Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Malik Hayat vs Supreme Appellate Court of Sindhii at Karachi and 21995 PLD Supreme Court 505 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-11
  speedy trialsspecial courtsjurisdictional defectcoram non judiceconstitutional petitionappellate finalityscheduled offences
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a constitutional petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, challenging his conviction by a Special Court for Speedy Trials and the subsequent dismissal of his appeal by the Supreme Appellate Court. The petitioner argued that his trial for an offence under Section 489-C of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was coram non judice because that offence was not listed in the schedule of the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act 1992. The Supreme Court observed that Section 2(c) of the Act empowers the Federal Government to transfer cases involving non-scheduled offences if they are deemed gruesome, brutal, or sensational. The Court held that the petitioner failed to raise this objection during trial and that the offence fell within the ambit of the Act's criteria for transfer. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that Article 212-B of the Constitution bars interference with proceedings of the Supreme Appellate Court, which is the final forum under the special law, except in extraordinary cases of jurisdictional defects. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as non-maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to interfere with judgments of the Supreme Appellate Court constituted under the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act 1992?
  • Can the Federal Government transfer cases to a Special Court for Speedy Trials for offences not specifically mentioned in the schedule of the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act 1992?
  • Is a trial conducted by a Special Court for Speedy Trials coram non judice if the offence is not listed in the Act's schedule but meets the criteria for transfer under Section 2(c)?
  • Does Article 212-B of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 bar the Supreme Court from interfering in proceedings of the Supreme Appellate Court?
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• Mahmood Ahmad and others vs The State1995 SCMR 1242 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-11
  bail cancellationleave to appealtentative assessmenttrial prejudicecriminal trial
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, facing trial under sections 302, 149, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sought leave to appeal against the High Court's order cancelling the bail previously granted to them by the Sessions Judge. The core legal question concerned the propriety of cancelling bail and the potential prejudice caused by strong observations made by the High Court during the cancellation proceedings. The Supreme Court of Pakistan declined to interfere with the cancellation of bail as the trial had already commenced and two witnesses had been examined, holding that it would be improper to consider the merits of bail at this advanced stage. However, the Court addressed the grievance regarding the High Court's uncautioned remarks, holding that such observations must be treated as strictly tentative and ad hoc, relevant solely to the bail matter. The key principle laid down is that observations made during bail proceedings must not influence the trial court in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused, which must be decided entirely on the evidence adduced during the trial. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused with cautionary directions to the trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the cancellation of bail when the trial has already commenced and witnesses have been examined?
  • Do observations made by a superior court in a bail matter prejudice the trial court's determination of guilt or innocence?
  • How should a trial court treat observations made by an appellate or revisional court in a bail order during the ongoing trial?
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• M4. Kishwara and 6 others vs Sher Azam and 4 others1995 SCMR 75 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-20
  leave to appealgift deedmutationconcurrent findingsmisreading of evidenceinheritance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the plaintiffs against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 20-3-1993, which dismissed their civil revision and upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The core legal question concerns whether the lower courts committed misreading and non-reading of evidence while upholding an unregistered gift deed and subsequent mutation regarding the disputed land. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the three courts below were based on a proper appreciation of evidence, noting that the donor had validly executed the gift in favor of the respondents who had cared for her after she was turned out by her brother. Consequently, the Court found no ground of misreading or non-reading of evidence. The petition for leave to appeal was refused, affirming the validity of the concurrent findings upholding the gift transaction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of lower courts regarding the execution of a gift deed can be interfered with on the ground of misreading of evidence?
  • Does a gift executed by an unmarried sister in favour of her nephews in equal share, due to her brother's second marriage and neglect, constitute a valid transaction?
  • Is an unregistered gift deed given effect through a revenue mutation legally sustainable when its execution is duly proved by evidence?
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• M. Y. Malik & Co. and 2 others vs Spendlours International1995 SCMR 922 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-01-08
  review petitioncivil appealcommercial disputeerror apparent on the face of the recordappreciation of evidencefirm liabilities
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition arises from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissing a civil appeal concerning monetary claims in a commercial dispute. The core legal question involved whether the High Court and the Supreme Court had committed errors patent on the face of the record by overlooking material evidence while disallowing certain payments claimed by the petitioners, specifically amounts of Rs. 50,000 paid to Mrs. Azra Shaikh, Rs. 2,00,000 paid to Azam Qureshi, and Rs. 7,00,000 on account of pledged goods. The Supreme Court held that the review petition succeeded in part, finding that documentary and oral evidence regarding the payments to Mrs. Azra Shaikh and Azam Qureshi had indeed been overlooked, thereby establishing that those amounts were paid towards the discharge of the firm's liabilities. Consequently, the Court reviewed its earlier judgment, upheld the two disputed claims, and reduced the decretal amount accordingly, while affirming the disallowance of the claim for pledged goods. The key principle laid down is that a judgment is liable to review under established principles when material evidence patent on the record has been overlooked, resulting in an erroneous factual finding.

  Questions settled

  • Can a judgment of the Supreme Court be reviewed when material evidence on the record has been overlooked?
  • Whether payments made to third parties can be credited towards the discharge of a firm's liabilities upon proof of proper authorization?
  • Is a review petition maintainable to correct factual misappreciations apparent from the record?
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• M. Ashraf Parwaz vs Prof. Asghar Ali Naaz1995 SCMR 45 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-27
  summary suitleave to defendlimitationsecurity depositleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of the petitioner's appeal by the High Court, which upheld the trial court's decree in favor of the respondent. The respondent had filed a summary suit under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for the refund of a security deposit amounting to Rs. 30,000 deposited upon his appointment as a college principal. The petitioner failed to seek leave to appear and defend within the prescribed period and his belated application was dismissed as time-barred, supported by an inadequate medical certificate. The core legal question concerned whether leave to defend a summary suit could be granted upon a time-barred application without satisfactory explanation, and whether refund of security could be withheld pending a separate recovery suit. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts correctly dismissed the time-barred application and that the respondent's undisputed security refund should not be delayed pending the outcome of the petitioner's separate embezzlement suit. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a belated application for leave to appear and defend a summary suit can be entertained without a satisfactory explanation and proper medical coverage for the relevant period?
  • Can the refund of a security deposit, admitted to be refundable upon the termination of employment, be withheld pending the outcome of a separate recovery suit filed by the employer?
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• Liaqat vs The State1995 SCMR 858 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-09
  leave to appealcounsel authorityconcession by counselcriminal appealnon-compoundable offencewithdrawal of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which maintained the petitioner's convictions under sections 148 and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, despite acquitting him of other charges following a compromise. The core legal question is whether a defense counsel in a criminal case possesses the authority to withdraw an appeal or concede guilt on behalf of an accused, thereby binding the accused to that decision, particularly when the underlying offense is non-compoundable. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether such a concession by counsel, made without the explicit authorization of the accused, is legally valid or if the court is obligated to decide the case on its merits regardless of the counsel's stance. The key principle to be determined is the extent of a defense counsel's authority to make concessions in criminal proceedings and whether such actions can prejudice the rights of the accused when they contradict the accused's interests or lack express authorization.

  Questions settled

  • Can a defense counsel in a criminal case validly withdraw an appeal or concede the guilt of an accused without the accused's express authorization?
  • Is a court obligated to decide a criminal appeal on its merits even if the defense counsel chooses not to press the appeal regarding specific convictions?
  • Does a concession made by counsel regarding a non-compoundable offense bind the accused in criminal proceedings?
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• Liaqat and anothers vs The State1995 SCMR 1819 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-24
  statutory bailsuspension of sentenceappellate baildelay in appealcriminal procedurediscretionary power
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two criminal petitions involving the interpretation of Section 426(1-A)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the suspension of sentences and grant of bail to convicts when appeals remain undecided beyond the statutory two-year period. The core legal question was whether an appellate court can deny bail under this provision based on the merits of the case or other discretionary factors. The Supreme Court held that Section 426(1-A) confers an independent statutory right to bail upon the expiry of the specified period, distinct from the court's discretionary power to suspend sentences on merits under Section 426(1). Consequently, the appellate court cannot deny bail under subsection (1-A) solely on the merits of the conviction. However, the court may still refuse bail for reasons unrelated to merits, such as the likelihood of the convict repeating the offence or if the appeal is imminent. The Court clarified that while the specific provisos of Section 497 do not apply to Section 426, the underlying principles regarding the prevention of further offences remain relevant considerations.

  Questions settled

  • Does the expiry of the statutory period under Section 426(1-A), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, create an absolute right to bail?
  • Can an appellate court deny bail under Section 426(1-A), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, based solely on the merits of the conviction?
  • Are the considerations for refusing bail under the provisos to Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, relevant when deciding bail applications under Section 426(1-A)?
  • Does Section 426(1-A), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, apply to appeals involving a sentence of death?
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• Liaqat Ali vs The State1995 SCMR 1310 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-14
  ocular testimonyballistic expertpolice encounterillegal possession of armscriminal appealapprehension at the spotmurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged a High Court judgment maintaining the appellant's conviction for murder and illegal possession of arms following a police encounter. The core legal questions were whether the absence of fouling in a recovered firearm negates credible ocular testimony, and whether the appellant's claim of being in prior police custody was substantiated. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that consistent ocular testimony from police witnesses, corroborated by the recovery of the weapon at the scene, outweighs technical evidence such as the absence of fouling in a firearm. The Court established that where prosecution witnesses lack personal animosity, their testimony regarding an encounter and apprehension at the spot is reliable, even if minor technical discrepancies exist. Furthermore, the Court held that inconsistent pleas by an accused regarding their arrest status undermine their credibility. The Court rejected speculative arguments regarding friendly fire, emphasizing that the prosecution's case was supported by overwhelming evidence of the appellant's participation in the occurrence and subsequent apprehension.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of fouling in a recovered firearm necessarily negate the ocular testimony of eyewitnesses?
  • Can an accused's inconsistent pleas regarding their arrest status undermine their defense?
  • Is the testimony of police officials reliable in the absence of personal animosity against the accused?
  • Does the recovery of a weapon at the scene of an encounter corroborate the prosecution's version of events?
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• Liaqat Ali Jatoi vs The State1995 SCMR 1082 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-20
  protective bailbail before arresttransfer of proceedingspolitical victimizationconstitutional petitionanti-corruption
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a Constitution petition under Article 186-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, seeking the transfer of his bail-before-arrest application from the High Court of Sindh to another High Court. The petitioner alleged that he faced political victimization and feared for his life and liberty upon entering the Province of Sindh due to his political affiliation with the Muslim League (N) and his opposition to the provincial government. He further alleged that the Anti-Corruption Establishment had registered an FIR against him for offences under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, leading to harassment of his family. The Supreme Court, noting the petitioner's apprehension and the assurance provided by the Advocate-General of Sindh that the petitioner would not be arrested, declined to transfer the case. Instead, the Court granted protective bail for a period of two weeks or until the petitioner surrendered before the High Court of Sindh, whichever occurred earlier, thereby enabling the petitioner to pursue his legal remedies in the appropriate forum without immediate threat of arrest.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court transfer a bail application from one High Court to another under Article 186-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is protective bail an appropriate remedy when a petitioner fears arrest while traveling to surrender before a High Court?
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• Lawrancepur Woollen and Textile Mills Ltd., Dawoodabad, District1995 SCMR 782 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-01
  misconductsubversive of disciplineindustrial disputereinstatementwrit petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing in limine a writ petition filed by an employer, Lawrancepur Woollen and Textile Mills Limited, challenging the reinstatement of an employee. The respondent employee had addressed a letter to the General Manager and Labour Department alleging that his transfer was a device to force his resignation. The management charged him with misconduct under clause (h) of sub-paragraph (3) of Standing Order 15 of the Schedule to the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, and terminated his service. The Labour Court ordered reinstatement, which was upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court examined whether the allegations levelled by the employee against the management constituted an act subversive of discipline amounting to misconduct. Finding that the contentions raised require further examination in light of precedent, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether writing a letter of complaint by an employee to management and the Labour Department alleging unfair transfer practices amounts to misconduct as an act subversive of discipline?
  • Does a charge sheet failing to disclose any misconduct vitiate the termination of an industrial worker?
  • Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing in limine the constitutional petition against an order of reinstatement of a workman?
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• Land Reforms Commission, Punjab, Lahore and anothers vs Mst. Azra1995 SCMR 890 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-08
  land reformsleave to appealinterim reliefconstitutional petitionproduce index unitsland holding ceiling
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an interim order passed by the High Court, which admitted a Constitution Petition for regular hearing and granted interim relief to the respondents. The dispute originated from proceedings initiated by the Land Reforms Commission under the Land Reforms Act, 1977, regarding the respondent's land holdings and the failure to file a declaration by the statutory deadline. The petitioners challenged the High Court's decision to admit the petition, arguing that the legal position was already settled by the Supreme Court in Sardar Ali v. Muhammad Ali (PLD 1988 SC 287). The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the High Court's interim order, reasoning that since the petition was already admitted for regular hearing, the petitioners would have a full opportunity to present their arguments and cite the relevant precedent before the High Court. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal, while expressing an expectation that the High Court would dispose of the pending Constitution Petition expeditiously.

