recognized in jurisprudence. The key principles laid down are that finality attached to judicial judgments cannot be circumvented through subsequent review or collateral proceedings, and that Article 13(a) of the Constitution does not bar the enhancement or final determination of sentences by an appellate court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a second criminal review petition is maintainable before the Supreme Court after the dismissal of the first review petition?
  • Does the serving out of a full term of life imprisonment during the pendency of legal proceedings bar the maintenance of a death sentence?
  • Can a High Court issue a writ against a judgment or order passed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
  • Whether prolonged incarceration resulting from the pendency of judicial remedies or executive delay attracts the doctrine of life expectancy to automatically commute a death sentence?
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• Karachi Dock Labour Board vs Messrs Quality Builders Ltd.2016 NLR Civil 338, 2016 PLJ Sc 404, 2016 P.S.C. 657, 2015-SCP-121, PLD 2016 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-10-02
  arbitration awardsole arbitratorappointment of arbitratorjurisdiction of arbitratorunilateral appointmentrule of the courtwaiver and acquiescence
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal addressed whether an arbitration award made by a sole arbitrator was issued with lawful jurisdiction and thus correctly made a rule of the court. The dispute arose from a construction contract containing an arbitration clause that was silent on the number of arbitrators and the appointment mechanism, thereby attracting Section 3 and Paragraph 1 of the First Schedule of the Arbitration Act, 1940, implying a reference to a single arbitrator by mutual consent. The respondent unilaterally appointed a sole arbitrator under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, without fulfilling the statutory preconditions, instead of seeking appointment through the court under Section 8 or Section 20. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that Section 9 was inapplicable and that the unilateral appointment rendered the arbitrator inherently without jurisdiction, making the resulting award a nullity. The Court further ruled that an inherent defect in jurisdiction is incurable by waiver or participation, and the court is duty-bound to examine the legality of an award sua sponte before making it a rule of the court. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the lower courts' judgments were set aside, and a retired judge was appointed as a new sole arbitrator by consent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 applies when the arbitration agreement is silent on the number of arbitrators and the manner of their appointment?
  • Does a party have the power to unilaterally appoint a sole arbitrator under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 where the arbitration agreement does not provide for a reference to two arbitrators?
  • Can an objection regarding the inherent lack of jurisdiction of an arbitrator be waived through the conduct or participation of a party?
  • Is a court duty-bound to independently examine the legality and jurisdictional validity of an arbitration award before making it a rule of the court?
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• Javed Ahmed vs Muhammad Sarwar2016 P.S.C. 857 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-08-05
  summary suitpromissory noteconditional instrumentburden of proofdocumentary evidenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment in a summary suit involving the enforcement of a promissory note. The core legal questions were whether the promissory note was conditional due to its reference to a prior agreement, thereby invalidating the summary suit, and whether the underlying financial transaction constituted a partnership investment deposited into a joint account, thus negating the petitioner's liability. The Supreme Court held that the reference to the prior agreement in the promissory note did not constitute a condition but rather served as security for the extended finance. Regarding the second contention, the Court found that the petitioner failed to produce any documentary evidence to substantiate the claim of a joint bank account or partnership investment, and failed to take necessary steps to summon such records during the trial. Consequently, the Court found no perversity or illegality in the impugned judgment, maintained the lower court's decision, and dismissed the petition. The judgment reaffirms that oral assertions regarding financial arrangements cannot override documentary evidence in summary proceedings without corroborative proof.

  Questions settled

  • Does a reference to a prior agreement in a promissory note necessarily render the instrument conditional?
  • Can a party rely on oral submissions regarding financial transactions when no documentary evidence is produced during trial?
  • Is a party required to take active steps to summon documents if they claim such documents are in the custody of others?
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• Jamshoro Joint Venture Ltd & others vs Khawaja Muhammad Asif & others2015 PLJ SC 69 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  civil review petitionscope of reviewpublic procurementimplementation agreementfundamental rightsjudicial review of contracts
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil review petitions sought a review of the Supreme Court's earlier judgment which decided a constitutional petition regarding an LPG extraction plant project awarded to M/s. Jamshoro Joint Venture Limited (JJVL) by Sui Southern Gas Company Limited (SSGCL). The core legal questions revolved around whether the judgment under review contained errors floating on the surface of the record regarding the deletion of crucial clauses from the Implementation Agreement, changes to the contract duration, royalty calculations, submission of financial plans and bid bonds, and whether review jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution could be treated as an appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petitions, holding that no case of misreading or non-reading of the record was made out, that material alterations in the agreement lacked proper board approval, and that review jurisdiction cannot be equated with an appeal. The key principle laid down is that the scope of review is strictly confined to correcting patent errors on the face of the record and cannot be used as a rehearing or an appeal against a judgment rendered under Article 184(3) of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the scope of review under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan can be treated as an appeal or a rehearing of the case?
  • Does the alteration of material clauses in a public procurement contract without proper board approval vitiate the transaction?
  • Can the Supreme Court examine questions of public importance and fundamental rights under Article 184(3) regardless of pending civil suits?
  • Whether judicial review principles apply to the exercise of contractual powers by government bodies to prevent arbitrariness and favouritism?
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• Ishqa Khan Khakwani and another vs Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, etc_2015 PSC 1446 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  political question doctrinedisqualification of parliamentarianArticle 62 and 63judicial reviewconstitutional interpretationArticle 184(3)parliamentary privilege
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns Constitution petitions filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, alongside an appeal against a High Court judgment, seeking the disqualification of the Prime Minister and the Interior Minister. The petitioners alleged that the respondents made false statements on the floor of the National Assembly regarding the Pakistan Army's role in mediating political protests, thereby violating Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the factual premise of the allegations was unfounded as there was no material inconsistency between the statements of the respondents and the Inter-Services Public Relations release. The Court clarified that the "political question" doctrine does not render a matter non-justiciable if it involves the interpretation of the Constitution or the enforcement of fundamental rights. It emphasized that superior courts have an inherent duty to enforce constitutional provisions regardless of political implications. Furthermore, the Court noted that disqualification under Articles 62 and 63 requires a prior declaration or conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction, which was absent in this case.

  Questions settled

  • Does the 'political question' doctrine preclude the Supreme Court from adjudicating matters that involve the interpretation of the Constitution?
  • Is a prior declaration or conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction a prerequisite for disqualification under Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can a court dismiss a constitutional petition solely on the ground that it raises a 'political question' without examining whether it involves the interpretation of the Constitution?
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• Ishaq Khan Khakwani and otherss vs Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and others2015 PLD Supreme Court 275 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-12-09
  constitutional petitiondisqualification of member of parliamentpolitical question doctrinejudicial reviewparliamentary privilege18th AmendmentArticle 62Article 63false statementPrime Minister eligibility
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court heard four petitions, including a civil petition and three constitution petitions, challenging the eligibility of the Prime Minister and Interior Minister under Articles 62(f) and 63(g) of the Constitution. The petitioners alleged that the Prime Minister made a false statement on the floor of the National Assembly regarding the Army's role as a mediator during political protests. The High Court had dismissed a constitution petition on the ground that it raised a "political question" and was not justiciable. The Supreme Court dismissed all petitions, finding no material inconsistency in the statements of the Prime Minister, Interior Minister, and ISPR, thereby concluding that the factual foundation for the allegations was non-existent. The Court clarified that the "political question" doctrine does not preclude judicial review when the determination of a matter requires the interpretation or application of constitutional provisions, even if it has political overtones. It was emphasized that, following the 18th Amendment, a prior declaration or conviction by a competent court is a prerequisite for disqualification under Articles 62(1)(f) and 63(1)(g) of the Constitution.

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• Irshad Ahmed Sheikh vs National Accountability Bureau and others2015 SCMR 588 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-01-14
  transfer of caseNational Accountability Ordinanceretrospective effectChairman NAB powersAccountability CourtAnti-Corruption Courtconstitutional petitioncorruptionbailjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the Sindh High Court, which had upheld the transfer of a corruption case from a Special Judge, Anti-Corruption Court, to an Accountability Court. The appellant contended that the Special Judge lacked authority to transfer the case, that the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 (NAB Ordinance) could not apply retrospectively to an incident from 1996-1997, and that the increased punishment under the NAB Ordinance could not be imposed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Section 16-A(a) of the NAB Ordinance clearly empowers the Chairman NAB to apply for such transfers. The Court further affirmed that Section 2 of the NAB Ordinance explicitly provides for its retrospective application from January 1, 1985, thereby allowing Accountability Courts to try cases predating its promulgation. The Court also noted that Section 16-A had been amended to ensure equal footing for the accused and NAB in transfer applications, with the ultimate decision resting with the superior courts in the interest of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Chairman NAB apply for the transfer of a case from an Anti-Corruption Court to an Accountability Court?
  • Can an Accountability Court decide a case where the alleged offence occurred before the promulgation of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Does the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, have retrospective effect?
  • Is the power granted to the Chairman NAB to apply for case transfers an unguided and unstructured discretion?
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• Irfan Ali vs The State2015 NLR Criminal 457, 2015 PLJ SC 634, 2015 SCMR 840, 2015 P.S.C. Crl. 447 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-03-16
  AppealDeath sentenceMurderEyewitness testimonyMedico-legal evidenceCorroborationAcquittal of co-accusedFirearm recoveryFSL reportUnwitnessed crime
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment concerns an appeal against the Lahore High Court's decision to uphold a death sentence for murder. The core legal questions involved the reliability of eyewitness testimony when contradicted by medico-legal evidence, the impact of a co-accused's acquittal on the appellant's conviction, and the requirement for strong corroboration in capital cases. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the appellant's conviction and sentence. The Court held that eyewitness testimony, found unreliable against an acquitted co-accused, cannot be relied upon against the appellant without strong, independent corroboration. Significant omissions in the FIR regarding fatal injuries found during autopsy, coupled with the FSL report discrediting firearm recovery, rendered the prosecution's case doubtful and suggested an unwitnessed crime. The Court emphasized that medical evidence inconsistent with ocular account denudes the latter of credibility, and capital punishment requires unimpeachable evidence.

