Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Ali Hassan Brohi vs Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others2015 KLR S.C. 115 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  civil serviceabsorptiondeputationquo-warrantojurisdictionservice tribunallocus poenitentiaeregularization
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals were preferred against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which had held that the provincial government was not authorized under the law to absorb the appellants into different cadres, services, or posts. The appellants, who had been absorbed into the Provincial Secretariat Service (PSS) and other cadres on various dates, contended that their appointments were valid under Rule 9(1) of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974, and Section 24 of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973. They also argued that the High Court lacked jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeals, noting that during their pendency, the core issue of absorption had already been decided in a separate constitutional petition. The Court reaffirmed its previous holding that absorption is unconstitutional, cannot be ordered under Section 24 of the Act or Rule 9(1) of the Rules, and is violative of the fundamental rights of civil servants.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provincial government has the authority to absorb civil servants or deputationists into different cadres under Section 24 of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Can absorption of civil servants be legally ordered or justified under Rule 9(1) of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974?
  • Does a writ of quo warranto lie before the High Court in matters involving the legality of a civil servant's absorption, or is such jurisdiction barred by Article 212 of the Constitution?
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• Ali Hassan Brohi Ali Azhar Baloch Abdul Ghani Jukhio Syed Abid Ali2015 PLC (C.S.) 1039 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-01-05
  civil service absorptionprovincial secretariat serviceterms and conditions of servicequo warrantoconstitutional jurisdictionservice tribunalfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns multiple appeals challenging the High Court of Sindh’s judgment regarding the legality of the absorption of various civil servants into the Provincial Secretariat Service (PSS) and other government departments. The core legal questions addressed whether the absorption of civil servants into different cadres or posts was permissible under Section 24 of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973, or Rule 9(1) of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974, and whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate such matters given the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court, referencing its prior judgment dated 12-6-2013, held that the absorption of civil servants into different cadres, services, or posts is unconstitutional and cannot be authorized under either the Act or the Rules. The Court affirmed that such absorptions violate the fundamental rights of other civil servants. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed, as the Court had already conclusively determined that absorption is legally impermissible, thereby rendering the appellants' arguments regarding procedural validity and jurisdiction moot.

  Questions settled

  • Can the absorption of a civil servant into a different cadre or post be legally justified under Section 24 of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Does Rule 9(1) of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974, authorize the absorption of civil servants into the Provincial Secretariat Service?
  • Is the absorption of civil servants into different cadres or posts violative of the fundamental rights of other civil servants?
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• Ali Hassan Brohi & others vs Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary2015 PLC (C.S.) 1039, 2015 KLR S.C. 115, 2015 SCMR 353, 2015 PLJ SC 433 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-01-05
  civil serviceabsorption of civil servantsquo warrantojurisdiction of High CourtService Tribunal jurisdictionSindh Civil Servants Actdeputationretrospective application
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of civil appeals arising out of a Sindh High Court judgment concerning the legality of absorbing various officers into the Provincial Secretariat Service (PSS) and other government cadres in Sindh. The appellants, who had been appointed or absorbed into various civil service positions, challenged the High Court's findings on grounds of jurisdiction, arguing that matters relating to terms and conditions of service fall exclusively within the domain of the Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution, that a writ of quo warranto was unmaintainable, and that the judgment should apply prospectively without penalizing officers for acts of state functionaries. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the core issue of absorption in service, posts, and cadres had already been conclusively decided in Constitutional Petition No. 71 of 2011 (judgment dated 12.06.2013) and affirmed on review. The Court reaffirmed that absorption can neither be ordered under Section 24 of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973 nor under Rule 9(1) of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974, as it is unconstitutional and violative of the fundamental rights of civil servants.

  Questions settled

  • Can an absorption in civil service posts or cadres be validly ordered under Section 24 of the Sindh Civil Servants Act 1973 or Rule 9(1) of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules 1974?
  • Is a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution challenging illegal absorption barred by Article 212 of the Constitution?
  • Are absorptions into civil service cadres unconstitutional and violative of the fundamental rights of civil servants?
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• Ali Azhar Khan Baloch., S.M. Kaleem Makki., Province of Sindh, etc vs Province of Sindh, etc., Dr. Nasimul Ghani Sahito., Farooq Azam Memon and others2015 PSC 145 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  civil service absorptionout of turn promotionservice tribunal jurisdictionconstitutional petitionArticle 184(3)Article 212judicial reviewcivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses multiple review petitions arising from a prior decision that struck down various legislative instruments facilitating the irregular absorption and "out of turn" promotion of civil servants in the Sindh province. The core legal questions concerned the maintainability of petitions under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, the interpretation of Rule 9(1) and 9-A of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974, and the jurisdictional bar imposed by Article 212 of the Constitution. The Court held that petitions challenging the vires of legislative instruments affecting service structures are maintainable under Article 184(3). It clarified that Rule 9(1) does not permit the permanent absorption of civil servants into different cadres, as such horizontal movement violates the statutory service structure. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that "out of turn" promotions are unconstitutional and that High Courts lack jurisdiction to entertain service matters, which fall exclusively under the Service Tribunals. The judgment emphasizes that unconstitutional legislative instruments are void ab initio, requiring the repatriation of beneficiaries to their parent departments, and underscores the necessity of strict adherence to constitutional mandates regarding civil service appointments.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant approach the High Court in a suit or constitutional petition regarding terms and conditions of service?
  • Does Rule 9(1) of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974 authorize the permanent absorption of a civil servant into a different cadre?
  • Are legislative instruments declared unconstitutional void ab initio, or do they operate only prospectively?
  • Is the grant of 'out of turn' promotion to civil servants constitutional?
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• Ali Azhar Khan Baloch and otherss/Appellants vs Province of Sindh2015 PLJ SC 216, 2015 PSC 145, 2015 SCMR 456 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-01-05
  Review PetitionCivil ServiceConstitutional JurisdictionService MattersAbsorptionAppointment by TransferOut of Turn PromotionRetrospective ApplicationHigh Court JurisdictionService TribunalFundamental RightsRule of LawGood GovernanceWedlock PolicyContempt of Court
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court, in review petitions, reaffirmed its earlier judgment which declared certain legislative instruments unconstitutional, leading to the repatriation and reversion of civil servants. The Court held that constitutional petitions under Article 184(3) are maintainable for service matters involving public importance and fundamental rights. It clarified that Rule 9(1) of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974, does not permit 'absorption' or horizontal movement of civil servants to different cadres without eligibility and qualifications, and that the concept of absorption is generally foreign to the service laws. 'Out of turn promotions' were reiterated as unconstitutional, with the term 'gallantry' in Section 9-A of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973, being interpreted to apply primarily to police/security personnel. The Court held that an unconstitutional law is void ab initio, and benefits accrued thereunder are withdrawn retrospectively. Crucially, it asserted that High Courts lack jurisdiction in civil service matters due to the bar in Article 212 of the Constitution, directing abatement of such suits/petitions and their transfer to Service Tribunals. The Court also initiated suo motu proceedings to examine the constitutionality of the 90-day waiting period for appeals to Service Tribunals under Article 10-A of the Constitution.

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• Al-Hamza Ship Breaking Co. and 14 others vs Government of Pakistan2015 SCMR 595 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-01-14
  import trade pricecustoms valuationship breakingdelegated legislationstructured discretionconstitutional jurisdictioncustoms duty
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from the dismissal of writ petitions by the Balochistan High Court concerning the fixation of Import Trade Prices (ITP) for imported vessels meant for breaking up and scrapping at Gadani. The core legal question revolves around the interpretation and scope of Section 25B of the Customs Act, 1969, and whether executive authorities can arbitrarily refuse to revise ITPs despite a verified drop in international prices exceeding the ten percent threshold stipulated in departmental Parameters. The Supreme Court held that while Section 25B must be read down to prevent it from being ultra vires Section 25, executive discretion under it is not unfettered and must be exercised reasonably, fairly, and in accordance with established parameters and statutory intent. The Court ruled that the Controller of Customs Valuation acted unlawfully and arbitrarily by failing to revise the ITP despite clear evidence of price fluctuations and fulfillment of all procedural requirements. Consequently, the judgments of the High Court were set aside, and the matters were remanded to the competent valuation authority for a fresh, expeditious determination based on the evidence available at the relevant time.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 25B of the Customs Act 1969 is ultra vires unless read down in conjunction with Section 25 of the said Act?
  • Can an executive authority refuse to revise Import Trade Prices when the mandatory criteria and parameters regarding price fluctuations are fulfilled?
  • Whether the High Court can decline to exercise constitutional jurisdiction where a statutory functionary's action is manifestly arbitrary and contrary to the record?
  • Is a decision made by a statutory functionary under the dictation of a superior officer legally sustainable?
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• Akhtar Iqbal vs The State2015 SCMR 291 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-11-28
  narcoticsbenefit of doubtrecovery memorandumsafe custodyfalse implicationsealing of samplescriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the appellant's conviction under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, where he was sentenced to life imprisonment for allegedly transporting narcotics in a motorcar. The Supreme Court observed several critical evidentiary gaps: the officer who effected the recovery and one attesting witness had died before trial, and the head of the raiding party was not produced without explanation. A significant discrepancy emerged regarding the sealing of the contraband; the parcels bore the monogram of an inspector who was not posted at the relevant station and was serving in another city at the time. Furthermore, the trial court's inspection of the parcels cast doubt on whether samples were properly secured from each packet. Given the appellant's background as a decorated Motorway Police Inspector and his defense that he was framed by a drug cartel, the Court found the prosecution's case lacked the requisite certainty. Consequently, the Court extended the benefit of doubt to the appellant, set aside the conviction, and ordered his acquittal.

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• Akhtar Ghori and others vs Province of Sindh and others2015 PLC (C.S.) 123 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-02-07
  civil review petitioninter se seniorityad hoc appointmentregularizationcivil serviceservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from civil review petitions filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan seeking review of its earlier judgment dated 14-6-2012 (erroneously referred to in parts as 2010), which had set aside the Service Tribunal's decision in a seniority dispute. The core legal question was whether the petitioners, who were appointed in 1991 under Rule 5 of the Sindh Public Service Commission (Functions) Rules 1990, were regular appointees from that date or if their services were only regularized under the Sindh Civil Servants (Regularization of Ad hoc Appointments) Act 1994, thereby affecting their inter se seniority against a respondent appointed in 1992. The Supreme Court observed that its previous judgment had erroneously assumed, without examining the 1991 appointment notifications or the statutory procedure of the 1994 Act, that the petitioners were only regularized in 1994. The Court held that a review is maintainable where a material error of fact and law has crept into the judgment. Consequently, the Court allowed the review petitions, recalled the impugned judgment, and restored the main petition for re-hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appointment made under Rule 5 of the Sindh Public Service Commission (Functions) Rules 1990 constitutes a regular appointment from its inception or requires subsequent regularization under the Sindh Civil Servants (Regularization of Ad hoc Appointments) Act 1994?
  • Can the Supreme Court recall its own judgment in review if it is shown that a material finding of fact regarding the date of regular appointment was made without examining the underlying appointment notifications?
  • Does the failure to follow the statutory regularization procedure under the Sindh Civil Servants (Regularization of Ad hoc Appointments) Act 1994 imply that the civil servants were already treated as regular employees by the competent authority?
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• Ai-Hamza Shipbreaking Co. and 14 others vs Government of Pakistan2015 KLR S.C. 29 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Import Trade PriceCustoms valuationStructured discretionDelegated legislationShipbreakingConstitutional jurisdictionAdministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This case concerns appeals against the Balochistan High Court's dismissal of petitions filed by ship-breaking companies challenging the Customs Department's refusal to revise Import Trade Prices (ITP) for vessels. The appellants argued that despite evidence of significant price declines in the international market, the Controller of Customs Valuation failed to revise the ITP as mandated by the "Parameters" established under Section 25B of the Customs Act, 1969. The core legal question was whether the Controller could ignore these binding guidelines and whether the High Court erred in treating the matter as a disputed question of fact. The Supreme Court held that while Section 25B allows for ITP fixation, it must be read in conjunction with Section 25, and executive discretion cannot be exercised arbitrarily. The Court affirmed that the "Parameters" were binding, and the Controller's failure to act upon evidence of price fluctuations violated the principles of structured discretion and the rule of law. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgments and remanded the cases for fresh determination, emphasizing that statutory powers must be exercised reasonably and in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Can an executive authority fix import trade prices in a manner that overrides the substantive valuation provisions of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Does the failure of a statutory functionary to follow self-imposed guidelines (Parameters) for price revision constitute an arbitrary exercise of power?
  • Is a decision by a statutory functionary based solely on the direction of a superior officer, rather than on the merits of the case, valid in law?
  • Can the High Court dismiss a constitutional petition on the ground of disputed facts when the case involves a clear violation of established administrative guidelines?
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• Ahmed vs The State2015 SCMR 993 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-03-26
  reduction of sentencemitigating circumstancesunwitnessed occurrencefailure to prove motiveprolonged incarcerationcompensationSection 201 PPCcapital punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction and death sentence of the appellant under Section 302(b) PPC for a 1996 murder based on circumstantial evidence. The appellant challenged his sentence, seeking a reduction from death to imprisonment for life. The core legal questions pertained to whether failure to prove the alleged motive, along with prolonged incarceration and reliance solely on circumstantial evidence, constituted sufficient mitigating grounds to reduce a capital sentence. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction but altered the sentence, holding that failure to establish motive in an unwitnessed occurrence, coupled with over eighteen years of incarceration, justified reducing the death sentence to life imprisonment. The Court further held that a sentence of fine under Section 302 PPC is unlawful and must be substituted with compensation under Section 544-A Cr.P.C. Additionally, the Court laid down that a conviction under Section 201 PPC cannot be recorded simultaneously alongside a conviction under Section 302 PPC. The appeal was partly allowed regarding sentence modification.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove motive in an unwitnessed occurrence constitute a valid ground to reduce a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Can prolonged incarceration under a death sentence serve as a basis for mitigating sentence when combined with other circumstances?
  • Can an accused be simultaneously convicted under Section 201 PPC and Section 302 PPC for the same incident?
  • Is a trial court empowered to impose a fine under Section 302 PPC instead of ordering payment of compensation under Section 544-A Cr.P.C.?
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• Agha Zahid Ali Hilali vs Muhammad Riaz and Others2015 NLR Civil 496 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-09-23
  summoning of witnessesconstitutional jurisdictionwrit petitiondiscretionary reliefjust decision of the casepetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which allowed a writ petition and permitted the respondents to summon a scribe and a stamp vendor as witnesses. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in exercising its constitutional jurisdiction to interfere with the discretion of the lower forums regarding the summoning of witnesses whose names were omitted from the initial witness list. The Supreme Court held that the examination of the scribe and stamp vendor was imperative for the just decision of the case, and the omission to include them earlier—prompted by counsel's inexperience or lack of understanding—constituted a good cause. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's judgment, ruling that the discretion exercised in aid of justice was neither arbitrary nor whimsical. The key principle laid down is that procedural omissions resulting from inadvertence or lack of experience may constitute good cause for summoning necessary witnesses to ensure a just decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether omission to include a witness in the initial witness list can constitute good cause for summoning the witness later?
  • Can the High Court interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction with an order regarding the summoning of witnesses?
  • Is the examination of a scribe and stamp vendor considered imperative for the just decision of a case involving disputed documents?
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• Adil Tiwana and others vs Shaukat Ullah Khan Bangash2015 SCMR 828 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-03-16
  specific performanceequitable relieftime of the essencediscretionary remedycontract lawbalance considerationconduct of parties
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit for specific performance regarding an agreement to sell executed in 1995. The core legal question was whether the respondent-purchaser was entitled to the discretionary relief of specific performance despite failing to pay the balance consideration by the contractually stipulated deadline. The Supreme Court observed that the agreement explicitly set a cutoff date, making time of the essence. Furthermore, the respondent repeatedly failed to comply with court orders regarding the deposit of securities and allowed a bank guarantee to expire, leaving the balance unpaid for years. The Court held that specific performance is an equitable and discretionary remedy under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, not a matter of right. Applying the maxim 'he who seeks equity must do equity,' the Court found the respondent's conduct disentitled him to relief. Consequently, the High Court's judgment was set aside, the trial court's dismissal of the suit was restored, and the appellants were directed to refund the initial part-payment.

