Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Bdul Karim vs Anwar and anothers1994 PLD Supreme Court 499 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-20
  leave to appealabduction for ransommurderconfessionrecovery of dead bodylast seenacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court whereby respondent No. 1 was acquitted of offences under sections 365-A and 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution case involved the alleged abduction of the petitioner's son by the respondent and others, a subsequent demand for ransom, the recovery of ransom notes, and the eventual discovery of the deceased's dead body from a quarter pointed out by the respondent. The trial court had convicted the respondent and sentenced him to imprisonment for life under both sections, but the High Court acquitted him on appeal. The petitioner contended before the Supreme Court that the lower appellate court misappreciated the evidence, particularly regarding the voluntary confession, the last-seen evidence, the recovery of ransom chits, and the pointing out and recovery of the dead body. The Supreme Court held that leave should be granted to reappraise the evidence for the proper and safe administration of criminal justice, laying down the principle that the apex court will review acquittals where evidence has been misappreciated.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal can be granted against an acquittal where evidence has allegedly been misappreciated?
  • Are recovery of incriminating chits, last-seen evidence, and pointing out a dead body sufficient to connect an accused to the crimes of abduction and murder?
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• Bazida through Legal Heirs and others vs Hussain Bakhsh through Legal1994 SCMR 1784 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-03
  pre-emptionTalabssuperior right of pre-emptionleave to appealcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing the petitioner's civil revision petition, which in turn upheld the dismissal of the petitioner's pre-emption suit by the lower courts. The core legal question concerns the maintainability of a pre-emption suit and the mandatory requirement of making demands (Talabs) under the relevant pre-emption law. The Supreme Court held that making Talabs is a condition precedent to the institution of a pre-emption suit, and failure to make such demands or to plead them in the plaint results in the extinguishment of the right of pre-emption. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts and dismissed the petition, ruling that suits cannot survive without fulfilling the statutory prerequisites of making Talabs as interpreted in established apex court jurisprudence.

