Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Mrs. Arshad Ali Khan vs Government of the Punjab through Secretary, Home1994 SCMR 1532 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-11
  preventive detentionpublic orderpublic safetylaw and orderconstitutional petitionmaintenance of public orderReview Board
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan challenged the preventive detention orders dated 21-7-1993 and 20-10-1993 issued against the detenu under Section 3 of the Punjab Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960. The detenu was detained on allegations of threatening the U.S. Embassy and attempting to recruit men to execute kidnapping threats following his brother's arrest in a drug-trafficking case. The core legal question was whether allegations amounting to individual criminal offenses triable under ordinary law justify preventive detention on grounds of being prejudicial to public safety or maintenance of public order. The Supreme Court held the detention unlawful, quashed the detention order, and directed the immediate release of the detenu. The Court laid down that 'public order' refers to activities affecting the public-at-large and local peace, as distinguished from ordinary breaches of law and order or individual offenses triable under penal statutes.

  Questions settled

  • Can an individual accused of specific criminal offenses triable under ordinary penal laws be subjected to preventive detention under public order laws on the same allegations?
  • What is the distinction between 'public order' and 'law and order' for the purpose of justifying preventive detention under Section 3 of the Punjab Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960?
  • Can vague or repetitive grounds furnish a legal justification for extending an order of preventive detention?
  Read full judgment →
• Moula Bux vs The State1994 PLD Supreme Court 592 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-16
  murderdeath sentenceappreciation of evidencechemical examiner reportinterested witnessescriminal appealprocedural delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence imposed for the murder of the appellant’s wife. The core legal questions concern whether the High Court correctly reversed the trial court's exclusion of a chemical examiner's report due to unexplained procedural delays, and whether the conviction remained sustainable upon the remaining evidence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in relying on the chemical examiner's report, as the delay in dispatching samples was unexplained and the responsible officer was not examined. However, the Court upheld the conviction, finding that the prosecution had established guilt beyond reasonable doubt through consistent eye-witness testimony, medical evidence, and the appellant's apprehension at the scene. The principle laid down is that while unexplained delays in forensic testing can invalidate such reports, a conviction may still be sustained if independent evidence sufficiently establishes the accused's guilt. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that brutal crimes involving excessive violence, such as the infliction of twenty incised wounds, do not warrant the reduction of a death sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay in sending sealed parcels to a chemical laboratory invalidate the forensic report?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on eye-witness testimony and medical evidence if the chemical examiner's report is excluded?
  • Is the High Court required to evaluate the entire evidence on record when confirming a death sentence under Section 374, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Moolchand and 9 others vs Muhammad Yousuf (Udhamdas) and 31994 PLD Supreme Court 462 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-15
  inheritanceco-shareradverse possessionlimitationoustermutationpartition suitHindu law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a civil dispute over inheritance rights in ancestral property following the death of a Hindu male, Assandas, in 1957. The primary legal questions were whether the plaintiff’s suit for partition and possession was time-barred due to alleged ouster and whether the High Court could grant relief to a pro forma defendant (the plaintiff's mother) who had not filed a separate suit. The Court held that the suit was not time-barred, affirming that mere mutation of records does not constitute ouster or adverse possession against a co-heir. The Court emphasized that possession of one co-heir is legally considered possession of all, and defendants failed to prove hostile, exclusive possession. Furthermore, the Court upheld the High Court’s decision to grant a share to the plaintiff's mother, ruling that a court may grant relief to a pro forma defendant if they are found entitled to inherit alongside the plaintiff. The key principle established is that co-sharers are not obliged to sue merely because of a wrong mutation, and adverse possession cannot be established against a co-heir without clear evidence of express ouster.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mutation of property records in the name of some heirs to the exclusion of others constitute sufficient evidence of ouster to trigger the limitation period against a co-heir?
  • Can a court grant a share in the property to a pro forma defendant who did not file a separate suit but is found entitled to inherit?
  • Does the possession of one co-heir constitute possession of all co-heirs for the purposes of adverse possession?
  • Does the conversion of a member of a joint Hindu family to Islam result in the automatic break-up of the joint family status?
  Read full judgment →
• Moolchand And 9 Other vs Muhammad Yousuf (Udhamdas) And 3 Other1994 PLD Supreme Court 462 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-15
  co-sharersadverse possessionousterlimitationHindu lawminoritypartitionmutation
  Summary & questions settled

  These consolidated appeals arise from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh concerning a suit for declaration, partition, and separate possession of ancestral immovable property filed by the plaintiff, claiming to be the legitimate son of the deceased owner through his second wife under Hindu law. The primary legal questions revolved around whether the suit was barred by limitation under sections 6 and 8 of the Limitation Act, 1908 in light of prior mutation proceedings, and whether a decree could be passed in favor of a pro forma defendant (the mother). The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the defendants failed to establish ouster or adverse possession against the plaintiff, who was a minor at the time of the mutation, and that mere non-participation in profits or erroneous mutation entries do not constitute adverse possession among co-sharers. The Court further held that conversion to Islam by a member of a joint Hindu family severs the joint status, attracting Articles 127 and 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908, and that relief can be granted to a pro forma defendant entitled to inherit. Both appeals were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a wrong entry in revenue mutation proceedings against a co-heir constitute adverse possession or start the period of limitation?
  • Can knowledge of mutation proceedings and dismissal of revenue appeals by a mother be imputed to her minor son for the purpose of limitation?
  • Whether conversion to Islam by a member of a joint Hindu family breaks the status of the joint family and extinguishes rights of survivorship?
  • Can a court grant relief to a pro forma defendant who has not formally filed a suit as a plaintiff but is found entitled to inherit?
  Read full judgment →
• Momin Khan and 2 others vs Additional Secretary, Home and Tribal1994 SCMR 1766 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-06-20
  boundary disputeJirgaremand orderframing of issuesProvincially Administered Tribal Areasleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' writ petition challenging the orders passed by the revenue authorities regarding a boundary dispute. The proceedings originated from an application for demarcation between two villages, leading to the constitution of a Jirga under the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas Civil Procedure (Special Provisions) Regulation No.II of 1975. After previous rounds of litigation and remand orders, the trial court ultimately dismissed the petitioners' suit. The petitioners contended that the trial court failed to comply with specific directions in a prior remand order regarding the framing of issues, thereby vitiating the proceedings. The Supreme Court observed that the remand order was based on a written agreement between the parties' counsel consenting to decision on the basis of already recorded evidence without producing fresh evidence. The Court held that the direction to frame issues was directory rather than mandatory in light of the parties' agreement, and the omission to frame fresh issues caused no prejudice or miscarriage of justice. Consequently, finding no illegality or misreading of evidence, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the direction to frame fresh issues in a remand order is mandatory or directory when parties have agreed to decide the case on previously recorded evidence?
  • Does the omission to frame fresh issues vitiate proceedings where no prejudice or miscarriage of justice is caused to the parties?
  • Can a party challenge procedural steps taken in contravention of a directory remand direction when such steps align with a prior written agreement of the parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Molasses Trading & Export (Pvt.) Limited. vs Federation Of Pakistan And OtherPTCL 1994 CL. 222 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  customs dutyexemption notificationvested rightspast and closed transactionsregulatory dutyretrospective legislationfiscal statute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns four appeals challenging the enhancement of customs duties on imported goods via notifications issued under Section 19 of the Customs Act, 1969. The core legal question was whether the newly inserted Section 31-A of the Customs Act, 1969, nullified the vested rights of importers established in Al-Samrez Enterprise v. Federation of Pakistan, and whether this retrospective provision could reopen past and closed transactions. The Court held that while Section 31-A effectively nullified the Al-Samrez principle regarding vested rights, it did not extend to past and closed transactions. The Court determined that where bills of entry were presented prior to the enactment of Section 31-A, the tax liability was already crystallized and the transaction finalized; thus, the retrospective law could not disturb these rights. Additionally, the Court reaffirmed that regulatory duties exceeding 50% of the rates specified in the First Schedule of the Customs Act, 1969, are ultra vires. The key principle laid down is that while the legislature possesses plenary power to legislate retrospectively, such laws cannot disturb rights in past and closed transactions unless expressly intended.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 31-A of the Customs Act 1969 nullify the principle of vested rights established in the Al-Samrez Enterprise case?
  • Can retrospective legislation reopen transactions that have already been finalized and closed?
  • Is the imposition of regulatory duty exceeding 50% of the rate specified in the First Schedule of the Customs Act 1969 legally valid?
  • Does the presentation of a bill of entry crystallize the tax liability of an importer?
  Read full judgment →
• Molasses Trading & Export (Pvt) Limited vs Federation of Pakistan And OtherK.L.R. 1994 Tax & Custom Cases 116 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  customs dutyexemption notificationvested rightsretrospective legislationpast and closed transactionsregulatory dutybill of entryimport licence
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a civil appeal arising from a common judgment of the Sindh High Court dismissing constitutional petitions filed by importers challenging enhanced customs duties on imported palm oil and soyabean oil. The core legal questions involved the effect of section 31-A of the Customs Act, 1969, introduced retrospectively by the Finance Act, 1988, which nullified the rule in Al-Samrez Enterprise regarding vested rights under exemption notifications, and whether such retrospective legislation re-opens past and closed transactions where bills of entry were presented prior to its enactment. The majority of the Supreme Court held that while section 31-A effectively destroyed vested rights and the distinction between taxability and payability established in Al-Samrez Enterprise, it did not operate to re-open past and closed transactions. Since the bills of entry were presented before the enactment of section 31-A and liabilities had crystallised under section 30 of the Customs Act, 1969, the transactions were past and closed and not affected by the new provision. The key principle laid down is that while the legislature is competent to enact retrospective fiscal laws taking away vested rights, such provisions will not be construed to disturb past and closed transactions unless expressly or by necessary intendment stated.

  Questions settled

  • Whether section 31-A of the Customs Act, 1969, nullifies the principle laid down in Al-Samrez Enterprise regarding vested rights created by exemption notifications?
  • Does the retrospective insertion of section 31-A in the Customs Act, 1969, have the effect of re-opening past and closed transactions?
  • What is the effect of the presentation of a bill of entry under section 30 of the Customs Act, 1969, in crystallizing tax liability?
  • Can regulatory duty be imposed in excess of fifty percent of the rate specified in the First Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohibullah, Chief Officer, Town Committee, Amangerh and others vs Mansoor Khan, Planning Officer, District Council, Mardan and others1994 SCMR 1658 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-29
  seniority listLocal Council Serviceservice lawBPS-16combined seniorityadministrative designationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed writ petitions challenging a combined seniority list of Local Council Service (LCS) officers. The core legal question was whether the respondents, initially appointed as Planning Officers in the Planning Branch, could be placed in a combined seniority list with officers in the Administration Branch, and whether their placement above the petitioners was legally justified. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the posts occupied by the respondents were explicitly designated as part of the Administration Branch of the Local Council Service. Consequently, the Court held that the department acted correctly in preparing a combined seniority list. Furthermore, the Court noted that the respondents were absorbed into BPS-16 positions in 1984, whereas the petitioners held lower-grade positions at that time and were only promoted to BPS-16 later. The principle established is that where specific posts are statutorily or administratively designated as part of a particular service branch, the seniority of officers holding those posts is properly determined within the combined seniority list of that service branch.

  Questions settled

  • Whether officers appointed to specific posts designated as part of the Administration Branch of the Local Council Service can be included in a combined seniority list with other officers of the same service?
  • Does the prior absorption of officers into BPS-16 positions justify their placement above officers who were promoted to BPS-16 at a later date in a combined seniority list?
  • Can a department prepare a combined seniority list for officers whose posts are borne on the same service branch, despite their specific departmental assignments?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Yasmin Khan and anothers vs Election Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad through Secretary and another1994 SCMR 113 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-04
  overseas votersright of franchiseelectoral rollsconstitutional petitionvoter registrationright to vote
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, Pakistani citizens residing abroad, filed a petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, seeking enrolment as voters to participate in National and Provincial Assembly elections. They contended that despite holding Pakistani passports and National Identity Cards, they were denied registration under Section 7 of the Electoral Rolls Act, 1974, because their ordinary place of residence is outside Pakistan. Furthermore, they argued that even if registered, the current electoral system lacks mechanisms for overseas Pakistanis to cast their votes without physically returning to their constituencies. The Supreme Court observed that while the petitioners had not personally attempted to register using their available documentation, a significant impediment exists for all overseas voters regarding the actual exercise of their franchise. Recognizing the constitutional implications of this denial and noting that the grievance is a continuing one not limited to a single election, the Court admitted the petition for regular hearing and issued notices to the concerned parties to examine the matter in depth.