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• Abdul REHMANs vs The State2015 NLR Criminal 112 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-04-03
  leave to appealreappraisal of evidenceidentification of accusedFirst Information Reportcriminal convictionrecovery of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a conviction where the petitioners challenged the evidentiary basis of their involvement in the alleged crime. The core legal questions addressed were whether the identification of the accused based on generic physical descriptions in the First Information Report (FIR) is sufficient to establish culpability, and whether the recovery of a motorcycle, without a specific identifying number mentioned in the FIR, provides a valid link to the crime. The Supreme Court observed that the lack of specific identification in the FIR and the absence of a clear explanation regarding how the petitioners were initially suspected of the offense raised significant concerns regarding the justification of their arrest, trial, and subsequent conviction. Consequently, the Court held that these contentions merit a thorough examination and reappraisal of the evidence. The Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the conviction could be sustained given the evidentiary deficiencies regarding the identity of the assailants and the connection of the recovered property to the crime.

  Questions settled

  • Does a generic physical description of assailants in an FIR constitute sufficient evidence to link an accused to a crime?
  • Can the recovery of an item, such as a motorcycle, serve as incriminating evidence if the item was not specifically identified or described in the FIR?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the prosecution fails to explain the basis for suspecting and arresting the accused?
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• Abdul Majeed through L.Rs. and others vs Sher Din through L.Rs.20I5 SCMR 620 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-01-14
  pre-emptioncolony landoral saletransfer of propertyco-sharersuperior right of pre-emptionregistration
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from concurrent judgments of the lower courts dismissing the appellants' regular second appeal and decreeing the respondents' pre-emption suit regarding agricultural land situated in a Colony Chak. The core legal questions involved whether colony lands in the erstwhile State of Bahawalpur are exempt from pre-emption under relevant notifications, and whether an oral sale of land valued over one hundred rupees confers a sufficient superior right on a pre-emptor where Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 applies. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the lower courts' judgments, holding that land allotted as a colony land under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 and excluded from pre-emption via notification under Section 8(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 remains exempt even upon subsequent transfer, and that an oral sale violating Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 fails to confer a valid title or co-sharer status to maintain a pre-emption suit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether colony lands allotted under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 and exempted through a notification under Section 8(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 are subject to pre-emption upon subsequent private transfer?
  • Does an oral sale of immovable property exceeding the value of one hundred rupees confer a valid title or co-sharer status sufficient to maintain a suit for pre-emption in areas where Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is applicable?
  • Whether the requirement of a registered instrument under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is mandatory for establishing a superior right of pre-emption based on co-sharership in the former State of Bahawalpur?
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• Abdul Majeed (Deceased) through L.RS. and Others vs Sher Din2015 NLR Civil 225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  pre-emptioncolony landoral saletransfer of propertysuperior right of pre-emptionregistration of sale deedBahawalpur State
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges a High Court judgment that dismissed a Regular Second Appeal, thereby upholding a decree in a pre-emption suit. The core legal questions were whether land allotted under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, in the former State of Bahawalpur is exempt from pre-emption, and whether a pre-emptor can establish a superior right of pre-emption based on an oral sale in an area where Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, requires a registered instrument for the transfer of immovable property. The Supreme Court held that the land in question, being 'colony land' under the 1912 Act, was excluded from the purview of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, by a 1944 government notification. Furthermore, the Court held that an oral sale does not confer a valid title to support a pre-emption claim where Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is applicable. The Court set aside the lower courts' judgments and dismissed the suit, establishing that such colony lands are exempt from pre-emption and that oral sales are insufficient to ground a pre-emption claim.

  Questions settled

  • Is land allotted under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 in the former State of Bahawalpur exempt from pre-emption?
  • Can a pre-emptor maintain a suit for pre-emption based on an oral sale in an area where Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 is applicable?
  • Does the exemption from pre-emption for colony lands apply only to the original allotment or also to subsequent transfers and sales?
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• Abdul Majeed (deceased) through L.Rs, and others vs Sher Din2015 NLR Civil 225, 2015 PLJ SC 544 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  pre-emptioncolony landoral saletransfer of propertysuperior right of pre-emptionState of Bahawalpur
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from concurrent judgments of the lower courts decreeing a pre-emption suit. The core legal questions involve whether agricultural land in a Colony Chak in Bahawalpur is exempt from pre-emption under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, and whether an oral sale violating Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 confers a superior right of pre-emption. The Supreme Court held that colony lands subject to the 1912 Act are exempt from pre-emption pursuant to notifications issued under Section 8(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, and that subsequent private ownership does not extinguish this exemption. Furthermore, the Court held that an oral sale of immovable property exceeding one hundred rupees in value, where Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 applies, is invalid without a registered instrument and does not vest the purported vendee with a superior right to maintain a pre-emption suit. The appeal was allowed and the pre-emption suit dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land allotted under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 in a colony area is exempt from the right of pre-emption?
  • Does an oral sale of immovable property exceeding one hundred rupees in value, in an area where Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 applies, confer a valid right or title to maintain a suit for pre-emption?
  • Whether the exemption from pre-emption granted to colony lands extends to subsequent private transfers and sales by an allottee?
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• Abdul Karim Nausherwani and another vs The State through Chief Ehtesab2015 PSC Crl. 546 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  corruption and corrupt practicesEhtesab Ordinanceabuse of official positionpublic office holdermisappropriation of government propertycriminal appealmens rea
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals against a High Court judgment convicting a former Food Minister and a businessman under the Ehtesab Ordinance, 1997, for corruption and corrupt practices regarding the unauthorized supply of government wheat on credit. The core legal question was whether the Minister’s actions, taken without legal authority or established policy and despite departmental resistance, constituted an offence under the Ordinance, and whether the absence of direct personal financial gain or proven mens rea precluded conviction. The Supreme Court, by majority, upheld the convictions, holding that the Ehtesab Ordinance employs expansive language covering actions contrary to law, rule, or usage, or involving the abuse of official position. The Court determined that the Minister’s persistent insistence on implementing orders, coupled with the failure to substantiate alleged Prime Ministerial directives, established the offence of corruption. The key principle laid down is that where legislation defines corruption in broad, inclusive terms, courts must give effect to that clear language, and public office holders cannot evade liability for abusing their position by citing non-existent directives or ignoring established departmental procedures.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of corruption and corrupt practices under the Ehtesab Ordinance, 1997, encompass actions taken by a public office holder that are contrary to law or rule, even in the absence of direct personal financial gain?
  • Can a public office holder be convicted for corruption when they insist on implementing orders that contradict established departmental policy and lack legal authorization?
  • Does the burden of proving a fact especially within the knowledge of an accused person shift to the accused under the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984?
  • Does the repayment of misappropriated funds during trial proceedings absolve an accused of the offence of corruption under the Ehtesab Ordinance, 1997?
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• Abdul Haq and Muhammad Waseem @ Naseem vs The State2015 PSC (Crl.) 509 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-06-08
  sectarian terrorismdeath penaltyAnti-Terrorism Actspot arrestballistic evidenceprompt FIRinjured witness
  Summary & questions settled

  Criminal appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose against the affirmation of convictions and death sentences awarded to the appellants by the Anti-Terrorism Court and High Court across four connected cases for the sectarian-motivated murder of twelve persons, including eight individuals at a Shia Majlis, two at Ghallah Mandi, and two chasing police officials. The core legal questions addressed were whether the prosecution established its case beyond reasonable doubt through ocular, medical, and ballistic evidence; whether the non-appearance of independent public witnesses weakened the prosecution; and whether an accused's offer under Section 340(2), Cr.P.C. to swear innocence on the Holy Quran carried legal sanctity against overwhelming evidence.

  The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the convictions and sentences. The Court held that the prosecution established guilt via consistent natural eyewitness accounts, prompt FIRs excluding deliberation, positive forensic ballistic reports matching recovered weapons, and the appellants' arrest at the spot following a police encounter. The Court laid down that public hesitation to testify due to fear does not discredit natural eyewitnesses, and a mere self-serving oath on the Holy Quran holds no legal sanctity against proven evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the non-appearance of members of the general public as witnesses in a daylight terrorist shooting impairs the credibility of natural eyewitnesses?
  • Does an accused's statement under Section 340(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure offering to swear innocence on the Holy Quran possess legal sanctity to rebut overwhelming incriminating evidence?
  • Whether a prompt FIR lodged within thirty minutes to an hour of a shooting incident excludes the possibility of consultation, deliberation, or false implication?
  • Can conviction and capital punishment under Section 302(b) PPC read with the Anti-Terrorism Act be sustained primarily on consistent ocular testimony corroborated by medical evidence and positive Forensic Science Laboratory reports?
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• Abdul Hamid @ Hamidi vs State2015 PLJ SC 1084 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-01-21
  murderocular evidenceinterested witnessquantum of sentencespur of the momentcriminal appealdeath penalty
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the murder of his employer. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of related prosecution witnesses and the appropriateness of the death penalty given the circumstances of the crime. The Supreme Court maintained the conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, finding the ocular account consistent and corroborated by medical evidence and the recovery of the weapon. However, the Court modified the sentence from death to life imprisonment. The key principle laid down is that the mere relationship of witnesses to the deceased does not render them 'interested' or unreliable absent a motive to falsely implicate the accused; such testimony requires careful scrutiny but is not discarded solely on grounds of kinship. Furthermore, where a murder occurs at the spur of the moment during a sudden quarrel rather than being a preplanned act, the death penalty is not warranted, and life imprisonment is the appropriate sentence. The benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was extended to the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere relationship of a witness to the deceased render their testimony unreliable?
  • Is a death sentence appropriate for a murder committed at the spur of the moment during a sudden quarrel?
  • Can a conviction be sustained based on ocular evidence corroborated by medical reports and recovery of weapons?
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• Abdul Ghaffar,etc. vs The State2015 P.S.C. Crl. 587 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  qatl-i-amdta'zirpartial compromisesentencing discretiondeath sentencelegal heirscompounding of offences
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal appeals addressed whether a compromise entered into with some, but not all, of the legal heirs of a deceased victim in a qatl-i-amd case can affect the sentence of death imposed on a convict as ta'zir, and whether such a partial compromise warrants reducing the death sentence to imprisonment for life. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while a partial compromise cannot legally effect compounding of the offence of qatl-i-amd—which requires the consent of all legal heirs—such a partial compromise constitutes a relevant fact and circumstance of the case that courts may consider when determining the quantum of sentence under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code. However, the Court clarified that a partial compromise does not automatically result in the imposition of the lesser sentence of imprisonment for life, as all facts and circumstances of the case must be weighed. Reviewing the specific facts of the appeals, the Court found no mitigating ground for leniency given the brutality of the offenses and accordingly dismissed the appeals, upholding the death sentences.

  Questions settled

  • Can a partial compromise with some, but not all, legal heirs legally compound the offence of qatl-i-amd?
  • Whether a partial compromise with an heir can be considered as a mitigating factor in determining the quantum of sentence for qatl-i-amd as ta'zir?
  • Does a compromise entered into by one or more heirs automatically result in the reduction of a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • What factors constitute the facts and circumstances of the case under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code when evaluating sentencing discretion?
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• Abdul Ghaffar and others vs The State2015 PSC Crl. 499 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-04-23
  Qatl-i-Amdta'zirpartial compromisesentencing discretiondeath penaltycompounding of offenceslegal heirs
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three criminal appeals challenging death sentences for Qatl-i-Amd (murder) where partial compromises were reached with some, but not all, legal heirs of the victims. The core legal question was whether such partial compromises, while insufficient to compound the offence under the law, could legally influence the court's discretion in sentencing. The Supreme Court held that while a partial compromise cannot legally compound an offence under Section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, it constitutes a relevant 'fact and circumstance of the case' under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Consequently, courts may consider such compromises when determining whether to impose the death penalty or life imprisonment. However, the Court clarified that a partial compromise does not automatically entitle a convict to a reduced sentence; the court retains full discretion to evaluate all facts and circumstances. In the present cases, the Court found the brutality of the crimes outweighed the partial compromises, and thus dismissed the appeals, maintaining the death sentences.

  Questions settled

  • Can a partial compromise with some heirs of a victim be used to compound an offence of Qatl-i-Amd under ta'zir?
  • Is a partial compromise with some heirs a relevant factor for a court to consider when determining the quantum of punishment in a ta'zir case?
  • Does a partial compromise with heirs automatically entitle a convict to a reduction of a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Does the term 'facts and circumstances of the case' in Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 include events occurring after the commission of the offence, such as a compromise?
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• Abdul Ghaffar and 2 others vs State2015 PLJ SC 741 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-04-23
  qatl-i-amdta'zirsentencing discretionpartial compromisedeath penaltylegal heirscompounding of offences
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three criminal appeals challenging death sentences for qatl-i-amd (intentional murder), specifically addressing whether a compromise reached with only some, rather than all, legal heirs of a victim impacts the sentence imposed as ta'zir. The core legal question was whether such a partial compromise necessitates the reduction of a death sentence to imprisonment for life. The Supreme Court held that while a partial compromise cannot legally compound an offence under ta'zir—as compounding requires the consent of all heirs—it nonetheless constitutes a relevant fact and circumstance of the case under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Consequently, courts may consider a partial compromise when determining the quantum of punishment. However, the Court clarified that such a compromise does not automatically entitle a convict to a reduced sentence. The sentencing court retains discretion to weigh all facts, including the brutality of the crime and the offender's conduct. Finding no merit in the appellants' cases, the Court dismissed the appeals, maintaining the death sentences despite the partial compromises.

  Questions settled

  • Does a partial compromise with some heirs of a victim in a ta'zir case legally compound the offence?
  • Can a partial compromise with heirs be considered as a factor when determining the quantum of punishment in a qatl-i-amd case?
  • Does a partial compromise with heirs automatically entitle a convict to a reduction of a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • What is the scope of the phrase 'facts and circumstances of the case' under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 regarding sentencing?
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• Aaduit vs Noor Muhammad2015 NLR Revenue 11 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-06-18
  mutationcancellation of mutationagreement to sellconcurrent findingscivil revisionpossession
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a suit for cancellation of a mutation, along with possession and permanent injunction, which was initially decreed by the trial court. However, the appellate court reversed the decree, and the High Court dismissed the petitioner's civil revision, upholding the lower appellate court's decision. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the validity of the mutation and the underlying transaction warranted interference under revisional or appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to prove any fraud in the mutation transaction, failed to plead particulars of fraud in the plaint, and could not point out any misreading or non-reading of evidence. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact regarding revenue mutations and property transactions will not be interfered with by the Supreme Court in the absence of demonstrated misreading or non-reading of evidence or unpleaded fraud.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a mutation by itself serves as a title of document?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere in concurrent judgments of lower courts without proof of misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  • Is it necessary to plead specific particulars of fraud in the plaint when challenging a transaction?
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• A. Qutubuddin Khan vs Chec Millwala Dredging Co. (Pvt.) Limited, Karachi2015 PSC 457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-04-03
  arbitration awardrule of the courtpatent illegalitylimitation periodjudicial dutyremandarbitration agreementex parte proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court Division Bench order remanding a matter to a Single Judge regarding an arbitration award. The core legal question was whether a court, when making an arbitration award a rule of the court, must mechanically accept it if objections are time-barred, or if it retains a duty to examine the award's validity. The Supreme Court held that the court’s power to make an award a rule of the court is judicial, not ministerial. Consequently, even in the absence of valid or timely objections, the court is not absolved of its responsibility to examine the award. The court must ensure the award is not a nullity, prima facie illegal, or suffering from invalidity apparent on the face of the record. The principle laid down is that the court must conduct a limited judicial exercise to verify the award's legality before passing a decree, regardless of whether the parties filed timely objections. The remand order was upheld to allow the Single Judge to perform this specific examination.