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• Iqbal Ahmed vs Managing Director Provincial Urban Development2015 NLR Civil 407 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  plot allotmentcancellation of allotmentrevisional jurisdictionbreach of contractpublic utility plotoutright salepayment schedule
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that restored the dismissal of the appellant's suit regarding the cancellation of a plot allotment. The appellant was allotted land in Bannu Township for a school in 1992, subject to specific payment terms. Despite multiple reminders and opportunities to pay installments, the appellant failed to comply, leading the authorities to cancel the allotment and forfeit a portion of the deposit. The appellant sought a declaration to pay at a reduced rate, which was denied. The Supreme Court held that the appellant’s failure to adhere to the payment schedule and his subsequent inaction justified the cancellation. The Court clarified that the 'outright sale' nature of the allotment required lump-sum payment, and the authority's prior leniency in allowing installments did not grant the appellant indefinite rights. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the High Court correctly exercised its revisional jurisdiction to correct jurisdictional errors and misreading of evidence by the lower appellate court. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the cancellation of the allotment.

  Questions settled

  • Can an allottee of a public utility plot claim a right to indefinite payment delays after failing to comply with the agreed payment schedule?
  • Does the characterization of a land transfer as an 'outright sale' in allotment regulations preclude the allottee from demanding payment by installments?
  • Is an allotment cancellation valid where the allottee was provided multiple notices and opportunities to pay but failed to do so?
  • Under what circumstances can the High Court exercise its revisional jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of an appellate court?
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• Inspector-General of Police, Punjab vs Tariq Mahmood2015 SCMR 77 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-04-25
  back benefitsreinstatementcivil servicehonourable acquittalgainful employmentdepartmental proceedingsservice tribunalpresumption of innocence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a challenge by the Inspector-General of Police against a Service Tribunal decision granting full back benefits to a reinstated police constable. The respondent had been dismissed in 1992 following a criminal case and absence from duty, but was reinstated in 2010 after his acquittal. The core legal question was whether a civil servant is entitled to back benefits for a prolonged period of removal if the department delayed the decision on his revision petition pending a criminal trial. The Supreme Court held that the grant of back benefits to a reinstated employee is the general rule, while denial is an exception requiring proof of gainful employment during the absence. The Court found that the department's decision to keep the revision petition pending for 17 years based on a criminal trial was legally flawed, as a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Consequently, the Court affirmed the respondent's entitlement to back benefits, excluding the initial four-month period of unauthorized absence, subject to a departmental inquiry regarding gainful employment.

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• Industrial Fabrication Company through M.D. vs Managing Director, Pak American Fertilizer Limited2015 PLD Supreme Court 154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-12-11
  arbitration agreementfull and final settlementexisting disputeaccord and satisfactionarbitration clausecivil appealcontractual dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged a High Court judgment that dismissed an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, for the appointment of an arbitrator. The appellant had entered into a contract with the respondent, which contained an arbitration clause. Following the completion of work, the appellant submitted a final bill and subsequently issued a letter accepting a specific payment as "full and final settlement" of all claims. The core legal question was whether an arbitration agreement remains enforceable when the underlying dispute has been resolved through such a settlement. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that an existing, unresolved dispute is a sine qua non for invoking arbitration. Since the appellant had accepted the payment as a final settlement without contemporaneously challenging it on grounds like coercion or undue influence, no "existing dispute" remained. Consequently, the Court affirmed that where a contract is extinguished by a final settlement, the arbitration clause perishes, precluding a reference to arbitration. The Court emphasized that parties cannot invoke arbitration after accepting a final settlement without first setting that settlement aside.

  Questions settled

  • Is an existing, unresolved dispute a prerequisite for invoking the jurisdiction of a court under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940?
  • Does an arbitration clause in a contract survive if the parties have entered into a full and final settlement of all claims arising under that contract?
  • Can a party invoke an arbitration clause after accepting payment in full and final settlement of a contract without challenging the validity of that settlement?
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• Industrial Fabrication Company through Its M.D. vs Managing2015 NLR Civil 389 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  arbitration agreementfull and final settlementarbitrable disputeaccord and satisfactioncontractual disputeSection 20 Arbitration Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute regarding the appointment of an arbitrator under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The appellant, a contractor, sought to refer a payment dispute to arbitration, claiming illegal deductions under a contract dated 03.10.1996. The respondent contended that the dispute had been resolved through a letter dated 17.01.2000, which constituted a full and final settlement, and that the appellant had accepted payment accordingly. The core legal question was whether an existing, arbitrable dispute remained when the parties had previously reached a full and final settlement. The Supreme Court held that where a contract is extinguished by a subsequent settlement in full and final satisfaction, no arbitrable dispute remains. The court emphasized that an existing dispute is a sine qua non for invoking arbitration jurisdiction. Because the appellant had unequivocally accepted the settlement without contemporaneous protest or allegations of coercion in their initial application, the court found no valid dispute existed to warrant a reference to arbitration. Consequently, the High Court's dismissal of the application was upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Does a full and final settlement of claims under a contract extinguish the right to invoke an arbitration clause?
  • Is an existing dispute a necessary condition for a court to order the filing of an arbitration agreement under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940?
  • Can a party that has accepted payment in full and final settlement subsequently claim coercion to revive an arbitration dispute without having challenged the settlement in proper proceedings?
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• Industrial Fabrication Company thorugh its M.D. vs Managing2015 PLJ SC 421 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  arbitration agreementarbitration clauseaccord and satisfactionfull and final settlementexisting disputeSection 20 Arbitration Actcontractual dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The appellant sought to refer a contractual dispute to arbitration, despite having previously accepted a payment as "full and final settlement" of all claims. The core legal question was whether an arbitration agreement remains enforceable when the underlying dispute has been resolved through accord and satisfaction. The Supreme Court held that an existing, unresolved dispute is a sine qua non for invoking arbitration under Section 20. Finding that the appellant had unequivocally accepted the settlement and failed to challenge its validity or allege coercion in its initial application or prior correspondence, the Court concluded that no arbitrable dispute existed. The Court affirmed that where a contract is extinguished or a claim is fully settled, the arbitration clause perishes with the contract. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the principle that parties cannot invoke arbitration for claims already settled unless the settlement itself is validly contested in appropriate proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is an existing, unresolved dispute a prerequisite for invoking the jurisdiction of the court under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • Does an arbitration clause remain enforceable after the parties have reached a full and final settlement of their claims under the contract?
  • Can a party invoke an arbitration clause for a claim that has already been settled through accord and satisfaction without first challenging the validity of that settlement?
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• In the matter of Application by Muhammad Shafi vs N/A2015 SCMR 1779 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-07-14
  FIR registrationcognizable offencesforest land encroachmentpolice investigationprofessional misconductSupreme Court Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from an application brought by Malik Muhammad Shafi highlighting a 2005 letter written by the Chief Conservator of Forests to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Rawalpindi, detailing serious cognizable offences including encroachment on forest land, beating, and kidnapping of forest officials by functionaries of Bahria Town and Habib Rafique and Company Limited. The core legal question was whether the police could refuse to register a criminal case where a complaint discloses the commission of cognizable offences. The Supreme Court held that the police are bound to register a case and investigate upon receiving information disclosing cognizable offences, and cannot refuse registration based on extraneous factual disputes. The Court laid down the principle that factual controversies are matters for police investigation rather than judicial pre-trial adjudication by courts, and underscored the mandatory nature of registering an FIR when cognizable offences are reported by public functionaries.