  Questions settled

  • Are Talabs a condition precedent for the institution of a pre-emption suit?
  • Does the failure to make demands for pre-emption extinguish the right of pre-emption?
  • Can a pre-emption suit be maintained if the plaint does not specifically state that Talabs had been made?
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• Bashir Hussain Bokhari vs Secretary, Ministry of Housing and Works, Islamabad And 2 Others1994 PLC (C.S.) 351 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-05
  pensionary benefitsfresh appointmenttransfer of servicecivil serviceservice tribunalsuperannuationcontinuity of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Federal Service Tribunal order refusing the appellant’s request to count his prior service in the Settlement Department (1960–1976) towards his pension after his retirement from the PAF (1976–1990). The core legal question was whether the appellant’s induction into the PAF constituted a transfer of service from the Settlement Department or a fresh appointment. The Supreme Court observed that the appellant had previously refused a transfer order within the Settlement Department, effectively abandoning that post, and subsequently accepted a new appointment at the PAF Base, Chaklala, under new terms and conditions, including age relaxation. The Court held that the appellant’s engagement with the PAF was a fresh appointment rather than a transfer of service. Consequently, the appellant was not entitled to count his previous service in the Settlement Department for pensionary benefits. The Court affirmed the Tribunal’s decision, noting that the appellant’s previous litigation history confirmed he had not served in the Settlement Department after refusing his transfer, thereby negating any claim to continuity of service for pension purposes.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appointment to a new department following the abandonment of a previous post constitute a transfer of service for pension purposes?
  • Can an employee claim continuity of service for pension benefits if the subsequent employment was a fresh appointment?
  • Is an employee entitled to count previous service towards pension if they refused a transfer order and abandoned their former position?
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• Bashir Hussain Bokhari vs Secretary, Ministry of Housing and Works, Islamabad and 2 others (Copy)1994 SCMR 420 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-05
  pension calculationprevious servicefresh appointmenttransfer of serviceservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the appellant's departmental appeal and refused his prayer to count his previous service in the Settlement Department for the computation of his pension upon retirement from the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). The core legal question determined by the court was whether the appellant's services were transferred from the Settlement Department to the PAF, or whether his appointment by the PAF authorities constituted a fresh appointment, thereby disqualifying him from counting his previous service towards pensionary benefits. The Supreme Court held that the appellant's refusal to obey a prior transfer order, coupled with a significant gap in service and his subsequent acceptance of a fresh civilian engagement in the PAF on new terms and conditions, established that his employment in the PAF was a fresh appointment rather than a transfer of service. Consequently, the previous service could not be counted for pension, and the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether previous service rendered in one government department can be counted for computation of pension upon subsequent employment in another department?
  • Does acceptance of a new civilian engagement in the Pakistan Air Force amount to a fresh appointment rather than a transfer of service?
  • Is an employee entitled to pensionary benefits for a past service period when employment was terminated following disobedience of a transfer order?
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• Bashir Ahmed Malik vs Government of N.W.F.P. through Chief Secretary, N..W.F.P. and 4 others1994 SCMR 1806 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-27
  leave to appealservice mattersrecruitment rulesprecedentprovincial assembly secretariat
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Bashir Ahmed Malik against the Government of N.W.F.P. and others. The core legal question is whether the impugned judgment failed to consider the precedent set in Muhammad Masihuzzaman's case and ignored Rule 12 of the North-West Frontier Province Provincial Assembly Secretariat (Recruitment) Rules, 1974. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these contentions raised by the petitioner. The key principle established is that prior binding precedents of the apex court and relevant statutory service rules must be duly considered and applied in service matters.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure to keep in view a binding judgment of the Supreme Court vitiates an impugned judgment?
  • Were the North-West Frontier Province ProvincialAssembly Secretariat (Recruitment) Rules, 1974 ignored in the passing of the impugned judgment?
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• Bashir Ahmed Malik vs Government of N.-W.F.P. Through Chief Secretary, N.-W.F.P. And 4 Others1994 PLC (C.S.) 1104 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-27
  leave to appealrecruitment rulesservice lawbinding precedentprovincial assembly secretariat
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal filed by Bashir Ahmed Malik against the Government of N.-W.F.P. The core legal question is whether the impugned judgment failed to consider the binding precedent in Muhammad Masihuzzaman's case and ignored Rule 12 of the North-West Frontier Province Provincial Assembly Secretariat (Recruitment) Rules, 1974. The Court granted leave to appeal to examine these contentions raised by the petitioner, determining that the issues regarding the application of the cited precedent and the specific recruitment rules require closer examination by the appellate bench. The key principle laid down is that established judgments and relevant statutory service rules must be duly considered in matters concerning provincial assembly secretariat recruitment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure to consider a relevant precedent of the Supreme Court vitiates a service matter judgment?
  • How are the North-West Frontier Province Provincial Assembly Secretariat (Recruitment) Rules, 1974 to be applied in employee recruitment disputes?
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• Bashir Ahmed and others vs Ali Muhammad and others1994 SCMR 1157 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-05-24
  criminal appealmurderbenefit of doubtocular testimonyimprovements in testimonycorroborationacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two criminal appeals arising from a murder case where the trial court convicted three accused persons under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing one to death and others to lesser sentences, while the High Court partly acquitted some accused and maintained the death sentence of Ejaz Ahmad. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the conviction of the appellant could be sustained on the basis of ocular testimony containing glaring discrepancies and improvements, particularly when co-accused had already been acquitted on the same evidence. The Supreme Court held that where eye-witnesses make material improvements and their testimony suffers from glaring discrepancies regarding the attribution of fatal injuries, and co-accused have been given the benefit of doubt on the identical evidence, it is unsafe to maintain the conviction of the remaining appellant without strong, independent corroboration. The Court laid down the principle that the benefit of doubt must be extended uniformly to a co-accused where the prosecution evidence is disbelieved in major parts and lacks corroborative support.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for murder can be sustained on ocular testimony that suffers from glaring discrepancies and material improvements?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt when co-accused facing the same allegations on identical evidence have already been acquitted?
  • Whether the uncorroborated testimony of interested witnesses is sufficient to maintain a death sentence in the absence of confirmatory circumstances?
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• Bashir Ahmed and 2 others vs The State1994 SCMR 1147 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-21
  criminal petition for leave to appealpost-arrest bailmurderpolice investigationinadmissible evidencealibiprima facie case
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition seeks leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court rejecting the petitioners' bail application in a case involving multiple murders and firearm injuries under sections 302, 324, 148, 149, and 379 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question is whether an accused is entitled to bail solely because successive police investigations placed them in column No. 2 of the report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, despite being directly charged in the FIR. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners are not entitled to bail because the investigating agency's exoneration was based on inadmissible evidence, namely statements of local respectables who were not eye-witnesses, rather than admissible material. The Court laid down the principle that while an investigation exonerating an accused is normally a ground for bail, this principle does not apply when the favorable finding rests entirely on inadmissible evidence, and a prima facie case is otherwise made out by the FIR, injuries, and specific roles attributed.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to bail solely because successive police investigations placed them in column No. 2 of the final report?
  • Does the principle that an exonerating investigation entitles an accused to bail apply when the investigation's conclusion is based on inadmissible evidence?
  • What is the effect of an FIR directly charging the accused and matching medical evidence when police investigation findings are disregarded by the courts?
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• Barkat Ali vs Arshad Ali and 2 others1994 SCMR 492 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-28
  review petitioncriminal appealalteration of convictionnon-appearance of counselerror patent on the face of the recordrehearing
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for review filed against the order of the Supreme Court dated 17-4-1993 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 23 of 1992, wherein the appeal was decided in the absence of the appellant's counsel and the conviction alteration from section 302, Pakistan Penal Code to section 304, Part I, Pakistan Penal Code by the High Court was upheld. The core legal question was whether the previous order suffered from an error patent on the face of the record due to non-appearance of the appellant's counsel and oversight of certain factual aspects regarding the statement of a defence witness. The Supreme Court held that the case required reconsideration after hearing all parties concerned, as the absence of counsel was satisfactorily explained and certain evidentiary aspects warranted review. The review petition was accordingly allowed, the previous order recalled, and the appeal ordered to be reheard on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a review petition can be allowed when the previous judgment was rendered in the absence of the appellant's counsel due to unavoidable circumstances?
  • Does the oversight of a material aspect of evidence constitute an error patent on the face of the record warranting a review?
  • Whether an appeal decided without hearing the appellant's counsel should be recalled and reheard on merits?
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• Bandai Shah and 9 others vs Board of Revenue, N.W.F.P, through Senior1994 SCMR 383 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-17
  Board of RevenueProvincially Administered Tribal Areasstatutory jurisdictionleave to appealtenancy lawapplication of laws
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the jurisdictional authority of the Board of Revenue within the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas. The core legal question presented for examination is whether the Board of Revenue possesses the requisite jurisdiction under Section 56 of the North-West Frontier Province Tenancy Act, 1950, which was extended to the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas via the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (Application of Laws) Regulation, 1974. Specifically, the Court seeks to determine if the explicit extension or application of the Board of Revenue Act, 1957, to these areas is a legal necessity, or if the provisions of the North-West Frontier Province Tenancy Act, 1950, are sufficient to confer such jurisdiction independently. The Court granted leave to appeal to resolve this question of statutory interpretation regarding the interplay between the Tenancy Act and the Board of Revenue's authority in the specified tribal regions. The Court directed that notice be issued to the Advocate-General and expedited the hearing of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 56 of the North-West Frontier Province Tenancy Act, 1950, confer jurisdiction upon the Board of Revenue in the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas?
  • Is the separate application or extension of the Board of Revenue Act, 1957, necessary for the Board of Revenue to exercise jurisdiction in the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas under the North-West Frontier Province Tenancy Act, 1950?
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• Bahawal through Legal Heirss vs Mst. Aisha and 2 others1994 SCMR 966 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-21
  civil revisionrevisional jurisdictionproperty transferfraudulent decreeleave to appealappellate courtthumb-impression evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside an appellate court's decision and restored a trial court's decree in a property dispute. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, could properly assess the merits of the case and restore the trial court's judgment after excluding disputed thumb-impression evidence. The heirs of the deceased owner had challenged a prior decree obtained by the petitioners' predecessor, alleging fraud in the transfer of property. The trial court had invalidated the transfer based on expert testimony regarding thumb-impressions and suspicious circumstances surrounding the sale. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted within its jurisdiction by reviewing the evidence on record, noting that exceptional circumstances justified a deviation from standard revisional limitations. The Court affirmed that the High Court correctly determined that the sale and receipt of consideration were not adequately proved, even absent the thumb-impression evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, upholding the High Court's decision to restore the trial court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court in its revisional jurisdiction evaluate the merits of a case when the trial court's reasoning is sounder than the appellate court's?
  • Is it permissible for a High Court to deviate from standard revisional limitations in exceptional circumstances?
  • Does the exclusion of a specific piece of evidence, such as a thumb-impression, necessarily invalidate a finding of fraud if other evidence on record supports the conclusion?
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• Bahadur through Legal Heirss vs Muhammad Aslam and another1994 SCMR 116 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-18
  co-sharersadverse possessionlimitationrevenue recordmutationoccupancy tenancyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from two petitions for leave to appeal directed against a consolidated judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside the decisions of the first appellate court and restored the trial court decrees in favor of the respondents. The core legal questions involved whether a suit for possession and challenge to void revenue entries by a co-sharer is barred by limitation, and whether a party claiming possession in their own rights can plead adverse possession. The Supreme Court held that the mutations creating occupancy and ownership rights were void and non-existent in the eyes of law, that a person claiming possession in their own rights cannot take the plea of adverse possession against a co-sharer, and that the bar of limitation does not apply to a title suit between co-sharers absent clear evidence of complete ouster. The petitions were accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person claiming possession of land in their own rights can take the plea of adverse possession?
  • Does the bar of limitation apply to a title suit filed by a co-sharer against another co-sharer without evidence of complete ouster?
  • From what point does limitation begin to run when adverse entries in the revenue record are challenged by a co-sharer?
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• Bahadur Khan and others vs Darvesh Ali Khan and 5 others1994 PLD Supreme Court 354 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-01
  joint holdingco-sharerpartition proceedingssale-deedpossessionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment and decree of the Peshawar High Court, which set aside the concurrent findings of the lower courts and decreed the respondents' suit for possession of land based on title. The core legal question concerned whether a purchaser of specific land from a co-sharer during pending partition proceedings acquires a superior right to a particular Khasra number allotted to another co-sharer upon final partition. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners, having purchased from a co-sharer in a joint holding while partition proceedings were pending and near finalization, do not stand in a better position than their vendor, and their purchase remains subject to adjustment at the time of partition. The Court laid down the principle that a sale of joint land by a co-sharer during ongoing partition proceedings is subordinate to the final outcome of the partition, and purchasers cannot claim exclusive ownership of a specific Khasra allotted to another party.

  Questions settled

  • Does a purchaser of land from a co-sharer during pending partition proceedings acquire a superior right to a specific Khasra number?
  • Is a sale of joint land by a co-sharer subject to adjustment at the time of partition?
  • Can a purchaser challenge partition proceedings to which their vendor was a party?
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• Bahadur Khan And Other vs Darvesh Ali Khan And S Other1994 PLD Supreme Court 354 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-01
  co-sharerjoint holdingpartition proceedingssale deedland possessionvendor rightsmutation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over land possession between co-sharers. The respondents filed a suit for possession of land, which was initially dismissed by the trial court and the appellate court on the grounds that the underlying sale deed in favor of the petitioners had not been challenged. The Peshawar High Court subsequently set aside these judgments and decreed the suit in favor of the respondents based on their title. The core legal question was whether a purchaser of land from a co-sharer in a joint holding, where partition proceedings are pending, acquires an absolute right to specific property or remains subject to the outcome of the partition. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the petitioners, as purchasers from a co-sharer, stood in no better position than their vendor. The Court established the principle that a sale of land by a co-sharer in a joint holding is inherently subject to adjustment during partition proceedings, particularly when such proceedings are pending at the time of the sale.

