Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Mst. Farhat Jabeen vs Muhammad Safdar and others2011 SCMR 1073 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-03-22
  dowerHaq-MahrNikahnamaconcurrent findingsnon-reading of evidenceconstitutional petitionremandfamily suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a family dispute where the appellant claimed two properties, including a shop, as dower (Haq-Mahr) gifted by her father-in-law at the time of marriage. While the trial court and the first appellate court concurrently decreed in favor of the appellant, the High Court, exercising constitutional jurisdiction, set aside the decree regarding the shop, finding it was not part of the dower. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court could interfere with concurrent findings of fact without considering the entire evidence on record. The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed a serious illegality by only considering the respondents' evidence while ignoring the appellant's evidence that had prevailed in the lower courts. The Court reiterated that interference in concurrent findings of fact is restricted to cases of mis-reading or non-reading of material evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case for a fresh decision based on a comprehensive review of the evidence from both sides.

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• Mst. Bibi Ghazala vs Member, Bor Punjab, Lahore and others2011 SCMR 749 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-07-07
  pre-emptionexchange deedLand Reforms Regulationsrevisional jurisdictionreview petitionsubstantive rightdisguised sale
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a pre-emption suit wherein the appellant’s registered exchange deed was challenged as a disguised sale to defeat a tenant's right of pre-emption. The core legal questions were whether the transaction constituted a sale subject to pre-emption and whether the Member Board of Revenue (MBR) possessed the authority to review its own order under the Land Reforms Regulations, 1972. The Supreme Court held that the transaction was a genuine exchange, as the pre-emptor failed to prove the payment of consideration, which is a sine qua non for establishing a sale. Regarding the procedural issue, the Court held that the MBR lacked the jurisdiction to review its order because the Land Reforms Regulations, 1972, contain no provision for review. The Court affirmed that review is a substantive right that must be explicitly granted by statute and cannot be implied. Consequently, the Court set aside the review order and the High Court’s affirmation, restoring the MBR’s original order dismissing the pre-emption suit, establishing that special statutory regimes with inbuilt procedures exclude general review powers.

  Questions settled

  • Is a genuine exchange of land a permissible device to avoid a pre-emption suit?
  • Does the Land Reforms Regulations, 1972, provide a statutory right of review for orders passed by the Member Board of Revenue?
  • Is payment of cash consideration a necessary condition to establish a sale in a pre-emption dispute?
  • Can the power of review be exercised in the absence of an explicit statutory provision?
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• Mst. Banori vs Jilani (deceased) through Legal Heirs etc_2011 PLJ SC 895 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  revisional jurisdictionlimitation periodSection 115 CPCstatutory interpretationprocedural delayduty of subordinate courtscopy of judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the interpretation of the 90-day limitation period for filing a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question was whether the statutory obligation of a subordinate court to provide a copy of the decision within three days impacts the calculation of the limitation period. The Supreme Court held that Section 115 CPC, as amended, constitutes a complete code for invoking revisional jurisdiction. The Court ruled that the legislative command requiring subordinate courts to supply copies of decisions within three days is mandatory and not mere surplusage. Consequently, where a subordinate court fails to provide the copy within the prescribed timeframe, the time taken by the court to supply the copy must be excluded from the 90-day limitation period. The Court set aside the High Court's dismissal of the revision petition, emphasizing that courts must give effect to all statutory provisions and that no litigant should suffer due to a court's failure to perform its legal duty.

  Questions settled

  • Does the 90-day limitation period for filing a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 include the time taken by a subordinate court to provide a copy of the decision?
  • Is the statutory requirement for a subordinate court to provide a copy of a decision within three days mandatory?
  • Can a party be penalized for a delay in filing a revision petition if the subordinate court fails to provide a copy of the decision within the prescribed three-day period?
  • Does Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 constitute a complete code regarding the exercise of revisional jurisdiction?
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• Mst. Aziz Latif and others vs Lahore Development Authority through D.-2011 SCMR 1494 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-06-28
  civil review petitionallotment of plotsconstitutional petitionLahore Development Authorityconversion of petition into appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from civil review petitions filed against a previous order of the Supreme Court dated 28-4-2009, which had set aside the judgment of the High Court that had allowed constitutional petitions filed by the petitioners. The core legal question concerned whether this Court, in its previous order, had failed to consider the report submitted by a committee headed by the Chairman Lahore Development Authority regarding the allotment status of the petitioners and the availability of alternate land. Upon court query, the learned counsel for the respondent Lahore Development Authority stated he had no objection to the acceptance of the review petitions provided the underlying petitions were converted into appeals and fixed for an early hearing. The Court held that, in view of the fair stance taken by the respondent, the review petitions should be allowed. The key principle laid down is that review petitions may be accepted and prior orders set aside with the consent of parties to convert pending petitions into appeals for a full hearing on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil review petition can be accepted when the respondent has no objection subject to the conversion of petitions into appeals?
  • Can an order of the Supreme Court be reviewed to correct an omission regarding the consideration of a material committee report?
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• Mst. Asia Bibi vs Dr. Asif Ali Khan, etc.2011 PLJ SC 834 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-05-26
  Benami transactionostensible ownerproperty disputeburden of proofappreciation of evidencecivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a property dispute over a bungalow in Abbottabad, where the respondent claimed exclusive ownership based on a registered sale deed, while the appellant (his mother) asserted the transaction was Benami. The core legal question was whether the property was purchased by the respondent or by his late father in the respondent's name to avoid taxes. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its appreciation of evidence, specifically regarding the source of funds, possession, and custody of title deeds. The Court found that the respondent failed to substantiate his claim of exclusive ownership, whereas the appellant provided evidence that the purchase money originated from the father’s account and that she retained possession and original documents. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the trial court's decree dismissing the suit. The judgment reaffirms that in Benami disputes, courts must rigorously examine the source of consideration, custody of title documents, and actual possession rather than relying solely on the registered sale deed.

  Questions settled

  • What are the critical factors for determining whether a property transaction is Benami?
  • Does the production of a registered sale deed conclusively prove exclusive ownership in a Benami dispute?
  • Can a court rely on the source of purchase funds to determine the real owner of a property?
  • Is the custody of original title deeds a relevant factor in establishing the nature of a property transaction?
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• Mst. Asia Bibi vs Dr. Asif Ali Khan and others2011 PLD Supreme Court 829 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-04-21
  Benami transactionostensible ownersource of considerationcustody of title deedssuit for declaration and possessionreappraisal of evidencebenamidar
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a suit for declaration, possession, perpetual injunction, and damages filed by Respondent No. 1 concerning a bungalow and plot of land. Respondent No. 1 asserted exclusive ownership based on a registered sale deed executed in his name, whereas the appellant (his mother) contended that the property was purchased by her deceased husband as a Benami transaction using his own funds, with Respondent No. 1 as the ostensible owner to avoid local taxes. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the High Court reversed the decision and decreed in favor of Respondent No. 1. Reevaluating the evidence, the Supreme Court held that the High Court misread the record and improperly applied the established tests for Benami transactions. The Court observed that the consideration came from the father's bank account, title documents were produced from the mother's custody, and she retained continuous possession. Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment and restored the trial court's dismissal of the suit.

  Questions settled

  • What core evidentiary factors determine whether a property transaction is Benami in nature?
  • Does the production of original title deeds from a defendant's custody and proof of continuous possession support a claim of Benami purchase?
  • Can a party established as an ostensible owner on a sale deed claim exclusive title when consideration was paid from another's bank account?
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• Mst. Ammara Waseem vs Syed Khawar Hussain and another2011 SCMR 148 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-10-20
  child custodywelfare of minorhizanatguardian and wardremarriage of motherfather as natural guardian
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of concurrent findings of the lower courts granting the custody of a minor to the father after the mother contracted a second marriage and moved to the United States. The core legal question concerns the welfare of the minor and whether the mother, having remarried and relocated abroad while attempting to take the child along, is entitled to custody over the natural father who remains in Pakistan and is capable of providing care. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal, holding that where a mother contracts a second marriage with a person residing abroad and attempts to remove the child, the welfare of the minor dictates that custody should remain with the natural father rather than the mother in a step-father's household abroad. The key principle laid down is that while the welfare of the minor remains the paramount consideration in all custody matters, a mother who moves abroad following a second marriage generally loses entitlement to custody when the natural father contests the proceedings and is available to provide proper care within the country.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the custody of a minor should be given to the mother who has contracted a second marriage and relocated abroad?
  • Does the welfare of the minor remain the paramount consideration in determining child custody between divorced parents?
  • Is a natural father entitled to the custody of his minor child when he has not remarried and is capable of providing proper care?
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• Ms. Salma Moosajee and another vs Federation of Pakistan and others2011 PLC (C.S.) 196 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-12-04
  leave to appealcivil serviceretrospective notificationlimitationemployment claim
  Summary & questions settled

  These two petitions arose from a common judgment of the High Court of Sindh dated 16-4-2009. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to examine whether the petitioners' claims on merit were rightly rejected by the High Court, despite the effective applicability of the Notification dated 9-8-2002 from 1-7-2002, a period during which the petitioners were admittedly under the employment of the respondents. The grant of leave in one of the petitions (Constitution Petition No. 581-K of 2009) was made subject to the question of limitation, which the Court directed to be examined and decided at the time of the final hearing of the appeals. The Court further directed the preparation of appeal paper books on the basis of the available record and allowed the parties to file additional documents within two months.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a notification dated 9-8-2002 with retrospective effect from 1-7-2002 applies to employees who were in service during that period?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted subject to the question of limitation to be decided at the final hearing?
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• Mrs. Rehmat Jehan vs Government of Punjab through Chief Secretary2011 SCMR 1344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-06-06
  compulsory retirementmisconductde novo inquiryservice tribunalillegal appointmentscivil servantre-evaluation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged the Punjab Service Tribunal's judgment upholding her compulsory retirement from service, which had been modified from her initial dismissal order dated 3-3-2003. The major penalty was imposed following an inquiry into allegations of misconduct, specifically that she made illegal appointments using fake documents and bypassed proper procedures while serving as Director of Education (EE) Multan. The core legal questions involved whether a de novo inquiry was legally barred and whether the charges of misconduct were duly established. The Supreme Court held that the appellant failed to demonstrate she was exonerated in any earlier inquiry or that the competent authority lacked the power to order a de novo inquiry, and further held that making appointments based on forged documents constitutes misconduct under the relevant rules. The Court established that findings of fact by tribunals based on properly appreciated evidence will not be re-evaluated in the absence of gross non-consideration, and that appointing persons through forged documents amounts to misconduct and acts prejudicial to good order and discipline.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a competent authority is barred from ordering a de novo inquiry after an initial inquiry.
  • Does making appointments on the basis of fake and forged documents constitute misconduct under the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules 1975?
  • Can the Supreme Court re-evaluate evidence in service appeals in the absence of gross non-consideration by the tribunal?
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• Mrs. Asma Hassa'n vs Mrs. Kausar H. Hamid and others2011 SCMR 299 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-06-24
  rent casestriking off defencedefault in rentconstitutional petitionrental premisesjudicial integrityappellate discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  Mrs. Kausar H. Hamid filed a rent case against Mrs. Asma Hassa'n, resulting in an order under section 16(1) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 to deposit arrears and future rent. Upon non-compliance, the petitioner's defence was struck off and vacant possession was ordered. The Appellate Court dismissed the tenant's appeal but granted one year to vacate the premises, which was done without notice to the landlady. Both parties filed Constitutional Petitions, and the High Court dismissed the tenant's petition. During the Supreme Court hearing, counsel for the petitioner admitted default in rent payment. The Supreme Court examined the record and noted that the Appellate Court granted time without hearing the landlady, and an inquiry by the District and Sessions Judge had questioned the integrity of the appellate judge. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upheld the impugned judgment, and directed the office to send a copy of the judgment to the Chief Justice of the High Court of Sindh to consider initiating disciplinary proceedings against the concerned judge. The core legal question concerned the legality of granting time to vacate without notice and the consequences of default in rent payment, and the Supreme Court held that such arbitrary extension without hearing is legally unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can grant time to a tenant to vacate premises without providing an opportunity of hearing to the landlord?
  • Does failure to comply with an order to deposit rent under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance justify striking off the tenant's defence?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings and dismissal of a constitutional petition in rent matters where default is admitted?
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• Mrs. Abida Parveen Channa R vs High Court of Sindh2011 PLC (C.S.) 836 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-02-23
  probationer terminationJudicial Magistratetermination simplicitermisconductdiscreet enquiryshow-cause noticereinstatementSindh Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan was directed against the judgment of the Sindh Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal, which upheld the termination of the appellant’s services as a Judicial Magistrate during her probationary period. The primary legal question was whether a probationer’s termination, worded innocuously as termination simpliciter due to unsatisfactory conduct, requires a show-cause notice and inquiry if the decision was effectively motivated by underlying allegations of misconduct. The Supreme Court held that the right to a show-cause notice is not determined solely by the presence of a stigma on the face of the termination order, but rather by whether allegations of misconduct influenced the mind of the competent authority. Finding that serious allegations of misconduct in a discreet inquiry report formed the actual basis of the decision, the Court ruled that definite conclusions cannot be based on discreet inquiries without a fair inquiry and hearing. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the termination order, and directed the appellant's reinstatement.