  Questions settled

  • Does the denial of voter registration to Pakistani citizens residing abroad, based on their ordinary place of residence, raise constitutional questions regarding the right of franchise?
  • Is the absence of mechanisms for overseas Pakistanis to cast their votes while residing abroad a justiciable impediment to the exercise of their right to vote?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Sajida Parveen and 2 others vs Principal, Dean, Khyber Medical1994 SCMR 342 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-20
  educational certificatesmedical college admissionresult verificationSupreme Court of Pakistaninterim order recall
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns proceedings before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arising from petitions regarding educational certificates and marks obtained by candidates seeking admission to medical colleges. The core legal question involved the verification of original result sheet registers from the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education against certificates submitted by candidates to the Khyber Medical College to detect discrepancies in reported marks. The court examined the administrative officer of the Board and the original records. The Supreme Court held that interim orders previously granted in favor of the petitioners should be recalled upon finding discrepancies between the official result registers and the certificates submitted by the candidates. The key principle laid down is that official educational board registers prevail over unverified or manipulated certificates submitted for admission purposes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether interim orders granted in admission matters can be recalled upon inspection of original board registers?
  • Do entries in official result sheet registers prevail over certificates submitted by candidates to educational institutions?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Farooq Sadiq vs Secretary, Health and 4 others1994 PLD Supreme Court 269 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-21
  service lawirregular appointmentadministrative errorsenioritypay scalesservice tribunalcivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the validity of the appellant's appointment as a Nursing Instructor in B.P.S. 14, a post which the Department contended was non-existent at the time of her appointment due to a prior revision of pay scales placing such posts in B.P.S. 17. The appellant challenged the Department's offer to adjust her as a Charge Nurse in B.P.S. 14, which would have resulted in a loss of seniority and benefits. The core legal question was whether the appellant's initial appointment, made by an incompetent authority to a non-existent post, could be regularized or if she must suffer the consequences of the Department's administrative error. The Supreme Court held that while the initial appointment was indeed irregular and the post non-existent, it was unjust to penalize the appellant for an administrative mistake. The Court directed that the appellant be treated as a Charge Nurse in B.P.S. 14 from the date of her initial appointment, ensuring she retains her seniority and benefits. The key principle established is that an employee should not suffer the adverse consequences of an administrative error committed by the appointing authority.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee be penalized for an administrative error committed by the appointing authority regarding the validity of their initial appointment?
  • Does the jurisdiction of the High Court to hear service matters stand barred under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is an appointment made to a non-existent post by an incompetent authority legally sustainable?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Farooq Sadiq vs Secretary, Health And 4 Others-1994 PLC (C.S.) 647 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-21
  service lawirregular appointmentadministrative errorseniorityBPS-14Nursing InstructorService Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the validity of the appellant's appointment as a Nursing Instructor (BPS-14) and her subsequent adjustment to the post of Charge Nurse (BPS-14). The appellant was appointed in 1982 to a post that had already been upgraded to BPS-17 in 1981, rendering her initial appointment irregular and incompetent. The core legal question was whether the appellant could claim BPS-17 status or if the Department's offer of adjustment to BPS-14 was lawful. The Supreme Court held that the appellant’s initial appointment was indeed invalid as the post of Nursing Instructor (BPS-14) was non-existent. However, acknowledging the appellant's eleven years of service and the fact that the administrative error regarding her appointment lay with the Department rather than the appellant, the Court directed that she be treated as a Charge Nurse (BPS-14) effective from her initial appointment date in 1982. The principle laid down is that where an employee serves for a significant period due to an administrative error in the appointment process, the employee should not suffer loss of seniority or benefits for the Department's mistake.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee claim the benefits of a post to which they were irregularly appointed when the post did not exist in that grade?
  • Should an employee suffer loss of seniority and benefits due to an administrative error in their initial appointment?
  • Is an appointment made to a non-existent post valid?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Farooq Sadio vs Secretary, Health And 4 Other1994 PLD Supreme Court 269 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-21
  service lawirregular appointmentadministrative errorup-gradationseniorityservice tribunalequitable relief
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, appointed as a Nursing Instructor (BPS-14), challenged the denial of her up-gradation to BPS-17 after the department declared her initial appointment irregular. The core legal question was whether an employee appointed to a non-existent post due to departmental error is entitled to up-gradation or should be adjusted in an existing post without loss of seniority. The Supreme Court held that the appellant's initial appointment was indeed irregular because the post of Nursing Instructor had been upgraded to BPS-17 prior to her appointment, and the appointing authority lacked the competence to make such an appointment. Consequently, the appellant was not entitled to up-gradation to BPS-17. However, acknowledging that the administrative error in the initial appointment lay with the department, the Court ruled it would be inequitable for the appellant to suffer. The Court directed that she be treated as a Charge Nurse (BPS-14) from the date of her initial appointment, preserving her seniority and accrued benefits. The principle established is that an employee should not be penalized for administrative errors committed by the department regarding their initial appointment.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee claim up-gradation to a higher grade when their initial appointment was made to a post that did not exist in that grade?
  • Is an employee entitled to protection of seniority and benefits when their appointment was irregular due to an administrative error by the department?
  • Does the jurisdiction of the High Court stand barred in service matters under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Abida Riasat Rizvi vs Philomena Mathew and 4 others1994 PLD Supreme Court 452 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-27
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentnotice of transferstatutory tenancyactual knowledgerent restrictiondiscretion of Rent Controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from an ejectment application filed by a landlady against tenants following a dispute over rent payment and the service of notice regarding the transfer of property ownership. The core legal question was whether the tenants, having acquired knowledge of the new ownership through previous litigation, could claim immunity from eviction due to the lack of formal notice under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, and whether their subsequent failure to pay rent for several years constituted a default warranting ejectment. The Supreme Court, by a majority, held that the appeal should be allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment. The Court reasoned that once tenants have actual knowledge of the transfer of ownership—evidenced here by their participation in prior execution proceedings—the statutory requirement for formal notice is substantially satisfied. Consequently, the tenants' failure to pay or deposit rent for a significant period after acquiring such knowledge constituted a willful default. The principle established is that formal notice under Section 13-A is not an absolute prerequisite for eviction when the tenant has actual knowledge of the ownership transfer and fails to discharge the primary duty of paying rent.

  Questions settled

  • Does actual knowledge of a transfer of ownership by a tenant dispense with the requirement of formal notice under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Can a tenant be held in default for failing to pay rent when they have knowledge of the new landlord but have not received a formal notice of transfer?
  • Is the discretion of a Rent Controller to condone a default in rent payment absolute, or must it be exercised based on valid and judicial reasons?
  • Does the filing of an objection application in execution proceedings constitute sufficient notice of ownership change for the purpose of rent payment obligations?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Abida Riasat Rizvi vs Philomena Mathew And 4 Other1994 PLD Supreme Court 452 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-27
  ejectment applicationdefault in payment of rentSection 13-A noticetransfer of ownershipactual knowledge of landlordtenancy rightstechnical default
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that dismissed an ejectment application against tenants. The core legal question was whether the failure to serve a formal notice under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, absolved the tenants of their obligation to pay rent, given that they had actual knowledge of the new landlord's identity through prior execution proceedings. The Supreme Court, by a majority, held that the formal notice requirement is intended to inform the tenant of the transfer of ownership. Once a tenant acquires actual knowledge of the new landlord, the purpose of the notice is fulfilled, and the tenant cannot rely on the absence of such notice to justify non-payment of rent. The Court ruled that the tenants' failure to pay rent for several years after gaining such knowledge constituted a clear default rather than a technical one. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's decision and restored the Rent Controller's order of ejectment, emphasizing that tenants must perform their duty to pay rent upon learning of the ownership transfer.

  Questions settled

  • Does actual knowledge of a change in ownership dispense with the requirement of a formal notice under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Can a tenant claim immunity from rent payment due to the lack of formal notice if they have participated in legal proceedings involving the new landlord?
  • Is a default in rent payment for several years after acquiring knowledge of a new landlord considered a technical default that warrants judicial discretion in favor of the tenant?
  • Does an ejectment order passed against a deceased tenant constitute a nullity?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirza Muzaffar Baig vs Additional District & Sessions Judge, Sialkot1994 SCMR 1643 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-19
  superdariinterim custody of vehiclestolen vehiclevehicle identificationmotor vehicles authoritycriminal procedureleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against an order of the High Court which maintained the grant of Superdari (interim custody) of a disputed motor vehicle in favour of respondent No. 2. The petitioner had lodged an FIR claiming his vehicle was stolen, while rival claims were asserted based on different engine and chassis numbers, registration books, and vehicle descriptions. The Assistant Commissioner initially granted Superdari to the petitioner, but the Additional Sessions Judge reversed this in revision, and the High Court upheld that reversal. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner raised technical contentions regarding discrepancies in the vehicle model and the number of cylinders. The Supreme Court held that for the proper and correct identification of the vehicle, these technical questions required examination with the assistance of the Motor Vehicles Authority. Consequently, the Court granted leave, converted the petition into an appeal, set aside the impugned order, and remanded the matter to the High Court for a fresh decision after obtaining relevant information from a competent officer of the Motor Vehicles Authority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether interim custody (Superdari) of a recovered vehicle should be granted to the person from whom it was recovered when rival claims and discrepancies in vehicle identification exist?
  • Can the Supreme Court remand a matter for fresh decision when technical questions regarding vehicle identification and model discrepancies remain unresolved by the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirza Muhammad Hanif Baig vs Raja Ali Akbar and 3 others1994 SCMR 1987 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-03-02
  rent evictionbona fide personal useconcurrent findings of factleave to appeallandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an eviction order issued by a Rent Controller, which was subsequently upheld by an Additional District Judge and a High Court judge in a constitutional petition. The core legal question was whether the landlords' requirement for the premises for their personal use was bona fide, a determination that hinges on factual findings. The Supreme Court examined the concurrent findings of the three lower forums regarding the bona fide personal need of the landlords. Finding no legal error or justification to interfere with the concurrent factual conclusions reached by the lower courts, the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal. The Court held that where multiple forums have consistently examined the evidence and reached a concurrent finding of fact regarding the bona fide requirement of a landlord, the appellate court will not interfere with such findings absent a compelling reason. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, though the Court granted the tenant a three-month period to vacate the premises upon an explicit undertaking to surrender possession.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the bona fide personal need of a landlord for rented premises?
  • Can a tenant be granted additional time to vacate premises upon an undertaking given to the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirza Afzal Baig vs Secretary, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and another1994 SCMR 1665 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-30
  service appealcondonation of delaypromotionjurisdiction of service tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's service appeal concerning a claim for promotion to BPS-18 and condonation of delay. The core legal questions involve whether the service appeal was barred by limitation under the Service Tribunals Act 1973 and whether matters relating to the determination of fitness for promotion are barred from the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal under proviso (b) to Section 4(1) of the said Act. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Service Tribunal rightly concluded the appeal was filed beyond the prescribed period without sufficient ground for condonation and that it was barred under proviso (b) to Section 4(1) of the Service Tribunals Act 1973 regarding determination of promotion. The petition was accordingly dismissed as disclosing no legal error or question of public importance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal before the Service Tribunal filed beyond the prescribed period after exhausting departmental remedies is liable to be dismissed for limitation?
  • Does proviso (b) to Section 4(1) of the Service Tribunals Act 1973 bar an appeal relating to the determination of fitness for promotion?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted against a service tribunal order when no question of public importance or legal error is made out?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Hasan vs The State and others1994 SCMR 1739 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-11
  leave to appealmurderacquittal reversalreappraisal of evidenceenhancement of sentencenon-bailable warrants
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard criminal petitions for leave to appeal against a consolidated judgment and order of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi. The High Court had accepted the appeals of private respondents, setting aside their convictions and sentences of life imprisonment under Sections 302, 149, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while dismissing the petitioner's revision petition for sentence enhancement. The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's reversal of the trial court's conviction was legally justified where the conviction was allegedly based on sound and reasonable grounds supported by record evidence, and whether the High Court's acquittal was arbitrary, contrary to the record, and based on conjectures and surmises. After reviewing the relevant record and hearing counsel, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal for the reappraisal of evidence and directed the issuance of non-bailable warrants against the acquitted respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal can be granted for the reappraisal of evidence where a High Court reverses a conviction based on sound grounds?
  • Whether an appellate judgment of acquittal can be challenged on the ground that it is arbitrary, contrary to the record, and based on conjectures and surmises?
  • Whether non-bailable warrants may be issued against acquitted respondents upon the grant of leave to appeal by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Minjawar and 7 others vs Abdul Matin and 20 others1994 SCMR 1722 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-18
  consolidation proceedingsconcurrent findings of factland measurementcivil court jurisdictionrevenue recordjoint ownership
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding a land dispute between joint owners following consolidation proceedings. The respondents filed a suit for declaration, injunction, and possession, alleging a deficiency in the land allotted to them under the Consolidation Scheme compared to the revenue record. The trial court, District Judge, and High Court concurrently found that the actual area on the spot differed from the revenue records, resulting in an inequitable distribution of land between the parties. The petitioners challenged the Civil Court's jurisdiction and the factual findings regarding land measurement. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts were based on a proper appreciation of evidence, including official revenue records and expert testimony from revenue officers. The Court affirmed that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to determine the actual area on the spot and that no misreading of evidence occurred. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, upholding the lower courts' findings that the respondents were entitled to possession of the deficient land area.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Civil Court have jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute regarding the actual measurement of land allotted during consolidation proceedings?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding land area measurements?
  • Is a party entitled to possession of land when it is proven that the actual area allotted on the spot is less than the area recorded in revenue documents?
  Read full judgment →
• Military Accountantgeneral, Rawalpindi and anothers vs Ch.1994 SCMR 963 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-16
  service tribunalspecial payassumption of chargefundamental rulesdeputationtemporary promotion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, dated 24-11-1992, which allowed the respondent's appeal regarding the claim for special pay. The core legal question is whether an employee is entitled to draw pay and allowances from a date prior to actually assuming the duties of the post, in light of Fundamental Rule 17. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that according to Fundamental Rule 17, an officer begins to draw pay and allowances attached to a post with effect from the date of assuming the duties of that post. The Court laid down the principle that a government servant cannot claim special pay or allowances from a date prior to the actual assumption of charge of the higher post.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an officer is entitled to draw pay and allowances from a date prior to assuming the duties of the post under Fundamental Rule 17?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the authority to grant special pay contrary to Fundamental Rule 17?
  Read full judgment →
• Military Accountant-General, Rawalpindi And Another vs Ch. Aziz-Ud-1994 PLC (C.S.) 509 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-16
  service tribunalspecial payassumption of chargedeputationtemporary promotionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, dated 24-11-1992, which had allowed the respondent's appeal regarding the grant of a special pay. Respondent No. 1 was temporarily appointed as a Group Officer on 11-6-1989 and assumed charge on 15-6-1989, from which date he was allowed a 10% special pay. He claimed the special pay from an earlier date when he reported for duty in Lahore, which the department rejected. The Federal Service Tribunal allowed his appeal by a majority decision. The core legal question concerns the entitlement to pay and allowances from a date prior to assuming the duties of the post under Fundamental Rule 17. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that under Fundamental Rule 17, an officer begins to draw pay and allowances attached to a post only from the date when they assume the duties of that post, and therefore the respondent was not entitled to the special allowance from a date prior to his actual promotion and assumption of charge.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an officer is entitled to draw pay and allowances from a date prior to assuming the duties of the post under Fundamental Rule 17?
  • Does the majority judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal correctly interpret Fundamental Rule 17 regarding the commencement of pay and allowances?
  Read full judgment →
• Mien Ejaz:Shafi vs Syed Ali Ashraf Shah And 12 Other1994 PLD Supreme Court 867 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-07-06
  election petitioninterlocutory ordermaintainability of appealrecount of votesRepresentation of the People ActElection Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed under Section 67 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, challenging an interlocutory order passed by an Election Tribunal. The Tribunal had directed the Deputy Election Commissioner to scrutinize and recount 722 disputed ballot papers during the pendency of an election petition. The core legal question was whether an appeal is maintainable before the Supreme Court against an interlocutory order of an Election Tribunal before the final disposal of the election petition. The Supreme Court held that the appeal was not maintainable. Relying on established case law, the Court affirmed that the scheme of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, contemplates appeals only against final orders passed by the Tribunal. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal as incompetent, noting that the appellant could raise their substantive arguments regarding the recount order before the Tribunal during final arguments. The Court also observed that while the Tribunal possesses the power to order a recount under Section 64 of the Act, such relief must be specifically sought and justified.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appeal maintainable before the Supreme Court against an interlocutory order passed by an Election Tribunal?
  • Does the Election Tribunal have the authority to order a recount of votes under the Representation of the People Act, 1976?
  • Can an Election Tribunal grant relief, such as a recount, that was not specifically requested in the prayer clause of the election petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad vs Ghulam Baqar1994 SCMR 1109 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-27
  Shamalat landproprietary bodyconcurrent findingscivil revisionleave to appealsale of share
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, which dismissed the petitioner's civil revision application and maintained the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts in favor of the respondent. The core legal question concerned whether a non-proprietor can successfully challenge the sale of a share in joint village shamalat land made by a member of the proprietary body to the respondent. The Supreme Court held that since the vendor was a member of the proprietary body who sold only his legitimate share in the shamalat land, and the petitioner did not belong to the proprietary body, the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the validity of the acquisition were unexceptionable and free from misreading or non-consideration of evidence. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused, affirming the concurrent findings upholding the respondent's acquired rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a non-proprietor can challenge the sale of a share in shamalat land made by a member of the proprietary body?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts when there is no misreading of evidence?
  • Whether the purchase of a specific share in shamalat land by a respondent from a valid member of the proprietary body confers lawful rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Luqman and 5 others vs Farida Khanam and another1994 SCMR 1991 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-22
  civil revisioncase decidedinterlocutory orderrevisional jurisdictionspecific performance
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court accepting a civil revision against an interlocutory order passed by the trial court in a pending suit for specific performance of contract. The core legal question was whether an interlocutory order allowing the summoning of a handwriting expert or retaining disputed writings on file constitutes "a case decided" so as to attract the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that the interlocutory order in question did not constitute "a case decided" and, therefore, the High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the civil revision. The appeal is consequently allowed, the High Court's order is set aside, and the trial court's order is restored. The key principle laid down is that an interlocutory procedural order of this nature does not amount to a "case decided" for the purposes of invoking civil revisional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an interlocutory order summoning a handwriting expert constitutes a case decided under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the High Court have revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 over an order that does not constitute a case decided?
  • Can an order retaining disputed writings and signatures on file for comparison be termed as a case decided?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Ejaz Shafi vs Syed Ali Ashraf Shah and 12 others1994 PLD Supreme Court 867 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-07-06
  election petitioninterlocutory ordermaintainability of appealrecount of votesRepresentation of the People ActElection Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a direct appeal filed under section 67 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 against an interlocutory order passed by the Election Tribunal, which directed the Deputy Election Commissioner to scrutinize and recount 722 rejected ballot votes in an election petition. The core legal question is whether an appeal is maintainable before the Supreme Court against an interlocutory order passed by the Election Tribunal during the pendency of an election petition. The Supreme Court held that the appeal is not maintainable as it was filed against an interim or interlocutory order rather than a final order, noting that under the scheme of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 and established case law, an appeal only lies against the final order of the Tribunal. The appeal was accordingly dismissed as non-maintainable without expressing any view on the merits of the recount.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appeal maintainable before the Supreme Court against an interlocutory order passed by the Election Tribunal during the pendency of an election petition?
  • Can an Election Tribunal order the recount of votes under the Representation of the People Act, 1976?
  • At what stage can an appeal be competently filed against the decision of an Election Tribunal under section 67 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs V.N. Lakhani & Company vs m.v. Lakatoi Express and 2 others1994 PLD Supreme Court 894 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-19
  admiralty jurisdictionaction in remsister shipbeneficial ownershiptime chartererarrest of shipstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against the dismissal of an admiralty appeal in limine by the High Court of Sindh. The petitioner had imported goods shipped on a vessel owned by a company which had time-chartered the respondent vessel 'Lakatoi Express'. The core legal question involved the interpretation of section 4(4) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance, 1980, specifically whether an action in rem for the arrest of a sister-ship can be maintained where the offending ship is merely under a time-charter rather than beneficially owned as respects majority shares by the person liable in personam. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a time-charterers or demise-charterers do not fall within the category of persons who 'beneficially own majority shares' in a ship. The key principle laid down is that the pre-condition for invoking admiralty jurisdiction under section 4(4) requires beneficial ownership of majority shares in the ship, and interpreting 'beneficially owned' to include charterers would render the statutory phrase 'as respects majority shares' redundant.