  Questions settled

  • Does a purchaser of land from a co-sharer in a joint holding acquire a better title than the vendor?
  • Is a sale of land by a co-sharer subject to adjustment during pending partition proceedings?
  • Can a purchaser of land from a co-sharer claim a specific Khasra number as their sole ownership if partition proceedings were pending at the time of purchase?
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• Badruddin vs Muhammad Yousuf1994 SCMR 1900 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-02
  ejectmentdefault in payment of electricity chargessub-meter readingSindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979definition of rentlandlord and tenantres judicatastare decisis
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arose from a High Court judgment reversing an ejectment order passed by the Rent Controller against a tenant for default in paying electricity charges. The tenant was obligated under the tenancy agreement to pay rent along with electricity charges determined by reading a sub-meter installed at the rented shop. The High Court had set aside the ejectment on the ground that the landlord failed to intimate the specific monthly electricity amounts or conduct joint readings. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's decision, distinguishing between cases where electricity liability depends on shared overall bills and cases where liability is directly based on sub-meter readings. The Court held that where liability is determined by a sub-meter installed at the tenant's shop, the tenant is not relieved of the duty to tender electricity charges merely because joint reading was not conducted or bills were not presented. Furthermore, under Section 2(i) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, unpaid electricity charges form part of the definition of rent, justifying ejectment for default.

  Questions settled

  • Does default in payment of electricity charges constitute a valid ground for ejectment under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Is a tenant absolved from tendering electricity charges when liability is based on sub-meter readings if the landlord fails to conduct joint sub-meter readings?
  • How does electricity liability based on sub-meter readings differ from liability based on proportional sharing of common utility bills in rent default cases?
  • Can a landlord institute ejectment proceedings on the basis of time-barred rent or utility dues?
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• Badarul Hassan Nizami and 4 others vs Muhammad Sultan Khan through Legal Heirs1994 SCMR 669 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-27
  civil revisionremand of caseadditional issuespermanent injunctionadditional evidenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which accepted a civil revision and set aside the remand order passed by the first appellate Court. The respondent had instituted a suit for permanent and mandatory injunctions regarding a property dispute, which was initially decreed by the trial Court. The first appellate Court subsequently set aside the judgment and remanded the case for further trial after framing additional issues. The High Court found that the framing of additional issues was unnecessary as the existing issues already covered the real controversy between the parties. The core legal question was whether the remand of the case and framing of additional issues by the first appellate Court was justified. The Supreme Court held that no case for interference was made out, affirming that the existing issues sufficiently covered the controversy and noting that parties could seek to produce additional evidence before the first appellate Court if necessary. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the first appellate Court is justified in remanding a case and framing additional issues when the real controversy is already covered by the existing issues?
  • Can parties produce additional evidence before the appellate Court without the framing of new issues?
  • Does the High Court have the power in civil revision to set aside an unnecessary order of remand passed by the first appellate Court?
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• Azmat Khan vs The State1994 SCMR 434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-20
  post-arrest bailretrospective applicationProhibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 1979possession of opiumpenal legislation amendment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had dismissed the appellant's petition for post-arrest bail regarding an offence under Article 3/4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 1979 involving the alleged possession of 5 kilograms of opium. The core legal question was whether an amendment introduced by Ordinance XXIV of 1993—which omitted the word 'Raw' before 'Opium' and made possession of opium exceeding one kilogram punishable with life imprisonment—applied retrospectively to an offence committed prior to its promulgation. The Supreme Court accepted the appeal and granted bail to the appellant in the sum of Rs. 50,000 with three sureties. The Court held that penal amendments increasing punishment or altering substantive law do not operate retrospectively to the detriment of an accused person for an offence committed before the amendment took effect.

  Questions settled

  • Does a penal amendment omitting 'Raw' from Article 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 1979 apply retrospectively to offences committed before its enactment?
  • Can an accused be subjected to enhanced punishment under an amendment enacted after the date of the alleged commission of the offence?
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• Aziz Muhammad vs Aziz Ahmad and others1994 SCMR 567 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-20
  Martial Law OrderSpecial Military Courttransfer of casejurisdictioncriminal trialpending caseinvestigation stage
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside the conviction and death sentences imposed on the respondents by a Special Military Court. The core legal question was whether the Martial Law Administrator had the authority under Martial Law Order No. 4 to transfer a criminal case to a Special Military Court when the case was still at the investigation stage and not yet pending before an ordinary criminal court. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the transfer order was invalid because the statutory provision explicitly required the case to be pending before an ordinary criminal court as a condition precedent for transfer. The Court reasoned that the power to transfer under Martial Law Order No. 4(3)(1) could not be exercised for cases merely under investigation. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that the transfer order was based on a misconception of the law and the factual status of the case, rendering the subsequent trial and conviction without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Can a case be transferred to a Special Military Court under Martial Law Order No. 4 if it is only at the investigation stage?
  • Is the pendency of a case before an ordinary criminal court a condition precedent for the exercise of transfer powers under Martial Law Order No. 4(3)(1)?
  • Does a transfer order issued under the assumption that a case is pending in court, when it is actually under investigation, constitute a valid exercise of power?
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• Aziz Ahmad and anothers vs Munir Ahmad and 2 others1994 SCMR 2039 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-21
  pre-emptionpecuniary jurisdictioncondonation of delayLimitation Actrejection of plaintZar-e-Panjum
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment concerning a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether the time spent by the plaintiffs in a court lacking pecuniary jurisdiction could be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908, and whether the failure to comply with procedural orders (like depositing Zar-e-Panjum) in that incompetent court warranted the rejection of the plaint. The Supreme Court held that the initial filing was within time and the subsequent transfer to a court of competent jurisdiction was necessitated by a technical error regarding pecuniary valuation. Consequently, the time spent in the wrong forum was correctly condoned under Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that procedural orders passed by a court lacking jurisdiction, such as those regarding court fees or deposit of Zar-e-Panjum, could not result in the penal consequence of plaint rejection. The petition was dismissed as the concurrent findings of the lower courts were upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Can time spent in a court lacking pecuniary jurisdiction be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Does a court lacking pecuniary jurisdiction have the authority to pass orders resulting in the penal rejection of a plaint for non-compliance?
  • Is the filing of a suit in a court lacking pecuniary jurisdiction due to valuation errors considered a technical mistake?
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• Azad Hussain vs Haji Muhammad Hussain1994 PLD Supreme Court 874 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-07-27
  written statementdefault in filing written statementdecree without recording evidencepronoteadjournmentspeaking ordercivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of an appeal by the High Court, which upheld the trial court's judgment decreeing a recovery suit under Order VIII, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 due to the defendant's failure to file a written statement. The core legal question was whether a trial court is legally justified in pronouncing judgment without recording evidence when a defendant fails to submit a written statement despite multiple opportunities and a specific court order. The Supreme Court held that the trial court acted lawfully and judiciously, as Order VIII, Rule 10 empowers courts to pronounce judgment upon default in filing a written statement following a clear, speaking order requiring the same. The key principle laid down is that where a defendant admits signatures on the suit instrument without pleading fraud at the initial stage, and subsequently fails to file a written statement despite extended time granted on cost with a clear warning that no further adjournments would be allowed, the court may validly decree the suit without recording evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court can legally decree a suit without recording evidence under Order VIII Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the defendant fails to file a written statement?
  • Does Order VIII Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 require a speaking order demonstrating the court's application of mind before pronouncing judgment for failure to file a written statement?
  • Can a defendant subsequently plead fraud regarding signatures on a pronote after having admitted those signatures before the trial court without protest?
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• Azad Hussain vs Ahaji Muhammad Hussain1994 PLD Supreme Court 874 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-07-27
  written statementdefault in filing written statementpronouncement of judgmentcivil procedurediscretionary powerspeaking orderleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a money recovery suit where the petitioner-defendant failed to file a written statement despite multiple opportunities and a peremptory order, leading the trial court to decree the suit under Order VIII, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without recording evidence. The High Court dismissed the subsequent appeal. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a trial court is legally justified in pronouncing judgment against a defendant under Order VIII, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without recording evidence when the defendant fails to file a written statement after being explicitly required to do so through a speaking order. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the trial court's judgment was valid, legal, and rendered after proper application of mind, particularly since the defendant had earlier admitted his signatures on the suit document without raising any plea of fraud. The key principle laid down is that a court may exercise its discretionary power under Order VIII, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to pronounce judgment without recording evidence when a defendant fails to file a required written statement, provided the requirement is made through a speaking order reflecting judicial application of mind.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court decree a suit under Order VIII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without recording evidence when the defendant fails to file a written statement?
  • Whether an order invoking the penal consequences of Order VIII, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 requires a speaking order showing judicial application of mind?
  • Does a defendant's admission of signatures on a copy of a document during proceedings preclude a subsequent belated plea of fraud?
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• Auditorgeneral of Pakistan and 2 others vs Syed Sajjad Hussain Shah1994 SCMR 1269 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-13
  seniority listcivil servantcadre membershipdeputationService Tribunalappointmentestablishmentservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves appeals against a Federal Service Tribunal judgment regarding the seniority of a civil servant in the Directorate of Revenue Receipts Audit. The core legal question was whether the appellant, who had been selected for the Directorate but never formally joined or received a posting order, could be included in the Directorate's seniority list. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the Tribunal's decision to exclude the appellant's name. The Court held that for a civil servant to be part of a specific cadre's seniority list, they must be a member of that establishment. Since the appellant never joined the Directorate, had no appointment order, and the relief order allowing him to join was cancelled with retrospective effect, he was never a member of the Directorate's establishment. Consequently, he could not be considered on deputation from the Directorate to the Auditor-General's office, and his inclusion in the seniority list was legally invalid. The judgment affirms that seniority is strictly tied to membership in a specific cadre, which requires formal appointment and joining.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant be included in the seniority list of a cadre if they never formally joined that establishment?
  • Does the cancellation of a relief order with retrospective effect prevent a civil servant from becoming a member of a new department?
  • Is a person who never held an appointment in a specific department considered to be on deputation from that department?
  • Can a civil servant challenge the inclusion of another person in a seniority list before the Service Tribunal?
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• Aurangzeb vs The State1994 SCMR 1280 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-11
  false complaintpublic servantcompetency of complaintcognizanceSection 182 PPCSection 195 CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the competency of a complaint filed by a Deputy Commissioner against the appellant for an offence under Section 182, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appellant had filed a complaint against a public servant with the Divisional Commissioner, who forwarded it to the Deputy Commissioner. An inquiry conducted by the Additional Deputy Commissioner found the appellant's complaint to be false. Consequently, the Deputy Commissioner directed that a complaint be filed against the appellant under Section 182, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appellant argued that under Section 195(1)(a), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, only the Commissioner (to whom the complaint was initially addressed) was competent to file the complaint, not the Deputy Commissioner. The Supreme Court held that the Deputy Commissioner, having conducted the inquiry and scrutinized the report, was the 'public servant concerned' within the meaning of Section 195(1)(a), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court affirmed that the officer who takes cognizance and investigates the matter is competent to initiate proceedings, regardless of where the initial complaint was filed. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Who is considered the 'public servant concerned' competent to file a complaint under Section 195(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the fact that an initial complaint was filed with a superior officer preclude a subordinate officer from filing a complaint under Section 182 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if the subordinate officer conducted the inquiry?
  • Is a complaint under Section 182 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 legally valid if initiated by an officer who investigated the false information, even if the original information was directed to a different authority?
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• Atta Hussain and another vs The State1994 SCMR 1191 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-01-08
  murdercommon intentionmedical evidencepost-mortem reportalteration of sentencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants were tried and convicted under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Bashir Ahmed, receiving sentences of death and imprisonment for life. On appeal and reference, the High Court maintained the conviction but altered the death sentences of two appellants to imprisonment for life, noting that while two appellants inflicted head injuries with Kassis, the post-mortem report showed only one incised wound, creating uncertainty as to the fatal blow. The Supreme Court granted leave to examine whether a patent error in the High Court's appreciation of the medical evidence resulted in a miscarriage of justice and falsified the prosecution case. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the medical evidence actually recorded two separate head injuries—an incised wound and a lacerated wound—consistent with the use of Kassis, thereby disproving the alleged contradiction. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, and the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was extended to the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Does a discrepancy between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the number of head injuries necessarily falsify the entire prosecution case?
  • Whether the High Court was justified in altering the death sentence to imprisonment for life when it was uncertain which of the two accused caused the fatal injury?
  • Can the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be granted upon the dismissal of a criminal appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Assistant Administrator, Evacuee Trust Property, Gujrat vs Rashid1994 SCMR 450 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-10-21
  interim injunctionevacuee trust propertycivil suitsexpedited trialappeals by leave
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through appeals by leave directed against interim injunctions issued by the Civil Courts relating to evacuee trust property. The core legal question concerns the propriety of sustaining interlocutory injunctions pending trial where properties administered under evacuee trust laws are involved. Upon hearing the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, the Court disposed of the appeals by consent, issuing a direction to the trial court to decide the underlying suits within three months. The Court held that the parties are at liberty to raise all available legal and factual pleas before the trial court within the stipulated timeframe, thereby bypassing the need to adjudicate upon the merits of the interim injunctions. The key principle laid down is that appellate proceedings against interlocutory orders may be amicably resolved and disposed of by directing an expedited trial on merits while preserving all factual and legal contentions of the contesting parties.