  Questions settled

  • Can the police refuse to register a case when a complaint discloses the commission of a cognizable offence?
  • Is it the function of the court to embark on an investigation of factual matters regarding land encroachment at the pre-FIR stage?
  • Under what provision are show cause notices for professional misconduct issued to advocates by the Supreme Court?
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• Imran alias Dully and another vs The State and others2015 SCMR 155 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-11-13
  circumstantial evidencelast seen evidenceextra-judicial confessionbenefit of doubtmurderzina-bil-jabracquittalchain of events
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of the appellant for the kidnapping, rape, and murder of a nine-year-old girl. The prosecution's case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, including 'last seen' testimony, an extra-judicial confession, and the recovery of a blood-stained sheet. The trial court awarded a death sentence, which the Federal Shariat Court later reduced to life imprisonment. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the 'last seen' evidence unreliable due to an unexplained eight-day delay in reporting and the witnesses' status as chance witnesses. The extra-judicial confession was deemed untrustworthy as it was made to a political rival, and the recovery of the incriminating sheet was considered a fabricated plant. The Court held that in cases based on circumstantial evidence, every link in the chain must be well-authenticated and lead to the sole conclusion of the accused's guilt. Finding the evidence sketchy and the chain of circumstances broken, the Court extended the benefit of doubt and acquitted the appellant.

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• Ikramullah and others vs The State2015 P.S.C. Crl. 639 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-04-13
  Control of Narcotic SubstancesChemical Examiner ReportSafe Custody of SamplesConscious PossessionBenefit of DoubtFugitive from Law
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave of the Court addresses the conviction of the appellants under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 for possession of charas. The core legal questions involved the legality and evidentiary value of a laconic chemical examiner report lacking mandatory test protocols, the establishment of safe custody and transmission of samples, and the requirement of proving conscious possession in the case of a mere passenger in a vehicle. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the convictions, holding that a chemical examiner report failing to state the protocols and tests applied pursuant to the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001 is legally deficient and cannot serve as conclusive proof, that failure to prove safe transmission of samples undermines the prosecution case, and that a passenger cannot be convicted without proof of conscious possession. The key principles laid down emphasize strict adherence to statutory rules for chemical analysis and the necessity of establishing safe custody of samples and conscious possession for passengers.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a chemical examiner report lacking test protocols and details of analysis has evidentiary value under Section 36 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Does failure of the prosecution to establish the safe custody and safe transmission of recovered narcotic samples vitiate the trial?
  • Can a mere passenger in a vehicle be convicted for the possession of narcotics found therein without proof of conscious possession?
  • Does a fugitive from law lose their right of audience before the court?
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• Iftikhar Ali vs Shahid Nazir, Etc.s2015 NLR Criminal 354 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-06-30
  criminal appealsudden fightpremeditationappraisal of evidenceSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging the judgment of the High Court regarding the conviction and sentence of respondents No. 1 and 2. The core legal question revolved around whether the High Court correctly re-appreciated the evidence to conclude that the incident was a result of a sudden fight without premeditation, thereby altering the nature of the offense rather than maintaining the Trial Court's view. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's appraisal of the evidence and its conclusion that the incident fell under an exception attracting section 302(c), Pakistan Penal Code 1860, was well-founded, particularly given the lack of weapon recoveries and corroborative medical evidence regarding strangulation. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court and dismissed the appeal, thereby upholding the High Court's judgment. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the High Court's appraisal of evidence and legitimate conclusions drawn therefrom in the absence of a jurisdictional error or misreading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in altering the conviction based on a finding of a sudden fight without premeditation?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's appraisal of evidence and legitimate conclusions in the absence of strong grounds?
  • Does the absence of weapon recovery and corroborative medical evidence impact the establishment of specific allegations in a criminal case?
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• Hyderabad Cantonment Board vs Raj Kumar and others2015 PSC 1310 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-05-20
  cantonment boardparking feestatutory interpretationcharging sectiontax and feevirescantonments act
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal addressed whether the Cantonment Executive Officer or Cantonment Board is empowered under the Cantonments Act, 1924 to charge a parking/service fee from public transport vehicles using halting places and bus stands within the cantonment area. The appellant Hyderabad Cantonment Board levied parking fees on commercial vehicles, which was successfully challenged in the High Court of Sindh as lacking statutory backing. The Supreme Court evaluated Section 200 of the Cantonments Act, 1924, and other relevant laws, holding that charging provisions must be strictly construed and any pecuniary burden requires explicit statutory sanction. The Court concluded that Section 200 of the Cantonments Act, 1924, which pertains to stallages, rents, and fees for stalls, shops, and slaughter-houses, does not envision or authorize the levy of parking fees. Furthermore, although the subsequent Cantonments Ordinance, 2002 provides powers to levy parking fees, it was not yet operational due to the lack of a federal notification. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming that a public authority cannot extract fees without a valid, operational legislative provision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Cantonment Board is empowered under Section 200 of the Cantonments Act, 1924 to levy parking fees on commercial vehicles?
  • Can a public authority impose a pecuniary burden, fee, or tax without explicit and operational statutory sanction?
  • Does an unnotified and unenforced ordinance provide valid legal backing for the collection of fees by a local government authority?
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• Hyderabad Cantonment Board vs Raj Kumar & others2015 PLJ SC 870 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-05-20
  cantonment boardparking feetaxation powercharging sectionstatutory interpretationultra vires
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the Hyderabad Cantonment Board challenges the High Court's judgment holding that the Board lacks the legal authority to levy parking fees on commercial public transport vehicles. The core legal question is whether the Cantonment Executive Officer or Cantonment Board is empowered under the Cantonment Act, 1924 to charge service or parking fees from public transport vehicles using halting places. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that charging provisions in statutes must be strictly construed and any pecuniary burden requires explicit statutory sanction. The Court found that Section 200 of the Cantonment Act, 1924 is strictly limited to stallages, rents, and fees for public markets and slaughter-houses, and does not encompass parking fees. Furthermore, while the Cantonment Ordinance, 2002 empowers the Board to levy parking fees, it remains unnotified and inoperative. The key principle laid down is that public authorities cannot levy taxes, fees, or pecuniary burdens without clear, unambiguous, and currently operational statutory backing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Cantonment Board is empowered under Section 200 of the Cantonment Act, 1924 to levy parking fees on commercial transport vehicles?
  • Can a public authority impose a fee or pecuniary burden without explicit and currently operational statutory backing?
  • Does an unnotified and unimplemented legislative instrument provide valid legal authority for the imposition of a fee?
  Read full judgment →
• Hina Manzoor vs Malik Ibrar Ahmed, etc.2015 PLD Supreme Court 396, 2015 PLJ SC 795, 2015 PSC 1301, 2015 P.S.C. 1100 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-04-28
  election petitionverification on oathRepresentation of the People Actlimitation periodamendment of pleadingsdismissal of election petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves an election appeal challenging the dismissal of an election petition by the Election Tribunal for want of proper verification under Section 55(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976. The core legal question was whether merely signing an election petition under the verification clause suffices without an oath being administered by an authorized person, and whether a subsequent verified memo filed after the period of limitation can cure such a defect. The Supreme Court held that the verification of an election petition on oath, attested by a competent authority, is mandatory under the election laws, and any subsequent rectification attempted after the expiry of the 45-day limitation period is barred. The court established that defects in the mandatory verification on oath cannot be cured by filing an amended petition out of time, as it affects valuable rights accrued to the returned candidate and does not constitute an amendment necessary to determine the real controversy on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does merely affixing a signature under the verification clause of an election petition without attestation by an authorized person satisfy Section 55(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976?
  • Is verification on oath of an election petition mandatory, and does its omission entail penal consequences resulting in dismissal?
  • Can a defective verification in an election petition be cured by filing a fresh or amended memorandum of the petition after the expiry of the period of limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• Hina Manzoor vs Malik Ibrar Ahmed and others2015 PLD Supreme Court 396 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-04-28
  election petitionverification on oathOath Commissionerlimitation periodamendment of pleadingssummary dismissalROPA
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from the dismissal of an election petition by the Election Tribunal under Section 63(a) of the Representation of the People Act 1976 (ROPA). The appellant, a runner-up candidate in NA-54 Rawalpindi, filed an election petition that lacked verification on oath before an Oath Commissioner or authorized officer, bearing only her signatures. She later submitted an amended memo cured of this defect, but after the 45-day limitation period prescribed under Section 52(2) of ROPA had expired. The core legal questions were whether verification under Order VI Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 requires administration of an oath by an authorized person in election petitions, and whether a defective verification clause can be cured by amendment after limitation. The Supreme Court held that verification on oath before a competent authority is mandatory under election laws, with non-compliance triggering summary dismissal under Section 63(a). Furthermore, curing such a defect after limitation is impermissible as it does not determine the real issue in controversy and deprives the respondent of an accrued right.

