Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muhammad Haneef vs The State1994 SCMR 1152 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-01-15
  lesser sentenceyoung offendermurderdeath sentence conversiontender agecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the High Court upholding the conviction of the appellant under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the sentence of death. The core legal question was whether the appellant was entitled to a lesser sentence of imprisonment for life in view of his tender age at the time of the commission of the offence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that upon recalculating the appellant's age based on the date of the incident rather than the date of his statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, he was approximately 16 years old at the time of the occurrence and thus qualified as a young offender. Consequently, the Court converted the death sentence to imprisonment for life, while maintaining the other sentences and extending the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that the accused's age for determining leniency must be reckoned as of the date of the occurrence rather than the later date of recording the statement under Section 342.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the age of an accused for the purpose of considering a lesser sentence should be determined as of the date of the occurrence or the date of recording his statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a young offender of tender age entitled to mitigation of the death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Does the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply when a death sentence is reduced to life imprisonment?
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• Muhammad Fazal vs Kaura through Legal Heirs, and others1994 SCMR 1783 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-07
  pre-emptionrevisional jurisdictionconcurrent findingsKhasra Girdawaritenancy rightsevidentiary value
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court, which set aside concurrent findings of the trial court and the appellate court regarding a suit for pre-emption. The petitioner had successfully challenged the sale of 96 Kanals of land in favour of the respondent, with the trial court decreeing the suit after finding that the respondent's claim of being a sitting tenant, based on Khasra Girdawari entries, lacked corroborative evidence. The High Court, exercising revisional jurisdiction, reversed these concurrent findings and dismissed the suit. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the High Court was legally justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact and whether a solitary entry in the Khasra Girdawari, absent other supporting evidence, was sufficient to establish the respondent's possession and status as a tenant. The core legal issue involves the limits of revisional jurisdiction in disturbing concurrent findings of fact and the evidentiary value of isolated revenue records in pre-emption litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Was the High Court justified in setting aside concurrent findings of the lower courts in its revisional jurisdiction?
  • Can a solitary entry in the Khasra Girdawari be relied upon to prove possession in the absence of other cogent evidence?
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• Muhammad Farooq Anjum vs Superintendent of Police and others1994 SCMR 381 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-06-16
  service appealdismissal from servicepolice constableunauthorized absenceshow-cause noticeleave to appealcontradictory pleas
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Police Constable, sought leave to appeal against the order of the Punjab Service Tribunal which dismissed his service appeal upholding his dismissal from service. The petitioner was proceeded against for unauthorized absence from duty, suspicious movement, and complaints of committing an unnatural offence. A show-cause notice was issued, following which the Superintendent of Police dismissed him, and his departmental appeals and subsequent service tribunal appeal were rejected. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was denied due process through lack of service of notice and whether his dismissal was legally justified. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner took contradictory stances regarding the service of the notice and failed to substantiate his claims, thereby justifying his dismissal. The court established that contradictory pleas by a litigant regarding service of notice disentitle them to relief, and unauthorized absence coupled with failure to respond to a show-cause notice warrants dismissal from disciplined service.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contradictory stances taken by a petitioner regarding the service of a show-cause notice disentitle him to relief?
  • Does unauthorized absence from duty without prior sanction justify dismissal from police service?
  • Can a petitioner challenge a departmental dismissal when he fails to reply to the show-cause notice?
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• Muhammad Fakhruddin Khan vs Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad And 5 Others1994 PLD Supreme Court 348 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-09
  repatriated employeesenioritypensionary benefitsOrdinance XI of 1983service matterlimitationformer East Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This service matter concerns the seniority and pensionary benefits of a repatriated former East Pakistan government employee. The core legal questions were whether the period spent by the appellant waiting for posting after his repatriation to Pakistan constitutes duty for the purpose of seniority and pension, and whether his appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal was time-barred. The Supreme Court held that the period spent waiting for posting after repatriation must be treated as duty for seniority and pensionary benefits, consistent with the principle established in Federation of Pakistan v. Zaki Ahmad Siddiqui. The Court further ruled that the appeal before the Tribunal was not time-barred, as the departmental authority had decided the representation on its merits, thereby providing a fresh cause of action. The key principle laid down is that the period of involuntary unemployment following repatriation from former East Pakistan for government employees is to be counted as service on duty for seniority and pension purposes under Ordinance XI of 1983.

  Questions settled

  • Does the period spent by a repatriated former East Pakistan government employee waiting for posting constitute duty for seniority and pension purposes?
  • Can a departmental authority's decision on the merits of a representation create a fresh cause of action for the purpose of limitation?
  • Are former East Pakistan government employees entitled to count their period of unemployment after repatriation as service on duty?
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• Muhammad Fakhruddin Khan vs Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad And 5 Other1994 PLD Supreme Court 348 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-09
  service tribunalsenioritypensionary benefitsrepatriated employeesEast Pakistan employeeslimitation periodwaiting period for posting
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves an appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the fixation of seniority and pensionary benefits for a former government employee of East Pakistan who was repatriated following the events of 1971 and subsequently absorbed into the federal service. The core legal question was whether the period spent by the appellant waiting for posting after repatriation to Pakistan should be treated as a period spent on duty for the purposes of seniority and pension, and whether his departmental appeal was time-barred. The Supreme Court held that the period spent waiting for posting must be counted towards seniority and pensionary benefits, following the principle established in prior jurisprudence regarding former East Pakistan employees. The Court further ruled that the service tribunal erred in dismissing the appeal as time-barred since a fresh cause of action arose upon the subsequent departmental decision. The key principle laid down is that the waiting period following repatriation for former East Pakistan employees is to be treated as duty for service benefits under the relevant statutory framework.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the period spent by a repatriated employee of former East Pakistan while waiting for posting after arrival in Pakistan can be counted towards seniority and pensionary benefits?
  • Whether an appeal filed before the Federal Service Tribunal is maintainable when a fresh cause of action arises from a subsequent departmental decision on merits?
  • How does Ordinance XI of 1983 govern the appointment, seniority, and pension of former employees of the Government of East Pakistan?
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• Muhammad Din vs Nazir Ahmed and 2 others1994 SCMR 109 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-08
  adverse possessionencroachmentHadd Shiknidemarcation of landevacuee propertycivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute regarding the alleged encroachment of 3 Marlas 7 Sarsais of land by the appellant upon property purchased by the respondents in a state auction. The core legal question was whether the appellant could successfully claim adverse possession over the encroached land, given that the encroachment was not publicly known or determined until formal demarcation proceedings occurred. The Supreme Court held that the appellant's claim of adverse possession failed because the encroachment was not public, hostile, or known to the respondents until the demarcation report was finalized. The Court established the principle that in cases of marginal encroachment (Hadd Shikni), adverse possession cannot be established until the fact of encroachment is determined through formal demarcation proceedings, as the possession cannot be considered 'public and hostile' in the absence of such determination. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower courts' findings that the appellant failed to prove adverse possession.

  Questions settled

  • Can a claim of adverse possession be established in cases of marginal encroachment before formal demarcation proceedings have taken place?
  • Does an encroachment of land constitute 'public and hostile' possession if the extent of the encroachment remains undetermined?
  • At what point does a cause of action for adverse possession arise in cases involving marginal land encroachments?
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• Muhammad Din and 2 others vs Muhammad Amin and 8 others1994 PLD Supreme Court 288 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-20
  consolidation schemepower of reviewrevenue lawerror apparent on the face of the recordejusdem generisBoard of Revenue
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over a consolidation scheme of a revenue estate. The core legal question concerned the scope of the power of review vested in the Member, Board of Revenue under Section 8 of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, 1957. Specifically, the Court examined whether the Member, Board of Revenue acted within his jurisdiction when reviewing a previous order. The Supreme Court held that the power of review is limited and distinct from an appellate power. It ruled that review can only be invoked upon the discovery of new and important evidence not previously available, or due to a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. The Court emphasized that the phrase 'for any other sufficient reason' in the statute must be interpreted ejusdem generis with the preceding grounds. Finding that the Member, Board of Revenue had improperly exercised review powers without identifying any such error or new evidence, the Court upheld the High Court's decision to set aside the review order and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of the power of review under Section 8 of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, 1957?
  • Can the power of review be equated with the power of appeal?
  • What constitutes a 'mistake or error apparent on the face of the record' for the purposes of a review application?
  • How should the phrase 'for any other sufficient reason' in Section 8 of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, 1957 be interpreted?
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• Muhammad Din And 2 Other vs Muhammad Amin And 8 Other---PLD 1994 Supreme Court 28 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-20Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Din alias Manni and another vs The State1994 SCMR 1847 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-11-18
  murderdying declarationmotiveappellate reviewsentence mitigationocular evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court maintaining the conviction of the appellants under section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for the murder of Mst. Maqsoodan Bibi, while altering the death sentence of the first appellant to imprisonment for life. The prosecution case was founded on an initial report alleging a petty motive regarding a refusal to assist in mud plastering, and a subsequent dying declaration alleging a motive involving seeing the accused in an objectionable position. The core legal questions pertained to the reliability of the dying declaration, the sufficiency of the motive, the credibility of ocular and child witness testimony, and the propriety of the sentence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the evidence relating to the immediate motive was unsatisfactory and shrouded in mystery, but upheld the conviction based on reliable ocular and corroborative evidence, and declined to interfere with the commutation of the death sentence. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution fails to establish a satisfactory immediate motive, but ocular and medical evidence overwhelmingly prove guilt, the conviction may be sustained while the uncertainty of motive may serve as a mitigating circumstance against the death penalty.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for murder under section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be sustained when the prosecution's alleged motive remains shrouded in mystery?
  • Can a dying declaration recorded by a police officer be relied upon when corroborated by other evidence?
  • Whether uncertainty or weakness in the proof of motive constitutes a mitigating circumstance for altering a sentence of death to imprisonment for life?
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• Muhammad Boota vs WAPDA And Others1994 PLC (C.S.) 503 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-18
  service appealdate of birthsuperannuationquestion of factleave to appealservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal against his retirement from service as an Assistant Lineman in WAPDA. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the determination of the petitioner's correct date of birth and subsequent retirement involved a substantial question of law of public importance under Article 212 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the determination of a correct date of birth is a question of fact resolved by the Tribunal upon appraisal of conflicting record entries, and does not warrant the grant of leave under Article 212(3). The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that factual disputes regarding service records do not constitute substantial questions of law of public importance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the determination of an employee's correct date of birth constitutes a question of fact?
  • Does a dispute regarding an entry of date of birth in service records involve a substantial question of law of public importance under Article 212 of the Constitution?
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• Muhammad Boota vs WAPDA And Others-1994 PLC (C.S.) 784 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-18
  service lawdate of birth disputesuperannuationFederal Service Tribunalleave to appealquestion of factWAPDA
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment by the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's challenge against his retirement from service by WAPDA. The core legal question concerned the determination of the petitioner's correct date of birth, as conflicting records existed: 1945 in the service book, 26-12-1946 in a school leaving certificate, and 1-7-1928 in the WAPDA employee list. The Tribunal had evaluated these documents and concluded that the petitioner's retirement was justified based on the date of birth recorded in the WAPDA list. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the determination of the petitioner's date of birth constituted a pure question of fact, which fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal to decide. Consequently, the Court found that the petition did not raise any substantial question of law of public importance as required for the grant of leave to appeal under the Constitution. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly refused, affirming that factual findings by the Tribunal are generally not subject to interference in this jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the determination of an employee's correct date of birth constitute a question of law or a question of fact?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 where no substantial question of law of public importance is involved?
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• Muhammad Boota vs WAPDA and others1994 SCMR 957 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-18
  service lawsuperannuationdate of birth disputeleave to appealquestion of factFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal challenging his retirement from service by WAPDA. The petitioner, formerly an Assistant Lineman, contested his retirement, arguing he had not reached the age of superannuation based on his service book, which recorded his birth year as 1945. However, the Tribunal observed conflicting evidence regarding the petitioner's date of birth, noting three different dates: 1945 in the service book, 26-12-1946 in a school leaving certificate, and 1-7-1928 in the WAPDA employee list. The Tribunal evaluated these documents and found the service book entry unreliable, ultimately concluding that the retirement was valid based on the date of birth recorded in the WAPDA list. The Supreme Court held that the determination of the petitioner's correct date of birth constituted a question of fact, which was within the Tribunal's jurisdiction to decide. Finding no substantial question of law of public importance, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is the determination of an employee's correct date of birth a question of fact to be decided by the Service Tribunal?
  • Does a dispute regarding an employee's date of birth constitute a substantial question of law of public importance under Article 212 of the Constitution?
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• Muhammad Bashir vs Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Education Department, Lahore And 2 Others1994 PLC (C.S.) 1099 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-16
  back benefitsservice tribunalreinstatementcivil servantintervening periodarrears of pay
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a Subject Specialist, challenged his retirement under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, before the Punjab Service Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the appeal, reinstating the appellant but ordering that the intervening period of his absence be treated as leave without pay, thereby denying him back benefits. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal was justified in withholding back benefits without assigning reasons or following the prescribed procedure for such determinations. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal erred by failing to provide reasons for denying back benefits and by failing to adhere to the statutory mechanism for determining such entitlements. The Court emphasized that under F.R. 54 and Section 16 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, the determination of back benefits involves a specific process, including the constitution of a committee to assess potential earnings during the intervening period. Consequently, the Court remanded the matter to the respondents to decide the appellant's entitlement to arrears in accordance with the law and relevant service rules.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Service Tribunal required to assign reasons when denying back benefits to a reinstated civil servant?
  • Does the Service Tribunal have the authority to bypass the committee mechanism for determining back benefits under F.R. 54?
  • Should the intervening period of a reinstated civil servant be treated as leave without pay without considering the statutory provisions for arrears?
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• Muhammad Bashi vs Khalid Mehmood and another1994 SCMR 1096 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-06
  criminal appealmurderself-defenceappreciation of evidenceconflicting versionsmedical evidencecommutation of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by the complainant challenged the Lahore High Court's judgment altering the respondent's conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code to section 304 Part I, reducing his sentence to 7 years' rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question involved evaluating conflicting versions of the incident presented by the prosecution and the accused, particularly concerning the plea of self-defence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in accepting the accused's self-defence version, which was contradicted by medical evidence showing the shot was fired from a close range of 3 to 4 feet and the absence of any injuries on the accused, while the prosecution version was corroborated by surrounding circumstances. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, restored the conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code, but commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment due to unestablished motives and withheld facts. The key legal principle laid down is that a plea of self-defence must be consistent with medical evidence, physical circumstances, and the absence of injuries on the assailant, and cannot be accepted based on bare statements when contradicted by the record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the plea of self-defence can be sustained when contradicted by medical evidence and the absence of injuries on the accused?
  • How should a court evaluate two conflicting versions of an incident presented by the prosecution and the defence?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to fully establish its motive justify altering a conviction or reducing a sentence from death to life imprisonment?
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• Muhammad Bakhsh vs Muhammad Jan And 2 Others1994 PLC 251 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-30
  miner booksalt miner servicetransfer of miner bookleave to appealrevision petitioninheritance of miner rights
  Summary & questions settled