  Questions settled

  • Can an action in rem for the arrest of a sister-ship be maintained against a vessel that is merely under a time-charter?
  • Does the expression 'beneficially owned as respects majority shares' under section 4(4) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance, 1980 include a time-charterer or demise-charterer?
  • What are the conditions required to invoke the Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court under section 4(4) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance, 1980?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Sunny Impex and another vs Director, Telegraph Stores and Workshop and 4 others1994 PTD 1031 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-22
  sales tax exemptiontelephone polesmachinery and apparatusconstitutional petitionleave to appealtariff interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of their Constitution Petitions by the High Court, which had declined to interfere with the authorities' refusal to grant sales tax exemption on telephone poles and tubes manufactured by the petitioners. The petitioners contended that these items formed an integral part of telecommunication machinery and were exempt under specific SRO notifications. The core legal question was whether telephone poles and tubes manufactured and supplied for telecommunication systems qualify as machinery, component parts, apparatus, or appliances eligible for sales tax exemption under the relevant notifications. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the contentions required detailed interpretation of the statutory notifications and Pakistan Customs Tariff items, particularly in light of precedents concerning conduit pipes used in conjunction with machinery. The Court held that the interpretation of the notifications warranted a full hearing and adjourned the matter.

  Questions settled

  • Whether telephone poles and tubes manufactured for telecommunication systems qualify as machinery or component parts entitled to sales tax exemption under SRO notifications?
  • Do telephone poles constitute electric apparatus or appliances used in conjunction with telecommunication machinery for the transmission of power?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Sunny Impex And Another vs Director, Telegraph Stores and Workshop And 4 OtherPLD 1994 Supreme Court 553 . · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-22
  sales tax exemptionleave to appealtelecommunication machinerytariff interpretationconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the dismissal in limine of their Constitution Petitions by the High Court, which had challenged the refusal of respondents to grant sales tax exemption on telephone poles and tubes manufactured by the petitioners. The petitioners contended that these items formed an integral part of telecommunication machinery and fell under specific exemption notifications issued under the Sales Tax Act. The core legal question was whether telephone poles and tubes used in conjunction with telecommunication systems qualify for sales tax exemption as machinery, components, apparatus, or appliances under the relevant statutory notifications and tariff headings. The Supreme Court held that the questions raised required interpretation of the notifications and relevant items of the Pakistan Customs Tariff, and consequently granted leave to appeal, alongside interim stay orders. The key principle laid down is that items utilized in conjunction with machinery for the transmission or distribution of power or signals, such as conduits or supporting structures essential to the operational system, warrant detailed judicial interpretation regarding their eligibility for statutory tax exemptions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether telephone poles and tubes manufactured for telecommunication systems qualify for sales tax exemption under SRO notifications?
  • Do supporting poles and tubes constitute component parts, apparatus, or appliances of telecommunication machinery used for transmission?
  • How are the terms 'machinery' and 'apparatus' to be interpreted in the context of sales tax exemption notifications for electrical and telecommunication goods?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Sunny Impex and another s vs Director, Telegraph Stores and Workshop and 4 others1994 PLD Supreme Court 553 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-22
  sales tax exemptiontelephone polestelecommunication machineryconstitutional petitionleave to appealapparatus and appliances
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal in limine of the petitioners' Constitution Petitions by the High Court. The petitioners manufactured telephone poles and tubes supplied to the telegraph authorities, claiming exemption from sales tax under specific government notifications covering telecommunication machinery and apparatus. Goods were seized on grounds of alleged tax evasion, leading to the writ petitions challenging the tax demand. The core legal question was whether the manufactured telephone poles and tubes qualify as machinery, component parts, apparatus, or appliances used in conjunction with telecommunication machinery to merit sales tax exemption. The Supreme Court held that the interpretation of the relevant notifications and tariff items raised substantial questions requiring deeper examination, particularly in light of previous precedents concerning conduit pipes and electrical transmission equipment. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal along with interim stay orders.

  Questions settled

  • Whether telephone poles and tubes manufactured for telecommunication systems qualify as machinery or component parts entitled to sales tax exemption?
  • Are telephone poles and tubes covered under the category of electric apparatus or appliances used for line telephony or telegraphy under the relevant sales tax notifications?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Sahaf Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Karachi Port Trust and 21994 SCMR 1866 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-22
  leave to appealdemurrage chargesKarachi Port Trustconstitutional petitionshipping agentsport rulesdetention of goods
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh dismissing the petitioner's constitutional petition regarding the delivery of imported machinery containers without the payment of demurrage charges. The core legal question concerns whether the importer or the shipping agent/operator is liable for Karachi Port Trust storage and demurrage charges when containers are detained at the terminal by the shipping agent. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, observing that the High Court itself found the shipping agents liable for the charges under the applicable port rules, and that the petitioner's prior letter should not arbitrarily burden them with such liability when attempting to secure the release of their goods. The Court held that under Rule 35(a) of the Manual of Procedure for the Handling, Berthing and Operation of Containers Vessels and Containers at Karachi Port, charges for containers withheld by shipping agents beyond the dwell time are to be levied against the shipping agents or operators, laying down the principle that importers cannot be arbitrarily burdened with demurrage resulting from the detention of goods by shipping agents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an importer is liable for demurrage charges when containers are detained by shipping agents?
  • Who is responsible for Karachi Port Trust storage charges under Rule 35(a) of the Manual of Procedure for the Handling, Berthing and Operation of Containers Vessels and Containers at Karachi Port when cargo is withheld by shipping agents?
  • Does a letter withdrawing a claim against a respondent shift the statutory liability for port storage charges onto the petitioner importer?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs National Construction Ltd. vs Aiwaneiqbal Authority1994 PLD Supreme Court 311 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-05
  bank guaranteetemporary injunctionarbitrationmobilization advancecontract performance
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which maintained the refusal of a temporary injunction sought by the appellant contractor to restrain the respondent authority from encashing bank guarantees. The appellant had undertaken the construction of the Aiwan-e-Iqbal Complex, Lahore, received a mobilization advance, and furnished bank guarantees. Due to delays, the project remained incomplete, leading the respondent to initiate encashment of the guarantees, whereupon the appellant filed an application under the Arbitration Act, 1940. The core legal question was whether the encashment of unconditional bank guarantees could be restrained by way of a temporary injunction pending arbitration proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that bank guarantees are independent contracts imposing absolute obligations on banks to pay in accordance with their terms, irrespective of any underlying disputes between the parties. The key principle laid down is that courts must give effect to the unconditional covenants of bank guarantees, and their encashment cannot be postponed pending arbitration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the encashment of an unconditional bank guarantee can be restrained by a temporary injunction pending arbitration proceedings?
  • Are bank guarantees considered independent contracts separate from the primary construction contract?
  • Does a bank have an absolute obligation to pay under a guarantee irrespective of disputes between the contracting parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs National Construction Ltd vs Aiwan E Iqbal Authority1994 PLD Supreme Court 311 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-05
  bank guaranteetemporary injunctionarbitration proceedingsmobilization advanceindependent contractencashment of guarantee
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the dismissal of an application for a temporary injunction by the Lahore High Court, which had refused to restrain the respondent from encashing bank guarantees furnished by the appellant, National Construction Limited, in relation to a construction contract. The core legal question was whether a court should grant an injunction to stop the encashment of bank guarantees when a dispute exists between the parties regarding the underlying contract. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the lower courts correctly exercised their discretion in refusing the injunction. The Court affirmed that bank guarantees constitute independent contracts, imposing absolute obligations on the issuing banks to pay upon demand, regardless of any ongoing disputes or arbitration proceedings between the contractor and the employer. The ratio established is that courts must give effect to the specific covenants of such guarantees, which are independent of the primary contract, and should not postpone their encashment pending the resolution of arbitration proceedings, as doing so would undermine the commercial purpose of these financial instruments.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court restrain the encashment of a bank guarantee based on an underlying dispute between the parties to a contract?
  • Are bank guarantees considered independent contracts separate from the primary construction agreement?
  • Should the encashment of a bank guarantee be postponed pending the outcome of arbitration proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Joint Venture Kocks KG/Rist and 2 others vs Federation of1994 PLD Supreme Court 308 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-22
  arbitration awarderror of law apparent on the face of the recordforeign exchange fluctuationconsultancy agreementobjections to awardleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from petitions for leave to appeal concerning a commercial dispute over a consultancy agreement for the construction of seed factories, involving foreign exchange rate fluctuations between U.S. Dollars and Deutsche Marks. The borrower terminated the contract after disputes arose regarding the currency in which invoices were to be submitted and paid. The parties referred the matter to arbitration, culminating in an award by an Umpire in favor of the consultants. Objections filed under the Arbitration Act were initially dismissed by the Senior Civil Judge who made the award the rule of the court, but the High Court partly modified the decision on the ground that the interpretation of a specific section of the agreement was not referred to arbitration. Both parties challenged the High Court's decision before the Supreme Court. The core legal questions involved whether the interpretation of the contract was specifically referred to arbitration, whether the award suffered from errors of law apparent on the face of the record, and how currency conversion and deductions should be handled. The Supreme Court granted leave to examine these contentions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the interpretation of section 3.01 of the agreement was specifically referred to Arbitration for decision so as to bar exceptions under sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act?
  • Does an arbitration award suffer from errors of law apparent on the face of the record regarding the currency of payment under a consultancy contract?
  • Whether a High Court is required to assign separate reasons for the dismissal of a civil revision when its findings are already contained in a connected appeal judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Joint Venture Kocks KG/Rist And 2 Other vs Federation of1994 PLD Supreme Court 308 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-22
  arbitration awardcontractual interpretationscope of referencecurrency fluctuationerror of lawarbitration act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a contractual dispute between the Federation of Pakistan and a joint venture of foreign consultants regarding payment terms in a loan-funded construction agreement. The core legal question is whether the interpretation of the payment clause (Section 3.01), which specified payment in Deutsche Marks at a fixed exchange rate, was within the scope of the arbitration reference, and whether the High Court erred in setting aside the Umpire's award on the grounds that the interpretation was outside the reference and legally flawed. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that both parties challenged the High Court's decision. The key principle established is that when parties refer disputes to arbitration, the scope of the arbitrator's authority is defined by the reference; however, the court must examine whether the High Court correctly applied the standards for reviewing an arbitration award under the Arbitration Act, particularly regarding whether the interpretation of specific contractual clauses was properly within the arbitrator's jurisdiction and whether the award contained errors of law apparent on the face of the record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the interpretation of a specific contractual clause was within the scope of the arbitration reference?
  • Does an arbitration award suffer from an error of law apparent on the face of the record if it interprets a contract clause differently than the High Court?
  • Can an appellate court set aside an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded their jurisdiction regarding the interpretation of a contract?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Absestos Cement Industries Ltd vs Lahore Municipal1994 SCMR 262 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-10
  octroi dutytaxing statutecommercial usagetrade meaningstatutory constructionmunicipal taxation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellant's revision petition regarding the appropriate octroi duty payable on its products, namely asbestos cement sheets and pipes, imported into the Lahore Municipal Corporation area. The core legal question was whether the appellant's products—composed predominantly of cement with a smaller proportion of asbestos fibre—fell under serial number 62 or serial number 66 of Notification No. 78/0/1986. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that trade and commercial terminology in taxing statutes must be construed according to their well-known meaning in trade and business circles. Since evidence established that asbestos sheets and pipes manufactured from a mixture of cement and asbestos fibre are recognized in the building trade under those designations, and given that pure one-hundred-percent asbestos sheets or pipes do not exist in trade, the appellant's products correctly fall under the category listed against serial number 62. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, with the court noting the respondents were bound by their treatment of the pipes.