  Questions settled

  • Should the Supreme Court interfere with an interim order of the High Court admitting a constitutional petition for regular hearing?
  • Is it appropriate for the Supreme Court to grant leave to appeal when the petitioner has the opportunity to argue the merits of the case before the High Court?
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• Lal Khan vs Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and another1995 SCMR 1758 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-06
  termination of servicemisconductdomestic inquirydefinition of employerpower of attorneylabour disputeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a security guard for misconduct involving the physical assault and verbal abuse of a co-worker. The petitioner challenged his dismissal on the ground that the Manager of Personnel and Administration, who appointed the inquiry officer and issued the dismissal order, was not the competent 'employer' under the law, arguing that only the Factory Manager possessed such authority. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the definition of 'employer' under Section 2(c) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, and the procedural requirements of Standing Order 15(4). The Court held that the Board of Directors, as the owner of the establishment, had validly executed a power of attorney authorizing the Manager of Personnel and Administration to appoint inquiry officers and dismiss workmen. Furthermore, Standing Order 15(4) does not require the approval of the employer to be in writing, nor does it mandate that the inquiry officer be appointed directly by the employer, provided the employer's approval for dismissal is obtained. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Manager of Personnel and Administration exercise the powers of an employer to dismiss a workman if authorized by a power of attorney executed by the Board of Directors?
  • Does Standing Order 15(4) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 require the employer's approval for dismissal to be in writing?
  • Is it legally mandatory under Standing Order 15(4) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 that the inquiry officer be appointed directly by the employer?
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• Lal Bakhsh and 2 others vs The State1995 SCMR 1122 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-10-17
  criminal appealmurderocular testimonycorroborationacquittalappreciation of evidencenight occurrence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellants for the murder of two individuals. The core legal question concerned the reliability of the ocular testimony provided by prosecution witnesses regarding a night-time occurrence. The Supreme Court observed that the incident took place at 2:00 a.m. in the open, and the witnesses, who were at a distance or inside a locked shop, were unlikely to have identified the assailants in the dark. Furthermore, the prosecution materially improved its version of the motive at trial, and the recovery evidence was deemed unreliable by the trial court. The Supreme Court held that the ocular testimony lacked credibility and required independent corroboration, which was absent in this case. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and sentences, acquitting the appellants. The judgment reaffirms the principle that where ocular evidence is suspect due to the circumstances of the crime, such as night-time visibility issues and distance, it cannot support a capital conviction without reliable corroborative evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on ocular testimony when the occurrence took place at night and the witnesses' presence is doubtful?
  • Is independent corroboration required for ocular testimony when the circumstances of the crime make identification of the culprits unlikely?
  • Can an appellate court rely on recovery evidence that the trial court rejected without providing sufficient reasoning?
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• Laiq Ahmad vs Mst. Shamshad Anwar1995 SCMR 214 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-26
  rent defaultevictionburden of proofrented premisesmoney ordertenancy dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute between a tenant and a landlady regarding an eviction order based on default in rent payment. The landlady filed an application under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, alleging default in rent from July 1984 to January 1985. The tenant contended that rent for July, August, and September 1984 had been paid to the landlady's attorney, who failed to issue receipts, and that subsequent rent was sent via money orders. The Rent Controller initially dismissed the eviction application; however, the High Court reversed this decision, finding the tenant in default. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the tenant had sufficiently proven the alleged payments. The Court held that the burden of proof rested on the tenant to establish payment when the landlady denied receipt. The tenant failed to produce the intermediary witness (A. Rehman) or the postman to verify the money orders. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's judgment, ruling that the tenant failed to substantiate the plea of payment, thereby confirming the eviction order for default.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proof shift to the tenant to prove payment of rent when the landlord denies receiving it?
  • Is the failure to produce a material witness who allegedly received rent on behalf of a landlord fatal to a tenant's plea of payment?
  • Can a tenant rely on money order coupons as proof of payment if the addressee denies receipt and the postman is not examined?
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• Lachman Das vs Servanand and 66 others1995 SCMR 435 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-11
  election petitionvote tabulationreturning officer reportremandelection tribunalarithmetical errorappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an Election Tribunal's decision that set aside the appellant's election to a reserved seat in the Provincial Assembly of Sindh and declared the respondent elected instead. The dispute arose from alleged arithmetical errors and miscalculations in the tabulation of votes by the Returning Officer. The Tribunal had relied solely on the Returning Officer's report without independently examining the underlying tally sheets (Forms XVI-B) to verify the accuracy of the vote counts. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal failed to exercise its jurisdiction properly by deciding the matter without examining the primary documents, which were essential for determining the truth of the alleged miscalculations. The Court emphasized that in election disputes involving contested vote tallies, the Tribunal must satisfy itself through the examination of relevant records rather than relying exclusively on a report. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the Tribunal's decision and remanded the case for a fresh determination, directing the Tribunal to re-examine the Returning Officer and the relevant documents to ensure a just and accurate resolution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Election Tribunal can decide an election petition based on a Returning Officer's report without examining the primary tally sheets?
  • Does an appellate court have the inherent power to consider documents necessary for the ends of justice even if not formally placed on record by a party?
  • Is the burden of proof on the petitioner to establish miscalculation of votes in an election dispute?
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• Kohisar Flour Mills, Mansehra and others vs Government of N.W.F.P.1995 PLD Supreme Court 647 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-28
  octroi taxtaxation proposallocal governmentstatutory procedureultra viresconstitutional petitiontax modification
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed a constitutional challenge to a government notification enhancing the octroi tax on grains. The petitioners, representing flour mills, challenged the government's action of increasing the tax rate from Re.0.50 to Rs.2 per quintal, arguing that the enhancement was ultra vires the N.-W.F.P. Local Government Ordinance, 1979, and the N.-W.F.P. Local Councils (Imposition of Taxes) Rules, 1980. The core legal question is whether the government was legally competent to revise the Octroi Schedule without adhering to the procedural requirements of previous publication and public notice mandated by the Ordinance and the Rules. The High Court had previously held that such procedural compliance was unnecessary as the action did not constitute a 'new' taxation proposal. The Supreme Court, finding a question of law of public importance regarding the scope of the government's power to modify existing tax rates without following statutory procedures, granted leave to appeal to examine the validity of the notification and the applicability of the procedural safeguards prescribed in the relevant legislation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the government is legally competent to revise an Octroi Schedule without complying with the procedural requirements of section 135 of the N.-W.F.P. Local Government Ordinance 1979?
  • Does the enhancement of an existing tax rate require adherence to the procedures laid down in rules 3, 4, and 5 of the N.-W.F.P. Local Councils (Imposition of Taxes) Rules 1980?
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• Kifayatullah vs Fidayat Shah, Executive Engineer, Peshawar and 51995 PLC (C.S.) 738 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-18
  service matterjurisdiction of High CourtService Tribunalconstitutional barinterim orderleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an interim order passed by the High Court of Peshawar in Writ Petition No. 449 of 1994. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court was justified in entertaining the writ petition and passing the impugned order, given the constitutional and statutory bar contained in Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan read with section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 regarding matters relating to the terms and conditions of civil servants. Granting leave to consider this bar, the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the interim order passed by the High Court shall remain operative until the final hearing of the appeal. The key principle laid down is that the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 is ousted in service matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal under Article 212.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition in service matters in view of the bar contained in Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Does section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court over matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of civil servants?
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• Kifayat Ullah vs Fidayat Shah and 5 others1995 SCMR 998 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-18
  service tribunaljurisdiction of High Courtconstitutional barterms and conditions of serviceleave to appealinterim order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning an interim order passed by the High Court of Peshawar in Writ Petition No. 449 of 1994. The core legal question is whether the High Court was justified in passing the impugned order in view of the constitutional bar contained in Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan read with section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1974, which restricts the jurisdiction of civil courts and high courts in matters relating to the terms and conditions of civil servants. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider this jurisdictional question and ordered that the interim order dated 27-9-1994 shall remain operative until the final hearing of the appeal. The principle laid down involves the delineation of the exclusive jurisdiction of Service Tribunals vis-a-vis the constitutional writ jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 212.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition in service matters in view of the bar contained in Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan read with section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1974?
  • Are the High Courts justified in passing interim orders in matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal?
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• Khurshid Ahmed Goreja vs The Appellate Authority through Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and 2 others1995 PLC (C.S.) 92 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-04-20
  civil servantService Tribunal jurisdictionlienretirement benefitsstatutory bodyemployment status
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged a judgment by the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal against his demotion from BPS-19 to BPS-18 by the Pakistan Council of Appropriate Technology (PCAT). The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who had previously served in the Telephone and Telegraph Department, retained the status of a 'civil servant' at the time of his demotion, thereby invoking the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had voluntarily retired from his original civil service position in the Telephone and Telegraph Department in 1982, availing himself of pensionary benefits and severing his lien. Consequently, his subsequent employment with the Appropriate Technology Development Organisation (later PCAT) did not constitute civil service. The Court affirmed the Tribunal's finding that the petitioner was not a civil servant at the time of the impugned order. The key principle established is that an individual who severs their lien with a government department through retirement and pension withdrawal ceases to be a civil servant, and subsequent employment in a statutory body does not restore that status for the purposes of Service Tribunal jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employee who retires from a government department and draws pensionary benefits retain their status as a civil servant?
  • Can a Service Tribunal exercise jurisdiction over an employee who is not a civil servant at the time of the impugned order?
  • Does continued service in a statutory body after retirement from a government department restore the original status of a civil servant?
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• Khan Muhammad and anothers vs S.H.O., Police Station Phool Nagar1995 SCMR 1283 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-15
  habeas corpusillegal detentionpersonal libertypolice custodyinvestigationsummary remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order passed by a High Court Judge in a habeas corpus petition. The core legal question was whether a court, upon finding that a person was illegally detained by police without any record or justification, could properly direct that the person be taken into custody again to 'complete formalities' for investigation. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in issuing such a direction. The ratio of the decision is that once a court determines that detention is illegal and without justification, it must set the detenu free. The court cannot issue directions for future arrest or custody based on vague assertions by investigating officers, as this undermines personal liberty and prejudges the investigation process. The key principle laid down is that habeas corpus is a summary remedy to address illegal detention; courts must not be misled by unsubstantiated police claims to justify illegal acts and should instead hold delinquent officers accountable for violations of personal liberty.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, direct that a detenu be taken into custody after finding the initial detention illegal?
  • Is it permissible for a court to order the arrest of a person based on a vague statement by an investigating officer that the person is required for investigation?
  • What is the scope of a court's authority in a habeas corpus petition when the detention is found to be without legal justification?
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• Khalil Ahmed and anothers vs The State and another1995 SCMR 836 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-15
  leave to appealconviction challengeacquittalreappraisal of evidencemedical evidenceocular evidencelimitation period
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two petitions for leave to appeal filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The first petition, filed by the complainant, challenged the acquittal of a respondent, while the second petition, filed by two convicts, challenged their conviction under Section 302/34 and Section 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, as maintained by the Lahore High Court. The core legal questions concerned whether the delay in filing the complainant's petition was excusable and whether the conviction of the petitioners was supported by reliable evidence. Regarding the complainant's petition, the Court held that the 23-day delay was not satisfactorily explained and refused leave to appeal. Regarding the convicts' petition, the Court observed that the complainant's testimony was contradicted by documentary evidence regarding the deceased's previous criminal involvement and enmities. Additionally, the Court noted discrepancies between medical evidence and ocular testimony, alongside issues regarding the recovery of empties. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to the convicts to allow for a full reappraisal of the evidence to ensure the proper administration of criminal justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal that lacks a satisfactory explanation warrants the refusal of leave?
  • Does a contradiction between ocular evidence and medical evidence necessitate a reappraisal of the entire evidence in a criminal case?
  • Can the denial of facts by a complainant on oath, when contradicted by documentary evidence, constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal against a conviction?
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• Khalid Khan vs Senior Member, Board of Revenue and others1995 SCMR 1817 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-05
  Naib-Tehsildar recruitmentministerial quotaadministrative discretionstandardization of criteriaage relaxationservice lawdepartmental promotion committee
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the selection process for the post of Naib-Tehsildar under the West Pakistan Naib-Tehsildari and Tehsildari Service Rules, 1962. The petitioner, a Senior Clerk, challenged the selection of other candidates for the ministerial quota, alleging a lack of transparent criteria in the Departmental Promotion Committee's decision-making process. The core legal question is whether the selection on merit from the ministerial service is valid when the selecting authority fails to establish or apply manifest, standardized criteria for the comparative evaluation of candidates. Additionally, the petition questions the validity of age relaxation granted to a selected candidate when other eligible candidates were available. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting the absence of minutes or records demonstrating that the Selection Committee's discretion was exercised through standardized, meaningful principles. The Court emphasized the principle that where legislative bodies delegate discretionary power to administrative authorities, those authorities must develop and apply manifest standards to confine their discretion, ensuring that selection processes are not arbitrary or devoid of objective evaluation.

  Questions settled

  • Is a selection process for promotion valid if the selecting authority fails to establish and apply manifest, standardized criteria for the comparative evaluation of candidates?
  • Does the delegation of discretionary power to administrative bodies require the development of manifest principles to confine that discretion?
  • Can age relaxation be granted to a candidate for a promotional post when a sufficient number of eligible competing candidates are available?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Javed vs Ansar Khan and others1995 SCMR 1846 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-11
  leave to appealmurdergrave and sudden provocationburden of proofreduction of sentenceimprisonment for lifedeath penaltymotive
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal filed respectively by the convict against the High Court judgment reducing his sentence from death to imprisonment for life, and by the brother of the deceased seeking restoration of the death sentence. The petitioner was tried and convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for murder. The core legal questions involved the determination of whether the plea of grave and sudden provocation under Exception 1 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code was established, and whether the withholding of the true motive by the prosecution justified withholding the death penalty. The Supreme Court held that where an accused admits killing, the burden is upon him to prove diminished liability, which he failed to discharge as no evidence or surrounding circumstances supported his belated plea of provocation. Furthermore, the Court held that where the prosecution withholds the true motive for the crime, reduction of the death sentence to imprisonment for life is justified. Both petitions for leave to appeal were accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proof shift to the accused when he admits to killing another person?
  • Can a plea of grave and sudden provocation be accepted without supporting evidence or circumstances appearing from the prosecution evidence?
  • Does the withholding of the true motive by the prosecution justify not imposing the extreme penalty of death?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Hussain , vs The Chancellor (Governor of Punjab) and 4 others1995 SCMR 738 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-29
  delegation of powersfinancial powersaggrieved personconstitutional petitionmaintainabilityleave to appealspecial costs
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal was filed against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's constitutional petition with special costs. The petitioner, an executive engineer at the University of Engineering and Technology, challenged a series of administrative orders that curtailed his delegated financial powers. The core legal question was whether an employee possesses a legally enforceable right in respect of administrative financial powers delegated to him. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and upheld the High Court's dismissal, holding that the petition was misconceived. The Court established that delegation of financial powers is merely an administrative arrangement intended to assist an employee in performing duties efficiently and does not confer any legal or quasi-legal right on the employee. Consequently, an employee cannot be considered an aggrieved person entitled to invoke constitutional jurisdiction when such powers are modified or withdrawn.