  Muhammad Bakhsh petitioned for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed his revision petition against the District Judge's decree. The underlying dispute concerned the entitlement to hold the deceased miner book of Fazal Ilahi. The Civil Court initially found in favor of the petitioner, but the District Judge reversed this finding and held the respondent entitled to the miner book pursuant to Rule 4 of the Salt Miner Service and Conduct Regulation, 1976. Both the Appellate and Revisional Courts noted that upon the death of the deceased miner, the petitioner was admittedly in government service and thus not properly situated to be transferred the miner book, especially when compared to respondent No.1, who was a nephew of the same degree without competing disqualifications. The Supreme Court of Pakistan found no legal error or infirmity in the impugned judgments. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the lower courts' interpretation and application of the service and conduct regulations regarding the transfer of miner books upon a miner's death.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a miner book can be transferred to a nephew who was in government service at the time of the deceased miner's death?
  • Does the High Court's dismissal of a revision petition warrant interference by the Supreme Court when no legal error is shown?
  • How does Rule 4 of the Salt Miner Service and Conduct Regulation, 1976 govern the priority of transferring a deceased miner's book among relatives?
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• Muhammad Bakhsh vs Muhammad Jan and 2 others1994 SCMR 5L5 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  miner bookservice regulationinheritance of licensecivil revisionleave to appealSalt Miner Service and Conduct Regulation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a revision petition concerning the entitlement to a deceased miner's 'miner book'. The dispute arose between two nephews of the deceased, Fazal Ilahi, regarding the right to hold the miner book under the Salt Miner Service and Conduct Regulation, 1976. The core legal question concerned the proper interpretation of the rules governing the transfer of such books upon a miner's death, specifically when competing claimants are of the same degree of relationship. The Appellate and Revisional Courts had determined that the petitioner was ineligible because he was in Government service at the time the cause of action arose, and that the trial court had incorrectly assumed the respondent possessed another miner book. The Supreme Court found no legal error or infirmity in the lower courts' judgments. Consequently, the Court held that the lower courts correctly applied the regulations, affirming the respondent's entitlement, and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the possession of a miner book by a cousin disqualify a nephew from inheriting a deceased miner's book under the Salt Miner Service and Conduct Regulation, 1976?
  • Is a person in Government service eligible to hold a miner book under the Salt Miner Service and Conduct Regulation, 1976?
  • What is the order of succession for a miner book upon the death of a miner under the Salt Miner Service and Conduct Regulation, 1976?
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• Muhammad Azim Khan alias Badi and 2 others vs Azad Khan and 108 others1994 SCMR 1119 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-06-27
  Mahazi Malikancontiguous ownersrecord of rightsproprietary rightsestate ownershipland dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a concurrent judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had upheld the trial and appellate court decrees in favor of the respondents. The dispute concerned the ownership of land in the estate of village Kakki, recorded as belonging to 'Mahazi Malikan' (contiguous owners). The petitioners, who owned land in a different estate (Landidak Qasuria) adjacent to the suit property, claimed ownership rights based on their status as contiguous owners. The core legal question was whether the term 'Mahazi Malikan' in the record of rights could be interpreted to include owners of land situated in a different estate. The Supreme Court held that the interpretation adopted by the lower courts—that 'Mahazi Malikan' refers exclusively to contiguous owners within the same estate—was legally sound and consistent with the purpose of settlement records, which define proprietary rights within specific estates. Finding no jurisdictional error or legal flaw in the concurrent findings of the lower forums, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that ownership rights in one estate do not extend to contiguous land located in a separate estate.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'Mahazi Malikan' in a record of rights include owners of contiguous land situated in a different estate?
  • Are settlement officers concerned with proprietary rights of persons having no rights in the specific estate being recorded?
  • Can an owner of land in one estate claim ownership of adjacent land in a different estate based solely on contiguity?
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• Muhammad Azim and others vs Ali Mohtashim and others1994 SCMR 555 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-09
  Jammu and Kashmir refugeesRehabilitation Resettlement Schememaintenance allotmentMartial Law Regulation 89Martial Law Regulation 91cancellation of allotmentnatural justiceSettlement Commissioner
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arising from the dismissal of a Constitution petition by the Lahore High Court concerning conflicting land allotments. The appellants, refugees from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, were allotted land for maintenance purposes in 1947/48. In 1959, the Settlement authorities allotted the same land to Respondent No. 1 without notice to the appellants and without cancelling their prior allotment. The High Court dismissed the appellants' constitutional petition holding that the subsequent allotment had attained finality in the absence of a timely appeal or revision. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment and the orders of the Settlement authorities. The Court held that under paragraph 4-A(ix), Part I of the Rehabilitation Resettlement Scheme, land allotted on a temporary basis to Jammu and Kashmir refugees was expressly excluded from the Scheme, rendering any subsequent allotment illegal. Furthermore, an allotment made without notice to the prior occupant cannot attain finality.

  Questions settled

  • Can land temporarily allotted to Jammu and Kashmir refugees for maintenance be validly allotted to another claimant under the Rehabilitation Resettlement Scheme?
  • Whether an allotment of land made in favor of a subsequent claimant without notice to or cancellation of the prior allottee's allotment is legally valid?
  • Do Martial Law Regulations No. 89 and 91 validate an allotment of land that was void ab initio under the Rehabilitation Resettlement Scheme?
  • Does an illegal allotment order attain finality against an aggrieved prior allottee who was not given notice of the proceedings?
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• Muhammad Azam vs The State1994 SCMR 1261 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-15
  leave to appealarms ordinancerecovery witnessescontradictions in evidencesuspension of sentencebail
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld his conviction under section 13 of the Arms Ordinance, 1965, resulting in a sentence of five years rigorous imprisonment and a fine. The core legal question concerns the appreciation of evidence, specifically regarding alleged misreading of evidence, contradictions between police recovery witnesses, non-association of public witnesses, and unconsidered defence documents and enmity with police officials. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the evidence in light of these contentions, suspended the sentence, and admitted the petitioner to bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when recovery witnesses are exclusively police officials and contradict each other on material particulars?
  • Can a conviction under the Arms Ordinance be sustained when defence evidence and documents regarding police enmity are allegedly ignored?
  • Whether the sentence can be suspended and bail granted upon the grant of leave to appeal?
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• Muhammad Azam vs Mst. Zainab Bibi and 16 others1994 SCMR 2043 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-08
  pre-emptionnature of transactionsale vs exchangequestion of factsecond appealleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the nature of a land transfer transaction involving Sahib Dad and the contesting respondents. The core legal question was whether the transaction constituted a sale or an exchange, a determination critical to the petitioner's claim for the right of pre-emption. The trial court initially characterized the transaction as an exchange, thereby denying the pre-emption claim. The first appellate court subsequently reversed this finding, classifying the transaction as a sale and decreeing the suit in favor of the petitioner. However, the High Court in second appeal overturned the appellate court's decision, restoring the trial court's original finding that the transaction was an exchange. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the classification of the transaction as either a sale or an exchange is a question of fact. Finding that the High Court provided substantial and sufficient reasoning for preferring the trial court's conclusion over that of the first appellate court, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that there was no merit in the challenge to the High Court's findings.

  Questions settled

  • Is the determination of whether a land transaction constitutes a sale or an exchange considered a question of fact?
  • Can a High Court in second appeal prefer the findings of a trial court over those of a first appellate court if the reasoning is substantial?
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• Muhammad Ayub Awan vs Muhammad Yaqub and 13 others1994 SCMR 1137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-19
  criminal complaintwithdrawal of complaintdismissal of complaintrevival of complaintleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a criminal complaint. The petitioner filed a direct complaint for theft, which remained pending for six years. Subsequently, the petitioner voluntarily filed an application before the Magistrate stating he no longer wished to prosecute the complaint, leading the Magistrate to dismiss the case. The petitioner later sought to revive the complaint, but the Magistrate rejected the application, citing a lack of power to revive a complaint dismissed at the complainant's own request. The High Court upheld this decision, noting the withdrawal was a voluntary act. The core legal question was whether a Magistrate is compelled to continue proceedings despite a complainant's express withdrawal of the complaint. The Supreme Court held that the Magistrate acted correctly in dismissing the complaint upon the petitioner's voluntary request. The Court affirmed that where a complainant consciously withdraws a complaint, the trial court has no alternative but to dismiss it. The petition was dismissed for lack of substance, as no illegality was committed by the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Magistrate have the authority to revive a criminal complaint that was previously dismissed at the specific request of the complainant?
  • Is a Magistrate required to proceed with a criminal case even when the complainant explicitly states they do not wish to prosecute it?
  • Does the voluntary withdrawal of a criminal complaint by a complainant constitute a valid ground for the dismissal of the proceedings by the trial court?
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• Muhammad Aslam vs The State1994 SCMR 1205 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-07
  surety bond forfeitureproclaimed absconderbail bondmitigating circumstancesleave to appealcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Muhammad Aslam, sought leave to appeal against an order of the Federal Shariat Court, which had dismissed his revision petition regarding the forfeiture of a surety bond. The petitioner and another individual had stood surety for an accused, Taoos Khan, facing trial under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance, 1979. Following the accused's absence and subsequent declaration as a proclaimed absconder, the Sessions Judge forfeited the surety bonds. The petitioner contended that the accused had died shortly after his initial absence and that the accused's prior absence was due to illness, arguing that the forfeiture of the entire bond amount was excessive in these circumstances. The Supreme Court of Pakistan considered whether the forfeiture of the entire surety bond amount was justified given the evidence of the accused's death and the mitigating circumstances surrounding his absence. Finding that the question of whether the full bond amount should have been forfeited required further examination, the Court granted leave to appeal specifically on this issue.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the entire amount of a surety bond should be forfeited when the accused dies shortly after becoming absent from court?
  • Does the death of an accused person constitute a valid ground for mitigating the forfeiture of a surety bond?
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• Muhammad Aslam Khan vs Chairman, Pakistan Telecommunication1994 PLC (C.S.) 778 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-24
  leave to appealpromotionservice tribunalseniority-cum-fitnesseligibilitydepartmental promotion committeemisreading of record
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dated 6-7-1993, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal seeking promotion as Assistant Engineer (BPS-16) from June 1985 instead of May 1991. The core legal question is whether the petitioner was wrongly denied consideration for regular promotion against the designated quota despite possessing the requisite qualifications and eligibility from June 1985. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that there was a prima facie misreading of the record by the Tribunal regarding whether the petitioner was considered and found unfit by the Departmental Promotion Committee in its 1988 meeting, or whether he was merely deemed ineligible. The key principle laid down is that an eligible civil servant possessing the requisite qualifications for promotion against a reserved quota is entitled to lawful consideration by the competent promotion forum, and misreading of departmental records by a service tribunal warrants interference by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether eligibility for promotion is synonymous with consideration for promotion by the Departmental Promotion Committee?
  • Does a service tribunal's misreading of the departmental record regarding a petitioner's consideration for promotion warrant the grant of leave to appeal?
  • Is a civil servant possessing the requisite qualifications entitled to consideration for promotion against a reserved quota from the date of acquiring eligibility?
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• Muhammad Ashraf vs Dr. Muhammad Zaman And Others1994 PLC (C.S.) 425 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-17
  service tribunallocus poenitentiaenatural justiceadvance incrementsupgradation of postmove-overcivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves four consolidated appeals arising from a common judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, concerning service disputes over promotions, upgradation of posts, advance increments, and move-overs between Dr. Muhammad Zaman and Dr. Muhammad Ashraf. The core legal questions revolved around the applicability of the rule of locus poenitentiae and the legality of retrospectively upgrading posts and appointments. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that adverse orders withdrawing benefits and promotions previously granted to Dr. Muhammad Zaman without affording him an opportunity of hearing were violative of the principles of natural justice and thus unsustainable. The Court affirmed the Tribunal's findings setting aside the withdrawal of advance increments and the down-gradation of the post, while maintaining the dismissal of appeals concerning time-barred challenges. The key principle laid down is that administrative orders detrimental to a civil servant's vested rights cannot be passed without adhering to the principles of natural justice, and the competent authorities retain the liberty to re-examine inter se seniority in accordance with law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the rule of locus poenitentiae is applicable to the case in the facts and circumstances of the matter?
  • Whether upgradation of a post with retrospective effect and similarly upgradation of an employee retrospectively could be made?
  • Can adverse administrative orders withdrawing benefits or promotions be sustained when passed without providing a hearing to the affected civil servant?
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• Muhammad Ashraf and others vs Dr. Muhammad Zaman and others1994 SCMR 249 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-17
  civil servicenatural justiceaudi alteram partemupgradationadvance incrementssenioritylocus poenitentiaelimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This common judgment addresses four appeals arising from a Federal Service Tribunal decision concerning the service conditions, upgradation, and advance increments of two medical officers. The respondent, Dr. Muhammad Zaman, had his post upgraded to BPS-19 and was granted advance increments, which were later cancelled by the department without a prior hearing. Concurrently, the appellant, Dr. Muhammad Ashraf, had his contract appointment regularized retrospectively. The Tribunal restored the respondent's increments and upgradation but dismissed his appeal against the appellant's retrospective regularization as time-barred. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the Tribunal's decision, holding that the cancellation of the respondent's increments and upgradation without a hearing violated the principles of natural justice. The Court ruled that while the adverse orders were rightly set aside on this ground, the official respondents remained free to re-examine the inter se seniority of the parties in accordance with the law after providing a proper hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Can an administrative order granting increments or upgradation to a civil servant be withdrawn without providing an opportunity of being heard?
  • Does the violation of the principle of natural justice render an administrative order of demotion or withdrawal of benefits unsustainable?
  • Can the question of inter se seniority be re-examined by department authorities if the original adverse orders are set aside due to procedural violations?
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• Muhammad Ashraf and 2 others vs The State and another1994 SCMR 688 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-12
  private complaintinquiry officeradmissibility of evidenceinvestigating officer opinionsummoning of accusedcriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arose from a criminal matter where the appellants, previously discharged by a Magistrate following a police investigation, were subsequently summoned by an Additional Sessions Judge based on a private complaint. The core legal question was whether the Inquiry Officer acted improperly by failing to examine the police officers who had initially investigated the case and found the appellants innocent. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the investigating officers' testimony regarding the opinions they formed during their investigation would have been inadmissible evidence. Consequently, the Inquiry Officer did not err in refusing to examine them. The judgment establishes the principle that the opinion of an investigating officer regarding the innocence or guilt of an accused is not admissible evidence in judicial proceedings, and therefore, an inquiry officer is not required to examine such officers when evaluating a private complaint for the purpose of summoning accused persons.