  Questions settled

  • Can appeals against interim injunctions be disposed of with a direction for an expedited trial upon the agreement of the parties?
  • Are parties permitted to take all legal and factual pleas before the trial court when suits are expedited by the appellate court?
  Read full judgment →
• Aslam and others vs The State and others1994 SCMR 1177 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-12
  leave to appealcorroborationocular accountmedical evidencevicarious liabilitycriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon petitions for leave to appeal arising from a criminal case. The core legal questions concern whether corroboration of the ocular account was necessary, whether medical evidence indicating two firearm wounds of entry of almost the same dimension in the face region of the deceased—which could result from a single fire according to the medical officer—provided the requisite corroboration against each of the petitioners, and whether the principle of vicarious liability was attracted based on the evidence on record. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these questions regarding corroboration and vicarious liability. The key principle laid down involves the scrutiny of medical evidence vis-a-vis ocular testimony for the purpose of corroboration in criminal trials.

  Questions settled

  • Whether corroboration of the ocular account was necessary in the case?
  • Whether medical evidence showing two firearm wounds of entry of almost the same dimension resulting from a single fire provided the requisite corroboration against the petitioners?
  • Whether the principle of vicarious liability was attracted in view of the evidence on record?
  Read full judgment →
• Ashiq Hussain alias Muhammad Ashraf vs The State1994 PLD Supreme Court 879 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-07-31
  murdercriminal appealevidence appreciationocular evidencedefence pleacounter-versionsbinding precedentsubordinate courtsmisconductsentence confirmation
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail petition challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed an appeal against a conviction under Section 302 PPC for murder and confirmed the death sentence. The core legal question addressed by the Supreme Court was the proper method for appreciating evidence in criminal cases, particularly those involving counter-versions. The Court dismissed the petition, upholding the conviction and sentence, finding no reason to disbelieve the prosecution's ocular account and rejecting the defence version as an afterthought. The Supreme Court laid down specific rules for evidence appreciation, emphasizing that courts must first discuss prosecution evidence to assess its reliability before examining the defence. It also reiterated that decisions of the Supreme Court enunciating principles of law are binding on all other courts in Pakistan under Article 189 of the Constitution, warning against contemptuous disregard by subordinate courts.

  Questions settled

  • What is the proper and legal way for courts to deal with evidence in criminal cases, particularly those with counter-versions?
  • How should a court approach an accused's statement under Section 342 Cr.P.C. if the prosecution evidence is disbelieved or if the statement is exculpatory?
  • What is the legal obligation of subordinate courts in Pakistan regarding decisions of the Supreme Court enunciating principles of law?
  • When considering counter-versions in a criminal case, how should a court evaluate the defence plea after assessing prosecution evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ashiq Ali and 1:3 others vs Secretary Finance, Goverenment of the1994 SCMR 500 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-28
  contempt of courtarrearsSpecial Research Allowancebinding precedentjudicial reliefgovernment exchequer
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from contempt proceedings initiated against the Secretary, Finance, Government of Punjab, due to the failure to comply with previous Supreme Court orders regarding the payment of arrears of Special Research Allowance to the petitioners for the period between 1-1-1985 and 30-6-1987. The core legal question concerned the enforcement of court-ordered financial benefits and the potential financial implications for the government exchequer regarding similarly situated employees. During the proceedings, the Secretary, Finance, appeared and provided an undertaking that the government would pay the petitioners their outstanding arrears. The Court accepted this statement and consequently discharged the contempt notice. Regarding the apprehension that this order might create a precedent for other employees, the Court clarified that judicial judgments are binding only upon the parties to the specific litigation. Therefore, the benefit of the Court's judgment is restricted solely to those officers who were parties to the original proceedings, unless the government voluntarily chooses to extend such benefits to others. This principle reinforces the limited scope of judicial relief to the specific litigants involved in a case.