  Questions settled

  • Does the delegation of financial powers to a public employee confer any legal or quasi-legal right on that employee?
  • Can an employee challenge the curtailment or withdrawal of his delegated financial powers through a constitutional petition?
  • Is an employee considered an 'aggrieved person' when administrative powers delegated to him for duty efficiency are curtailed?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Altaf Hussain vs Mrs. Fahmida Malik and 3 others1995 SCMR 156 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-11
  leave to appealexecution applicationprocedural orderadjournmentHigh Court discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order passed by a Judge in Chambers of the Lahore High Court, which had directed that an execution application be fixed for hearing on a specific date with the consent of all counsel, while also stipulating that no further adjournments would be granted. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's procedural order fixing a date for the hearing of an execution application and denying further adjournments suffered from any legal infirmity or illegality. Upon hearing the petitioner's counsel, the Supreme Court found that the petitioner was unable to demonstrate any error, illegality, or infirmity in the impugned order. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the petition lacked merit. The court affirmed the High Court's discretion in managing its own docket and ensuring the expeditious disposal of execution proceedings. The petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused, reinforcing the principle that appellate courts will not interfere with routine procedural orders of the High Court unless a clear legal error is established.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's procedural order fixing a date for the hearing of an execution application?
  • Does a High Court have the authority to refuse further adjournments in an execution application?
  Read full judgment →
• Kh. Allah Bakhsh and 5 others vs Ghulam Muhammad and 11 others1995 SCMR 747 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-07-20
  evacuee propertymortgageprescriptionrejection of plaintleave to appealdeclaration suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of the trial court, the Additional District Judge, and the High Court, which rejected the petitioners' plaint in a suit for declaration. The petitioners, claiming to be mortgagees of land previously owned by Hindus who migrated to India, sought a declaration that the mortgage was over 60 years old at the time of Independence, thereby extinguishing the mortgagors' rights through prescription. The land had been treated as evacuee property and transferred to the respondents' predecessor-in-interest. The core legal question was whether the petitioners could establish that the mortgage was sufficiently aged to trigger prescriptive rights. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to substantiate their claim regarding the age of the mortgage. Upon review, the Court found that the mortgage was created in 1910, meaning it was not 60 years old at the time of Independence. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that the petitioners' assertion lacked factual foundation.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mortgage created in 1910 satisfy the requirement of being 60 years old at the time of Independence in 1947?
  • Can a suit for declaration regarding the expiration of a mortgage by prescription be maintained if the mortgage is not 60 years old at the time of Independence?
  Read full judgment →
• Karim Bakhsh and others vs Ghulam Hussain and others1995 SCMR 58 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-12-19
  pre-emptionimprovement of statussale considerationright of pre-emptionagricultural landsubsequent sale
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order regarding a pre-emption dispute over agricultural land. The core legal question was whether a subsequent sale of land, executed after the filing of a pre-emption suit, could effectively improve the status of the vendees (petitioners) to match or exceed that of the pre-emptors, thereby defeating the pre-emption claim. The Supreme Court held that such a subsequent sale, made with the intent to defeat the rights of pre-emptors, does not constitute an improvement in status and is invalid under the relevant statutory provisions. Furthermore, the Court addressed the issue of sale consideration, noting that findings on market value not challenged before the High Court remain binding. Consequently, the Court upheld the High Court's decision regarding the pre-emption right but modified the decree to reflect the sale price determined by the appellate court, granting the respondents a specific timeframe to pay the balance amount. The key principle established is that a vendee cannot improve their status through a transaction executed after the initiation of a pre-emption suit to defeat the pre-emptor's superior right.

  Questions settled

  • Can a vendee improve their status to defeat a pre-emption claim through a sale transaction executed after the filing of the pre-emption suit?
  • Does a sale made with the specific object of defeating the rights of pre-emptors constitute a valid improvement of status?
  • Are findings regarding sale consideration and market value that were not challenged before the High Court binding in subsequent appellate proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. and anothers vs Karachi1995 SCMR 1762 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-07
  octroi dutylevy of taxelectricity as goodsretrospective taxationlocal government taxationstatutory compliance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the validity of imposing octroi duty on electricity by the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation. The Karachi Electric Supply Corporation challenged the levy, arguing that electricity does not constitute 'goods' subject to octroi and that the 1982 taxation proposal could not be revived in 1991 without fresh compliance with statutory procedures. The High Court previously held that while electricity constitutes 'goods', the 1982 proposal had been abandoned due to inaction, and the subsequent 1991 notification could not impose retrospective taxation. Both parties filed petitions for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in both petitions to examine whether electricity qualifies as 'goods' for octroi purposes and whether the local council possesses the authority to impose such taxes retrospectively under the relevant local government legislation. The case remains pending for final adjudication after the summer vacation.

  Questions settled

  • Does electricity constitute 'goods' for the purpose of levying octroi duty?
  • Can a local council impose octroi duty retrospectively under the Sindh Local Government Ordinance 1979?
  • Can a taxation proposal initiated in 1982 be revived in 1991 without fresh compliance with statutory procedures?
  Read full judgment →
• Junaid Ahmad Khan vs Chief Engineer and others1995 SCMR 697 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-30
  service tribunalleave to appealdismissal for non-prosecutionrestoration applicationseniority disputenegligence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the order of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had dismissed his service appeal and subsequent restoration applications for non-prosecution. The core legal question pertained to whether sufficient and unintentional grounds were shown for the absence of the petitioner and his counsel, and whether the Supreme Court should interfere with concurrent orders of dismissal for default in a service matter involving seniority disputes. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was negligent in prosecuting his appeal and restoration applications, and no substantial question of public importance was involved to warrant interference under its constitutional jurisdiction. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that habitual negligence in pursuing legal remedies before a service tribunal does not merit Supreme Court intervention.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an order of the Service Tribunal dismissing an appeal for non-prosecution when the petitioner is found negligent?
  • Does a service dispute regarding seniority alone involve a substantial question of public importance warranting Supreme Court jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Jehandad vs Malik Altaf Hussain and 3 others1995 SCMR 863 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-10
  pre-arrest bailcriminal house trespassoutraging modestymala fidebail cancellationcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court order granting pre-arrest bail to respondents accused of criminal house trespass and outraging the modesty of women. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in granting pre-arrest bail given the nature of the allegations and the absence of evidence suggesting mala fide intent. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s order was unsustainable and set it aside, thereby restoring the Additional Sessions Judge's order that had dismissed the bail application. The Court established the principle that where serious allegations of criminal house trespass and outraging the modesty of women are involved, and there is no material on record to demonstrate that the FIR was based on ulterior motives or that the criminal justice machinery was invoked to disgrace or humiliate the accused for mala fide reasons, such a case is not a fit instance for the grant of pre-arrest bail. The extraordinary relief of pre-arrest bail requires clear proof of mala fides, which was absent in this matter.

  Questions settled

  • Is a case involving allegations of criminal house trespass and outraging the modesty of women a fit case for the grant of pre-arrest bail?
  • Does the absence of evidence regarding ulterior motives or mala fide intent preclude the grant of pre-arrest bail?
  • Can the Supreme Court set aside an order of the High Court granting pre-arrest bail if the High Court failed to consider the seriousness of the allegations?
  Read full judgment →
• Javed Nawaz vs The State1995 SCMR 1151 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-21
  jurisdiction of special courtsuppression of terrorist activitieslapsing of ordinanceretrospective effectbinding precedentconstitutional law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court which rejected the preliminary objections raised by the petitioner regarding jurisdiction. The core legal question concerns whether a Special Court constituted under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act, 1975 had the jurisdiction to try the petitioner under section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, given that the amending Ordinances including the said section in the Schedule had lapsed and were subsequently re-promulgated with retrospective effect. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly relied upon binding precedent holding that retrospective effect can be given to a re-introduced Ordinance from an earlier date and that the mere granting of leave to appeal in another case does not overturn existing binding judgments. The key principle laid down is that earlier authoritative judgments of the Supreme Court remain binding on all courts under Article 189 of the Constitution until dissented from by a larger Bench, regardless of leave having been granted in a similar matter.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Special Court has jurisdiction to try an offense under an Ordinance that subsequently lapsed?
  • Can retrospective effect be given to a re-introduced Ordinance from an earlier date?
  • Does the granting of leave to appeal in another case affect the binding nature of an existing judgment of the Supreme Court under Article 189 of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Javaid Iqbal and anothers vs The State1995 SCMR 1090 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-16
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationjudicial discretionprohibitory clausecriminal appealgrievous hurt
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a High Court order that cancelled the post-arrest bail previously granted to the petitioners by an Additional Sessions Judge in a criminal case involving charges under sections 324, 147, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the trial court's discretion to grant bail, given the nature of the injuries and the applicability of the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its interference. The Court found that the trial court had exercised its discretion appropriately after a proper appraisal of the material on record. Furthermore, the Court accepted the contention that the offence, at its highest, likely fell under section 337 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which carries a maximum sentence of three years and thus does not trigger the prohibitory clause of section 497. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the bail granted to the petitioners.

  Questions settled

  • Does an offence punishable with three years' imprisonment fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Under what circumstances should a High Court interfere with the discretion exercised by a trial court in granting bail?
  • Is the cancellation of bail justified when the trial court has properly appraised the prosecution material on record?
  Read full judgment →
• Javaid Hassan vs Abdul Latif1995 PLD Supreme Court 415 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-29
  wilful defaultejectmentlandlord and tenanttransfer of propertyrent restrictionbona fide confusioncontumacy
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that reversed a Rent Controller's order and granted an ejectment decree against the appellant-tenant on the grounds of wilful default in rent payment. The core legal question was whether a tenant could be held a wilful defaulter when ownership of the premises was transferred during pending litigation, but the transferor continued to assert ownership and pursue ejectment proceedings without disclosing the transfer. The Supreme Court held that the tenant was not a wilful defaulter. The Court reasoned that the previous landlord’s continued assertion of ownership and litigation created a bona fide confusion for the tenant regarding the rightful payee. Consequently, the tenant’s conduct lacked the necessary contumacy required to establish wilful default. The Court established the principle that where a landlord fails to disclose a transfer of ownership and continues to litigate, a tenant who remains confused and seeks judicial guidance on rent payment cannot be penalized for wilful default, distinguishing such cases from instances where a tenant ignores notice of transfer and acts contumaciously.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant be held a wilful defaulter for non-payment of rent when the previous landlord continues to litigate ejectment proceedings without disclosing a transfer of ownership?
  • Does the failure of a landlord to disclose the transfer of property to a tenant absolve the tenant of liability for wilful default if they continue paying the previous owner?
  • Is a tenant's conduct considered contumacious if they seek court permission to deposit rent due to uncertainty regarding the identity of the rightful landlord?
  Read full judgment →
• Jam Manzoor Ahmad vs Director (Food), Punjab, Lahore and another1995 PLC (C.S.) 890 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-19
  disciplinary proceedingscivil servantefficiency and disciplineshortage of wheatrecording of evidenceright of defenceservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from disciplinary proceedings initiated against the appellant, a Foodgrains Inspector, under the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975, regarding a shortage of wheat stored under his supervision. The Enquiry Officer and authorised officer recommended writing off the loss due to natural causes and untimely rains, but the successor authority disagreed in part and ordered the recovery of the cost of a portion of the wheat. The Punjab Service Tribunal dismissed the appellant's subsequent appeal, leading to a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the disciplinary authority and the Service Tribunal could lawfully impose a penalty of recovery without recording evidence in proof of the charge and without affording the accused an opportunity to produce evidence in defence, in disregard of mandatory procedural rules. The Supreme Court held that the authority punished the appellant in sheer disregard of rule 7 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975, and established precedent by failing to record witness statements or permit defense evidence. The Court laid down the principle that disciplinary proceedings resulting in a penalty cannot be sustained when conducted without recording evidence as required by law and without determining specific breaches under the rules.

  Questions settled

  • Can a disciplinary authority impose a penalty under the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975 without recording statements of witnesses in proof of the charge?
  • Is it lawful for a disciplinary authority to deny an accused civil servant the opportunity to produce evidence in defence during an inquiry?
  • Whether concurrent findings of subordinate officers regarding a natural calamity can be ignored by the authority without recording proper evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ishrat (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Maulana Muhammad Din and 3 others1995 SCMR 1235 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-20
  leave to appealnatural justiceright to be heardwrit jurisdictionstatus quoprocedural fairness
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court, which had allowed a writ petition filed by the respondents. The core legal question presented for consideration is whether the High Court's order, which set aside a decision of the Commissioner in favour of the petitioner, was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice, specifically because it was issued without notice to the petitioner and without providing them an opportunity of hearing. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine this procedural irregularity, specifically addressing whether the petitioner was condemned unheard. The Court ordered that the status quo be maintained pending the final adjudication of the appeal. This case underscores the fundamental legal principle that judicial or quasi-judicial orders affecting the rights or interests of a party cannot be passed without affording that party a proper opportunity to be heard, as failure to do so renders the proceedings legally infirm.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court set aside an administrative order in writ jurisdiction without providing notice and an opportunity of hearing to the party in whose favour the order was passed?
  • Does the failure to provide a hearing to an affected party constitute a violation of the principle of being condemned unheard?
  Read full judgment →
• Irshad Bibi and others vs Member, Board of Revenue and another1995 SCMR 797 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-10
  Pedigree Livestock Breeding SchemeLumberdar Grant Schemerenewal of leaseState landdiscretionary powervested rightleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a writ petition filed by the predecessor of the petitioners. The original allottee was granted State land under the Pedigree Livestock Breeding Scheme for a ten-year period, which was renewable under paragraph 8 of the scheme at the discretion of the Collector. Upon the expiry of the lease, the petitioner sought renewal, but before it was granted, the government superseded the scheme with the Lumberdar Grant Scheme, requiring allottees to be Lumberdars. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had a vested right to renewal of the lease under the defunct scheme. The Supreme Court held that paragraph 8 conferred no absolute right of renewal, but rather discretionary power upon the Collector, and a change in the law precluded relief since the petitioner was not a Lumberdar. Furthermore, the petitioners had enjoyed possession for over fifteen years through litigation. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an allottee of State land under the Pedigree Livestock Breeding Scheme have a vested right to the renewal of a lease upon its expiry?
  • Can a writ petition be maintained to enforce the renewal of a lease under a superseded and defunct government scheme?
  • Does paragraph 8 of the Pedigree Livestock Breeding Scheme vest absolute entitlement to lease renewal in the grantee?
  Read full judgment →
• Irshad Ali vs Sajjad Ali and 4 others1995 PLD Supreme Court 629 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-07-23
  rendition of accountslimitationmixed question of law and factremanddissolution of partnershipcivil procedurepreliminary issue
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for special leave to appeal arose from a suit for rendition of accounts filed by the respondent against the petitioner. The trial court dismissed the suit as time-barred after framing and deciding a preliminary issue on limitation. The High Court, in revision, set aside the lower courts' judgments, holding that the limitation issue was a mixed question of law and fact dependent on the factual determination of whether the partnership had been dissolved. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that when an issue of limitation is not a pure question of law but involves factual disputes—such as the date of partnership dissolution—it cannot be decided in isolation under Order XIV, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court held that all issues arising from the pleadings must be framed and tried together to ensure a proper adjudication. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and the case was remanded to the trial court for a fresh decision after framing all necessary issues.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court decide a suit on a preliminary issue of limitation if that issue involves mixed questions of law and fact?
  • Does Order XIV, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure permit the disposal of a suit on a preliminary issue if that issue requires the recording of evidence?
  • Is the question of whether a partnership has been dissolved a question of fact that impacts the limitation period for a suit for rendition of accounts?
  Read full judgment →
• Intezar Ahmed Khan and anothers vs Mst. Khatoon Hadi and another1995 SCMR 194 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-06-08
  ejectmentrent caseimpairment of value and utilitypartition walldemised premisestenant evictionSindh Rented Premises Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from judgments of the High Court reversing the Rent Controller's dismissal of rent cases and granting ejectment orders against the tenants. The core legal question was whether the removal of a partition wall between two shops by a tenant constitutes an act likely to impair the material value or utility of the premises under clause (iv) of subsection (2) of section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The Supreme Court held that the mere removal of an ordinary partition wall does not automatically create a presumption or proof of material impairment of the value or utility of the building, especially in the absence of evidence showing structural load-bearing value. The Court laid down the principle that while certain structural changes may justify a presumption of impairment, the simpliciter removal of an ordinary partition wall without evidence of structural impact or actual impairment does not warrant eviction under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, thereby setting aside the High Court's judgments and restoring the Rent Controller's orders dismissing the rent cases.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the removal of a partition wall between two shops automatically constitutes an act likely to impair the material value or utility of the premises under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Is it incumbent upon a landlord to prove that the act of a tenant has actually or is likely to materially impair the value or utility of the rented premises?
  • Can the removal of an ordinary non-structural partition wall serve as a sufficient ground for the ejectment of a tenant?
  Read full judgment →
• Inspector-General of Police, Punjab Lahore and 3 others vs Yar1995 PLC (C.S.) 87 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-19
  service appealpolice disciplinedismissal from serviceunauthorized absenceservice tribunalpenalty modification
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, against an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal. The respondent, a police constable, had been dismissed from service by the Superintendent of Police, Rawalpindi, for unauthorized absence from duty and involvement in criminal activities, as evidenced by multiple First Information Reports. While the departmental authorities upheld the dismissal, the Punjab Service Tribunal modified the penalty, reducing the dismissal to the stoppage of three increments without cumulative effect, despite finding no illegality or irregularity in the initial departmental proceedings. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the Service Tribunal was justified in interfering with the departmental penalty of dismissal in light of the material available on the record regarding the respondent's misconduct. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the sustainability of the Tribunal's order, specifically questioning whether the Tribunal erred in mitigating the punishment given the nature of the allegations against the respondent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Punjab Service Tribunal is justified in reducing a penalty of dismissal to the stoppage of increments when there is no finding of illegality in the departmental proceedings?
  • Can a Service Tribunal interfere with a departmental penalty of dismissal based on unauthorized absence and criminal involvement?
  Read full judgment →
• Inspector-General of Police, Balochistan, Quetta vs Syed Imran1995 SCMR 29 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-09-09
  service lawpolice serviceprobationary dischargefunctus officioreinstatementdisciplinary authorityPolice Rules 1934
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the validity of a reinstatement order passed by a Deputy Inspector-General of Police (DIG) regarding a probationer Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI) who had been previously discharged from service. The core legal question was whether the DIG, having exercised the power of discharge under Rule 12.8 of the Police Rules, 1934, could subsequently review and set aside his own order to reinstate the probationer, and whether such an order was legally sustainable. The Supreme Court held that the DIG became functus officio upon passing the initial discharge order. Consequently, the DIG lacked the legal authority to reinstate the respondent; only the next higher authority, the Inspector-General of Police, possessed the jurisdiction to review the matter upon a proper representation. The Court emphasized that the Police is a highly disciplined force, and service matters must be handled strictly according to the prescribed legal authority. The Court set aside the Service Tribunal's judgment, which had erroneously upheld the DIG's reinstatement order, and restored the original discharge order.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Deputy Inspector-General of Police reinstate a probationer after having previously passed an order of discharge under Rule 12.8 of the Police Rules 1934?
  • Does a Deputy Inspector-General of Police become functus officio after passing an order of discharge against a probationary police officer?
  • Is an order of reinstatement passed by a Deputy Inspector-General of Police without lawful authority subject to being set aside by the Supreme Court?
  • Who is the competent authority to review a discharge order passed under Rule 12.8 of the Police Rules 1934?
  Read full judgment →
• Inre: Criminal Miscellaneous No.19K of 1994 Against S. Sami Ahmed,1995 PLD Supreme Court 568 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-08-30
  professional misconductadvocatedisciplinary proceedingscontempt of courtjudicial decorumSupreme Court Ruleslegal ethics
  Summary & questions settled