  Questions settled

  • Is the opinion of an investigating officer regarding the innocence of an accused admissible as evidence in court?
  • Is an inquiry officer under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 required to examine police officers who previously investigated the case when deciding whether to summon accused persons?
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• Muhammad Ashraf alias Chaudhry vs The State1994 SCMR 667 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-16
  narcotics possessionsentence reductionmitigating circumstancesrigorous imprisonmentProhibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordercriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a conviction under Article 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, for the possession of heroin. The appellant, Muhammad Ashraf, was initially convicted by the trial court under both Article 3 and Article 4 of the Order. The Federal Shariat Court subsequently set aside the conviction under Article 3 but maintained the conviction and sentence under Article 4. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellant did not challenge the conviction itself but sought a reduction in the sentence, citing his advanced age (approximately 60 years) and his status as the sole breadwinner for a large family. The Supreme Court, finding the plea for mitigation genuine, exercised its discretion to reduce the sentence. The Court held that while the conviction for the possession of narcotics was maintained, the sentence of five years' rigorous imprisonment and fifteen stripes was excessive given the appellant's personal circumstances. Consequently, the Court reduced the sentence to two years' rigorous imprisonment and five stripes, while maintaining the fine of Rs. 2,000.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court reduce a sentence of imprisonment and stripes based on the advanced age and family responsibilities of the convict?
  • Does the absence of a formal age record in the paper book preclude the Court from considering the age of the accused for sentencing purposes?
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• Muhammad Ashraf alias Achhu and others vs The State1994 SCMR 1466 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-19
  harabadacoityrobberyhudood ordinanceamputationocular evidencerecovery of robbed propertyprompt FIR
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Special Court for Speedy Trials convicting the appellants under section 17(3) of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 and section 337-F(vi)/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for committing haraba and causing injuries. The core legal questions involve the credibility of ocular evidence, the corroborative value of prompt FIR lodging and recoveries, and the application of punishments for haraba under the Hudood Ordinance. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that consistent and disinterested ocular testimony, supported by timely medical examination, prompt reporting, and recovery of robbed items, conclusively established the guilt of the appellants. The court affirmed the convictions and the sentence of amputation as mandated by section 17(3) of the Ordinance, laying down that reliable eyewitness accounts corroborated by material recoveries and medical evidence form a sufficient and unassailable basis for conviction in violent robbery cases.

  Questions settled

  • Whether ocular testimony of injured and independent witnesses, when consistent and prompt, is sufficient to maintain a conviction for haraba?
  • Can a statement made to an investigating officer be used to contradict a witness in view of the prohibition contained in section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether the punishment of amputation under section 17(3) of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 is properly attracted and confirmable upon proof of violent robbery?
  • Does the prompt lodging of an FIR without unexplained delay rule out deliberation and false implication?
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• Muhammad Asghar and anothers vs The State1994 PLD Supreme Court 301 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-12
  acquittalcriminal revisiondouble presumption of innocenceretrialappraisal of evidencemiscarriage of justicefalsus in uno falsus in omnibus
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a High Court order that set aside an acquittal judgment and directed a retrial for the appellants. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, was justified in interfering with a trial court's acquittal order based on the principles governing such interference. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in setting aside the acquittal. The ratio of the decision is that an order of acquittal carries a double presumption of innocence—the general presumption of innocence and the presumption arising from a competent court's finding of not guilty. Interference with an acquittal is only permissible if the judgment is manifestly wrong, perverse, based on misreading or non-reading of evidence, or results in a miscarriage of justice. A mere difference of opinion between the appellate/revisional court and the trial court regarding evidence appraisal does not justify interference. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that police opinions on guilt cannot substitute for judicial evidence, and the principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus applies when eyewitness accounts are disbelieved regarding co-accused.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of a High Court's power to interfere with an acquittal order in criminal revision proceedings?
  • Does a difference of opinion between the trial court and the revisional court regarding evidence appraisal justify setting aside an acquittal?
  • Can the opinion of the police regarding the guilt or innocence of an accused form the sole basis for a conviction?
  • Does the principle of double presumption of innocence apply to an accused person who has been acquitted by a trial court?
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• Muhammad Asghar And Another vs The State1994 PLD Supreme Court 301 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-12
  acquittalcriminal revisionretrialdouble presumption of innocencerevisional jurisdictionappraisal of evidencemiscarriage of justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside an acquittal order passed by a Sessions Judge and directed a retrial of the appellants. The core legal question was whether the High Court, exercising revisional jurisdiction, was justified in interfering with an acquittal order without finding it perverse or based on misreading of evidence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its interference. The Court reaffirmed that an accused person who has secured an acquittal enjoys a double presumption of innocence. Interference with such an order is permissible only if the judgment is manifestly wrong, perverse, ignores material evidence, or results in a miscarriage of justice. A mere difference of opinion regarding the appraisal of evidence between the trial court and the revisional court does not justify setting aside an acquittal. Furthermore, police opinion cannot serve as the sole basis for conviction, and evidence disbelieved regarding some accused cannot be selectively applied to others. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order and restored the trial court’s acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can a revisional court set aside an order of acquittal?
  • Does a mere difference of opinion regarding the appraisal of evidence justify a revisional court in setting aside an acquittal?
  • Can police opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of an accused form the sole basis for a conviction?
  • Is the principle of double presumption of innocence applicable to an accused who has been acquitted by a trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arshad vs Syed Asim Saqlain and another1994 SCMR 969 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-10
  transfer of criminal caseinterlocutory orderjudicial impartialityspeedy trialstay of proceedingsSupreme Court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed under Article 186-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, seeking the transfer of two Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions from the Peshawar High Court to a High Court outside the Province of N.-W.F.P. The underlying dispute involved the transfer of a murder trial involving the petitioner, Muhammad Arshad, which had been moved between various courts by the Federal Government due to concerns regarding judicial impartiality, specifically involving the relationship between a victim's brother and a sitting judge. The Peshawar High Court had issued an interim order staying proceedings in the Court of Sessions Judge, Abbottabad, while admitting the challenge to the Federal Government's transfer order for regular hearing. The Supreme Court observed that the order challenged before it was merely an interlocutory order passed by the High Court. The Court held that since the petitioner could raise all arguments against the interim order before the High Court itself, no special grounds existed to warrant interference with the High Court's interlocutory order at this stage. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Should the Supreme Court interfere with an interlocutory order of a High Court when the arguments can be raised before the High Court itself?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the power to transfer a criminal case between High Courts under Article 186-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arshad Saeed, DIG Police vs Government of Pakistan1994 PLC (C.S.) 755 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-13
  service appeallimitation periodlocus standifinality of adjudicationinduction policyseniorityvoid ab initio
  Summary & questions settled

  These three consolidated appeals under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 challenged the Service Tribunal's dismissal of service appeals regarding seniority and induction policies. The core legal questions concerned the strict application of limitation periods in service matters, the locus standi of a civil servant to challenge induction policies implemented before their entry into a specific grade, and the principle of finality of adjudication regarding previously decided service disputes. The Supreme Court dismissed all appeals, holding that strict adherence to limitation periods is mandatory in service matters, and the plea that an order is void ab initio does not bypass such limitations. The Court clarified that while policy decisions affecting service conditions are generally amenable to the Service Tribunal's jurisdiction, a civil servant lacks standing to challenge policies implemented before they entered the relevant grade. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the principle of finality, ruling that previously adjudicated matters cannot be re-agitated based on government admissions made in unrelated litigation concerning different occupational groups.

  Questions settled

  • Does the plea that an order is void ab initio exempt a civil servant from the limitation period prescribed for filing a service appeal?
  • Can a civil servant challenge an induction policy implemented before they entered the relevant grade?
  • Does a policy decision affecting terms and conditions of service qualify as a departmental order amenable to the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal?
  • Can a previously adjudicated service matter be re-agitated based on government admissions made in litigation concerning a different occupational group?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arshad Saeed, DIG Police vs Government of Pakistan1994 SCMR 1033 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-13
  service appeallimitation periodlocus standifinality of adjudicationservice tribunal jurisdictionseniority disputeinduction policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involved three consolidated appeals under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, challenging decisions of the Service Tribunal regarding service grievances, seniority, and induction policies. The core legal questions concerned whether service appeals could be maintained despite significant delays, whether policy decisions affecting service terms were appealable under the Service Tribunals Act 1973, and whether previously adjudicated service matters could be reopened based on subsequent disclosures. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal correctly dismissed the appeals. It affirmed that strict adherence to limitation periods is mandatory in service matters, and that claims of 'void' orders do not automatically bypass statutory limitation bars without satisfactory explanation. Furthermore, the Court clarified that while policy decisions affecting terms and conditions of service are generally appealable, a civil servant lacks locus standi to challenge induction policies that were in force before they entered the relevant grade. Finally, the Court upheld the principle of finality of adjudication, ruling that previously decided service disputes cannot be reopened absent compelling new evidence directly applicable to the specific case.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant challenge an induction policy for a grade they had not yet entered when the policy was implemented?
  • Does the claim that an impugned order is void ab initio automatically exempt a service appeal from the statutory period of limitation?
  • Can a service appeal be maintained against a policy decision if the appellant has not exhausted departmental remedies or if the appeal is filed after the limitation period?
  • Does an admission by the government regarding a policy in one occupational group justify the reopening of a previously adjudicated service matter in a different occupational group?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arshad and anothers vs The State1994 SCMR 1220 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-24
  Zina-bil-Jabarleave to appealuncorroborated testimonyfalsely implicatedparty factionalismcriminal convictionprosecutrix credibility
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which upheld the petitioners' convictions for Zina-bil-Jabar but reduced their sentences. The core legal question is whether the uncorroborated, solitary testimony of the prosecutrix is sufficient to sustain a conviction for Zina-bil-Jabar in circumstances where there is evidence of pre-existing enmity, party factionalism, and significant contradictions in the prosecutrix's own statements. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the investigating officer had opined the petitioners were not connected to the offence, and that the prosecutrix's testimony regarding the sequence of events was contradictory. The Court held that these factors raise substantial doubt regarding the reliability of the prosecutrix's testimony as the sole basis for conviction. The key principle established is that where a conviction rests solely on the testimony of a prosecutrix, such testimony must be scrutinized with extreme caution, particularly when there is evidence of motive for false implication, poor reputation of the witness, and material inconsistencies in the narrative presented at trial.

  Questions settled

  • Can the uncorroborated statement of a prosecutrix form a sound basis for conviction in a Zina-bil-Jabar case?
  • Does evidence of party factionalism and enmity between parties impact the reliability of a complainant's testimony?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the investigating officer has opined that the accused were not connected to the offence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Anis and others vs Abdul Haseeb and others1994 PLD Supreme Court 539 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-06
  service tribunal jurisdictionconstitutional jurisdictioneligibility versus fitnesspromotionterms and conditions of serviceupgradation of postscivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses appeals against a common judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which had entertained a writ petition filed by customs department employees challenging promotion notifications and seniority determinations. The primary legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction to entertain the matter in view of the bar contained in Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan, read with Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, and specifically whether the dispute pertained to 'eligibility' (triable by the Service Tribunal) or 'fitness' (excluded from the Tribunal's jurisdiction). The Supreme Court held that the High Court lacked jurisdiction because the controversy involved terms and conditions of service, specifically the determination of eligibility for promotion. The Court clarified the distinction between eligibility and fitness, ruling that eligibility relates to objective qualifications and terms of service falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal, whereas fitness involves subjective evaluation. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the matter to the Service Tribunal to be treated as a pending service appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has jurisdiction in service matters in view of Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • What is the distinction between eligibility and fitness for promotion regarding the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal?
  • Does the question of a civil servant's eligibility for promotion relate to the terms and conditions of service?
  • Whether an aggrieved civil servant can challenge promotion and seniority matters through a constitutional petition in the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Anis And Other vs Abdul Haseeb And Others1994 PLC (C.S.) 931 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-06Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Anis And Other vs Abdul Haseeb And Other1994 PLD Supreme Court 539 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-06
  service tribunal jurisdictioneligibility versus fitnessterms and conditions of serviceconstitutional jurisdictionpromotioncivil servantupgradation of posts
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated appeal arises from a common judgment of the High Court of Sindh concerning a writ petition filed by customs department employees challenging the promotion of certain Assistant Collectors to Grade-18. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction to entertain the service dispute in light of Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 and Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act 1973, or whether the matter fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal, turning particularly on the distinction between a civil servant's 'eligibility' for promotion and their 'fitness' for a post. The Supreme Court held that the High Court lacked jurisdiction as the controversy regarding promotion eligibility and terms and conditions of service fell exclusively within the domain of the Service Tribunal. The key principle laid down is that while the question of a civil servant's 'fitness' for promotion is excluded from the Tribunal's jurisdiction under proviso (b) to Section 4(1) of the Service Tribunals Act 1973, the question of 'eligibility' relates to terms and conditions of service and falls squarely within the Tribunal's exclusive jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to entertain service matters relating to the terms and conditions of civil servants?
  • Is there a legal distinction between a civil servant's eligibility for promotion and their fitness to hold a higher post or grade?
  • Does the Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to determine the question of a civil servant's eligibility for promotion?
  • Does proviso (b) to subsection (1) of section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act 1973 bar an appeal to the Service Tribunal regarding the fitness or otherwise of a person to be promoted to a higher post?
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• Muhammad Amjad and others vs The State and others1994 SCMR 1142 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-04
  criminal appealleave to appealsentence modificationappraisal of evidenceprivate complaintmurder convictionenhancement of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two criminal petitions arising from a private complaint for murder. In the first instance, the petitioners, Muhammad Amjad and Mehmood, were convicted of murder and sentenced to transportation for life, which the High Court subsequently modified to imprisonment for life with a fine, allegedly without providing notice to the convicts regarding this modification. The second petition, filed by the widow of the deceased, challenges the acquittal of other respondents and seeks the enhancement of the sentences imposed on the convicts. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in both petitions. The core legal questions involve whether the High Court erred in modifying the sentence without notice to the convicts and whether the lower courts adhered to established principles governing the appraisal of evidence in criminal cases. The Court ordered that both appeals be heard together to address these issues, specifically examining the procedural fairness of the sentence modification and the evidentiary standards applied by the trial and appellate courts in the underlying murder conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court modify a criminal sentence to the detriment of the convict without providing prior notice?
  • What are the established principles governing the appraisal of evidence in criminal murder trials?
  • Should separate petitions challenging conviction and acquittal in the same case be heard together?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amir vs The State1994 SCMR 662 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-24
  murderocular evidencemedical evidenceidentificationmoonlit nighteyewitness testimonycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arises from the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction and sentence of the appellant under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder. The core legal questions involve the credibility of eye-witnesses, identification in moonlit nights, and the reliability of medical evidence regarding stomach contents versus ocular testimony. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the presence and credibility of natural eye-witnesses were unexceptionable, that prior acquaintance with the accused and sufficient moonlit light ensured proper identification, and that calculations of time of death based on stomach contents are a mere guesswork and cannot outweigh consistent ocular evidence. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of natural eye-witnesses can be discarded merely on the ground that they are related or interested witnesses?
  • Is identification made on a moonlit night reliable when the accused was previously known to the witnesses?
  • Can the calculation of the time of death based on stomach contents override consistent ocular evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amir and anothers vs G Ul Muhammad alias Gulla and 41994 SCMR 1073 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-15
  double murderleave to appealacquittalbenefit of doubtgrave and sudden provocationappellate interferencecriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding a double murder case. The petitioner, Ahmed, was convicted of murdering two individuals, while his co-accused were acquitted on the benefit of the doubt. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its appreciation of evidence by acquitting the co-accused and upholding the petitioner's conviction. The petitioner argued he acted under grave and sudden provocation, claiming his brother committed the acts. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's findings were supported by the record and that the petitioner's presence and role were established, distinguishing his case from the acquitted co-accused. The Court affirmed the conviction, noting that the petitioner could not evade liability by suppressing his own role or fabricating a defense. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with an acquittal judgment unless it is demonstrated that there was no evidence to support the view taken by the court recording the acquittal, adhering to established appellate restraint.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal?
  • Can a convict avoid liability for murder by suppressing their own role and attributing the act to a third party?
  • Does the admission of presence at the scene of a crime, coupled with a failed defense of grave and sudden provocation, sustain a conviction for murder?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali and 9 others vs Muhammad Sharif and 4 others1994 SCMR 1715 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-16
  abatement of suitsuccession under customagricultural landremand orderlast male holderMuslim Personal Law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the Lahore High Court’s order declaring that a civil suit regarding agricultural land succession had abated under the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983. The appellants, claiming as collaterals, disputed the rights of the respondents, who claimed through the sister of the deceased last male holder. The core legal question was whether the 1983 Ordinance, which mandates the abatement of pending proceedings involving succession under custom, applied to this specific case. The Supreme Court held that the applicability of the Ordinance depended entirely on the date of the last male holder's death, a fact not yet established on the record. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s order and restored the Additional District Judge’s decision to remand the case for the framing and determination of specific issues, including the date of death. The principle established is that where a suit's abatement under the 1983 Ordinance hinges on a disputed factual timeline, a remand for evidence and adjudication is the appropriate legal course.