  Questions settled

  • Does a court have a duty to examine an arbitration award for patent illegality even if no objections are filed or objections are time-barred?
  • Is the power of a court to make an arbitration award a rule of the court ministerial or judicial?
  • Can an arbitration award be set aside by a court suo motu if it is found to be a nullity or prima facie illegal?
  Read full judgment →
• 1. Nasir Mehmood 2. Tahir @ Tahira vs The State2015 NLR Criminal 193 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-12-12
  capital punishmentstatement under Section 342 Cr.P.C.admission of guiltmurderanti-terrorismcriminal appealre-appraisal of evidencesupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a judgment of the High Court maintaining the convictions and death sentences of the appellants for a multiple murder incident involving the killing of six persons, under Sections 302 and 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, and Section 13 of the Pakistan Arms Ordinance 1965. The core legal questions involved the reliability of the prosecution's evidence regarding a night occurrence, the evidentiary value and legal effect of an admission made by an accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether the death sentences ought to be maintained or reduced on the basis of mitigating circumstances and discrepancies. By a majority of two to one, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the convictions and death sentences of the appellants, holding that the inculpatory parts of the statements made under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, supported by reliable prosecution evidence and medical testimony, were sufficient to prove the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the inculpatory part of an accused's statement recorded under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be read in support of the prosecution's evidence?
  • Can an admission made by an accused during a trial serve as the sole basis for awarding a death sentence on a capital charge?
  • Whether contradictions in a night occurrence and delayed post-mortem reports warrant the reduction of a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  Read full judgment →
• [Action Against Giving of Direct Outlets. from Naseer Branch' Rohri2014 SCMR 353, 2014 NLR Civil 129 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-12-03
  water theftirrigation rightstail-end growersfundamental rightsconstitutional petitionpublic interest litigationSindh Irrigation Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition, filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, addressed grievances regarding the unauthorized issuance of direct irrigation outlets and systematic water theft in the Naseer Branch, Rohri. The petitioners alleged that influential individuals were tampering with outlets, depriving tail-end growers of their rightful water share and causing financial losses. The core legal question concerned whether the irrigation authorities and local police were failing to enforce existing laws, thereby infringing upon the fundamental rights of tail-end farmers. The Supreme Court held that the Irrigation Department had failed to discharge its statutory duties, as evidenced by reports of tampered outlets and unequal water distribution. The Court directed the Secretary of Irrigation to personally inspect outlets and ensure strict compliance with sanctioned limits. Furthermore, it mandated that local police cooperate with irrigation authorities to prosecute water theft. The judgment established that farmers possess a fundamental right to property and livelihood under Articles 9 and 24 of the Constitution, which the state must protect by strictly enforcing the Sindh Irrigation Act, 1879, to prevent water misuse and ensure equitable distribution.

  Questions settled

  • Does the unauthorized tampering of irrigation outlets violate the fundamental rights of tail-end farmers to property and livelihood?
  • Are irrigation authorities legally obligated to ensure equitable water distribution by preventing the misuse of water outlets?
  • Can the Supreme Court direct police and irrigation departments to coordinate enforcement actions against water theft under Article 184(3) of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Zia Ur Rehman vs Syed Ahmed Hussain and others2014 SCMR 1015 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-01-27
  election petitiondisqualificationeducational qualificationverification on oathmandatory provisionRepresentation of the People ActCode of Civil Procedureamendment of pleadingslimitation periodmaintainability of petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court disposed of two Civil Appeals challenging an Election Tribunal's judgment that had set aside the appellant's election from PK-54 Mansehra due to disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution for misstatement regarding educational qualification. The core legal question revolved around the maintainability of election petitions not verified on oath as mandated by Sections 54 and 55 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, and whether such a defect could be cured by amendment after the limitation period. The Court held that the requirement for an election petition to be signed and verified on oath, as prescribed by Section 55(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, read with Order VI, Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is mandatory. Non-compliance entails dismissal of the petition under Section 63 of the Act. An application to amend the petition to cure this defect, if filed beyond the 45-day limitation period for filing an election petition under Section 52(2) of the Act, is not permissible. Consequently, the appeals were allowed, and the Election Tribunal's judgment was set aside.

  Read full judgment →
• Zeeshan Energy Ltd. and others vs Faysal Bank Ltd.2014 SCMR 1048 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-02-12
  leave to defendfinancial institutions recoveryequity-based financingsubstantial questions of fact and lawrecovery suitconflicting judgmentssimultaneous trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a recovery suit filed by the respondent-bank against the appellants under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, wherein leave to defend was denied and a decree was passed, later modified by the High Court. The core legal question concerns whether the appellants raised substantial questions of law and fact warranting the grant of leave to defend under section 10 of the Ordinance, particularly given documentary evidence suggesting the project was initially conceived on equity participation rather than conventional banking finance. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts erred in dismissing the appellants' contentions as unsubstantiated, as the documents presented raised genuine triable issues requiring evidence. The ratio laid down is that where a defendant raises specific, substantiated factual and legal disputes regarding the nature of the financial arrangement supported by documentary evidence, leave to defend must be granted under section 10(8) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, and cross-suits involving the same subject matter ought to be tried together to avoid conflicting judgments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to defend can be denied when a defendant produces documentary evidence raising substantial questions of fact regarding the nature of the financial facility?
  • Should cross-suits filed by the borrower and the financial institution involving the same subject-matter be tried together to avoid conflicting judgments?
  • Does an unsubstantiated assertion by a financial institution override contemporaneous documents indicating an equity-based project instead of conventional debt financing?
  • Whether the denial of leave to defend under section 10 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 constitutes a denial of a legal right when triable issues exist?
  Read full judgment →
• Zafar Iqbal and Otherss vs The State2014 NLR Criminal 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-05-28
  criminal appealdeath sentence conversionmitigating circumstancesocular evidencebenefit of doubtsentencing discretionmurder reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentences of the appellants for the murder of three individuals. The core legal question concerns whether the evidence sufficiently supports the conviction and whether the imposition of the death penalty remains appropriate in light of potential mitigating factors. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions, finding the ocular evidence reliable and corroborated by medical and forensic reports. However, the Court converted the death sentences to life imprisonment. The ratio of the decision is that the benefit of doubt can be extended to the sentencing phase, even when the conviction is sustained. The Court established that where the immediate cause of an incident remains shrouded in mystery, or where forensic evidence regarding weapon recovery is inconsistent, these factors constitute extenuating circumstances. Consequently, the Court emphasized that under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, judges must exercise judicial discretion with reasoned application of mind when selecting between death and life imprisonment, adhering to the principle that the ultimate penalty requires clear justification.

  Questions settled

  • Can the benefit of doubt be extended to the sentencing phase even when the conviction is upheld?
  • Does the failure to recover a weapon or a mismatch between recovered weapons and crime empties constitute a mitigating circumstance for sentencing?
  • Is a judge required to provide reasons when choosing between the death penalty and life imprisonment under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the absence of a clear immediate motive for the murder of secondary victims serve as an extenuating circumstance for sentencing?
  Read full judgment →
• Zafar Iqbal and Others vs The State2014 SCMR 1227 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-10-22
  murderdeath sentencelife imprisonmentmitigating circumstancesocular accountrelated witnessesmotive shrouded in mysteryrecovery of weaponssentence modification
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the conviction and death sentences awarded to five appellants for the murder of three individuals (a father and his two sons) over a domestic dispute regarding marriage proposals. The prosecution's case rested on the ocular testimony of the deceased's widow and daughter, supported by medical evidence and the recovery of weapons. The appellants contended that the witnesses were related and interested, and that the evidence was unreliable due to improvements and lack of independent corroboration. The Supreme Court, while reappraising the evidence, found the ocular account consistent and the presence of witnesses at the scene natural. However, the Court noted several mitigating factors: no weapon was recovered from one appellant; the recovered rifle of another did not match the crime empties; and the immediate cause for killing the two sons, when the motive was primarily against the father, remained shrouded in mystery. Consequently, the Court maintained the convictions but converted the death sentences into life imprisonment, affirming that benefit of doubt regarding the immediate motive or specific recoveries can be pressed for mitigation of sentence.

  Read full judgment →
• Zafar Hussain vs The State and another2014 PSC (Crl.) 847 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-01-07
  post-arrest bailabsconsionproclaimed offendercancellation of bailmurderfugitive from justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order granting post-arrest bail to an accused charged with murder and other offenses. The core legal question was whether the accused, who had been a proclaimed offender and remained a fugitive from justice for a significant period, was entitled to bail despite the serious nature of the allegations. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in granting bail. The Court observed that the accused was specifically named in the FIR for firing at the deceased, and his conduct as a fugitive, including his arrest while attempting to flee the country and involvement in another criminal case during his period of absconsion, disentitled him to the concession of bail. The key principle laid down is that the conduct of an accused, particularly prolonged absconsion and the status of a proclaimed offender, serves as a strong ground to deny bail, even where a lower court has characterized the case as one of further inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Does the status of an accused as a proclaimed offender and a long-term fugitive disentitle them to the grant of post-arrest bail?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court order granting bail if the accused has demonstrated conduct showing a high risk of future absconsion?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail if they were involved in another criminal case during their period of absconsion from the primary case?
  Read full judgment →
• Wukala Mahaz Barai Tahafaz Dastoor vs Federation of Pakistan and another2014 SCMR 111 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-09-04
  foreign policynational securityjusticiabilitytrichotomy of powersjudicial reviewconstitutional petitiondefence policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's Intra Court Appeal and upheld a Single Judge's decision to dismiss a Constitution petition. The petitioner had sought judicial directives compelling the Federation of Pakistan to command the Armed Forces to defend against alleged external aggression, to declare the USA an enemy state, and to dispose of or relocate Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. The core legal question was whether the judiciary possesses the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon matters concerning foreign policy, national defence, and state security. The Supreme Court held that the issues raised were non-justiciable and fell outside the judicial domain. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition, reasoning that judicial interference in such matters would violate the constitutional principle of the trichotomy of powers between the Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary. Consequently, the Court found no grounds to interfere with the concurrent orders of the High Court, as the petition lacked merit and sought relief beyond the scope of judicial review under the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Are matters relating to foreign policy, national defence, and state security justiciable under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the judiciary have the authority to issue directives to the Executive regarding the management of the Armed Forces or nuclear assets?
  • Does judicial interference in matters of state security violate the constitutional principle of the trichotomy of powers?
  Read full judgment →
• Waris vs Muhammad Sarwar2014 SCMR 1025 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-02-11
  pre-emptionTalb-i-IshhadTalb-i-Muwathibatamendment of plaintcross-objectionsestoppellimitationrejection of plaint
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a pre-emption suit, challenging the Peshawar High Court's dismissal of a revision petition concerning the amendment of a plaint and the validity of a Talb-i-Ishhad notice. The core legal questions were whether the trial court erred in allowing the amendment of the plaint to include specific details regarding the information of the sale, and whether the omission of the time and place of information in the Talb-i-Ishhad notice rendered the suit unsustainable. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant was barred from challenging the amendment order because they had accepted costs and failed to file cross-objections against the trial court's findings on the performance of Talbs. The Court further held that mentioning the date of Talb-i-Muwathibat in the Talb-i-Ishhad notice is sufficient to satisfy statutory requirements for calculating limitation periods. The principle established is that a party who accepts costs awarded upon an amendment order and fails to file cross-objections against adverse findings in the trial court is estopped from reopening those issues at the appellate stage.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge an order allowing the amendment of a plaint after having accepted the costs awarded in that same order?
  • Does the failure to file cross-objections against adverse findings in a trial court bar a party from challenging those findings in subsequent appellate proceedings?
  • Is it mandatory to mention the specific time and place of information in a notice of Talb-i-Ishhad to satisfy the requirements of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act 1987?
  • Does the omission of the time and place of information in a notice of Talb-i-Ishhad invalidate a pre-emption suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Wahid Bakhsh Wattoo and others vs Pak American Fertilizers Limited2014 SCMR 113 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-10-10
  voluntary separation schemegolden hand shake schemepast and closed transactionreasonable classificationdiscriminationservice lawretrenchment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding the entitlement of former employees of Pak American Fertilizer Limited to benefits under a Golden Hand Shake Scheme (GHSS) after they had already accepted a Voluntary Separation Scheme (VSS). The core legal question was whether the employees, having accepted VSS benefits, were entitled to claim the more favorable terms of a subsequently introduced GHSS in sister concerns, and whether the denial of such benefits constituted discrimination under Article 25 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the VSS and GHSS were independent schemes introduced at different times for different purposes, and that the employees' acceptance of VSS benefits constituted a 'past and closed transaction.' The Court affirmed that reasonable classification is permissible under the Constitution, and that employees who voluntarily accept a retirement scheme and receive full payment cannot later claim benefits from subsequent schemes introduced for others. The principle laid down is that once a voluntary separation agreement is executed and benefits are received, the transaction is closed, and employees cannot retrospectively claim benefits from later-introduced schemes.

  Questions settled

  • Can employees who have voluntarily accepted a separation scheme and received full payment claim benefits from a subsequently introduced scheme?
  • Does the introduction of different retirement schemes for different entities based on distinct economic circumstances violate the right to equality under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the principle of 'past and closed transaction' apply to employees who have accepted voluntary separation benefits before the introduction of a more favorable scheme?
  Read full judgment →
• Wahid Bakhsh Baloch vs The State2014 PSC (CO.) 453 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-03-12
  misuse of authorityburden of proofcriminal appealNAB Ordinancemens reaacquittaluncorroborated testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant, a former Deputy Commissioner, under Section 10(a) of the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999, for alleged misuse of authority in the allotment of state land at an undervalued rate. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had sufficiently established the essential ingredients of the offence, specifically mens rea and actus reus, and whether the burden of proof had been discharged. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court emphasized that the initial burden of proof in criminal trials rests squarely on the prosecution and does not shift to the accused, even under the provisions of the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999. Furthermore, the Court found the testimony of the prosecution’s key witness uncorroborated and unreliable. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted. The judgment reaffirms the principle that a conviction cannot be sustained without positive evidence of guilt, and that mere suspicion or uncorroborated accomplice testimony is insufficient to establish criminal liability.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 14 of the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999 shift the burden of proof from the prosecution to the accused?
  • What are the essential ingredients required to establish the offence of misuse of authority under the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999?
  • Can a conviction be sustained based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice?
  • Does a mistake of civil law negate the existence of mens rea in a criminal charge of misuse of authority?
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• The State vs Syed Ali Baqar Naqvi and others2014 PSC (Crl.) 442 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-11-12
  acquittal appeallimitation periodProvincial Governmentstatutory interpretationcriminal procedurestate appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the limitation period for filing an appeal against an acquittal by the Provincial Government under Section 417(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The High Court had dismissed the State's appeal as time-barred, erroneously applying a shorter limitation period. The Supreme Court examined the statutory framework of Section 417, Cr.P.C., noting that it creates three distinct categories for acquittal appeals: those by the Provincial Government (Section 417(1)), those by a complainant (Section 417(2) and (3)), and those by an aggrieved person (Section 417(2A)). The Court held that while specific limitation periods are prescribed for complainants (60 days) and aggrieved persons (30 days), no such specific period is provided for the Provincial Government under Section 417(1). Consequently, the Court ruled that the limitation period for appeals filed by the Provincial Government remains governed by Article 157 of the Limitation Act 1908, which prescribes a period of six months. The impugned order was set aside, and the appeal was remanded to the High Court for disposal on merits.