  Questions settled

  • Can the services of a probationer be terminated on the basis of underlying allegations of misconduct without conducting a regular inquiry or providing an opportunity of being heard?
  • Does the right to a show-cause notice depend solely on whether the termination order visibly contains a stigma or upon whether allegations of misconduct actually motivated the competent authority?
  • Can a competent authority rely on discreet inquiries to reach definite conclusions of misconduct against a judicial officer to terminate their service?
  • Is a Service Tribunal required to examine the entire record behind an ostensibly simple termination order to determine if it is dismissal in the garb of termination simpliciter?
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• Mr. Justice Hasnat Ahmad Khan And Another vs Federation Of Pakistan/StateK.L.R. 2011 Supreme Court 43 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-02-18
  contempt noticejudicial authorityadministration of justiceSupreme Court of Pakistanjudicial dignity
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from appeals filed by Justice Hasnat Ahmed Khan and Justice Syed Shabbar Raza Rizvi before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. During the proceedings, the Court took note of an incident where a High Court judge issued contempt notices against judges of the Supreme Court, an order which was subsequently set aside by the Peshawar High Court on the judicial side. Addressing attempts to undermine the authority of the Supreme Court and its members, the Court considered it necessary to preserve the dignity and respect of the administration of justice. The Supreme Court held that specific named judges from various high courts and the Supreme Court shall not pass any judicial or administrative orders against the members of the bench or other judges of the Supreme Court. The Court laid down the principle that any such order passed by the named judges against Supreme Court judges shall possess no legal or binding effect and shall be treated as non-existent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether orders passed by a judge against members of the Supreme Court possess any legal or binding effect?
  • Can the Supreme Court declare certain orders passed by judges to be non-existent in order to preserve the dignity of the institution?
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• Moula Bux Leghari vs Additional Inspector-General (Aigp)2011 PLC (C.S.) 660 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-06-08
  service matterdate of birth disputejurisdiction of Supreme Courtsubstantial question of lawlimitationcondonation of delaycontroverted questions of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a service matter concerning a dispute over the petitioner's date of birth, which had previously been adjudicated by a service tribunal. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Court should exercise its jurisdiction to re-examine factual determinations made by the lower tribunal. The Supreme Court held that its jurisdiction is strictly limited to addressing substantial questions of law of public importance and does not extend to the determination of controverted questions of fact. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petition. Furthermore, the Court observed that the petition was time-barred and lacked any reasonable explanation to justify the condonation of the delay. The petition was dismissed on both the merits regarding the scope of the Court's jurisdiction and the procedural ground of limitation. The judgment reaffirms the principle that the Supreme Court will not act as a forum for re-evaluating factual findings in service matters unless a substantial question of law of public importance is involved.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to determine controverted questions of fact in service matters?
  • Is the Supreme Court's jurisdiction restricted to substantial questions of law of public importance?
  • Can a petition be dismissed if it is barred by time and lacks a reasonable explanation for delay?
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• Mohim Khan vs The State2011 SCMR 1026 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-10-23
  judicial confessionmurdersentence reductionimprisonment for lifecriminal appealSection 302(b) PPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant, Mohim Khan, for the murder of Abdul Ghafoor. The core legal questions concern the reliability of a judicial confession and the appropriateness of the death penalty in light of the circumstances surrounding the crime. The Supreme Court found that the prosecution case was honest, noting that the complainant initially suspected another individual, and the appellant's implication arose during the investigation. The Court upheld the conviction under Section 302(b), Pakistan Penal Code 1860, relying on a judicial confession recorded under Section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which had been concurrently accepted by the trial and appellate courts. However, the Court determined that the deceased had previously acted improperly by entering the appellant's house armed, which contributed to the motive for the crime. Consequently, the Court held that the extreme penalty of death was not warranted. The death sentence was set aside and substituted with imprisonment for life, with the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, granted to the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Is a judicial confession recorded under Section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 sufficient to sustain a conviction when it has been concurrently accepted by lower courts?
  • Does the existence of a prior improper act by the deceased justify the commutation of a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Is the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to a sentence of imprisonment for life?
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• Mobashir Ahmad vs State2011 PLJ SC 33 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-03-08
  review jurisdictionre-appraisement of evidenceerror apparent on the face of the recordre-hearing of appealcriminal appealscope of review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed by the petitioner, Mobashir Ahmad, seeking to challenge a previous judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan dated April 23, 2009, which had upheld his conviction. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had established sufficient grounds for the review of the earlier appellate judgment. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner merely sought a re-hearing and re-appraisement of evidence already considered during the initial appeal, which does not constitute a valid ground for review. The Court reaffirmed the principle that review jurisdiction is limited and cannot be invoked for re-arguing a case on merits or for re-examining arguments already adjudicated. The Court laid down the principle that a review petition is only competent where there is discovery of new and important evidence that could not have been produced with due diligence, or where there exists an error apparent on the face of the record—defined as a self-evident error of fact or law that does not require elaborate discussion.

  Questions settled

  • Can a review petition be granted for the purpose of re-arguing a case on its merits?
  • What constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record sufficient to warrant a review?
  • Is the discovery of new evidence a necessary condition for maintaining a review petition?
  • Does a desire for the re-hearing of a matter constitute a sufficient ground for the grant of review?
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• Miss Zubaida Khatoon vs Mrs. Tehmina Sajid Sheikh and others2011 PLC (C.S.) 596 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-12-09
  constitutional jurisdictionterms and conditions of servicefitness versus eligibilitypromotionservice tribunalmalafideselection board
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenges the judgment of the High Court whereby a notification promoting the appellant to the post of Principal School of Nursing was set aside and declared to be based on mala fide. The core legal questions involved whether the High Court had jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution in light of Article 212 and Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act to examine the matter, and whether the High Court was legally justified in interfering with the Departmental Promotion Committee's findings regarding fitness for promotion. The Supreme Court held that since the matter pertained to the 'fitness' of a civil servant for promotion rather than 'eligibility', no appeal lay before the Service Tribunal under Section 4(1)(b) of the Service Tribunals Act, and thus the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 was not ousted. The Court further held that while the High Court rightly annulled the promotion notification due to concealment of relevant service records and misleading of the Promotion Committee, it erred in directing promotion directly and should have remanded the matter for a fresh decision. The appeal was partly allowed with a direction to the Promotion Committee to decide the matter de novo.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to entertain a petition against an order of a departmental authority determining the fitness of a civil servant for promotion?
  • Does an appeal lie to a Service Tribunal against an order or decision of a departmental authority determining the fitness or otherwise of a person to be promoted to a higher post or grade under Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act?
  • What is the distinction between eligibility and fitness of a civil servant for the purpose of promotion and jurisdiction of service tribunals?
  • Can the High Court undertake a factual inquiry based on admitted service records to determine if a promotion order was passed in colorable exercise of power or based on concealed records?
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• Miss Asma Ghafoor vs Principal, King Edward Medical College, Lahore and 3 others2011 SCMR 1311 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-01-21
  MBBS examinationacademic disciplineconstitutional petitionexamination chanceseducational institution regulationswrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court, which had challenged the refusal of the King Edward Medical College to allow the appellant to sit for the first professional MBBS examination. The appellant, admitted in the 1999-2000 academic session, had failed to clear the first professional examination despite multiple attempts over several years. The core legal question was whether the appellant was entitled to additional examination chances beyond the limit prescribed by the college regulations. The Supreme Court held that the appellant had exhausted the permissible number of attempts and failed to demonstrate any violation of rules or regulations by the respondent institution. The Court affirmed that a student is obligated to pass the professional examination within the prescribed number of chances. Finding no illegality or infirmity in the High Court's order, which correctly applied established precedents regarding academic discipline and the limitations of constitutional jurisdiction in such matters, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the appellant had no legal entitlement to further examination opportunities.

  Questions settled

  • Is a student entitled to additional examination attempts beyond the limit prescribed by medical college regulations?
  • Can a constitutional petition be maintained when a student fails to demonstrate a violation of institutional rules and regulations?
  • Does the failure to pass a professional examination within the prescribed number of chances justify the refusal of further examination opportunities?
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• Mir Shakeel-Ur-Rehman and others vs Yahya Bakhtiar and others2011 PLJ SC 421 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-11-17
  criminal defamationabatement of complaintretrospective application of lawGeneral Clauses Actnon-cognizable offencepersonal injurylocus standi
  Summary & questions settled

  These consolidated criminal appeals addressed two primary issues: the retrospective application of procedural amendments to pending criminal complaints and the survival of a criminal defamation complaint following the complainant's death. The Court held that amendments to the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, making defamation non-cognizable, do not apply retrospectively to pending complaints, as Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, mandates that pending proceedings continue under the law prevailing at the time of commencement. Regarding the second issue, the Court affirmed that while criminal defamation is an offence against society, it remains a personal injury. Consequently, a complaint abates upon the complainant's death unless the defamatory imputation specifically harms the reputation of survivors or the institution the deceased represented. Finding that the subject libel was person-specific and lacked allegations of harm to the complainant's family or public interest, the Court ruled that the complaints abated upon the complainant's death. The impugned judgments were set aside, and the complaints were declared abated, emphasizing that criminal defamation actions do not automatically survive the complainant's death.

  Questions settled

  • Does a criminal defamation complaint abate upon the death of the complainant?
  • Do procedural amendments to the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, apply retrospectively to criminal complaints pending at the time of the amendment?
  • Can the legal heirs of a deceased complainant be impleaded in a criminal defamation case where the libel was directed solely at the deceased?
  • Under what circumstances does a criminal defamation complaint survive the death of the complainant?
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• Mir Saleem Ahmed Khosa. vs Election Commission of Pakistan and others2011 PLD Supreme Court 310 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-02-23
  election petitionrecount of votesinterim ordersmaintainabilitywrit jurisdictionsecrecy of ballotElection Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two civil petitions filed against interim orders passed by an Election Tribunal in an election dispute regarding constituency PB-27, Jaafarabad-III. The petitioner challenged the Tribunal's orders, which had directed a recount of ballot papers and addressed procedural objections regarding the maintainability of the election petition. The High Court had dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petitions, citing their interlocutory nature and the lack of maintainability under Article 199 of the Constitution. Before the Supreme Court, the core legal question involved the propriety of ordering a recount without first resolving preliminary objections on maintainability and the procedural safeguards required during such a recount. The Supreme Court, noting the prolonged pendency of the election petition, modified the Tribunal's order to ensure strict compliance with the statutory proviso regarding the secrecy of ballots during inspection. The Court held that while the Tribunal has the power to order a recount, it must adhere strictly to the procedural mandates of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, and directed the Tribunal to decide the main election petition, including all pending objections, within a strict timeframe of 30 days.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Election Tribunal have the authority to order a recount of ballot papers under the Representation of the People Act 1976?
  • What procedural safeguards must an Election Tribunal observe when ordering the inspection and recount of counted ballot papers?
  • Are interim orders passed by an Election Tribunal subject to challenge through constitutional petitions under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Mir Sahib Jan vs Janan2011 SCMR 27 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-06-02
  rejection of plaintabuse of processfraudulent litigationremand orderdeclaration suitsale agreementidentity of partiesfrivolous litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute over land ownership and the validity of a sale agreement dated 11-07-2006. The respondent filed a suit for declaration and correction of revenue entries, which the appellant contested as fraudulent, citing previous rounds of litigation where similar documents were declared fake. The trial court (Majlis-e-Shoora) dismissed the suit under Order VII, Rule 11 C.P.C., finding the respondent had misrepresented his identity and that the litigation was an abuse of process. The High Court subsequently remanded the case for a full trial. The Supreme Court, in a split decision, examined whether the plaint could be rejected at the threshold. The majority allowed the appeal, restoring the dismissal and imposing costs, holding that the respondent was engaging in repetitive, fraudulent litigation. However, the dissenting opinion maintained that under Order VII, Rule 11 C.P.C., only the plaint's contents should be considered, and factual controversies regarding identity and fresh causes of action require evidence through trial. The majority ultimately held that courts must take effective measures against obstinate litigants to prevent the abuse of legal processes.

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• Mir Muhammad Idris and others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance and others2011 PLD Supreme Court 213 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-01-14
  constitutional petitionreappointmentnational bank of pakistanmoney billfinance actbanks (nationalization) actunconstitutional amendmentpublic officestatutory interpretationseparation of powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This Constitution Petition challenged the fifth reappointment of Syed Ali Raza as President of the National Bank of Pakistan (NBP) for one year, effective July 1, 2010, arguing that the underlying amendment to the Banks (Nationalization) Act, 1974, was illegal. The core legal question was whether Section 11(3)(d) of the Banks (Nationalization) Act, 1974, which governs the reappointment of the NBP President, could be validly amended by the Finance Act, 2007, a Money Bill. The Supreme Court held that the subject matter of reappointment of the NBP President does not fall within the definition of a Money Bill as enumerated in Article 73(2) of the Constitution. Therefore, the amendment to Section 11(3)(d) of the Act of 1974 by the Finance Act, 2007, was unconstitutional and illegal for lacking the constitutional requirement of approval by both Houses of Parliament. Consequently, the reappointment of respondent No. 3, made under this unconstitutional legislation, was declared unconstitutional, and he was ordered to cease holding office immediately.

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• Mir Muhammad Idris And Another vs Federation Of Pakistan Through Secretary Ministry Of Finance And OtherK.L.R. 2011 Supreme Court 46 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Money BillFinance Actconstitutional petitionstatutory appointmentlegislative competenceBanks (Nationalization) Acttenure of office
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the reappointment of the President of the National Bank of Pakistan, arguing that the underlying legal amendment permitting multiple reappointments was unconstitutional. The core legal question was whether the amendment to Section 11(3)(d) of the Banks (Nationalization) Act, 1974, which allowed for indefinite terms, could be validly enacted through a Finance Act. The Supreme Court held that the amendment did not constitute a Money Bill under Article 73 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, as it did not pertain to fiscal matters defined therein. Consequently, the amendment, having been passed as part of a Finance Act without the bicameral legislative process required for ordinary legislation, was unconstitutional and void. The Court established the principle that legislative amendments affecting the tenure of statutory appointments cannot be surreptitiously introduced through Finance Acts if they do not meet the constitutional criteria for Money Bills. Accordingly, the Court declared the respondent's reappointment illegal and ordered that he cease to hold office with immediate effect.

  Questions settled

  • Can an amendment to a statute governing the tenure of a statutory office be validly enacted through a Finance Act?
  • Does an amendment to the Banks (Nationalization) Act, 1974, regarding the reappointment of the Bank's President fall within the definition of a Money Bill under Article 73 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is an appointment made under an unconstitutional legislative amendment void?
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• Mir Afzal Khan vs The State2011 SCMR 171 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-06-03
  murder convictionocular evidenceabsconsioncorroborative evidencecriminal appealappreciation of evidencesentence modification
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a conviction for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appellant challenged his conviction, arguing that co-accused were acquitted in a previous trial based on the same evidence, that there was no incriminating recovery, and that eye-witness testimony was unreliable. The core legal question was whether the conviction could be sustained despite the acquittal of co-accused and alleged discrepancies in the ocular account. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction. It held that the ocular account provided by the prosecution witnesses was consistent and credible, and that the identity of an eye-witness not explicitly named in the F.I.R. was sufficiently established. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the appellant's long absconsion served as a strong corroborative circumstance of guilt. The Court clarified that while the conviction was sound, the sentence of fine imposed by the lower courts required modification to ensure it was legally tenable, converting it into compensation for the legal heirs of the deceased.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained when co-accused in the same incident were previously acquitted?
  • Does the failure to name an eye-witness in the F.I.R. automatically render their testimony inadmissible?
  • Is long absconsion of an accused a valid corroborative circumstance of guilt?
  • Can the Supreme Court modify the nature of a fine imposed by lower courts in a criminal conviction?
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• Mian Najibuddin Oawaisi vs Aamir Yar and others2011 PLD Supreme Court 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-11-05
  corrupt practiceselection commissionchief election commissionercognizable offenceseducational qualificationscomplaintrepresentation of the people act
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil miscellaneous application was filed by the Election Commission of Pakistan seeking clarification regarding the implementation of previous judgments of the Supreme Court concerning the initiation of criminal proceedings against persons accused of corrupt practices, specifically regarding false declarations of educational qualifications under election laws. The core legal question involved whether the Chief Election Commissioner individually and independently, or the Election Commission, could proceed to implement the judgments and lodge complaints in light of relevant constitutional and statutory provisions. The Supreme Court held, upon examining sections 78(3)(d), 82, 94, and 95 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, that offences relating to corrupt practices are cognizable and that either the Election Commission, the Chief Election Commissioner, or any private individual is legally competent to lodge a complaint before the Sessions Judge. The key principle laid down is that there is no statutory bar precluding either the Commission, the Commissioner, or an individual from initiating a complaint for corrupt practices under the electoral framework.