  Questions settled

  • Are judgments of the Court binding on persons who were not parties to the litigation?
  • Can the government be compelled to extend the benefit of a court judgment to similarly situated employees who were not parties to the original case?
  • Does a contempt notice discharge upon the respondent's undertaking to comply with the court's order?
  Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali vs Muhammad Rafiq and 2 others1994 SCMR 478 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-22
  pre-arrest bailbail confirmationleave to appealmala fidesfalse implicationcriminal theft
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the order of the High Court confirming pre-arrest bail granted to respondents Nos.1 and 2 in a case involving allegations of theft of cloth from the petitioner's powerloom factory. The core legal question concerned the propriety of confirming pre-arrest bail where mala fides or false implication was suspected due to prior litigation and police complaints initiated by the accused against the complainant. The Supreme Court held that where the accused had previously obtained a High Court direction for registration of a case against the complainant prior to the lodging of the FIR by the complainant, the possibility of false implication could not be ruled out. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the confirmation of pre-arrest bail and refused leave to appeal, establishing that prior adversarial proceedings and complaints by the accused against the complainant form a valid ground for considering the possibility of mala fides in pre-arrest bail matters.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be confirmed when the possibility of false implication by the complainant cannot be ruled out?
  • Does the prior registration of a complaint by the accused against the complainant provide grounds for apprehending mala fides in a subsequent criminal case?
  Read full judgment →
• Armed Nawaz vs The State1994 PLD Supreme Court 358 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-19
  special courtspeedy trialsqualification of judgecoram non judicemurdercriminal petitionsaving clause
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition filed by the convict against the dismissal of his criminal appeal by the Lahore High Court, which maintained his convictions and sentences under section 302, section 353, and another provision of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and assaulting a public servant. The core legal question raised was whether the trial conducted by the presiding officer of the Special Court was coram non judice on the ground that he lacked the qualifications prescribed under section 4(2) of the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act 1987. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the appointment was lawfully made under the earlier Special Courts for Speedy Trials Ordinance 1987, the validity of which was protected and saved by section 15(3) of the Act. The key principle laid down is that appointments made under a repealing Ordinance are saved if the succeeding Act contains an express saving clause protecting such appointments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial conducted by a judge of a Special Court is coram non judice if the judge does not meet the qualifications prescribed under section 4(2) of the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act 1987?
  • Does an appointment made under the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Ordinance 1987 remain valid despite the subsequent enactment of the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act 1987?
  • Are concurrent findings of guilt by the lower courts liable to interference when the prosecution proves its case beyond reasonable doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• Anno or Textile Mills Ltd. and anothers vs The Federation of Pakistan1994 PLD Supreme Court 568 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-02
  minimum wagesunskilled workersretrospective legislationfundamental rightslabour lawsbountyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment dismissing their petitions that challenged the West Pakistan Minimum Wages for Unskilled Workers (Amendment) Act, 1993. The Amending Act revised the minimum wages of unskilled workers from Rs. 140 to Rs. 1,500 per month, making the increase retrospectively effective from July 1, 1992. The petitioners contended that the retrospective application created an arbitrary liability in violation of their fundamental rights under Articles 4, 8, 12, 18, 23, 24, and 25 of the Constitution, and characterized the increase as an unlawful 'bounty'. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the legislature is fully competent to give retrospective operation to laws. It ruled that the revision of wages, which had remained static for over two decades, was reasonable and did not violate any fundamental rights. The Court clarified that legislative wage increases are not arbitrary bounties or largess but legal rights and obligations. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the legislature has the competence to retrospectively increase the minimum wages of unskilled workers?
  • Does the retrospective imposition of a higher minimum wage violate the fundamental rights of employers under Articles 4, 12, and 18 of the Constitution?
  • Can a statutory increase in minimum wages be legally characterized as an arbitrary bounty or government largess?
  Read full judgment →
• Anno or Textile Mills Ltd. And Another vs The Federation of Pakistan1994 PLC 388 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-02
  minimum wagesretrospective legislationfundamental rightsunskilled workerslegislative competencelabour law
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment dismissing their challenge to the West Pakistan Minimum Wages for Unskilled Workers (Amendment) Act, 1993. This Act revised the minimum wages for unskilled workers from Rs. 140 to Rs. 1,500, with retrospective effect from 1-7-1992. The petitioners contended that the retrospective imposition of liability was arbitrary, violated fundamental rights under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, and that the wage increase constituted an illegal 'bounty' rather than wages. The Supreme Court held that the legislature has the authority to enact retrospective legislation and that the increase in wages, after remaining static for over two decades, was a reasonable legislative measure. The Court clarified that such legislative action does not constitute an arbitrary 'bounty' but a legal obligation. Consequently, the Court found no violation of fundamental rights, including those related to property or trade, and dismissed the petition, affirming that the legislature may validly impose financial liabilities through retrospective operation of law.