  Questions settled

  • What is the limitation period for an appeal against acquittal filed by the Provincial Government under Section 417(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the amendment adding Section 417(2A) to the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 alter the limitation period for appeals filed by the Provincial Government?
  • Is the limitation period for an acquittal appeal filed by the Provincial Government governed by Article 157 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• The National Bank of Pakistan vs Saf Textile Mills Ltd. through Shazia Said2014 P.C.T.L.R. 338 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  financial institutions recoverymortgage salenon-judicial foreclosureconstitutional viresdue processfair trialbanking courtfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from judgments evaluating the constitutionality of Section 15 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which empowered financial institutions to sell mortgaged property without the intervention of a court. The core legal questions involved whether Section 15 violated fundamental constitutional rights, including access to justice, property rights, equality, and the newly incorporated right to a fair trial and due process. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and held that Section 15 of the Ordinance of 2001 is unconstitutional and ultra vires the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The Court reasoned that the statutory provisions effectively deprived mortgagors of essential safeguards, remedies, and the right to object to sham sales or the absence of a reserve price, thereby offending Articles 3, 8, 10A, 24, and 175 of the Constitution. The key principle laid down is that any statutory mechanism permitting non-judicial foreclosure and sale of mortgaged property must incorporate adequate, meaningful judicial remedies and adhere strictly to the standards of due process and fair trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 15 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 violates the constitutional right to a fair trial and due process under Article 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Does the power of financial institutions to sell mortgaged property without court intervention amount to an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power?
  • Can a statutory provision authorizing non-judicial sale of property stand when it excludes post-sale remedies and the requirement of a reserve price?
  • Whether Section 15 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 is severable or if the entire section must be struck down as ultra vires?
  Read full judgment →
• The National Bank of Pakistan vs Saf Textile Mills Ltd. THR. Shazia Said2014 NLR Civil 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  mortgage foreclosureconstitutional validitydue processfair trialfinancial institutions recoveryproperty rightsnon-judicial salebanking law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the constitutionality of Section 15 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which empowered financial institutions to sell mortgaged property without judicial intervention. The core legal question was whether this provision violated fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, specifically regarding due process, fair trial, and property rights. The Supreme Court held that Section 15 was ultra vires the Constitution. The Court reasoned that the provision created a parallel, exploitative recovery system that deprived mortgagors of the right to object to the sale process, lacked essential safeguards like a reserve price, and excluded judicial oversight. By allowing financial institutions to act as seller, buyer, and auctioneer without a fair trial or due process, the provision offended Articles 3, 9, 10A, 24, and 25 of the Constitution. The Court established that the denial of a remedy constitutes the destruction of a right, and that statutory provisions enabling such non-judicial foreclosure without adequate procedural safeguards are unconstitutional.

  Questions settled

  • Is Section 15 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, unconstitutional for violating fundamental rights?
  • Does the power of a financial institution to sell mortgaged property without judicial intervention violate the right to a fair trial and due process?
  • Can a statutory provision that excludes judicial oversight in the sale of mortgaged property be sustained under the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• The Federation Of Pakistan Through Secretary, Ministry Of Finance vs Sultan Ahmad Shams and others2014 PSC 427 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  pension calculationemolumentscivil servantsretrospective applicationservice tribunalclassification of pensionerspay scales
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals by the Federation of Pakistan against a Federal Service Tribunal judgment that directed the recalculation of pensions for retired civil servants by including various allowances such as Special Additional Allowance, Special Relief Allowance, Adhoc Relief, and Dearness Allowance. The core legal question was whether these allowances constitute 'emoluments' under Civil Service Regulations 486 and whether the subsequent merger of these allowances into basic pay scales via a 2011 Office Memorandum entitles already-retired civil servants to pension recalculation. The Supreme Court held that the allowances were not part of pensionable emoluments at the time of retirement and that the 2011 Memorandum could not be applied retrospectively. The Court reaffirmed the principle established in I.A. Sherwani that pensioners and serving civil servants constitute distinct classes; therefore, revisions to pay scales for serving employees do not automatically confer rights upon those who have already retired. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment, ruling that the respondents were not entitled to the claimed pension recalculation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of 'emoluments' in CSR 486 include ad-hoc allowances for the purpose of pension calculation?
  • Can subordinate legislation, such as an Office Memorandum, be applied retrospectively to grant pension benefits to already retired civil servants?
  • Does the revision of pay scales for serving civil servants entitle retired civil servants to a notional recalculation of their pension?
  • Are pensioners and serving civil servants considered the same class for the purposes of Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Terrorist Incident of District Courts, Islamabad --- (Suo Motu case)2014 PSC (Crl.) 562 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-03-10
  Suo MotuTerrorismJoint Investigation TeamJudicial securityCriminal investigationVictim compensationPrejudicial statements
  Summary & questions settled

  This Suo Motu case arose following a terrorist attack on the District Courts in Islamabad, which resulted in the deaths of several individuals, including a judicial officer, and numerous injuries. The core legal questions concerned the adequacy of existing security protocols, the integrity of the police investigation, and the sufficiency of government compensation for the victims' families. The Court held that to ensure a transparent and impartial inquiry, the Secretary Interior must constitute a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) comprising independent and competent officers, headed by a Deputy Inspector General. Furthermore, the Court directed the government to review the quantum of compensation and consider employment opportunities for the families of the deceased. A key principle laid down is that public figures and government officials are strictly prohibited from making statements regarding an ongoing investigation that could prejudice its merits or influence witnesses. The Court also affirmed that parallel inquiries, such as those initiated by the High Court, may continue alongside the JIT investigation to ensure comprehensive fact-finding.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court direct the government to constitute a Joint Investigation Team in a criminal matter?
  • Does the Court have the authority to restrict public officials from making statements regarding ongoing criminal investigations?
  • Is the government obligated to review compensation and employment for victims of terrorist incidents occurring within court premises?
  Read full judgment →
• Telecard Limited Through Its Authorized Representative Ghufran Shaheer2014 PSC 765 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-02-13
  company appealjuristic personboard resolutionauthorizationlocus standicorporate litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an appeal filed by Telecard Limited against the dismissal of its statutory appeal by the High Court. The core legal question addressed by the court is whether an appeal on behalf of a corporate juristic person can be initiated and filed without proper authorization through the articles of association or a board resolution. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a legal proceeding on behalf of a company cannot be maintained without due authority derived from the articles of association or a board resolution, which was conspicuously missing in this case as the appellant failed to establish the CEO's authority. The key principle laid down is that a company, being a juristic person, must demonstrate proper authorization through corporate governance documents or board resolutions to competently institute legal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a company initiate legal proceedings without authorization through its articles of association or a board resolution?
  • Is a legal appeal maintainable when signed by a chief executive officer without documented proof of corporate authority?
  • What is required to establish the locus standi of a listed company filing an appeal before the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Telecard Limited through Authorized representative vs Pakistan2014 PSC 765, 2014 CLD 415 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-02-13
  juristic personboard resolutionarticles of associationauthorized representativecorporate litigationlocus standimemo of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed under the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act, 1996, by a limited company challenging a decision of the High Court. The primary legal question concerned the locus standi and the validity of the appeal's institution, specifically whether the individual who signed the memorandum of appeal possessed the requisite legal authority to represent the juristic person. The High Court had dismissed the appeal on the grounds that it was not filed by an authorized person. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed that a company, being a juristic person, cannot initiate litigation without express authority derived from its articles of association or a specific board resolution. The Court noted that the appellant failed to produce any documentation, such as a board resolution, to establish that the Chief Executive Officer was authorized to sign the memo of appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the appeal lacked merit due to the absence of proper authorization, reinforcing the principle that corporate litigation must be backed by documented institutional consent.

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• Tassaduq Hussain vs Mst. Muneer Fatima2014 SCMR 1744 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-08-20
  relationship of landlord and tenantejectment petitioncantonments rent restrictionsale agreementspecific performanceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of an ejectment proceeding initiated by the respondent against the petitioner under section 17 of the Cantonments Rent Restrictions Act, 1963, on the grounds of default in payment of rent, personal need, and subletting. The Rent Controller and subsequently the Lahore High Court ordered the eviction of the petitioner, rejecting his plea that he occupied the property as an owner by virtue of a sale agreement rather than as a tenant. The core legal question was whether a valid relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties and whether the petitioner successfully established possession as an owner. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to prove that he was put in possession pursuant to the alleged sale agreement, which in any case does not confer title, and that the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the landlord-tenant relationship were based on proper appreciation of evidence. The court laid down that an unexecuted or unperfected sale agreement does not create ownership or negate an established tenancy, and that leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution will not be granted against concurrent factual findings free from misreading or non-reading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does an agreement to sell confer ownership title on the purported vendee so as to extinguish the relationship of landlord and tenant?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Rent Controller and the High Court under Article 185(3) of the Constitution in the absence of misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  • Whether failure to file a suit for specific performance to perfect title affects the plea of ownership in rent proceedings?
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• Tariq Mahmood vs Ghulam Mustafa Shah and another2014 PSC 660 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-03-18
  General Power of Attorneydeclaration suitbona fide purchaserrevocation of power of attorneycivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the concurrent decrees passed against him in a suit for declaration. The respondent No. 1 had filed a suit challenging the validity of a General Power-of-Attorney and a subsequent sale-deed executed by respondent No. 2 in favor of the petitioner, contending that the power-of-attorney was fraudulent and stood revoked upon the death of one of the executants. The Trial Court, appellate court, and High Court ruled in favor of respondent No. 1. The Supreme Court considered whether the petitioner had established his status as a bona fide purchaser without notice and whether he was entitled to interfere with the concurrent findings. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to prove the payment of sale consideration, was never delivered possession of the property, and omitted to file an independent suit for possession. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition and declined leave to appeal, affirming that the lower forums properly appreciated the material on record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the death of one of the executants revokes a General Power-of-Attorney?
  • Can a defendant in a declaration suit seek a substantive decree for possession without filing a separate suit?
  • Whether a purchaser of property without delivery of possession can claim the status of a bona fide purchaser without establishing payment of sale consideration?
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• Tahir Hussain and others vs Ilyas Ahmad and others2014 SCMR 1210 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-03-13
  ejectment orderexecuting courtobjection petitioncollateral proceedingsrent controllerexecution of decreetenancy dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that remanded an execution matter to the Executing Court to decide objection petitions regarding a final ejectment order. The core legal question concerns whether an Executing Court may entertain repeated objection petitions regarding issues already settled in final rent proceedings, and whether collateral civil proceedings can obstruct the execution of such an order. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment. It held that the Executing Court is bound to enforce the final ejectment order and lacks jurisdiction to re-adjudicate issues already decided by the Rent Controller or to entertain fresh objections that attempt to relitigate the merits of the tenancy. The Court established the principle that an Executing Court possesses limited jurisdiction and cannot entertain objections on issues already adjudicated, nor can collateral civil proceedings or subsequent claims of possession or ownership defeat a final ejectment order. The Court emphasized that the Executing Court must execute the decree without allowing parties to prolong proceedings through repetitive, meritless objections, thereby ensuring the effective implementation of judicial orders.

  Questions settled

  • Can an Executing Court entertain objection petitions regarding issues already decided by the Rent Controller?
  • Does an Executing Court have the jurisdiction to stay the execution of a final ejectment order due to pending collateral civil proceedings?
  • Can a third party in possession defeat an ejectment order by filing objection petitions based on claims of ownership or sale agreements?
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• Syntron Limited vs Huma Ijaz and others2014 SCMR 531 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-08-25
  public interest litigationimpleadment of partiesnecessary partyproper partywrit jurisdictionfundamental rightscivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of an application for impleadment in a public interest litigation writ petition. The original writ petition sought to restrain the procurement and use of Woven Poly Propylene (WPP) bags for storing wheat. The petitioner, a manufacturer and supplier of such bags, sought to be joined as a respondent, arguing that the outcome of the litigation would directly affect their business interests and that they were a necessary party. The High Court had dismissed the application by relying on previous orders regarding other parties. The Supreme Court held that in public interest litigation, courts should adopt a more liberal stance regarding the impleadment of parties whose interests are likely to be prejudiced by the outcome. Finding that the petitioner was a necessary party whose business would be directly impacted by the relief sought, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and granted the application for impleadment, establishing that parties likely to be affected by the outcome of public interest litigation should be permitted to join the proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Should courts adopt a liberal approach regarding the impleadment of parties in public interest litigation?
  • Is a manufacturer whose business is directly threatened by the relief sought in a writ petition a necessary party to the proceedings?
  • Can an application for impleadment be dismissed solely by relying on previous orders regarding other parties without considering the specific facts of the current applicant?
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• Syed Tahir Hussain Mehmoodi and otherss vs Agha Syed Liaqat Ali and others2014 SCMR 637 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-02-10
  Closure of evidenceOrder XVII Rule 3 CPCDelinquent litigantExamination on commissionOrder XXVI Rule 5 CPCStrict constructionRevisional jurisdictionFinality of ordersCivil Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned a suit for declaration where the defendants' evidence was closed under Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. The core legal questions revolved around the application of this rule, particularly whether a delinquent litigant, whose evidence was closed, should still be allowed to record their own statement, and the court's obligations in such circumstances. The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the High Court's decision allowing the respondents-defendants to record their own statements, finding the High Court's approach (based on the absence of 'marked absent' in the order sheet) a 'possibly valid approach'. The Court held that Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. is penal and must be strictly construed, with no concession to delinquent litigants. While a court is not obliged to *suo motu* offer a subsequent opportunity for a party to appear as their own witness when evidence is closed, it should not decline if the party is present and requests it. The Court also dismissed a petition regarding an application under Order XXVI, Rule 5, C.P.C., as the trial court's rejection orders were not appropriately challenged and had attained finality. Adherence to law, as per Article 4 of the Constitution, is a duty, not a mere technicality.

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• Syed Nazir Gillani vs Pakistan Red Crescent Society and another2014 SCMR 982 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-02-11
  Review petitionConstitutional petitionMaintainabilityStatutory rulesNon-statutory rulesService rulesMaster and ServantWrit jurisdictionRemoval from servicePakistan Red Crescent Society
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition challenged a Supreme Court judgment dated 1-6-2005, which had allowed an appeal by the Pakistan Red Crescent Society and set aside a Lahore High Court judgment. The original Supreme Court judgment had held that a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution, filed by the respondent challenging his removal from service, was not maintainable as he was governed by non-statutory rules. The review petitioner contended that the Red Crescent Society's service rules were statutory, framed under section 5 of the Pakistan Red Crescent Society Act, and that a writ would be competent for rule violations. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, affirming that the rules framed by the Pakistan Red Crescent Society are non-statutory, thereby rendering a writ petition non-maintainable. The Court reiterated the principle that where conditions of service of employees of a statutory body are not regulated by rules framed under a statute but by internal rules, their violation cannot normally be enforced through writ jurisdiction, and such employees are governed by the principle of 'Master and Servant'.

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• Syed Mubashir Raza Jaffri, Etc. vs Employees Old Age Benefits Institutions2014 PSC 861 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  illegal appointmentspublic interest litigationnepotismEOBIfundamental rightsservice regulationsregularization of contract employees
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a public interest litigation under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan challenging illegal appointments, absorptions, and regularizations made in the Employees Old Age Benefits Institution (EOBI) between 2009 and 2012. The core legal questions centered on whether bulk appointments made in violation of recruitment rules, operating manuals, and regional quotas under political pressure, nepotism, and cronyism are sustainable, and whether the Supreme Court can interfere in service matters through public interest litigation. The Supreme Court held that appointments made in flagrant violation of merit, statutory rules, and recruitment procedures are null and void, and cannot be protected on humanitarian grounds or due to subsequent regularization by a Cabinet sub-committee. The Court laid down that appointments in public institutions must strictly adhere to transparency, merit criteria, and applicable service regulations, and that backdoor entries and politically motivated recruitments infringe the fundamental rights of qualified citizens.