  Questions settled

  • Who is competent to lodge a complaint regarding corrupt practices under the Representation of the People Act, 1976?
  • Whether an offence of corrupt practice under section 78(3)(d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 is a cognizable offence?
  • Can a private individual lodge a complaint for corrupt practices before a Sessions Judge under the electoral laws?
  • What is the distinction between sections 94 and 95 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 regarding the filing of complaints?
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• Mian Najeeb-Ud-Din Owaisi vs Aamir Yar and 7 others2011 SCMR 180 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-07-02
  election petitionfake degreedisqualificationArticle 62Article 63Representation of the People Act 1976corrupt practiceimpersonation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal under section 67(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 (ROPA) arose from an order of the Election Tribunal dismissing the appellant's election petition on technical grounds of non-verification under section 55(3). The appellant had challenged the election of respondent No. 1 as Member of National Assembly (N.A. 184 Bahawalpur) on grounds of disqualification, alleging that respondent No. 1 relied upon bogus, forged, and cancelled B.A. degrees from multiple universities, made false declarations on oath, and engaged in impersonation. During Supreme Court proceedings, the University of Balochistan confirmed the cancellation of respondent No. 1's degree due to fraud and unfair means, and respondent No. 1 subsequently tendered his resignation. The Supreme Court emphasized that Parliament's sanctity requires strict compliance with Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution. Holding that resigning does not absolve a candidate who improperly entered Parliament through false declarations and bogus documents, the Supreme Court disposed of the appeal by directing the Chief Election Commissioner to initiate appropriate action against respondent No. 1 under section 78 of ROPA 1976.

  Questions settled

  • Does the resignation of a Member of the National Assembly bar proceedings against them for obtaining office using bogus educational degrees?
  • Can a candidate who submits false declarations on oath regarding educational qualifications be subjected to action under section 78 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976?
  • Is an election petition challenging a candidate's qualification under Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution renderable moot by the resignation of the returned candidate?
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• Mian Ghayassuddin and others vs Mst. Hidayatun Nisa and others2011 SCMR 803 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-04-27
  leave to appealgift mutationfraud and misrepresentationconcurrent findingsmisreading of evidenceonus of proofpardanashin ladySection 41 Transfer of Property Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution arose from a suit filed by the respondents seeking declaration of their legal inheritance share in the legacy of their deceased mother and challenging certain gift mutations as fraudulent and ineffective. The trial court and appellate court concurrently decreed the suit, and the High Court dismissed the petitioners' civil revision. The petitioners contended that the findings were based on misreading of evidence and sought protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioners failed to discharge the heavy onus of proving that the elderly and infirm donor acted with free will, consent, and independent advice. Finding concurrent factual determinations based on cogent evidence and no misreading or non-reading, the Supreme Court held that no substantial question of law of public importance was involved and dismissed the petition, refusing leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact where no misreading or non-reading of evidence is demonstrated?
  • Upon whom does the onus of proof lie to establish the validity of a gift mutation alleged to be made by an elderly and infirm person?
  • Can protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 be claimed when underlying gift mutations are proven to be deceptive and fraudulent?
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• Mian Aurangzeb vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry2011 PLC (C.S.) 982 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-02-14
  Service TribunalAd hoc appointmentSeniorityLeave to appealFederal Public Service Commission
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises out of conflicting views taken by Members of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, where two Members dismissed the matter on merits while one Member concluded that the petitioner should be given due seniority. The petitioner was initially appointed on an ad hoc basis in April 1989 and subsequently qualified through the Federal Public Service Commission. The core legal question for consideration is whether the petitioner's long service of more than twelve years should be counted to his credit for seniority purposes. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider this question and examine the conflicting views of the Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the period of service rendered on ad hoc basis should be counted towards seniority when the employee subsequently qualifies through the Federal Public Service Commission?
  • How are conflicting views among Members of the Federal Service Tribunal resolved on appeal before the Supreme Court?
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• Messrs Victor Electronics Appliances Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs Habib2011 SCMR 806 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-02-04
  Banking Court jurisdictionFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) OrdinanceLetters of Creditexclusive jurisdictioncivil suitconcession of law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an appellate judgment that set aside a civil decree in favor of the appellant, Victor Electronics Appliances Industries Pvt. Ltd., due to lack of jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the appellant's suit, which arose from a dispute over a Letter of Credit facility provided by the respondent-Bank, should have been filed in a Banking Court under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, rather than as a civil suit under ordinary law. The Supreme Court upheld the appellate court's decision to set aside the decree, noting that the appellant's counsel had conceded the jurisdictional issue during the appellate proceedings. The Court affirmed that Letters of Credit fall within the definition of 'finance' under the Ordinance, thereby mandating the exclusive jurisdiction of the Banking Court. While acknowledging the general principle that jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, the Court held that where the statutory definition of 'finance' clearly encompasses the subject matter of the dispute, the Banking Court possesses exclusive jurisdiction, and the concession merely acknowledged the existing legal position.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Banking Court have exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving Letters of Credit under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001?
  • Can jurisdiction be conferred upon a court through the concession of counsel?
  • Is a suit regarding a Letter of Credit facility maintainable as a civil suit under ordinary law when it falls under the definition of 'finance' in the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001?
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• Messrs Silk Bank Limited vs Qazi Ehtishamul Haq and others2011 SCMR 1854 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-02-23
  merger of decreejurisdictionsetting aside decreeproper forumbanking courtexecution proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a controversy regarding the appropriate forum for challenging a judgment and decree that had been varied on appeal. The petitioner challenged the judgment of the High Court in First Appeal No. 42 of 2009, which had upheld a Banking Court's order reversing its own judgment and decree, despite the fact that the original decree had already been varied and enhanced by the High Court in First Appeal No. D-39 of 2007. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, as well as under general law, a judgment and decree can only be assailed before the court that passed or last varied it. Once the High Court varied the Banking Court's decree, the lower court's decree merged into the High Court's decree. Consequently, the proper forum for seeking to set aside the decree on grounds of non-service, misrepresentation, or fraud was the High Court, not the Banking Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment, and permitted the respondents to approach the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Which court has the jurisdiction to set aside a judgment and decree under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the lower court's decree has been varied on appeal?
  • Does a lower court's decree merge into the appellate court's decree once the appellate court varies or modifies it?
  • Can a Banking Court entertain an application to set aside a decree that has already been modified and enhanced by the High Court in an appeal?
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• Messrs Sezai Turkes Feyzi Akkaya Construction Company (Stfa) vs Messrs Ekon Yapi Onarim Ticaret Ve Sanayi Ltd and 2 others2011 SCMR 1053 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-07-29
  contractual ouster clauseforum selectionterritorial jurisdictionrejection of plaintcivil revisioncause of actioninternational commercial agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Islamabad High Court, which dismissed a civil revision petition concerning the rejection of a plaint. The dispute involves two Turkish construction companies that entered into an agreement containing a clause designating Istanbul courts as the exclusive forum for dispute resolution. Respondent No. 1 initiated a recovery suit in Islamabad, prompting the petitioner to seek rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, citing the contractual ouster clause. The lower courts dismissed the application, leading to the current proceedings. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the contractual provision effectively ousts the jurisdiction of Pakistani courts, whether the petitioner maintains a sub-office in Islamabad, and whether the cause of action partly accrued within the jurisdiction of the Islamabad courts. The Court is tasked with reconciling the contractual forum selection clause with the statutory provisions governing territorial jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, specifically addressing whether parties can contractually exclude the jurisdiction of competent courts.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contractual clause designating a foreign jurisdiction for dispute resolution effectively oust the jurisdiction of Pakistani courts?
  • Can parties to a contract legally exclude the jurisdiction of a court that would otherwise have territorial jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the maintenance of a sub-office and the accrual of a cause of action within a specific territory establish jurisdiction despite a contrary forum selection clause?
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• Messrs Punjab Sugar Mills vs Government of Punjab and others2011 SCMR 1950 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-06-17
  sugar millsintra court appealexempting notificationleave to appealnon-speaking judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal filed by Messrs Punjab Sugar Mills against the Government of Punjab and others. The core legal questions concern whether the provisions of appeal and revision under section 7 of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963 applied to debar the petitioner company from filing an Intra Court Appeal (ICA) following a notification exempting sugar mills from the Ordinance, whether the petitioner's Intra Court Appeal was incompetent under the proviso to subsection (2) of section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 in the absence of an original order or an order of the specified nature, and whether the impugned judgment was a non-speaking judgment. Upon hearing the petitioner's counsel in detail, the Supreme Court granted leave to consider these questions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of appeal and revision under section 7 of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963 apply to debar a petitioner from filing an Intra Court Appeal after the issuance of a notification exempting sugar mills from the Ordinance?
  • Whether an Intra Court Appeal is incompetent under the proviso to subsection (2) of section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 in the absence of an original order or an order arising from proceedings of the nature stated therein?
  • Whether the impugned judgment suffered from the defect of being a non-speaking judgment?
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• Messrs Pakistan Synthetics Limited vs Waqar Ahmed and others2011 SCMR 11 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-06-10
  termination simpliciterretrenchmentlast come first goreorganizationlabour courtgrievance petitionreinstatement with back benefitsmala fide termination
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil appeals were filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by the appellant company against a consolidated judgment of the Balochistan High Court, which had set aside the Labour Court's decision and ordered the reinstatement of the respondent workers with full back benefits. The appellant had terminated the respondents under Standing Order 12(1) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968, alleging financial losses and reorganization. The respondents challenged their termination, claiming victimization for union activities and arguing that the mandatory principle of 'last come, first go' under Standing Order 13 was violated by retaining junior workers. The core legal questions were whether the action constituted a termination simpliciter or a disguised retrenchment, and whether it adhered to statutory retrenchment procedures. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the termination was a colourable exercise of power and a device to circumvent Standing Order 13. An employer must strictly follow statutory retrenchment procedures in good faith, and senior workers cannot be selectively terminated while retaining juniors.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employer invoke Standing Order 12(1) for termination simpliciter when selectively discharging senior workers while retaining junior workers in the same category?
  • Whether the mandatory principle of 'last come, first go' under Standing Order 13 applies when an employer undertakes downsizing or reorganization?
  • Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction under Article 185(3) of the Constitution to interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding an employer's financial losses unless proven perverse or physically impossible?
  • Can a retrenchment be held invalid and mala fide if an employer fails to produce audited financial records to substantiate alleged financial losses?
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• Messrs Pakistan International Airlines Corporation vs Board of Trustees, Employees' Old-Age Benefits and others2011 SCMR 1102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-04-22
  Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act 1976EOBI contributionstatutory body exemptionestablishment registrationFactories Act 1934statutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave arose out of complaints filed by the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Institution against the appellant, Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC), for failing to register its establishment and pay contributions. The Adjudicating Authority held the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 applicable to PIAC's Flight Kitchen and Engineering departments with effect from 01-07-1976. This decision was upheld by the Board of Trustees and the High Court of Sindh. PIAC argued before the Supreme Court that pursuant to clauses (a), (c), and (f) of section 47 of the 1976 Act, it was exempt as a statutory body performing state functions. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that section 46 governs exemptions of an 'industry' or 'establishment' by the Federal Government, which PIAC never obtained, whereas section 47 deals strictly with the non-application of the Act to specific categories of 'persons' employed in specified services, not to employers or establishments registered under the Factories Act, 1934.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employer or establishment can claim exemption under section 47 of the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976?
  • What is the legal distinction between an exemption granted under section 46 and the exclusions listed under section 47 of the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976?
  • Whether departments of a statutory body registered as factories under the Factories Act, 1934 constitute an establishment for the purposes of the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976?
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• Messrs Pakistan International . Airlines Corporation vs Board of Trustees, Employees Old-Age Benefits and others2011 PLC (C.S.) 295 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Employees' Old-Age Benefits Actstatutory exemptionestablishmentindustryfactoryPIACcontribution liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the court arose from concurrent decisions of the Adjudicating Authority, the Appellate Authority (Board of Trustees), and a Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh, which held that the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 applied to the Flight Kitchen and PIA Engineering departments of the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC). The core legal question was whether PIAC and its employees were exempt from the provisions and contribution requirements of the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 by virtue of section 47 thereof. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that section 47 of the Act applies exclusively to individual employees of specified categories or services and does not exempt an 'establishment' or 'industry' as an employer, which instead must seek exemption under section 46 through notification by the Federal Government. The key principle laid down is that section 47 of the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 pertains to the personal non-application of the Act to certain employed persons rather than granting blanket immunity to employers or establishments.

  Questions settled

  • Does section 47 of the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 exempt an entire establishment or industry from the application of the Act, or does it only apply to certain individual persons in employment?
  • How is an establishment or industry exempted from the provisions of the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976?
  • Does the statutory exclusion under section 47 of the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 relieve an employer from paying contributions under the Act?
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• Messrs Kohinoor Looms Limited vs MCB Bank Limited2011 SCMR 298 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-03-03
  leave to appealbanking recoveryappealabilityreserve priceauction valuationFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order passed by the High Court in a banking recovery proceeding. The petitioner challenged the High Court's determination that the order issued by the Banking Judge was not appealable, arguing that such a finding was legally erroneous. Furthermore, the petitioner contested the reserve price fixed by the High Court for the auction of assets, asserting that the valuation was presumptuous and did not reflect the actual market value of the property in question. The Supreme Court, upon considering the preliminary submissions, granted leave to appeal to examine the maintainability of the appeal against the Banking Judge's order and to review the propriety of the reserve price determination. The Court's decision to grant leave establishes that the issues regarding the appealability of orders under the relevant financial recovery legislation and the methodology for determining reserve prices in banking auctions are substantial questions of law requiring further adjudication by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order passed by a Banking Judge appealable under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001?
  • What criteria should be applied when fixing a reserve price for the auction of assets in banking recovery proceedings?
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• Messrs Black Gold Ind. vs Federation of Pakistan and others2011 SCMR 956 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-06-17
  civil petitionbank guaranteepay orderinterim relieffinality of proceedingsconditional order
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arises from a grievance regarding a condition imposed by the Lahore High Court in a previous order, which required the petitioner to provide a bank guarantee as a prerequisite for the release of a pay order held by the respondents. The petitioner contended that the underlying dispute, which necessitated the pay order, had already been conclusively and finally decided, rendering the requirement for a bank guarantee and the continued retention of the pay order unnecessary. The core legal question was whether the condition of providing a bank guarantee remains enforceable when the substantive matter in issue has reached a final conclusion. The Supreme Court held that the requirement for a bank guarantee was contingent upon the pendency of the dispute. Consequently, the Court directed the respondents to release the pay order without the bank guarantee if the matter is indeed conclusively decided. However, if the matter remains pending, the petitioner must comply with the original High Court order. The principle established is that interim conditions imposed by a court for the protection of claims are subject to the continued existence of the underlying dispute.

  Questions settled

  • Does the requirement to provide a bank guarantee as a condition for interim relief persist if the underlying dispute has been conclusively decided?
  • Can a respondent continue to retain a pay order if the substantive matter in issue has reached a final conclusion?
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• Messrs Axleproducts Limited vs Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd.2011 SCMR 1469 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-02-10
  ex parte decreeservice of summonssubstituted servicebanking courtfinancial institutions recoveryleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the Sindh High Court dismissing the petitioner's appeal against an order of the Banking Court, which had refused to set aside an ex parte decree passed under section 12 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 read with section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioner contended that the ex parte decree was passed without proper service of summons, arguing that substituted service through publication was resorted to without first exhausting personal service methods. The core legal questions involve whether service of summons through publication under section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 is valid when other modes are not exhausted, and whether special procedure rules for service in banking matters meet constitutional standards of reasonable classification. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these contentions regarding the statutory interpretation of service provisions under the Ordinance and the Code of Civil Procedure 1908.