  Questions settled

  • Can the legislature validly impose a financial liability on employers through retrospective wage legislation?
  • Does a legislated increase in minimum wages constitute an arbitrary 'bounty' or a legal obligation?
  • Is the retrospective application of a minimum wage revision a violation of fundamental rights under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Amin Khan vs Naubat Khan1994 SCMR 1769 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-29
  pre-emptioncontiguous propertypendente litesuppression of factsmutationright of pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a Peshawar High Court judgment that restored a trial court decree in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner (vendee) possessed a superior or equal right of pre-emption based on the ownership of contiguous property. The respondent (plaintiff) claimed pre-emption based on ownership of adjacent land. The petitioner asserted equal right of pre-emption through a mutation attested during the pendency of the suit, involving land in a different estate. The High Court found that the petitioner had suppressed material facts regarding the status of his claimed land, which had been successfully pre-empted in separate litigation. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to establish a valid claim of contiguity, noting the land was in a different estate and the underlying mutation was subject to separate pre-emption proceedings. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling that the petitioner could not rely on suppressed facts to defeat the respondent's established right of pre-emption, and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a vendee claim a right of pre-emption based on a mutation attested during the pendency of the suit?
  • Does the suppression of material facts regarding the status of property ownership justify High Court interference in findings of fact?
  • Can a vendee claim contiguity for pre-emption purposes based on land situated in a different estate?
  Read full judgment →
• Aman Ullah Khan vs Water and Power Development Authority And Others1994 PLC (C.S) 1623 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-28
  review petitionunauthorized absenceforeign employmentdisciplinary actionservice tribunalWAPDA employee
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a review petition filed under Article 188 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, read with Order XXVI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, seeking review of the Supreme Court's earlier judgment dismissing the petitioner's civil petition. The core legal question is whether the petitioner, a former Provincial Government officer permanently absorbed into WAPDA, was wrongfully dismissed for obtaining unauthorized foreign employment during ex-Pakistan leave, and whether grounds for reviewing the previous judgment exist. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that upon permanent transfer and absorption into WAPDA, the petitioner's lien with the Provincial Government stood abolished, rendering WAPDA competent to initiate disciplinary action for misconduct. The key principle laid down is that an employee who obtains unauthorized foreign employment in clear violation of express undertakings given at the time of availing ex-Pakistan leave is not entitled to judicial indulgence or review of a lawful disciplinary dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee permanently transferred from a provincial government to WAPDA retains a lien on his previous provincial post?
  • Does obtaining unauthorized employment abroad during ex-Pakistan leave constitute misconduct warranting dismissal from service?
  • What are the grounds for entertaining a review petition under Article 188 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 read with Order XXVI of the Supreme Court Rules 1980?
  Read full judgment →
• Aman Ullah Khan vs Water and Power Development Authority and others (Copy)1994 SCMR 1840 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-28
  review petitionservice lawWAPDAunauthorized employmentdisciplinary actionlienpermanent absorption
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed under Article 188 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging a Supreme Court judgment that dismissed the petitioner's appeal against his dismissal from service by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA). The petitioner, an engineer originally from the Provincial Government, was transferred to WAPDA and subsequently dismissed for misconduct after securing unauthorized employment abroad while on ex-Pakistan leave, violating an express undertaking. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner remained a Provincial Government officer rather than a WAPDA employee, and whether the disciplinary action taken by WAPDA was competent. The Court held that upon transfer to WAPDA, the petitioner was permanently absorbed, and his lien on the Provincial Government post was abolished, rendering WAPDA competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings. The Court found no merit in the review petition, affirming that the petitioner's unauthorized employment and failure to resume duty constituted valid grounds for dismissal. The key principle laid down is that an employee permanently absorbed into a new organization upon transfer loses their lien on their previous post, subjecting them to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the new employer.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employee transferred to WAPDA from the Provincial Government retain a lien on their previous post after permanent absorption?
  • Is WAPDA competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings against an employee who secures unauthorized employment abroad while on leave?
  • Does the acceptance of unauthorized foreign employment during ex-Pakistan leave constitute valid grounds for dismissal from service?
  Read full judgment →
• Altaf Khan vs Joint Admission Committee, Medical College, Peshawar1994 SCMR 1166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-04
  leave to appealmedical college admissionprovisional equivalence certificateFATA seatsequal treatmentdiscriminationinterim order
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a High Court order dismissing the petitioner's writ petition in limine. The petitioner sought admission to a medical college against a seat reserved for FATA candidates, having completed his foreign secondary education in Saudi Arabia. Although he secured top marks among FATA applicants, the Joint Admission Committee denied admission because his provisional equivalence certificate required him to pass an examination in Pakistan Studies within one year, as per the college prospectus. During proceedings, the petitioner subsequently passed the required Pakistan Studies examination and was granted provisional admission by interim order. He contended that other candidates with provisional equivalence certificates were granted admission, resulting in discriminatory treatment in violation of the right to equal treatment under the law, and relied on an undertaking given by the Advocate-General. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the petitioner was subject to unlawful discrimination and whether he was entitled to admission following compliance with the requisite academic conditions and undertakings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an applicant holding a provisional equivalence certificate subject to passing a supplementary exam is entitled to admission if they pass the exam within the permitted period?
  • Whether denying admission to a candidate on the basis of a provisional equivalence certificate constitutes unlawful discrimination when other similarly situated candidates with provisional certificates are admitted?
  • Whether an undertaking given by a Law Officer on behalf of the state regarding admission to an educational institution binds the admission authority.
  Read full judgment →
• Altaf Khan vs Joint Admission Committee through its Chairman, Khyber1994 SCMR 375 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-12
  provisional admissionmedical college admissionmerit listSAFRON approvalinterim reliefacademic session
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a petition seeking provisional admission to a medical college. The core legal question was whether a candidate who has satisfied the examination requirements, secured approval from the States and Frontier Regions Division (SAFRON), and achieved the top position on the merit list is entitled to provisional admission when the academic session at the primary institution has already concluded. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the appellant prima facie deserved provisional admission. Since the academic session at Khyber Medical College had already concluded while the session at Ayub Medical College was still ongoing, the Court directed Ayub Medical College to consider the appellant for provisional admission. The Court established the principle that where a candidate establishes a strong prima facie case on merit and administrative approval, the expiration of an academic session at one institution should not entirely foreclose admission if an ongoing session at a comparable institution can accommodate them.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a candidate who is placed at the top of the merit list and approved by the relevant authority is prima facie entitled to provisional admission?
  • Can a court direct an alternative educational institution with an ongoing academic session to consider a candidate for provisional admission if the session at the primary institution has already concluded?
  Read full judgment →
• Altaf Hussain and others vs Ch. Muhammad Fayyaz and others1994 SCMR 541 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-30
  leave to appealpre-emptiondisplaced personsTarbela Damexemption from pre-emptionMartial Law Regulation 115
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners seek leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court passed in a writ petition, which set aside the order of the Member, Board of Revenue, dismissing the pre-emption suit. The dispute arises from the sale of land to the petitioners, who claimed exemption as displaced persons due to the construction of Tarbela Dam under a notification issued pursuant to the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. The core legal question involves whether the right of pre-emption under Martial Law Regulation 115 could be taken away by a notification issued under section 8(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, in light of conflicting judgments of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider the contention that conflicting precedents require examination regarding the interplay between Martial Law Regulation 115 and exemption notifications under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, laying down that an authoritative review of the divergent views of the apex court is warranted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a notification issued under section 8(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 take away the right of pre-emption conferred under Martial Law Regulation 115?
  • Are sales in favour of displaced persons due to the construction of Tarbela Dam exempted from pre-emption?
  Read full judgment →
• Altaf Hussain and anothers vs The State and another1994 SCMR 1943 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-04-27
  murder convictionsentence commutationocular evidencemitigating circumstancesleave to appealcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves cross-petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which maintained the conviction of the petitioner for murder under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 but commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment and enhanced the compensation payable to the legal heirs. The core legal questions concerned whether the conviction was justified based on the ocular evidence and whether the sentence of life imprisonment was appropriate given the circumstances of the crime. The Supreme Court held that the ocular account provided by the prosecution witnesses was consistent, credible, and corroborated by medical evidence and the recovery of the weapon. The court affirmed the conviction, noting that the defense version of events was properly rejected by the lower courts. Regarding the sentence, the court upheld the High Court's decision to impose life imprisonment rather than the death penalty, acknowledging that the immediate provocation arose from a dispute over a common wall, which served as a mitigating factor. The petitions for leave to appeal were consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the ocular account of prosecution witnesses is sufficient to sustain a murder conviction when corroborated by medical evidence?
  • Can a dispute over a common wall be considered a mitigating circumstance justifying the commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Is the appellate court justified in rejecting a defense version of events that lacks evidentiary support?
  Read full judgment →
• Altaf Hussain and anothers vs Ghulam Muhammad1994 SCMR 977 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-10
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptioncustom of pre-emptionregular second appealleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a judgment passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, which dismissed the petitioners' Regular Second Appeal upholding the dismissal of their pre-emption suit. The core legal question concerns whether a town like Pindigheb, where the custom of pre-emption existed prior to 1913, requires a pre-emptor to separately prove the existence of the custom of pre-emption in a newly-constructed sub-division or Mohallah where the suit property is situated. The Supreme Court heard the contentions that the town was not sub-divided so as to necessitate separate proof for each Mohallah and that the Pre-emption Act applies to both built areas and vacant sites included in the town since before 1913. Granting leave to appeal, the Court held that the points raised required consideration, particularly regarding the applicability of the custom of pre-emption to different parts of the town.

  Questions settled

  • Does a pre-emptor need to prove the existence of the custom of pre-emption in each sub-division or Mohallah if the custom is already established in the town since before 1913?
  • Whether the Pre-emption Act is applicable to both built-up areas and vacant sites included in a town prior to 1913?
  Read full judgment →
• Almaskhanum vs Federation of Pakistan And 4 Other1994 PLD Supreme Court 91 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-03
  Wafaqi MohtasibOmbudsman jurisdictionConstitutional petitionEfficacious remedyRepresentation to PresidentService matterEmbassy School
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a High Court order that dismissed a constitutional petition in limine. The petitioner, a teacher selected as Headmistress for the Embassy School in Jeddah, had her appointment declared null and void by the Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) following a representation by a rival candidate. The petitioner contested the Ombudsman's jurisdiction, arguing that the school did not constitute an 'agency' under the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983, and that the matter was barred under Article 9(2) of the same Order. The core legal questions concerned whether the Ombudsman possessed jurisdiction over the school and whether the representation to the President under Article 32 of the Order constituted an adequate and efficacious alternate remedy that would preclude the invocation of the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court examined the scope of the Ombudsman's authority and the nature of the statutory remedy provided by Article 32, ultimately addressing whether the failure to pursue this representation barred the petitioner from seeking relief through a constitutional petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether in view of Article 9 of the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983, the Ombudsman had jurisdiction in the case?
  • Whether the remedy provided under Article 32 of the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983 can be treated as an efficacious and adequate remedy?
  Read full judgment →
• Altaf Hussain Shah vs The State1994 SCMR 480 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-24
  suspension of sentencestatutory baildelay in appealcriminal appealpost-conviction bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order that declined to suspend the petitioner's sentence, despite the petitioner's argument that he was entitled to bail on statutory grounds due to the delay in the final hearing of his appeal. The petitioner had been convicted by an Additional Sessions Judge on 27-6-1990, and his appeal remained pending well beyond the statutory period for disposal. The core legal question was whether the continued incarceration of the petitioner, in light of the failure to dispose of his appeal within the statutory timeframe, warranted the grant of bail. The Supreme Court held that since the statutory period for the disposal of the appeal had clearly elapsed and the High Court's previous directions to expedite the hearing had not been fulfilled, the petitioner was entitled to relief. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and admitted the petitioner to bail upon furnishing the required sureties.