  Questions settled

  • Whether appointments made in a public statutory body in violation of prescribed recruitment rules and operating procedures are lawful?
  • Can bulk appointments tainted by political pressure and nepotism be protected on humanitarian grounds?
  • Whether a Cabinet sub-committee possesses the legal authority to regularize illegal appointments made in violation of a statutory corporation's rules?
  • Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution to examine illegal recruitment practices in a public institution as a matter of public importance?
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• Syed Mehmood Akhtar Naqvi vs Federation of Pakistan THR. Secretary2014 NLR Civil 212 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2012-09-20
  dual citizenshipdisqualification of parliamentariansfalse declarationcorrupt practicerecovery of public fundsnomination papers
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 sought a declaration of disqualification against several Parliamentarians and Members of Provincial Assemblies (MPAs) on the ground of holding dual citizenship. The core legal question was whether the acquisition of foreign citizenship under Article 63(1)(c) of the Constitution, read with the Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951, automatically disqualifies a member from being elected or continuing as a member of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) or a Provincial Assembly. The Supreme Court held that Article 63(1)(c) must be construed strictly according to its plain meaning, and any member holding dual citizenship is disqualified. The Court ruled that making a false declaration on oath regarding such disqualification during nomination constitutes a corrupt practice, exposing the individual to criminal prosecution and disqualification. Consequently, the Court directed the Election Commission of Pakistan to de-notify the disqualified members, initiate criminal proceedings for false declarations, and ordered the recovery of all monetary benefits drawn by them during their tenure.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a member of Parliament or a Provincial Assembly who holds dual citizenship is disqualified from holding office under Article 63(1)(c) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • How should the terms 'ceases to be a citizen of Pakistan' and 'acquires the citizenship of a foreign State' in Article 63(1)(c) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 be interpreted?
  • What are the legal consequences, including criminal liabilities, for a candidate who makes a false declaration on oath regarding their qualification or disqualification at the time of filing nomination papers?
  • Can the Supreme Court directly order the de-notification of disqualified legislators and the recovery of monetary benefits drawn by them without a reference under Article 63(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 when the facts are established?
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• Syed Khalid Hussain Shah vs The State and another2014 SCMR 12 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-07-25
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirymedical evidenceocular accountconflict of evidenceattempted murdercriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a Peshawar High Court decision denying bail to the petitioner in a case involving charges under Sections 324, 334, 148, and 149 of the PPC and the Arms Ordinance. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner and his son fired pistols at the victim, causing abdominal injuries. However, the Supreme Court observed significant discrepancies between the ocular account, the injury sheet, and the medical evidence, which recorded injuries to the thighs and scrotal region rather than the abdomen. Furthermore, the court questioned whether the specific dimensions of the wounds were consistent with the alleged weapon and distance. The Court held that where such contradictions exist, the case falls within the ambit of 'further inquiry' under Section 497(2) Cr.P.C. The Court clarified that the commencement of trial does not bar the grant of bail if a case for further inquiry is established. Consequently, the petition was converted into an appeal and bail was granted.

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• Suo Motu Case No.24 of 2010: In the matter of (Regarding Corruption in2014 SCMR 484 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-12-06
  suo motu jurisdictionpublic interest litigationcorruptionre-employment of civil servantsjudicial independencefundamental rightsHajj scamexecutive interference
  Summary & questions settled

  This suo motu case was initiated under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan regarding massive corruption and mismanagement in the 2010 Hajj arrangements, which resulted in the financial exploitation of pilgrims. The core legal questions concerned the accountability of public officials for corruption, the legality of executive interference in criminal investigations, and the regulatory compliance of re-employing retired civil servants. The Court held that the corruption scandal, which involved exorbitant charges and the failure to provide promised accommodation, violated fundamental rights. It directed the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) to conduct transparent investigations, mandated the refund of excess amounts to pilgrims, and ordered the extradition of absconding accused. Regarding civil service, the Court ruled that the re-employment of retired officers must strictly adhere to Section 14 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, emphasizing that such appointments must be in the public interest and must not block the promotion rights of junior officers. The judgment establishes that judicial orders are binding on the executive, and any interference with ongoing investigations or the penalization of officers complying with court orders is unlawful.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court exercise suo motu jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution in matters involving corruption and mismanagement of public funds?
  • Does the re-employment of retired civil servants require strict adherence to the public interest criteria and statutory provisions under Section 14 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Is the executive branch legally permitted to interfere with or hamper criminal investigations conducted by the Federal Investigation Agency?
  • Can a civil servant be penalized or made an Officer on Special Duty (OSD) for complying with a judicial order?
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• Suo Motu Case No.18 of 2010: In the matter of vs Not2014 P.S.C. 6, 2014 SCMR 585 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-11-22
  suo motuwhite-collar crimepublic procurementcontempt of courtcorruptioncontinuing mandamusinvestigation monitoringNational Insurance Company Ltd.
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from suo motu proceedings concerning massive corruption and white-collar crime within the National Insurance Company Ltd. (NICL). The core legal questions involved the legality of the NICL Chairman’s appointment and whether high-ranking government functionaries obstructed the subsequent criminal investigation into the NICL scam. The Court held that the appointment of the Chairman was non-transparent and violated statutory criteria. Furthermore, it found that various government officials, including the former DG FIA and high-level secretaries, deliberately hampered the investigation to protect accused persons, thereby committing corruption and corrupt practices under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The Court affirmed that public servants who abet corruption by failing to exercise their authority to prevent it are liable under the law. Emphasizing the principle of continuing mandamus, the Court asserted its authority to monitor investigations to ensure fairness. Consequently, the Court directed the Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau to take over the cases, ensure the recovery of looted public funds, and proceed against the accused and those who obstructed justice, while initiating contempt proceedings against the responsible officials.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court monitor criminal investigations to ensure fairness and transparency?
  • Does the obstruction of a corruption investigation by government officials constitute an offence under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Are appointments to autonomous bodies made in violation of established statutory criteria and rules subject to judicial review?
  • Does the failure of a public servant to exercise authority to prevent corruption constitute a corrupt practice?
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• Suo Motu Case No.16 of 2011 Etc.: In the matter of vs Not2014 SCMR 541 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-11-01
  suo motulaw and ordersmugglingillicit armsnarcotics controlcustoms enforcementconstitutional dutyKarachi
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court initiated these suo motu proceedings to oversee the implementation of its earlier directions regarding the restoration of law and order in Karachi, specifically targeting the proliferation of illicit arms and narcotics. The core legal question concerned whether executive and law enforcement agencies—including Customs, Police, Rangers, and the Anti-Narcotics Force—were effectively discharging their statutory duties to prevent smuggling and maintain public peace. The Court held that despite prior directives, these agencies had not sufficiently addressed the crisis. Consequently, the Court mandated that the Federal and Provincial governments implement rigorous measures, including enhanced surveillance at ports, centralized electronic record-keeping for arms imports, and coordinated operations against identified criminal hubs. The Court laid down the principle that law enforcement agencies are under a constitutional and legal obligation to protect the lives and property of citizens, and that the writ of the government must be restored through the strict, non-discriminatory application of existing laws, irrespective of political or administrative challenges.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of law enforcement agencies to prevent the smuggling of arms and narcotics constitute a breach of their constitutional duty to protect the lives and property of citizens?
  • Are the Customs authorities legally obligated to maintain centralized electronic records of all arms imports to prevent the misuse of import authorizations?
  • Can the Anti-Narcotics Force exercise its powers under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 to freeze the assets of drug traffickers?
  • Is the Federal Government constitutionally obligated under Article 148(3) to assist the Provincial Government in maintaining law and order?
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• Suo Motu Action Regarding Illegal Selling Out the Auqaf Properties2014 PLD Supreme Court 100 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-10-02
  suo motu jurisdictionevacuee trust propertypublic property disposaltransparency in public contractsfiduciary dutyunauthorized investmentconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This suo motu action under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan concerned the illegal disposal of Evacuee Trust Property Board (ETPB) land to the Defence Housing Authority (DHA) Lahore and an unauthorized financial investment in a non-existent project. The core legal questions were whether the ETPB’s land transfer to DHA and its subsequent investment of public funds were conducted in accordance with the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975. The Supreme Court held that both transactions were unlawful, lacking transparency, and caused colossal financial loss to the ETPB. The Court declared the DHA land deal void, offering DHA the choice to accept original, more beneficial terms or return the land. Furthermore, the Court ordered the recovery of the unauthorized investment, directed a forensic audit of the ETPB, and mandated civil and criminal proceedings against the former Chairman and responsible officials. The judgment reaffirms that public property must be managed with strict adherence to statutory mandates, ensuring transparency, fairness, and the protection of charitable interests, prohibiting arbitrary disposal by public functionaries.

  Questions settled

  • Can a statutory body dispose of public property without adhering to the principles of transparency and fair competition?
  • Is an investment of public funds by the Evacuee Trust Property Board in a non-existent project lawful under the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act 1975?
  • Does the premature reconstitution of the Evacuee Trust Property Board violate the tenure protections prescribed by the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act 1975?
  • Can a court order the reversal of land mutations and sale deeds if the underlying transaction by a public body is found to be unlawful and detrimental to the public interest?
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• Sohail Ahmed Usmani ' vs Director-General Pakistan Civil Aviation2014 SCMR 1843 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-07-16
  back benefitsreinstatementmisconductservice lawgainful employmentshow cause noticecivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged a High Court judgment that reinstated the appellant into service but denied him back benefits. The appellant, an employee of the Civil Aviation Authority, had been dismissed following allegations of misconduct, including habitual lateness and failure to timely process audit reports. While the High Court found the general charges of misconduct unproven, it upheld the denial of back benefits, asserting the appellant was partially responsible for the delay in processing a specific audit report. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court erred in this denial and in its assessment of the appellant's explanation for the delay. The Court held that the appellant had provided a detailed, unrebutted explanation for the delay in his reply to the show cause notice, which lower authorities failed to consider. Furthermore, the Court established that upon reinstatement, an employee is entitled to back benefits unless the employer proves the employee was gainfully employed during the dismissal period. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the denial of back benefits and directing payment for the period of dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Is an employee entitled to back benefits upon reinstatement if the employer fails to prove the employee was gainfully employed during the dismissal period?
  • Does the failure of an authority to consider a detailed explanation provided in a reply to a show cause notice vitiate the findings of misconduct?
  • Can a court deny back benefits to a reinstated employee without establishing that the employee was gainfully employed elsewhere during the period of dismissal?
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• Sikandar Shah vs Raza Shah and another2014 PSC (Crl.) 851 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-03-07
  dying declarationjudicial confessionhired assassindeath sentencereduction of sentenceabsconsionappeal against acquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from consolidated criminal appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning a courtroom shooting incident resulting in murder. The convict, Farhad, appealed his conviction and death sentence under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while the complainant, Sikandar Shah, appealed against the acquittal of co-accused Raza Shah. The primary legal questions evaluated were whether an unsigned statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. could serve as a valid dying declaration, whether a delayed judicial confession was voluntary, and whether long incarceration during appeal pendency entitled a convict to sentence reduction. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and death sentence of Farhad, finding his voluntary confession and red-handed arrest supported by ocular and medical evidence, and dismissed the complainant's appeal against Raza Shah's acquittal. The Court ruled that an unsigned dying declaration recorded by an independent officer carries strong corroborative value, that delay in appeal disposal attributable to the convict does not ground sentence mitigation, and that absconsion cannot sustain conviction where participation is logically improbable.

  Questions settled

  • Can an unsigned statement recorded by a police officer under Section 161 Cr.P.C. be relied upon as a valid dying declaration to corroborate eyewitness testimony?
  • Does prolonged incarceration in a death cell entitle a death-row convict to a reduction of sentence when the delay in concluding appellate proceedings is attributable to the convict's own counsel?
  • Can evidence of absconsion serve as a sole basis for conviction where the prosecution's own case relies on the crime being executed by a hired assassin?
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• Sher Bahadur vs Fayyaz, etc.2014 PSC (Crl.) 731 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-08-22
  juvenile justiceclaim of juvenilityonus of proofbenefit of doubtleave to appealage determination
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition challenges an order of the Peshawar High Court wherein respondent No. 1 was declared a 'child' under the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, based on unverified educational and identity documents despite no prior claim of juvenility before the Trial Court or in the memorandum of appeal. The core legal question revolves around whether the High Court erred in determining juvenility without positive proof, drawing adverse inferences for delayed claims, and extending the benefit of doubt regarding age to the accused. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider these contentions and suspended the operation of the impugned judgment. The legal principle highlighted is that the onus of proof regarding a claim of juvenility lies upon the accused, and a delayed claim without positive evidence does not entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an adverse inference is to be drawn against an accused person in case of a delayed claim of juvenility?
  • Does the onus of proof regarding age lie on the accused person to establish his claim of juvenility through positive evidence?
  • Can an accused take advantage of a doubt regarding his age when claiming to be a juvenile?
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• Sher Bahadur vs Fayyaz and others2014 PSC (Crl.) 731, 2014 PLD Supreme Court 791 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-08-22
  juvenile justiceclaim of juvenilityburden of proofbenefit of doubtleave to appealdelayed claimage determination
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a criminal petition seeking leave to appeal against an order passed by the Peshawar High Court, which had determined respondent No.1 to be a child under the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000 based on a Secondary School Certificate and a National Identity Card without verifying their authenticity, despite the respondent never having raised a plea of juvenility before the trial court or in his memo of appeal. The core legal questions concern the burden and standard of proof regarding a delayed claim of juvenility, the drawing of adverse inferences from such delay, and whether the benefit of doubt regarding age can be extended to an accused person who fails to establish juvenility through positive evidence. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions raised substantial questions requiring consideration, and suspended the operation of the impugned remand judgment of the High Court pending the regular hearing of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an adverse inference is to be drawn against an accused person in the case of a delayed claim of juvenility?
  • Where a doubt arises regarding an accused person's age, is the benefit of such doubt to be extended to the accused or does the onus lie on the accused to establish juvenility through positive evidence?
  • Can a High Court rely upon a school certificate and national identity card to determine juvenility without verifying their authenticity?
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• Sher Bahadur Khan vs District Govt. Vehari & OthersNLR 2014 Tax.1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2012-07-21
  export taxcontractorpenaltyPunjab Local Councils (Lease) Rulesright of audiencerefundarrears of land revenue
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging the Lahore High Court's judgment affirming orders passed by revenue and local government authorities regarding the refund of overcharged export tax and imposition of a penalty. The core legal questions relate to whether the petitioner was denied a right of audience and whether an agreement between the parties could override statutory rules regarding the quantum of penalty. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was given ample opportunity of hearing through subsequent appellate and revisional forums, curing any initial defect, but that the imposition of an 11 times penalty was illegal as no agreement can override statutory rules. The court laid down the principle that statutory rules, such as Rule 8(2) of the Punjab Local Councils (Lease) Rules, 1990, prevail over private contractual arrangements, and penalties cannot exceed the limits prescribed by law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether lack of notice before an initial authority vitiates proceedings when subsequent appellate and revisional hearings cure the defect?
  • Can an agreement between parties override the penalty limits prescribed by statutory rules?
  • What is the maximum penalty permissible under Rule 8(2) of the Punjab Local Councils (Lease) Rules, 1990 for overcharging by a contractor?
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• Sheikh Saleem vs Mrs. Shamim Attaullah Khan and others2014 SCMR 1694 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-08-13
  rent proceedingstransfer of caseequitable principlesejectmentconstitution petitionex parte order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition impugning the dismissal of a Constitution Petition by the High Court of Sindh, which had upheld an ejectment order passed against the petitioner-tenant in a rent case. The core legal question was whether the principle underlying Section 24-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding the transfer of cases without the necessity of court motion notices applies to rent proceedings governed by the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979, notwithstanding that the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply in stricto sensu. The Supreme Court held that although the strict provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 do not apply to rent cases, the equitable principles embodied therein—including Section 24-A—apply to rent proceedings to foster natural justice and ensure the expeditious disposal of disputes between landlords and tenants. The Court laid down that parties are obliged to keep track of their cases upon administrative transfer, and failure to appear before the transferee court does not invalidate proceedings where notice requirements under equitable principles have been met.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 are applicable in stricto sensu to rent proceedings under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  • Can the equitable principles of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be applied to rent proceedings to ensure expeditious disposal?
  • Does Section 24-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to the transfer of rent cases from one Rent Controller to another?
  • What is the effect of a party's failure to appear before a transferee court upon the administrative transfer of a rent case?
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• Sheikh Muhammad Shakeel vs Sheikh Hafiz Muhammad Aslam2014 PSC 1448 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-05-14
  promissory notenegotiable instrumentattestationstamp dutyadmissibility of evidencerecovery suitsummary procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which had dismissed a suit for recovery of money based on a promissory note. The core legal questions were whether a promissory note requires attestation under the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, and whether an insufficiently stamped promissory note, once admitted into evidence without objection, can be excluded from consideration by an appellate court. The Supreme Court held that a promissory note is defined exclusively by the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and does not require attestation under the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Furthermore, the Court held that under Section 36 of the Stamp Act, 1899, once a document is admitted into evidence and marked as an exhibit without objection, its admissibility cannot be challenged on the grounds of insufficient stamping in subsequent proceedings. The Court established that the requirements of Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, are exhaustive for the validity of a promissory note, and Section 36 of the Stamp Act, 1899, creates a mandatory bar against questioning the admissibility of such instruments once admitted.