  Questions settled

  • Does verification of an election petition under Order VI Rule 15 CPC require administration and attestation of an oath by an authorized officer?
  • Is the requirement of verification on oath in an election petition mandatory under the Representation of the People Act 1976?
  • Can a defect in the verification clause of an election petition be cured by amendment after the expiry of the limitation period?
  Read full judgment →
• Himesh Khan vs The National Accountability Bureau (NAB), Lahore' and others2015 KLR Supreme Court Cases 96 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  post-arrest baildelay in trialNational Accountability Ordinancestatutory delayconstitutional libertyspeedy trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a criminal petition for leave to appeal arising from the denial of post-arrest bail to the petitioner, the former chairman of the Bank of Punjab, who faced corruption charges in a NAB reference pending before an Accountability Court. The core legal question was whether an accused facing trial under special legislation like the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, which generally restricts bail, can be granted post-arrest bail on the ground of inordinate and shocking delay in the conclusion of the trial not attributable to the accused. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed the same, granting bail to the petitioner. The holding establishes that where an accused has suffered prolonged incarceration for a shockingly long period and the delay in trial is not caused by their own acts or omissions, the broader principles of statutory delay and constitutional guarantees of liberty and speedy trial can be invoked, allowing courts to grant bail even in cases governed by special restrictive statutes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted on the ground of inordinate delay in trial to an accused facing charges under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Can the principles of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be pressed into service in hardship cases falling under special laws that restrict bail?
  • Does an inordinate delay in the conclusion of a trial, not caused by the accused, justify the release of the detained person on bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Himesh Khan vs The National Accountability Bureau (NAB), Lahore and others2015 SCMR 1092 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-04-14
  post-arrest bailinordinate delayspeedy trialNational Accountability Ordinanceconstitutional right to libertystatutory delayaccountability court
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Himesh Khan, sought post-arrest bail in a National Accountability Bureau (NAB) reference pending before an Accountability Court, where he had been incarcerated for approximately five years. The core legal question was whether an accused facing charges under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, could be granted bail on the grounds of inordinate delay in the trial, despite the Ordinance's restrictive provisions regarding bail. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail, noting that the trial's delay was not attributable to him but rather to the prosecution and co-accused. The Court affirmed that while the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, does not explicitly recognize bail, the broader principles of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, regarding statutory delay can be invoked in hardship cases to protect an accused's constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Court established that an accused cannot be left indefinitely in custody due to prosecution delays, and that bail may be granted in such cases to prevent the abuse of the process of law.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be granted bail under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, on the grounds of inordinate delay in the trial?
  • Does the absence of specific bail provisions in the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, preclude the application of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, in cases of extreme hardship?
  • Is a delay in trial attributable to the prosecution and co-accused a valid ground for granting bail to an accused who has been incarcerated for a long duration?
  Read full judgment →
• Himesh Khan vs National Accountability Bureau (NAB), Lahore and others2015 KLR Supreme Court Cases 96, 2015 SCMR 1092, 2015 PLJ SC 768 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-04-14
  post-arrest bailNational Accountability Ordinanceinordinate delayspeedy trialconstitutional right to libertyaccountability court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by an accused, Himesh Khan, facing trial in an Accountability Court for financial fraud charges under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The petitioner, incarcerated since 2009, sought bail on the grounds of inordinate delay in the trial, which had spanned several years with numerous witnesses yet to be examined. The core legal question was whether bail could be granted for offences under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, despite the absence of explicit statutory provisions for bail and the inapplicability of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail, noting that the trial delay was not attributable to him but rather to the prosecution and co-accused. The Court affirmed that while the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 does not explicitly provide for bail, the constitutional right to a speedy trial and the broader principles of justice allow for bail in cases of shocking, non-attributable delay, preventing the accused from being held indefinitely without trial.

  Questions settled

  • Can bail be granted to an accused under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, despite the absence of specific bail provisions in that statute?
  • Does the principle of inordinate delay in trial justify the grant of bail even when the statutory provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are not strictly applicable?
  • Is an accused person entitled to bail if the delay in the conclusion of the trial is not attributable to their own conduct?
  Read full judgment →
• Hassan alias Mehdi Hussain and another vs Muhammad Arif2015 P.S.C. 676 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-11-17
  civil revisiondismissal for non-prosecutionrestoration applicationlimitation periodresiduary article 181inherent powersrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the leave of the Supreme Court addresses whether an application seeking the restoration of a civil revision dismissed for non-prosecution is governed by a specific article of the Limitation Act, 1908, or by the residuary Article 181. The appellants challenged a High Court order dismissing their civil revision for non-prosecution and a subsequent restoration application on the ground of being barred by a 30-day limitation period. The Court held that since the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, does not contain specific provisions for the dismissal and restoration of revision petitions, courts exercise inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to dismiss and restore such petitions. Consequently, because no specific article in the Limitation Act, 1908 prescribes a limitation period for such restoration applications, the residuary Article 181 applies, providing a three-year limitation period from the date the right to apply accrues. The appeal was allowed and the matter remanded.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil revision before a higher court considered a valuable right or a mere privilege?
  • Which article of the Limitation Act, 1908 governs an application for the restoration of a civil revision dismissed for non-prosecution?
  • What is the limitation period for filing an application to restore a civil revision dismissed for non-prosecution?
  • Under which provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 can a court dismiss or restore a civil revision petition for non-prosecution?
  Read full judgment →
• Hassan Ali Grains (Pvt.) Ltd. and others vs Government of PAKISTANthrough Secretary M_o Finance and otherss2015 SCMR 957 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-04-06
  regulatory dutyconfiscatory levyfreedom of traderight to propertydismissal for non-prosecutionremand
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil appeals were instituted before the Supreme Court of Pakistan following a remand order in an earlier round of litigation (Government of Pakistan v. Muhammad Ashraf, PLD 1993 SC 176), wherein the High Court had been tasked with adjudicating a limited question. The core legal issue was whether the imposition and subsequent reduction of regulatory duty by the Government via notifications dated 07-04-1986 and 17-04-1986 amounted to a confiscatory exercise of State power violating fundamental rights to engage in trade and acquire property under Articles 18 and 23 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. On remand, a Division Bench of the Sindh High Court examined relevant domestic and comparative jurisprudence, concluding that the levy was not confiscatory. The Supreme Court concurred entirely with the High Court's findings and reasoning, holding that the regulatory duty did not constitute a confiscatory measure. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed on merits, while certain connected appeals were dismissed for non-prosecution due to the absence of counsel.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the imposition and subsequent reduction of regulatory duty through governmental notifications amounted to a confiscatory exercise resulting in an unconstitutional deprivation of property?
  • Whether a regulatory duty imposed by the State infringes the fundamental right to conduct a lawful trade, business, or occupation under Article 18 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Whether an appeal before the Supreme Court is liable to be dismissed for non-prosecution when neither the Advocate Supreme Court nor the Advocate-on-Record appears despite the matter being listed?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Farman Ullah vs Latif-Ur-Rehman2015 PLJ SC 924, 2015 P.S.C. 1261, 2015 SCMR 1708 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-05-06
  specific performanceex parte decreefraud and misrepresentationrevival of suitSection 12(2) CPCremandcivil procedurejurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a suit for specific performance where an ex parte decree was obtained by the appellant. The respondent successfully challenged the decree under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.) on grounds of fraud and misrepresentation. While setting aside the decree, the trial court and the High Court also dismissed the main suit, holding that its revival would be futile. The core legal question was whether, upon setting aside a decree under Section 12(2) C.P.C., the original suit must be automatically revived or if the court possesses the jurisdiction to dismiss the suit concurrently. The Supreme Court held that the general rule is the automatic revival of the suit to allow the defendant to file a written statement and join issues on merits. The Court clarified that while exceptions exist—such as when a plaint lacks a cause of action or is legally barred—a suit cannot be dismissed where factual controversies remain and parties have not yet led evidence on the main merits of the lis. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower courts' judgments and remanded the matter for trial on merits.

  Read full judgment →
• Haji Abdul Raziq Khan vs Federation of Pakistan through Its.2015 NLR Civil 201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-07-25
  Import Policy OrderLetter of Creditvested rightcustoms clearanceimport banUniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought to import 2000 used sprinkler lorries under an agreement with a foreign exporter, claiming the benefit of the proviso to Paragraph 4 of the Import Policy Order 2013 (IPO-2013), which exempts imports from new bans if Letters of Credit (LCs) were established prior to the issuance of the amending order. The Customs Authorities stopped the clearance of consignments, arguing that the import violated the IPO-2013 ban on vehicles older than five years and that the petitioner's LCs were issued after the ban took effect. The Supreme Court held that the proviso to Paragraph 4 only protects transactions where LCs were established before the amending order. The Court clarified that an irrevocable LC is a separate transaction from the underlying sale contract and cannot be expanded to cover future shipments not specified in the original LC. Consequently, the Court ruled that only LCs issued before the IPO-2013 came into effect qualified for the exemption, while subsequent LCs did not, thereby dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does a general agreement for the import of goods create a vested right for all future consignments under the proviso to Paragraph 4 of the Import Policy Order 2013?
  • Is an irrevocable Letter of Credit a separate transaction from the underlying sale contract?
  • Can a Letter of Credit be interpreted to cover future shipments not specified in the original instrument for the purpose of claiming an exemption under the Import Policy Order 2013?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Abdul Raziq Khan vs Federation of Pakistan through its Secretary M/O2015 NLR Civil 201, 2015 P.C.T.L.R. 14 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-07-25
  Import Policy OrderLetters of Creditvested rightscustoms clearanceimport bandocumentary creditscontractual interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenges an Islamabad High Court judgment affirming the dismissal of the petitioner's writ petition regarding the import of used sprinkler lorries. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, having entered into an agreement for the import of 2000 lorries prior to the Import Policy Order 2013, acquired a vested right to import the entire lot, thereby exempting subsequent consignments from the ban on imports of vehicles older than five years under the proviso to Paragraph 4 of the Import Policy Order 2013. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the proviso only protects transactions where Letters of Credit were established prior to the amending order. The court found that the underlying sales agreement did not constitute a single Letter of Credit; rather, each consignment was a separate transaction requiring distinct Letters of Credit. The court established that an irrevocable Letter of Credit is a distinct contractual relationship independent of the underlying sales contract. Consequently, only those specific Letters of Credit issued before the Import Policy Order 2013 came into effect qualify for the exemption, and subsequent Letters of Credit issued after the ban cannot rely on the prior agreement to circumvent the regulatory restriction.