  These disciplinary proceedings were initiated under Rules 30 and 31 of Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, against several Advocates of the Supreme Court for their unauthorized, hostile, and defiant entry into the Chambers of the Chief Justice of Pakistan while he was in a meeting. The core legal question was whether the respondents' conduct constituted professional misconduct warranting disciplinary action under the Supreme Court Rules. The Court held that the respondents' actions—entering the Chambers without permission in a hostile manner—amounted to conduct unbecoming of an Advocate of the Supreme Court. The Court emphasized that Advocates, as officers of the court, are held to a higher standard of decorum and must maintain respect for judges and courts, regardless of external pressures or tense situations. The Court rejected the respondents' justifications, noting their failure to tender an unqualified apology. Consequently, the Court found the respondents guilty of professional misconduct and suspended their right to practice before the Supreme Court for a period of two years, establishing that such behavior undermines the dignity of the judiciary and violates the professional obligations of legal practitioners.

  Questions settled

  • Does the unauthorized entry of an Advocate into a Judge's chambers constitute conduct unbecoming of an Advocate under the Supreme Court Rules 1980?
  • Are Advocates of the Supreme Court subject to disciplinary jurisdiction for conduct occurring outside the courtroom?
  • Is an Advocate's failure to tender an unqualified apology for disruptive behavior a relevant factor in disciplinary proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Inayat Yaqoob vs Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Islamabad1995 PLC (C.S.) 787 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-12
  leave to appealservice terminationstatutory rulesdepartmental enquirywrit petition maintainabilityprinciples of natural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, which dismissed his writ petition challenging the termination of his services as a Sanitary Attendant with the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. The petitioner's services were terminated following a departmental enquiry. The core legal question was whether the writ petition was maintainable given that the petitioner's service was allegedly governed by statutory rules, and whether the enquiry was conducted in accordance with the applicable rules without violating principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court held that the enquiry prima facie appeared not to have been conducted in accordance with the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, particularly regarding the recording of evidence and opportunity to cross-examine. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to consider these contentions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a writ petition is maintainable against the termination of service governed by statutory rules?
  • Whether an enquiry conducted without recording evidence in the presence of the employee violates the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when the departmental enquiry prima facie fails to follow mandatory procedural requirements?
  Read full judgment →
• Inayat Yaq00b vs Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Islamabad and 2 others1995 SCMR 960 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-12
  leave to appealservice terminationdepartmental enquirystatutory rulesconstitutional petitionnatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, which dismissed his writ petition challenging the termination of his services as a Sanitary Attendant with the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against termination governed by statutory rules, and whether the departmental enquiry was conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice and the applicable rules. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that since the services were governed by statutory rules, namely the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, and prima facie the enquiry was conducted without recording evidence in the petitioner's presence or providing an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, the contentions warranted a thorough examination. The key principle laid down is that termination of employment governed by statutory rules must strictly adhere to prescribed procedural safeguards, and failure to provide an opportunity of participation and cross-examination raises valid grounds for judicial scrutiny.

  Questions settled

  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable against the termination of service governed by statutory rules?
  • Whether an enquiry conducted without recording evidence in the presence of the accused employee violates the applicable disciplinary rules?
  • Does failure to provide an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses during a departmental enquiry warrant the grant of leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• In re: Nazir Ahmad and anothers vs Not1995 SCMR 1163 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-19
  leave to appealocular evidenceappraisal of evidencelife imprisonmentcriminal appealmurder convictiondefence plea
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by two convicts, Nazir Ahmad and Tariq Mahmood, who were sentenced to life imprisonment for murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioners challenged their convictions, which were upheld by the High Court, following an incident where the deceased was killed during the wheat harvesting season. The core legal question was whether the trial court and the High Court erred in their appraisal of the ocular evidence and the rejection of the defence's plea of self-defence and false implication. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the material on record, found that the eyewitnesses had credibly accounted for their presence, and the nature of the injuries and weapons used indicated an unplanned, spontaneous occurrence involving multiple assailants. Consequently, the Court held that the conviction was justified and the defence plea lacked merit. The judgment reaffirms the principle that where ocular evidence is consistent and corroborated by the nature of injuries and circumstances, it is sufficient to sustain a conviction, provided no legal infirmity exists in the lower courts' appraisal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of multiple injuries on a deceased body, consistent with the use of different weapons, support a conviction under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a delay in filing a jail petition be condoned for convicts who are incarcerated?
  • Is the appraisal of ocular evidence by lower courts subject to interference by the Supreme Court in the absence of legal error or infirmity?
  Read full judgment →
• In re: Contempt of Court Proceedings Against General (Retd.) Mirza Aslam Baig vs Not1995 SCMR 159 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-09
  contempt of courtreview petitioncorrection of ordermitigating circumstancesjudicial recordmajority opinion
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition was filed by General (Retd.) Mirza Aslam Baig against a previous order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan dated 29th March 1993. In that order, the Court had concluded contempt proceedings against the respondent, but the formal "Court Order" contained a statement that the respondent was "found guilty of contempt of this Court" while being discharged due to mitigating circumstances. The core legal question was whether this finding of guilt was consistent with the majority opinions delivered in the contempt proceedings. Upon reviewing the judgments of the majority, the Court found that the majority had not actually held the respondent guilty of contempt; rather, they had concluded that the proceedings should be dropped based on the respondent's expressions of regret and the satisfaction of the law's purpose. The Court held that the formal order was inconsistent with the majority's reasoning and required correction. Consequently, the Court allowed the review petition and substituted the formal order to reflect that the proceedings against the respondent were simply dropped, correcting the record to align with the majority's actual findings.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court correct a formal order to align it with the majority opinion expressed in the judgments?
  • Does a finding of guilt in a formal order that contradicts the majority's reasoning constitute an error subject to review?
  • Under what circumstances may the Court discharge an accused in contempt proceedings without a formal finding of guilt?
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• In re: Anonymous Police Employees of Balochistan (Servile Matter) vs1995 SCMR 34 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-08
  pension liabilityservice mattergovernment policypolice employeesBalochistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a service-related grievance involving police employees of the Government of Balochistan regarding pension liabilities. The core legal question addressed was whether the provincial government would accept and honor the pension claims of these employees. The Supreme Court of Pakistan disposed of the matter after the Advocate-General of Balochistan presented minutes from a government meeting held on October 4, 1992. In these minutes, the Government of Balochistan formally resolved not to refuse the pension liability of the employees in any case. Consequently, the Court found the grievance resolved by the government's policy decision. The Court directed the Advocate-General to submit a copy of the formal order issued by the government to implement this decision, thereby concluding the proceedings based on the government's undertaking to fulfill its pension obligations.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Government of Balochistan accept the pension liability of its police employees?
  • Can a service matter be disposed of based on a government's formal decision to accept liability?
  Read full judgment →
• Imdad Ali vs The State1995 SCMR 823 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-28
  suspension of sentencebail pending appealmurderappellate discretionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Imdad Ali against the order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed his application for the suspension of his sentence and release on bail pending his appeal. The petitioner was convicted under Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to 20 years' rigorous imprisonment along with a fine and compensation order under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in declining to suspend the sentence and evaluate the evidence prior to the final hearing of the appeal. The Supreme Court held that the discretion exercised by the High Court in refusing to evaluate the evidence prematurely at the bail stage suffered from no legal flaw warranting interference. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing that an appellate court is justified in declining to evaluate evidentiary merits for the purpose of suspending a sentence before the main appeal is heard.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can be said to have failed to exercise jurisdiction when it declines to evaluate evidence at the time of deciding a suspension of sentence application?
  • Does the refusal of the High Court to suspend a sentence pending appeal warrant interference by the Supreme Court when no legal flaw is shown in the exercise of discretion?
  • Can a convicted person claim suspension of sentence as a matter of right prior to the decision of their appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Ilyas Haider Zaidi Advocate vs Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Rawalpindi and 3 others1995 PLC (C.S.) 99 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-24
  service tribunalseniorityretrospective promotionante-dating promotionvested rightleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dated 1-3-1992, concerning a dispute over the ante-dating of his promotion to BPS-16. The core legal question was whether a revision of a seniority list pursuant to a Supreme Court judgment automatically entitles a retired civil servant to retrospective promotion and ante-dating of promotion from an earlier date. The Supreme Court held that the revision of a seniority list alone is insufficient for ante-dating promotion, as a proper procedure through the Selection Board must be followed and no vested right to promotion from a particular date exists unless embedded in a specific rule. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the revision of a seniority list pursuant to a Supreme Court judgment automatically entitle a civil servant to retrospective promotion?
  • Is a selection board procedure required for claiming an ante-dated promotion?
  • Does a civil servant have a vested right to promotion from a particular date without a specific rule supporting it?
  Read full judgment →
• Ilyas Ahmed vs The State1995 SCMR 985 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-07
  illegal gratificationcorruptionburden of proofreasonable doubtleave to appealdocumentary evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment upholding the petitioner's conviction under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The petitioner, a WAPDA clerk, was accused of demanding illegal gratification to correct an allegedly excessive electricity bill. The petitioner contended that the case was fabricated due to a personal dispute regarding a business transaction involving his father. The core legal question before the Court is whether the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, particularly in light of the failure to produce the electricity bill that served as the purported basis for the bribe demand. The Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the absence of the bill or supporting evidence from WAPDA regarding the bill's existence and nature raised significant doubts about the prosecution's case. The principle established is that the failure to produce crucial documentary evidence underpinning the alleged motive for a bribe can undermine the prosecution's burden of proof.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to produce the document alleged to be the basis for a bribe demand create reasonable doubt in a corruption case?
  • Can a conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 be sustained when the prosecution fails to produce the primary evidence establishing the motive for the alleged bribe?
  Read full judgment →
• Islam Din and 7 others vs Naseeruddin1995 SCMR 906 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-08
  civil procedurejurisdictionacquiescencewaiver of objectiontransfer of suitleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil suit for possession of a house. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, and subsequent appeals and revision petitions were dismissed by the Additional District Judge and the High Court, respectively. The petitioners challenged the proceedings on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to close their evidence, arguing that the Senior Civil Judge, to whom the case was transferred, should have proceeded afresh. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioners had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Senior Civil Judge and failed to raise this objection during the trial or in the first appellate stage. The High Court had rightly rejected this plea, noting it was raised for the first time in revision. The Supreme Court held that since the objection was purely technical and the petitioners had acquiesced to the jurisdiction throughout the proceedings, the petition lacked merit. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal, finding no error of law in the impugned judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge the jurisdiction of a court for the first time in a revision petition if they failed to raise it before the trial court or the first appellate court?
  • Does a party's failure to object to a court's jurisdiction during trial proceedings constitute acquiescence?
  • Is a technical objection regarding the closure of evidence valid when the party has submitted to the court's jurisdiction throughout the litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Ijaz Masih alias Chun vs The State1995 SCMR 1515 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-24
  murderself-defenseright of private defenseappreciation of evidencecriminal appealconfessional statementSection 302 PPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of the appellant, Ijaz Masih, for the murder of the deceased, Zahid alias Pappu. The trial court convicted the appellant under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while acquitting his co-accused. The Federal Shariat Court upheld the conviction but commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the appellant’s judicial statements, when accepted in their entirety, established a complete right of self-defense that would negate criminal liability. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant’s plea of self-defense was unsubstantiated. The Court observed that the appellant sustained no injuries, the alleged weapon of the deceased was not recovered, and the medical evidence contradicted the appellant's description of the incident. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the appellant's statement did not establish a valid right of private defense to justify the homicide. The principle laid down is that a plea of self-defense must be supported by objective circumstances and evidence, and a court is not bound to accept an exculpatory statement if it is inconsistent with the physical facts of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Does a statement made by an accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically entitle the accused to an acquittal if it claims self-defense?
  • Can a court reject a plea of self-defense if the physical evidence, such as the absence of injuries on the accused, contradicts the accused's version of events?
  • Is a court required to accept an accused's statement in its entirety if the statement is inconsistent with the established facts of the case?
  Read full judgment →
• Ijaz Ahmed vs Hayat Muhammad and 2 others1995 SCMR 1236 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-20
  Pre-emption suitTalab-i-IshhadTalab-i-MuwathibatLeave to appealMisreading of evidenceAppellate jurisdictionRevision petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a pre-emption suit where the Trial Court partly decreed the claim, but the Additional District Judge, on appeal, dismissed the suit in its entirety. The High Court subsequently dismissed a revision petition, affirming that the essential pre-emption demands, Talab-i-Ishhad and Talab-i-Muwathibat, had not been made. The petitioner contended before the Supreme Court that these demands were indeed made, and that the lower courts had misread the evidence presented by P.W.1 and P.W.2. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider this specific contention regarding the making of Talabs and the alleged misreading of evidence.