  Questions settled

  • Does a promissory note require attestation under Article 17(2)(a) of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Can an appellate court exclude a promissory note from evidence on the grounds of insufficient stamping if it was admitted without objection in the trial court?
  • What are the essential ingredients of a valid promissory note under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881?
  • Does Section 36 of the Stamp Act, 1899, bar the questioning of an instrument's admissibility once it has been exhibited in evidence?
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• Shahzada Muhammad Aslam vs Soofi Wali Muhammad and others2014 SCMR 1059 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-12-17
  evacuee propertyspecific performancecompromise decreeSection 12(2) CPCallotment of propertypossessionCustodian confirmation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil appeals regarding the ownership of a shop in Multan, involving conflicting claims of evacuee property status and specific performance of a sale agreement. The core legal questions were whether the subject shop constituted 'evacuee property' requiring Custodian confirmation under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957, and whether the respondent could validly challenge a prior compromise decree through an application under Section 12(2), Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that the shop was not 'evacuee property' available for disposal, as it had been exchanged for non-evacuee property and was not available on the statutory cut-off date. The Court further determined that the transfer to the respondent's predecessor was invalid due to the absence of required physical possession. Consequently, the Court ruled that the respondent failed to establish grounds for challenging the compromise decree under Section 12(2), Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The judgment establishes that possession is a mandatory condition precedent for allotment under the Scheme for the Management and Disposal of Available Urban Properties, and property unavailable on the cut-off date cannot be reclassified as evacuee property.

  Questions settled

  • Can a property be treated as evacuee property if it was not available for disposal on the statutory cut-off date?
  • Is physical possession a condition precedent for the allotment of property under the Scheme for the Management and Disposal of Available Urban Properties?
  • Can a compromise decree be challenged under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without establishing fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of jurisdiction?
  • Does the failure to obtain Custodian confirmation under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957 automatically render a property evacuee property if it was exchanged for non-evacuee property?
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• Shahid Zafar and 3 others vs The State2014 PLD Supreme Court 809 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-08-29
  anti-terrorismcommon intentionself-defensemurdercompromisecompounding of offencesdeath sentence conversionfasad-fil-arz
  Summary & questions settled

  Criminal appeals were filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan impugning a Sindh High Court judgment that upheld the appellants' convictions under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The prosecution case was that the appellants, who were law enforcement personnel and a park guard, fatally shot an unarmed young man who was begging for his life, and deliberately failed to provide him medical assistance, causing him to bleed to death. The core legal questions involved whether the firing constituted self-defense, whether common intention was established for all co-accused, whether the offense constituted terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, and whether a compromise between the accused and legal heirs could result in an acquittal or commutation of sentence. The Supreme Court held that the video evidence completely falsified the plea of self-defense and established common intention for the rangers personnel, that the gruesome public killing created fear and insecurity amounting to terrorism under Section 6(1)(b) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, and that offenses under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 are non-compoundable. The Court laid down that a gruesome murder creating societal panic falls within the ambit of terrorism and Fasad-Fil-Arz, while partly converting the death sentence of the principal accused to life imprisonment based on mitigating circumstances and altering the conviction of the park guard whose common intention was not proven.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the shooting of an unarmed citizen by law enforcement personnel in public view constitutes an act of terrorism under Section 6(1)(b) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Can a sentence of death under Section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 be converted to life imprisonment on the basis of a compromise between the accused and the legal heirs of the deceased?
  • Whether co-accused standing as bystanders during an offense can be convicted with the aid of Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does an offense falling under Section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 remain compoundable?
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• Shahid Ahmed vs Oil and Gas Development Company Ltd. through Managing Director, Islamabad and others2014 SCMR 1008 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-02-28
  date of birth correctionsuperannuationlachesconstitutional petitionservice recordadministrative circularsdisputed facts
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition seeking a direction to correct his date of birth in his service record. The petitioner, appointed as a Junior Engineer in the Oil and Gas Development Company Ltd. (OGDCL) in 1985, had declared his date of birth as 6-6-1953. In 2012, nearing his retirement, he sought to correct it to 11-6-1956 based on an order from the local education department. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's dismissal, holding that the petition was barred by laches as the petitioner served for over twenty years before seeking the correction. The Court ruled that administrative circulars declaring the date of birth at entry as final are valid and in line with general service law principles. Furthermore, disputed questions of fact regarding age certificates cannot be resolved in constitutional jurisdiction without being proved before a civil court of competent jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a public employee can seek correction of their date of birth in service records after an inordinate delay and when nearing superannuation?
  • Can administrative instructions or circulars declaring the date of birth at entry into service as final be validly applied if the statutory service rules are silent on the matter?
  • Can disputed documents regarding an employee's age be conclusively determined under the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court without recourse to a civil suit?
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• Shabana Naz vs Muhammad Saleem2014 SCMR 343 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-06-10
  Custody of minorGuardianshipHizanatWelfare of minorRemarriage of motherGuardians and Wards ActMuhammadan LawConstitutional petitionFamily law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that dismissed a constitutional petition, thereby upholding a Family Court's decision granting custody of a minor daughter to her father under the Guardians and Wards Act. The core legal questions revolved around whether the father was entitled to custody despite allegations of non-maintenance and whether the mother lost her right of Hizanat upon remarriage to a stranger, with the welfare of the minor being the paramount consideration. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower courts' decisions. It found that the father had continuously provided maintenance, and the mother's remarriage to a person not related to the minor within prohibited degrees generally disentitles her from Hizanat. The Court reiterated that while the rule of Hizanat discontinuing upon the mother's remarriage is not absolute and can be departed from in exceptional circumstances for the minor's welfare, no such circumstances were demonstrated in this case. The paramount consideration of the minor's welfare was found to align with granting custody to the father.

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• Senate Secretariat through Chairman and anothers vs Miss Faiqa Abdul2014 PLC (C.S.) 939, 2014 SCMR 522 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-11-07
  deputationpermanent absorptionrepatriationmala fidediscriminationDepartmental Promotion Committeebiasleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from an Intra-Court Appeal judgment of the Islamabad High Court regarding the repatriation and permanent absorption of a deputationist in the Senate Secretariat. The primary legal issue was whether administrative decisions concerning repatriation and absorption are subject to judicial review when tainted by personal bias, mala fide, and discriminatory treatment, given that absorption is not a vested right. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, maintaining the High Court's direction to process the employee for permanent absorption and pay her outstanding salaries. The Court held that while an employee has no vested right to absorption or extension of deputation, the employer's authority to repatriate cannot be exercised on personal whims, bias, or in a discriminatory manner. The Court further laid down that an officer who authors an adverse evaluation report against an employee cannot ethically or legally sit as chairman of the Departmental Promotion Committee evaluating that employee, as doing so renders the committee's recommendations illegal.

  Questions settled

  • Is an employee entitled as of right to permanent absorption or extension of a deputation period?
  • Can a court interfere with an employer's discretionary order of repatriation if it is based on mala fide, personal bias, or discrimination?
  • Does the participation of an officer who prepared an adverse report as chairman of a Departmental Promotion Committee invalidate its recommendations?
  • What is the legal effect of an administrative order passed on the basis of a Single Judge judgment after that judgment has been set aside by a Division Bench?
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• Senate Secretariat through Chairman and another vs Miss Faiqa Abdul2014 PLC (C.S.) 939 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-11-07
  deputationpermanent absorptionrepatriationmala fidebiasdiscriminationvested rightwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the judgment of the Islamabad High Court, which had set aside a repatriation notification and directed the Senate Secretariat to process the respondent's permanent absorption and allow her to resume duties with back benefits. The core legal question concerned whether an employee on deputation possesses a vested right to permanent absorption and whether repatriation orders vitiated by personal mala fide, bias, and discrimination are sustainable in writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that while absorption is not a vested right and employers generally possess the authority to repatriate deputationists, administrative discretion cannot be exercised arbitrarily, with personal bias, or on the basis of discrimination. The Court laid down the principle that where an authority exhibits clear personal bias and conflict of interest—such as an officer sitting as chairman of a promotion committee evaluating their own adverse report against an employee—the resulting administrative decision becomes tainted with mala fide and is legally unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether permanent absorption or extension of a deputation period constitutes a vested right of an employee?
  • Can an employer repatriate a deputationist to their parent department before or after the completion of the deputation period?
  • Does a conflict of interest vitiate the recommendations of a Departmental Promotion Committee?
  • Whether writ jurisdiction can be invoked on the grounds of personal mala fide, bias, and discrimination in administrative matters?
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• Secretary, Government of Punjab, Finance Department and 269 others2014 SCMR 1336 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-03-31
  pension restorationcommutation of pensioncivil servantsvested rightspension increasesservice lawdiscriminationconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This common judgment addresses whether retired civil servants of the Government of Punjab are entitled to periodic increases in pension granted during their 15-year commutation period upon the restoration of their full pension. The appellants (Government of Punjab) challenged decisions of the Punjab Service Tribunal and Lahore High Court which had set aside a Finance Department memorandum dated 22-03-2008 that authorized the deduction of such increases. The Supreme Court held that under Section 18 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, and Rule 8.12 of the Punjab Civil Services Pension Rules, 1963, pension is a vested legal right, not a bounty. The court interpreted 'restoration' to mean the re-vesting of the full right to pension, placing the retiree at par with those who never commuted. Consequently, denying increases granted during the commutation period constitutes unlawful discrimination. The court affirmed that restored pension must include all intervening increases to satisfy the requirements of Article 25 of the Constitution, dismissing the government's appeals.

  Read full judgment →
• Secretary, Government Of Punjab Etc. vs Khalid Hussain Hamdani etc.2014 PSC 618 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-02-19
  administrative discretionprocedural fairnessWednesbury testPEEDA Actservice tribunalmajor penaltyinquiry reportproportionality
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the validity of major penalties imposed on civil servants for alleged financial irregularities involving excess payments to contractors. The core legal question is whether a Competent Authority can enhance penalties recommended by an Inquiry Officer based on an ex parte report from a third party without confronting the accused, and whether such administrative discretion satisfies the test of reasonableness. The Supreme Court held that the Competent Authority’s decision was procedurally flawed and unreasonable because it relied on extraneous material not part of the inquiry and failed to provide reasons for disagreeing with the Inquiry Officer’s findings. Consequently, the Court set aside the Service Tribunal's order which had fully exonerated the respondents, and instead reinstated the minor penalties originally recommended by the Inquiry Officer. The Court affirmed that administrative discretion must be exercised reasonably, adhering to the principles of proportionality and procedural fairness, and that any departure from an Inquiry Officer’s findings requires valid, recorded reasons and an opportunity for the accused to respond to new evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Competent Authority enhance a penalty recommended by an Inquiry Officer based on evidence not confronted to the accused?
  • Is an administrative authority required to record reasons when disagreeing with the findings of an Inquiry Officer?
  • Does the doctrine of proportionality apply to the quantum of punishment in service disciplinary matters?
  • Can a court substitute its own finding for that of an administrative authority in disciplinary proceedings?
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• Secretary Sindhi Adbi Board, Jamshoro and another vs Mirza Dabeer2014 SCMR 652 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-12-16
  Sindhi Adbi Boardregularization of serviceconstitutional petitionpowers of Chairmanappointment in BPS-16societies registration
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged the order of the Sindh High Court which allowed the respondent's constitutional petition and directed that he be paid a salary in BPS-16. The respondent was initially appointed on contract as a Calligrapher in BPS-16 by the Sindhi Adbi Board, registered under the Societies Registration Act XI of 1860, and his services were later regularized in BPS-9. Upon the respondent's representation, the Minister for Education/Chairman of the Board ordered his appointment/regularization in BPS-16. The core legal question was whether the Chairman/Minister had the authority under the Board's constitution to make such an appointment or regularization. The Supreme Court held that under the constitution of the Board, power to make appointments and regularizations is vested in the Board itself comprising multiple members, and the Chairman/Minister lacks independent authority to make such appointments. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment, ruling that the Chairman's order was without lawful authority, while directing the Board to examine the respondent's grievance regarding his appointment in BS-9.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Chairman of the Sindhi Adbi Board has the authority to independently appoint or regularize employees in BPS-16?
  • Does the power to make appointments and regularizations vest in the Board as a whole under its constitution?
  • Is an appointment order passed by the Chairman without statutory backing considered to be without lawful authority?
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• Sarwar, etc. vs The State2014 PSC (Crl.) 738 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  private complaintsummonspre-arrest bailbond for appearanceCode of Criminal Procedurejudicial restraintprocess issuance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter addresses the legal controversy regarding the procedure applicable when an accused person is summoned by a trial court in a private complaint case. The core question was whether such an accused must apply for pre-arrest bail under Section 498, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, or if they are merely required to furnish a bond under Section 91, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, for their future appearance. The Supreme Court held that the previous judgments in Noor Nabi and Luqman Ali were rendered per incuriam for ignoring earlier binding precedents. The Court ruled that when a court issues a summons under Section 204, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the accused is not under restraint and should be directed to execute a bond under Section 91. The Court clarified that "sufficient grounds for proceeding" under Section 204 cannot be equated with "reasonable grounds for believing" guilt under Section 497. If an accused fails to furnish the bond, they may be committed to custody until compliance. If a warrant is issued, the accused may seek bail, but Section 91 remains the primary mechanism for securing appearance in summons cases.

  Questions settled

  • Does the issuance of a summons under Section 204, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, automatically place an accused person under restraint requiring pre-arrest bail?
  • Can a court require an accused person summoned under Section 204, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, to execute a bond under Section 91, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, instead of applying for bail?
  • Is the opinion of a court that there are "sufficient grounds for proceeding" under Section 204, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, equivalent to the "reasonable grounds for believing" an accused is guilty under Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What is the legal consequence if an accused person fails to furnish a bond under Section 91, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, after being summoned?
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• Sarwar and others, Iftikhar Ahmed, Nadeem Khan, Shaukat Ali, Mukhtiar Hussain vs The State and others, Allah Ditta and others2014 SCMR 1762 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-10-03
  private complaintsummonswarrantbailpre-arrest bailbond for appearancecustodyrestraintCode of Criminal Procedureper incuriam
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan resolved a long-standing legal controversy concerning the procedure for an accused person summoned by a trial court in a private complaint under Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The core legal question was whether such a person is required to apply for pre-arrest bail under Section 498 Cr.P.C. or merely furnish a bond for appearance under Section 91 Cr.P.C. The Court held that the law enunciated in Mazhar Hussain Shah v. The State, upheld in Reham Dad v. Syed Mazhar Hussain Shah, and Syed Muhammad Firdaus v. The State, was correct. It declared the contrary view expressed in Noor Nabi and 3 others v. The State and Luqman Ali v. Hazaro and another as incorrect and per incuriam. The Court clarified that the 'sufficient ground' for proceeding under Section 204 Cr.P.C. is distinct from 'reasonable grounds' for believing guilt under Section 497 Cr.P.C. When summons are issued, the intention is not to impose restraint, and the accused should execute a bond under Section 91 Cr.P.C. for future appearance. However, if a warrant (bailable or non-bailable) is issued, implying restraint, the accused may apply for pre-arrest bail, though the court may still opt for a bond under Section 91 Cr.P.C. to secure attendance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person summoned by a trial court in a private complaint under Section 204 Cr.P.C. is required to apply for pre-arrest bail under Section 498 Cr.P.C. or merely furnish a bond under Section 91 Cr.P.C.?
  • Can an opinion of a court about 'sufficient ground' for proceeding under Section 204 Cr.P.C. be equated with 'reasonable grounds' for believing guilt under Section 497 Cr.P.C.?
  • Does the issuance of summons for appearance under Section 204 Cr.P.C. amount to an arrest or create an apprehension of arrest, thereby making bail relevant?
  • What is the appropriate procedure when an accused person appears before a court in response to summons issued under Section 204 Cr.P.C.?
  • What is the distinction between 'bail' and 'bond' in the context of securing an accused person's appearance in court?
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• Sarosh Haider vs Muhammad Javed Chundrigar and others2014 PLD Supreme Court 338 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-12-20
  senioritycivil servicelocus poenitentiaeaudi alteram partemestoppellachesvoidable orderpast and closed transaction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a High Court order directing the implementation of a Chief Secretary's decision to grant seniority to Respondent No. 1 over the appellant. Both parties were appointed on the same date in 1986. Although Respondent No. 1 had higher merit marks, the appellant was consistently placed higher in seniority lists for fourteen years, during which Respondent No. 1 failed to challenge the status quo. The core legal questions involved the application of Rule 11 of the Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1975, the principle of locus poenitentiae, and the effect of laches. The Supreme Court held that while merit usually determines seniority for same-day appointees, the respondent's long-term acquiescence created a vested right for the appellant. The Court ruled that the Chief Secretary's order violated the principle of audi alteram partem and that the respondent was barred by the principle of estoppel and the doctrine of past and closed transactions. Consequently, the High Court's order was set aside.