  Questions settled

  • How should terms used in a tariff or notification relating to trade and business be construed?
  • Whether products composed of a mixture of cement and asbestos fibre fall under the category of asbestos sheets in trade circles?
  • Can pure one-hundred-percent asbestos sheets or pipes be considered a commercially known product in the building trade?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehtab Khan and others vs The State1994 SCMR 1472 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-22
  review jurisdictionsubstantive rightSpecial Courts for Speedy Trialsstatutory interpretationfinality of judgmentinherent powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal petition for review filed by convicts against a judgment of the Supreme Appellate Court, which had previously dismissed their appeal against conviction and the State's appeal for enhancement of sentence. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Appellate Court, established under the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act 1992, possesses the inherent power to review its own judgments in the absence of an express statutory provision. The Court held that the right to review, like the right to appeal, is a substantive right that must be expressly conferred by statute. It determined that the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act 1992 does not provide for such a power, either expressly or by implication. Furthermore, the Court distinguished this from the Supreme Court's power under Article 188 of the Constitution, clarifying that the Supreme Appellate Court is a distinct statutory creation. Consequently, the review petitions were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, affirming the principle that a court cannot assume review jurisdiction unless explicitly granted by the governing legislation.

  Questions settled

  • Is the right to review a judgment a substantive right or a matter of procedure?
  • Does the Supreme Appellate Court established under the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act 1992 possess the inherent power to review its own judgments?
  • Can a court assume jurisdiction to review its own orders in the absence of express statutory provision?
  • Does the theory of continuation of proceedings automatically confer a right of review upon an appellate court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehraj Din and others vs Sheikh Naseeb Elahi and others1994 SCMR 266 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-29
  settlement of propertyevacuee propertywrit jurisdictionfindings of factpreferential rightpossession datesconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment dismissing constitutional petitions regarding the division and transfer of a large residential building in Lahore under settlement laws. The core legal questions involved whether the Settlement Commissioner’s division of the property into two units was sustainable and whether the determination of preferential rights for transfer based on possession dates was legally sound. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner’s decision to divide the building into two units was based on physical inspection and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the findings regarding the claimants' possession dates, noting that the Settlement Commissioner’s assessment of evidence regarding priority of possession was a finding of fact. The Court laid down the principle that findings of fact by a Settlement Commissioner, particularly concerning the physical division of property and the verification of possession dates, cannot be reopened or interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction unless the order is shown to be arbitrary, fanciful, or mala fide. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with a Settlement Commissioner's finding of fact regarding property division in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Is a Settlement Commissioner's determination of possession dates for property transfer subject to judicial review?
  • Under what circumstances can a court disturb a finding of fact made by a Settlement Commissioner?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehr Muhammad Ali vs Province of Punjab through Collector, Sialkot1994 SCMR 1640 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-19
  locus standievacuee propertyinformer applicationallotment cancellationconcurrent findingscivil revisionlimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's civil revision, affirming the concurrent dismissal of his suit for declaration and consequential relief regarding an evacuee property (Haveli). The petitioner, acting as an informer, had previously filed an application under the Displaced Persons and Land Settlement Act of 1958 for the cancellation of the property's allotment, alleging fraud, which was dismissed by the settlement authorities. The core legal questions involve whether the petitioner possessed the requisite locus standi to challenge the allotment in a civil court and whether the concurrent findings of the lower forums suffered from any legal infirmity. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts were unexceptionable, ruling that the petitioner lacked locus standi and that the suit was barred by limitation, as the adverse orders of the settlement authorities had attained finality. The key principle laid down is that an informer whose application for cancellation of an allotment has been dismissed by competent settlement authorities has no vested right or locus standi to challenge the allotment through a civil suit after the limitation period.

  Questions settled

  • Does an informer whose cancellation application is dismissed by settlement authorities possess locus standi to file a civil suit challenging an evacuee property allotment?
  • Can findings of fact concurrently reached by three lower forums be interfered with by the Supreme Court without showing a legal infirmity?
  • Whether a suit for declaration filed years after the dismissal of an application by settlement authorities is barred by limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehr Din through Legal Heirs vs Azizan and another1994 SCMR 1110 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-16
  ex parte decreefraud and misrepresentationservice of summonsPardanashin ladiescivil revisionde novo trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which accepted a civil revision and set aside an ex parte decree passed in favor of the predecessor of the petitioners. The core legal question concerned whether the ex parte decree was validly obtained and whether the High Court rightly set aside the decree on an application under section 12(2) C.P.C. read with Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. due to fraud, misrepresentation, and non-compliance with statutory provisions regarding the service of summons on Pardanashin ladies. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that proper procedures for service of summons were not observed, and fraud and concealment were involved in securing the ex parte decree. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision to annul the ex parte decree and order a de novo trial. The key principle laid down is that strict compliance with service of summons procedures, particularly concerning Pardanashin ladies, is mandatory, and decrees obtained through fraudulent concealment of service are liable to be set aside under section 12(2) C.P.C.

  Questions settled

  • Can an ex parte decree obtained through fraudulent service of summons be challenged under section 12(2) C.P.C.?
  • Whether failure to observe proper procedure for serving summons on Pardanashin ladies vitiates an ex parte decree?
  • Is the High Court justified in setting aside an ex parte decree in revision when mandatory provisions regarding service of process have not been complied with?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehr Dil and 3 others vs Faqir Hussain and 11 others1994 SCMR 1755 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-06
  civil revisionconcurrent findingsleave to appealmisreading of evidencedeclaration of ownershipappellate interference
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had dismissed a civil revision filed by the petitioners. The petitioners had previously filed a suit seeking a declaration of ownership regarding a specific parcel of land measuring 8 Kanals 11 Marlas in Khasra No. 718. The trial court dismissed the suit, and the appellate court subsequently upheld that dismissal. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the concurrent findings of fact by the three lower courts were vitiated by any misreading or non-reading of evidence or any error of law that would warrant appellate interference. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the petitioners' counsel failed to demonstrate any such misreading, non-reading, or legal error in the lower courts' findings. Consequently, the Court held that no grounds existed for interference with the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The principle affirmed is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in the absence of demonstrated misreading, non-reading of evidence, or a clear error of law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in the absence of misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  • What is the threshold for challenging concurrent findings of fact in a civil revision before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mayor, Municipal Corporation, Rawalpindi vs Muhammad Ghaffar1994 SCMR 256 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-12
  compulsory retirementnatural justiceright to hearingpublic interestmunicipal employeesmala fideservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside the compulsory retirement of municipal employees. The core legal question was whether the compulsory retirement of employees under the Local Councils and Municipal Committees Servants (Retirement) Rules, 1966, requires a prior opportunity of hearing to be afforded to the affected individuals, and whether such retirement constitutes a stigma requiring procedural fairness. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that compulsory retirement involves an element of compulsion and carries a stigma in the public eye. Consequently, the Court held that the principles of natural justice mandate that an affected employee must be given an opportunity of hearing before such an order is passed. The Court further clarified that a subsequent hearing before an appellate authority does not cure the lack of a hearing at the initial stage. The principle laid down is that where retirement is purportedly in the public interest, the authority must provide the employee with the grounds and material supporting that conclusion prior to the order.

  Questions settled

  • Does the compulsory retirement of a municipal employee under the Local Councils and Municipal Committees Servants (Retirement) Rules, 1966, require a prior opportunity of hearing?
  • Can a hearing before an appellate authority cure the failure to provide a hearing before an initial order of compulsory retirement is passed?
  • Is an order of compulsory retirement that fails to disclose the material or grounds supporting the conclusion of 'public interest' legally sustainable?
  Read full judgment →
• Mayor, Municipal Corporation, Rawalpindi vs Muhammad Ghaffar1994 PLC (C.S.) 432 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-12
  compulsory retirementright of hearingnatural justicepublic interestmunicipal employeespetitions for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from four petitions seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, which allowed writ petitions filed by municipal employees challenging their compulsory retirement. The core legal question is whether an employee compulsorily retired after 25 years of service under the relevant retirement rules is entitled to an opportunity of hearing prior to the passing of the retirement order, and whether such retirement was vitiated by mala fides. The Supreme Court held that compulsory retirement involves an element of compulsion and stigma, and therefore principles of natural justice require that an affected employee must be given an opportunity of hearing before the retirement order is passed, with adequate disclosure of material supporting the conclusion that retirement is in public interest. The Court ruled that a subsequent hearing before an appellate forum cannot cure the absence of a pre-decisional hearing. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee compulsorily retired from service is entitled to an opportunity of hearing before the retirement order is passed?
  • Does a hearing before an appellate forum cure the lack of a pre-decisional hearing prior to compulsory retirement?
  • Whether compulsory retirement carrying a stigma requires adherence to the principles of natural justice?
  Read full judgment →
• Masood Aslam Dar vs Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad1994 SCMR 2121 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-07-26Read full judgment →
• Masood Ahmad and another vs The State1994 SCMR 6 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-20
  criminal appealmurderbenefit of doubtidentification paradeocular testimonycorroborationmedical evidencecriminal jurisprudence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan examines the legality of convicting two appellants under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 based solely on the testimony of eye-witnesses whose credibility had already been substantially undermined. The trial court convicted five accused persons, but the High Court acquitted three co-accused after drawing an adverse inference against the prosecution for resisting a formal identification parade. The core legal question was whether the suspicious conduct of the prosecution and the resulting disbelief of the eye-witnesses regarding the acquitted co-accused should also taint their testimony against the remaining appellants. The Supreme Court held that the reluctance of the prosecution to conduct an identification parade, combined with intrinsic inconsistencies between the ocular and medical evidence, unnatural witness conduct during the attack, and uninspiring recoveries, cast a serious doubt on the veracity of the entire prosecution case. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and sentences, extending the benefit of the doubt to the appellants and ordering their immediate acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the reluctance of the prosecution to hold an identification parade reacts upon the entire testimony of eye-witnesses so as to benefit all accused persons?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained upon the uncorroborated testimony of eye-witnesses who have been disbelieved regarding co-accused?
  • Does the failure of eye-witnesses to intervene during a fatal attack cast doubt on their claimed presence at the scene?
  • Are recoveries of weapons from public or accessible places sufficient to corroborate ocular testimony in a murder trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Maritime Security Agency, Karachi vs Muhammad Saleem Khan and others1994 PLD Supreme Court 486 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-02
  quashment of proceedingsinherent powersFishery Officercoram non judiceabuse of processcriminal procedureexclusive fishery zone
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment quashing criminal proceedings initiated against respondents for illegal fishing under the Exclusive Fishery Zone (Regulation of Fishing) Act, 1975. The core legal questions were whether the prosecution was competently initiated by an officer lacking the requisite statutory notification, and whether the High Court was justified in exercising its inherent powers under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, without requiring the respondents to first seek acquittal before the trial Magistrate under Section 249-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the officer who seized the vessel and lodged the FIR was not authorized under the applicable SRO at the time of the incident, rendering the proceedings coram non judice. The Court laid down the principle that while the High Court should generally direct parties to exhaust remedies like Section 249-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, it may directly exercise its inherent powers under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, when proceedings are ex facie without jurisdiction and constitute an abuse of the court's process.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise inherent powers under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, when a trial court has jurisdiction under Section 249-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a prosecution initiated by an officer lacking the requisite statutory notification considered coram non judice?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to quash criminal proceedings directly without requiring the accused to first approach the trial court under Section 249-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Maritime Security Agency, Karachi vs Muhammad Saleem Khan And Other1994 PLD Supreme. Court 486 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-02
  quashment of proceedingsinherent powers of High Courtcoram non judiceFishery Officerexclusive fishery zoneabuse of processillegal seizure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that quashed criminal proceedings initiated against the respondents for illegal fishing under the Exclusive Fishery Zone (Regulation of Fishing) Act, 1975. The core legal questions were whether the prosecution was competently initiated by an authorized Fishery Officer and whether the High Court correctly invoked its inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, without requiring the respondents to first seek acquittal before the District Magistrate under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Supreme Court held that the officer involved lacked the requisite authorization under the relevant S.R.O. at the time of the incident, rendering the proceedings coram non judice. Consequently, the Court affirmed the quashment. The key principle laid down is that while the High Court should generally direct parties to seek relief from the trial court under Section 249-A or 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 for factual disputes, it may exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A to quash proceedings ex facie without jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of the court's process.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise its inherent power under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash proceedings that are ex facie without jurisdiction?
  • Is it mandatory for an accused to approach the trial court under Section 249-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 before invoking the High Court's inherent jurisdiction for quashment of proceedings?
  • Does a Fishery Officer have the authority to seize a vessel and arrest the crew if they are not explicitly authorized by a notification in the official Gazette under the Exclusive Fishery Zone (Regulation of Fishing) Act 1975?
  Read full judgment →
• Maqbool Ahmed vs Superintending Engineer (E), WAPDA, 2ND Circle, Faisalabad and another1994 SCMR 1671 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-17
  service appeallimitationtime-barred appealacquittalservice duesleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal. The core legal questions concern whether the petitioner's appeal before the Tribunal was barred by limitation and whether the petitioner was entitled to claimed financial dues following an order of acquittal issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. The Court granted leave to appeal to examine these questions in detail. The principle established relates to the examination of limitation periods in service appeals and the consequential financial entitlements of a civil servant or employee upon earning an honorable or competent acquittal from criminal charges.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the appeal of the petitioner before the Federal Service Tribunal was barred by time?
  • Whether an employee is entitled to claimed dues after securing an order of acquittal from a court of competent jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Maqbool Ahmed Khakwani vs Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and 7 others1994 SCMR 511 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-30
  leave to appeallimitation periodservice tribunaltime-barred appealservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging an order regarding the limitation period for an appeal filed before the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad. The core legal question presented for consideration is whether the petitioner's appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal could be legally treated as time-barred, specifically in light of the precedent established by the Supreme Court in the case of Gulbat Khan v. Water and Power Development Authority (1992 SCMR 1789). The Court granted leave to appeal to examine this issue, thereby setting the stage for a determination on whether the principles of limitation applied by the Tribunal align with the authoritative interpretation of the law as laid down in the cited precedent. The judgment serves as an interlocutory order initiating the appellate process to resolve the conflict between the Tribunal's finding of time-bar and the relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the computation of limitation periods in service matters.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal filed before the Federal Service Tribunal be dismissed as time-barred in light of the principles established in Gulbat Khan v. Water and Power Development Authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain vs Government of N.W.F.P. through Chief Secretary1994 SCMR 1656 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-02-07
  promotionservice lawcivil serviceannual confidential reportprovincial selection boardleave to appealseniority
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed a challenge to the promotion of a respondent to the post of Assistant Director (BPS-17). The petitioner, a junior officer, contended that his service record and Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) were superior to those of the respondent, and that he had been recommended for the post by the Director of Civil Defence. The core legal question was whether the promotion was invalid due to the disregard of the petitioner's alleged superior merit and whether a departmental recommendation could override the Provincial Selection Board’s decision. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, holding that the promotion was made strictly according to rules and merit. The Court established that a stopgap or acting appointment confers no right to permanent promotion. Furthermore, it affirmed that an "average" rating in an ACR does not constitute an adverse remark, and departmental recommendations lack binding effect against the formal selection process. Consequently, the Court found no legal infirmity in the promotion process and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does an acting or stopgap appointment create a vested right to permanent promotion?
  • Does an "average" rating in an Annual Confidential Report constitute an adverse remark?
  • Can a departmental recommendation letter override the decision of a Provincial Selection Board regarding promotion?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain vs Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad And 3 Others1994 PLC (C.S.) 627 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-20
  civil servicedeputationcessation of serviceFundamental Rule 18retrospective orderdisciplinary proceedingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 challenges a Federal Service Tribunal judgment regarding the termination of a civil servant. The petitioner, formerly employed in the Telegraphs and Telephone Department, went on deputation to Saudi Arabia. Following his failure to report for duty upon the expiry of his deputation, the department initiated disciplinary proceedings and determined he had ceased to be in service as of 12-6-1977, pursuant to Fundamental Rule 18. The Tribunal modified this termination date to 12-6-1982 but upheld the cessation of service. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner's deputation had been validly extended beyond the initial period and whether the department could retrospectively recognize the cessation of service. The Supreme Court held that the department's policy letter regarding deputation was permissive and required an independent order to operate, which was absent. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that recognizing the legal consequences of continued absence from duty from the date they occurred did not constitute an impermissible retrospective order. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a permissive policy letter regarding deputation operate to extend a deputation period without an independent order?
  • Does an order recognizing the legal consequences of a civil servant's continued absence from the date they occurred constitute an impermissible retrospective order?
  • Does the failure to report for duty after the expiry of a deputation period trigger the cessation of service under Fundamental Rule 18?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain vs Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad and 3 others1994 SCMR 519 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-20
  service appealdeputationunauthorized absencecessation of serviceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, directed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal. The petitioner, a former civil servant in the Telegraphs and Telephone Department, went on deputation to Saudi Arabia. Following the expiry of his deputation period, he failed to report back for duty and was subsequently proceeded against departmentally, resulting in an order declaring that he had ceased to be in service upon the expiry of his deputation pursuant to Fundamental Rule 18. The Federal Service Tribunal partly accepted his appeal by modifying the date he ceased to be a civil servant and setting aside the recovery of monetary benefits. The core legal question concerned the validity of determining the cessation of service from the date deputation expired and the interpretation of extension policies. The Supreme Court held that the department correctly recognized the legal consequences flowing from the petitioner's continued unauthorized absence, and no departmental overreach occurred. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order declaring the cessation of service due to unauthorized absence after deputation can take effect from a retrospective date?
  • Whether a permissive policy letter regarding deputation extension can operate independently without a specific extension order?
  • Does unauthorized absence beyond the expiry of a deputation period attract the application of Fundamental Rule 18?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain and 6 others vs The State1994 SCMR 94 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-04-21
  grave and sudden provocationcriminal appealbenefit of doubteyewitness testimonymurder convictionappreciation of evidencefalse implication
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the convictions of seven appellants for murder under Section 302/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt and whether the defense plea of grave and sudden provocation was established. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's evidence was not confidence-inspiring, noting that the complainant's testimony was unreliable and that the prosecution had indiscriminately implicated all male family members of the accused. Furthermore, the investigation had already cleared one accused of involvement. The Court accepted the defense plea of grave and sudden provocation raised by one appellant, Nazar Hussain, who admitted to killing the deceased after finding him in an objectionable condition with his sister. Consequently, the Court acquitted six appellants, granting them the benefit of doubt, and convicted Nazar Hussain under Section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The principle established is that where prosecution evidence is unreliable and indiscriminately ropes in family members, the court must grant the benefit of doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution indiscriminately implicates all male family members of the accused?
  • Does the finding of an investigating officer that an accused is innocent carry weight in judicial proceedings?
  • When is a plea of grave and sudden provocation sufficient to reduce a charge of murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder?
  • Is eyewitness testimony reliable when the witnesses are closely related to the deceased and the prosecution story is otherwise inconsistent?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain and 4 others vs The State1994 SCMR 1327 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-22
  Qisas and Diyatwaiver of qisastazirsudden provocationsudden flare-upunlawful assemblyvicarious liabilitycommon object
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave of the Court challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction and sentences of the appellants under sections 148, 302(c) read with 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and section 337(d) read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions examined were whether the waiver of Qisas by one of the heirs under section 309 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 benefits convicts tried under Tazir, and whether section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 applies where an incident stems from a sudden flare-up among closely related family members rather than pre-concert and premeditation. The Supreme Court held that a waiver of Qisas does not benefit convicts sentenced under Tazir, and that vicarious liability under section 149 does not apply in cases of sudden quarrels without pre-planning. Consequently, the Court partly allowed the appeal, setting aside the convictions under sections 148 and 149, while maintaining specific individual convictions and sentences under sections 302(c) and 337(d) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The key principle laid down is that vicarious liability provisions are inapplicable to sudden flare-ups lacking pre-concert, and waiver of Qisas by a Wali is legally inconsequential when convictions are handed down under Tazir.