  Questions settled

  • Does a suit involving succession under custom automatically abate under the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983, without establishing the date of death of the last male holder?
  • Is a remand order by an appellate court appropriate when a trial court has failed to frame a necessary issue regarding the date of death of the last male holder?
  • Does the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983 apply to cases where possession of land has already been delivered under a past decree?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali And 25 Other vs Hassan Muhammad And 6 Other1994 PLD Supreme Court 245 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-07
  land resumptionco-sharerlimitation periodrevenue recorddeclaration suitadverse possessionallotment cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning a dispute over land originally allotted jointly to three brothers in 1934. The core legal question was whether the resumption of a brother's share by the Government in 1938 and subsequent long-standing revenue entries and registered sale deeds barred a declaratory suit filed by his successors in 1983, and whether such resumption order could be deemed void. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the concurrent findings of the first appellate court and the High Court declaring the 1938 resumption order void were unsustainable, as the burden of proof under the Qanun-e-Shahadat was not discharged, and the challenge brought after 45 years was barred by limitation. The Court established that where a property's title is substantially denied through resumption, successive mutations, and a registered sale deed to the exclusion of a co-owner, the possession of other co-sharers cannot be deemed to be on behalf of the excluded party, and a declaratory suit must be brought within the statutory limitation period.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the resumption of a land grant by the Government can be challenged in a civil court after a lapse of over forty years?
  • Does a presumption of regular performance attach to official and judicial acts under the Qanun-e-Shahadat regarding historical revenue orders?
  • Whether the possession of co-sharers operates on behalf of an excluded co-owner when title has been openly denied through successive mutations and registered sale deeds?
  • What is the applicable limitation period for filing a declaratory suit to challenge an order that deprives a person of their proprietary rights in land?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram vs The State and 3 others1994 SCMR 550 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-07-28
  court witnessesdying declarationcriminal procedureleave to appealtrial stageprosecution evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a revision petition challenging the refusal of the Additional Sessions Judge to summon additional court witnesses under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The complainant sought to summon several individuals to prove an alleged dying declaration of the deceased, which the investigating agency had not recorded, and to introduce records from writ petitions filed by the parents of the deceased. The trial court and the High Court rejected the application, noting that the investigating agency denied the existence of such a dying declaration, the alleged recorder of the declaration had not mentioned it in his previous statements, and the application was filed at a belated stage after eighteen witnesses had already been examined. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' decisions, finding the orders well-reasoned and free from legal error. The Court held that there was no justification for interference, as the complainant was attempting to build a new case at an advanced stage of the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court refuse an application to summon additional witnesses under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the application is filed at a belated stage?
  • Is the refusal of a trial court to summon witnesses under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 subject to interference if the order is well-reasoned?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram vs The State1994 SCMR 277 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-12
  suspension of sentencebail pending appealreappraisal of evidencediscretionary powercriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed in limine the petitioner's application for suspension of sentence and bail following his conviction under the Pakistan Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in dismissing the bail application solely on the ground that it required a reappraisal of evidence, which the High Court deemed inadmissible at that stage. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's reasoning was legally flawed, as the Court is obligated to consider and dispose of bail applications on their merits even when they do not fall under the statutory criteria of Section 426(1-A)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. While the Supreme Court declined to bypass the High Court by deciding the bail application itself, it established the principle that a court must exercise its discretion to decide such applications on merits rather than summarily dismissing them based on the necessity of evidence reappraisal.

  Questions settled

  • Is a High Court required to decide an application for suspension of sentence on merits even if it does not fall under the criteria of Section 426(1-A)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a court dismiss an application for suspension of sentence solely on the ground that it requires a reappraisal of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram Bunda And 3 Other vs Pakistanieelevision1994 PLC 620 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-17
  trade unionfundamental rightsfreedom of associationconstitutional petitionindustrial relations
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, employees of Pakistan Television, filed a petition directly in the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, seeking the enforcement of their Fundamental Right under Article 17(1) to form trade unions, alleging that the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Ordinance, 1978 and the consequent cancellation of the registration of the Pakistan Television Corporation Employees Union violated this right. The core legal question involved the constitutional validity of the 1978 Ordinance taking away trade union activities for Pakistan Television employees. The Supreme Court noted that a similar question of law had been raised in another pending matter and that leave to appeal had been granted in a connected petition. Consequently, the Court admitted the present petition for regular hearing to be fixed along with the appeal arising from the connected petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Ordinance, 1978 taking away the right of Pakistan Television Corporation employees to form a trade union are repugnant to Article 17(1) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Whether the cancellation of the registration of the Pakistan Television Corporation Employees Union pursuant to the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Ordinance, 1978 violates the fundamental right to form a union guaranteed by Article 17(1) of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram and 3 others vs Muhammad Rashid and 2 others1994 PLD Supreme Court 848 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-14
  Pre-emptionRight of pre-emptionVendeeStatus improvementInheritanceSuccessionPunjab Pre-emption Act 1913Appellate court
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a pre-emption suit where the vendees sought to defeat the pre-emptors' claim by asserting an improved status acquired through inheritance during the pendency of a second appeal. The core legal question was whether a vendee can defeat a pre-emption decree by improving their status via succession after the trial court has already adjudicated the matter. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the vendees could not rely on status improvements occurring after the trial court's decree. The Court affirmed that while Section 21-A of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, permits improvements via inheritance or succession to be pleaded as a defense, such improvements must be perfected before the decree is passed by the trial court. The principle laid down is that the rights of the parties in a pre-emption suit are to be determined based on their status at the time of the trial court's decree, and subsequent improvements during the appellate stage cannot be invoked to displace a vested right established by that decree.

  Questions settled

  • Can a vendee defeat a pre-emption suit by improving their status through inheritance after the trial court has passed a decree?
  • Does Section 21-A of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, permit a vendee to use status improvements occurring during the appellate stage to defeat a pre-emption claim?
  • Is an appellate court required to consider status improvements of a vendee that occur after the trial court's decree in a pre-emption suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram And 3 Other vs Muhammad Rashid And 2 Other=1994 PLD Supreme Court 848 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-14
  pre-emptionimprovement of statusinheritance and successionsecond appealpunjab pre-emption actcrucial dates
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses whether a vendee in a pre-emption suit can defeat a pre-emptor's claim by improving their status through inheritance or succession after the passing of a decree by the trial court, specifically during the pendency of a second appeal before the High Court. The core legal question involves the interpretation and temporal application of section 21-A of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, regarding when a vendee can successfully set up an improved status. The Supreme Court held that while a vendee may improve their status through inheritance or succession after the institution of a suit, such an improvement must occur before the passing of a decree in the pre-emption suit by the trial court. An improvement occurring post-decree, during the appellate stage, cannot be utilized to defeat the pre-emptor's claim. The key principle established is that improvements in a vendee's status via inheritance or succession are limited by the temporal threshold of the trial court's decree, aligning with the general rule that appellate courts evaluate the correctness of the trial court's decision based on the circumstances existing at the time of adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Can a vendee defeat a pre-emption claim by improving their status through inheritance or succession after the passing of a decree by the trial court?
  • Up to what stage of proceedings can a vendee effectively improve their status to defeat a suit for pre-emption under section 21-A of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913?
  • Does an appellate court take into consideration circumstances or status improvements that arise during the pendency of an appeal in pre-emption litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal Shah vs Mazhar Hussain Shah and 3 others1994 SCMR 694 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-01-21
  murderappeal against acquittalcorroboratory evidencerecovery of weaponsinterested witnessreappraisal of evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave of the Court arose from a judgment of the High Court acquitting the respondents of murder charges under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution alleged that the respondents, along with others, attacked the deceased Nazar Shah resulting in numerous injuries and death, supported by an eyewitness account, prompt FIR, motive, and subsequent weapon recoveries. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court erred in discarding the corroboratory recovery evidence and eyewitness testimony, leading to an arbitrary acquittal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court properly scrutinized the interested nature of the recovery witness, noted significant discrepancies between the testimonies of the witness and the investigating officer, and correctly identified the selective reliance on related witnesses when independent ones were available. Finding the High Court's assessment unexceptionable and noting that a mere difference of opinion does not warrant setting aside an acquittal, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can set aside an acquittal merely on the basis of a difference of opinion regarding the appreciation of evidence?
  • Does the reliance on a related and interested witness for weapon recoveries without independent attestation affect the credibility of the recovery evidence?
  • Whether discrepancies between the testimony of an eyewitness and the investigating officer regarding the pointation and recovery of weapons warrant discarding the recovery evidence?
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• Muhammad Afzal and anothers vs The State1994 SCMR 453 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-22
  suspension of sentencecriminal appealmedical contradictionocular evidencebail pending appealmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the order of the High Court dismissing their application under Section 426, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for suspension of the sentence of life imprisonment passed by the trial court. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to suspension of sentence pending appeal in view of the apparent contradiction between the ocular account and the medical evidence, coupled with the acquittal of all co-accused. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petition should be converted into an appeal and allowed, thereby suspending the sentence of the petitioners. The key principle laid down is that where ocular allegations regarding specific firearm injuries attributed to the accused are contradicted by the medical report, and co-accused have already been acquitted, a fit case is made out for suspension of sentence during the pendency of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the sentence of life imprisonment can be suspended under Section 426, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when medical evidence contradicts the ocular account?
  • Does the acquittal of co-accused furnish a ground for the suspension of sentence of the remaining convicts?
  • Can the Supreme Court convert a petition for leave to appeal into an appeal and grant interim relief based on contradictions in the record?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afsar vs The State1994 SCMR 2051 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-07-27
  post-arrest bailprohibitory clausesection 324 PPCBadi'ahfurther inquirysimple injuryattempt to commit Qatl-i-amd
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the Lahore High Court's refusal to grant post-arrest bail to the petitioner in an FIR under Section 324, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner fired a rifle shot hitting the victim on his ankle, causing a simple injury during a court-premise altercation between two rival groups. The core legal questions pertained to whether an injury falling under Section 337-F(ii), PPC attracts the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 under the amended law, and whether the case called for further inquiry regarding who the aggressor was. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and granted bail. It held that under the amended Section 324, PPC, when hurt is caused, the penalty is dictated by the specific hurt caused, which in this case amounted to 'Badi'ah' under Section 337-F(ii), PPC carrying up to three years' imprisonment. Consequently, the offence fell outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Cr.P.C., and the existence of counter-allegations rendered it a case of further inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Does an injury falling under Section 337-F(ii) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • How does the penalty under the amended Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 apply when a simple, non-vital hurt is caused during an attempted Qatl-i-amd?
  • Does an exchange of firing between rival parties present a case of further inquiry for the purpose of granting bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zubeda and 5 others vs Additional Settlement Commissioner, Multan and 2 others1994 SCMR 2026 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-01-08
  leave to appealsettlement lawsagreement of associationfunctus officioremandwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against a judgment of the High Court whereby a writ petition filed by respondent No. 3 was allowed and the case was remanded to the Notified Officer for decision afresh. The core legal question concerns the competency of a revision petition and the jurisdiction of settlement authorities to entertain applications for the cancellation of an agreement of association following the repeal of settlement laws. The Supreme Court granted leave to examine whether the order of remand passed by the High Court accords with the established guidelines and case-law regarding the functus officio status of settlement authorities after the repeal of the relevant laws. The court held that leave should be granted to examine the correctness of the High Court's remand order in light of the cited precedents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a revision petition is maintainable before a Settlement Commissioner after the repeal of settlement laws?
  • Does a Settlement Commissioner become functus officio after the repeal of settlement laws when no case is pending on or before the specified date?
  • Is the High Court's order of remand in accordance with the guidelines laid down in past case-law regarding repealed settlement statutes?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zubaida Imran vs Ch. Abdul Sattar and others1994 SCMR 1134 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-24
  review petitionspecific performancelimitationcondonation of delaynecessary partygross negligenceimpleadment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed against a Supreme Court judgment that dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding a suit for specific performance of a contract of sale. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's failure to implead a necessary party (one of the decree-holders) within the period of limitation was an inadvertent error subject to condonation, or the result of gross negligence. The petitioner had erroneously impleaded her husband instead of the necessary respondent in her first appeal before the High Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in seeking to implead the correct party. The Court affirmed its previous finding that the omission constituted gross negligence rather than a mere inadvertent mistake. Consequently, the Court held that no grounds existed to review the earlier judgment, as the petitioner had failed to demonstrate any error apparent on the face of the record or sufficient cause to condone the delay under the relevant limitation laws.