  Questions settled

  • Does an underlying sales agreement for multiple consignments constitute a single Letter of Credit for the purpose of regulatory exemptions?
  • Can an importer claim the benefit of a grandfathering clause in an Import Policy Order for Letters of Credit issued after the ban came into effect?
  • Is a bank's obligation under an irrevocable Letter of Credit independent of the underlying commercial contract between the importer and exporter?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Abdul Raziq Khan vs Federation of Pakisatan through its Secretary2015 PLJ SC 97 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-10-02
  import policy orderletters of creditvested rightcustoms clearancestatutory interpretationcommercial agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition assailing the dismissal of an intra-court appeal and a writ petition concerning the clearance of imported used sprinkle lorries by Customs Authorities. The petitioner entered into an agreement to import 2000 used sprinkle lorries and argued that having established an initial letter of credit prior to the Import Policy Order, 2013, a vested right accrued for the entire import notwithstanding subsequent bans on machinery older than five years. The core legal question was whether the exception in the proviso to Paragraph 4 of the Import Policy Order, 2013, which protects imports where letters of credit were established prior to the amending order, applies to subsequent letters of credit opened under an overarching commercial agreement. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that letters of credit are separate, individual transactions and that only those specific letters of credit issued prior to the amending order qualify for the exemption. The key principle laid down is that under documentary credit practices, an agreement or proforma invoice for a bulk purchase does not extend the statutory exemption to subsequent individual letters of credit opened after the enforcement of a regulatory ban.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an agreement for bulk import creates a vested right for subsequent letters of credit under the Import Policy Order, 2013?
  • Does a letter of credit constitute a transaction separate from the underlying commercial sale contract?
  • Can the benefit of the proviso to Paragraph 4 of the Import Policy Order, 2013 be extended to letters of credit issued after the enforcement of an amending order?
  Read full judgment →
• Haider Ali and anothers vs DPO Chakwal and others2015 SCMR 1724 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-09-04
  registration of FIRcriminal justice reformpolice accountabilitycognizable offencemaladministrationinvestigation standardsfundamental rightsprosecution system
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a family dispute of a civil nature where the police initially refused to register an FIR, leading to protracted litigation reaching the Supreme Court. The Court observed systemic failures in the criminal justice system, including the flouting of mandatory FIR registration under Section 154 Cr.P.C., unjustified delays in investigations, and a lack of police accountability. The Court identified four critical areas of concern: pre-investigation (FIR registration), investigation (lack of training and evidence-based arrests), prosecution (weak evidence and witness protection), and accountability (ineffective internal mechanisms). The Court held that the police have no discretion to refuse a cognizable offence's registration and emphasized that arrests must only occur upon sufficient evidence. Laying down a comprehensive reform framework, the Court issued fifteen directives to Federal and Provincial governments, including the establishment of a universal complaint system, strict adherence to Section 154 Cr.P.C., implementation of witness protection, and public disclosure of police budgets and performance reports to ensure the realization of fundamental rights under Articles 9, 10, 10A, and 14 of the Constitution.

  Read full judgment →
• Habib Bank Limited vs WRSM Trading Company L.L.C. and others2015 SCMR 1694 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-06-04
  banking lawterritorial jurisdictionextraterritorial applicationfinancial institutionsrecovery of financeleave to appealinterest-based transactions
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a banking company registered in Pakistan, initiated a suit in the Banking Court at Lahore to recover debts arising from financial facilities provided to the respondents in Dubai. The respondents challenged the territorial jurisdiction of the Banking Court, which upheld the objection and ordered the return of the plaint. The Lahore High Court affirmed this decision, further opining that the underlying interest-based transaction was void under the Contract Act, 1872. The petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, contending that the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, applies to financial transactions conducted by Pakistani banking institutions abroad and that the creditor is entitled to follow the debtor. The petitioner further argued that the High Court's observations regarding the validity of the interest-based contract were extraneous and legally misconceived. Finding that the case presented novel legal questions regarding the extraterritorial application of the Ordinance and the jurisdiction of Pakistani courts over foreign financial transactions, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and suspended the operation of the impugned judgments pending final adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 apply to financial transactions conducted by a Pakistani banking institution outside of Pakistan?
  • Can a court determine the validity of an underlying contract under the Contract Act 1872 when it has already concluded it lacks territorial jurisdiction over the suit?
  • Is the principle that a creditor can follow the debtor applicable to confer jurisdiction upon Pakistani courts for financial transactions entered into abroad?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulraiz vs The State, etc.2015 PLJ SC 879, 2015 P.S.C. Crl. 744 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-06-04
  partial compromisereduction of sentencedeath sentenceta'zirqatl-i-amdlegal heirsquantum of punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the dismissal of the appellant's application for the reduction of his death sentence to imprisonment for life based on a partial compromise with the widow of the deceased. The appellant's conviction and death sentence for qatl-i-amd under ta'zir, along with the dismissal of his appeal, review petition, and a mercy petition by the President, had already attained finality. The core legal questions concerned whether a partial compromise between a convict and some legal heirs of a deceased can entail acquittal or automatically serve as a valid basis for the reduction of a sentence of death to imprisonment for life in a ta'zir case. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a partial compromise involving only some heirs cannot result in acquittal, and while a compromise with an heir may be considered among the facts and circumstances of the case for determining the quantum of punishment, it is not a conclusive factor and does not automatically warrant a lesser punishment. The key principle laid down is that a partial compromise does not furnish a sufficient or valid basis for reducing a death sentence when the convict's conduct is brutal, unjustified, and other heirs refuse to compound the offence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a partial compromise between a convict and some of the heirs of the deceased entail acquittal in a case of Ta'zir?
  • Does a compromise with one or more heirs of the victim automatically result in the imposition of the lesser punishment of imprisonment for life?
  • May a partial compromise serve as a valid basis for the reduction of a sentence of death to imprisonment for life under the facts and circumstances of a case?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulraiz vs State, etc.2015 PLJ SC 879 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-06-04
  partial compromisedeath sentencereduction of sentenceTazirqatl-i-amdmitigating circumstancessupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the dismissal of the appellant's application for reduction of a death sentence based on a partial compromise with the widow of the deceased, after all judicial and executive remedies had been exhausted. The core legal question was whether a partial compromise between a convict and some of the heirs of the deceased in a Tazir case can serve as a valid basis for reducing a sentence of death to imprisonment for life. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while a partial compromise may be considered among the facts and circumstances of a case for determining the quantum of punishment, it does not automatically result in a lesser punishment, particularly where all heirs have not compounded the offence and the convict acted in a cruel and brutal manner. The key principle laid down is that a partial compromise alone is not a conclusive factor or a sufficient basis for sentence reduction in the absence of mitigating circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a partial compromise between a convict and some of the heirs of the deceased can entail the acquittal of the convict in a case of Tazir?
  • Can a partial compromise provide a valid basis for the reduction of a sentence of death to imprisonment for life?
  • Does a compromise with one or more heirs of a victim automatically result in the imposition of a lesser punishment?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Noor Ali vs The State2015 NLR Criminal 113 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-12-04
  narcoticsrecoveryhostile witnesschemical analysisreasonable doubtcriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 for the possession of 13450 grams of Charas. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution successfully proved the recovery of narcotics beyond reasonable doubt, given that the sole public witness turned hostile and there were material contradictions in the evidence provided by police officials regarding the recovery process and the sampling of the contraband. The Supreme Court held that the failure of the public witness to support the prosecution case, combined with significant discrepancies in the testimony of police witnesses regarding the number of pieces of Charas recovered and the failure to take representative samples from each packet for chemical analysis, created serious doubts in the prosecution's case. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant, establishing the principle that when a public witness does not support the prosecution, it is difficult to rely solely on police evidence for conviction, and that failure to draw representative samples from each packet of narcotics vitiates the recovery.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for narcotics possession be sustained solely on the evidence of police officials when the public witness has turned hostile?
  • Does the failure to take representative samples from each packet of recovered narcotics for chemical analysis vitiate the prosecution's case?
  • What is the effect of material contradictions in the testimony of recovery witnesses on the prosecution's burden of proof in a narcotics case?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of the PUNJABthrough Chief Secretary, Lahore and others vs Ch. Abdul Sattar Hans and 29 others2015 SCMR 915 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-03-18
  service lawequal pay for equal workArticle 25Article 3federalismprovincial autonomypay scalesbudgetary constraintsservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The Punjab Government filed appeals against a decision of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had directed that Provincial Government Deputy Accountants (BPS-14) be granted equal pay scales and perks to Federal Government Senior Auditors (BPS-16) under Articles 3 and 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The core legal questions pertained to whether Provincial employees can claim parity with Federal employees based on Article 25, whether Article 3 applies to voluntary employment terms, and whether a Service Tribunal can compel a Province to incur financial burdens regardless of budgetary constraints. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the Tribunal's judgment. The Court held that Article 3 applies to forced or compulsory labor, not voluntary public employment. Further, Article 25 permits reasonable classification; Provincial and Federal employees serve different employers with independent financial resources under a federal framework (Part V, Chapter 1 of the Constitution). Courts and tribunals cannot compel a Provincial Government to impose additional taxation or reallocate resources to match emoluments paid by another jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can Provincial Government employees claim identical pay scales and emoluments with Federal Government employees under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does Article 3 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 apply to voluntary terms and conditions of public service accepted by employees?
  • Does a Service Tribunal have the authority to override provincial budgetary constraints and direct a Provincial Government to raise financial resources to pay higher salaries?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of the Punjab through Chief Secretary, Lahore, etc. vs Ch.2015 P.S.C. 1024 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  service tribunalequal pay for equal workfederalismconstitutional equalityprovincial autonomycivil servantsreasonable classificationbudgetary constraints
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals by leave of the Court were filed by the Government of the Punjab against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had granted provincial employees the same emoluments and perquisites as federal government employees performing similar duties. The core legal question was whether provincial government employees can claim parity in pay and perquisites with federal government employees under the principle of equal treatment and Articles 2-A, 3, 25, 37, and 38 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the impugned judgment, holding that federal and provincial governments operate independently under the constitutional framework of federalism, with distinct employers, service structures, and budgetary constraints. The Court ruled that Article 25 permits reasonable classification, requires an apple-to-apple comparison, and does not mandate identical pay scales across different governments. Furthermore, Article 3 concerning exploitation is inapplicable to voluntary employment, and service tribunals cannot compel provincial governments to burden taxpayers or exceed budgetary limits to match federal pay scales.