  Questions settled

  • Does the waiver of Qisas by a Wali under section 309 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 benefit convicts who have been tried, convicted, and sentenced under Tazir?
  • Whether section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is attracted in a case where an occurrence is the result of a sudden flare-up and heat of passion rather than pre-concert and premeditation?
  • Can vicarious liability under section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be applied when there is doubt regarding the formation of an unlawful assembly with a common object?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad vs Muhammad Iqbal1994 SCMR 560 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-31
  summary suitleave to defendpromissory notelimitationaffidavitcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellant's regular first appeal arising from a summary suit decreed under Order XXXVII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The respondent had instituted a summary suit for the recovery of Rs.30,000 based on a promissory note. The trial court decreed the suit and refused leave to defend because the appellant's petition lacked grounds, was barred by time without an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908, and was not accompanied by an affidavit. The High Court upheld this decision. The core legal question was whether leave to defend a summary suit could be granted without complying with the mandatory requirements of filing an affidavit disclosing valid facts and making a timely application. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings were correct, noting that a plea regarding the non-service of a copy of the plaint could not be raised for the first time before the apex court, and the failure to file an affidavit and a time-extension application justified the dismissal. The principle laid down is that a defendant seeking leave to defend a summary suit must strictly fulfill procedural prerequisites including a timely application supported by an affidavit disclosing substantial facts.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea regarding the non-service of a copy of the plaint with the summons be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • Whether leave to defend a summary suit under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 can be granted without filing an affidavit disclosing valid facts?
  • Is a petition for leave to defend a summary suit maintainable when it is barred by time and no application for condonation of delay has been filed?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad and 5 others vs Directorgeneral Pak. P.W.D. and 21994 SCMR 254 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-03
  redesignation of postsenioritypromotionService TribunalGrade-16Sub-EngineerAssistant Engineer
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comprises six consolidated appeals filed against the dismissal of departmental appeals by the Service Tribunal. The core legal question concerns whether the administrative redesignation of a post held by a junior employee from Sub-Engineer to Assistant Engineer in the same Grade-16 adversely affects the seniority and promotion rights of senior Sub-Engineers. The Supreme Court held that redesignation of a post without a change in grade does not amount to promotion and does not affect inter se seniority, relying on official assurance that the administrative arrangement confers no promotional advantage. The Court disposed of the appeals by ruling that the redesignation shall not be treated as promotion and that future promotions must strictly adhere to the existing seniority list where the appellants remain senior.

  Questions settled

  • Does the redesignation of a post from Sub-Engineer to Assistant Engineer within the same grade constitute a promotion?
  • Can the redesignation of a junior employee's post adversely affect the inter se seniority of senior employees in the same grade?
  • Are appeals before the Service Tribunal maintainable against an administrative redesignation order that does not constitute a final promotional order?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad And 5 Other vs Director-General, Pak. P.W.D. And 21994 PLC (C.S.) 430 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-03
  service lawredesignation of postinter se senioritypromotionadministrative arrangementgazetted status
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns six consolidated appeals filed by Sub-Engineers of the Pakistan Public Works Department (Pak. P.W.D.) challenging the redesignation of a junior colleague's post from Sub-Engineer (B-16) to Assistant Engineer (Gazetted) (B-16). The appellants, who were senior to the respondent, contended that this redesignation granted the respondent an unfair advantage in status, powers, and perks, potentially prejudicing their future seniority and promotion prospects. The Service Tribunal had dismissed their appeals, citing both merits and maintainability issues. The core legal question was whether the mere redesignation of a post within the same grade constitutes a promotion that alters inter se seniority. Upon hearing the department's representative, the Supreme Court held that the redesignation was purely an administrative arrangement and did not constitute a promotion. The Court affirmed that the appellants' seniority remained intact. The key principle laid down is that the redesignation of a post to a gazetted status without a change in grade does not amount to a promotion, nor does it affect the inter se seniority of employees within the same grade.

  Questions settled

  • Does the redesignation of a post from non-gazetted to gazetted status within the same grade constitute a promotion?
  • Can the redesignation of a colleague's post affect the inter se seniority of other employees in the same grade?
  • Is a redesignation of a post merely an administrative arrangement if the grade remains unchanged?
  Read full judgment →
• Mangta vs Province of Punjab through District Collector, Bhakkar and 291994 SCMR 498 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-20
  civil procedurecompromisesettlement allotmentleave to appealrehabilitation authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court order dismissing his application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure as time-barred. The controversy arose from the reduction of the petitioner's land allotment by the Chief Settlement Commissioner and a subsequent compromise in a constitutional petition where the petitioner agreed to retain a portion of the land while informers took the rest. The core legal question concerned the maintainability and merits of invoking Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure to reopen the matter and challenge the compromise and settlement allotments. The Supreme Court held that the application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure was entirely misconceived, as the petitioner's entitlement was fixed at 200 kanals and any additional claim based on a compromise with private parties was of no concern to the settlement authorities. The court laid down the principle that a party whose entitlement is legally fixed cannot challenge the disposal of resumed units or seek to reopen settled matters regarding third-party claims through an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure is maintainable to reopen settled land allotments based on a compromise?
  • Can a petitioner claim land beyond their fixed statutory entitlement from settlement authorities based on a private compromise with informers?
  • Does a party have locus standi to challenge the disposal of resumed units by settlement authorities once their own entitlement is determined?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Shaukat Ali Dogar and 12 others vs Ghulam Qasim Kean Khakwani1994 PLD Supreme Court 281 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-09
  constitutional jurisdictionpolice investigationjudicial restraintseparation of powerscognizable offencecriminal procedurewrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from petitions challenging a High Court judgment that directed the registration of a criminal case against former public representatives for alleged embezzlement of public funds and subsequently exercised ongoing supervision over the police investigation. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, possesses the authority to maintain continued control and oversight over police investigations prior to the submission of a challan. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court may competently direct the registration of a case involving cognizable offenses, it lacks the jurisdiction to supervise or control the investigation process itself. The Court affirmed that the functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary but distinct; judicial interference in police investigations before a charge is preferred is impermissible. Consequently, the Court set aside the directions requiring periodical progress reports and excised certain disparaging observations made by the High Court regarding the accused and the investigative process, emphasizing that judicial restraint is essential to maintain the separation of powers and ensure a fair trial.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise ongoing supervision and control over a police investigation before a challan is submitted?
  • Is the High Court competent to direct the registration of a criminal case in its constitutional jurisdiction when a cognizable offense is alleged?
  • Does the requirement of prior sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 prevent the police from registering a case and conducting an investigation?
  • Are judicial observations that castigate institutions or individuals without a final verdict appropriate in a judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Shaukat Ali Dogar And 12 Other vs Ghulam Qasim K+Ia,N Khakwani1994 PLD Supreme Court 281 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-09
  constitutional petitionpolice investigationjudicial supervisioncognizable offenceembezzlementanti-corruptionTameer-e-Wattan Programme
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of intra-court appeals by the Lahore High Court, which had directed the registration of a criminal case against the petitioners—former mayors entrusted with Tameer-e-Wattan Programme funds—under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 read with Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, alongside mandating continuous judicial supervision of the ensuing police investigation. The core legal questions concern whether the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, can order the registration of a cognizable offence against public servants and whether it can exercise continued control and monitor progress reports of the police investigation prior to the submission of a challan. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals, holding that while the High Court's direction to register a case upon allegations of a cognizable offence is competent and unexceptionable, the judiciary must not interfere with or exercise ongoing supervisory control over police investigations before a challan is submitted. Furthermore, general, non-specific condemnation of institutions and targeted observations in judgments should be avoided. The key principle laid down is that the functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary and non-overlapping; the court's jurisdiction to interfere in investigations is limited, and pre-challan judicial monitoring of police investigations is without jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court direct the registration of a criminal case when allegations show the commission of a cognizable offence by public servants?
  • Is it permissible for a court to exercise continued control and demand periodical progress reports during a police investigation before a challan is submitted?
  • Does Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 prevent the police from registering a case and conducting an investigation without prior sanction?
  • To what extent can the judiciary interfere with the statutory duties of the police in matters of investigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Sanaullah and 9 others vs The Deputy Administrator (R.P.) Centre1994 SCMR 1225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-14
  settlement propertyopen auctiontransfer of propertydemarcationresidual propertywrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a dispute over the ownership of a specific room within a property (Ahata No. 221) in Lahore Cantt. The appellants, successors-in-interest of the original auction purchaser, Malik Hidayatullah, challenged the transfer of a room to the respondent, Mst. Bilqis Akhtar, by the Settlement Authorities. The core legal question was whether the room in the respondent's possession was part of the property previously auctioned to the appellants' predecessor or if it remained residual property available for fresh allotment. The Supreme Court examined previous demarcation proceedings and the admissions made by the respondent's father, who had previously acknowledged the disputed area as part of the auctioned property. The Court held that the disputed room was indeed part of the property already transferred to the appellants' predecessor. Consequently, the Court set aside the orders of the Settlement Authorities and the High Court, ruling that the authorities acted without lawful authority in allotting the already transferred property. The principle established is that Settlement Authorities cannot allot property that has already been validly transferred through open auction.