  Questions settled

  • Can a failure to implead a necessary party within the period of limitation be condoned if the omission is found to be the result of gross negligence?
  • Does the inadvertent misidentification of a respondent in an appeal constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay under the Limitation Act 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zubaida Bibi and others vs Mst. Majidan and another1994 SCMR 1978 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-01
  Nikahnamapublic documentMuslim Family Lawsinheritance mutationNikah Registraradmissibility of documentsres judicata
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute regarding inheritance and the validity of a marriage. The appellants challenged a lower court's reliance on a Nikahnama to establish the respondent's status as a widow, arguing that the document was not properly proved and that a previous judgment dismissing the respondent's dower suit could not operate as res judicata. The Supreme Court examined the status of a Nikahnama under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, and the Evidence Act, 1872. The Court held that because the Nikah Registrar is remunerated for public duties, they qualify as a 'public officer' and the Nikahnama constitutes a 'public document' under Section 74 of the Evidence Act. Consequently, a certified copy of the Nikahnama is admissible as proof of its contents without requiring the examination of the Nikah Khawan or witnesses, absent effective rebuttal. While acknowledging that the previous dower suit judgment did not operate as res judicata, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision, ruling that the production of the Nikahnama sufficiently proved the respondent's claim.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Nikahnama considered a public document under the Evidence Act 1872?
  • Does the status of a Nikah Registrar as a public officer permit the admission of a certified copy of a Nikahnama without examining the Nikah Khawan?
  • Can a finding in a suit that was ultimately dismissed operate as res judicata in subsequent litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zeenat Sultan vs Mumtaz Khan and 9 others1994 PLD Supreme Court 667 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-04-11
  condonation of delaylimitation periodacquittalcriminal appealmurdercorroborationmedical evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a judgment of the High Court acquitting the respondents of charges under sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The primary legal questions concerned whether a delay of 274 days in filing a petition for leave to appeal against an acquittal could be condoned, and whether the High Court's acquittal judgment warranted interference on merits. The Supreme Court held that in criminal matters seeking the reversal of an acquittal, limitation periods must be strictly applied, and delay is not condoned unless the petitioner was prevented by an act of the accused or kept unaware of the judgment. The Court found the appellant's explanations for the delay to be conflicting and vague, and further noted that on merits, the medical evidence contradicted the ocular testimony regarding the weapons used, and independent corroboration was lacking. The appeal was accordingly dismissed as time-barred and devoid of merit. The key principle laid down is that an acquittal judgment creates a precious right in favour of the accused, and a petition to set it aside out of time will not be entertained unless strict legal requirements for condoning delay are met, alongside the established threshold that appellate courts will not interfere with acquittals unless the lower court's conclusions are perverse or based on a misreading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal against an acquittal can be condoned without showing that the petitioner was prevented by an act of the accused or kept out of knowledge of the judgment?
  • Is a petitioner seeking to reverse an acquittal required to strictly satisfy all technical requirements of limitation given that the accused faces jeopardy to their life or liberty?
  • Under what circumstances may an appellate court interfere with an acquittal judgment upon reappraisal of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zeenat Sultan vs Mumtaz Khan And 9 Other1994 PLD Supreme Court 667 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-04-11
  condonation of delayacquittallimitationcriminal appealocular testimonymedical evidenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court judgment that acquitted several respondents in a criminal case. The primary legal question addressed is whether a delay of 274 days in filing a petition for leave to appeal against an acquittal should be condoned. The Court held that the delay could not be condoned, as the appellant failed to demonstrate that she was prevented from filing the petition by any act of the respondents or lack of knowledge regarding the acquittal. The Court reaffirmed the principle that in cases seeking the reversal of an acquittal, the law must be applied strictly in favor of the accused, as the acquittal confers a precious right that should not be jeopardized by time-barred petitions. Furthermore, the Court examined the merits and found that the medical evidence contradicted the prosecution's ocular testimony, as the injuries sustained by the deceased could not have been caused by the weapons allegedly used by the respondents. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed both as time-barred and on its merits.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court condone a delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal against an acquittal?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with an acquittal judgment solely on the ground of a different reappraisal of evidence?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal against an acquittal maintainable if the petitioner fails to prove they were prevented from filing in time by the respondents' actions?
  • Does the principle of strict application of limitation apply to criminal appeals against acquittals?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zahida Shaheen and anothers vs The State and anothers1994 PLD Supreme Court 266 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-14
  ZinaOffence of ZinaHudood Ordinanceirregular marriagecombining aunt and nieceTalaqnamanotice of divorcemens realeave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which maintained the conviction of the petitioners under Section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The prosecution alleged that petitioner Aqil-ur-Rahman contracted marriage with petitioner Mst. Zahida Shaheen while his marriage with her paternal aunt was still intact, rendering the marriage invalid and sexual intercourse between them an act of Zina. The defense contended that the previous wife was divorced prior to the second marriage, as evidenced by a un-notified Talaqnama, and alternatively that any violation was unintentional and fell short of the mens rea required for 'wilful' Zina. The Supreme Court considered whether failure to give notice of divorce under Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 invalidates a Talaq, whether combining an aunt and niece in marriage constitutes a void or merely irregular (fasid) marriage, and whether the element of mens rea was satisfied. Leave to appeal was granted to determine these legal questions, while post-conviction bail was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does failure to give notice of a Talaq under Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 render a divorce ineffective or invalid in criminal proceedings?
  • Does a marriage contracted with the niece of a current wife during the subsistence of the marriage constitute a void marriage or an irregular (fasid) marriage?
  • Can sexual intercourse within an irregular or invalid marriage contracted due to ignorance of Islamic legal prohibitions constitute the offence of Zina without the requisite mens rea?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zahida Shaheen And Another vs The State And Another1994 PLD Supreme Court 266 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  ZinaHudood Ordinanceinvalid marriageTalaqnamaMuslim Family Lawsmens reawillful sexual intercourse
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, Mst. Zahida Shaheen and Aqil-ur-Rehman, were convicted under section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, for entering into an allegedly invalid marriage. The prosecution contended that the male petitioner married the niece of his then-subsisting wife, rendering the marriage invalid and the subsequent sexual intercourse Zina. The petitioners argued that the previous marriage had been dissolved via a Talaqnama prior to the second marriage, and alternatively, that the lack of knowledge regarding the prohibition of marrying a wife's niece negated the 'willful' element required for Zina. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the case raised substantial legal questions regarding the validity of the marriage, the effect of failure to provide notice of divorce to the Union Council under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, and the interpretation of 'willfully' in the context of Zina. The Court refused bail for the male petitioner, citing the need to prevent cohabitation pending the final determination of the marriage's legal status, and ordered an early hearing for the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to give notice of a Talaq to the Chairman of the Union Council under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 render the divorce ineffective or invalid?
  • Can sexual intercourse following a marriage that is irregular but not void be classified as 'Zina' under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979?
  • Is the element of 'willfully' in the definition of Zina negated if the parties are unaware that their marriage is prohibited under Sharia?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Tayyaba Begum vs Taqi Haider1994 SCMR 1913 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-14
  ejectmentwilful defaultrented premisespractice of paymentlandlord-tenant relationshipburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a judgment that overturned an ejectment order against a tenant. The core legal question was whether the tenant's failure to pay rent constituted 'wilful default' under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, or if such default was excused by an alleged established practice of the landlord collecting accumulated rent every three to four months. The Supreme Court held that the tenant failed to prove a consistent, uniform, and regular practice of collecting accumulated rent. The Court determined that isolated instances of delayed payments do not constitute a binding practice that overrides the statutory and contractual obligation to pay rent monthly. Furthermore, the Court held that a landlord's failure to provide an address or collect rent does not absolve a tenant of the obligation to pay rent, as the tenant could have deposited the rent with the Rent Controller. Consequently, the Court set aside the appellate judgment and restored the ejectment order, establishing that fragmented evidence of irregular payments cannot create a practice to excuse statutory default.

  Questions settled

  • Does an alleged practice of paying accumulated rent override the contractual obligation to pay rent monthly?
  • Can a tenant justify non-payment of rent on the ground that the landlord failed to collect it?
  • What constitutes a consistent and regular practice of rent payment sufficient to negate a claim of wilful default?
  • Is a tenant required to deposit rent with the Rent Controller if the landlord fails to collect it?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sufaidi vs Kanni1994 SCMR 570 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-21
  land allotmentsettlement disputeinheritance rightschallenge to allotmentSupreme Court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The dispute in this appeal relates to land originally allotted to Mangli deceased, the father of the appellant Mst. Sufaidi, which was subsequently withdrawn and re-allotted amidst conflicting claims, revisions, and a compromise. Ultimately, respondent No. 1 Kanni received an allotment of the disputed land on May 16, 1974, while the heirs of Mangli were ordered by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner to receive land in accordance with Shariat. The core legal question is whether the appellant is entitled to the disputed land despite failing to specifically challenge the allotment made in favor of the respondent. The Supreme Court held that since the appellant failed to challenge the specific allotment order dated May 16, 1974, and given that the respondent is also an heir of Mangli entitled to a share under Shariat, no case for interference with the High Court's decision was made out. The key principle laid down is that an unchallenged allotment order cannot be set aside by the appellate court without certainty as to the party's entitlement, especially where the rival claimant may also qualify as a legal heir.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellant can claim land without specifically challenging the underlying allotment order in favor of the respondent?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with an allotment order when the aggrieved party has failed to question it before the lower forums?
  • Whether a legal heir's entitlement to property under Shariat overrides an unchallenged specific allotment in the absence of formal legal challenge?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shumal Begum vs Mst. Gulzar Begum and 3 others1994 SCMR 818 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-29
  revisional jurisdictionSection 115 CPCpower of attorneyvalidity of giftattorney gifting principal propertyfindings of factmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged a High Court judgment rendered in revisional jurisdiction, which had set aside the First Appellate Court's decree and restored the trial court's dismissal of suits challenging property gifts made by an attorney. The core legal questions pertained to the scope of High Court revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 C.P.C. regarding findings of fact, and whether an attorney under a general power of attorney can gift the principal's property to his own spouse without specific authorization. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the First Appellate Court's decree. The Court held that the High Court cannot disturb findings of fact in revision merely by reappraising evidence and substituting its opinion, unless the finding is perverse, fanciful, or infected by misreading or non-consideration of evidence. Furthermore, the Court established that a general power of attorney does not confer implied authority to make a gift. Because a gift requires the express personal intention of the donor, an attorney cannot execute a gift unless specifically authorized, explicitly identifying the exact property and intended donee.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 C.P.C. disturb findings of fact merely by reappraising evidence and substituting its own opinion?
  • Does a general power of attorney confer implied authority on an attorney to execute a gift of the principal's property?
  • What specific details must a power of attorney contain to validly authorize an agent to execute a gift on behalf of the donor?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shukaria PERVEENPetiotioner vs The Custodian and others1994 SCMR 720 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-12
  restoration of petitiondismissal for non-prosecutionadjournment requestmutual consent of counselSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking the restoration of a review petition that was previously dismissed for non-prosecution. The core legal question is whether mutual consent of counsels for adjournment operates to automatically adjourn a case fixed for hearing by the court, thereby absolving the parties from attendance. The Supreme Court held that an agreement between counsels to seek an adjournment does not imply that the case stands adjourned, and parties remain bound to appear until the court formally accepts the request and grants the adjournment. The key principle laid down is that no presumption of adjournment can be made in the absence of a formal court order, and mutual consent alone does not constitute sufficient ground to restore a matter dismissed in default due to non-appearance.

  Questions settled

  • Does mutual consent of counsels to an adjournment automatically adjourn a case fixed for hearing?
  • Are parties absolved from appearing in court if an adjournment request has not been formally granted?
  • Does the belief that a case has been adjourned constitute sufficient cause to condone default in appearance?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sharifan Bibi vs Syed Safdar Ali Shah and another1994 SCMR 1222 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-20
  pre-emptioncustomary lawburden of proofprobative valueadmissionsjudicial precedent
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two appeals arising from pre-emption suits filed by the respondent, Syed Safdar Ali Shah, regarding the purchase of property in Mohallah Imam Sahib, Sialkot. The core legal question was whether the custom of pre-emption existed in the locality, and specifically, what probative value should be accorded to previous judicial precedents based on admissions or compromises regarding the existence of such custom. The Supreme Court held that while judgments based on admissions or compromises carry less weight than contested cases, they are not irrelevant and may be considered as evidence of the existence of the custom, as they may reflect a consciousness of the right. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, finding that the pre-emptor had sufficiently established the existence of the custom of pre-emption in the locality. The key principle laid down is that when a general custom of pre-emption is proven to prevail in a town, the burden of proof shifts to the party alleging limitations on that custom to prove such exceptions or limitations.