  Questions settled

  • Whether service of summons through publication under section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 is valid without exhausting other modes of service?
  • Can an ex parte decree passed by a Banking Court be set aside under section 12 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 read with section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on grounds of defective service?
  • Does the special procedure for service of summons provided under section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 satisfy the principle of reasonable classification?
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• Messrs Al-Raham Travels and Tours (Pvt) Ltd and others vs Ministry of Religious Affairs, Hajj, Zakat and Ushr through Secretary and others2011 SCMR 1621 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-07-25
  Hajj PolicyHajj Group OrganizersConstitutional PetitionFundamental RightsCorporate VeilGovernment PolicyMala FideWrit JurisdictionEquality before lawFreedom of trade
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses civil petitions challenging a Lahore High Court decision that declared a restriction on fresh enrolment of Hajj Group Organizers (HGOs) in the Hajj Policy 2011 as illegal and unconstitutional. The core legal questions revolved around the High Court's jurisdiction to interfere with government policy, the applicability of fundamental rights (Articles 4, 18, and 25 of the Constitution) to corporate bodies, and allegations of mala fide in policy formulation. The Supreme Court converted the petitions into appeals and accepted them, setting aside the High Court's judgment. The Court held that while High Courts can intervene if a policy conflicts with law or fundamental rights, the High Court's finding of mala fide in this instance was unsupported by the record. It affirmed that corporate bodies, whose shareholders are citizens, may claim fundamental rights protection by looking behind the corporate veil, particularly when compelled to incorporate by government policy. The Court also clarified that the exclusion under Article 18(c) of the Constitution applies only to trade or service controlled by the government or its corporations. The Supreme Court directed the government to formulate future Hajj policies transparently and well in time.

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• Messrs Adnan Trading Company vs Appellate Tribunal Customs, Central Excise and Sales Tax and others2011 SCMR 1535 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-03-01
  restoration of appealnon-prosecutionappellate discretionlimitationsufficient causedismissal of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a challenge to an order of the Appellate Tribunal Customs, Central Excise and Sales Tax, which was subsequently dismissed by the High Court of Sindh for non-prosecution. The appellant filed multiple restoration applications, which were also subject to dismissal and subsequent restoration. Ultimately, the High Court dismissed the restoration application on merits and on the grounds of limitation, citing the appellant's persistent failure to prosecute the case diligently. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to restore the appeal given the appellant's conduct and the lack of sufficient cause for absence. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the relief of restoration is contingent upon demonstrating good and sufficient cause for absence. The Court affirmed that the High Court's refusal to exercise discretion was neither arbitrary nor erroneous, noting that the appellant failed to explain their conduct or justify the absence. The principle established is that restoration of an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution requires a showing of good and sufficient cause, and appellate courts possess discretion to deny such relief where a party's conduct demonstrates a lack of diligence.

  Questions settled

  • Is the restoration of an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution a matter of right or judicial discretion?
  • Does the failure to provide a good and sufficient cause for absence justify the refusal to restore an appeal?
  • Can an appellate court dismiss a restoration application on the basis of the appellant's prior conduct in prosecuting the case?
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• Mehr Noor Muhammad vs Nazir Ahmed2011 SCMR 1559 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-06-16
  promissory noteQanun-e-Shahadatmarginal witnessesshort cause suitstamp dutyevidentiary burden
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, arising from a dispute involving a promissory note. The primary legal questions presented for consideration involve procedural and evidentiary issues under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Specifically, the Court is tasked with determining whether a short cause suit can be converted into a long cause suit due to the alleged non-cancellation of revenue stamps on a promissory note, and the legal consequences of such partial non-cancellation. Furthermore, the Court must address the evidentiary requirements for proving a promissory note under Articles 17 and 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, particularly whether the production of two marginal witnesses is mandatory when the scribe has already testified to the execution of the instrument. The Court grants leave to examine whether the attestation of two witnesses alters the legal nature of a promissory note and the extent of the plaintiff's burden of proof regarding witness production.

  Questions settled

  • Can a short cause suit be treated as a long cause suit due to the non-cancellation of stamps on a promissory note?
  • What is the legal effect of partial non-cancellation of stamps on a promissory note?
  • Does the proof of a promissory note require the production of two marginal witnesses under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Does the attestation of two witnesses on a promissory note change its legal nature?
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• Mehr Manzoor Hussain and others vs Muhammad Nawaz and another2011 PLJ SC 96 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-03-25
  void ab initiominoritylimitation periodsale deedcontractual capacityspecific performance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a property dispute where the respondent challenged a sale deed executed during his minority. The core legal question was whether a sale agreement executed by a minor is void or voidable, and consequently, whether the suit was barred by limitation under Article 44 of the Limitation Act 1908, which requires a suit to be filed within three years of attaining majority. The Supreme Court held that an agreement of sale executed by a minor is void ab initio and incapable of ratification, as a minor lacks the legal capacity to contract under Section 11 of the Contract Act 1872. The Court distinguished this from transactions executed by a natural guardian, which are voidable and subject to the three-year limitation period. Since the transaction was void ab initio, the limitation period under Article 44 did not apply. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision, noting the respondent filed the suit promptly upon discovering the mutation in the revenue record. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is an agreement of sale executed by a minor void or voidable?
  • Does the three-year limitation period under Article 44 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to a sale agreement executed by a minor?
  • What is the legal distinction between a void transaction and a voidable transaction regarding contractual capacity?
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• Mehmoodul Hassan and others vs Mst. Janna T and others2011 SCMR 1059 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-02-23
  inheritancepaternity disputewill deedconcurrent findingsdeclaratory suitGrow More Food Schemeburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants challenged the dismissal of their suit for declaration of ownership regarding land originally granted to Hassan Khan under the Grow More Food Scheme. The appellants claimed to be the children of Hassan Khan and entitled to inheritance, while also asserting rights under a will deed. The respondents, descendants of Hassan Khan, contested the paternity and the validity of the will. The trial, appellate, and High Court concurrently dismissed the suit, finding the appellants were children of Mst. Ayesha’s previous marriage, not Hassan Khan's. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined the evidence, including school records and the Nikahnama, confirming the appellants were not the legal heirs of Hassan Khan. Furthermore, the Court found the alleged will to be non-genuine and noted the appellants' lack of credibility in denying the respondents' relationship to the deceased. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts, ruling that the appellants failed to establish paternity or the validity of the testamentary document, thereby dismissing the appeal with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding paternity can be interfered with by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the failure to produce the scribe or stamp vendor of a will deed affect its genuineness?
  • Can a person claim inheritance rights based on a will if the paternity claim underlying the suit is proven false?
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• Mehmood Hussain Shah and others vs Munir Hussain Shah and others2011 SCMR 766 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-07-08
  pre-emptionsuperior rightspecific performancewaiver of rightstatutory noticeextinguishment of right
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a pre-emption suit instituted by the plaintiff-respondent, who claimed a superior pre-emptive right over the subject land on the qualification of being the vendor's son. The suit was initially decreed in favor of the pre-emptor, but the decision was reversed on first appeal and subsequently affirmed in a regular second appeal. After a remand by the Supreme Court, the High Court allowed the regular second appeal, which was challenged by the petitioners. The core legal questions were whether a transaction concluded through a decree for specific performance constitutes a pre-emptible sale, and whether the pre-emptor's right was extinguished in the absence of a statutory notice. The Supreme Court held that since no notice under Section 19 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 was served upon the pre-emptor, his right of pre-emption could not be deemed extinguished under Section 20 of the Act. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emptor's right of pre-emption is extinguished under Section 20 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 if no notice under Section 19 of the Act was served upon him?
  • Does a transaction resulting from a decree in a suit for specific performance constitute a pre-emptible sale?
  • Can waiver of a pre-emptive right be pleaded against a pre-emptor without proof of service of the statutory notice of intention to sell?
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• Mazhar Hussain vs The State2011 SCMR 455 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-05-27
  private defenseexceeding right of self-defenseconcurrent findingsmurdersentence conversionconstitutional jurisdictionQatl-e-amd
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that converted the petitioner’s death sentence into life imprisonment for the murder of two individuals. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, having admitted to the killings, was entitled to acquittal on the grounds of self-defense, or whether the High Court correctly determined that he had exceeded the right of private defense. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court’s decision was legally sound. The Court affirmed that while the petitioner may have been attacked, the injuries he sustained were not of a nature to justify the lethal use of a firearm against two persons. Consequently, the petitioner exceeded the right of private defense. The Court further emphasized that it generally does not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts when exercising its discretionary constitutional jurisdiction under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The conviction and sentence of life imprisonment were maintained as the petitioner failed to demonstrate any illegality in the lower courts' reasoning.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right of private defense justify the use of lethal force when the injuries sustained by the accused are not life-threatening?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is a conviction for Qatl-e-amd sustainable when an accused admits to the killings but claims the right of private defense?
  Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Hussain vs General Manager Operations, Railway2011 SCMR 1999 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-07-18
  service appeallimitationcondonation of delayretrospective promotionFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal which dismissed his service appeal seeking promotion retrospectively as hopelessly time-barred, noting he retired on 16-1-2001 and claimed promotion from 8-1-1998. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal was justified in dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation without examining whether the delay was attributable to the respondent department's conduct in processing his grievance. The Supreme Court held that the question of whether the respondent department was responsible for the delay required consideration to determine if the delay ought to be condoned. The Court converted the petition into an appeal, set aside the impugned judgment, and remanded the matter back to the Federal Service Tribunal for a decision on merits. The key principle laid down is that where delay in approaching a service tribunal is intertwined with or caused by departmental proceedings or inquiries, the tribunal must examine the department's role before dismissing the appeal on limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Service Tribunal is bound to consider if the department contributed to the delay before dismissing a service appeal as time-barred?
  • Can a service appeal be dismissed on the question of limitation without addressing the explanation for delay provided in the memo of appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Maulana Abdul Haq Baloch and others vs Government of Balochistan2011 PLD Supreme Court 835 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-05-25
  mining leasejoint venture agreementfeasibility study reportexploration licenseconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves petitions and constitutional challenges regarding the exploration and lease rights of copper and gold mines in Reko Diq, District Chaghai, Balochistan, originating from the Chaghai Hills Exploration Joint Venture Agreement (CHEJVA) initially executed in 1993 between the Balochistan Development Authority and BHP, and later novated to Tethyan Copper Company (TCC). Petitioners challenged the legality of the joint venture, rules relaxations, and the award process, seeking transparency and protection of public interest. During the proceedings, TCC completed its exploration, submitted a feasibility study report, and formally applied for a mining lease under the Balochistan Mineral Rules, 2002. The core legal question centered on whether this Court should preemptively evaluate the feasibility report and determine the entitlement to the mining lease. The Supreme Court held that under the governing law and rules, the matter of examining the feasibility report and deciding on the mining lease application falls exclusively within the domain of the competent authority of the Government of Balochistan. The Court recalled its earlier restraining order and directed the Government of Balochistan to decide TCC's application fairly, transparently, and in accordance with the law, without being influenced by the pending proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court should preemptively evaluate a feasibility study report and determine entitlement to a mining lease during the pendency of proceedings?
  • Does the authority to decide upon a mining lease application under the Balochistan Mineral Rules, 2002, lie exclusively with the Government of Balochistan?
  • Can a court direct the competent provincial authority to expeditiously decide a pending mining lease application transparently and in accordance with the law?
  Read full judgment →
• Maulana Abdul Haq Baloch & others vs Govt. of Balochistan through Secretary Industries & Min Dev. & others2011 PLJ SC 734 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-05-25
  mining leaseconstitutional petitionReko Diqjoint venture agreementadministrative discretionstatutory authoritymineral exploration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns constitutional petitions challenging the legality of the Chagai Hills Exploration Joint Venture Agreement and the subsequent grant of mining licenses for the Reko Diq area in Balochistan. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court should adjudicate the merits of the mining lease application submitted by Tethyan Copper Company or allow the provincial government to exercise its statutory authority. The Court held that the determination of the mining lease application falls exclusively within the domain of the Government of Balochistan under the governing Balochistan Mineral Rules, 2002. Consequently, the Court recalled its previous restraining order that had prevented the provincial government from processing the application. The Court affirmed the principle that judicial intervention should not pre-empt the statutory duties of competent authorities. It directed the Government of Balochistan to decide the pending lease application expeditiously, transparently, and fairly, in accordance with the law, without being influenced by the pendency of the proceedings before the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to pre-empt a statutory body from deciding on a mining lease application?
  • Is the Government of Balochistan the competent authority to decide on the grant of a mining lease under the Balochistan Mineral Rules, 2002?
  • Should a court vacate a restraining order when the parties agree that the competent authority should proceed with its statutory duties?
  Read full judgment →
• Maula Bux and others vs Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Lahore and others2011 SCMR 207 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-12-01
  waqf propertyremand of caseAuqaf Departmentproperty notificationbest evidence rulecivil litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a dispute concerning the notification of property as 'waqf' by the Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Lahore. The appellants challenged the takeover of specific property, including a Khanqah, shops, and residential houses, under the Auqaf (Federal Control) Act, 1976. The District Judge had initially set aside the notification, finding that the specific Khasra numbers were not proven to be waqf property. However, the High Court subsequently allowed the respondent's appeal, setting aside the District Judge's order. Upon review, the Supreme Court observed that both parties acknowledged that the best available evidence regarding the nature of the property had not been presented during the proceedings. Consequently, in the interest of justice, the Supreme Court set aside both the High Court's judgment and the District Judge's earlier decision. The Court remanded the matter to the District Judge with a direction to decide the appellants' application afresh, ensuring a thorough examination of the evidence, and mandated that the proceedings be concluded expeditiously within eight weeks of receiving the order.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court remand a matter to the trial court when the parties agree that the best evidence was not produced?
  • Does the Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance 1979 supersede the Auqaf (Federal Control) Act 1976 regarding pending applications?
  • What is the appropriate course of action when lower courts fail to properly evaluate evidence regarding the status of waqf property?
  Read full judgment →
• Maqsood Ahmad vs The State2011 SCMR 1057 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-01-14
  murderjail petitionleave to appealspot arrestforensic matchocular testimonycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a jail petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which upheld his conviction under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and death sentence for the murder of Muhammad Ameer, Advocate. The core legal question revolved around the reliability of the ocular testimony and the sufficiency of corroborative evidence, including the petitioner's spot-arrest with the weapon of offence, a positive forensic report matching the recovered rifle with the crime scene empty, and an admitted motive. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through consistent eyewitness accounts corroborated by direct physical and forensic evidence. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal was declined, affirming that concurrent findings of guilt based on solid corroboration warrant no interference.