  Questions settled

  • Whether provincial government employees are entitled to the same pay scales and perquisites as federal government employees performing similar duties?
  • Does a disparity in pay between federal and provincial government employees violate the principle of equality under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Can Article 3 of the Constitution of Pakistan be invoked in respect of voluntary public service regarding claims of exploitation in pay?
  • Is a service tribunal competent to direct a provincial government to incur additional financial burdens or impose taxes to match federal salary structures?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of the Punjab through Chief Secretary, Lahore, etc. vs CH.2015 PLJ SC 709 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  service lawpay parityprovincial autonomyfederalismequal protectionbudgetary constraintsservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves appeals by the Government of the Punjab against a Service Tribunal decision that directed the provincial government to grant pay scales and emoluments to its employees equivalent to those of Federal Government employees performing similar duties. The core legal question was whether provincial employees can claim parity in pay and perquisites with federal employees under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, based on the principle of equal treatment. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal's decision was flawed, emphasizing that the Province and the Federation are autonomous entities with independent powers under the Constitution. The Court clarified that Article 25 of the Constitution requires an 'apple-to-apple' comparison, which was absent here given the different employers and budgetary constraints. Furthermore, the Court rejected the application of Article 3 regarding exploitation, noting that service was voluntary. The key principle laid down is that provincial governments operate within their own budgetary and constitutional autonomy, and courts cannot compel them to match federal pay scales or impose additional taxes to meet such demands, as this would undermine the federal structure of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Can provincial government employees claim pay parity with federal government employees based on the performance of similar duties?
  • Does the principle of equal protection under Article 25 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, mandate identical pay scales for employees of different governments?
  • Is it constitutionally permissible for a Service Tribunal to compel a provincial government to impose additional taxes to meet salary demands?
  • Does the concept of exploitation under Article 3 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, apply to voluntary government service?
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• Government of the Punjab through Chief Secretary, Lahore, etc. (in all2015 PLJ SC 709, 2015 P.S.C. 1024, 2015 SCMR 915, KLR 2015 Supreme Court · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-03-18
  civil serviceequal payreasonable classificationfederalismprovincial autonomyexploitationbudgetary constraints
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court was filed by the Government of Punjab against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal. The Tribunal had held that Deputy Accountants (BPS-14) employed by the Provincial Government were entitled to the same pay scales and emoluments as Senior Auditors (BPS-16) employed by the Federal Government, reasoning that differing pay scales for similar work violated constitutional protections against exploitation and discrimination. The Supreme Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment, holding that Federal and Provincial employees are not similarly placed as they are employed by different employers with distinct financial resources and budgetary constraints. The Court ruled that under the federal structure of the Constitution, each Province is autonomous and empowered to make its own laws and rules regarding civil servants. Consequently, a reasonable classification based on different employers is permissible, and Article 25 of the Constitution is not violated. Furthermore, Article 3 of the Constitution regarding exploitation is inapplicable to voluntary public employment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Provincial Government employees can claim pay parity with Federal Government employees performing similar duties under Article 25 of the Constitution?
  • Does the difference in pay scales between Federal and Provincial civil servants amount to exploitation or forced labor under Article 3 of the Constitution?
  • Can a Service Tribunal direct a Provincial Government to incur extra financial burdens and potentially levy taxes to match Federal pay scales?
  • Does the federal structure of the Constitution permit Provinces to maintain independent terms, conditions, and pay scales for their civil servants?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of the Punjab through Chief Secretary and others vs Aamir2015 SCMR 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-03-28
  civil servicetermination of servicelocus poenitentiaerecruitment processeligibility criteriareinstatementselection committee
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the termination of employees appointed in BPS-1 to 5 and 7 in District Chiniot. Following their appointment on 7-4-2010, the government cancelled the recruitment approximately 1.5 months later, alleging non-transparency and fraud in the selection process. The High Court set aside the termination orders but directed a re-processing of the cases through an impartial committee to individually examine eligibility, residency, and the authenticity of documents. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the department must scrutinize the eligibility of each respondent fairly. The Court invoked the principle of locus poenitentiae, holding that while those meeting the eligibility criteria should be retained despite minor procedural irregularities in the selection committee's composition, those found ineligible or unqualified must be removed. The Court dismissed the appeal and directed the department to complete the re-processing within two months, emphasizing that benefits of the judgment could extend to similarly placed employees as per established precedent.

  Read full judgment →
• Government of Sindh through Secretary and Director General, Excise and Taxation and another vs Muhammad Shafi and others2015 PLD Supreme Court 380 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  property taxtax exemptionlease in perpetuityEvacuee Trust Property Boardurban immovable property taxstatutory interpretationfiscal statutesregistration of lease
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerned whether properties owned by the Evacuee Trust Property Board (the Board) and leased to a private respondent for 30 years were exempt from property tax under Section 4(a) of the Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958. The appellant department argued that the lease, being extendable, constituted a 'lease in perpetuity,' thereby disqualifying it from the tax exemption granted to Federal Government properties. The Court examined the concept of 'perpetuity' in the context of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and the Registration Act, 1908. It held that a lease for a fixed term with specific conditions for reversion of superstructure to the lessor, restrictions on alienation, and clauses for cancellation upon breach cannot be termed a lease in perpetuity. The Court further clarified that under Pakistani law, any lease exceeding one year must be registered to have legal validity. Consequently, as the lease was for a fixed term and not perpetual, the property remained vested in the Federal Government (the Board) and was exempt from provincial property tax. The appeal was dismissed.

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• Government of Sindh through Secretary & Director General, Excise &2015 PLJ SC 939 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  property taxlease in perpetuityevacuee trust propertyurban immovable property taxtransfer of propertyregistered instrumenttax exemption
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses whether property owned by the Evacuee Trust Property Board and leased to a private individual is exempt from urban immovable property tax under Section 4(a) of the Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958, and whether the lease constitutes a lease in perpetuity. The core legal questions involve the interpretation of 'lease in perpetuity' under general law and statutory property tax exemptions for government properties. The Supreme Court held that the lease in question was for a fixed term and thus not in perpetuity, as the terms—including reversion of superstructures without compensation and restrictions on subletting—militate against permanence. The Court laid down that a lease exceeding one year requires a registered instrument under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and Registration Act, 1908 to create a permanent interest, and that the nature of a lease must be determined from the cumulative terms of the instrument, object, and statutory compliance rather than unilateral renewal clauses or permission to construct.