  Questions settled

  • What is the probative value of judicial precedents based on admissions or compromises regarding the existence of a custom of pre-emption?
  • Does the existence of a general custom of pre-emption in a town create a presumption that applies to specific localities within that town?
  • Upon whom does the burden of proof lie when a general custom of pre-emption has been established but a party alleges limitations on that custom?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sharifan Bibi and 9 others vs Kamal Din and another1994 SCMR 1988 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-26
  evacuee propertysettlement operationstransfer of propertyclaimantex parte decreeleave to appealstatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the transfer of an evacuee house in Lahore under settlement laws. The petitioners' predecessors, who were claimants, occupied a house initially misdescribed in their transfer documents. A non-claimant subsequently obtained transfer rights of another property, which was later surrendered in favour of respondent No. 1. When the petitioners sought demarcation and price assessment, respondent No. 1 obtained an ex parte civil court decree restraining the Deputy Settlement Commissioner from enquiring into the allotment, without impleading the petitioners. Nonetheless, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner inspected the spot, found discrepancies in property numbers, and issued a transfer order in favour of the petitioners. Respondent No. 1 then filed a separate suit challenging the Deputy Settlement Commissioner's order as void in light of the earlier civil decree, succeeding through the lower courts and the High Court. The Supreme Court examined the contentions that claimants have a superior right to properties in their occupation regardless of misdescription, and that an ex parte decree obtained without joining necessary parties is not binding. Finding the arguments meritorious, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and ordered status quo to be maintained.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ex parte civil court decree is binding on parties not impleaded in the suit?
  • Does a claimant have a superior right to the transfer of a house under their actual occupation despite a misdescription of the property number in initial forms?
  • Whether the Settlement Department is competent to correct property descriptions and enquire into allotment matters notwithstanding a civil court injunction obtained without necessary parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shaheen Akhtar And Other vs Mst. Farhat Yasmeen And Others1994 PLC (C.S.) 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-23
  service matterwrit jurisdictiontransfer and postingleave to appealequitable relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order regarding a service dispute between two teachers, Mst. Shaheen Akhtar and Mst. Farhat Yasmeen, involving their respective postings and transfers. The core legal question was whether the High Court properly exercised jurisdiction in a service matter where both parties had initially invoked its writ jurisdiction, leading to conflicting orders regarding their postings. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court lacked jurisdiction in service matters and should not have entertained the petitions, it declined to interfere with the impugned order because the High Court's decision essentially placed both parties on an equal footing and sought to accommodate them near their homes, as previously assured by the Department. The key principle laid down is that while the High Court lacks jurisdiction in service matters, the Supreme Court may decline to interfere with an order that does not perpetrate injustice, even if that order was passed without proper jurisdiction, particularly when the parties themselves invoked that jurisdiction and the outcome is equitable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to adjudicate service matters in a Constitution Petition?
  • Can the Supreme Court decline to interfere with an order passed by the High Court in a service matter if no injustice has been perpetrated?
  • Should a High Court order in a service matter be treated as a precedent for the exercise of jurisdiction in future service disputes?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shaheen Akhtar and anothers vs Mst. Farhat Yasmeen and 9 others1994 SCMR 413 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-23
  service matterwrit jurisdictiontransfer and postingleave to appealjudicial restraintservice dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order involving a service dispute between two teachers, the petitioner and respondent No. 1, regarding their respective postings and transfers. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate service matters via a Constitution Petition and whether the impugned order, which directed the Department to accommodate both parties near their homes, was sustainable. The Supreme Court observed that while the High Court correctly noted its lack of jurisdiction in service matters, it nonetheless proceeded to decide the case on merits to ensure consistency with a prior order. The Supreme Court held that although the High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain such service disputes, it would not interfere with the impugned order because the outcome placed both parties on an equal footing and resulted in no injustice. The Court affirmed that the High Court's decision to entertain the petition should not be treated as a precedent for the exercise of jurisdiction in future service matters.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to adjudicate service matters through a Constitution Petition?
  • Can a High Court order passed in a service matter be treated as a precedent for future exercise of jurisdiction in similar cases?
  • Should the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court order in a service matter if no injustice has been perpetrated on the parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sarwar Jan vs Ayub and another1994 SCMR 664 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-28
  leave to appealsentence enhancementrevisional jurisdictioninherent jurisdictioncriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Haripur, on 15-12-1992, which enhanced the sentence imposed upon convicts by the trial court. The core legal question for consideration is whether the revisional order of the Additional Sessions Judge enhancing the sentence was appealable, and consequently, whether jurisdiction under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 could be invoked to set aside that order. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these questions regarding the maintainability of appeals against sentence enhancement and the scope of inherent powers of the High Court under section 561-A.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order of the Additional Sessions Judge enhancing a sentence imposed by the trial court is appealable?
  • Can jurisdiction under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be invoked to set aside an order passed in revisional jurisdiction enhancing a sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sardar Begum vs Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and 3 others1994 SCMR 395 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-11-30
  State landevacuee propertyallotmentproprietary rightsmutationverified claimland classification
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged a High Court judgment upholding the classification of specific land as 'State land' rather than 'evacuee land', thereby denying the appellant's claim to proprietary rights. The core legal question was whether the disputed Killa number was legally part of an exchange between State and evacuee property, which would have validated the appellant's allotment against a verified claim. The Supreme Court examined the historical record, specifically Mutation No. 358, which sanctioned the exchange. The Court found that the disputed land was not included in the mutation and that government records consistently identified it as State property. The Court held that since the land remained State property, it was unallotable against verified claims, and the appellant had no valid title. The key principle laid down is that in disputes regarding the classification of land, official mutation records sanctioned by competent authorities constitute evidence of superior value, and where such records exclude specific property from an exchange, that property retains its original character, rendering subsequent allotments against verified claims impermissible.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mutation document sanctioning an exchange of land prevail over claims that specific property was included in said exchange without documentary support?
  • Can land classified as State property be validly allotted against a verified claim?
  • Is an appellate court justified in interfering with concurrent factual findings by revenue authorities regarding the classification of land?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Salima Bibi vs Mst. Halima Bibi1994 SCMR 1858 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-07-21
  specific performanceagricultural landpre-emption suitpleadingsleave to appealquestion of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises out of concurrent findings of courts below decreeing a suit filed by the respondent for specific performance of a contract for the sale of agricultural land. The petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, contending that the land in dispute was under litigation in a pending pre-emption suit during the pendency of the specific performance claim, and further argued that there was no agreement for sale between the parties. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's contention regarding the pending pre-emption suit was entirely without merit and directly opposed to her own written statement where she admitted the pre-emption suit had been decided. Furthermore, the court held that the factual controversy regarding the existence of the agreement was not raised before the High Court and could not be agitated for the first time before the apex court. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused, affirming the judgments of the lower forums.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party take a plea in the Supreme Court that is directly opposed to their own pleadings in the written statement?
  • Whether a claim for specific performance of an agreement to sell is barred merely because the land was previously under litigation in a pre-emption suit?
  • Will the Supreme Court permit a party to raise a new factual controversy regarding the existence of an agreement for sale if it was not urged before the High Court?
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• Mst. Saleem Khatoon and anothers vs The Deputy1994 PLD Supreme Court 160 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-29
  land settlementwrit jurisdictionpending proceedingsfraud and forgeryallotment cancellationconstitutional petitionevacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from appeals against the High Court's dismissal of Constitutional petitions challenging the cancellation of agricultural land allotments. The appellants' land, originally allotted under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, was cancelled by the Deputy Commissioner on grounds of fraud and forgery. The core legal question was whether the Deputy Settlement Commissioner possessed the jurisdiction to initiate cancellation proceedings after the repeal of the 1958 Act by the Evacuee Property Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975, which restricted authority to pending proceedings. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the proceedings were indeed pending before the target date, as evidenced by multiple prior reports of fraud. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 is not constrained by sub-constitutional legislation regarding pending proceedings. Consequently, the Court held that the High Court's refusal to interfere with factual findings of fraud and forgery is not subject to jurisdictional attack, and the appeals were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 remain unaffected by sub-constitutional limitations regarding pending proceedings?
  • Can the High Court's refusal to interfere with factual findings of fraud regarding land allotments be challenged on jurisdictional grounds?
  • Did the Deputy Settlement Commissioner have jurisdiction to initiate cancellation proceedings after the enactment of the Evacuee Property Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975?
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• Mst. Saleem Khatoon And Another vs The Deputy1994 PLD Supreme Court 160 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-29
  land settlementallotment cancellationpending proceedingswrit jurisdictionfraud and forgerydisplaced personsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from the dismissal of Constitutional petitions by the High Court, which had challenged the cancellation of land allotments made under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. The core legal question was whether the Deputy Settlement Commissioner possessed the jurisdiction to initiate proceedings for the cancellation of allotments for fraud and forgery after the repeal of the 1958 Act by the Evacuee Property Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975, which restricted authority to pending proceedings. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the proceedings were indeed pending before the target date. Furthermore, the Court held that the High Court’s writ jurisdiction under Article 199 is not constrained by sub-constitutional legislation regarding the pendency of proceedings before settlement authorities. The key principle laid down is that where the High Court declines to interfere with findings of fact regarding fraud in allotment cases, such refusal is not subject to jurisdictional attack based on the pendency qualification, as the High Court's discretionary writ jurisdiction remains independent of statutory limitations placed on settlement authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 depend on whether proceedings were pending before a settlement authority under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
  • Can a settlement authority initiate proceedings for the cancellation of land allotments after the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, if the proceedings were pending before the target date?
  • Is a refusal by the High Court to interfere with findings of fact regarding fraud in land allotment cases subject to jurisdictional attack based on the pendency of proceedings?
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• Mst. Sakina Bibi and 14 others vs Akram Beg and 7 others1994 SCMR 1511 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-09
  presidential amnestycommutation of sentencebinding precedentremandsupreme court rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Order XXXIII, Rules 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 sought to harmonize two allegedly conflicting judgments of the Supreme Court in Hakim Khan v. Government of Pakistan and Eid Muhammad v. The State, concerning the scope of the Presidential Amnesty Order dated December 6, 1988, under Article 45 of the Constitution. The petitioners, legal heirs of deceased victims in pending murder cases, contended that Hakim Khan's case remanded the question of the amnesty's scope to the High Court, whereas Eid Muhammad's case decided the point without hearing affected parties, creating a conflict. The core legal question was whether a remand order passed by the Supreme Court on a question of law precludes the Court from deciding the same legal question in another pending matter, and whether such prior remand necessitates a conflicting ratio or a right to be heard before the subsequent decision. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that no conflict existed between the two judgments and that the pendency of a remanded case before a lower court does not bar the Supreme Court from authoritatively settling a point of law, which remains binding under Article 189 of the Constitution. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court's pronouncement on a question of law in one case applies bindingly to all pending and future proceedings, and the mere remand of a similar issue to a lower court does not suspend the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to determine that legal proposition in other matters.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the remand of a case by the Supreme Court to the High Court on a specific legal question bars the Supreme Court from deciding the same legal proposition in another case?
  • Does a judgment rendered by the Supreme Court on a question of law have binding effect under Article 189 of the Constitution over cases pending before subordinate courts as a result of remand?
  • Whether interested parties in a remanded case must be heard by the Supreme Court before it decides the same legal issue in a separate proceeding?
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• Mst. Saifura vs Sikandar Khan and 14 others1994 SCMR 2026 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-20
  civil reviewpetition for leave to appealproof of titleexecution of decreeconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  Mst. Saifura filed a civil suit claiming ownership of a share in a disputed house through dower and alleging unlawful dispossession during the execution of a warrant of possession. Her suit was dismissed by the Senior Civil Judge, and subsequent appeals before the District Judge and the High Court were also dismissed. A petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court was likewise dismissed. The petitioner then sought a review of the Supreme Court's judgment. Upon hearing the counsel and examining the record, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner's submissions merely reiterated previous arguments and attempted to re-litigate factual aspects properly appraised by all lower forums, which concurrently concluded that the petitioner failed to prove her title. The Court ruled that no error or sufficient ground was made out for the review of the earlier judgment, and consequently dismissed the review petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a review petition can be entertained when it merely reiterates submissions already considered and rejected?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the proof of title in a review petition?
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• Mst. Sahib Khatoon vs Allah Ditta and 10 others1994 SCMR 2002 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-20
  pre-emptionconditional decreecosts to follow the eventdoctrine of set-offexecution of decreedeposit of pre-emption money
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by a vendee arises out of a pre-emption suit decreed in favour of the respondents' predecessor-in-interest, requiring him to deposit a specified balance of the pre-emption money by a target date, failing which the suit stood dismissed with costs. The core legal question is whether the decree-holder validly complied with the conditional decree by depositing a slightly lesser amount while claiming a set-off against awarded costs. The Supreme Court held that the phrase 'costs to follow the event' meant that the award of costs was contingent upon the successful fulfilment of the decree's conditions, and since the pre-emptor failed to deposit the full purchase money by the stipulated date, the contingency entitling him to costs did not arise, rendering the doctrine of set-off inapplicable. The appeal was accepted, the High Court judgment was set aside, and the trial Court's dismissal of the suit was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emption decree-holder can claim a set-off of costs against the purchase money when the award of costs is contingent upon the successful outcome of the suit?
  • What is the legal import of the expression costs to follow the event in a conditional pre-emption decree?
  • Does the failure to deposit the exact requisite pre-emption money by the target date result in the dismissal of the suit where the decree provides default consequences?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Safaidi and 3 others vs Ch. Mumtaz Ahmad Khan and 7 others1994 SCMR 1458 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-02
  land settlementallotment cancellationmukhbari applicationdisplaced personsdelay and lachessupreme court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a land settlement dispute where an allotment originally confirmed in 1959 was challenged nearly fifteen years later through a fresh Mukhbari application filed on 22-6-1974, just prior to the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. The core legal question is whether a fresh Mukhbari application could be validly entertained after a delay of fifteen years and after earlier challenges had been dismissed and the allotment confirmed by competent authorities. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, holding that administrative orders confirmed in 1959 cannot be set at naught on the basis of a belated Mukhbari application filed fifteen years later. The key principle laid down is that citizens are entitled to be secure in their settled rights and stale administrative proceedings initiated after an inordinate delay without lawful justification are unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a fresh Mukhbari application can be entertained fifteen years after the confirmation of an allotment?
  • Can settled property allotments be reopened just before the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saeeda Begum vs Mukhtar Ahmad Butt and 2 others1994 SCMR 1444 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-11-24
  Property titleNominationCooperative societyOral saleRegistered deedMortgageTransfer of Property ActTitle dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerned a dispute over the title to a plot of land in Model Town, Lahore. The appellant, Mst. Saeeda Begum, claimed ownership based on an alleged oral sale by Seth Rahim Bakhsh, the original owner, and his subsequent nomination of her as a member of the Model Town Cooperative Society Limited. Seth Rahim Bakhsh had previously mortgaged the plot to the appellant via a registered deed. After his death, his widow sold the property to respondents. The core legal question was whether the nomination or the alleged oral sale conferred valid title. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower appellate courts' decisions. It held that a nomination in a cooperative society's record does not, by itself, imply transfer or devolution of property. Furthermore, the alleged oral sale was not proven, especially given that the parties had previously executed a registered mortgage deed, indicating a custom of registering property transactions. The absence of a registered sale deed was a significant factor against the appellant's claim.

  Questions settled

  • Does a nomination in a cooperative society's record automatically imply the transfer or devolution of property?
  • Is an alleged oral sale of property valid without a registered deed, especially when parties have previously engaged in registered transactions?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a nomination in a cooperative society's record regarding property ownership?
  • Can a claim of property ownership based on an oral sale be sustained without specific proof of sale date or witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saeeda Begum vs Amjad Ali and another1994 SCMR 944 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-13
  leave to appealacquittaleyewitness testimonyhostile witnessmurder convictionappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal filed by the sister of the deceased against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had acquitted the respondent of murder charges under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The respondent was initially convicted by the trial court for the murder of Mazhar Ali, but the High Court overturned this conviction and dismissed the petitioner's revision petition for sentence enhancement. The core legal question is whether the High Court erred in discarding the testimony of the sole eyewitness, Muzaffar Ali, in a case involving a single accused where other prosecution witnesses had turned hostile. The Supreme Court observed that the occurrence took place in broad daylight and that the eyewitness, being a close relative of the deceased, would not likely substitute the respondent for the real culprit. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the validity of the High Court's acquittal, finding that the contention regarding the reliability of the eyewitness testimony required further judicial scrutiny.