  Questions settled

  • Whether ocular testimony of interested witnesses can be relied upon when corroborated by spot-arrest and forensic evidence?
  • Does an admission of motive in a statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 strengthen the prosecution case?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of guilt in a criminal appeal without compelling grounds?
  Read full judgment →
• Maqbool Ahmad and others vs Fazal-E-Haq and others2011 SCMR 1035 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-03-28
  restoration of appealdismissal for non-prosecutioncondonation of delayinheritance disputeprocedural justiceAdvocate-on-Record
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns applications for the restoration of Civil Appeals that were previously dismissed for non-prosecution. The appellants sought restoration, arguing that their original counsel had been appointed as a Judge of the Federal Shariat Court, and they lacked notice of the hearing. They further contended that the notice issued by the Court office was specifically directed at the Advocate-on-Record to implead legal heirs of deceased respondents, rather than a general hearing notice, and that the failure to implead legal heirs should not have resulted in the dismissal of the appeals. The respondents opposed the applications, citing the Advocate-on-Record's failure to appear despite notice and a significant delay in filing the restoration applications. The Supreme Court observed that notices had been issued to the Advocates-on-Record for both parties, yet neither side appeared. Given that the underlying appeals involved long-standing inheritance disputes, the Court exercised its discretion to restore the appeals, subject to the payment of costs, emphasizing the necessity of resolving the decades-old litigation on its merits rather than dismissing it on procedural grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution be restored when the original counsel has been appointed as a judge and the parties claim lack of notice?
  • Does the failure to implead legal heirs of deceased respondents justify the dismissal of an appeal for non-prosecution?
  • Should an appeal involving long-standing inheritance disputes be restored despite a delay in filing the restoration application?
  Read full judgment →
• Map Rice Mills (Pvt.) Limited vs Shakeel Ahmed and others2011 PLJ SC 475 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-08-06
  successor liabilitylabour lawreinstatementdue processopportunity of hearingindustrial relationstermination of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that upheld a Labour Court order reinstating employees of Pak. Pearl Rice Mills, whose assets and liabilities were transferred to the petitioner, MAP Rice Mills. The core legal questions were whether the successor entity was liable for the previous management's employment obligations and whether the petitioner was denied a fair opportunity of hearing. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner, having acquired the business, assumed its liabilities and could not avoid responsibility for the employees' termination. The Court further observed that the petitioner had been granted numerous adjournments to present evidence but failed to do so, rejecting the claim of a denial of due process. The key principle laid down is that a successor entity acquiring a business enterprise inherits its existing liabilities, including those related to employment, and a party cannot allege a violation of the right to a fair hearing when it has failed to utilize repeated opportunities provided by the court to present its case.

  Questions settled

  • Does a successor entity that acquires the assets of a business also assume its existing employment liabilities?
  • Can a party that fails to avail itself of numerous adjournments to produce evidence subsequently claim a denial of the right to a fair hearing?
  • Is a verbal termination of service valid under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmed and others vs Aurangzeb2011 SCMR 1322 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-06-30
  pre-emptionTalb-i-Muwathibatmisreading of evidencecontradictory pleadingssuit for possessionconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had affirmed lower court decisions decreeing a suit for possession through pre-emption. The core legal question was whether the plaintiff had validly performed the requisite Talbs (Talb-i-Muwathibat) to sustain a pre-emption claim, given the contradictory evidence presented. The plaintiff alleged in the plaint that he acquired knowledge of the sale and performed the Talb-i-Muwathibat on August 28, 1995, in the presence of one witness. However, during his testimony as P.W.1, the plaintiff claimed the event occurred on September 5, 1995, in the presence of a different individual. The Supreme Court held that these statements were irreconcilable and that the lower courts had failed to address this material contradiction, thereby misreading the record. Consequently, the Court set aside the judgments of all lower courts and dismissed the respondent's suit. The key principle laid down is that a pre-emption suit cannot succeed where the plaintiff's stance regarding the performance of Talbs is contradictory and irreconcilable with the evidence on record.

  Questions settled

  • Can a pre-emption suit be decreed when the plaintiff provides contradictory evidence regarding the date and manner of performing Talb-i-Muwathibat?
  • Does a material contradiction between the plaint and the oral testimony of the plaintiff regarding the performance of Talbs warrant the dismissal of a pre-emption suit?
  • Are concurrent findings of lower courts immune to interference by the Supreme Court if they are based on a misreading of the record?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Waheed alias Abdul Hameed vs The State and another2011 SCMR 1945 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-06-16
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirypolice investigationinnocence during investigationmurder feudstatutory bail considerations
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal seeking post-arrest bail in a case registered under sections 302, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Baghbanpura, District Gujranwala. The core legal question is whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail given that he was declared innocent during successive police investigations, placed in column No. 2 of the report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, attributed no specific injury, and that co-accused had already been granted bail. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that the case against the petitioner called for further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that where an accused is declared innocent in successive police investigations, is assigned a general role with no specific injury attributed, and co-accused have been granted bail, the case falls within the scope of further inquiry warranting the grant of post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused declared innocent in successive police investigations is entitled to post-arrest bail?
  • Does the absence of a specific injury attributed to an accused in a murder case warrant further inquiry for the purpose of bail?
  • Whether the grant of bail to co-accused is a relevant consideration when deciding a bail petition for another accused facing similar allegations?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Taj Muhammad Shah Mohyuddin Hashmi vs Secretary, Ministry2011 PLC (C.S.) 817 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2008-10-16
  service appealdepartmental penaltyFederal Service Tribunaljurisdictionremandservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves service appeals concerning departmental penalties imposed under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance 2000. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Federal Service Tribunal correctly declined jurisdiction or dismissed appeals involving such penalties, given the evolving judicial interpretation regarding the Tribunal's authority to entertain challenges against actions taken under the aforementioned Ordinance. Upon review, the Court noted that both parties acknowledged that the Federal Service Tribunal had subsequently adopted a different, more permissive view regarding its jurisdiction to entertain service appeals involving penalties imposed under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance 2000. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the impugned judgments of the Federal Service Tribunal, and remanded the matters back to the Tribunal. The Court directed that the original service appeals be deemed pending before the Tribunal for a fresh decision in accordance with the law. This judgment reinforces the principle that service tribunals must adjudicate appeals regarding departmental penalties in alignment with the prevailing legal interpretation of their statutory jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to entertain service appeals involving departmental penalties imposed under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance 2000?
  • Should a matter be remanded to the Federal Service Tribunal when the Tribunal has subsequently altered its stance on its own jurisdiction regarding specific service appeals?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Shahid Mehmood vs Malik Afzal Mehmood and others2011 SCMR 551 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-09-14
  civil procedureunconditional withdrawalres judicatafraudconsent decreeoral giftlegal bar
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over property gifted orally by parents to their son, Malik Afzal Mehmood. The petitioner, another son, had previously filed two suits challenging the validity of the gift, both of which were withdrawn unconditionally. Subsequently, the respondent obtained a consent decree against his mother regarding the property. The petitioner then filed an application under Section 12(2) of the C.P.C. to set aside said decree, alleging fraud for not being impleaded as a necessary party. The core legal question was whether a party barred from filing a fresh suit under Order XXIII, Rule 1(3) of the C.P.C. could circumvent this restriction by filing an application under Section 12(2). The Supreme Court held that since an application under Section 12(2) is a substitute for a suit, the limitations imposed by law on filing suits apply. The Court ruled that the petitioner cannot be allowed to do indirectly what the law bars him from doing directly, thereby dismissing the petition.

  Read full judgment →
• Malik Naveed Ahmed vs Mst. Aasia and others2011 SCMR 243 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-11-15
  leave to appealmaintenance for wifelimitation periodArbitration CouncilMuslim Family Laws
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, examining whether an application for recovery of maintenance for a wife under Section 9 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 is governed by Article 181 or Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908, and whether a revision filed before the District Revenue Officer against an order of the Arbitration Council was barred by time. The Court granted leave to appeal to examine these questions concerning limitation and interference in the interest of justice. Pending the final decision of the appeal, the Court directed that a portion of the deposited maintenance amount be disbursed to the respondent wife, while the balance is to be kept in a profit-yielding account, and ordered the appeal to be fixed for hearing within three months.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application before the Arbitration Council for effecting recovery of maintenance for a wife under section 9 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, is governed by Article 181 or Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • Whether a revision filed before the District Revenue Officer against the order of the Arbitration Council is barred by time?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Javed vs Province of Sindh through Secretary Local2011 SCMR 232 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-01-05
  judicial proprietyconflict of interestjudicial biasremand of casecomplete justicerecusal of judge
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a civil petition challenging a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which had upheld a trial court's order in a suit involving a land dispute and investment claims. The core legal question was whether a judicial order passed by a High Court Judge is sustainable when that Judge had previously appeared as counsel for one of the parties in the same matter. The Supreme Court observed that judicial propriety dictates that a person who has acted as an advocate for a party in a case should refrain from adjudicating upon it after their elevation to the bench. Given the consensus among the parties that the trial court judge should have disassociated himself from the proceedings, the Supreme Court held that the impugned judgments were unsustainable. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the judgments of both the High Court and the trial court, exercising its powers under Article 187 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to ensure complete justice, and remanded the case to the High Court for expeditious disposal within six months.

  Questions settled

  • Is a judicial order sustainable if passed by a judge who previously represented one of the parties in the same matter?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to set aside judgments where a conflict of interest regarding the presiding judge is established?
  • Can the Supreme Court remand a case to the High Court with specific timelines for disposal in the interest of justice?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Ishaq vs The State and others2011 SCMR 1350 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-07-11
  post-arrest bailcriminal conspiracyterrorismabsence of evidenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court refusing post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a criminal case involving multiple offences under the Pakistan Penal Code, the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, the Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965, and the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The core legal question was whether post-arrest bail could be granted to an accused incarcerated for a prolonged period who was not present at the crime scene and where the prosecution failed to point out any legally admissible evidence supporting the allegation of conspiracy allegedly hatched from inside prison. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and admitted the petitioner to bail. The Court laid down the principle that justice cannot be brutalized in the name of terrorism in the absence of legally admissible evidence on the record connecting the accused to the crime.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted when the prosecution fails to point out any legally admissible piece of evidence supporting the allegation of conspiracy?
  • Does the involvement of an accused in heinous offences as a terrorist justify denying bail in the absence of supporting evidence on record?
  • Is bail warranted for an accused who was incarcerated in prison at the time of the occurrence and not present at the scene of the crime?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Dad and another vs Karrar Khalid and another2011 PLC (C.S.) 729 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-01-18
  service tribunallimitationcondonation of delaysenioritydepartmental appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal which had set aside departmental orders and assigned seniority to respondent No. 1 over the appellants. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the respondent's appeal before the Tribunal was barred by time and whether the Tribunal's condonation of delay was legally sustainable. The Supreme Court held that the respondent filed his appeal before the Tribunal sixteen months after his departmental representation and twelve months after a departmental communication without waiting for the final decision on his appeal, rendering the challenge to the original order patently time-barred. The Court established that where a civil servant opts to await a departmental decision, a fresh limitation period arises only upon the final decision, and jumping into litigation prematurely without awaiting that decision or timely filing against the original order precludes invoking limitation extensions. Consequently, the appeal was accepted and the Tribunal's judgment was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal filed before the Service Tribunal without waiting for the final decision on a departmental representation is barred by time?
  • Can the condonation of delay by the Service Tribunal be sustained when granted arbitrarily and casually?
  • When does a fresh period of limitation become available to a civil servant challenging a departmental order?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Aqeel vs The State2011 SCMR. 170 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-03-22
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationmurderDNA reportdeeper appreciation of evidencecriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, seeking pre-arrest bail in respect of a criminal case involving offences punishable under sections 302 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner was initially granted pre-arrest bail by the trial court, which was subsequently cancelled by the High Court of Sindh upon an application filed by the complainant under section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail given the available material and allegations of manipulation in the DNA report by the investigating officer. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that prima facie ample evidence was available connecting the petitioner to the crime and that deeper appreciation of evidence is not warranted at the bail stage, particularly in the absence of established mala fide on the part of the complainant or investigating officer. The key principle laid down is that pre-arrest bail will be refused where prima facie connection to a capital charge exists and no mala fide for false implication is made out.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be maintained when prima facie evidence connects the accused to the offence under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is deeper appreciation of evidence permissible at the pre-arrest bail stage?
  • What constitutes sufficient ground for the cancellation of pre-arrest bail under section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Major (Retd.) Ahsan-Ul-Haque vs Muhammad Ejaz2011 SCMR 487 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-09-02
  personal needejectmentlandlord and tenantmisreading of evidenceCantonments Rent Restriction Actpleadingsgood faith
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against concurrent judgments of the Rent Controller and the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the landlord's application for the ejectment of a tenant on the grounds of personal need and default in rent payment. The core legal question was whether the landlord's claim of personal need was substantiated despite the omission of specific details regarding his retirement and intended business in the initial pleadings, and whether the landlord's prior actions—such as selling other property or seeking rent enhancement—negated his claim of good faith. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the lower courts misread the evidence. The Court established that a landlord is not required to plead every evidentiary detail in the initial petition, provided the jurisdictional fact of personal need is asserted. Furthermore, the Court held that a landlord is entitled to pursue multiple legal remedies, such as seeking rent enhancement and eviction simultaneously, and that prior private arrangements with other tenants do not bar a landlord from seeking statutory eviction under the relevant rent laws.

  Questions settled

  • Is a landlord required to plead every evidentiary detail regarding personal need in the initial ejectment petition?
  • Can a landlord simultaneously pursue remedies for rent enhancement and eviction of a tenant?
  • Does a landlord's prior private arrangement to vacate other property bar them from seeking statutory eviction of a current tenant?
  • Does the pendency of a separate civil suit for rendition of accounts regarding construction costs preclude a landlord from seeking eviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Majid Naeem vs The State and another2011 PSC (Crl.) 643 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-05-17
  post-arrest bailrash and negligent drivingqatl-bis-sababqatl-e-amdrule of consistencycar racingmens rea
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a post-arrest bail application by the Lahore High Court. The petitioner was accused of driving a racecar at high speed during an organized car race, losing control, and causing the deaths of five spectators and injuries to several others. Initially registered under Sections 279, 109, 322, and 337-G of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, the prosecution subsequently added Sections 302 and 324 of the Code. The petitioner sought bail on the ground of consistency, pointing out that a co-accused (the race referee) had been granted bail, and argued that the absence of mens rea excluded Section 302, making the offence one of qatl-bis-sabab under Section 322, which is punishable only by Diyat. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the rule of consistency did not apply as the petitioner's role as the actual driver was distinct from the referee's. The Court ruled that extreme rash and negligent driving, where the driver is presumed to know the life-threatening consequences, does not automatically warrant bail, and the final determination of the applicable statutory provision remains the exclusive prerogative of the trial court at the charge-framing stage.