  Read full judgment →
• Iftikhar-Ud-Din and anothers vs The Deputy Administrator, Evacuee1995 SCMR 944 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-11
  evacuee propertyShamilat Dehpartition of landremand orderleave to appealjoint Khata
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a High Court judgment concerning a dispute over land measuring 8 Kanals, 10 Marlas, and 105 Sq.Ft. (Khasra No. 1535) in village Pakki Thatti, Lahore. The High Court had remanded the matter to the Chairman of the Evacuee Trust Property Board for a fresh decision, noting an absence of positive evidence regarding whether the Shamilat Deh had been partitioned between Muslim and non-Muslim owners. The petitioners contend that the remand was unnecessary, arguing that both parties agreed no partition of the Shamilat Deh had occurred. Relying on the principle established in Mehr Dad v. Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner (PLD 1974 SC 193), the petitioners assert that property cannot be declared evacuee property until a joint Khata is partitioned. The Supreme Court, finding merit in the petitioners' arguments regarding the legal necessity of partition before evacuee status can be determined, grants leave to appeal to examine the propriety of the High Court's remand order.

  Questions settled

  • Can property be declared evacuee property before the partition of a joint Khata?
  • Is a remand order appropriate when the parties agree that no partition of Shamilat Deh has taken place?
  Read full judgment →
• Ibrahim and 2 others vs The State1995 SCMR 1296 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-01
  compromisemurderDiyatlegal heirsacquittalminor beneficiaries
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of convictions and sentences under sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for murder and attempted murder. During the proceedings, the parties filed a compromise application wherein the major legal heirs of the deceased waived their right to compensation and forgave the appellants. The matter was referred to the Sessions Judge, Nawabshah, who verified the factual position and the statements of the legal heirs, noting that some heirs were minors. The Supreme Court directed the appellants to deposit the minors' shares of Diyat money in PLS bank accounts, which was duly complied with. The State counsel conceded that the compromise was in accordance with law and that it was not a fit case to invoke section 311 of the Pakistan Penal Code for Tazir. The Supreme Court accepted the compromise, set aside the convictions, and ordered the immediate release of the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court accept a compromise between the parties in a murder case involving minor legal heirs?
  • What procedure must be followed when minor legal heirs are involved in a criminal compromise regarding Diyat?
  • When may the court decline to press into service section 311 of the Pakistan Penal Code for imposing Tazir despite a valid compromise?
  Read full judgment →
• House Building Finance Corporation vs S.M. Iqbal1995 SCMR 544 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-05
  ex parte decreeservice of summonsremand of casecivil revisionsetting aside ex parte decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court maintaining the dismissal of the petitioner's application for setting aside an ex parte decree. The core legal question involved whether the petitioner was properly served and represented in the original suit. The Supreme Court observed that neither the name of the Advocate nor of the Perokar was noted down in the order-sheet, and there was no evidence of personal service of the petitioner. Consequently, the Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, accepted it, set aside the judgments of the courts below, and remanded the case to the trial court for a decision on merits. The key principle laid down is that where there is no record of proper service or authorised representation of a defendant in the order-sheets, an ex parte decree cannot be sustained and the matter should be remanded for a decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ex parte decree can be sustained when there is no record of proper service or authorised representation of the defendant in the order-sheets?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be converted into an appeal and disposed of on merits when the lower courts failed to verify the service of summons?
  Read full judgment →
• Hayat Hussain and others vs Administrator, Thal Development and others1995 SCMR 735 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-07
  land acquisitionallotmentvendee rightsseniority principlenatural justiceex parte orderconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court challenges the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellants' writ petition against the cancellation of land previously allotted to their predecessor-in-interest. The core legal questions involve whether the principle of seniority in adjusting claims of vendees was justified under the relevant law, whether such a principle violates the fundamental right to equal protection under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan, and whether prior allotments could be cancelled without notice and hearing. The Supreme Court held that the authorities erred in cancelling the prior allotment and passing an ex parte order without notice or reasoned justification, and that the High Court failed to address these material contentions. The case was accordingly remanded to the competent authority for a fresh decision after affording a proper hearing to all concerned parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the principle of seniority in adjusting the claims of vendees is justified and covered by the provisions of the Thal Development Act?
  • Does the application of the seniority principle in adjusting vendee claims violate the fundamental right of equal protection of law guaranteed by Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Can a prior land allotment made in favour of a vendee be cancelled without notice and opportunity of hearing?
  Read full judgment →
• Jawad Ali vs The State1995 SCMR 1304 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-07-28
  murderenhancement of sentencecapital punishmenteye-witness testimonymotiveFIR non-productionattempted murder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court whereby the appellant's conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was altered from life imprisonment to death, and his acquittal under section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was set aside, convicting him thereunder. The prosecution case was that the appellant, aggrieved by the deceased's intervention regarding his drug-selling activities, entered a welfare trust armed with a pistol and fatally shot the deceased alongside injuring other witnesses. The core legal questions involved the credibility of eye-witness testimony, the establishment of motive, the non-production of the First Information Report at trial, and the propriety of enhancing the sentence to death given the brutal manner of the assault. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that direct eye-witness testimony, supported by medical evidence and weapon recovery, conclusively established guilt, and that the brutal and cold-blooded nature of the murder warranted the capital sentence. The Supreme Court laid down that non-production of the First Information Report is not fatal when the complainant's statement is duly exhibited, and that a gruesome execution of a crime from close range precludes mitigating circumstances for a lesser penalty.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the non-production of the First Information Report at trial is fatal to the prosecution's case when the complainant's statement is duly exhibited?
  • Does the brutal and gruesome manner of an attack negate mitigating circumstances for the reduction of a death sentence?
  • Whether an appellate court is justified in setting aside an acquittal and convicting the accused under section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 upon proper evaluation of eye-witness evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Hasil and anothers vs Karam Hussain Shah and others1995 SCMR 1385 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-08
  pre-emptionco-sharerconsolidation proceedingspreferential rightthree stages of pre-emptiondismissal decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by leave against the judgment of the Lahore High Court arising out of a pre-emption suit. The core legal question concerns whether a pre-emptor who loses their status as a co-sharer in a joint khata due to consolidation proceedings occurring after the dismissal of their suit by the trial court, but before a decree is passed in their favour by the first appellate court, thereby loses their preferential right of pre-emption. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a pre-emptor must maintain their qualifying status up until the date of a decree passing in their favour. The Court held that a dismissal decree by a trial court cannot be equated with a decree decreeing the suit regarding its legal effects. The key principle laid down is that consolidation proceedings which alter khata ownership and cause a pre-emptor to lose their co-sharer status before a successful pre-emption decree is rendered will defeat the pre-emption claim, as the pre-emptor must continuously possess the preferential qualification at all three critical stages: the date of sale, the date of institution of the suit, and the date of the decree.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emptor must retain their qualifying status as a co-sharer up to the date of passing a decree in their favour?
  • Can a dismissal decree of a pre-emption suit by a trial court be equated with a decree decreeing the suit for the purpose of preserving a pre-emptor's status?
  • Does the loss of a co-sharer status due to consolidation proceedings during the pendency of an appeal defeat a pre-emption suit?
  • What are the three critical stages at which a pre-emptor must prove their right of pre-emption?
  Read full judgment →
• Hasham Khan vs Mujibur Rehman and others1995 SCMR 148 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-13
  ejectment applicationrent controllerpersonal bona fide needlandlord and tenantrented premisesurban areaexecution of ejectment order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had restored an ejectment order passed by a Rent Controller against the petitioner. The core legal question was whether a landlord, who is currently occupying a rented shop in the same urban area, is legally precluded from seeking the eviction of a tenant from a shop owned by the landlord on the grounds of personal bona fide need. The petitioner argued that the landlord's existing rented premises were more suitable for their business needs and that the eviction application was merely a pretext to increase rent. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the High Court's decision. Relying on established precedent, the Court held that the statutory requirement for proving personal need does not extend to or cover other rented premises occupied by the landlord. The key principle laid down is that the term 'building' in the context of personal need for eviction refers exclusively to premises owned by the landlord, and a landlord's occupation of rented property does not bar them from seeking eviction from their own property.

  Questions settled

  • Does a landlord's occupation of a rented shop in the same urban area preclude them from seeking the eviction of a tenant from a shop owned by the landlord on the grounds of personal need?
  • Does the statutory requirement for proving personal need for eviction extend to rented premises occupied by the landlord?
  Read full judgment →
• Haroon alias Harooni vs The State and another1995 SCMR 1627 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-03
  murderocular evidenceinterested witnessindependent witnessabscondencecorroborationbenefit of doubtacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a double-murder incident that occurred within the premises of the District Court, Faisalabad. The appellant, along with two co-accused, was charged with firing at and killing two individuals and injuring another due to prior enmity. The trial court acquitted the co-accused but convicted the appellant under Section 302 PPC, sentencing him to life imprisonment, which the High Court subsequently enhanced to a death sentence. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan evaluated the credibility of the ocular evidence. The Court observed that the primary eye-witness was inimical and related to the deceased, while the independent witness had falsely implicated the acquitted co-accused, demonstrating a reckless disregard for the truth. The Court held that the testimony of an independent witness is not automatically stamped with truth and must inspire confidence. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the appellant's abscondence did not constitute sufficient corroboration, as innocent persons may also flee out of fear. Consequently, the Court accepted the appeal and acquitted the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere status of a witness as independent and unrelated to the complainant automatically stamp their testimony with truth?
  • Can the circumstance of an accused's abscondence serve as sole or sufficient corroboration to sustain a conviction when ocular evidence is unreliable?
  • What is the legal standard for evaluating the veracity of a witness's statement in a criminal trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Haq Nawaz vs Muhammad Jan1995 PLD Supreme Court 561 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-06
  right of pre-emptionostensible giftsale vs giftconcurrent findings of factpre-emptible transactionburden of proofHibba
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether the High Court was justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact by the trial and appellate courts, which had determined that a transaction ostensibly labeled as a 'gift' (Hibba) was, in reality, a sale subject to the right of pre-emption. The appellant, a preemptor, challenged the High Court's revision judgment, which had set aside the lower courts' findings on the basis that no price was proven to have been fixed or paid. The Supreme Court observed that the lower courts had correctly identified that the donor and donee lacked the requisite relationship or affection typically associated with a gift, and that the transaction was motivated by a prior, unfulfilled sale agreement between the parties' fathers. The Supreme Court held that the absence of direct evidence regarding the fixation or payment of a price does not preclude a finding of sale where surrounding circumstances clearly indicate the transaction is not a gift. Consequently, the Court restored the concurrent findings of the lower courts, ruling the transaction was a sale and thus pre-emptible.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court determine that a transaction is a sale subject to pre-emption even in the absence of direct evidence regarding the fixation or payment of a price?
  • Is a High Court justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the nature of a transaction if no misreading of the record is established?
  • Does the lack of a familial relationship or affection between donor and donee serve as a relevant factor in determining whether a transaction is a gift or a sale?
  Read full judgment →
• Hamza Khan vs Province of Balochistan through Secretary, Department1995 SCMR 711 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-09-07
  educational admissionreserved seatsopen meritadministrative discretionjudicial reviewresidency criteriaprofessional colleges
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the denial of admission to an Engineering College, where the appellant was rejected from a reserved rural seat due to his dual residency in both rural and urban areas. The core legal question was whether the appellant, having been rightfully denied the rural seat, was entitled to admission against open merit seats despite not explicitly applying for that category and having obtained his education outside the province. The Supreme Court held that while the reservation policy correctly prioritizes exclusive rural residents over dual residents to ensure equitable access, the High Court erred in denying the appellant admission to open merit seats on technical grounds. The Court established that a candidate’s failure to apply for a specific category should not preclude admission to open merit seats if they are otherwise qualified. Furthermore, the Court ruled that judicial review should not be based on grounds not raised or considered by the original administrative authority, such as the Selection Committee, and that such technicalities should not deprive a student of education.