  Questions settled

  • Is the High Court justified in discarding the testimony of a sole eyewitness in a murder case involving a single accused?
  • Does the fact that an eyewitness is a relative of the deceased make their testimony inherently unreliable in a murder trial?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted against an acquittal where the High Court has discarded the evidence of a witness who did not turn hostile?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Noorunnisa and another vs Ghulam Sarwar and 6 others1994 SCMR 2087 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-19
  inheritancefemale heirscustomary lawbona fide purchaserTransfer of Property Actco-shareradverse possessionpartition
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by leave of the Court against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court arising out of a suit for declaration and possession regarding inheritance shares. The core legal questions involved whether female heirs are excluded by custom, whether the vendee is a bona fide purchaser protected under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882, and how a sale by co-sharers of specific joint property is to be treated. The Supreme Court held that the deceased died governed by Shariah, that the female heirs were entitled to their shares under Islamic law, that the plea of bona fide purchase was untenable without due inquiry, and that a sale by co-sharers of specific joint land amounts to a sale of their Hissadari possession subject to adjustment at the time of partition. The Court laid down the principle that a vendor from a co-sharer stands in no better position than his vendor and possession held by a co-sharer is permissive rather than adverse to other co-sharers, restoring the judgment of the District Judge.

  Questions settled

  • Whether female heirs are entitled to inherit under Islamic law or customary law when the predecessor died in the domain of Shariah?
  • Is a purchaser of joint property from some of the co-sharers protected as a bona fide purchaser under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 without making reasonable inquiries as to other legal heirs?
  • Does the possession of a co-sharer become adverse to other rightful co-sharers upon a sale of joint property?
  • How is a sale of specific joint property by certain co-sharers to be adjusted among the shareholders?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Noor Nissa and 14 others vs Nazir Ahmed Khan Lughmani and 191994 SCMR 1333 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-04-05
  Land Reforms RegulationFederal Land CommissionCivil Court DecreesResumption of LandCourt of WardsFinality of JudgmentJurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the validity of land transfers made by Abdul Latif Khan, which were challenged under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 (MLR 115). The core legal question was whether the Federal Land Commission possessed the jurisdiction to set aside or ignore final civil court consent decrees passed before the December 20, 1971, cutoff date, on the grounds that such transfers violated Section 16 of the Punjab Court of Wards Act, 1903. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the Federal Land Commission lacked the jurisdiction to set aside or ignore final civil court decrees that had attained finality before the Commission's intervention. The Court distinguished the present case from precedents where transfers were void ab initio under personal law, noting that the decrees in question were validly passed and not challenged in competent appellate forums. The key principle laid down is that while the Federal Land Commission has authority to determine land holdings under MLR 115, it cannot unilaterally disregard final civil court decrees that have attained legal finality, as such decrees can only be challenged through appropriate appellate or revisional judicial forums.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Land Commission have the jurisdiction to set aside or ignore final civil court decrees passed before the cutoff date specified in the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972?
  • Can the Federal Land Commission invoke Section 16 of the Punjab Court of Wards Act, 1903, to invalidate consent decrees that have already attained finality?
  • Is the ratio in Sher Zaman v. Muhammad Ishaq (PLD 1985 SC 144) applicable to situations where civil court decrees have already attained finality before the Federal Land Commission intervenes?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naseem Akhtar and 4 others vs Shalimar General Insurance1994 SCMR 22 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-01
  execution of decreeexecuting courtstatutory liabilityinsurance policymotor vehicle accidentfinality of decreerevision petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from execution proceedings of a civil decree. The predecessor-in-interest of the appellants was killed in a road accident, prompting his heirs to file a suit for compensation against the driver, owner, and the insurer (respondent No. 1). The trial court decreed the suit for Rs. 2,00,000. The insurer's subsequent appeal and restoration application were both dismissed for non-prosecution, rendering the decree final. During execution, the insurer resisted, claiming its statutory liability was limited to Rs. 20,000 under Section 95(2)(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The High Court allowed this plea in revision. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's decision, holding that an executing court cannot go behind a decree to re-determine liability on a plea that was not raised during the trial. The Court laid down the principle that once a decree passed by a competent court becomes final, it must be executed in its terms, and statutory limitations on liability cannot be raised for the first time in execution proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can an executing court go behind a decree to re-determine the liability of a party on a statutory plea not raised during the trial?
  • Whether a statutory limitation on an insurer's liability under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 must be pleaded before the decree is passed to be enforceable?
  • Is a decree passed by a competent court executable in its terms even if it erroneously exceeds a statutory limit on liability and the judgment-debtor failed to prosecute its appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Najma Ashraf vs Mst. Noor Jehan1994 SCMR 913 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-26
  summary evictionrented premisesbona fide requirementlandlord and tenantcommercial premisesremandSindh Rented Premises Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an ejectment application filed by a landlady against her tenant under section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, seeking summary eviction based on her age. The Rent Controller ordered eviction, holding that the bona fides of the requirement were irrelevant under section 14, a decision upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to determine whether a landlady already occupying premises in the same building can invoke section 14 to evict a tenant from commercial premises, and whether the bona fides of her requirement must be considered. The Court held that sections 14 and 15 of the Ordinance provide distinct causes of action. It ruled that the lower courts erred by failing to assess the evidence regarding the bona fides of the need, especially given the ambiguity surrounding the landlady's current occupation and the mixed nature of the claim. The Court established that a landlord is disqualified from invoking section 14 if they occupy a building they own in any locality, regardless of its suitability. Consequently, the eviction order was set aside, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a landlord invoke the summary eviction provisions of section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 if they already occupy a building they own in any locality?
  • Are sections 14 and 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 mutually exclusive, or can they be invoked simultaneously?
  • Is the bona fide requirement of the landlord a relevant consideration for an eviction application filed under section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mehmooda Siddique vs Javed Tariq and others1994 SCMR 2005 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-08-23
  review petitioncondonation of delaysettlement authoritiesfraudulent allotmentdisplaced personsconstitutional jurisdictionfinding of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed by Mst. Mehmooda Siddique against an order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan dated 10-2-1992, which dismissed her petition for leave to appeal regarding the cancellation of land allotments. The underlying dispute originated when Settlement Authorities cancelled allotments made to Mst. Rasuli, who had allegedly obtained them fraudulently by misrepresenting herself as the daughter of a claimant displaced person. The petitioner, a subsequent transferee from Mst. Rasuli, challenged the cancellation in the High Court, which upheld the Settlement Commissioner's finding of fact that the allotment was fraudulent. After the Supreme Court dismissed the petitioner's leave to appeal, she sought review, arguing that because the Court subsequently granted leave to appeal in a related case (C.P. No. 1037-L of 1991) involving the same underlying allotment, her petition should be reconsidered to ensure consistency. The review petition was filed with a delay of 120 days, accompanied by an application for condonation of delay. The Court issued notice to the respondents for an early hearing to address the maintainability and merits of the review.

  Questions settled

  • Can a review petition be entertained when it is filed with a significant delay of 120 days?
  • Does the granting of leave to appeal in a related case involving the same subject matter provide sufficient grounds to review a previously dismissed petition for leave to appeal?
  • Is a finding of fact by a Settlement Commissioner regarding the identity of a claimant subject to challenge under the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Manzoor Begum through Legal Heirs vs Mst. Allah Rakhi through Legal Heirs and another1994 SCMR 986 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-23
  review petitionconstitutional jurisdictionadmissionland allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a civil review petition filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan seeking review of the court's earlier judgment dated 23-6-1993. The core legal questions involve whether an admission attributed to a party could be set aside in constitutional jurisdiction and whether the previous judgment would impede the petitioners from seeking a lawful reduction in land allotment alleged to be in excess of entitlement. The court held that the first ground merely reargued the merits already considered, and the second ground was misconceived as the impugned judgment strictly addressed the validity of the admission and subsequent orders. Consequently, no sufficient ground for review was made out. The key principle laid down is that a review petition cannot be used to re-litigate matters already considered on merits or to raise misconceived apprehensions regarding collateral matters not determined by the judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Can an admission attributed to a party be set aside in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does a judgment upholding the validity of an admission impede petitioners from seeking lawful reduction in excess land allotments?
  • What constitutes a valid ground for review of a judgment under Pakistani law?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Majroza. vs Said Akbar and 2 others1994 SCMR 679 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-18
  consent decreedowerunsound mindfraudimpleadmentconcurrent findingscivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by special leave directed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the appellant's revision petition arising out of proceedings under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question was whether the appellant, claiming ownership of the disputed property through a dower deed, was entitled to be impleaded as a party in an application for setting aside a consent decree on the grounds of fraud and unsoundness of mind. The Supreme Court held that since all three lower courts concurrently found the evidence produced by the appellant insufficient to establish her claim of ownership, she had no interest in the property and her request to be made a party was rightly refused. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact regarding insufficiency of evidence by lower courts will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court in absence of strong justification, and a person with no established interest in the subject property cannot claim a right to be impleaded in proceedings concerning it.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person claiming property through an unregistered dower deed is entitled to be impleaded as a party in proceedings under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the sufficiency of evidence to prove property ownership?
  • Can a party lacking a verified legal interest in the subject matter of a suit claim a right to participate in those proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Majroza vs Said Akbar and 2 others1994 SCMR 20 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-18
  consent decreedowerimpleadmentconcurrent findingsSection 12(2) CPCunregistered documentburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arose from a dispute over land ownership where the appellant, claiming the property as dower, sought to be impleaded in proceedings initiated under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to set aside a consent decree. The core legal question was whether the appellant had established a sufficient interest in the disputed property to be impleaded as a party, given the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the insufficiency of her evidence. The trial court, the District Judge, and the High Court all concurrently held that the evidence presented by the appellant—an unregistered document and testimony from her attorney and the scribe—was insufficient to prove her claim of ownership. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts, ruling that since the appellant failed to prove her interest in the property, the refusal to implead her was correct. The key principle affirmed is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the sufficiency of evidence unless a clear error is demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the sufficiency of evidence?
  • Is a party entitled to be impleaded in proceedings under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if they fail to establish a valid interest in the property?
  • Does an unregistered document, supported only by the testimony of the attorney and the scribe, constitute sufficient proof of ownership in a dower claim?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Latif Bibi vs Abdul Ghafoor and another1994 SCMR 1727 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-27
  suspension of sentencemurderdiscretionary ordercriminal petitionSupreme Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from an order of the Lahore High Court suspending the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to the respondent by the trial court in a murder case. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's discretionary order suspending the sentence of life imprisonment warranted interference, given that the respondent was not attributed any injury to the deceased and was only alleged to have raised a Lalkara, held the deceased, and given a fist blow to a prosecution witness. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that since no injury to the deceased was attributed to the respondent, the Court was not inclined to interfere with the discretionary order passed by the High Court. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will generally not interfere with the discretionary suspension of a sentence by a high court where the accused is not alleged to have caused any injury to the deceased.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's discretionary order suspending a sentence of life imprisonment where no injury to the deceased is attributed to the accused?
  • Does raising a Lalkara and holding the deceased without causing any injury warrant the denial of suspension of sentence pending appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Lalan vs Noor Muhammad and 12 others1994 SCMR 1771 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-22
  right of passageeasement of necessityreferee reportpermanent injunctionconcurrent findingsappointment of refereecivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld a decree for permanent injunction regarding a right of passage. The respondents had sued the petitioner for obstructing a passage they claimed to have used for over 50 years, seeking its removal. During the appellate stage, the parties mutually agreed to appoint an advocate as a referee to determine whether the passage was in constant use and if an alternative existed. The referee submitted a report confirming the respondents' right of passage due to necessity, which the lower appellate court adopted to dismiss the petitioner's appeal. The petitioner contended that the referee acted as an arbitrator, thus requiring an opportunity to file objections to the award. The Supreme Court rejected this, holding that the referee was appointed by mutual consent to resolve the specific dispute, and absent allegations of misconduct, the report was validly accepted. Finding concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts and no misreading of evidence, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that a referee's report based on mutual consent is binding.

  Questions settled

  • Can a report submitted by a referee appointed by mutual consent of the parties be challenged as an arbitration award?
  • Does a court have the authority to rely on a referee's report to resolve a dispute regarding an easement of necessity?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding a right of passage subject to interference by the Supreme Court in the absence of misreading of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Khurshid Begum vs Syed Izhar Ahmed Tirmizi and 3 others1994 SCMR 1977 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-17
  leave to appealagricultural landurban immovable propertymisreading of evidenceallotment of landrevenue recordssettlement authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed her constitutional petition regarding the classification and allotment of a specific parcel of land. The core legal dispute concerns whether the subject property, Khasra No. 2175, should have been classified as agricultural land or urban immovable property, which directly impacted the validity of the allotment made to the petitioner versus the subsequent transfer to respondent No. 1. The petitioner contended that the land was agricultural, supported by revenue records, and that the authorities misread the evidence by treating it as urban property. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, finding merit in the contention that the lower forums and the High Court failed to properly consider the revenue records and evidence presented by the petitioner, specifically regarding the land's status as agricultural. The key principle established is that the failure of judicial or quasi-judicial forums to consider relevant documentary evidence, such as revenue records, constitutes a misreading of evidence, warranting appellate intervention to ensure that factual determinations are based on a comprehensive review of the record.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a court to consider relevant revenue records constitute a misreading of evidence?
  • Can a property classified as agricultural land be validly disposed of as urban immovable property without proper evidentiary support?
  • Is the Supreme Court empowered to grant leave to appeal when lower forums have failed to consider material evidence on record?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Jamila vs Muhammad Tahir and another1994 SCMR 365 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-04-11
  ex parte decreeexecution proceedingsstay of executionSection 12(2) CPCfraud and collusionlis pendensstatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Peshawar High Court judgment that restored a trial court's order staying execution proceedings. The petitioner, Mst. Jamila, had obtained an ex parte decree regarding a property, which was subsequently challenged by a subsequent transferee, Muhammad Tahir, via an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, alleging fraud and suppression of facts. The trial court had initially stayed the execution of the decree pending the resolution of this challenge. The appellate court reversed this stay, but the High Court restored it. The core legal question was whether the trial court correctly exercised its discretion in staying execution proceedings while the underlying decree was being challenged for fraud. The Supreme Court held that since the decree was under active challenge on grounds of fraud and collusion, the trial court properly exercised its discretion to maintain the status quo. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, finding no legal error in the revisional order, and dismissed the petition, establishing that execution proceedings should generally be stayed when the validity of the decree itself is sub judice on allegations of fraud.