  Questions settled

  • Can the rule of consistency for granting bail be claimed by a principal accused driver when a co-accused referee has been granted bail?
  • Does an act of extreme rash and negligent driving causing multiple deaths automatically exclude the application of Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at the bail stage?
  • Should the appellate court definitively determine the applicability of Section 302 versus Section 322 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 during bail proceedings?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail as a matter of right under Section 322 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 on the sole ground that the offence is punishable only by Diyat?
  Read full judgment →
• Majid Naeem vs State and another2011 PLJ SC 662 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-05-17
  post-arrest bailrash and negligent drivingqatl-bis-sababqatl-e-amdrule of consistencyextreme negligencecar race accident
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition seeks leave to appeal against the dismissal of the petitioner's bail application by the Lahore High Court, arising from a tragic incident where five persons were killed and several injured due to rash and negligent driving during an arranged car race. The core legal questions involved whether the petitioner was entitled to bail on the rule of consistency vis-a-vis a co-accused, and whether extreme rash and negligent driving resulting in multiple deaths warranted bail under the realm of qatl-bis-sabab or qatl-e-amd. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner, who was actively driving the racecar that lost control, stood on a distinctly different footing from the co-accused who acted merely as a race referee, and that extreme rash and negligent driving in a public or spectator-laden area does not automatically entitle an accused to discretionary bail. The Court laid down the principle that extreme reckless driving where consequences are foreseeable constitutes severe culpable conduct precluding the grant of bail, and that the ultimate determination of whether a charge falls under Section 302 or Section 322 of the Pakistan Penal Code remains the prerogative of the trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused who actively drove a vehicle in a race causing multiple deaths is entitled to bail on the rule of consistency when a co-accused acting as a race referee was granted bail?
  • Does extreme rash and negligent driving resulting in multiple fatalities disentitle an accused from claiming discretionary bail?
  • Whether the determination of applicability between Section 302 and Section 322 of the Pakistan Penal Code is the sole prerogative of the trial court at the framing of the charge stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Mahmood Hussain Larik and 2 others vs Muslim Commercial Bank2011 PLC 307 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-03-31
  workman statusindustrial relationsappellate jurisdictionservice lawbank officergrievance applicationconstitutional interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three appeals by bank officers (Grade-III) challenging High Court judgments that reversed Labour Court orders reinstating them. The core legal questions were whether the appellants qualified as "workmen" under the relevant labour laws and whether their appeals to the Supreme Court were maintainable as of right under Article 185(2)(d) and (e) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Supreme Court, by a majority, held that the appellants were not "workmen" because their primary duties involved managerial and supervisory functions rather than manual or clerical work, rendering their grievance applications before the Labour Court misconceived. Regarding the constitutional issue, the Court clarified that the right of appeal under Article 185(2)(d) and (e) is restricted to civil disputes involving quantifiable monetary claims or property valued at Rs. 50,000 or more, which did not apply to these service-related reinstatement claims. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed. The key principle established is that the determination of "workman" status depends on the nature of duties actually performed, not job designation, and that service-related reinstatement claims do not automatically satisfy the valuation requirements for appeals as of right under Article 185(2).

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of 'workman' under the West Pakistan Standing Orders Ordinance 1968 include bank officers performing supervisory duties?
  • Are service-related reinstatement claims quantifiable for the purpose of an appeal as of right under Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • What is the test for determining whether an employee is a 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance?
  • Does Article 185(2)(e) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 apply to non-monetary service disputes?
  Read full judgment →
• M. Anwar Sidhu vs National Bank of Pakistan and others2011 SCMR 261 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-06-29
  dismissal from servicecompulsory retirementdepartmental enquiryright to personal hearingproportionality of penaltyservice lawunblemished service record
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a former employee of the National Bank of Pakistan, challenged his dismissal from service following departmental proceedings regarding alleged financial irregularities. The core legal questions concerned whether the appellant was afforded a proper opportunity to defend himself, specifically regarding the provision of an enquiry report and a personal hearing, and whether the penalty of dismissal was proportionate given his unblemished twenty-six-year service record and the absence of personal gain or loss to the bank. The Supreme Court observed that the appellant was denied the opportunity to explain his actions due to the failure to provide the enquiry report and the lack of a personal hearing. Furthermore, the Court noted that the charges did not involve personal gain or financial loss to the institution. Consequently, the Court held that the penalty of dismissal was disproportionate. Applying the principle of proportionality in disciplinary matters, the Court set aside the dismissal and converted the penalty into compulsory retirement, emphasizing that leniency is appropriate when no actual loss is proven against an employee with a long, unblemished record.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to provide an employee with a copy of the enquiry report and an opportunity for a personal hearing vitiate the disciplinary proceedings?
  • Is the penalty of dismissal from service proportionate where an employee with an unblemished service record is charged with temporary retention of funds without evidence of personal gain or loss to the employer?
  • Can the Supreme Court convert a penalty of dismissal into compulsory retirement in service matters where the original penalty is found to be disproportionate?
  Read full judgment →
• LT. General (Retd) Muhammad Afzal Najeeb vs Javed Sadiq Malik2011 PLJ SC 88 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-03-09
  ejectment petitionrent defaultCantonment Rent Restriction Acttender of rentframing of issuessummary proceedingsstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an ejectment petition filed against a tenant for alleged default in rent payment. The tenant had deposited rent directly with the Rent Controller, and the lower courts, relying on a precedent interpreting the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979, ordered ejectment without framing issues or allowing evidence. The core legal question was whether the Rent Controller correctly applied the law regarding rent tender and whether summary ejectment was permissible despite the tenant's denial of default. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts erred in law by applying the Yasmeen Khan dictum, which interpreted the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979, to a case governed by the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act 1963. The Court clarified that the statutory provisions regarding rent tender in these two laws are not identical. Consequently, because the tenant disputed the allegations of default, the Rent Controller was required to frame issues and permit evidence rather than ordering summary eviction. The judgment establishes that precedents from one rent statute cannot be automatically applied to another with different provisions, and disputed facts in rent proceedings necessitate a proper inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act 1963 require the same procedure for rent tender as the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  • Can a Rent Controller order ejectment for rent default without framing issues when the tenant denies the default?
  • Is the direct deposit of rent with a Rent Controller under the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act 1963 automatically considered a default?
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• Liaqat Ali vs State2011 PLJ SC 884 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-05-12
  criminal appealmurderqatl-i-amdocular accountmedical evidencebenefit of doubtreappraisal of evidencecapital punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court affirming the appellant's conviction under Section 302(b) PPC for qatl-i-amd and his sentence of death, along with fine and compensation. The core legal question revolved around the reliability of the prosecution's ocular and medical evidence, specifically regarding conflicting claims of multiple firearm injuries versus a single head injury, un-witnessed circumstances, and the arbitrary differentiation between co-accused. The Supreme Court held that glaring discrepancies between ocular testimony and medical evidence, the withholding of crucial independent witnesses, and structural failings in the investigation created insurmountable doubts regarding the prosecution's case. The ratio decidendi is that where eye-witness testimony is fundamentally inconsistent with medical evidence and tainted by material contradictions, a conviction based thereon cannot be sustained. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the lower court judgments were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted of the charge and directed to be set at liberty.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for murder can be sustained when the ocular testimony is in direct conflict with the medical evidence regarding the number of firearm injuries?
  • Does the principle of 'sifting the grain from the chaff' justify convicting one co-accused while acquitting another who was attributed an identical role based on the same discredited eye-witness testimony?
  • What is the effect on the prosecution's case when key independent witnesses present at the scene are deliberately withheld from trial?
  • Whether the failure to recover crime empties, blood, and forensic evidence from the spot warrants the grant of benefit of doubt to the accused in a capital case?
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• Liaqat Ali vs Government of NWFP through Secretary Health, Peshawar2011 PLJ SC 207 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-04-10
  service terminationdepartmental inquirycriminal acquittalwillful absencecivil servantservice tribunaldisciplinary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the NWFP Service Tribunal, which upheld the termination of the petitioner, a Laboratory Attendant, from government service. The petitioner was terminated following his involvement in a criminal case and subsequent willful absence from duty. After his acquittal in the criminal proceedings, the petitioner sought reinstatement, arguing that the acquittal cleared him of the charges and that his absence was involuntary. The core legal question was whether an acquittal in criminal proceedings automatically invalidates departmental termination based on the same facts, and whether the absence of a regular departmental inquiry vitiates the termination order. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that criminal and departmental proceedings are independent and not inter-dependent; thus, an acquittal does not per se absolve a civil servant of departmental liability. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that a civil servant cannot benefit from their own abscondence in criminal proceedings to justify unauthorized absence from duty. The key principle established is that disciplinary action and criminal proceedings serve distinct purposes and can proceed separately, and willful absence while evading law constitutes valid grounds for removal.

  Questions settled

  • Does an acquittal in criminal proceedings automatically absolve a civil servant of departmental liability?
  • Are departmental disciplinary proceedings and criminal proceedings inter-dependent?
  • Can a civil servant claim that absence from duty was involuntary while they were absconding from criminal law?
  • Does the failure to conduct a regular departmental inquiry always invalidate a termination order?
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• Liaqat Ali vs Government of N.-W.F.P. through Secretary Health, Peshawar and others2011 PLC (C.S.) 990 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-04-10
  service appealdepartmental inquirycriminal acquittalwillful absencetermination of servicecivil servantabscondence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the N.-W.F.P Service Tribunal, which upheld the termination of the petitioner, a Laboratory Attendant, from government service. The petitioner was terminated following his involvement in a criminal case and subsequent willful absence from duty. After his acquittal in the criminal proceedings under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the petitioner sought reinstatement, arguing that his acquittal cleared him of the charges and that the lack of a regular departmental inquiry rendered his termination unlawful. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that criminal acquittal does not automatically absolve a civil servant of departmental liability, as disciplinary and criminal proceedings are independent. The Court further held that the petitioner’s status as a fugitive from law during his absence from duty constituted sufficient grounds for removal, regardless of the lack of a formal inquiry, as the absence was willful and not denied. Consequently, the Court found no legal or factual infirmity in the Tribunal's decision, affirming that a civil servant cannot benefit from their own abscondence.

  Questions settled

  • Does an acquittal in criminal proceedings automatically absolve a civil servant of departmental liability?
  • Are departmental disciplinary proceedings and criminal proceedings interdependent?
  • Can a civil servant claim absence from duty was beyond their control when they were a fugitive from law?
  • Is a regular departmental inquiry mandatory even when the civil servant's misconduct, such as willful absence, is admitted?
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• Land Acquisition Collector, etc. vs Mst. Iqbal Begum etc.2011 PLJ SC 22 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-01-07
  land acquisitioncompensationmarket valuepotentiality of landcompulsory acquisitionaward
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from appeals filed against a judgment regarding the determination of compensation for acquired land. The core legal question revolves around the correct assessment of market value, potentiality, and compensation for land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeals, holding that the compensation determined by the High Court, taking into account plus and minus factors under Sections 23 and 24, was unexceptionable and based on proper evaluation of potentiality, location, and market price of adjoining lands rather than solely on past sales. The Court laid down the principle that land potentiality must be assessed with reference to its future use and prospects, aiming to provide complete indemnity and adequate compensation to the owner, ensuring they receive equivalent value for the property deprived.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the potentiality of acquired land should be determined merely at the time of issuance of the notification or with reference to its future use?
  • Is one year's average of past sales an absolute yardstick for the assessment of compensation in land acquisition matters?
  • What are the relevant factors to be considered by the court while determining adequate compensation for acquired land?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan Muhammad and others vs The State2011 SCMR 705 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-06-04
  kidnapping for ransomcircumstantial evidencerecovery of dead bodypointationconfessional statementanti-terrorismcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction and sentencing of the appellants for kidnapping for ransom and the subsequent murder of a cloth trader under Section 365-A and Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, along with provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 and the Pakistan Arms Ordinance 1965. The core legal question involved the reliability and sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, specifically pointing out flaws in police investigation, the evidentiary value of disclosures leading to the recovery of the dead body and crime weapon, and a belated plea of minority. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that unimpeachable circumstantial evidence, including judicial confessions, medical reports, and the recovery of the deceased's body and weapon based on the appellant's pointation under Article 40 of the Evidence Act 1872, formed a complete and unbreakable chain pointing exclusively to the guilt of the accused. The key principle laid down is that minor investigative lapses by police do not vitiate a conviction where independent, natural, and corroborative evidence of recovery and confession firmly establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the recovery of a dead body and crime weapon at the pointation of an accused can serve as sufficient corroborative piece of circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction?
  • Does a minor lapse or irregularity in police investigation vitiate an otherwise reliable and well-corroborated prosecution case?
  • Can a plea of minority raised for the first time before the Supreme Court without sufficient material on record be entertained?
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• Khaliq Hussain vs The State2011 SCMR 131 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-10-27
  murder convictionself-defenseappreciation of evidencecriminal petitionSection 302 PPCeye-witness testimonyburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition challenged a High Court judgment maintaining the petitioner's conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder. The core legal questions concerned whether the conviction could be sustained despite the acquittal of co-accused on the same evidence, and whether the petitioner’s plea of self-defense, raised during his statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, warranted a reduction of the charge to Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner's admission of presence and causing injuries, corroborated by disinterested eye-witnesses and medical evidence, provided sufficient grounds for conviction. The Court established that the acquittal of co-accused does not automatically invalidate a conviction where the evidence against the specific accused is consistent and corroborated. Furthermore, the Court laid down the principle that a plea of self-defense must be substantiated by evidence; failure to produce witnesses or testify on oath under Section 340(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 renders such a plea unreasonable and insufficient to mitigate the offense.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained when co-accused are acquitted on the same evidence?
  • Is an accused's statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 sufficient to establish a plea of self-defense without further evidence?
  • Does the failure to testify on oath under Section 340(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 weaken a defense plea of self-defense?
  • Under what circumstances can a murder charge be reduced from Section 302(b) to Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalilurrehman and another vs Dr. Manzoor Ahmed and others2011 PLD Supreme Court 512 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-02-24
  ejectment petitionleave to defendsublettingwitness affidavitsmandatory vs directoryrent lawsummary procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an ejectment petition filed under the Punjab Rented Premises Ordinance, 2007. The petitioners sought eviction on grounds of subletting, which was dismissed by the Rent Tribunal and upheld by the High Court. The petitioners contended that the respondents were precluded from examining witnesses because they failed to file witness affidavits alongside their application for leave to defend as per Section 22(3) of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court examined the structure of Section 22(3), distinguishing between mandatory and directory requirements. The Court held that while the filing of the respondent's own affidavit is mandatory (though curable upon sufficient cause), the provision regarding witness affidavits is prefaced by the phrase 'if desired'. This indicates an optional procedural step for the purpose of obtaining leave. Consequently, the Court ruled that the failure to file witness affidavits at the leave stage does not penalize a tenant by barring oral evidence during the trial once leave is granted. The petition was dismissed as the findings on subletting were concurrent and the legal objection was found meritless.

  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Umar vs Syed Athar Iqbal, Chairman Pakistan Overseas2011 SCMR 1555 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-05-19
  absconderright of audiencedispensation of personal appearancebail bond cancellationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the dismissal of his application under section 205, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and the subsequent confirmation of orders by the High Court, arising from a criminal case registered against him for publishing visa advertisements without permission. The petitioner had absconded to the United Kingdom, leading to the cancellation of his bail bonds and the consignment of the case under section 512, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether an absconding accused could be granted relief or audience to dispense with personal attendance under peculiar circumstances. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while an absconder ordinarily has no right of audience, the petition could be allowed based on a solemn undertaking given by the petitioner and the consent of the Deputy Attorney-General. The Court laid down the principle that conditional relief may be granted to an absconding accused subject to furnishing heavy surety bonds ensuring future appearance before the trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Does an absconder have a right of audience before a court of law?
  • Can an application under section 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be entertained when proceedings under section 512 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 have been finalized against an accused?
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• Khalid Mehmood vs The State2011 SCMR 1110 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-03-31
  death sentenceqisasleave to appealcriminal appealpenal code
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Khalid Mehmood against his conviction and sentence of death. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the sentence of death could be awarded by way of Qisas without considering the relevant statutory provisions regarding exceptions and alternatives to Qisas as enumerated in the Pakistan Penal Code. The Court held that the trial court and the High Court had ignored the relevant provisions of law, creating a ground for further examination. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider the contentions raised, converted the petition into an appeal, and ordered it to be fixed for an early hearing, laying down that lower courts must duly consider statutory provisions governing Qisas.