  Questions settled

  • Is a candidate's failure to explicitly apply for an open merit seat a valid ground to deny admission if they are otherwise qualified?
  • Can a High Court dismiss a petition on grounds that were not considered or raised by the original administrative authority?
  • Should a student with dual residency (rural and urban) be preferred over a student with exclusive rural residency for seats reserved for rural areas?
  Read full judgment →
• Hamid Qayyum and 2 others vs Muhammad Azeem through Legal Heirs and another1995 PLD Supreme Court 381 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-13
  specific performanceagreement to sellhandwriting expertconcurrent findingsburden of proofforgery
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a regular second appeal wherein the appellants challenged the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower forums decreeing the respondents' suit for possession through specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 9-2-1970. The core legal question concerned the alleged forgery of the predecessor's signatures on the disputed agreement to sell, receipt, and the scribe's register. Following a difference of opinion between two judges of the Supreme Court, the matter was referred to a third judge for resolution. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the valid execution of the documents and the genuineness of the signatures were supported by reliable direct and expert evidence and did not warrant interference. The key principle laid down is that natural variations in signatures due to age, illness, or passage of time must be distinguished from deliberate forgery, and courts should rely on the general characteristics of handwriting supported by direct testimony rather than isolated visual differences.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the execution of an agreement to sell can be disturbed by the Supreme Court without proof of misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  • How should the opinion of a handwriting expert be evaluated when conflicting expert evidence is presented regarding disputed signatures?
  • Can a court rely on the general characteristics and similarities of signatures rather than visible dissimilarities when assessing allegations of forgery?
  • Under what circumstances is secondary evidence admissible for a lost document in a civil suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Hakim Ali and 2 others vs Ghulam Muhammad and 2 others1995 SCMR 549 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-13
  evacuee propertypending proceedingsavailable propertyallotment of landdisplaced personsrepeal of lawsright of purchase
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the entitlement of occupants to purchase evacuee agricultural land under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975. The core legal question was whether land, subject to pending allotment proceedings initiated by claimants, constitutes 'available property' for sale to occupants under Section 3(1) of the 1975 Act. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in directing the sale of the land to the respondents. The Court ruled that because the appellants' application for allotment was pending at the time of the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, the land was not 'available' for disposal under Section 3(1) of the 1975 Act. The key principle laid down is that property subject to pending proceedings at the time of the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, must be disposed of according to the repealed laws; it only becomes 'available' for sale to occupants under Section 3(1) of the 1975 Act if, after final adjudication of those pending proceedings, the property remains unallotted.

  Questions settled

  • Does land subject to pending allotment proceedings at the time of the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, constitute 'available property' for sale to occupants under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975?
  • Must pending proceedings under the repealed Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 be finalized before the land in dispute can be offered for sale to occupants under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975?
  • Does the right of an occupant to purchase land under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975 arise if the land is already subject to a claim by a displaced person pending at the time of repeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Usman Ghani and others vs Municipal Committee, Mingora and others1995 PLD Supreme Court 645 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-16
  civil revisionconcurrent findingsland acquisitionmisreading of evidencedeclaration of titleMartial Law RegulationState land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a civil suit for declaration of title filed by the petitioners, claiming ownership of certain shops constructed under a water tank on land previously acquired by the Ex-Ruler of Swat. The petitioners alleged the shops were given to them as compensation for the land acquisition. The trial court and the District Judge decreed the suit in favor of the petitioners. However, the High Court, in civil revision, set aside these concurrent findings, leading to the present petition for leave to appeal. The core legal question was whether the petitioners had established their title to the property through valid compensation or evidence of ownership. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to provide cogent evidence of compensation, while their own admissions confirmed the Ex-Ruler had the power to acquire land for public purposes without compensation, vesting such land in the State. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling that the lower courts had misread the evidence. The principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact may be set aside in revision when they are based on a misreading or non-reading of material evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court set aside concurrent findings of lower courts in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does land acquired by the Ex-Ruler of Swat for public purposes without compensation vest in the State?
  • Is a claim of ownership based on alleged compensation valid when there is no documentary evidence to support the transfer of property?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Shahjahan Khan vs Aurang Zeb Khan and another1995 PLD Supreme Court 462 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-30
  temporary injunctionco-sharersjoint propertypartition of landinterim staycivil revisionconstruction on joint land
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court order that set aside an interim stay granted by a District Judge, thereby restoring a trial court's refusal to grant a temporary injunction. The dispute arose between co-sharers of a joint land parcel (Khasra No. 3081), where the respondent sought to construct a house on a portion in his possession. The petitioner, a co-sharer, sought an injunction to restrain construction pending a formal partition of the land. The High Court found that the land had historically been subject to numerous sales and construction activities, establishing that the specific portion in question had acquired a distinct identity. Consequently, the High Court allowed the construction subject to the respondent furnishing security to remove the structure should the petitioner succeed in the main suit. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, finding it consistent with established legal principles regarding interim injunctions in co-ownership disputes and noting that the High Court had adequately safeguarded the interests of both parties. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a co-sharer be restrained from constructing on a portion of joint land that has historically been treated as distinct and separate?
  • Is it appropriate for a court to allow construction on disputed joint land subject to the furnishing of security?
  • Does the existence of prior sales and construction on portions of joint land justify the refusal of an injunction against further construction by a co-sharer?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Noor-Ul-Haq vs Collector of Customs, Customs House, Lahore1997 P.C.T.L.R. 1206 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Customs ActSeizure of goodsShow-cause noticeStatutory limitationExtension of timeReasoned orderConstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged show-cause notices issued by Customs Authorities, arguing that the authorities failed to issue these notices within the two-month period stipulated in Section 168(2) of the Customs Act, 1969. The core legal question was whether the failure to issue a timely show-cause notice, combined with the absence of valid, reasoned orders extending the seizure period, entitled the petitioner to the return of the seized goods. The Court held that the orders of extension passed by the Collector of Customs were legally deficient because they failed to record "reasons" as mandatorily required by the statute. Consequently, the show-cause notices issued after the expiry of the two-month period were unsustainable. The Court established the principle that the statutory requirement for recording reasons in writing for extending a seizure period is a mandatory, quasi-judicial obligation. Failure to provide such reasons renders an extension order void, and the Customs Authorities lose the right to retain the seized goods, thereby entitling the possessor to their immediate restoration, regardless of any potential separate liability for penal action.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to issue a show-cause notice within two months of seizure under Section 168(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, entitle the possessor to the return of the goods?
  • Must an order extending the period of seizure under Section 168(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, contain recorded reasons to be legally valid?
  • Can an order extending the seizure period be considered valid if it merely references a request for extension without providing independent reasons?
  • Does the non-compliance with the two-month notice period under Section 168(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, absolve a party from all potential penal liability?
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• Haji Muhammad vs Jehan Khan and 3 others1995 SCMR 197 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-09-08
  pre-emptionlimitationlachesjoint suitrevision petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arises from a judgment of the Balochistan High Court dismissing the appellant's revision petition on the ground of laches and limitation. The core legal question was whether adverse, factually incorrect observations made by the Majlis-e-Shoora against a pre-emptor co-plaintiff could be sustained, and whether the delay in challenging them was sufficiently explained. The Supreme Court held that since the appellant and his deceased brother had jointly filed the pre-emption suit, findings treating the appellant merely as an attorney were factually incorrect and unsustainable. Furthermore, the Court held that the delay stood properly explained because the appellant was awaiting the outcome of the respondents' pending petition and had to file his revision only after that petition was withdrawn as not pressed. The appeal was accordingly accepted, and the impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside, laying down the principle that erroneous observations contrary to established record cannot prejudice a party's rights, and procedural delays stemming from bona fide pursuit or defense of related proceedings stand sufficiently explained.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a co-plaintiff in a pre-emption suit can be non-suited based on a misreading of the record concerning his status as a party?
  • Whether the withdrawal of a petition by the opposite party furnishes a valid explanation for delay in challenging adverse observations in a revision petition?
  • Can factually incorrect observations made by an appellate forum regarding a party's locus standi be sustained in law?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Siddique alias Shadi Khan and 9 others vs Border Area1995 SCMR 764 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-03-30
  Border Area Committeeland allotmentrehabilitation lawsleave to appealIntra-Court Appealcancellation of allotmentwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had accepted an Intra-Court Appeal filed by the Border Area Committee, thereby cancelling land allotments previously made in favor of the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. The dispute originated from the cancellation of land allotments by the Border Area Committee, which had been challenged through various writ petitions. The petitioners contend that the Border Area Committee was improperly constituted following the repeal of Rehabilitation Laws, arguing that the Rehabilitation Commissioner's representative could not validly participate in cancellation proceedings. Furthermore, the petitioners assert that the Committee lacked the authority to review allotments made by the Committee itself, and that under the relevant regulations, only allotments made prior to 20-3-1959 were subject to scrutiny. Observing that the case involves significant legal questions and noting conflicting High Court judgments, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to resolve the validity of the Committee's actions and the constitutionality of the underlying regulatory framework, directing the Advocate-General, Punjab, to assist the Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Border Area Committee was properly constituted to order the cancellation of allotments after the repeal of Rehabilitation Laws?
  • Does the Border Area Committee possess the authority to review or cancel allotments that were originally made by the Committee itself?
  • Are only those land allotments made prior to 20-3-1959 subject to scrutiny by the Border Area Committee under the relevant regulations?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Arshad vs Muhammad Faryad Ali and 9 others1995 SCMR 241 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-11-27
  acquittalleave to appealocular evidenceinterested witnessmotivedouble murderpresumption of innocence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that acquitted three respondents previously convicted by a Special Court for the double murder of two individuals. The core legal question was whether the High Court's acquittal was based on sound reasoning or if it was perverse, thereby warranting interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision was well-founded, noting that the prosecution's motive evidence was contradicted by court records, the ocular witnesses were inimical and interested, and their presence at the scene was doubtful. Furthermore, the Court found the identification of one respondent in darkness implausible. The key principle laid down is that where an acquittal is based on a proper assessment of evidence, and the reasons provided are neither perverse nor artificial, the appellate court will not interfere, especially as the presumption of innocence is reinforced by an acquittal from a court of competent jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Is a petition for leave to appeal against an acquittal maintainable when the acquittal was not challenged in the High Court?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court judgment of acquittal if the reasons provided are neither perverse nor artificial?
  • Does the presumption of innocence become stronger after an acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Akram vs P.I.A.Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-01
  service terminationreinstatementMartial Law OrderReview BoardNational Industrial Relations Commissionpublic importancegolden handshakehuman rights violation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Canteen Supervisor at Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), challenged his removal from service, which occurred in 1982 under Martial Law Order No. 52. Following the establishment of a Review Board in 1989 to assess the cases of employees removed under Martial Law Regulations, the petitioner sought reinstatement. Although a Senior Member of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) passed a consent order in 1990 for the re-employment of terminated staff, which was upheld on appeal by the Full Bench of the NIRC, the Federal Government declined to reinstate the petitioner. The Government cited the petitioner's age and the fact that he had already received terminal benefits under a 'golden handshake' policy. The Supreme Court held that the Review Board functioned merely as a recommendatory body whose findings were subject to Government approval. Finding that the Government had validly exercised its discretion to reject the recommendation and that no fundamental human rights violation of public importance or urgency existed, the Court dismissed the petition as incompetent.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Review Board constituted to review the removal of employees under Martial Law possess the power to issue binding reinstatement orders or is its function merely recommendatory?
  • Can a petition regarding service termination be dismissed for lack of public importance or urgency under Article 184(3) of the Constitution?
  • Is a consent order passed by the National Industrial Relations Commission binding on the Federal Government if the Government subsequently rejects the underlying recommendation for reinstatement?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Abdullah vs The State1995 SCMR 821 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-28
  court witnessessummoning of witnessestrial court discretioncriminal trial procedureleave to appealprosecution evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a criminal revision petition by the High Court, which had upheld a trial court's refusal to summon specific police officers as court witnesses. The petitioner, facing trial for murder and related offenses, sought to examine a Deputy Superintendent of Police and another officer as court witnesses after the prosecution had concluded its evidence. The trial court rejected the application, noting that the officers' statements were recorded after the submission of the challan and that the defense remained at liberty to produce them as defense witnesses. The core legal question was whether the trial court erred in refusing to exercise its discretion to summon these individuals as court witnesses. The Supreme Court held that no case for interference was made out, as the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the testimony of these officers was necessary for a just determination of guilt or innocence. The court affirmed that the trial court's discretion in summoning witnesses is contingent upon the necessity of the evidence for reaching a correct conclusion.

  Questions settled

  • Is a trial court required to summon police officers as court witnesses merely upon the request of the accused?
  • Does the refusal of a trial court to summon specific witnesses constitute a ground for interference if the necessity of their testimony is not established?
  • Can the defense produce witnesses as defense evidence if the court declines to summon them as court witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Maula Bakhsh and anothers vs The State1995 SCMR 1132 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-19
  murderright of private defenceinjured witnessesleave to appealcriminal assaultappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the High Court upholding the conviction of the petitioners under section 302/34 and 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Gul Faqir and murderous assault on prosecution witnesses. The core legal questions involve assessing the credibility of injured eyewitnesses, evaluating the plea of right of private defence of person and property, and determining whether the accused exceeded such right, thereby attracting a lesser punishment under section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider these legal points, noting the admission of a scuffle by the accused alongside competing defence versions supported by witness testimonies.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of injured prosecution witnesses establishes their presence at the scene beyond doubt?
  • Does an accused admitting to a scuffle and raising a plea of private defence discharge the burden under criminal law?
  • Whether an accused exceeding the right of private defence is entitled to a lesser punishment under section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Kalbe Ali Wazir vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and 6 others1995 SCMR 1202 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-14
  service tribunalpromotionsupersessionleave to appealdepartmental appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an Executive Engineer, challenged his supersession to the post of Superintending Engineer before the Federal Service Tribunal, which initially remanded the case for fresh consideration. Upon reconsideration, the Central Selection Board again did not accord promotion to the petitioner. The petitioner filed a miscellaneous petition before the Tribunal challenging this subsequent decision instead of filing a departmental appeal or a regular appeal. The Tribunal disposed of the miscellaneous petition upon being informed that the earlier judgment had been implemented. The petitioner then sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether a miscellaneous petition without a departmental appeal or regular appeal was maintainable against a fresh adverse promotion order. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of a departmental appeal and a regular appeal against the fresh order, the petition was not maintainable and the Tribunal was justified in its approach. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a miscellaneous petition is maintainable against a fresh adverse promotion order without filing a departmental appeal?
  • Can a fresh cause of action regarding promotion be challenged without filing a regular appeal before the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Gulu Khan vs Gul Daraz Khan and another1995 SCMR 1765 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-07-03
  bail cancellationmurderfurther inquirycommon intentionvicarious liabilitydiscretionary powertentative assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the High Court's order granting bail to the respondent in a murder case registered under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in granting bail based on the ground of "further inquiry" under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, given the general allegations of firing by multiple accused. The Supreme Court, upon review, held that the High Court’s reliance on "further inquiry" was misplaced. The Court established that "further inquiry" under Section 497(2) requires a judicial finding that there are no reasonable grounds to believe the accused committed a non-bailable offense, rather than merely identifying hypothetical questions. Furthermore, the Court clarified that where multiple accused are charged with firing at a deceased, the inability to pinpoint the fatal shot does not necessitate bail, as vicarious liability may apply. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's order and cancelled the respondent's bail, emphasizing that discretion must be exercised judiciously based on established legal principles.