  Questions settled

  • Can execution proceedings be stayed when the underlying decree is challenged under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on grounds of fraud?
  • Does a trial court have the discretion to maintain the status quo during the pendency of a challenge to a decree?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hafiza Bibi vs Ali Hussain and others1994 SCMR 1194 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-20
  pardanashin ladyfiduciary relationshipindependent advicefraudulent sale-deedinheritance mutationalienation of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the validity of a sale-deed executed by a female appellant in favour of her stepbrothers. The appellant filed a civil suit for cancellation of the sale-deed on the ground of fraud, asserting that she never alienated her inherited land and was only made to thumb-mark papers while staying at her stepbrothers' house. The trial court decreed the suit, but the lower appellate court and the High Court dismissed it. The core legal question was whether the transaction involving a female under fiduciary care and without independent advice could be sustained as valid. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the alienate stood in a fiduciary relationship and, in the absence of independent advice, the transaction could not be sustained. The Court laid down the principle that alienations by vulnerable female relatives without independent advice in fiduciary settings are legally unsustainable, restoring the trial court's decree.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a sale-deed executed by a female in favour of her stepbrothers can be sustained without independent advice?
  • Does a transaction involving a vulnerable female relying on family members stand vitiated in the absence of independent legal advice?
  • Can a registered sale-deed be set aside on the ground of fraud when executed while the executant is residing with the beneficiaries?
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• Mst. Firdous Sabir vs Haji Mushtaq Ahmed Pervaiz1994 SCMR 355 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-17
  ejectment petitionbona fide personal needrent restrictionown usebusiness expansionlandlord-tenant dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from ejectment petitions filed by a landlady against tenants for shops in a cantonment area, citing bona fide personal need for business expansion. The Rent Controller ordered eviction, but the High Court reversed this, finding the landlady's requirement not bona fide. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine if the evidence supported the claim of bona fide personal need and whether the statutory provision regarding premises becoming unsuitable for needs encompasses business expansion. The Supreme Court held that the landlady successfully established her bona fide requirement for the additional shops to expand her business. The Court clarified that the statutory requirement for "own use" does not restrict a landlord from conducting business through agents, such as a spouse or relatives. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, restored the Rent Controller's eviction orders, and granted the tenants one year to vacate the premises. The key principle established is that "own use" in rent restriction laws is broad enough to include business operations managed by the landlord's family members.

  Questions settled

  • Does the statutory requirement of 'own use' for a landlord preclude conducting business through a spouse or relatives?
  • Can a landlord seek eviction of a tenant for the purpose of expanding an existing business?
  • Does the evidence of a landlord's need to install additional machinery constitute a bona fide requirement for additional shop space?
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• Mst. Fatima Bibi and others vs Noor Dad and another1994 SCMR 62 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-28
  pre-emption suitcourt-feetable of net profitsrejection of plaintdeficient court-fee
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of a pre-emption suit relating to agricultural land filed on 1-4-1975, where the core legal question involved the determination of court-fee based on the table of net profits and the consequences of submitting a deficient or flawed table. The trial Court had dismissed the suit, holding that it was undervalued and insufficiently stamped due to discrepancies in the net profit tables supplied by the plaintiffs. However, the First Appellate Court and subsequently the High Court found that the omissions were clerical, that the plaintiffs' conduct was not contumacious, and that under the binding precedent of Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakur Khan, it was the duty of the court to afford an opportunity to make good any deficiency in court-fee. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the lower appellate and high courts correctly applied the law regarding court-fee deficiency and that the parties had sufficient opportunity to lead evidence on the valuation issue.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the court is mandated to grant time to a plaintiff to supply deficient court-fee in the absence of contumacy?
  • Can a pre-emption suit be dismissed for undervaluation without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to make good the deficiency in court-fee?
  • Whether discrepancies in the table of net profits relating to agricultural land justify the outright dismissal of a pre-emption suit?
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• Mst. Faqraz Bibi vs Elahi Bakhsh and 2 others1994 SCMR 686 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-27
  leave to appealdowerNikah Namaproprietary rightspermanent injunctioncivil revisionproperty dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a civil revision application regarding a dispute over property ownership. The petitioner, the wife of respondent No. 3, filed a suit for permanent injunction claiming possession of a house allegedly transferred to her in lieu of dower by her father-in-law (respondent No. 1) at the time of her marriage. While the trial court initially decreed the suit in her favor, the first appellate court reversed this decision, a finding subsequently upheld by the High Court in revision. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the entry in the 'Nikah Nama' regarding the transfer of the house, coupled with the father-in-law's signature confirming the stipulation, constitutes sufficient evidence of a valid transfer of proprietary rights. Finding that the contentions regarding the evidentiary value of the 'Nikah Nama' and the established exercise of proprietary rights require deeper judicial examination, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to further consider the merits of the petitioner's claim.

  Questions settled

  • Does an entry in a Nikah Nama regarding the transfer of property in lieu of dower, signed by the transferor, constitute sufficient evidence of a valid transfer of proprietary rights?
  • Can a suit for permanent injunction be maintained based on a claim of property ownership transferred as dower?
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• Mst. Bushra Raheel vs Sajjad Haider Khan and 2 others1994 SCMR 2009 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-06
  transfer of casesconsolidation of suitsfamily lawconstitutional jurisdictionSupreme Court powersrestitution of conjugal rightscustody of minors
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a wife involved in multiple family law proceedings, invoked the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Pakistan seeking the transfer and consolidation of various suits pending between her and her husband. The husband had initiated proceedings for the restitution of conjugal rights and custody of minor children in Peshawar, while the petitioner had filed suits for the dissolution of marriage and dower in Lahore. The petitioner argued that prosecuting cases in Peshawar posed a threat to her life and caused inconvenience, requesting the Court to exercise its powers under Article 186-A of the Constitution to transfer and consolidate these cases to a single forum to avoid conflicting judgments. The Supreme Court examined the scope of Article 186-A, noting it was introduced to allow the transfer of cases pending before one High Court to another. The Court held that it could not interpret the expression "pending before" to include cases pending within the jurisdiction of lower courts without violating the legislative intent and the federal scheme. Consequently, the petition was dismissed in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Does Article 186-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 empower the Supreme Court to transfer cases pending before lower courts or family courts?
  • Can the expression 'pending before' in Article 186-A of the Constitution be interpreted to mean cases pending within the jurisdiction of a High Court?
  • Is the Supreme Court authorized to consolidate family law suits pending in different provinces under its constitutional transfer powers?
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• Mst. Bushra and 5 others vs Muhammad Yasin and another1994 SCMR 1622 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-04-30
  leave to appealmurderQisas and Diyyatwaiver of Qisascommutation of sentencemitigating circumstanceslegal heirsWali
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition and a jail petition challenging a judgment of the High Court, which had altered the death sentence of the accused Muhammad Yasin to life imprisonment for the murder of his brother and mother, while maintaining a sentence of fine. The High Court based its decision to commute the death sentence on the waiver of Qisas and Diyyat by some of the legal heirs under section 309 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The petitioners, including the widow and children of one of the deceased, challenged the judgment on the grounds that no mitigating circumstances existed for a lesser sentence and that certain heirs could not lawfully waive Qisas and Diyyat to the exclusion of other qualified Walis or on behalf of others. The Supreme Court found that the questions raised were of general legal importance and granted leave to appeal in both petitions to examine the legality of the waiver and appraise the evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether some of the legal heirs can waive the right of Qisas and Diyyat on behalf of other Walis?
  • Whether a sister and a cousin can be termed as the sole Walis in the presence of other qualified heirs such as a maternal uncle?
  • Whether the waiver of Qisas by certain heirs constitutes a sufficient mitigating circumstance to warrant the conversion of a death sentence to life imprisonment?
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• Mst. Bismillah and 7 others vs Muhammad Din and another1994 SCMR 390 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-15
  ejectmentrent defaultconstitutional petitionappellate authorityremandlandlord and tenantrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an ejectment application filed by the respondent against the appellants, which was initially allowed by the Rent Controller. The Additional District Judge subsequently set aside the Rent Controller's findings on both the issue of default in rent payment and the necessity of a notice under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. The High Court, in a constitutional petition, accepted the respondent's argument regarding the notice requirement and restored the Rent Controller's order, effectively ordering ejectment. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court had failed to address the finding of the appellate authority regarding the issue of default, which remained unresolved. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by overlooking the lack of a clear finding on the default issue, as the appellate authority had not conclusively determined whether the respondent's demand for rent was genuine or complied with. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment to the extent of the default issue and remanded the case to the High Court for a fresh determination of the default question after hearing the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court restore a Rent Controller's order in a constitutional petition without adjudicating on the issue of rent default?
  • Is a finding on the issue of rent default required to be clearly recorded by an appellate authority before an ejectment order can be sustained?
  • Does the failure of an appellate authority to record a clear finding on the genuineness of a rent demand necessitate a remand of the case?
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• Mst. Bashiran vs Hao Nawaz and 6 others1994 SCMR 1145 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-05
  murderacquittalleave to appealwithdrawal of appealcompromiselegal heirsforgiveness
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the mother of the deceased against the acquittal of the respondents in a murder case. During the proceedings before the Supreme Court, the appellant and her daughter, being the sole legal heirs of the deceased, stated categorically that they had forgiven the accused respondents voluntarily, without any pressure or coercion, solely for the sake of God, and requested permission to withdraw the appeal. The core legal question concerned the effect of a voluntary compromise and forgiveness by the legal heirs in a criminal murder appeal. The Court, being satisfied that the compromise and request for withdrawal were made freely and voluntarily, recalled its earlier order granting leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will permit the withdrawal of a criminal appeal and recognize the compounding of an offense or forgiveness by the legal heirs of the victim when made voluntarily and without coercion.

  Questions settled

  • Can legal heirs withdraw an appeal against an acquittal after forgiving the accused?
  • Will the court permit the withdrawal of a criminal appeal when the legal heirs state they have forgiven the accused voluntarily and without coercion?
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• Mst. Amina Bai through Legal Heirs vs Karachi Metropolitan1994 SCMR 804 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-07
  public trustcharitable dedicationMusafir Khanachange of usermunicipal corporationconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arises from a dispute concerning the Moledina Musafir Khana in Karachi, constructed in 1893 for poor Muslim travellers through joint contributions by Haji Moledina and the then Karachi Municipality. The core legal question was whether a charitable property dedicated for public use and managed for decades can be demolished or converted to commercial use by the municipal authority. The Supreme Court held that the Musafir Khana constitutes a public trust or charitable dedication of a permanent nature, and its user cannot be arbitrarily altered or destroyed by the controlling authority. The Court ruled that while the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation manages the property, it cannot demolish the building for commercial exploitation; any utilization must align with the original charitable purpose or public welfare, and the historical plaque bearing Haji Moledina's name must be preserved. The appeal was accordingly allowed, restoring the concurrent findings of the lower courts with specific directions regarding management and scheme approval.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a property constructed and used for decades as a charitable Musafir Khana acquires the character of a public trust preventing its conversion to commercial use?
  • Can a municipal corporation alter the charitable purpose or demolish a building dedicated to public welfare and established through joint contributions?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and first appellate court regarding the charitable nature of a property can be interfered with in revisional jurisdiction without proper justification?
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• Muhammad Bashir vs Allah Ditta and others1994 SCMR 1870 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-08
  gift deedundue influencemental capacityMuslim lawconcurrent findingsalienation of propertyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil suit challenging a gift deed executed by the petitioner's father, Budha, in favour of the respondent. The petitioner alleged that the gift was procured through undue influence and that the donor lacked the mental capacity to execute the deed. The trial court, the district court, and the High Court concurrently dismissed the suit, finding that the evidence established the donor was in a fit state of mind and acted voluntarily. The Supreme Court examined whether a Muslim donor possesses the right to alienate property during their lifetime and whether the lower courts erred in their factual findings regarding undue influence. The Court held that a Muslim donor has unfettered power to dispose of property by gift during their lifetime, provided they are of sound mind and acting voluntarily. Finding that the petitioner failed to substantiate claims of mental incapacity or undue influence, and noting the donor lived for ten years post-gift without complaint, the Supreme Court affirmed the concurrent findings and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Muslim donor have the power to alienate property by way of gift during their lifetime?
  • Can a gift deed be invalidated on the grounds of undue influence if the donor remained alive for a significant period without challenging the transaction?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact by subordinate courts regarding the mental capacity of a donor binding in a petition for leave to appeal?
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• Mst. Aisha Bibi vs Nazir Ahmad and 10 others1994 SCMR 1935 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-16
  agricultural landsale-deedmutationreview jurisdictionMartial Law Regulationrevenue officersjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which accepted a second appeal, set aside the judgments of the lower courts, and decreed the respondents' suit. The dispute concerns agricultural land sold via a registered sale-deed that was subsequently reviewed and set aside by revenue officers under Martial Law Regulation 64. The core legal question was whether revenue officers exercising review jurisdiction under the land revenue laws could simultaneously annul a transaction on grounds of violating Martial Law Regulations. The Supreme Court held that an officer acting under a specific statute must strictly follow its procedure and cannot exercise powers under another statute; if a violation of Martial Law Regulations was suspected, the matter should have been referred to the Land Commission or Deputy Land Commissioner. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's findings that the revenue officers' orders were without jurisdiction and dismissed the petition, laying down the principle that statutory authorities must exercise powers strictly within the four corners of the specific statute conferring them.

  Questions settled

  • Can a revenue officer exercising review powers under revenue laws simultaneously set aside a transaction for violating Martial Law Regulations?
  • Whether revenue officers are bound to give effect to transactions completed through registered deeds in the revenue record in the absence of a patent mistake?
  • Does the power to declare any transaction as offending Martial Law Regulation 64 vest exclusively in the Land Commission or appointed Land Commissioners?
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• Mrs. Fakhra Javed vs Noor Ali1994 SCMR 971 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-06
  leave to appealbona fide personal needevictionlandlord and tenantrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the landlady against the judgment of the Sindh High Court, which had set aside the Rent Controller's order and dismissed her eviction application against the tenant. The core legal question concerns whether actual professional training or possession of a certificate is a condition precedent for a landlady seeking the eviction of a tenant on the ground of bona fide personal need to start a garments and boutique business. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that it must be considered whether such training or certification is legally required as a prerequisite for establishing bona fide personal need for commercial premises under the relevant rent restriction laws. The key principle laid down is that the necessity of specific training or prior experience for establishing a bona fide personal need to run a business requires examination by the appellate court.

  Questions settled

  • Is actual training of a landlady in a proposed business a condition precedent for eviction of a tenant on the ground of bona fide personal need?
  • Whether possession of a certificate or experience is mandatory to establish bona fide personal need for commercial premises?
  • Can an appellate court reverse an eviction order on the ground that the landlord lacks prior experience in the intended business?
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