  Questions settled

  • Can a sentence of death by way of Qisas be awarded without considering the provisions of sections 306(c), 307, and 308 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Whether the failure of lower courts to consider relevant statutory provisions regarding Qisas causes prejudice warranting interference by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Mehmood and others vs The State2011 SCMR 664 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-06-16
  Criminal AppealMurderDeath SentenceBenefit of DoubtOcular TestimonyWeapon RecoveryFire-Arm Expert ReportMotiveCircumstantial EvidenceLast Seen EvidenceRecovery of Dead BodyInsanity PleaQanun-e-ShahadatAbduction
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses two criminal appeals concerning murder convictions and death sentences. In *Khalid Mehmood and others vs The State*, the Supreme Court upheld the convictions and death sentences of Khalid Mehmood and Zahid alias Javed Iqbal under Section 302(b) PPC, finding the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through ocular testimony, weapon recovery, fire-arm expert reports, motive, and medical evidence. However, the appeal of Abid Hussain was allowed, and his conviction set aside due to serious doubt regarding his participation and lack of weapon recovery. The Court reiterated that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and any reasonable doubt benefits the accused. In *Gul Muhammad vs The State*, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the death sentence for the abduction and murder of a minor. The Court found the delay in the FIR suitably explained and multiple circumstances, including last seen evidence, the accused's disclosure, pointation of the crime scene, and recovery of the dead body, corroborated his involvement. The plea of insanity was rejected based on medical opinion, and it was held that motive is not a legal requirement for awarding the maximum penalty if the case is otherwise proven beyond reasonable doubt. Information leading to recovery at the accused's instance is admissible under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat.

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• Khalid Mehmood and others vs The State and others2011 SCMR 1719 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-06-28
  pre-arrest bailcriminal petitiondisputed possessioninvestigationbail granted
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through a petition for leave to appeal seeking pre-arrest bail in respect of a criminal case registered via First Information Report No. 86 of 2011 at Police Station Rinala Khurd. The core legal question concerns the entitlement of the petitioners to pre-arrest bail where they explicitly disclaim possession of the disputed property and have fully cooperated with the investigating agency. The court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, granting pre-arrest bail to the petitioners. The key principle laid down is that where accused persons do not claim possession of the subject matter of the crime and nothing remains to be recovered from them following their participation in the investigation, they are entitled to be admitted to bail.

  Questions settled

  • Are accused persons entitled to pre-arrest bail when they disclaim possession of the subject matter of the crime?
  • Does joining the investigation and the absence of any further recovery justify granting bail to the petitioners?
  Read full judgment →
• Khadim Hussain vs State2011 PLJ SC 327 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-11-16
  double murderdeath sentenceinterested witnessesmotivefalsus in uno falsus in omnibussifting grain from chaffmedical corroborationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's appeal against his conviction under Section 302(b) and Section 452 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, resulting in a death sentence for the double murder of a woman and her minor daughter. The core legal questions involved the appreciation of ocular evidence from related witnesses, the relevance and weight of motive, the application of the doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, and the sustainability of conviction when co-accused are acquitted on the same evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the testimony of related or interested witnesses is reliable if found truthful and consistent, that minor contradictions do not discredit trustworthy eyewitnesses, that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not applicable in Pakistan where courts must sift grain from chaff, and that the prosecution successfully proved its case through consistent ocular testimony, medical evidence, and recovery of the weapon.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of related or interested eyewitnesses can be discarded solely on the ground of their relationship to the deceased?
  • Does the acquittal of co-accused persons on the same evidence ipso facto warrant the acquittal of the remaining accused?
  • Is the legal maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus applicable in the criminal administration of justice in Pakistan?
  • Whether motive is a sine qua non for proving a criminal charge under the Pakistan Penal Code?
  Read full judgment →
• Kashif Amir vs State2011 PLJ SC 291 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-06-30
  narcotic possessionburden of proofcriminal liability of driverdestruction of case propertyControl of Narcotic Substances Actsampling of narcoticspresumption of guilt
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment maintaining the petitioner's conviction under Section 9-C of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following the recovery of narcotics from a vehicle he was driving. The core legal questions concerned whether a driver can be held liable for narcotics concealed in a vehicle’s secret cavities and whether the destruction of the recovered narcotics without notice to the accused vitiated the trial. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a driver, being in charge of the vehicle, is deemed to have possession and control of its contents. The Court affirmed that under Section 29 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, once the prosecution establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the accused to prove innocence. Additionally, the Court ruled that narcotics destruction under Section 516-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, is lawful if representative samples are drawn and certified, rejecting the necessity of sampling every individual packet when the nature of the substance is not disputed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a driver of a vehicle legally responsible for narcotics concealed within the vehicle's secret cavities?
  • Does the burden of proof shift to the accused under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, once the prosecution establishes a prima facie case?
  • Is the destruction of recovered narcotics without prior notice to the accused unlawful under Section 516-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Must the prosecution draw samples from every individual packet of recovered narcotics to secure a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
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• Karachi Development Authority and others vs Syed Iqbal Ahmed and others2011 SCMR 472 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-02-08
  non-utilization feeallotment of plotsconstitutional petitiondemand noticeKarachi Development Authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from appeals directed against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi, which allowed constitutional petitions filed by respondents regarding demand notices issued by the Karachi Development Authority for non-utilization fees (NUF) on allotted plots. The core legal question concerned the validity of demand notices issued in excess of amounts stipulated under original contracts and subsequent notifications regarding NUF rates. Upon hearing counsel for the respondents, the Supreme Court disposed of the appeals in terms agreed upon by the parties. The Court held that respondents were free to challenge the vires of specific notifications and resolutions dated 30-1-2001 before the High Court afresh, uninfluenced by the previous judgment, and outlined procedural safeguards regarding voluntary deposits and suspension applications. The key principle laid down is that matters concerning the vires of subordinate legislation not dilated upon by the lower court can be remanded or left open for independent adjudication through constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge the vires of notifications and resolutions regarding non-utilization fees afresh in the High Court if the lower court did not dilate upon them?
  • Whether the voluntary deposit of an outstanding amount at a revised rate is subject to a claim instituted through the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Karachi vs Sindh2011 SCMR 1709 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-07-21
  industrytrade unionnon-profit organizationestablishmentfundamental rightfreedom of associationlabor laws
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal impugned the judgment of the Sindh High Court regarding the legal status and registration of a trade union representing employees of the Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The core legal question was whether the appellant chamber, being a non-profit association incorporated under company law to promote trade and commerce, qualifies as an 'industry' under labor legislation so that its employees have the right to form a trade union. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant falls within the definition of 'industry' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance 2002 and the Industrial Relations Act 2008 because it engages in providing services for a fee to its members and the business community, notwithstanding its non-profit status or the absence of a profit motive. The Court laid down the principle that the nature of the organized economic activity and provision of services for consideration determines whether an entity is an industry, and labor laws, being beneficial legislation, must be interpreted liberally to uphold the fundamental right of workers to form trade unions under the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Does a non-profit association incorporated to promote trade and commerce qualify as an 'industry' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance 2002 and Industrial Relations Act 2008?
  • Is the absence of a profit motive or the non-distribution of profits decisive in determining whether an organization is an industry under labor laws?
  • Whether employees of a chamber of commerce have the fundamental right to form a trade union under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Justices Hasnat Ahmad Khanand Syed Shabbar Raza Rizvi: In the matter2011 PLD Supreme Court 195 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-02-02
  contempt of courtindependence of judiciaryProclamation of EmergencyProvisional Constitution Orderdue processequal treatment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from identical applications filed by Justice Hasnat Ahmad Khan and Syed Shabbar Raza Rizvi seeking equal treatment under Articles 4, 9, 25, and 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, and requesting that notices be issued to other functionaries, including the former President General Pervez Musharraf and former Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, who were allegedly equally liable for actions connected to the Proclamation of Emergency, Provisional Constitution Order, and Oath of Office (Judges) Order, 2007. The core legal question was whether proceedings against the applicants for contempt of court regarding the disobedience of the restraint order dated 3-11-2007 should be linked or clubbed with potential contempt proceedings against other high functionaries. The Court held that the alleged contempt involving the issuance of constitutional instruments prior to 3-11-2007 is materially different from the charge of disobeying the restraint order itself, and thus the proceedings should remain independent. The key principle laid down is that distinct classes of contempt arising from different factual bases and timelines ought not to be clubbed together.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contempt proceedings for disobeying a court restraint order should be clubbed with proceedings regarding the issuance of the Proclamation of Emergency and Provisional Constitution Order?
  • Do persons who issued constitutional instruments prior to a restraint order face the same contempt charges as those who allegedly disobeyed the restraint order directly?
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• Justice Hasnat Ahmed Khan and others vs Federation of Pakistan/State2011 PLD Supreme Court 680 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-03-18
  contempt of courtjudicial oathprovisional constitution orderconstitutional deviationjudicial independenceparliamentary validationdoctrine of necessitynullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propriaeighteenth constitutional amendmentjudges' removal
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court heard Intra Court Appeals challenging an order that initiated contempt proceedings against judges who took oath under the Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) and Oath of Office (Judges) Order, 2007, issued by General Pervez Musharraf. The core legal questions revolved around the constitutional permissibility and propriety of initiating contempt proceedings under Article 204 of the Constitution against superior court judges for disobeying the Supreme Court's restraint order of November 3, 2007, and their status as judges in the absence of parliamentary validation of the PCO regime. The Court held that the Constitution and law do not prohibit such proceedings, and judges are not immune. It further ruled that judges who took oath under the unconstitutional PCO and Oath Order, 2007, ceased to hold office from the date of the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment (April 20, 2010), as Parliament did not validate those actions. Consequently, they could not claim immunity from contempt proceedings. The Court emphasized that superior courts lack jurisdiction to legitimize unconstitutional acts, a power reserved for Parliament through constitutional amendment, and applied the maxim "nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria" against those who benefited from their own wrong.

  Read full judgment →
• Justice Hasnat Ahmed Khan and another vs Federation of Pakistan/State2011 PLD Supreme Court 274 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-02-18
  contempt noticejudicial authorityadministration of justiceSupreme Court of Pakistanjudicial dignity
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan on appeals filed on behalf of Justice Hasnat Ahmed Khan and Justice Syed Shabbar Raza Rizvi. During the proceedings, the Court noted an administrative and judicial development wherein a judge of the Peshawar High Court had issued contempt notices to Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court, an order which was subsequently set aside by a larger bench of the Peshawar High Court on the judicial side. To preserve and protect the dignity and respect of the judiciary and ensure the smooth administration of justice, the Supreme Court held that specific named judges shall not pass any such orders against the members of the bench or judges of the Supreme Court. The Court laid down the principle that if any such order is passed by them, it shall have no legal or binding effect whatsoever and shall be deemed non-existent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order passed by a High Court judge issuing contempt notices against judges of the Supreme Court has any legal or binding effect?
  • Can the Supreme Court declare orders passed against its judges by other judicial functionaries to be non-existent in order to preserve the dignity of the institution?
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• Junaid Rehman and others vs The State and others2011 PLD Supreme Court 1135 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-09-28
  kidnapping for ransomAnti-Terrorism ActSection 365-A PPCactual payment of ransomdemand of ransomtest identification paradesentence reductionlife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed appeals arising from the conviction of appellants for abducting a victim for ransom under Section 365-A PPC read with Section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The trial court sentenced the appellants to death, but the High Court modified the sentence to life imprisonment while acquitting one co-accused. The appellants conceded their guilt regarding the abduction itself but contended that because the High Court discarded evidence showing actual payment of ransom, conviction under Section 365-A PPC and Section 7(e) ATA was unsustainable and should be altered to simple kidnapping under Section 365 PPC. The Supreme Court affirmed that under Section 365-A PPC and Section 2(n) ATA, actual payment or proof of receipt of ransom is not a mandatory requirement. The offence of kidnapping for ransom is fully constituted if the abduction was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom or if ransom was demanded. Finding the evidence of demand and purpose credible, the Supreme Court upheld the convictions and life sentences, dismissing the appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Is proof of actual payment of ransom necessary to constitute the offence of kidnapping for ransom under Section 365-A PPC and Section 2(n) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Whether the offence under Section 365-A PPC is complete upon establishing that abduction was carried out for the purpose of demanding ransom, irrespective of whether ransom was actually paid?
  • Can a conviction for kidnapping for ransom be sustained solely on credible testimony of the abductee and his father regarding demands made for release?
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• Jumma vs The State2011 SCMR 1428 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-04-03
  jail petitionleave to appealdeath sentenceocular evidencemedical evidencereappraisal of evidencesingle eyewitness
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, which confirmed the death sentence awarded to the petitioner by the Sessions Judge, Rahimyar Khan, for the murder of Mst. Ganwar Mai and causing injuries to the informant, Muhammad Afzal. The petitioner challenged the conviction, arguing that the death sentence was based solely on the testimony of a single eyewitness, Muhammad Afzal, whose evidence lacked credibility and was allegedly contradicted by medical evidence. Upon hearing the arguments from both the petitioner's counsel and the Deputy Prosecutor General, the Supreme Court determined that the evidence presented in the case required a thorough reappraisal to ensure justice. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, allowing the matter to proceed for a detailed examination of the merits of the conviction and sentence based on the conflicting testimonies and medical reports.

  Questions settled

  • Does the testimony of a single eyewitness, when contradicted by medical evidence, necessitate a reappraisal of the case by the Supreme Court?
  • Can a death sentence be sustained solely on the basis of a single eyewitness whose credibility is challenged?
  Read full judgment →
• Jerry Prince vs The State2011 PSC (Crl.) 726 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-08-03
  narcotics smugglingconcurrent findings of factleave to appealappreciation of evidencerecovery of contrabandcriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following the recovery of heroin from the petitioner's suitcase at an airport. The core legal question was whether the conviction was sustainable given the petitioner's contention that the prosecution failed to prove ownership of the suitcase or possession of the contraband. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court. The Court held that it will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts unless the petitioner demonstrates that the findings are based on misread or non-read evidence, are patently improbable, perverse, or result in a grave miscarriage of justice. The Court established that the burden lies heavily on the petitioner to show such infirmities, and as the petitioner failed to raise any substantial question of law or demonstrate that the evidence was misappreciated, the concurrent conviction was maintained.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by lower courts in criminal cases?
  • Does the failure to prove formal ownership of a suitcase containing narcotics invalidate a conviction if the recovery was made from the accused's possession?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to re-examine evidence when a petitioner alleges misreading of evidence by the lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Javed Iqbal and others vs Employees' Oldage Benefits Institution, Government of Pakistan through Regional Head and others2011 PLD Supreme Court 26 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-03-15
  land acquisitionpublic purposemala fidestatutory corporationinvestment rulesejectmentconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses appeals arising from land acquisition and eviction proceedings involving a bungalow in Abbottabad rented by the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Institution (EOBI). The core legal question centered on whether EOBI could lawfully initiate land acquisition proceedings for its regional office without adhering to statutory investment rules, budgetary approvals, and proof of a genuine public purpose, and whether the acquisition lacked good faith. The Supreme Court held that EOBI's initiation of land acquisition proceedings was coram non judice, illegal, mala fide, and lacking in statutory sanction, as EOBI failed to establish mandatory board approvals, budgetary provisions, or compliance with the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976 and its framing rules regarding real estate investments. The Court laid down the principle that statutory bodies like EOBI must strictly comply with governing financial rules, investment limits, and budgetary procedures before acquiring property, and cannot misuse state coercive machinery through land acquisition to subserve private malice or bypass lawful ejectment orders.