  Questions settled

  • Can Settlement Authorities allot property that has already been transferred to a third party through open auction?
  • Does a previous admission by a predecessor-in-interest regarding property boundaries bind their successors in subsequent allotment disputes?
  • Are orders passed by Settlement Authorities regarding property already transferred considered to be without lawful authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Riaz vs Salim Akhtar and 4 others1994 SCMR 2109 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-11
  compromise orderauthority of counselsecond appealejectmentleave to appealfactual controversy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against a compromise order passed by the High Court in a second appeal under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal question concerned whether a compromise order passed by the High Court on the statement of counsel could be challenged directly before the Supreme Court on the ground that the counsel lacked instructions. The Supreme Court refused to enter into the factual controversy regarding the instructions given to counsel, holding that if the petitioner was aggrieved by the impugned order, the appropriate remedy was to approach the High Court which passed the order. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused, establishing the principle that allegations regarding unauthorized compromise orders passed by counsel should appropriately be raised first before the same court that recorded the order.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner challenge a compromise order passed by the High Court directly before the Supreme Court on the ground of lack of counsel's instructions?
  • What is the appropriate forum for a party aggrieved by a consent or compromise order alleging lack of instruction to counsel?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Gul Hasan & Co. and 5 others vs Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited, Quetta1994 SCMR 18 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-12
  leave to appealjurisdictionretroactive operationprocedural lawbanking recoveryspecial court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the jurisdictional implications of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) (Amendment) Act, 1992. The core legal question presented for examination is whether the change in jurisdiction introduced by the 1992 Amendment Act was merely procedural in nature and thus operated retroactively, thereby rendering proceedings before a Special Court, established under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 and presided over by a High Court Judge, as being without jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to address this specific issue of law. Pending the final adjudication of the appeal, the Court directed the petitioner to furnish fresh security for the decretal amount before the executing court, allowing the utilization of existing security provided under a previous order, subject to its sufficiency and satisfaction. The Court further ordered that the appeal be prepared for final disposal within a period of two months.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the change in jurisdiction brought about by the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) (Amendment) Act, 1992 was procedural and operated retroactively?
  • Did the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) (Amendment) Act, 1992 render proceedings before a Special Court presided over by a High Court Judge without jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Anjum Farooq Piracha vs Waqar Zafar Chauhan alias Wikki and 2 others1994 SCMR 1230 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-29
  bail cancellationmurderfirearm injuriesabuse of bail concessionmisreading of record
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave is directed against an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a petition for the cancellation of bail granted to the respondents by the Additional Sessions Judge in a case involving murder and attempt to commit murder within court premises. The core legal question revolves around whether the High Court misread the record and misapplied the law in refusing to interfere with the bail-granting order. The Supreme Court held that the Additional Sessions Judge failed to consider material facts, including firearm injuries inflicted by the respondents and the quashment of the cross-case, and that the respondents had abused the concession of bail by engaging in subsequent criminal conduct. The Supreme Court consequently allowed the appeal, set aside the lower court orders, and cancelled the bail granted to the respondents, laying down that the abuse of bail through subsequent criminal acts during the pendency of proceedings warrants the forfeiture of the concession of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court misread the record and misapplied the law in refusing to interfere with the grant of bail?
  • Does the commission of subsequent offenses during bail amount to an abuse of the concession of bail?
  • Whether bail can be cancelled when the accused are charged with an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Aman And 3 Other vs Fida Muhammad And S Other1994 PLD Supreme Court 331 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-10
  redemption of mortgagemortgaged landlimitation periodjurisdiction of civil courtstay of suitspecial statuterevenue authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court upholding the reversal of a trial court decree by the 1st Appellate Court in a property dispute. The core legal question was whether a civil suit for a declaration regarding the extinction of a mortgage due to the expiry of the limitation period is maintainable when an application for redemption under special legislation is already pending before the revenue authorities. The Supreme Court held that the West Pakistan Redemption and Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, 1964 is a special statute, and where an application for redemption has been made to the Collector under the Act, the civil court's jurisdiction to entertain a claim is barred until the Collector renders a decision under sections 5 and 6 of the Act. The Court laid down the principle that in such circumstances, the appropriate course for the Civil Court is to stay the proceedings of the civil suit until the competent revenue authority decides the pending redemption petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil suit for declaration regarding redemption of mortgaged property is maintainable while an application for redemption under the West Pakistan Redemption and Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, 1964 is pending before the Collector?
  • Does the jurisdiction of the civil court bar the entertainment of a mortgage claim until a decision is given by the Collector under sections 5 and 6 of the West Pakistan Redemption and Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, 1964?
  • What is the appropriate course of action for a Civil Court when a redemption petition under the West Pakistan Redemption and Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, 1964 is already pending before the revenue authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• Makroo alias Chahat vs Haji Shah Muhammad and 9 others1994 SCMR 496 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-28
  interim injunctiontemporary injunctionmesne profitssecurity for costscivil revisiondeclaration of ownership
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves civil appeals against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had granted interim injunctions in favor of the plaintiffs-respondents in suits for declaration of ownership of land. The trial court and the District Judge had previously dismissed the applications for temporary injunctions. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the interim injunctions were properly granted in the circumstances of the case, given that the rights of the parties had not been previously adjudicated. Upon hearing the parties, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals only partly. The Court held that while the interim injunctions could be maintained, they must be made subject to the condition that the respondents furnish adequate security for mesne profits to the satisfaction of the trial court. The Court also declined to entertain contempt petitions at this stage, noting that such proceedings would be premature and potentially prejudicial to the merits of the ongoing litigation, with liberty granted to the parties to pursue such remedies upon the conclusion of the main suit if a case is established.

  Questions settled

  • Can an interim injunction be granted subject to the condition of furnishing security for mesne profits?
  • Is it appropriate to initiate contempt of court proceedings while the main litigation regarding property ownership is still pending?
  Read full judgment →
• Maj. (Retd.) Ejaz Ahmad vs Khalid Mahmood Sindhu1994 SCMR 449 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-20
  civil procedureinterim injunctionalienation of propertyconstruction at own riskSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning a dispute over a plot of land and ongoing construction thereon during the pendency of a suit. The core legal question involves the necessity of protecting the subject matter of the suit by restraining the respondent from alienating the disputed property and holding any construction raised after the institution of the suit and notice to be at his own risk. The Court, upon noting the absence of the respondent despite proper service of notice, converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it to the limited extent of issuing an interim order. The holding establishes that pending the determination of the suit, any construction made by the respondent shall be at his own risk and he is restrained from alienating the disputed property, while expressly leaving the merits open for further argument should the respondent subsequently appear and show satisfactory cause.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition be converted into an appeal when the respondent fails to appear despite proper service of notice?
  • Whether an interim order can be issued against a party raising construction and alienating property during the pendency of a suit?
  • Does the Supreme Court grant interim relief regarding disputed property while leaving the merits of the case open for future argument?
  Read full judgment →
• Maj, (Retd.) Mian Badshah vs Major (Retd.) Bahadur Shah1994 SCMR 384 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-04-17
  Jirga decisionArbitration awardArbitration Act 1940Costs of suitDiscretion of courtRecovery suitCustomary law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a suit for the recovery of money based on a Jirga decision. The core legal question was whether the Jirga decision constituted an arbitration award under the Arbitration Act, 1940, necessitating it to be made a rule of court, and whether the High Court correctly awarded costs after the trial court had denied them. The Supreme Court held that the Jirga decision did not qualify as an arbitration award under the Arbitration Act, 1940, because the parties were acting according to custom rather than the statute. Consequently, the decree for recovery was upheld. Regarding costs, the Court ruled that while the trial court failed to record reasons for denying costs as required by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the denial itself was justified given the complexity of the legal controversy regarding the Jirga's status. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order for costs, restoring the trial court's original order that parties bear their own costs, thereby establishing that discretion in awarding costs is appropriate when legal issues are genuinely debatable.

  Questions settled

  • Does a decision rendered by a Jirga based on custom constitute an arbitration award under the Arbitration Act, 1940?
  • Is a court required to record reasons when it directs that costs shall not follow the event under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
  • Can an appellate court award costs when the trial court's denial of costs was not challenged in the appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Mahmood Ahmad and others vs Muhammad Aslam and others1994 SCMR 1143 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-04
  leave to appealcriminal appealocular evidencesafe administration of criminal justiceconviction alterationmurderappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns cross-petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had modified the convictions of the accused persons. The prosecution alleged that the accused, armed with weapons, attacked the complainant and others, resulting in the death of one victim and injuries to several others, motivated by a prior case registered against the brother of one of the accused. The trial court had convicted the accused under sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. On appeal, the High Court acquitted one accused and altered the conviction of the remaining two from section 302/34 to section 304 Part-I read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, reducing their sentences. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the arguments regarding the reliability of ocular evidence, the alleged misreading of evidence by the lower courts, and the propriety of the conviction alteration, determined that the High Court's judgment contained features requiring further judicial scrutiny. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal in both petitions to ensure the principles of safe administration of criminal justice were duly observed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court's alteration of a conviction from section 302 to section 304 Part-I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 warrant a grant of leave to appeal by the Supreme Court?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal to examine whether the principles of safe administration of criminal justice were observed in the evaluation of ocular evidence by the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• M.R. Khalid vs Chief Secretary, Punjab and another1994 SCMR 1633 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-19
  date of birthcivil servantretirementservice tribunaldeclaratory decreeacquiescence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal concerning the correction of his date of birth and retirement order. The petitioner, who joined the Provincial Civil Service on 19-8-1955 with a self-declared date of birth of 2-6-1930, was retired upon reaching the age of 60 years on 1-6-1990. Prior to retirement, he obtained a declaratory decree from an Additional District Judge fixing his date of birth as 2-6-1933, in a suit against the University of the Punjab to which the Government was not a party. Armed with this decree, he sought correction of his service record, which the Government and subsequently the Service Tribunal rejected due to his prolonged acquiescence and failure to object during his 35-year service career. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's prolonged silence and failure to challenge his recorded date of birth in periodic gradation lists disentitled him to a favourable exercise of discretion by the Government, and a decree obtained in a suit where the Government was not a party did not bind it. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant can seek correction of his date of birth at the fag end of his service after decades of acquiescence?
  • Does a declaratory decree regarding a date of birth obtained in a suit where the Government was not a party bind the Provincial Government?
  • Can a civil servant challenge the rejection of a representation regarding his date of birth before the Service Tribunal successfully after remaining silent over his recorded birth date in periodic gradation lists?
  Read full judgment →
• M.H. Mirza vs Ferderation of Pakistan through Secretary, Cabinet1994 SCMR 1024 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-09
  pension benefitspremature retirementmaster and servantconstitutional petitionlachesnon-pensionable postservice matters
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan examines whether the appellant, a former employee of the Capital Development Authority (CDA), was entitled to pension benefits on the analogy of the case Muhammad Masihuzzaman v. Federation of Pakistan. The appellant had served in the CDA on a temporary, non-pensionable post and sought premature retirement in 1980 while on leave preparatory to retirement. Subsequently, the CDA promulgated pension regulations in 1981, which the appellant sought to invoke after attempting to rejoin service. The High Court dismissed his constitutional petition on grounds of laches and lack of merits. The Supreme Court held that the CDA's rules and regulations lack statutory basis, rendering a constitutional petition incompetent under the principle of master and servant. Furthermore, the Court held that the appellant held a non-pensionable post, earned full gratuity, and could not claim pension benefits under the 1981 Regulations since he did not fulfill the essential conditions of service. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Constitution petition is competent against a statutory corporation governed by the principle of master and servant in the absence of statutory rules?
  • Does the adoption of government rules by reference lend a statutory cover or content to the rules of the Capital Development Authority?
  • Whether an employee holding a non-pensionable post can claim the benefit of subsequent pension regulations without fulfilling the required qualifying service and conditions?
  • How does the concept of laches apply in service matters when invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court after a prolonged delay?
  Read full judgment →
• M.D. Tahir, Advocate vs Lahore High Court through Registrar1994 SCMR 1507 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-09
  writ petitionsecurity depositconstitutional jurisdictioncondition precedentSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through a petition challenging the condition of deposit of security imposed by a judge as a condition precedent for taking further proceedings in a writ petition. The core legal question was whether a court can lawfully impose a security deposit condition to proceed with a writ petition. The Supreme Court held that the condition of deposit of security was without lawful authority and unwarranted in law. Consequently, the court accepted the writ petition, establishing the principle that imposing arbitrary financial conditions for pursuing constitutional remedies in writ petitions is legally impermissible.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court impose a security deposit as a condition precedent for taking further proceedings in a writ petition?
  • Is the imposition of a security deposit for pursuing a writ petition warranted in law?
  Read full judgment →
• Liaquat Ali vs Mst. Bashiran Bibi and another1994 SCMR 1729 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-26
  post-arrest bailbail for womenleave to appealstatutory exceptionoffence of zinadiscretionary order
  Summary & questions settled

  Liaquat Ali petitioned for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court dated 20-10-1993, which granted post-arrest bail to Mst. Bashiran Bibi respondent in a criminal case registered under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The High Court had granted bail on the basis that the respondent, being a woman, fell within the protective ambit of the first proviso to section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Upon hearing the petitioner's counsel, the Supreme Court of Pakistan found no valid ground to interfere with the discretionary bail order passed by the High Court. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the exercise of judicial discretion in favor of the female accused under the statutory exception.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a woman accused of an offence under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 is covered by the first proviso to section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with a discretionary order of the High Court granting bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Liaquat Ali Memon and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others1994 PLD Supreme Court 556 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-09
  locus poenitentiaeCentral Superior Servicesoccupational group allocationcivil service trainingreversion of civil servantsFederal Service Tribunalvested right
  Summary & questions settled