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• Sarfraz Saleem vs Federation of Pakistan, etc.2014 PSC 786 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-01-16
  Service TribunalJurisdictional barWrit jurisdictionArticle 199Article 212Due processAdministrative tribunalNon-functional tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the scope of the jurisdictional bar under Article 212(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 regarding service matters. The petitioner challenged the dismissal of their writ petition, which the High Court had rejected citing the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Service Tribunal (FST). The core legal question was whether the constitutional bar on High Court jurisdiction under Article 212(2) operates when the FST is non-functional due to the non-appointment of its Chairman. The Supreme Court held that the bar of jurisdiction under Article 212(2) is contingent upon the actual establishment and functionality of the relevant Administrative Tribunal. Since the FST was non-functional, the bar did not apply, and the High Court could exercise its jurisdiction under Article 199 to prevent a legal vacuum. The Court affirmed that "establishment" implies physical existence and the capacity to adjudicate, not merely legislative creation. This ensures compliance with the fundamental rights to due process and fair trial under Articles 4 and 10-A of the Constitution, upholding the principle ubi jus ibi remedium.

  Questions settled

  • Does the bar of jurisdiction under Article 212(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 apply when the relevant Administrative Tribunal is non-functional?
  • What is the legal meaning of 'establishment' of an Administrative Tribunal for the purpose of invoking the bar of jurisdiction under Article 212(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can a High Court exercise jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 in service matters when the Federal Service Tribunal is not functional?
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• Sarfraz Saleem vs Federation of Pakistan and others2014 PLC (C.S.) 884, 2014 PSC 786, 2014 PLD Supreme Court 232 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-01-16
  Federal Service Tribunalbar of jurisdictionwrit jurisdictioncivil servicenon-functional tribunaldue processfair trialappointment of Chairman
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a High Court decision dismissing a writ petition on the grounds of a jurisdictional bar under Article 212(2) of the Constitution. The petitioner argued that although his grievance regarding service terms fell within the domain of the Federal Service Tribunal (FST), the tribunal had been non-functional since January 2013 due to the non-appointment of a Chairman. The Supreme Court considered whether the constitutional bar of jurisdiction applies when the relevant administrative tribunal is non-functional. The Court held that the 'establishment' of a tribunal under Article 212(2) requires its physical existence and operational functionality, not merely its existence on paper. Relying on the principle of 'ubi jus ibi remedium' and the fundamental rights to fair trial and due process under Articles 4 and 10-A, the Court ruled that a litigant cannot be left in a legal vacuum. Consequently, the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 199 remains available when the FST is non-functional. The Court set aside the impugned orders and directed the Federal Government to appoint a Chairman within 30 days.

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• Sardar Muhammad Israr Tareen vs Sardar M. Yaqoob Khan Nasar and Others'2014 NLR Civil 120 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-03-27
  election petitioncorrupt practicesillegal practicesriggingdisqualificationdirect evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the Election Tribunal which had declared the respondent as the successful candidate for NA-263 and held the appellant guilty of corrupt and illegal practices due to rigging. Although the tenure of the National Assembly had expired, the appellant challenged the findings on issues of rigging and corrupt practices, as they disqualified him from contesting future elections under Section 99(1A)(e) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976. The Supreme Court of Pakistan considered whether a candidate can be held guilty of corrupt and illegal practices based on presumption rather than direct evidence. The Court held that under Section 68(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, there must be direct evidence linking the candidate to the corrupt practices. Since no such direct evidence existed and the respondent's counsel conceded the point, the Court partly allowed the appeal and set aside the findings holding the appellant guilty of corrupt and illegal practices.

  Questions settled

  • Can a candidate be held guilty of corrupt and illegal practices in an election based on presumptions rather than direct evidence?
  • Does a finding of corrupt practices by an Election Tribunal require direct evidence of the candidate's involvement under Section 68(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976?
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• Sandoz Pak Ltd. vs Government of Pakistan and others2014 SCMR 796, 2014 PTD 1231 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-01-23
  review petitionexcise dutyclassification of goodstax demanderror apparent on the face of the recordappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition was filed against a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which had previously allowed the Government's appeal and set aside a High Court judgment in favor of the petitioner, Sandoz Pak Ltd. The underlying dispute concerned a demand for excise duty on a product manufactured by the petitioner, 'Leucophor', which the authorities sought to classify under Entry 04.03 of the 1st Schedule to the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. The petitioner challenged the demand, arguing it was an afterthought and legally invalid. The core legal question in the review was whether the previous Supreme Court judgment contained an error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference. The Supreme Court, upon review, held that the previous judgment had been rendered after extensive deliberation and consideration of the evidence, including distinguishing the current case from previous precedents regarding similar products like 'Tinopal'. Finding no error floating on the record, the Court dismissed the review petition, affirming that the previous judgment was just and did not require modification.

  Questions settled

  • What is the standard for maintaining a review petition against a judgment of the Supreme Court?
  • Does a failure to consider specific High Court judgments constitute an error apparent on the face of the record justifying review?
  • Can a review petition be used to re-argue the merits of a case already decided by the Supreme Court?
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• Sandoz Pak Ltd. vs Government of Pakistan and others and others2014 SCMR 796 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-01-23
  review petitionexcise dutyproduct classificationtax demanderror apparent on the face of the recordcustoms and excise
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition was filed by Sandoz Pak Ltd. seeking to set aside a Supreme Court judgment that had previously allowed the Government's appeal and reversed a High Court decision in favor of the petitioner. The underlying dispute concerned the classification of a product, 'Leucophor,' under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, and the subsequent demand for excise duty by the Collector (Appeals) and the Central Board of Revenue. The petitioner argued that the Supreme Court's prior judgment failed to consider certain High Court precedents. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the judgment under challenge had been rendered after extensive hearings and careful consideration of the evidence. The Court distinguished the present case from the precedent relied upon by the petitioner, noting that the earlier case involved a different product ('Tinopal') with distinct chemical properties, whereas the laboratory report for 'Leucophor' lacked similar findings. Concluding that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any error apparent on the face of the record, the Court dismissed the review petition with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Does a failure to consider High Court precedents in a Supreme Court judgment constitute an error apparent on the face of the record sufficient to warrant a review?
  • Can a review petition be maintained if the petitioner fails to demonstrate any error apparent on the record in the judgment under review?
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• Salamat Ali alias Chamma vs The State and another2014 PSC (Crl.) 434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-02-26
  professional conductbar councildisciplinary mechanismrule of lawexpeditious justicecode of conduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court regarding circumstances involving professional conduct of advocates and disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Punjab Bar Council. The core legal question concerns whether the disciplinary mechanism and proceedings conducted by the Punjab Bar Council met the required statutory standards and the code of conduct under the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1976, in light of constitutional imperatives for inexpensive and expeditious justice under Article 37(d) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Court held, prima facie, that the disciplinary proceedings appeared to have fallen short of the prescribed standards and adjourned the matter to examine the law and the decision of the Punjab Bar Council Tribunal. The key principle laid down is that the Bar and its members must adhere to their code of conduct and remain subject to the rule of law to ensure effective access to and delivery of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the disciplinary proceedings conducted by the Punjab Bar Council met the standards set out in the code of conduct for advocates?
  • What is the obligation of the Bar and its members in upholding the constitutional imperative of inexpensive and expeditious justice?
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• Salamat Ali alias Chaima vs The State and another2014 PSC (Crl.) 430 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2012-08-31
  post-arrest bailstatutory right to bailconduct of counselobstruction of justicebar council disciplinary proceedingsdelay in trial
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a criminal case arising from F.I.R. No. 417 registered under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, contending that he had acquired a statutory right to bail due to delay in recording evidence under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether an accused person can claim statutory bail when the delay in trial is directly attributable to the deliberate obstruction and improper conduct of the counsel retained by the accused. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner, by retaining the same counsel and failing to disassociate from such conduct, condoned the obstruction, thereby disentitling himself to discretionary relief or statutory bail under the circumstances. The court dismissed the petition and directed disciplinary proceedings against the counsel through the bar council, laying down the principle that the conduct of an accused's counsel in obstructing judicial proceedings can negate claims for discretionary or statutory bail concessions.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused claim statutory bail when trial proceedings are delayed due to the obstructive conduct of the accused's counsel?
  • Whether an accused who retains a counsel with improper conduct before the trial court condones such behavior so as to affect bail adjudication?
  • Does the right to statutory bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 remain absolute when the accused or his representative actively obstructs the progress of the trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Salamat Ali alias Chaama vs The State and another2014 SCMR 743 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2012-08-31
  post-arrest bailstatutory delayconduct of counselobstruction of justicedisciplinary proceedingsbar council
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal seeking post-arrest bail in a criminal case registered under sections 324, 427, 148, 149, and 337-F(vi) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question is whether an accused can claim a statutory right to bail under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the conduct of the accused's retained counsel has deliberately obstructed the trial proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner, having retained the same counsel and condoned such improper conduct, cannot benefit from the statutory delay and is not entitled to discretionary relief. The court dismissed the petition and directed disciplinary proceedings against the counsel through the provincial bar council, emphasizing that an ethical Bar is indispensable to the judicial system under the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused can claim a statutory right to bail when the delay in trial is caused by the obstructionist conduct of the accused's counsel?
  • Can the conduct of a retained counsel be imputed to the accused for the purpose of denying discretionary relief like bail?
  • Does the statutory right to bail under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply unconditionally when trial proceedings are hindered by the defense?
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• Sajjad Hussain Mukhi vs The State and others2014 SCMR 1741 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-08-12
  criminal acquittal appealSection 265-K Cr.P.C.civil disputefamily litigationdelay in F.I.R.property disputeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition challenged an order of the High Court which had dismissed the petitioner's criminal acquittal appeal. The petitioner sought to overturn the trial court's decision to acquit the private respondents under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, alleging he was denied the opportunity to lead further evidence and that the trial court acted in haste. The Supreme Court examined the record and found that the petitioner had been given ample opportunity to produce witnesses but failed to do so. Furthermore, the Court observed that the underlying dispute was essentially a civil property conflict between the petitioner and his family members, characterized by a significant delay in lodging the F.I.R. and the absence of credible evidence supporting the criminal allegations. The Court held that where civil litigation regarding property is pending between parties, a criminal court should refrain from adjudicating the dispute, as such matters fall within the domain of the civil courts. Finding no illegality or perversity in the lower courts' orders, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal court adjudicate a dispute that is already the subject of pending civil litigation between the parties?
  • Does the failure to produce witnesses after being given ample opportunity justify the dismissal of a criminal case under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a significant, unexplained delay in lodging an F.I.R. a relevant factor in assessing the credibility of criminal allegations?
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• Sahib Jan And Other vs Mst. Ayesha Bibi through L.Rs. etc.2014 PSC 813 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-04-04
  inheritanceMuslim personal lawcustomary lawco-sharerlimitationmutationalienation of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil appeals regarding inheritance rights to the estate of a deceased brother, Muhammad Afzal, under Islamic law versus customary law. The core legal questions were whether the plaintiff, Mst. Ayesha, was entitled to her share under Shariat despite long-standing mutations based on custom, and whether the North-West Frontier Province Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1935, was effective at the time of the brother's death. The Court held that the Act 1935 became operative upon the Governor General's assent on December 5, 1935, which preceded the brother's death on December 10, 1935, thereby abolishing customary inheritance. The Court ruled that the plaintiff, as a co-sharer, was not barred by limitation as she was wrongfully excluded from her inheritance. The Court modified the High Court's judgment, ruling that the plaintiff is entitled to her 1/3rd share, and that any land alienated by the brother, Muhammad Nawaz, to third parties should be apportioned from his share, preserving the plaintiff's entitlement. The key principle established is that upon the death of a Muslim, legal heirs automatically become co-sharers, and one co-sharer cannot unilaterally deprive another of their rights.

  Questions settled

  • Does the North-West Frontier Province Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1935 become operative upon the Governor General's assent?
  • Can a co-sharer be barred by limitation for failing to challenge a mutation of which they had no knowledge?
  • Should alienations made by a co-sharer be apportioned towards their own share to satisfy the rights of other co-sharers?
  • Does the West Pakistan General Clauses Act 1956 apply retrospectively to enactments promulgated before its commencement?
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• Saeed-Ud-Din And Other vs Hafeez Begum and others2014 PSC 776 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-02-21
  colonization landtenancy rightssuccessionmale lineal descendantsinheritancecolony land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a civil appeal arising from a dispute over the inheritance of agricultural land originally purchased in 1941 under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912. The original tenant died in 1945, prior to the enactment of Section 19-A of the said Act, leaving behind a widow, sons, and daughters. The core legal question was whether succession to the tenancy and subsequent proprietary rights should be governed by Section 20 of the Act—restricting devolution to male lineal descendants—or by Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) pursuant to Section 19-A. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that because the original tenant died before the introduction of Section 19-A in 1951, his tenancy rights were exclusively regulated by Section 20, under which only his sons succeeded to the tenancy. Consequently, the sons paid the remaining instalments and independently acquired full ownership in 1956 in their own right, rather than as legal heirs inheriting under general Shariat law. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the judgments of the High Court and the lower courts, and the plaintiffs' suit was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 19-A of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 apply retrospectively to a Muslim tenant who died before the coming into force of the said amendment?
  • Are female legal heirs entitled to a share in a tenancy and subsequent proprietary rights under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 when the original tenant died prior to 1951?
  • Does the payment of remaining instalments by the sons of a deceased tenant under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 make them full owners in their own right rather than as legal heirs of the original tenant?
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• Sadia Jabbar and 3 others vs Federation of Pakistanand othersPTCL 2014 CL. 586 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2012-01-24
  customs valuationleave to appealdetermination of valuelimitation periodconjectural apprehension
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the judgment dated 28-2-2011 of the High Court of Sindh Karachi arising out of Customs valuation matters. The core legal question pertained to whether resort to section 25A of the Customs Act was uncalled for when section 25 exhaustively prescribes modes for valuation, and whether section 18 was overstretched. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that no adverse decision was passed against the petitioners as the case was merely remanded to the department for a fresh determination of value, which did not prejudice them, and that the petitioners' apprehensions were conjectural. Furthermore, the petitions were barred by limitation by four days without a plausible explanation. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions for leave to appeal, affirming that the impugned judgment did not violate the provisions of the Customs Act.