  Questions settled

  • Whether property owned by the Evacuee Trust Property Board in possession of a lessee is exempt from tax under Section 4(a) of the Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958?
  • What constitutes a lease in perpetuity for the purposes of statutory property tax exemptions?
  • Can an unregistered lease document create a permanent lease exceeding one year in light of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and Registration Act, 1908?
  • Does the permission to construct a permanent superstructure on leased land automatically render the lease permanent in nature?
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• Government of Sindh through Secretary & Director General, Excise112 TAX 57 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  urban immovable property taxlease in perpetuityevacuee trust propertytax exemptiontransfer of propertyregistered instrument
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment regarding the levy of property tax under the Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958, on properties owned by the Evacuee Trust Property Board and leased to a private individual. The core legal questions involve whether the property is exempt from tax under Section 4(a) of the Act as Federal Government property and whether the lease constitutes a lease in perpetuity. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that properties owned by the Evacuee Trust Property Board and leased for a fixed term with reversion of superstructures do not constitute leases in perpetuity and qualify for tax exemption as Federal Government properties. The Court laid down principles for determining whether a lease is in perpetuity, emphasizing the mandatory requirements of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and the Registration Act, 1908, alongside the terms and conditions of the lease agreement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether properties owned by the Evacuee Trust Property Board are exempted from property tax under Section 4(a) of the Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958?
  • How to determine whether a particular lease of immovable property is a lease in perpetuity or for a fixed term?
  • Does a lease for a period exceeding one year require a registered instrument under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and the Registration Act, 1908 to be recognized as a permanent lease?
  • Whether the inclusion of a renewal clause at the option of the lessor renders a lease perpetual in nature?
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• Government of Pakistan M/o Railways, through Secretary and others vs2015-SCP-127, 2016 SC MR 442 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  upgradation of postspolicy decisiondiscriminationreasonable classificationwrit jurisdictionterms and conditions of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Islamabad High Court upholding the writ petition of respondents, who sought upgradation of their posts from Basic Scale-13 to Basic Scale-16 on the ground of discrimination vis-a-vis other employees. The Supreme Court considered whether the High Court rightly interfered with a policy decision regarding the upgradation of pay scales. The Court held that the upgradation of pay scales is a policy decision falling within the domain of the competent authority, and differentiation in the extent of upgradation among various categories of employees based on the nature of their duties constitutes a reasonable classification under Article 25 of the Constitution rather than unlawful discrimination. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the High Court and dismissed the respondents' writ petition, ruling that courts should not interfere with policy matters or administrative categorization lacking any violation of fundamental rights or vested rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a policy decision regarding the upgradation of pay scales of employees can be challenged in the writ jurisdiction of the High Court on the plea of discrimination?
  • Does differentiation in the scale of upgradation among different categories of employees amount to unlawful discrimination under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Do civil servants have a vested right to demand a specific level of upgradation of their posts?
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• Government of KPK through Chief Secretary, Peshawar and others vs Muhammad Javed and others2015 PSC 82 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  service rulespromotion quotaService Tribunal jurisdictionpolicy mattervested rightcivil servicejudicial reviewqualification enhancement
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals arose from a Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal judgment that questioned the government's authority to amend service rules for the Irrigation Department. The amendments reduced the promotion quota for diploma-holder Sub-Engineers and established a new quota for B. Tech. (Hons) degree holders. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal possessed the jurisdiction to interfere with these policy-driven amendments and whether the government could alter promotion criteria to the detriment of existing employees. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that the government holds the exclusive authority to frame and amend service rules to improve service structures and reward higher qualifications, which is a policy matter. The Court emphasized that promotion is not a vested right, and such policy decisions are not justiciable unless there is demonstrable mala fide. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment, ruling that the government’s power to prescribe qualifications and promotion quotas for civil servants falls within its executive domain, free from judicial interference absent specific evidence of bad faith.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Service Tribunal interfere with the government's policy decision to amend service rules regarding promotion quotas?
  • Does a civil servant have a vested right to a specific promotion quota prescribed in service rules?
  • Is the government's decision to prescribe higher educational qualifications for promotion to a higher grade justiciable?
  • Does the Service Tribunal have the authority to put government promotions on hold pending the reconsideration of service rules?
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• Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary and others vs Muhammad Javed and others2015 PLJ SC 181, 2015 PSC 82, 2015 SCMR 269 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-11-24
  civil servicepromotion quotaservice rules amendmentvested rightService Tribunal jurisdictionexecutive policyjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal concerning the validity of amendments made to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Irrigation and Public Health Engineering Department (Recruitment and Appointment) Rules, 1979. The impugned amendment reduced the promotion quota for diploma-holder Sub-Engineers (BPS-11) to Assistant Engineers (BPS-17) from 20% to 15% and created an 8% quota for Sub-Engineers holding B.Tech. (Hons.) degrees. The Tribunal had partially accepted the diploma holders' appeals, referring the rules back for reconsideration and staying promotions. The Supreme Court of Pakistan set aside the Tribunal's decision and dismissed the service appeals, holding that framing recruitment and promotion policy, enhancing qualification criteria, and modifying promotion quotas fall within the exclusive executive domain. The Court ruled that promotion or the maintenance of a specific promotion quota is not a vested right. In the absence of demonstrated mala fides or person-specific design, the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to direct the Government to reconsider its statutory rules or halt promotions.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant have a vested right to claim promotion or to insist on the retention of a specific promotion quota prescribed under service rules?
  • Does the Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to judicial review and direct the Government to reconsider amendments made to service rules prescribing recruitment and promotion policies in the absence of mala fides?
  • Can the Government lawfully alter service rules to enhance qualifications, curtail a class of employees' promotion quota, and allocate a separate quota for higher-degree holders?
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• Government College University, Lahore through its Vice Chancellor and others vs Syeda Fiza Abbas and another2015 P.S.C. 793 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  gold medal awarduniversity regulationsjudicial review of academic policyinterpretation of statutesstandard score formulaacademic meritpublic sector university
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order directing Government College University, Lahore, to award a gold medal to the respondent, who had secured the highest marks in her M.Sc. Banking and Finance program. The University contended that the gold medal was awarded based on a 'Standard Score' formula involving normal curve distribution, rather than raw marks, and argued that such academic policy matters are beyond judicial review. The Supreme Court examined the relevant University Regulations, which explicitly stipulated that the gold medal is awarded to the student who tops the list based on total marks obtained in all semesters. The Court held that the University's internal formula was not supported by the regulations, was extraneous, and illogical. The Court affirmed that while it generally avoids interfering in academic policy, it must intervene when regulations are clear and the institution fails to abide by its own established rules, causing injustice. The appeal was dismissed, and the University was directed to award the gold medal to the respondent.

  Questions settled

  • Can a university award academic honors based on a formula not prescribed in its own regulations?
  • Does the judiciary have the authority to interfere in university academic policy when the institution violates its own clear regulations?
  • Is a university's internal 'standard score' formula for determining gold medal recipients valid if it contradicts the express requirement to award based on total marks?
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• Ghulam Rasool vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division Islamabad and others2015 PLJ SC 384, 2015 PSC 58, 2015 PLD Supreme Court 6 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-11-14
  civil servantservice tribunaljurisdictionpublic appointmentsconstitutional postsstatutory bodiesexecutive authoritytrichotomy of powersjudicial reviewrecommendations
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses a civil petition concerning a civil servant's promotion policy and, more significantly, clarifies previous Supreme Court directions on appointments to public offices. Initially, the Court upheld the dismissal of a civil servant's writ petition by the Islamabad High Court, affirming that the Federal Service Tribunal is the proper forum for grievances related to civil servants' terms and conditions, in accordance with Section 2(b) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973. Subsequently, the Court revisited its earlier directions in Khawaja Muhammad Asif v. Federation of Pakistan regarding the establishment of a Commission for public appointments. It clarified that those directions, particularly paragraphs 26 and 27, were recommendations and did not assume the status of law. The Court held that the exclusive power to appoint heads of statutory, autonomous, semi-autonomous, and regulatory bodies, as well as public sector companies, vests in the Federal Government under Article 90 of the Constitution and relevant specific statutes. The principle of trichotomy of powers was emphasized, asserting that courts should not interfere with the executive's policy-making domain. The Court also noted that the Federal Government's appointment policy remains subject to judicial review under Articles 184 and 199 of the Constitution.

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• Ghulam Rasool vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary2015 PSC 58 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  civil servantservice tribunaljudicial reviewexecutive authoritypublic appointmentstrichotomy of powersbinding precedent
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses two distinct matters: the service grievance of civil servants and the scope of judicial directions regarding public appointments. Regarding the first, the Court held that employees of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) are civil servants under the Civil Servants Act, 1973, and must seek redress before the Federal Service Tribunal, as High Courts lack jurisdiction in such service matters. Regarding the second matter, the Court clarified that its previous directions in Khawaja Muhammad Asif v. Federation of Pakistan (2013) concerning the establishment of a Commission for public appointments were merely recommendations and not binding law. The Court affirmed that under Article 90 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, the executive authority to make appointments vests in the Federal Government, which must act in accordance with specific statutory provisions governing such bodies. The Court emphasized the principle of trichotomy of powers, holding that the judiciary should not usurp executive policy-making functions, and that appointments must be made based on merit as prescribed by relevant statutes.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to entertain a petition filed by a civil servant regarding terms and conditions of service?
  • Are judicial recommendations made in a judgment regarding public appointment procedures legally binding on the Federal Government?
  • Does the Federal Government have the exclusive executive authority to make appointments to statutory and regulatory bodies under Article 90 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can a court substitute specific statutory appointment procedures with a mechanism not provided for by law?
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• Ghulam Qammber Shah vs Mukhtiar Hussain, etc.2015 NLR Criminal 1, 2015 PLD Supreme Court 66, 2015 PLJ SC 400, 2015 PSC · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-11-28
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationsuccessive bail applicationwithdrawal of bail petitionfresh groundcriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the complainant against the order of the Lahore High Court granting post-arrest bail to the respondent in a case involving offences under Sections 324, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether a successive post-arrest bail application could be maintained before the same court when earlier applications had been dismissed as not pressed or withdrawn after arguments, and whether the pendency of a private complaint constituted a fresh ground. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in entertaining the third bail application, reiterating that the withdrawal of a bail petition after argument amounts to a decision on merits, and a subsequent application is barred unless a genuine fresh ground exists. The Court also held that continued custody in a challan case is not rendered illegal merely because a private complaint is simultaneously pending. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the impugned bail order was set aside, and the bail granted to the respondent was cancelled.