  This case concerns three petitions for leave to appeal arising from a common judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which set aside government orders reverting certain civil servants to their originally allocated Central Superior Services (CSS) groups after they had been reallocated to preferred groups by the Prime Minister and completed their training. The core legal question was whether the Government possessed the locus poenitentiae under section 21 of the General Clauses Act to recall or cancel the reallocation orders once acted upon and after the completion of training, and whether third-party candidates appearing in subsequent examinations could claim reallocation based on those vacancies. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the Tribunal was justified in upholding the reallocations and setting aside the reversions based on the doctrine of locus poenitentiae and completed training, while also ruling that third-party petitioners had no vested right to claim group reallocations based on subsequent competitive examinations without statutory backing. The key principle laid down is that once an executive order regarding occupational group allocation is acted upon and the officer completes training, creating a vested right, the principle of locus poenitentiae bars the Government from unilaterally recalling or reversing the allocation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Government have the power of locus poenitentiae to recall an occupational group allocation order after it has been acted upon and the civil servant has completed training?
  • Can a candidate appearing in a subsequent Central Superior Services examination claim reallocation to a different service group as a matter of right without statutory backing?
  • Are third-party candidates entitled to intervene in service appeals concerning the group allocations of other officers when they do not hold the specific posts in question?
  Read full judgment →
• Liaquat Ali Memon And Other vs Federation of Pakistan And Others1994 PLC (C.S.) 946 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-09
  occupational groupslocus poenitentiaecivil servicereversionCSS examinationvested rightFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from petitions for leave to appeal filed against the orders of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had set aside the Government's reversion of certain civil servants to their originally allocated occupational groups. The core legal question pertained to whether the Government had the locus poenitentiae to recall or recede from its earlier orders reallocating occupational groups after the officers had completed their training. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that once the reallocation orders had been acted upon and training completed, the Government lacked the power under section 21 of the General Clauses Act to recall those orders, as a vested right had been created in favour of the officers. Furthermore, the Court observed that administrative instructions barring the change of occupational groups aim to prevent the wastage of public resources and maintain smooth governance, and that candidates have no inherent right to alter their final group preferences or claim reallocation based on subsequent examinations without statutory backing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Government has the power of locus poenitentiae to recall an order of occupational group reallocation after it has been acted upon and training completed?
  • Does success in the Central Superior Services examination confer an absolute right to appointment or reallocation to a desired service group?
  • Can a civil servant claim reallocation of an occupational group on the basis of a subsequent competitive examination after having already completed training in a previously allocated group?
  Read full judgment →
• Liaquat Ali Memon And Other vs Federation of Pakistan And Other1994 PLD Supreme Court 556 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-09
  locus poenitentiaecivil serviceoccupational groupscentral superior servicesreallocation of groupsservice tribunalvested right
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from three petitions for leave to appeal directed against judgments of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had set aside Government orders reverting certain civil servants to their originally allocated Central Superior Services groups after they had undergone training in reallocated groups following representations to the Prime Minister. The core legal questions involved whether the Government possessed the power of locus poenitentiae under section 21 of the General Clauses Act to recall or alter occupational group allocations once acted upon and whether third parties who were not parties to the service appeals could claim reallocation based on subsequent examinations without statutory backing. The Supreme Court held that once orders allocating service groups had been acted upon and training completed, a vested right was created and the Government lacked the power to recede or recall the appointment orders under the doctrine of locus poenitentiae. Furthermore, third-party petitioners could not claim reallocation of groups in the absence of enabling statutory rules and in light of established policy prohibiting changes of occupational groups. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Government has the power of locus poenitentiae under section 21 of the General Clauses Act to recall or alter occupational group allocations of civil servants once acted upon?
  • Does success in the Central Superior Services examination confer an absolute right to appointment or reallocation to a specific occupational group?
  • Can third parties who were not impleaded in service tribunal appeals claim reallocation of service groups based on subsequent competitive examinations without statutory rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Liaqat vs The State1994 SCMR 1161 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-04-21
  right of private defenceculpable homicideexceeding right of self-defencerisk of harm to innocent personscriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, later altered by the High Court to Section 304 Part-I, regarding the killing of two individuals. The appellant, Liaqat, intervened during an altercation where his father was being beaten by the complainant party. The High Court had held that while the appellant had a right of private defence to rescue his father, he had exceeded that right by killing the two deceased persons. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the appellant’s actions fell within the scope of Section 106 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which provides protection when the right of private defence cannot be exercised without risk of harm to innocent persons. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was in a situation where he could not effectively exercise his right of self-defence without risking harm to those surrounding his father. Consequently, the Court acquitted the appellant, establishing the principle that an accused is not required to measure their defensive actions in golden scales when acting under immediate threat to life.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right of private defence extend to situations where an accused cannot effectively defend themselves without risking harm to innocent persons?
  • Is an accused required to measure their defensive actions in golden scales when acting under an immediate threat to life?
  • Does the killing of bystanders during an attempt to rescue a relative from a violent assault fall under the protection of Section 106 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Liaqat Ali vs The State and another1994 SCMR 691 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-24
  bail cancellationpost-arrest bailsudden occurrencejudicial discretionpremeditationcriminal law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which set aside the bail previously granted to the petitioner by an Additional Sessions Judge. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in cancelling bail by distinguishing the circumstances of the case from precedent, specifically regarding the 'suddenness' of the occurrence. The petitioner argued that the incident was a sudden fight, potentially attracting Section 308 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while the High Court found that the accused had come prepared to avenge a previous incident, thereby negating the element of suddenness. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the High Court had properly distinguished the facts from the cited precedent and that its reasoning regarding the absence of suddenness was sound. The Court affirmed that bail cancellation is appropriate where the circumstances, such as premeditation or specific intent to avenge, contradict the claim of a sudden, unplanned occurrence, justifying the exercise of judicial discretion to deny bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in cancelling bail when the circumstances of the case contradict the claim of a sudden occurrence?
  • Does the presence of a prior motive to avenge an insult negate the plea of a sudden fight for the purpose of bail?
  • Can the High Court distinguish a precedent case based on the specific factual circumstances of the current incident?
  Read full judgment →
• Lassa Sheikh and anothers vs Mateen Hameed1994 SCMR 369 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-06-19
  property disputeallotment of landtransfer of propertycivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment concerning a property dispute over a plot of land. The core legal question involved the validity of the transfer of a plot originally allotted to a third party, Shaukat Hussain, in 1962, and subsequently purchased by the respondent. The petitioner, claiming entitlement as a refugee from Jammu and Kashmir in possession of the plot, sought a declaration that the initial transfer to Shaukat Hussain was void and illegal. The trial court dismissed the petitioner's suit and decreed the respondent's suit for possession, which was upheld on appeal and in civil revision. The Supreme Court held that the respondent possessed a valid title to the property. The Court observed that the petitioner's application for transfer had been rejected, and the petitioner failed to challenge that rejection at the appropriate time. Consequently, the Court found no infirmity in the impugned orders and determined that no point of law of public importance existed to warrant interference. The petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does a petitioner have standing to challenge a property transfer if their own application for the same property was previously rejected and not appealed?
  • Is a purchaser of a plot from a valid transferee entitled to possession against a claimant whose application for transfer was rejected?
  • Does a civil revision require a point of law of public importance for the Supreme Court to grant leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Land Acquisition Officer and Collector and others vs Qalandar Khan1994 SCMR 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-20
  land acquisitionlimitation periodconsent ordercompensation assessmentstatutory compensationcomplete justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which had dismissed the petitioners' appeal against a District Judge's decree in a land acquisition matter. The core legal question was whether the limitation period for filing an appeal against a judgment and decree awarding compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, should be computed from the date of the original decree or from a subsequent date when a consent order awarded additional statutory compensation. The Supreme Court held that the limitation period for the appeal against the original judgment and decree commenced from the date of that decree, not the subsequent consent order. The Court reasoned that the consent order did not merge with the original decree in a manner that would extend the limitation period, particularly as no appeal could be filed against a consent order. Furthermore, the Court declined to exercise its discretionary power to issue directions for 'complete justice' under the Constitution, finding the lower court's assessment of compensation based on documentary evidence to be fair and just. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does a subsequent consent order modifying a decree extend the limitation period for filing an appeal against the original judgment and decree?
  • Can an appeal be filed against a consent order passed by a court?
  • Does the Supreme Court's power to do complete justice under Article 187 of the Constitution allow it to override statutory limitation periods for appeals?
  Read full judgment →
• Lal Din vs Bashir Ahmad and 5 others1994 SCMR 454 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-23
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryconflicting FIRsgrave and sudden provocationmurderleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a High Court order granting bail to respondents Nos. 1 to 5, who were accused of the murder of Muhammad Aslam. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in granting bail given the conflicting versions of the incident presented in two separate First Information Reports (F.I.R.). The petitioner's F.I.R. alleged a premeditated assault, while the respondents' version, supported by an earlier F.I.R. lodged by the prosecutrix, alleged that the deceased was killed following a provocation arising from an attempted rape. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the existence of two competing F.I.R.s, the earlier timing of the prosecutrix's report, and the corroborating medical evidence collectively established a case for further inquiry into the guilt of the accused. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution's case is countered by a plausible, earlier-in-time version of events supported by medical evidence, the matter warrants further inquiry, thereby justifying the grant of bail pending trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of two conflicting First Information Reports regarding the same incident constitute grounds for further inquiry in bail proceedings?
  • Is the timing of a First Information Report a relevant factor in determining the entitlement to bail?
  • Can medical evidence corroborating an earlier-in-time First Information Report justify the grant of bail to the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Lal Din alias Lalu and anothers vs The State1994 MLD 1414 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-16
  murderspeedy trialspot arrestmedical evidenceocular accountballistic matchcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Special Court for Speedy Trials, Multan, convicting the appellants under section 302(b)/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Saleh Muhammad in the premises of the District Courts. The core legal question involved the sufficiency of ocular and circumstantial evidence, the legality of proving medical evidence through a dispenser when the medical officer had gone abroad, and the credibility of immediate spot-arrests with crime weapons. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the presence of natural eye-witnesses, prompt FIR, corroborative ballistic reports, and the immediate apprehension of the appellants at the scene with their respective weapons conclusively established their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the Court held that the post-mortem report was legally proven through a dispenser who was personally acquainted with the handwriting and absence of the medical officer. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, upholding the conviction and sentences.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of a dispenser can be relied upon to prove a post-mortem report when the examining medical officer has left the country?
  • Does the immediate apprehension of an accused at the scene of crime along with the crime weapon furnish sufficient corroboration to an ocular account?
  • Whether the presence of close relatives and friends as eye-witnesses at court premises during criminal litigation is considered natural and reliable?
  Read full judgment →
• Khyber Insurance Company Ltd. vs Pakistan National Shipping1994 PLD Supreme Court 725 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-31
  fixation of fair rentterminus a quoappellate powersSindh Rented Premises OrdinanceCode of Civil Procedurepowers of appellate courtrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh regarding the fixation of fair rent under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether an appellate authority/judge in chambers could modify the operative date (terminus a quo) for the payment of fair rent from December, 1990 (as ordered by the Rent Controller) to the date of the rent application, in favor of a respondent who had not filed any appeal against the Rent Controller's order. The Supreme Court held that the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as a whole is not applicable to proceedings under the Ordinance, and the powers under Order XLI, Rule 33 C.P.C. cannot be invoked to alter the date to the detriment of the appellant when no cross-appeal or objection was filed by the respondent. Furthermore, section 21 of the Ordinance does not empower the appellate authority to grant unappealed relief involving substantial monetary liability. The appeal was allowed and the Rent Controller's original date of December, 1990 was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate authority under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, can substitute the operative date for the payment of fair rent in favor of a respondent who did not file an appeal or objection against the Rent Controller's order?
  • Does the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 apply as a whole to proceedings under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Can the provisions of Order XLI, Rule 33, C.P.C. be invoked in rent proceedings to grant relief on an unappealed issue involving substantial monetary liability?
  • Whether the Rent Controller is competent to order the payment of fair rent from the date of the order when the governing statute does not specify the date from which fair rent is payable?
  Read full judgment →
• Khushal Khan vs Rao Nawaz and 4 others1994 SCMR 814 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-22
  pre-emptionfinal judgment and decreeabatement of pre-emption suitsIslamic law of pre-emptionrevisionwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a writ petition against orders in a pre-emption matter. The petitioner had instituted a pre-emption suit in 1973 regarding agricultural land. After several rounds of litigation through revenue authorities, the Board of Revenue ultimately remanded and decreed the suit in favor of the petitioner in 1992, which was subsequently set aside by the High Court. The core legal question was whether a pending pre-emption suit where the plaintiff's suit had originally been dismissed could be decreed by relying on Section 34 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, following the lapse of the old pre-emption laws pursuant to the Shariat Appellate Jurisdiction's ruling in Said Kamal Shah's case. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that under the authoritative interpretation established in Rozi Khan v. Syed Karim Shah, the phrase 'judgments and decrees passed by the Courts have become final' in pre-emption saving provisions refers strictly to judgments and decrees wherein the pre-emptor's suit was decreed. The Court affirmed that pending proceedings where the suit stood dismissed are not saved in favor of the pre-emptor, thereby distinguishing Muhammad Sharif v. Muhammad Sharif.

  Questions settled

  • What is the legal meaning of the words 'judgments and decrees passed by the Courts have become final' under pre-emption saving provisions?
  • Does Section 34 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991 protect a pre-emption suit where the plaintiff's suit was originally dismissed by the trial court?
  • How does the cessation of old pre-emption laws pursuant to Said Kamal Shah's case affect pending pre-emption litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Khurshid Ahmed Goreja vs The Appellate Authority through Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and 2 others1994 SCMR 1654 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-04-20
  civil servantService Tribunal jurisdictionpermanent absorptionretirement benefitsstatutory bodylien termination
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former employee of the Pakistan Council of Appropriate Technology (PCAT), challenged a Federal Service Tribunal judgment that dismissed his appeal against a demotion order for lack of jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the petitioner retained the status of a 'civil servant' under the relevant service laws, thereby invoking the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal, despite having previously retired from his original position in the Telephone and Telegraph Department. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had severed his ties with the civil service upon his retirement in 1982, after which he was permanently absorbed into the ATDO (later PCAT). Consequently, he did not hold the status of a civil servant at the time of the impugned disciplinary order. The Court upheld the Tribunal's finding that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The key principle laid down is that an individual who has retired from the civil service and accepted pensionary benefits, subsequently serving in a statutory body, does not retain the status of a civil servant for the purposes of Service Tribunal jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employee who retires from the civil service and accepts pensionary benefits retain the status of a civil servant while employed by a statutory body?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to hear an appeal filed by an employee who is not a civil servant?
  • Does permanent absorption into a statutory body after retirement from the civil service constitute a continuation of civil service status?
  Read full judgment →
• Khursheed Ahmed vs Chairman, Pakistan Telecommunication1994 PLC (C.S.) 293 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-08-03
  service tribunalmove-overcompulsory retirementextraordinary leaveback benefitsannual confidential reportssupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal concerning the effective date of his move-over following reinstatement into service. The petitioner, formerly an Assistant Engineer in the T&T Department, was compulsorily retired, but the Tribunal earlier converted the penalty into the stoppage of three increments. Upon reinstatement without back benefits and treating the intervening period as extraordinary leave without pay, the petitioner claimed entitlement to a move-over from an earlier date. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to claim a move-over and intervening increments during the period of retirement and subsequent extraordinary leave without pay. The Supreme Court held that the petition was devoid of merit, affirming that a break in service and extraordinary leave disentitle an employee from earning increments during that period, and that the requisite formula for move-over, including consecutive favourable annual confidential reports, could not be satisfied during such leave. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee is entitled to earn increments during a period of break in service treated as extraordinary leave without pay?
  • Can an employee claim a move-over to a higher grade without fulfilling the required formula including consecutive favourable annual confidential reports?
  • Whether a previous unchallenged judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal acts as a closed transaction regarding the terms of reinstatement?
  Read full judgment →
• Khuda Bakhsh through Legal Heirs and 8 others vs Muhammad Din1994 SCMR 402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-12-09
  limited estatecustomary successionoccupancy tenancyappraisement of evidenceverified claimallotment of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal concerns the nature of land allotment made to a widow, Mst. Faji, against a verified claim received from India following the partition of the country. The core legal question was whether the property held by the widow constituted a 'limited estate' of her deceased husband or if she was the full owner. The trial and appellate courts had concurrently held that she was a full owner, primarily relying on her acts of mortgaging and redeeming the land. The Supreme Court set aside these findings, identifying three legal errors in the lower courts' appraisement of evidence: improperly shifting the burden to the appellants to produce pre-partition records from India, over-emphasizing post-partition documents, and failing to properly weigh creditworthy oral evidence. The Court held that the land tenure, being hereditary occupancy tenancy held by an agriculturist tribe, was governed by custom, under which the widow inherited only a limited estate. Consequently, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit, affirming the property was held as a limited estate.

  Questions settled

  • Does the act of a widow mortgaging and redeeming inherited land prove she is a full owner rather than a limited estate holder?
  • Is it legally permissible for courts to penalize parties for failing to produce pre-partition documentary evidence from India?
  • Does the hereditary occupancy tenancy of an agriculturist tribe indicate the applicability of custom to succession?
  Read full judgment →
• Khuda Bakhsh through his Legal Heirs vs Mst. Niaz Bibi and anothers1994 PLD Supreme Court 298 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-11
  past and closed transactionabatement of proceedingsMuslim Personal Lawcustomary lawexecution of decreedelivery of possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the High Court, which held that the suit filed by the appellants based on custom stood abated by virtue of section 2-A of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983. The core legal question was whether the delivery of possession of the suit land pursuant to a decree during the pendency of a second appeal, and in the absence of a stay order, constitutes a 'past and closed transaction' exempt from abatement under the proviso to section 2-A(c) of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the pendency of the appeal keeps the dispute alive, and the execution and delivery of possession remain subject to the ultimate result of the appellate proceedings and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to restitution. The key principle laid down is that the execution of a decree and delivery of possession during a pending appeal do not render the matter a past and closed transaction so as to bar the abatement provisions of section 2-A(c) of the Ordinance.