  Questions settled

  • Whether resort to section 25A of the Customs Act is uncalled for when section 25 exhaustively prescribes modes for determination of value?
  • Can a petition be entertained when it is barred by limitation and no plausible explanation is offered?
  • Does an order remanding a case back to the department for fresh determination of value cause a legally cognizable grievance to the petitioner?
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• Sabir HUSSAIN/Petitioner vs The State2014 SCMR 794 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-01-30
  jail petitionmurder trialconviction on motiveacquittalco-convict paritycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal miscellaneous application and a jail petition seeking relief for the petitioner Sabir Hussain, whose jail petition was inadvertently omitted from being considered alongside his co-convict Faqir Hussain due to an office error. The core legal question is whether the petitioner is entitled to acquittal on the same grounds as his co-convict whose conviction was earlier set aside by the court. The Supreme Court held that since the case against the petitioner was based solely on motive, which stands on an even better footing than the acquitted co-convict's case of no evidence, the petitioner cannot be convicted exclusively on such basis. The court allowed the petition, converted it into an appeal, set aside the convictions and sentences, and ordered the immediate release of the petitioner. The key principle laid down is that no accused person can be convicted on a charge of murder exclusively on the basis of an alleged motive.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused person be convicted of murder exclusively on the basis of a motive alleged against him?
  • Whether a co-convict is entitled to acquittal on the same grounds when the case against him is on an even better footing than an already acquitted co-accused?
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• Sabir Hussain vs The State2014 PSC (Crl.) 440 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-01-30
  jail petitionacquittalconviction on motiveco-convictno evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a Jail Petition filed by the petitioner, Sabir Hussain, whose case was inadvertently omitted from a previous appeal filed by his co-convict, Faqir Hussain. The Supreme Court had previously acquitted Faqir Hussain on 17.11.2011, finding the prosecution's case against him—based solely on motive and alleged absconsion—to be a case of 'no evidence.' Upon discovering the administrative error that excluded Sabir Hussain from the earlier proceedings, the Court reviewed his case. The Court found that the evidence against Sabir Hussain was even weaker than that against the acquitted co-convict, as it relied exclusively on an alleged motive. The Court held that an accused cannot be convicted of murder solely on the basis of a motive. Consequently, the Court allowed the petition, converted it into an appeal, set aside the convictions and sentences recorded by the lower courts, and acquitted the petitioner, ordering his immediate release unless required in other cases.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused person be convicted of murder exclusively on the basis of a motive?
  • Does the acquittal of a co-convict on the basis of 'no evidence' provide grounds for the acquittal of another accused whose case is on a better footing?
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• Saadullah and others vs Mst. Gulbanda and others2014 SCMR 1205 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-04-09
  inheritanceMuhammadan LawSunni Lawresiduariesdoctrine of returnRaddconsanguine brotherlegal heirsmutation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute regarding the inheritance of the estate of Badshah Mir, who died issueless. The deceased left behind a mother, three real sisters, and a consanguine brother. Under the initial revenue mutation, the mother was allotted 1/6th share, the three sisters 2/3rd share, and the consanguine brother 1/6th share as a residuary. The real sisters challenged this, claiming the remaining 1/6th share should devolve upon them. The core legal question was whether, under Sunni Law, real sisters exclude a consanguine brother from inheriting as residuaries. The Supreme Court, referencing Verse 176 of Surah An-Nisa and the Table of Residuaries in Mulla’s 'Principles of Mahomedan Law', held that real sisters (positioned at serial No. 6) are nearer in degree than a consanguine brother (positioned at serial No. 7). Consequently, the sisters inherit their fixed shares as 'sharers' and the remainder as 'residuaries' through the doctrine of return (Radd), thereby excluding the consanguine brother entirely. The appeal was dismissed.

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• S. Masood Abbas Rizvi vs Federation of Pakistan2014 PLC (C.S.) 1077 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-02-27
  deputationrepatriationvested rightcivil servantconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arises from an order of the Sindh High Court dismissing the petitioner's constitutional challenge against his repatriation from deputation. The petitioner, an officer of the Pakistan Audit and Accounts Service, was posted on deputation as Director (Finance) in the Export Processing Zone Authority before being repatriated to his parent department by the Establishment Division. The core legal question is whether a civil servant on deputation has a vested right to complete a stipulated deputation period and whether the competent authority is required to assign reasons for premature repatriation. The Supreme Court held that a deputationist has no vested right to remain on deputation for any stipulated period and can be repatriated to their parent department at any time without assigning reasons. The Court laid down the principle that deputationists do not acquire a vested right to a deputation post, and under Section 2(b)(i) of the Civil Servants Act 1973, such persons lose their status as civil servants during the deputation period.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant on deputation have a vested right to remain on the deputation post for a stipulated period?
  • Is the competent authority required to assign reasons when repatriating a deputationist to their parent department?
  • What is the status of a civil servant under the Civil Servants Act 1973 during the period they are on deputation?
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• S. Masood Abbas Rizvi vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary2014 PLC (C.S.) 1077, 2014 SCMR 799 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-02-27
  RepatriationDeputationVested rightCivil servantParent departmentConstitutional petitionSupreme CourtService matterRepatriation without reasons
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition challenged an order of the Sindh High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition against his repatriation from deputation. The petitioner, an officer of the Pakistan Audit and Accounts Service, was repatriated from his deputation post as Director (Finance) in BS-20 at the Export Processing Zone Authority to his parent department without reasons being assigned. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a deputationist possesses a vested right to remain on a deputation post for a stipulated period and if the parent department is legally obligated to provide reasons for repatriation. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the High Court's decision. It held that a deputationist has no vested right to continue on a deputation post and can be repatriated to their parent department at any time without assigning reasons. The Court emphasized that the parent department is competent to issue such repatriation orders, and in terms of Section 2(b)(i) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, a person on deputation may even lose their status as a "Civil Servant" during that period.

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• Rustam vs Aurangzeb and others2014 SCMR 146 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-08-29
  leave to appealpre-emptionShafi-Shureekco-sharerwritten statementstatus quoN.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act 1987
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning a suit for pre-emption. The petitioner contended that he was a Shafi-Shureek (co-sharer) in the suit land, pointing to evidence (Exh.P.W.3/1) produced by the respondents themselves, which had been overlooked by all three lower courts. Relying on precedent and Section 20 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act 1987, the petitioner argued that the court is competent to take notice of a co-ownership plea and decide the case on its merits even if such plea was not explicitly raised in the written statement. The Supreme Court found that the contention raised by the petitioner warranted consideration. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and ordered the parties to maintain status quo pending the proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can the court take notice of a plea of being a co-sharer in suit land under Section 20 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act 1987 if it was not raised in the written statement?
  • Should leave to appeal be granted when lower courts overlook evidence establishing a party's status as Shafi-Shureek in a pre-emption suit?
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• Roohul Amin and another vs The State and others2014 SCMR 348 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2012-12-06
  ocular testimonymurder convictioncriminal appealappreciation of evidencesentence enhancementwitness credibilityreasonable doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court upholding the conviction of the appellant for the murder of the deceased. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt based on the ocular testimony provided, and whether the sentence warranted enhancement. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution’s case was proved beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found that the ocular testimony of the prosecution witnesses was consistent, confidence-inspiring, and remained unshattered despite rigorous cross-examination. The Court determined that minor discrepancies regarding the time of the report, the timing of the post-mortem, and the number of recovered empties versus injuries did not undermine the veracity of the witnesses. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the identification of the assailant was reliable given the familiarity between the parties and the lighting conditions. Consequently, the conviction and the sentence of life imprisonment were maintained, and the complainant's petition for enhancement of the sentence was dismissed as meritless and time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Does the relationship of prosecution witnesses to the deceased automatically render their testimony incredible?
  • Do minor discrepancies in the timing of an FIR and post-mortem examination invalidate the prosecution's case?
  • Can a conviction be maintained when the number of recovered crime scene empties does not match the number of injuries sustained by the deceased?
  • Is the identification of an assailant reliable when the occurrence takes place during twilight?
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• Riaz Mian and another vs The State2014 SCMR 1165 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-11-12
  narcotics recoveryControl of Narcotic Substances Actconscious possessionbus driver liabilityjoint possessionacquittalcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal appeals arose from the conviction and life imprisonment sentences handed down to the appellants (a driver, co-driver, and conductor) under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, by the Special Judge (CNS), Hyderabad, as affirmed by the High Court of Sindh. An ANF raid on a bus led to the recovery of 420 kg of chars and 17 kg of opium from iron boxes and gunny bags located on the bus roof. The core legal question was whether the bus crew could be held jointly liable or fixed with conscious knowledge/possession of narcotics solely because the illegal contraband was being transported on the vehicle. The Supreme Court observed that the principal accused and owner of the bus explicitly claimed sole ownership of the baggage, produced the keys, and pointed out the boxes, with no evidence connecting the crew or establishing their knowledge or connivance. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the convictions, and acquitted the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Can a bus driver, co-driver, or conductor be held liable for joint possession of narcotics found on a bus roof without proof of conscious knowledge or connivance?
  • Whether the recovery of contraband from baggage owned, identified, and unlocked solely by a passenger/owner exonerates the bus crew from criminal liability?
  • Is mere presence on a vehicle carrying concealed narcotics sufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
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• Rehmatullah Khan through LRs vs Superintendent, Customs and others2014 SCMR 1203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-01-22
  civil appealcontract enforcementrecovery of moneyinternal correspondencebinding agreementburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit for recovery of money filed by the appellants, which was initially decreed by the trial court but subsequently dismissed by the High Court in appeal. The core legal question was whether an enforceable agreement existed between the appellants and the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) regarding the hiring of a site, given the absence of a signed contract. The appellants relied on internal departmental correspondence and alleged oral directions from Customs officials to support their claim of a binding agreement and subsequent construction work. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that internal departmental correspondence does not constitute a binding contract and that the appellants failed to establish the existence of a signed agreement. The Court affirmed the principle that parties bear the burden of ensuring a formal, signed agreement is in place before undertaking construction or modifications on property, and that internal departmental solicitations for advice do not create legal obligations toward third parties. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does internal departmental correspondence regarding the solicitation of advice constitute a binding contract with a third party?
  • Is a party entitled to recover costs for construction or modifications made on property in the absence of a signed lease agreement?
  • Can oral directions from departmental officials create a binding contractual obligation in the absence of a formal signed agreement?
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• Rehmat Ali through Legal Representatives vs Muhammad Younis and others2014 NLR Civil 457, 2014 PLD Supreme Court 680 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-04-09
  pre-emptioninterregnum suitsZaroorat and ZararTalb-i-Ishhadsaving clauseIslamic injunctionsFederal Shariat Courtstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Court arose from pre-emption litigation originating in 1987 during the interregnum period following the striking down of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. The core legal questions involved the proper interpretation and interplay between section 35 and section 6(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, specifically whether pending and interregnum pre-emption suits saved and revived under section 35(1) were exempted from pleading and proving 'Zaroorat' and 'Zarar' under section 6(2), and the effect of the Federal Shariat Court's judgment declaring section 6(2) repugnant to Islam. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while section 35(2) dispensed with certain requirements like written notices for Talb-i-Ishhad and extended limitation for interregnum suits, it did not exempt pre-emptors from fulfilling the mandatory requirements of section 6(2) regarding Zaroorat and Zarar, which remained valid law until December 31, 1993. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that a pre-emptor must possess and maintain the right of pre-emption throughout the proceedings up to the date of the decree.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the saving and revival provisions of section 35 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 exempt a pre-emptor from pleading and proving Zaroorat and Zarar under section 6(2)?
  • Do the relaxations provided under section 35(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 regarding Talb-i-Ishhad and limitation extend to dispensing with the substantive requirements of section 6(2)?
  • At what stages of the proceedings must a pre-emptor possess and maintain the right of pre-emption under the law?
  • What is the legal effect of section 35(1) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 on pre-emption suits filed during the interregnum period?
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• Rehmat Ali (Deceased) through Legal Representatives vs Muhammad2014 NLR Civil 457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-04-09
  right of pre-emptioninterregnum suitZaroorat and ZararTalb-i-Ishhadsaving clausePunjab Pre-emption Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a pre-emption suit filed on 8.3.1987 during the interregnum period, which was initially decreed by the trial court on 16.7.1991. The first appellate court subsequently dismissed the suit on the grounds that Talb-i-Ishhad was not validly made and the pre-emptor failed to plead and prove Zaroorat and Zarar under Section 6(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991. The Lahore High Court upheld the dismissal regarding Zaroorat and Zarar. The core legal question was whether Section 35 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991 dispensed with the requirement of pleading and proving Zaroorat and Zarar under Section 6(2) for suits filed during the interregnum. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while Section 35(2) dispensed with certain requirements like formal notices of Talb-i-Ishhad and strict limitation periods, it did not exempt pre-emptors from proving Zaroorat and Zarar as mandated by Section 6(2). The ratio is that pending pre-emption suits saved and revived under Section 35 remain fully subject to the substantive qualification requirements of Section 6(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 35 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991 dispenses with the requirement of proving Zaroorat and Zarar under Section 6(2) for pre-emption suits filed during the interregnum?
  • Does Section 35(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991 exempt a pre-emptor from establishing Talb-i-Ishhad in pending or revived suits?
  • What is the legal effect of Section 35(1) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991 on pre-emption suits instituted during the interregnum period between 1986 and 1990?
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• Regarding Enormous Increase in the Price of Flour_ In the matter of vs Not2014 SCMR 329 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-12-02
  price hikeflour pricesfood securityprofiteering and hoardingfundamental rightsconstitutional petitionbasic necessities
  Summary & questions settled

  These proceedings were initiated upon a letter addressed to the Chief Justice of Pakistan regarding the enormous increase in the price of flour and wheat in the country, which was registered as a constitution petition. The core legal question concerned the failure of federal and provincial authorities to curb unprecedented price hikes, hoarding, and profiteering of essential food commodities, thereby failing to ensure the availability of flour at affordable rates to the general public. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that both federal and provincial governments are duty-bound under the relevant statutory provisions and the Constitution to control prices, ensure food security, and curb profiteering. The Court laid down the key principle that under Article 38 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, it is the primary responsibility of the State to secure the well-being of the people by providing basic necessities of life, including food, and that provincial governments must strictly enforce price control mechanisms under the Price Control and Prevention of Profiteering and Hoarding Act 1977 and the Foodstuffs (Control) Act 1958 to alleviate public hardship.

  Questions settled

  • Is it the responsibility of the State under Article 38 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan to provide basic necessities like food to citizens?
  • Do provincial governments have the duty to control prices of foodstuffs under the Foodstuffs (Control) Act, 1958?
  • What are the statutory obligations of federal and provincial authorities regarding the prevention of profiteering and hoarding under the Price Control and Prevention of Profiteering and Hoarding Act, 1977?
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• Raja vs Tanveer Riaz and others2014 PLD Supreme Court 466 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-03-06
  pre-emption suitzar-e-soemcomputation of timestatutory interpretationlimitation periodGeneral Clauses Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the appellant was ordered by the Trial Court to deposit the zar-e-soem (one-third of the sale price) within thirty days. The central legal question was whether the day on which the court passes the order for such deposit should be included or excluded when calculating the thirty-day statutory period prescribed under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991. The lower courts had dismissed the suit, holding that the deposit was made one day late by including the date of the order in the calculation. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the day on which the order is passed must be excluded when computing the thirty-day period. Relying on Section 8 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956, the Court affirmed that the first day of a series of days is excluded. Consequently, the deposit made by the appellant was found to be within the stipulated time. The Court set aside the impugned judgments and remanded the matter to the Trial Court for proceedings in accordance with law.

  Questions settled

  • Should the day on which a court passes an order for the deposit of zar-e-soem be included in the thirty-day period prescribed by the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991?
  • How does Section 8 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956, affect the computation of time for court-ordered deposits?
  • Does the word 'of' in the proviso to Section 24(1) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, signify that the thirty-day period for deposit begins after the date of the filing of the suit?
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• Raja Raii Nawaz vs Federation of Pakistan and Others2014 NLR Civil 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-11-05
  local government electionscantonment boardsconstitutional mandatecontempt of courtdevolution of powerfundamental rightsgood governance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the failure of the Federal Government to hold local government elections in Cantonment Boards and the Islamabad Capital Territory, as mandated by the Constitution. The core legal question was whether the Federal Government could delay these constitutional obligations by citing pending legislative amendments to existing laws. The Court held that constitutional mandates for local government elections cannot be subordinated to the government's legislative agenda or administrative convenience. Consequently, the Court issued a notice of contempt to the Secretary of Defence for failing to fulfill prior commitments to hold elections. The Court directed the government to proceed with elections under existing laws immediately, emphasizing that the devolution of political, administrative, and financial authority to local representatives is a binding constitutional command. The key principle laid down is that the state must ensure non-discriminatory participation in local governance across all federating units, and that constitutional provisions regarding local bodies must be enforced in their letter and spirit without delay.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Federal Government delay constitutional mandates for local government elections by citing pending legislative amendments?
  • Does the failure to comply with a court-ordered commitment to hold elections warrant a notice of contempt against the Secretary of Defence?
  • Are citizens residing in Cantonment Boards entitled to the same local government representation as citizens in non-Cantonment areas?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to enforce the holding of local government elections under existing laws when the executive fails to act?
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