  Questions settled

  • Does the withdrawal of a bail petition after arguing the case on merits amount to a dismissal on merits?
  • Can a successive post-arrest bail application be entertained by the same court without a fresh ground arising after the dismissal of the earlier application?
  • Does the pendency of a private complaint regarding the same incident render the continued custody of an accused in a challan case illegal?
  • Does the attribution of a specific fire-arm injury supported by medical evidence disentitle an accused to post-arrest bail on the ground of further inquiry?
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• Ghulam Qammber Shah vs Mukhtiar Hussain, Etc.s2015 NLR Criminal 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-11-28
  post-arrest bailsuccessive bail applicationswithdrawal of bail petitionfresh groundbail cancellationfirearm injurycriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the complainant against the grant of post-arrest bail to respondent No. 1 by the Lahore High Court in a case under sections 324, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of successive post-arrest bail applications after earlier ones were dismissed as withdrawn or not pressed, and whether the pendency of a cross private complaint renders custody in the challan case illegal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in entertaining a third bail application without a genuine fresh ground and that withdrawal of a bail petition after argument constitutes a decision on merits. The Court established the principle that successive bail applications before the same court are barred unless a true fresh ground arising after the dismissal of the previous petition is shown, and set aside the impugned bail order, cancelling the bail granted to respondent No. 1.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a subsequent post-arrest bail application is maintainable before the same court after the dismissal of earlier bail petitions as withdrawn or not pressed?
  • Does the withdrawal of a bail application after arguments constitute a dismissal on the merits?
  • Does the pendency of a private complaint regarding the same incident constitute a fresh ground for entertaining a successive bail application?
  • Whether continued custody in a challan case becomes illegal merely due to the filing of a parallel private complaint?
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• Ghulam Qammber Shah vs Mukhtiar Hussain, etc2015 PLJ SC 400 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-11-28
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationsuccessive bail applicationwithdrawal of bail petitionfresh ground for bailfire-arm injury
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court granting post-arrest bail to Respondent No. 1 in a criminal case involving offences under Sections 324, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether a successive or third post-arrest bail application is maintainable before the High Court when earlier applications were withdrawn or dismissed not on merits, and whether pendency of a private complaint constitutes a fresh ground for bail. The Supreme Court held that withdrawal of a bail petition after arguments constitutes a dismissal on merits, and successive bail applications are barred unless a true fresh ground exists. Furthermore, the pendency of a private complaint filed prior to the dismissal of earlier applications is not a fresh ground, and detention in a challan case is not illegal merely due to a parallel private complaint. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, set aside the impugned order, and cancelled the bail granted to Respondent No. 1.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a successive post-arrest bail application is maintainable before the High Court after the withdrawal of earlier bail petitions?
  • Does the dismissal of a bail application as withdrawn after arguments amount to a decision on the merits?
  • Can the pendency of a private complaint be treated as a fresh ground for entertaining a subsequent bail application?
  • Whether continued custody in a challan case becomes illegal upon the institution of a private complaint regarding the same incident?
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• Ghulam Qammber Shah vs Mukhtiar Hussain and others2015 PLD Supreme Court 66 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-11-28
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationsuccessive bail applicationswithdrawal of bail petitionfresh grounds for bailcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order granting post-arrest bail to a respondent accused of offences under sections 324, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether a third successive bail application, filed after two previous applications were dismissed as withdrawn, was maintainable, and whether the pendency of a private complaint regarding the same incident constituted a fresh ground for bail. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in granting bail. It established that a bail application withdrawn after arguments on merits constitutes a dismissal on merits; therefore, a subsequent application is only maintainable if it presents a genuine fresh ground not available previously. The Court further held that the mere pendency of a private complaint, filed before the dismissal of earlier bail applications, does not constitute a fresh ground. Finding that the respondent was attributed a specific injury supported by medical evidence, the Court set aside the impugned order, cancelled the bail, and ordered the respondent's immediate arrest.

  Questions settled

  • Does the withdrawal of a bail application after arguments on merits amount to a dismissal on merits?
  • Can a subsequent bail application be entertained if it does not disclose a fresh ground that was unavailable at the time of the previous dismissal?
  • Does the mere pendency of a private complaint regarding the same incident constitute a fresh ground for a subsequent bail application?
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• Ghulam Hussain Ramzan Ali vs Collector of Customs (Preventive), Karachi2015 NLR Criminal 149, PTCL 2015 CL.177, 2015 PTD 107 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-05-28
  customs referencelimitationsmugglingtransit passengerpresumption of servicevoid ordercondonation of delaysearch of person
  Summary & questions settled

  This Civil Appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a High Court judgment dismissing a customs reference application on the ground of limitation. The appellant, a transit passenger, was apprehended at Karachi Airport with 85 gold bars after failing to make a formal declaration and attempting to leave the customs station. The customs authorities confiscated the gold and imposed a penalty. The appellant's departmental appeals and revision/appeal before the Appellate Tribunal were dismissed. Subsequently, the appellant filed a reference application before the High Court after a delay of several years, claiming non-receipt of the Tribunal's order and contending that the order was void for lack of jurisdiction over a transit passenger, thus defeating limitation. The Supreme Court held that service by post to the counsel's given address was presumed under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The Court further held that Section 158 of the Customs Act, 1969 authorized searching a transit passenger attempting to leave a customs area, and even a void order must be challenged within the statutory period of limitation from the date of knowledge.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 27 of the General Clauses Act create a presumption of effective service when a judgment is dispatched by registered post to a party's designated address?
  • Does the limitation period for challenging an order begin to run from the date of knowledge even if the order is alleged to be void or without jurisdiction?
  • Can customs authorities search a transit passenger under Section 158 of the Customs Act, 1969 if there is reasonable suspicion of smuggling upon attempting to leave a customs area?
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• Ghulam Farooq vs The State2015 SCMR 948 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-03-11
  murderdeath penaltyocular accountappreciating evidencecriminal appealSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from the conviction of the appellant for the murders of his sister, her husband, and their minor daughter, following an elopement and marriage considered unacceptable by the appellant. The core legal question concerns the appraisal of ocular testimony, medical evidence, prompt FIR, and recovery of the weapon of offence to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt in a multiple murder case, as well as the justification for the death penalty in brutal circumstances involving honour killings. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case through consistent eyewitness accounts supported by medical evidence and recovery, and that the appellant's brutal conduct in taking multiple lives without provocation warranted no leniency. The court laid down the principle that the deliberate killing of family members for choosing matrimonial partners in a cruel manner justifies the imposition and maintenance of the death penalty.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of guilt by courts below based on consistent eyewitness accounts can be maintained by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the killing of multiple family members for matrimonial choices justify the imposition of the death penalty without leniency?
  • Whether prompt lodging of an FIR and recovery of the weapon of offence corroborate the ocular testimony in a murder trial?
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• Ghazanfar All vs Appellate Authority/Additional District Judge,2015-SCP-154, 2016 PLJ SC 297, 2016 PLD Supreme Court 151, 2016 P.S.C. 236 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-11-04
  local bodies electionsnomination papersservice of statutory bodypublic servantZakat and Ushr Committeedisqualification of candidateselection appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil petitions, converted into appeals, arose from impugned judgments of the High Court upholding the rejection of the petitioners' nomination papers for local bodies elections on the ground that, as former Chairman and Member of a Local Zakat and Ushr Committee, they fell within the disqualification under Section 27(2)(e) of the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013, for being in the service of a statutory body. The core legal questions examined whether holding such a voluntary, honorary position in a Local Committee constitutes being 'in the service of a statutory body' and whether their statutory status as 'public servants' under Section 23 of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980 operates as a disqualification. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, holding that the petitioners were 'engaged in' rather than 'employed for' the administration of the Ordinance, received no salary or remuneration, and were not subject to state-controlled appointment or removal tests. Consequently, they were not 'in the service of' a statutory body, and their deeming status as public servants for penal purposes did not attract election disqualification.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Member or Chairman of a Local Zakat and Ushr Committee is in the service of a statutory body under Section 27(2)(e) of the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013?
  • Does the deeming status of a public servant under Section 23 of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980 disqualify a person from contesting local bodies elections?
  • What are the determining tests for establishing whether a person is in the service of a statutory body or authority for election disqualification purposes?
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