  Questions settled

  • Does the execution of a decree and delivery of possession during the pendency of an appeal constitute a past and closed transaction under section 2-A of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983?
  • Whether the absence of a stay order from an appellate court affects the abatement of pending proceedings under section 2-A(c) of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983?
  • Does the pendency of an appeal keep the dispute alive despite the execution of the underlying decree?
  Read full judgment →
• Khawaja Abdul Khaliq vs Water and Power Development Authority1994 PLC (C.S.) 776 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-17
  disciplinary actionservice tribunalunauthorized electricity connectionquestion of factleave to appealreversion in rank
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Line-Superintendent employed by the Water and Power Development Authority, was subjected to disciplinary action and reverted to a lower post for three years after being found guilty of unauthorizedly granting an electricity connection to a village. His departmental representation and subsequent appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal were both dismissed. In his petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, the petitioner did not dispute granting the connection without formal permission, but contended he acted under the verbal orders of the Sub-Divisional Officer, who was exonerated in separate departmental proceedings. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner acted under the valid orders of the Sub-Divisional Officer, which was determined to be a pure question of fact. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's contention did not raise any substantial question of law of public importance. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal, finalizing the penalty imposed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a claim of acting under verbal orders of a superior officer raise a substantial question of law of public importance in service matters?
  • Whether a factual determination by service tribunals regarding departmental misconduct warrants interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Can an employee escape disciplinary liability for an unauthorized act by asserting verbal instructions that are denied by the superior officer?
  Read full judgment →
• Khawaja Abdul Khaliq vs Water and Power Development Authority1994 SCMR 965 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-17
  service matterdepartmental inquiryreversion in rankunauthorized electricity connectionleave to appealquestion of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a Line-Superintendent against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which upheld his departmental reversion for unauthorizedly granting an electricity connection. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner acted under the verbal orders of the Sub-Divisional Officer, presenting a pure question of fact. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioner admitted to giving the connection without permission from the competent authority, and the Sub-Divisional Officer did not support the petitioner's assertion of having received verbal orders. Furthermore, the contention raised no substantial question of law of public importance. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the disciplinary action and the Tribunal's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does a defense of acting under verbal orders of a superior officer raise a substantial question of law of public importance?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent factual findings of departmental authorities and the Service Tribunal regarding unauthorized acts?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan Muhammad vs Sh. Muhammad Akram1994 SCMR 1711 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-31
  review petitionlimitationSupreme Court Rulescounsel representationcondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for review of a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Civil Appeal No. 1051 of 1990, which was barred by 29 days and filed by a new advocate who did not represent the petitioner during the hearing of the appeal. The core legal question is whether a review petition can be entertained when filed by a counsel who did not appear at the hearing of the original appeal, in violation of the applicable rules, and accompanied by a time-barred application without satisfactory justification for waiving procedural requirements. The court held that the petition violates Rule 6 of Order XXVI of the Pakistan Supreme Court Rules, and since no satisfactory justification was made out to waive the requirement, the petition stands dismissed. The key principle laid down is that review petitions must strictly comply with procedural rules regarding representation, and failure to provide sufficient justification for non-compliance or delay warrants dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a review petition can be filed by an advocate who did not appear at the hearing of the original appeal under the Pakistan Supreme Court Rules?
  • Is a review petition barred by time and violating procedural rules liable to be dismissed without satisfactory justification for waiver?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalilur Rehman and another vs Secretary, Irrigation and Public1994 SCMR 1336 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-27
  ad hoc appointmentregularization of servicescivil servantsdepartmental promotioninitial recruitmentservice tribunalstop-gap arrangement
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, Peshawar, dismissing the appellants' service appeal. The core legal question was whether the regularization benefits granted by the N.-W.F.P. Civil Servants (Regulation of Services) Ordinance, 1987 (and subsequently the North-West Frontier Province Civil Servants (Regulation of Services) Act, 1988) apply to departmental promotees or are strictly restricted to direct ad hoc appointees. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory provisions for regularization of ad hoc appointments apply exclusively to initial direct recruitment pending selection through the Public Service Commission, and do not extend to civil servants who were promoted from a lower cadre on an ad hoc or officiating basis. The key principle laid down is that regularization statutes concerning ad hoc appointees target direct recruitment rather than internal departmental promotions governed by separate service rules and promotion quotas.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the benefits granted by the N.-W.F.P. Civil Servants (Regulation of Services) Ordinance, 1987 apply to departmental promotees or are limited to direct ad hoc appointees?
  • Does an officiating promotion from a lower cadre as a stop-gap arrangement constitute an ad hoc appointment eligible for regularization under the North-West Frontier Province Civil Servants (Regulation of Services) Act, 1988?
  • Do civil servants promoted on an ad hoc basis fall within the purview of regularization provisions intended for initial recruitments under provincial service legislation?
  Read full judgment →
• Khali Lur-Rehman And Another vs Secretary, Irrigation and Public1994 PLC (C.S.) 972 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-27
  service tribunalad hoc appointmentregularization of servicescivil servantsdepartmental promoteesinitial recruitmentstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, filed with leave of the Court, challenges the judgment of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, Peshawar, which dismissed the appellants' service appeal regarding the regularization of their services. The appellants, serving as Civil Engineers and holding posts as acting Sub-Divisional Officers (S.D.O.s) as a stop-gap arrangement, sought regularization under the North-West Frontier Province Civil Servants (Regulation of Services) Act, 1988. The core legal question was whether the statutory benefits of regularization granted to provincial ad hoc employees under the 1988 Act applied to departmental promotees or were restricted solely to direct initial ad hoc appointees. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of the 1988 Act applied exclusively to persons appointed on an ad hoc basis through initial direct recruitment and did not cover civil servants promoted from a lower cadre on an ad hoc basis. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, upholding the decision of the Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the regularization benefits granted under the North-West Frontier Province Civil Servants (Regulation of Services) Act, 1988 apply to departmental promotees or are restricted only to direct ad hoc appointees?
  • Does an ad hoc appointment under the North-West Frontier Province Civil Servants Act, 1973 include promotions made from a lower cadre?
  • Are civil servants who are promoted to officiate on an ad hoc basis covered by the provisions of the North-West Frontier Province Civil Servants (Regulation of Services) Act, 1988?
  Read full judgment →
• Khairullah and another vs The State1994 SCMR 1066 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-11
  criminal appealmurderocular evidencecorroborationballistic reportchain of custodydeath sentenceremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence imposed for murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns whether the positive report of a Fire-arms Expert provides sufficient corroboration to the ocular evidence of inimical witnesses, given significant procedural lapses in the handling of crime evidence, specifically regarding the sealing of parcels, the custody of weapons, and the failure to analyze bullets recovered from the deceased. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's case suffered from inherent defects and missing links that rendered the existing record insufficient to sustain the conviction. Consequently, the Court set aside the judgments of the trial court and the High Court and remanded the case for further evidence. The key principle laid down is that when ocular evidence is provided by inimical witnesses, independent corroboration is mandatory. Procedural irregularities in the recovery and forensic chain of custody create reasonable doubt, and the court must ensure these gaps are clarified through the examination of relevant witnesses before adjudicating capital cases.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to send all recovered bullets for forensic analysis constitute a fatal flaw in the prosecution's case?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the chain of custody for crime weapons and empties is broken or unclear?
  • Is it the duty of the trial court to ensure that procedural gaps in the recovery of evidence are clarified through the examination of relevant witnesses?
  • Does the positive report of a Fire-arms Expert provide sufficient corroboration to ocular evidence when the recovery process is marred by procedural irregularities?
  Read full judgment →
• Major Zafar Iqbal vs Mst. Rehmat Jan and another1994 SCMR 339 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-24
  minor custodywelfare of the minorGuardians and Wards Actmaternal-grandmother custodyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court which handed over the custody of minor Shahbaz Zafar to his maternal-grandmother, respondent No. 1, on the ground of the minor's welfare. The core legal question involved the determination of custody of the minor among the father, mother, and maternal-grandmother, considering the fitness of the parents and the paramount consideration of the minor's welfare. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly adjudged the maternal-grandmother as the best person to have custody since the mother was residing in London and the father, with a second wife and children, was stationed in Somalia, making both parents unfit for custody under the circumstances. The key principle laid down is that while determining the custody of a minor, the paramount and primary consideration before the court is the welfare of the minor.

  Questions settled

  • What is the primary and paramount consideration while deciding the custody of a minor?
  • Whether the maternal-grandmother can be granted custody of a minor when both parents are considered unfit?
  • Does a father residing abroad with a second family have a preferential right to custody over a maternal-grandmother who has continuously cared for the minor?
  Read full judgment →
• Khadim Hussain vs Director, Public Instructions (Schools) Punjab, Lahore And Another1994 PLC (C.S.) 342 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-23
  compulsory retirementmisappropriationnegligence of dutydepartmental inquiryreinstatementback benefitsservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal which dismissed the appellant's appeal against an order of compulsory retirement and recovery of Rs.4,250. The appellant, a Secondary School Teacher entrusted with managing litigation for the Education Department, was accused of misappropriating funds collected for filing a writ petition and of negligence in pursuing the litigation, which led to the eviction of a school. The Enquiry Officer exonerated the appellant of misappropriation but found him negligent, whereas the competent authority reversed this, finding him guilty of misappropriation but not of negligence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the Service Tribunal failed to apply its mind to the evidence and the conflicting findings. Upon review, the Court found no concrete evidence to support either charge. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the penalties, and ordered the appellant's reinstatement in service with all back benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a departmental authority impose a penalty based on a charge of misappropriation for which the Enquiry Officer exonerated the accused, without any supporting evidence on the record?
  • Whether the Service Tribunal is legally bound to independently analyze the evidence and address conflicting findings between an Enquiry Officer and the competent authority?
  • Can a civil servant be penalized for negligence in pursuing litigation in the absence of concrete evidence establishing such negligence?
  Read full judgment →
• Khadim Hussain vs Director, Public Instruction (Schools) Punjab, Lahore and another1994 SCMR 418 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-23
  service tribunalcompulsory retirementdepartmental inquirymisappropriationnegligencereinstatementback benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court challenges the order of the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, which dismissed the appellant's appeal against the imposition of compulsory retirement and recovery of money by the departmental authority. The core legal question concerned whether the imposition of penalties for misappropriation and negligence was sustainable when the inquiry officer had exonerated the appellant of misappropriation and found no concrete evidence supporting the charges. The Supreme Court held that there was no evidence on record to establish either the charge of misappropriation or the alleged negligence in pursuing the departmental litigation. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the departmental penalty and tribunal's order were set aside, and the appellant was ordered to be reinstated with all back benefits. The key principle laid down is that disciplinary penalties cannot be sustained by an authority or tribunal in the absence of tangible evidence supporting the specific charges, particularly when the inquiry officer has found no proof of culpability.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a departmental authority can find an employee guilty of a charge from which the inquiry officer has exonerated them without supporting evidence?
  • Can a penalty of compulsory retirement and recovery of amount be sustained when there is no evidence of misappropriation or negligence on record?
  • What is the effect of a service tribunal failing to apply its mind to the material facts and objections raised in a service appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Kh. Saeedul Hassan, Ex-Additional District and Sessions Judge vs Government of the Punjab Through The Chief Secretary, Lahore1994 PLC (C.S.) 1113 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-10
  civil servantdisciplinary proceedingspersistent reputation of corruptiondepartmental inquirystandard of proofnatural justicepersonal hearingjudicial officer
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the dismissal of a civil servant, an Additional District and Sessions Judge, on charges including a persistent reputation of corruption. The core legal questions were whether the appellant was entitled to a second personal hearing when the competent authority disagreed with the designated hearing officer’s report, and whether proving a persistent reputation of being corrupt requires evidence of specific instances of bribery. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the designated officer committed jurisdictional and legal errors by applying the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt and requiring specific instances of corruption to substantiate the charge. The Court clarified that departmental inquiries require only reasonable and fair inferences based on the evidence, not the rigorous standards of criminal trials. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the Authority is not legally obligated to grant a fresh personal hearing simply because it disagrees with the designated officer's findings. The judgment establishes that persistent reputation is a general assessment of character by peers and the community, which does not necessitate proof of isolated, concrete acts of misconduct.

  Questions settled

  • Does the charge of having a persistent reputation of being corrupt require proof of specific instances of bribery in a departmental inquiry?
  • Is the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt applicable to departmental or administrative disciplinary proceedings?
  • Is the Authority required to grant a second personal hearing to a civil servant if it disagrees with the findings of the officer designated to conduct the initial personal hearing?
  • What is the scope of the role of an officer designated under Rule 8 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules 1975 to conduct a personal hearing?
  Read full judgment →
• Kamran Industry (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan through Regional Manager, Regional Office, Lahore and 2 others1994 SCMR 1970 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-16
  plaint rejectioncause of actionbanking jurisdictionspecial courtrecovery of loansCode of Civil Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which had rejected the petitioner's plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioner, a borrower, had filed a suit for declaration against a banking company, alleging that the loan agreement was illegal and that the bank had failed to release the full loan amount. The core legal question was whether the trial court correctly rejected the plaint for lack of cause of action based on documents produced by the defendant. The Supreme Court held that while the trial court erred in rejecting the plaint based on the defendant's documents—as the averments in the plaint must be presumed correct at that stage—the rejection was ultimately justified on different grounds. The Court ruled that the suit was barred by law under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979, which grants exclusive jurisdiction to Special Courts for claims arising out of loan transactions between banking companies and borrowers. Consequently, the Court affirmed the rejection of the plaint, noting that the petitioner's remedy lay before the Special Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court reject a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 based on documents produced by the defendant?
  • Does the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979 exclude the jurisdiction of ordinary Civil Courts in matters arising out of loan transactions?
  • Is a suit barred by law if it is filed in a Civil Court despite the existence of a Special Court under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Jewan and 7 others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Revenue, Islamabad and 2 others1994 SCMR 826 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-24
  rejection of plaintOrder VII Rule 11 C.P.C.temporary injunctioncause of actionres judicataabuse of processremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from an order of the Lahore High Court upholding the rejection of the appellants' plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1808 (C.P.C.) at the stage of deciding an application for temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. The core legal question was whether a trial court can reject a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 based on disputed assertions of the defendant, allegations of mala fides, or unproved res judicata, without confining itself to the contents of the plaint and documents admitted by the plaintiff. The Supreme Court held that the scope of Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. is distinct from Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. To reject a plaint before evidence is led, a court must strictly examine only the averments in the plaint and material admitted by the plaintiff. Unproved defense pleas or premature claims of res judicata cannot form the basis for non-suiting a plaintiff under Order VII, Rule 11. The appeal was allowed and the case remanded.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court reject a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the C.P.C. based on unproved allegations made in the defendant's written statement?
  • What is the distinction between examining material for temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 and rejecting a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the C.P.C.?
  • Is a trial court competent to dismiss a suit as barred by res judicata under Order VII, Rule 11 of the C.P.C. before the record of prior proceedings is formally proved?
  Read full judgment →