  Questions settled

  • Is a convict entitled to bail when the statutory period for the disposal of their appeal has elapsed without a decision?
  • Does the failure of the High Court to expedite an appeal as previously directed justify the Supreme Court granting bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Rakha vs Mukhtar Ahmad Baig through L.Rs,1994 SCMR 1773 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-20
  leave to appealmortgage deedagreement to sellsettlement departmentP.T.O.civil revisionappellate court findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 24-2-1993, which reversed the findings of the Additional District Judge regarding the nature of a transaction involving a property issued via P.T.O. by the Settlement Department. The core legal question concerns whether the simultaneous execution of a Mortgage Deed and an Agreement to Sell constituted a mortgage or a completed sale. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider the petitioner's contentions that the documents must be read together to ascertain the parties' real intention to sell, that subsequent acts such as the execution of a Surrender Deed and an application for an Income-tax No Objection Certificate demonstrated a sale, and that the High Court erred in interfering with the factual findings of the final Court of fact. The holding of the Court is to grant leave to examine these contentions, allowing the stay to continue.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Mortgage Deed and an Agreement to Sell executed on the same date are to be read together to ascertain the real intention of the parties?
  • Can the High Court interfere with the factual findings of the ultimate Court of fact in civil revision?
  • Whether a transaction involving a P.T.O. property executed through a mortgage deed and agreement to sell amounts to a mortgage or a sale?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta vs Yousuf and another1994 SCMR 1718 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-16
  habeas corpusillegal detentionbonded laborspecial costswrit jurisdictionrecovery of detenus
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a writ petition for habeas corpus in the Lahore High Court, alleging that his family members were being held in illegal detention by the respondent under the guise of bonded labor. The High Court dismissed the petition and imposed special costs on the petitioner, accepting the respondent's claim that the alleged detenus had left his premises. The petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. To verify the claim of detention, the Supreme Court deputed its own officer to search the respondent's premises, but the officer failed to locate the alleged detenus. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the petition regarding the recovery of the detenus could not proceed further, though the petitioner remained free to seek relief from an appropriate forum if the detenus were located. Regarding the imposition of special costs by the High Court, the Supreme Court found the order unjustified, noting that the State counsel could not support it, and accordingly set aside the order for costs.

  Questions settled

  • Can a writ petition for habeas corpus proceed when the alleged detenus cannot be located by a court-appointed bailiff?
  • Is the imposition of special costs on a petitioner seeking habeas corpus justified when the petition is dismissed based on factual findings?
  • Does a dismissal of a habeas corpus petition due to the inability to locate the detenus preclude the petitioner from filing a fresh application if the detenus are later located?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta vs Ghulam Shabbir and 2 others1994 SCMR 1253 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-27
  criminal appealacquittalocular evidenceinterested witnessesbenefit of doubtmedical testimonymurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that acquitted two respondents of murder charges, reversing their conviction by the trial court. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly assessed the credibility of the prosecution's eye-witnesses and the reliability of the evidence regarding the apprehension of the accused. The Supreme Court upheld the acquittal, finding that the High Court's assessment was sound. The Court held that the presence of the eye-witnesses at the scene was highly improbable, as their explanations for being at the deceased's shop were inconsistent and unconvincing. Furthermore, the Court noted that the witnesses were related to the complainant and had refused to affirm their testimony on the Holy Qur'an. Consequently, the Court ruled that the ocular account was unreliable, which undermined the entire prosecution case, including the alleged recovery of blood-stained weapons and clothing. The principle laid down is that where the presence of eye-witnesses is improbable and their testimony is inconsistent with medical evidence, the prosecution's case fails, justifying an acquittal based on the benefit of doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of eye-witnesses whose presence at the scene of the crime is highly improbable can be relied upon for conviction?
  • Does a refusal by eye-witnesses to affirm their testimony on the Holy Qur'an provide a valid ground for doubting their credibility?
  • Can the recovery of incriminating evidence be sustained if the underlying ocular account of the occurrence is found to be unreliable?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Bakhsh vs Umar and another1994 SCMR 1129 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-04-24
  pre-emptionexecution proceedingsfinality of judgmentres judicatanon-compliancedeclaration suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute concerning the execution of pre-emption decrees. The petitioner, having purchased land in 1979, faced pre-emption suits which were initially decreed. Following appellate proceedings and a Supreme Court judgment, the petitioner was awarded an additional sum as the price of the disputed land. The respondents failed to deposit this additional amount within the prescribed time, leading to the dismissal of the pre-emption suits. Instead of raising objections during the execution proceedings, the petitioner filed a separate suit for a declaration that the pre-emption suits stood dismissed for non-compliance with the relevant procedural law. The High Court rejected the plaint, holding that the matter had attained finality through the Supreme Court judgment and could not be re-litigated via a separate suit. The Supreme Court affirmed this, holding that once a matter is adjudicated by the apex court, it is not open to interpretation or challenge through a fresh suit. The petition was dismissed as the court found no legal infirmity in the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party file a separate suit to interpret or challenge the finality of a Supreme Court judgment?
  • Does the failure to deposit the additional price in a pre-emption suit within the time prescribed under Order XX Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 result in the dismissal of the suit?
  • Is a separate suit maintainable for matters that should be addressed during execution proceedings?
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• Allah Bakhsh vs Mst. Fathe Bibi1994 SCMR 1945 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-07-14
  benami transactionpossessionregistered sale deedconcurrent findingsleave to appealproduction of documents
  Summary & questions settled