  Questions settled

  • Does the inability to identify which specific accused caused the fatal shot in a murder case involving multiple assailants constitute grounds for 'further inquiry' under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What is the legal threshold for invoking the 'further inquiry' provision under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in non-bailable offenses?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the discretionary grant of bail by the High Court if the order is based on incorrect legal premises?
  • Is a tentative assessment of evidence sufficient for deciding bail applications, or is a deeper appreciation of evidence required?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Gul Payao Din vs Hamayun Saifullah Khan and 10 others1995 PLD Supreme Court 642 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-15
  impleadmentnecessary partyCode of Civil ProcedurePermanent Transfer Deedconsolidation of suitsrevisional jurisdictionproperty title
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a revision petition by the High Court, which upheld the trial court's refusal to implead the petitioner as a party in a civil suit regarding the title of a property. The petitioner, holding a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) and Permanent Transfer Order (P.T.O.), sought impleadment after the Assistant Commissioner cancelled these documents without notice. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was a necessary party under Order I, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, given the alleged illegal cancellation of his title documents. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's discretionary refusal to implead the petitioner was not open to interference, as the petitioner had already filed an independent suit to establish his title and challenge the cancellation order. The Court affirmed that the lower courts' observations regarding the petitioner's title documents were not binding on the merits of his independent suit and suggested that consolidation of the suits could address concerns regarding multiplicity of litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Is a person holding a Permanent Transfer Deed a necessary party in a civil suit concerning the title of the same property?
  • Can a court refuse to implead a party under Order I, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if that party has already filed an independent suit regarding the same property?
  • Do observations made by a court while rejecting an application for impleadment have a binding effect on the merits of an independent suit filed by the applicant?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Feroze Din vs The District Magistrate, Lahore and another1995 SCMR 705 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-25
  functus officioNo-Objection Certificatead interim injunctionbalance of convenienceirreparable lossstatus quoleasehold rights
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a dealer for Pakistan Burmah-Shell Limited, challenged a notice issued by the District Magistrate, Lahore, requiring the relocation of a petrol pump site on grounds of public safety and traffic obstruction. The petitioner had previously invested significant capital in the site with official approval and held a lease valid until January 1986. After the trial court granted an ad interim injunction to maintain the status quo, the Additional District Judge set aside this order, and the High Court dismissed the petitioner's revision petition. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the District Magistrate possessed the authority to withdraw a previously issued No-Objection Certificate (N.O.C.). The Court held that the District Magistrate became functus officio after issuing the N.O.C. and lacked the authority to unilaterally withdraw it. Furthermore, the Court found that the petitioner had established a prima facie case, and the balance of convenience favored maintaining the status quo to prevent irreparable loss. Consequently, the Supreme Court restored the trial court's injunction order, ruling that the District Magistrate's actions were legally unsound.

  Questions settled

  • Does a District Magistrate become functus officio after issuing a No-Objection Certificate for a petrol pump?
  • Can a District Magistrate unilaterally withdraw a previously issued No-Objection Certificate on grounds of public safety?
  • Is an ad interim injunction appropriate when the petitioner would suffer irreparable loss from eviction before the expiry of a lease?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Fazal Shah and 2 others vs Shahbaz Khan and 5 others1995 SCMR 85 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-20
  pre-emptionshamilat-i-dehjamabandigraveyardwaqf propertyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had set aside an appellate court's decision and restored a trial court decree in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether an appellate court could deprive recorded owners of ownership rights in a specific Khasra number on the ground that it had become dedicated Waqf property as a graveyard due to long user, despite the absence of a specific plea in the written statement and without impleading the affected beneficiaries or owners. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of pleadings, specific evidence, and proper impleadment, and given that revenue records (Jamabandis) demonstrated continuous ownership by the proprietary body alongside subsequent alienations and abadi usage, ownership rights could not be deemed extinguished. The Court laid down that presumption of truth is attached to Jamabandi entries regarding ownership, and a finding of dedication as graveyard cannot be sustained without proper pleadings, evidence, and parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can deprive recorded owners of ownership rights in land on the ground of dedication as a graveyard without specific pleadings and impleadment?
  • Does a presumption of truth attach to ownership entries in the Jamabandis regarding Shamilat-i-deh?
  • Can ownership rights in a Khasra number be extinguished on account of long user as a graveyard without clear evidence of dedication?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Ali Khan & Company, Abbottabad and 8 others vs M/s. Allied Bank1995 PLD Supreme Court 362 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-13
  leave to defendOrder XXXVII CPCsummary procedurerecovery of loanBanking Companies Ordinance 1979deemed admissionstatement of accountsbankers books evidence actsecured loan
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a recovery suit decreed by the Special Court Banking under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, and affirmed by the Peshawar High Court in a First Appeal. The trial court had dismissed the appellants' application for leave to defend under Order XXXVII, Rule 3 C.P.C. and decreed the suit, which the High Court maintained. The primary legal question was whether, upon refusal of leave to defend in a summary suit under Order XXXVII C.P.C. (read with Section 7(2) of the Banking Ordinance, 1979), the court is still bound to record evidence of the plaintiff, or whether the allegations in the plaint are deemed admitted, entitling the plaintiff to a decree. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that refusal or absence of leave to defend under Order XXXVII, C.P.C. places the defendant in default, meaning allegations in the plaint are deemed admitted and the plaintiff becomes entitled to a decree without formally proving its claim through evidence, provided the court applies its mind to ensure the plaint discloses a valid cause of action and legal entitlement.

  Questions settled

  • Does sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 of Order XXXVII C.P.C. apply to cases where an application for leave to defend has been filed and rejected by the court?
  • Is a court required to record evidence of the plaintiff before decreeing a suit under Order XXXVII C.P.C. when the defendant's leave to defend application is dismissed?
  • Does the fact that a bank loan is fully secured automatically entitle a borrower to grant of leave to defend under Order XXXVII C.P.C.?
  • What are the legal consequences when a defendant fails to obtain leave to defend or fails to fulfill conditions subject to which leave was granted under Order XXXVII C.P.C.?
  Read full judgment →
• Hafiz Muhammad 1Shaq vs Ch. Muhammad Siddique1995 SCMR 730 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-12
  eviction petitionlandlord and tenantspecific performanceremand of caseframing of issuesrent defaultimpairment of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from an eviction petition filed by the respondent against the appellant, alleging rent default and property damage. The appellant contested the eviction, asserting an agreement to sell the property and a pending civil suit for specific performance. The Rent Controller determined the relationship of landlord and tenant existed and ordered eviction without addressing the substantive allegations of default or property damage. On appeal, the Additional District Judge upheld the finding on the landlord-tenant relationship but remanded the case for the Rent Controller to frame and decide issues regarding the alleged default and damage. The High Court subsequently set aside the remand order and restored the eviction order. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Rent Controller erred by failing to frame and adjudicate upon the core issues of default and property damage. The Court emphasized that the mere existence of a landlord-tenant relationship does not automatically warrant eviction without a finding on the specific grounds alleged. Consequently, the High Court's order was set aside, and the case was remanded for a proper inquiry into the merits of the eviction grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere establishment of a landlord-tenant relationship automatically justify an eviction order without findings on specific grounds like default or property damage?
  • Is a Rent Controller required to frame and adjudicate upon all material issues raised in the pleadings, including allegations of rent default and property damage?
  • Does the pendency of a civil suit for specific performance regarding the tenanted property preclude a Rent Controller from deciding an eviction petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Habib Ullah Khan vs Amir Zaman and 9 others1995 SCMR 135 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-28
  pre-emptiondeposit of pre-emption moneybank guaranteestatutory interpretationreview of ordercivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed a writ petition challenging the District Judge's order revising the trial court's order regarding the deposit of pre-emption money. The core legal question revolves around the interpretation and mandatory nature of unamended section 24 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987, requiring a pre-emptor to deposit one-third of the sale price in cash and furnish a bank guarantee for the remaining two-third. The Supreme Court held that where the sale price is explicitly mentioned in the sale deed or mutation, the court has no discretion to determine a probable value and is bound to order the deposit strictly in accordance with subsection (1) of section 24. Resorting to sections 3 and 33 of the Act for guidance from Shariah is unwarranted when the statutory provision is clear and unambiguous. Furthermore, the trial court lacked grounds under section 114 read with Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to review its initial valid deposit order. The Supreme Court accordingly dismissed the petition while granting an extension of time to comply with the deposit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court has the discretion to determine the probable value of property under unamended section 24 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987 when a sale price is already mentioned in the sale deed or mutation?
  • Can recourse be had to sections 3 and 33 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987 for interpretation when the provisions of section 24 of the said Act are clear and unambiguous?
  • Under what circumstances can a trial court review its interlocutory order regarding the deposit of pre-emption money under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Habib Bakhsh vs Mst. Bilquis Begum and others1995 SCMR 448 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-11
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentlandlord and tenantspecific performanceregistered sale-deeddeposit of rent
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which set aside the Rent Controller's order and granted ejectment against the petitioner-tenant on the ground of default in payment of rent. The core legal question was whether a tenant can withhold rent from a registered purchaser and deposit it with the Rent Controller based on a pending suit for specific performance and cancellation of the sale deed. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner remained a tenant and was legally liable to pay rent to the new purchaser under the registered sale-deed, notwithstanding any pending litigation or agreement to purchase. The Court concluded that depositing rent in the name of the previous owner, who had lost interest in the property, did not cure the default. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that filing a suit for specific performance does not absolve a tenant from paying rent to the rightful purchaser.

  Questions settled

  • Does the filing of a suit for specific performance and cancellation of a sale deed absolve a tenant from paying rent to the registered purchaser?
  • Can a tenant validly deposit rent with the Rent Controller in the name of the previous owner after receiving notice of a registered sale?
  • Whether a tenant commits default by refusing to pay rent to the successor-in-interest of the demised premises?
  Read full judgment →
• Habib Ahmed Khan and anothers vs Sameeullah Khan and others1995 SCMR 788 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-07
  Section 12(2) CPCfraud and misrepresentationconsent decreeconcurrent findingsleave to appealunauthorized advocate
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment upholding an order that set aside a consent decree. The petitioner had obtained a decree for a declaration of ownership of agricultural land based on a written statement filed by an advocate, which the respondents subsequently challenged under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, alleging fraud and misrepresentation. The trial court set aside the decree, finding it was procured through fraud and that the advocate lacked authorization. The High Court affirmed this, noting that the suit remained pending for adjudication on merits. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that concurrent findings of fact regarding fraud and misrepresentation by the lower courts did not warrant interference. The Court further clarified that observations made during Section 12(2) proceedings are restricted to that specific controversy and do not prejudice the trial on the merits. It was established that parties are free to lead fresh evidence or adopt existing evidence during the subsequent trial, ensuring the trial court remains uninfluenced by prior interlocutory findings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a decree obtained through fraud and misrepresentation be set aside under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Do findings made during proceedings under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 prejudice the trial of the suit on its merits?
  • Are parties permitted to lead fresh evidence during the trial of a suit after a decree has been set aside under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulistan and others vs The State1995 SCMR 1789 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-07
  criminal appealsolitary witnessappreciation of evidenceFIR fabricationcorroborationinterested witnessacquittalcapital charge
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and sentences of the appellants for murder and attempted murder. The core legal question was whether a conviction could be sustained based solely on the testimony of a related and inimical witness, particularly when the First Information Report (FIR) appeared fabricated. The Supreme Court held that while a conviction may legally rest on the testimony of a single witness, that witness must be absolutely dependable. In this case, the witness was related, partisan, and had previously implicated an accused who was subsequently acquitted, demonstrating a tendency to exaggerate. Consequently, the Court ruled that the witness's testimony required independent corroboration to be considered a safe basis for conviction, which was absent. Furthermore, the Court found that the investigating officer had dishonestly prepared the FIR, necessitating extreme caution in evaluating the prosecution's evidence. Finding no reliable corroborative evidence to connect the appellants to the crime, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants, establishing that a tainted FIR and an unreliable solitary witness preclude a safe conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal conviction be sustained solely on the testimony of a related and inimical witness without independent corroboration?
  • What is the legal consequence when an investigating officer is found to have dishonestly prepared the First Information Report?
  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused, to whom a witness attributed specific criminal acts, affect the credibility of that witness's testimony against other accused persons?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Hussain Shah vs Mulazim Hussain Shah1995 SCMR 973 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-21
  pre-emptionTalab-e-MuwathibatTalabsleave to appealcivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit filed by the petitioner to challenge the sale of the suit property to the respondent. The suit was contested by the respondent on the ground that the petitioner had failed to make the necessary 'Talabs' as required under pre-emption law. Both the trial court and the appellate court dismissed the suit, and the Lahore High Court subsequently dismissed the petitioner's civil revision in limine. The core legal question before the Supreme Court of Pakistan was whether the petitioner's deposition, stating that upon learning of the sale he immediately sent two persons to the defendant to offer the money consideration and demand the return of the property, was sufficient to constitute 'Talab-e-Muwathibat'. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider this specific question regarding the legal sufficiency of the petitioner's actions in fulfilling the requirement of Talab-e-Muwathibat.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emptor's act of sending two persons to the vendee to offer the consideration money and demand the return of the property immediately upon learning of the sale constitutes a valid Talab-e-Muwathibat?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of the Punjab through Secretary (Services), Sga&I1995 PLD Supreme Court 541 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  writ jurisdictionservice matterinterim reliefjurisdiction of High CourtService Tribunalstay ordermaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court interim order that admitted a writ petition filed by a civil servant and granted a stay against adverse departmental actions. The Provincial Government argued that the High Court lacked jurisdiction, asserting the matter fell exclusively within the Service Tribunal's domain under the Constitution. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court’s order was interim and non-final. The Court held that the High Court is fully competent to determine its own jurisdiction and the maintainability of the petition after hearing both parties. The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the interim order, noting that the High Court had not yet had the opportunity to adjudicate the jurisdictional objections raised by the appellants. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed with a direction for the High Court to dispose of the writ petition finally within one month. The judgment reinforces the principle that appellate courts should avoid premature interference with interim orders, allowing the High Court to first exercise its authority to decide its own jurisdiction and the merits of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the authority to determine its own jurisdiction and the maintainability of a writ petition after hearing both parties?
  • Should the Supreme Court interfere with an interim, non-final order of the High Court before the High Court has adjudicated the jurisdictional objections raised by the parties?
  • Is a dispute regarding disciplinary proceedings against a civil servant exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of the Punjab through Secretary (Services), Services1995 SCMR 546 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-09
  limitationcondonation of delayintra-court appealgovernment as litigantdiscretion of court
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellants' Intra-Court Appeal (ICA) as time-barred by four days. The core legal question was whether the High Court rightly exercised its discretion in refusing to condone the delay in filing the appeal by the Government departments, where the explanation of departmental correspondence was deemed vague and each day's delay was not explained. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's discretion in declining to condone the delay was properly exercised on correct appreciation of the factual and legal position, emphasizing that the Government cannot be treated differently from private litigants on the question of limitation and that each day's delay must be accounted for under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Furthermore, pleas not raised before the High Court cannot be urged for the first time before the Supreme Court. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Government can be treated differently from a private litigant on the question of limitation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Is it mandatory to explain each day's delay when seeking condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can a plea regarding the explanation of delay, not raised before the High Court, be permitted to be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Punjab and others vs Khadim Hussain and others1995 SCMR 754 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-26
  leave to appealcompromise orderlease extensionquarrying of stonewrit petitionstatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Government of Punjab against an order of the Lahore High Court dated 15-4-1992, which disposed of a writ petition in terms of a compromise allowing respondent Khadim Hussain to continue stone quarrying until 5-9-1996 upon payment of Rs. 77 lacs. The core legal question concerns whether a compromise order allowing a lease extension and substitution of unworkable quarrying land was contrary to law, unauthorized, and collusive, resulting in financial loss to the exchequer. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the legality of the compromise order and whether it was vitiated by unauthorized interpolation. The court held that leave should be granted to consider the validity of the High Court's compromise order regarding the lease of an area other than the one originally leased out.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a compromise order allowing a lease for quarrying of stone from an area other than the one previously leased out is contrary to law?
  • Can a compromise leading to a lease extension be set aside if it is alleged to be unauthorized and collusive resulting in financial loss to the government exchequer?
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• Government of Pakistan, Aviation Division and anothers vs Mst. Shaila1995 SCMR 11 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-07
  civil servantAirports Security ForceFederal Service Tribunalleave to appealservice matterjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, filed by the Government of Pakistan against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal. The respondent, an Assistant Security Officer at Lahore Airport, had been discharged from service under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952. The core legal question was whether employees of the Airports Security Force qualify as civil servants, thereby falling under the jurisdiction of the Federal Service Tribunal, particularly in light of amendments to the Airports Security Force Act, 1975. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the impugned order of the Federal Service Tribunal was unexceptionable. The Court reaffirmed the principle established in its precedent, Fasihuddin v. Khawar Latif Butt and others (1993 SCMR 1), that employees of the Airports Security Force are indeed civil servants. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the government's contention that the respondent was excluded from civil servant status, thereby upholding the Tribunal's decision to remand the case for a fresh determination.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees of the Airports Security Force considered civil servants?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have jurisdiction over the service matters of Airports Security Force employees?
  • Can the government challenge the status of Airports Security Force employees as civil servants based on the Airports Security Force (Amendment) Ordinance 1984?
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• Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Rawalpindi and anothers vs Abdul Hamid1995 SCMR 1214 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-20
  service lawdisciplinary proceedingsbenefit of doubtrecovery of lossreduction in rankFederal Service Tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had partially set aside a disciplinary order against a government employee. The respondent, a Record Keeper and In-charge of Maps, faced disciplinary action after maps were found missing, resulting in his reduction to a lower grade and an order for the recovery of Rs. 77,890. The Federal Service Tribunal, upon reviewing the departmental inquiry, concluded that the evidence created doubt regarding the respondent's liability for the missing maps and consequently set aside the recovery order, while maintaining the reduction in rank. The Supreme Court examined the findings of the Tribunal and found no legal infirmity in the decision to extend the benefit of doubt to the respondent regarding the financial recovery. Furthermore, the Court noted that because the respondent had not filed a cross-appeal challenging the reduction in his rank, it could not grant further relief. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the Tribunal's judgment and dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court grant relief regarding a disciplinary penalty if the aggrieved employee has not filed an appeal against that specific penalty?
  • Is the Federal Service Tribunal empowered to set aside a financial recovery order if the evidence regarding the employee's liability is doubtful?
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• Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance, Islamabad and 31995 SCMR 209 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-06-09
  Customs ActAfghan Transit Trade AgreementTransit TradeImport BanRemand
  Summary & questions settled