  Questions settled

  • Whether section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act would be applicable in the cases in hand?
  • Whether a bungalow can be acquired by way of land acquisition proceedings?
  • Can the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Institution initiate land acquisition proceedings for real estate without complying with the statutory requirements and investment rules framed under the Employees Old Age Benefits Act, 1976?
  • Do land acquisition proceedings initiated to bypass lawful ejectment orders and satisfy personal malice constitute a valid public purpose under the law?
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• Javaid and another vs The State2011 PSC (Crl.) 429 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-11-23
  criminal appealidentification paradeillegal police detentionforensic science laboratory reportcrime emptiesmurderdacoitybenefit of doubtacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction and death sentence of the appellants Javed and Nadeem under Sections 392/34 and 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 7(ii) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The core legal questions involved the reliability of an identification parade where witnesses merely placed hands on the accused without specifying their roles, the credibility of police custody dates contradicted by official inquiry records, and the evidentiary value of forensic reports matching crime empties when weapons and empties were handled while the accused were already in illegal police custody. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and acquitted the appellants. The ratio decidendi is that an identification parade lacking specific physical descriptions and role attribution, combined with proof of prior illegal police custody and delayed dispatch of crime empties, renders the prosecution's case highly doubtful, warranting acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an identification parade where witnesses merely place hands on the accused without specifying individual roles is legally reliable?
  • Does prior illegal detention of the accused by the police vitiate a subsequent identification parade and alleged recoveries?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a Forensic Science Laboratory report matching crime empties when the timing of weapon recovery and dispatch is rendered doubtful?
  • Whether contradictions between official inquiry records regarding the date of arrest and the prosecution's stated arrest date entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt?
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• Jamshaid Asmat alias Sheedu vs The State and others2011 SCMR 1405 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-05-27
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirysupplementary statementdelayed nominationrecovery of stolen property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court refusing post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a case registered under Section 392 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the evidentiary circumstances. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner was not named in the initial F.I.R., and his name surfaced only through a supplementary statement made two months after the occurrence. Furthermore, the credibility of this statement was undermined by the complainant's subsequent exoneration of co-accused persons nominated in the same statement. The Court also noted that the alleged recovery of the stolen property was not from the petitioner's possession, and there was no evidence connecting the recovered cash or weapon to the offence. Holding that the case called for further inquiry into the petitioner's guilt and noting that the investigation was complete, the Court granted post-arrest bail. The principle laid down is that where the prosecution's case rests on delayed identification and questionable recoveries, the accused is entitled to bail pending trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does the delayed nomination of an accused in a supplementary statement, coupled with the exoneration of co-accused by the complainant, constitute grounds for further inquiry regarding bail?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail when the alleged stolen property was not recovered from his personal possession?
  • Does the lack of evidence connecting recovered items to the specific offence charged justify the grant of bail?
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• Jamila Khatoon and others vs Aish Muhammad and others2011 SCMR 222 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-11-11
  AppealCivil RevisionDeclaration suitPossessionLand allotmentMutationFraudLimitationBarred by timeDelay and laches
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, filed under Article 185(2)(d)(e) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that accepted a civil revision, thereby setting aside lower court decisions which had dismissed a suit for declaration and possession. The original suit, initiated in 1989, sought to cancel a land mutation attested in 1956, alleging fraudulent allotment to the respondents' predecessor-in-interest instead of the appellants'. The core legal questions revolved around the rightful claimant to the allotted land, the alleged fraud in the mutation, and critically, whether the suit was barred by limitation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision. The Court held that the suit was "hopelessly barred by time" as it was filed 28 years after the impugned mutation, and the appellants failed to adequately explain the significant delay or prove fraud. The principle laid down was that a suit challenging a mutation must be filed within the period of limitation, and vague averments of lack of knowledge are insufficient to escape the operation of the Limitation Act 1908, especially when there is evidence of earlier knowledge.

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• Khalid Aziz vs The State2011 PSC (Crl.) 8 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-10-05
  National Accountability Bureauassets beyond known sources of incomeburden of proofpresumption of guiltcorruptionacquittalcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal concerns a conviction under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, involving allegations of asset accumulation beyond known sources of income. The core legal question is whether the prosecution successfully established the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 9(a)(v) of the Ordinance, specifically the disproportion between the accused's assets and known income, thereby triggering the burden-shifting presumption under Section 14(c). The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the accused's known sources of income or demonstrate that the assets in question were disproportionate to those sources. The Court reaffirmed that the burden only shifts to the accused to explain their assets once the prosecution has objectively established the accused's public office, the nature/extent of assets, the known sources of income, and the disproportionate nature of the assets. Since the prosecution failed to meet this initial threshold, the presumption of guilt did not arise. Furthermore, the Court found the accused's explanation regarding the disputed funds satisfactory. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential ingredients the prosecution must prove to establish an offence under Section 9(a)(v) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • At what stage does the burden of proof shift to the accused under Section 14(c) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Does the mere possession of pecuniary resources by a public office holder constitute an offence under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • What is the standard of proof required for an accused to discharge the burden of explaining their assets under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
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• Jahangir Sarwar and others vs Lahore High Court and another2011 PLC (C.S.) 704 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-11-08
  judicial service rulesreasonable classificationArticle 25provincial autonomyCivil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrateeligibility criteriaconstitutional equality
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition challenging Rule 7(1)(a) of the Punjab Judicial Service Rules, 1994. The petitioners, employees of various courts, sought to strike down the requirement of two years of law practice for the post of Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate, arguing it was discriminatory under Article 25 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 because the Sindh Judicial Service Rules, 1994, provided exemptions for similar staff. The core legal question was whether the Punjab rules could be equated with the Sindh rules and whether the classification was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that rules framed by one province under its specific statutory authority cannot be applied to another province without adoption. The Court affirmed that Article 25 does not prohibit reasonable classification, provided it rests on a rational basis. The key principle laid down is that the Constitution contemplates different laws for different provinces, and legislative classification based on territorial or administrative considerations is permissible provided it is not arbitrary or capricious.

  Questions settled

  • Can the judicial service rules of one province be applied to another province without formal adoption?
  • Does the requirement of two years of law practice for the post of Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate violate the principle of equality under Article 25 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is the doctrine of reasonable classification applicable to legislative differences between provinces?
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• Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Railways and others vs Abdul Wahid and others2011 SCMR 1836 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-10-27
  Fatal Accidents ActRailway accidentNegligenceContributory negligenceDamagesCompensationVicarious liabilityLife expectancyLevel crossingDuty of care
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court dismissed appeals against High Court judgments and decrees awarding damages under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1885, to legal heirs of three persons who died in a railway accident at a manned level crossing with open gates. The core legal question concerned whether the accident resulted from the Railways' negligence or the deceased's contributory negligence, and the criteria for assessing liability and damages. The Court held that negligence was unequivocally attributable to the Railways for failing to take precautionary measures, such as closing the gate, thereby extending an "invitation" to cross. The principle of 'contributory negligence' was deemed inapplicable unless the Railways proved the victim breached secured safety measures. The Court affirmed vicarious liability for employees' negligence and upheld the criteria for assessing life expectancy (around 65-70 years) and awarding damages for loss of association and future income augmentation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether negligence is attributable to Railways when an accident occurs at a manned level crossing with open gates?
  • Can the plea of 'contributory negligence' be applied against a deceased in a railway accident case where safety measures were not secured?
  • What is the criteria for determining the life expectancy of a deceased for calculating damages under the Fatal Accidents Act?
  • Is an employer vicariously liable for the acts of omission, commission, and negligence of its employees in railway accidents?
  • Can damages for loss of association and future income augmentation be awarded under the Fatal Accidents Act?
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• Islamic Republic of Pakistan and others vs Akhtar Ali Khan2011 SCMR 939 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2009-04-28
  fatal accidentscontributory negligencerash and negligent drivingbrake failureleave to appealcivil liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition impugns the judgment of the Sindh High Court which dismissed High Court Appeal No. 179 of 2007 and upheld the judgment and decree passed in a suit filed under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. The core legal question involved whether the lower forums correctly appreciated the facts regarding the defences of contributory negligence and mechanical failure (brake failure) raised by the petitioner. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was entirely responsible for the accident due to rash and negligent driving, noting that the vehicle dashed against a stationary motorcycle resulting in the death of the deceased, and that the defence of brake failure or contributory negligence could not be sustained on the evidence on record. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal was refused, affirming the liability of the petitioner under the law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employer or vehicle owner can escape liability for a fatal accident by pleading mechanical failure such as brake failure?
  • Does the failure to maintain a vehicle properly constitute rash and negligent driving resulting in liability under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding contributory negligence in a civil suit?
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• Irshad Muhammad Shah vs HESCO and another2011 SCMR 1717 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-06-14
  compulsory retirementdepartmental appealtime-barred appealFederal Service Tribunalpetition for leave to appealmajor penaltystatutory periodservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging an order of the Federal Service Tribunal which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal in limine. The petitioner was awarded the major penalty of compulsory retirement from service via an order dated 10-10-2006, but preferred a departmental appeal on 30-1-2009. The petitioner contended that the penalty could not be imposed without a fair, impartial, and transparent departmental inquiry conducted in accordance with law. The Supreme Court examined the record and affirmed that the departmental appeal was admittedly barred by time. Relying on established precedent, the Court held that where a departmental appeal is not filed within the statutory period and is time-barred, an appeal preferred before the Service Tribunal is incompetent on that account. Finding no legal or procedural irregularity in the Tribunal's order, the Supreme Court held the petition to be devoid of merit and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal before the Service Tribunal is competent if the preceding departmental appeal was barred by time?
  • Can the merits of an inquiry or major penalty be examined when the departmental remedy is not pursued within the statutory limitation period?
  • Is a Service Tribunal justified in dismissing an appeal in limine on the ground that the underlying departmental appeal was time-barred?
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• Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, Lahore and another vs Muhammad Zaman2011 SCMR 1663 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-06-21
  proforma promotionservice tribunalwillful absencereinstatementcompassionate groundsleave without pay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition impugning the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, which had accepted the respondent's appeal, set aside an order dated 9-2-2009, and granted the respondent proforma promotion from the date his juniors were promoted. The core legal question was whether an employee reinstated into service on compassionate grounds after a prolonged period of willful absence, with the intervening period treated as leave without pay, is entitled to proforma promotion. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed the same, setting aside the Tribunal's judgment. The Court held that an employee reinstated purely on compassionate grounds following unauthorized absence, where the absence period is regularized as leave without pay, is not entitled to proforma promotion, and that the Service Tribunal erred in granting such relief without cogent reasons.

  Questions settled

  • Is an employee reinstated into service on compassionate grounds entitled to proforma promotion?
  • Does a period of prolonged willful absence treated as leave without pay qualify an employee for seniority and proforma promotion?
  • Can the Service Tribunal grant proforma promotion without cogent reasons when reinstatement is based on compassion?
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• Independent Music Group SMC (Pvt.) Ltd and another vs Federation of Pakistan and others2011 PLD Supreme Court 805 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-06-06
  satellite TV licencePEMRAwrit of mandamusdelay in statutory disposalsecurity clearanceremand of mattermonopoly and fair competitionconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which had remanded the petitioners' application for a satellite TV broadcast channel licence back to the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) for reconsideration after setting aside the initial refusal based on security clearance. The core legal question was whether the High Court, upon invalidating the refusal of the licence, should have issued a writ of mandamus directing PEMRA to issue the licence rather than remanding the matter. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that where an application has been unjustifiably delayed beyond the statutory period and the refusal order is found unsustainable, remanding the matter causes undue hardship and endless litigation. The key principle laid down is that executive authorities cannot repeatedly invent new grounds or delay applications without legal justification, and upon the setting aside of an improper refusal, the aggrieved party is entitled to the issuance of the licence in accordance with law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court, upon setting aside an illegal refusal of a licence by PEMRA, ought to issue a writ of mandamus instead of remanding the matter?
  • Does an applicant acquire a right to the issuance of a licence when their application is kept pending beyond the statutory period without lawful rejection?
  • Is an executive authority permitted to raise fresh objections or withhold a licence on grounds not part of the original refusal order?
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• In the matter of: Suo Motu Case No. 24 of 2010 (Regarding Corruption in Hajj Arrangements in 2010) vs Not2011 PLC (C.S.) 1076 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-03-11
  suo moture-employment on contractsuperannuationdiscriminationArticle 25Article 9disciplinary forcesinvestigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This suo motu proceeding arose out of corruption in Hajj arrangements, wherein the Supreme Court of Pakistan also examined the legality and propriety of re-employing public servants on contract after reaching superannuation. The core legal questions involved the scope of post-superannuation contractual appointments in federal and provincial governments, the applicability of Article 9 of the Constitution, and whether retaining specific officers while terminating others amounted to discriminatory treatment under Article 25. The Supreme Court observed that while several re-employed members of disciplinary forces had been terminated, the Director-General FIA was retained despite adverse judicial observations, prima facie violating Article 25. The court directed the Federal Government and Secretary Establishment to collect comprehensive details of all contract employees across all ministries. The Court adjourned the matter to enable the Federation to file its formal response and issued notice to the Attorney-General for Pakistan regarding the interpretation of constitutional provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the retention of a specific officer on post-superannuation contract while terminating similarly placed officers violate Article 25 of the Constitution?
  • Can the scope of re-employment of public servants on contract after superannuation be tested under Article 9 of the Constitution?
  • Whether the Supreme Court can issue directions to collect data and review contractual re-employments of superannuated officers across government ministries?
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• In the matter of vs Not2011 PLC 123 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2010-11-04
  Lady Health Workersminimum wagefundamental rightsright to livelihoodequality of citizenscontractual employeespublic policy
  Summary & questions settled

  These proceedings were initiated on an anonymous application and subsequent human rights cases concerning the service conditions and low remuneration of Lady Health Workers, Lady Health Supervisors, Accounts Supervisors, and Drivers under the National Program for Family Planning and Primary Health Care. The core legal question was whether the government could pay such contractual health workers wages below the statutory minimum wage and whether disparate pay scales violated fundamental rights to life and equality. The Supreme Court held that the government, as a welfare state, must adhere to minimum wage principles and that contractual terms violating public policy or providing discriminatory wages are unenforceable. The Court ruled that all such workers are entitled to a minimum wage of Rs. 7,000 per month and directed the government to rationalize their salaries based on the nature of their duties, laying down the principle that fundamental rights under Articles 9 and 25 of the Constitution prohibit discriminatory compensation by state organs regardless of contractual status.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the government can pay contractual employees wages lower than the statutory minimum wage?
  • Does payment of sub-minimum wages to government health workers violate Articles 9 and 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Are employment contracts accepting less than the minimum wage enforceable against public welfare principles?
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