  The Government of Pakistan filed a petition for leave to appeal against the Sindh High Court's order dated 24-3-1992, which had quashed letters issued by the Central Board of Revenue banning the import of tyres under the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement, holding them violative of section 16 of the Customs Act. At the hearing before the Supreme Court, both parties conceded that section 16 of the Customs Act was not applicable and that the matter was instead governed by section 129 of the Customs Act and the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement, 1965, neither of which had been examined by the High Court. Consequently, the Supreme Court by consent converted the petition into an appeal, set aside the impugned order of the High Court, and remanded the case for fresh determination in light of section 129 of the Customs Act and the terms of the treaty agreement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether section 16 of the Customs Act applies to goods in transit to Afghanistan or if such cases are governed by section 129 of the Customs Act?
  • Can administrative letters banning transit trade items be sustained without examining the applicable statutory provisions and treaty agreements?
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• Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Finance and 3 others vs Manzoor Brothers1995 SCMR 516 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-07
  customs lawimport policydepartmental practiceretrospective applicationestoppeladministrative interpretationconfiscation of goods
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal by the Government of Pakistan against a High Court judgment favoring a respondent-firm, M/s. Manzoor Brothers, regarding the import of cycle hub-spindles. The Customs authorities had confiscated the goods, alleging they were imported without a valid license under the Import Policy Order, 1982-83, thereby violating the Customs Act, 1969 and the Import and Export (Control) Act, 1950. The core legal question was whether the Customs Department could retroactively apply a new administrative ruling to goods imported prior to that ruling, despite a long-standing departmental practice of permitting such imports. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the Customs Department could not depart from a consistent, long-standing departmental practice to the detriment of settled rights. The Court affirmed that administrative rulings cannot be applied retrospectively to transactions completed before the ruling was issued. The key principle laid down is that where an executive authority has consistently interpreted a statute or rule over a long period, it creates an element of estoppel, and courts will prevent the authorities from suddenly departing from such practice to the prejudice of parties who relied upon it.

  Questions settled

  • Can an administrative authority retroactively apply a new ruling to goods imported before that ruling was issued?
  • Is the government bound by a long-standing departmental practice regarding the interpretation of import regulations?
  • Does a consistent departmental construction of a statute create an estoppel against the authorities?
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• Government of N.WF.P. through Secretary Forests, Fisheries and Wildlife, Peshawar and 3 others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad and 15 others1995 PLD Supreme Court 412 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-12
  leave to appealland commissionmartial law regulationdeclaration formswrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing their writ petitions, which challenged the order of the Chairman, Federal Land Commission, permitting the legal heirs of late Nawab Muhammad Fareed Khan to file fresh declaration forms under Martial Law Regulation 64 and Martial Law Regulation 115. The core legal question was whether fresh declarations could be authorized and filed in respect of property already subjected to declarations under the said regulations. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider the contentions that once declarations had been made, no subsequent declarations could be entertained and the Chairman lacked the power to authorize them, while ordering that the interim stay order shall continue pending the disposal of the appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Chairman of the Federal Land Commission authorize the filing of fresh declaration forms under Martial Law Regulation 64 and Martial Law Regulation 115 after initial declarations have already been submitted?
  • Whether fresh declarations can be filed in respect of property that was previously surrendered and settled under Martial Law Regulation 64?
  • Does the Federal Land Commission have the power to direct the Deputy Land Commissioner to issue fresh notices to heirs for independent determination under Martial Law Regulations?
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• Government of N.W.F.P. through Chief Secretary and others vs Iqbal1995 SCMR 82 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-09-07
  civil servantregularization of servicead hoc appointmentproject employeefinality of judgmentleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court which directed the absorption of the respondent as a regular civil servant in Grade-18 or to an equivalent post. The core legal question concerned whether the services of an ad hoc employee, whose appointment had been regularized pursuant to earlier finalized judicial decisions, could be terminated on the premise that he was appointed to a specific project. The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed no infirmity, noting that the respondent's initial appointment was not tied to any specific project and that the earlier judgments confirming his regularized service status had attained finality and could not be re-opened. The key principle laid down is that matters and questions conclusively decided by final judicial pronouncements operate as a bar to subsequent re-litigation or inconsistent administrative action regarding an employee's service status.

  Questions settled

  • Can the service of a regularized civil servant be terminated on the ground that he was appointed to a specific project when the original appointment order and final judicial decisions establish otherwise?
  • Whether questions already decided by final judgments in previous writ petitions can be re-opened and re-agitated in subsequent proceedings?
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• Government of N.-W.F.P. through Secretary, Law, Peshawar vs Muhammad1995 PLC (C.S.) 91 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-06
  service lawpensionary benefitsgratuityservice tribunalprevious serviceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The Government of N.-W.F.P. filed a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, which had allowed the respondent to count his previous service period from 10-2-1967 to 30-12-1979 for the purpose of calculating gratuity and pensionary benefits. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Service Tribunal correctly applied the precedent established by the Supreme Court in Appeals Nos. 369 to 373 of 1985 regarding the computation of past service for pensionary purposes. The Supreme Court found that the petitioner's counsel could not provide any compelling arguments to justify departing from the established legal position or the Tribunal's reliance on the cited precedent. Consequently, the Court upheld the decision of the Service Tribunal, holding that the respondent's previous service period was validly countable for pensionary benefits. The petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused, affirming the principle that established precedents regarding the calculation of pensionable service must be consistently applied by Service Tribunals.

  Questions settled

  • Can previous service rendered by a government employee be counted for the determination of gratuity and pensionary benefits?
  • Is a Service Tribunal bound to follow the precedents of the Supreme Court regarding the computation of pensionable service?
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• Ghulam Shabbir vs The State1995 SCMR 1166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-08
  criminal revisionacquittalretrialcondonation of delayleave to appealappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan via a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which allowed a criminal revision application filed by the complainant, setting aside the acquittal of the petitioners and remanding the case for retrial. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court acted within its jurisdiction and correctly appraised the evidence in accordance with principles for safe administration of justice while interfering with an acquittal in revision. The Supreme Court granted leave to examine these questions, noting contentions regarding misreading of evidence by the High Court and the prolonged delay since the incident. The Court held that leave should be granted to properly evaluate the High Court's exercise of revisional jurisdiction and appraisal of evidence, continuing the stay of proceedings in the trial court pending the final disposal of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court acted within its jurisdiction in setting aside an acquittal and remanding the case for retrial in a criminal revision application?
  • Did the High Court rightly appraise the evidence in accordance with principles laid down for the safe administration of justice?
  • Whether a retrial ordered after a significant lapse of time serves any useful purpose in the administration of justice?
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• Ghulam Sarwar vs Mazhar Ahmad1995 PLD Supreme Court 677 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-12
  pre-emptionlimitation periodattestation of mutationphysical possessionagricultural landsuperior pre-emptive rightco-sharer
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a pre-emption suit concerning agricultural land. The core legal question revolves around the determination of the period of limitation for filing a pre-emption suit where the sale is effected through an oral transaction subsequently recorded in a mutation, specifically whether limitation runs from the alleged prior delivery of physical possession or the date of attestation of the mutation. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner-vendee failed to establish actual physical possession prior to the attestation of the mutation through reliable evidence, and therefore limitation rightly commenced from the date the mutation was formally attested by the Revenue Officer, rendering the respondent's suit within time. The key principle laid down is that recitals in private agreements or unverified revenue entries regarding prior delivery of possession cannot bind a pre-emptor unless substantiated by convincing evidence showing clear public notice of physical possession functioning to start the limitation period earlier than the mutation attestation date.

  Questions settled

  • When does limitation start to run for a pre-emption suit in the case of an oral sale of agricultural land effected through a mutation?
  • Can recitals in an unverified sale agreement or private receipt regarding prior delivery of possession bind a pre-emptor for the purpose of limitation?
  • Whether a mutation can be deemed to be sanctioned on the date parties acknowledge the sale transaction before a Revenue Officer rather than the date of formal attestation?
  • What constitutes sufficient proof of physical delivery of possession capable of serving as notice to prospective pre-emptors to trigger the limitation period?
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• Ghulam Rasool vs (Mst.) Zainab Bibi1995 SCMR 513 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-09
  leave to appealrestoration of appealservice of noticeprocedural lawappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against an order passed by a Judge in Chambers, which had allowed the respondent's application under Order XLI, Rule 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, thereby restoring an appeal to be heard on its merits. The petitioner contended that the respondent had been served with a notice of appeal on March 4, 1987, and that the subsequent proceedings were flawed because no hearing took place on that specific date, leading to an adjournment. The Supreme Court examined the impugned order, noting that the lower court had carefully considered the relevant legal authorities regarding the service of notice and the procedural requirements for restoring an appeal. Finding that the lower court had exercised its discretion with care and caution, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no merit in the petitioner's arguments. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the decision to restore the appeal for a hearing on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court restore an appeal under Order XLI, Rule 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 after it has been dismissed for default?
  • Is the service of notice on a specific date a prerequisite for the validity of subsequent adjournment orders in an appeal?
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• Ghulam Rasool and anothers vs Abdur Rashid and another1995 SCMR 761 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-02
  pre-emptionco-ownershipabatement of suitShariat Lawleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the dismissal of their pre-emption suit regarding a land sale registered on 16 April 1986, filed on 12 April 1987 on the ground of co-ownership. The trial court held the suit had abated based on the judgment in Malik Said Kamal's case (PLD 1986 SC 360), and the appellate and revisional courts upheld this view. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that since the suit was filed on 12 April 1987 when Shariat Law was applicable, it was governed by the rule in Mst. Safia Begum v. Ibrahim (PLD 1989 SC 314), which allowed suits for pre-emption under general law regarding causes of action arising after 31 July 1986. The Supreme Court granted leave to examine this contention.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emption suit filed on the ground of co-ownership after 31 July 1986 is competent under general law?
  • Did the judgment in Malik Said Kamal's case abate all pre-emption suits arising after 31 July 1986?
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• Ghulam Mustafa vs The State1995 PLD Supreme Court 488 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-30
  murdercapital punishmentocular evidencecorroborationpartial acquittalmotiveprivate revengecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant Ghulam Mustafa and four co-accused were tried for murder. The trial court convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced him to death, while acquitting the four co-accused. The High Court dismissed the appellant's appeal and confirmed the death sentence, as well as dismissing the complainant's revision petition against the acquittals. On further appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the ocular evidence of two eye-witnesses, which was partially disbelieved regarding the acquitted co-accused, could sustain the appellant's conviction without independent corroboration. The Supreme Court held that the testimony of the eye-witnesses was trustworthy, corroborated by prompt lodging of the First Information Report, medical evidence, the appellant's admission of motive regarding a prior family murder, and the surrounding circumstances. The Court affirmed that the partial acquittal of co-accused does not inherently discredit the entire prosecution case against a convicted co-accused where sufficient corroborative evidence exists, and declined to reduce the death sentence to life imprisonment on grounds of private revenge. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether ocular evidence rejected in respect of acquitted co-accused can be used to support the conviction of another accused without independent corroboration?
  • Does the acquittal of certain co-accused persons automatically vitiate the conviction of the remaining accused tried under the same charge?
  • Whether taking private revenge for a prior family murder constitutes a mitigating circumstance warranting the reduction of a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Can minor discrepancies in the testimonies of eye-witnesses and the absence of a visible blood trail be grounds for discarding otherwise credible ocular evidence?
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