  The present petition for special leave to appeal arises out of a property dispute over a house situated in Basti Qulwali, Chak Noor Shah, purchased by the respondent through a registered sale deed from the sons of Allah Ditta. The petitioner, who was in possession of the house, resisted the respondent's suit for possession by claiming ownership through a benami transaction and prior construction by his grandfather. The core legal question concerns the legality of the trial court's rejection of a belatedly produced document regarding the benami claim, and the validity of the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's refusal to receive the document at a belated stage was fully in accordance with procedural law, and the concurrent findings regarding the respondent's ownership suffered from no illegality. Consequently, the Court laid down the principle that late production of documents without prior reliance at the earliest stage is rightly rejected under procedural rules, and concurrent findings of fact regarding ownership based on registered sale deeds will not be disturbed in the absence of legal infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court is justified in refusing to receive a document in evidence when it was neither relied upon nor produced at the earliest stage of proceedings?
  • Can concurrent findings of lower courts regarding ownership based on a registered sale deed be interfered with in the absence of illegality?
  • Whether a defendant can successfully resist a suit for possession on the basis of an unpleaded and belatedly tendered benami document?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Bakhsh vs Government of Punjab And Others1994 PLC (C.S.) 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-09
  pensionary benefitssubstantive postreversiontemporary appointmentmunicipal employeeretirement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the calculation of pensionary benefits for the appellant, who served as an Overseer in the Municipal Committee, Rawalpindi, and was temporarily appointed as a Municipal Engineer subject to government sanction. The core legal question was whether the appellant was entitled to receive pension calculated on the basis of the higher post of Municipal Engineer or his substantive post of Overseer. The Supreme Court held that the appellant's appointment as Municipal Engineer was never finalized or approved by the competent authority, his reversion to the substantive post of Overseer was validly upheld in previous litigation, and his continued discharge of duties as a Municipal Engineer was merely under interim court stay orders. The key principle laid down is that an employee occupying a higher post provisionally or under interim judicial protection without final approval or substantive confirmation cannot claim retirement benefits or pension based on that higher post.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee who performed duties of a higher post under interim court stay orders is entitled to pension calculated on the basis of that higher post?
  • Does a provisional or officiating appointment without the requisite statutory approval ripen into a substantive appointment for retirement benefits?
  • Whether a municipal employee's pension should be computed based on their substantive post when their reversion to that post was upheld by courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Bakhsh vs Ghulam Rasool and 8 others1994 SCMR 2048 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-27
  pre-emptionact of courtjudicial errorappellate jurisdictiondecreelimitation of jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a pre-emption suit where the appellant challenged the High Court's decision to set aside a decree in his favor. The trial court had initially dismissed the suit due to non-payment of court fees, a decision later reversed by the first appellate court. However, the High Court partially set aside the appellate decree, citing the Supreme Court's ruling in Malik Said Kamal Shah, which barred pre-emption decrees after July 31, 1986. The core legal question was whether the appellant could invoke the principle that 'no person should suffer for the act of the court' to argue that his suit should be deemed decreed on the date of the trial court's erroneous dismissal, thereby bypassing the subsequent legal bar on pre-emption. The Supreme Court held that the principle applies only to procedural omissions or failures by the court, not to erroneous judicial decisions on law or fact. The Court ruled that judicial errors must be corrected through appellate processes and cannot be equated with an 'act of the court' causing injury. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming that the legal bar applied to the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle that no person should suffer for the act of the court apply to erroneous judicial decisions on questions of law or fact?
  • Can a party claim that a suit should be deemed decreed on an earlier date because a trial court's initial dismissal was later found to be erroneous by an appellate court?
  • What constitutes an 'act of the court' that triggers the protective principle that no person should suffer for such an act?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Sher alias Ajab Ali vs The State1994 SCMR 1884 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  kidnapping for ransomdacoityretracted confessionidentification paradeconcurrent findingsappreciation of evidencespecial court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that maintained the conviction of the petitioner for kidnapping for ransom and dacoity. The petitioner was convicted by a Special Court for Suppression of Terrorist Activities under Sections 365-A, 395, and 397 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's conviction was sustainable given his defense that he was also a victim of kidnapping and the alleged discrepancies in the prosecution's evidence regarding identification and police encounter. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's conviction was sound, noting he was apprehended at the scene with the car used in the crime and the abductees, and was found in possession of the car key. The Court rejected the petitioner's plea of being a victim as an afterthought, unsupported by evidence, and affirmed that a retracted judicial confession, when corroborated by direct and circumstantial evidence, remains a valid basis for conviction. The Court refused leave to appeal, finding no legal or factual flaws in the lower courts' concurrent findings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a retracted judicial confession be used to support a conviction if corroborated by other evidence?
  • Does the apprehension of an accused at the crime scene with the victims and instruments of the crime negate a plea of innocence?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and the High Court subject to interference in a petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Shah, H Allah Din and 18 others vs The State and another1994 SCMR 717 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-17
  Special Court jurisdictionSuppression of Terrorist Activities ActKlashnikov usetransfer of caseFIR allegationsnon-recovery of weaponcriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from an order transferring a criminal case involving murder and attempt to murder (Sections 302, 324, 148, and 149 PPC) from the ordinary Sessions Court to a Special Court established under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975. The core legal question was whether the case was exclusively triable by the Special Court where an automatic assault rifle (Klashnikov) was alleged to have been used in the F.I.R., despite the weapon's non-recovery during investigation and the recovery of different crime empties. The Supreme Court held that the question of jurisdiction is to be determined on the basis of allegations made in the F.I.R. and the material produced by the prosecution at the time of presenting the challan, and non-recovery of the weapon during investigation does not oust the Special Court's jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that trial jurisdiction under the Act is evaluated from the prosecution's initial allegations and supporting material, such as eye-witness statements affirming the use of prohibited weapons, leaving evidentiary discrepancies to be tested during the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the jurisdiction of a Special Court under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, is to be determined on the basis of allegations in the F.I.R. and prosecution material at the time of challan?
  • Does the non-recovery of an alleged automatic weapon like a Klashnikov during investigation exclude the jurisdiction of the Special Court?
  • Can the question of trial jurisdiction be decided based on the non-recovery of crime weapons before recording evidence and cross-examination?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Begum and 2 others vs Zardad Khan and 4 others1994 SCMR 1140 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-04
  limited ownercustomary lawgiftshariat sharetermination of life estateresiduariesinheritance
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' Regular Second Appeal, thereby upholding the concurrent findings of the lower courts decreeing the respondents' suit for joint possession. The dispute arose from a gift of land made in 1964 by a widow who had succeeded to her deceased husband's estate in 1933 as a limited owner under customary law. The core legal question was whether the widow, after the termination of her limited estate, became the full owner of the property or was restricted to her Shariat share. The Supreme Court held that upon the enforcement of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1962, the limited estate terminated, and succession opened among the Shariat heirs of the last full owner. Consequently, the widow was only entitled to her 1/4 share under Shariat, and her gift of the entire property in excess of her legal share was void ab initio and not binding on the residuaries.

  Questions settled

  • Does a limited owner under customary law become the absolute owner of the entire estate upon the enforcement of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1962?
  • Is a gift made by a former limited owner in excess of her Shariat share valid and binding on the residuaries of the last full owner?
  • How is succession determined upon the termination of a widow's limited estate under the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1962?
  Read full judgment →
• Alamsher and others vs The Member, Board of Revenue (Colonies), Punjab, Lahore and others1994 SCMR 465 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-26
  state landland acquisitionBoard of Revenuepromissory estoppeladministrative lawland exchangelawful authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a dispute over the retention of state land provided to the appellants in exchange for their land acquired by the government in 1953. Initially, the Thal Development Authority granted the appellants state land, but later attempted to reclaim it. While a High Court judgment in 1967 restrained the Authority from interfering with the appellants' possession, it dismissed the suit against the Government. Subsequently, in 1976, the Board of Revenue issued a memorandum allowing the appellants to retain the land upon payment of the price difference between the acquired land and the state land. However, in 1982, the Board of Revenue reversed this decision, ordering the appellants' eviction. The core legal question was whether the Board of Revenue could unilaterally resile from its 1976 commitment to allow the appellants to retain the land. The Supreme Court held that the Board's 1982 decision was based on a misconception of the High Court's earlier ruling, which did not prohibit the Government from exercising its authority to settle the matter. Consequently, the Court declared the 1982 eviction orders without lawful authority and upheld the 1976 arrangement.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Board of Revenue unilaterally resile from a commitment to allow land retention after issuing a formal memorandum to that effect?
  • Does a court judgment dismissing a suit against the Government preclude the Government from subsequently exercising its administrative discretion to settle a land dispute?
  • Is a government body bound by its own administrative decisions regarding the disposal of state land?
  Read full judgment →
• Alam Zab Khan vs Commissioner, Afghan Refugees, N.W.F.P., Peshawar1994 PLC (C.S.) 632 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-23
  civil servantcontractual employmentservice tribunal jurisdictiontemporary appointmenttermination of servicesleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding the termination of his services as a Village Administrator in the Afghan Refugees Organization. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, whose appointment was described as temporary and on a contract basis for two years, qualified as a 'civil servant' under the relevant statutory framework, thereby granting him the right to maintain an appeal before the Service Tribunal. Upon reviewing the appointment order, the Supreme Court affirmed the Tribunal's finding that the employment was indeed temporary and contractual in nature. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner did not meet the definition of a civil servant and lacked the standing to maintain an appeal before the Tribunal. The petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused. The key principle established is that an individual employed on a specific, time-bound contractual basis does not qualify as a civil servant for the purposes of invoking the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal under the Civil Servants Act.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employee appointed on a temporary, time-bound contract basis qualify as a civil servant?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from an employee serving on a contract basis?
  • Can an employee whose services are dispensed with due to the expiration of a contract claim the status of a civil servant?
  Read full judgment →
• Alam Zab Khan vs Commissioner, Afghan Refugees, N.W.F.P., Peshawar1994 SCMR 546 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-23
  civil servantcontractual employmentFederal Service Tribunaltermination of serviceleave to appealtemporary appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding the termination of his services as a Village Administrator in the Afghan Refugees Organisation. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, whose employment was terminated on the grounds that his services were no longer required, qualified as a 'civil servant' under the relevant statutory framework, thereby granting him the right to maintain an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding that the petitioner's appointment was explicitly temporary and on a contract basis for a fixed period of two years. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner did not meet the definition of a civil servant under the Civil Servants Act, 1973, and thus lacked the standing to maintain an appeal before the Tribunal. The principle laid down is that an employee engaged on a specific, time-bound contract cannot claim the status or protections afforded to civil servants under the Civil Servants Act, 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employee appointed on a fixed-term contract basis qualify as a civil servant under the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Is an employee whose services are terminated on a contract basis entitled to maintain an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Akhtar Ali Javed vs Principal, Quaidiazam Medical College, Bahawalpur1994 SCMR 532 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-22
  medical college admissionFirst Professional MBBS examinationlimitation of chancesfundamental rightsdiscriminationultra viresprospectus rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenges the Lahore High Court's order upholding the cancellation of the appellant's admission to Quaid-e-Azam Medical College, Bahawalpur, for failing to clear the First Professional M.B.,B.S. Examination within the permissible four chances. The core legal questions involved whether the college's restrictive rule limiting examination chances was ultra vires, discriminatory under Fundamental Right No. 25, or unlawfully retrospective against students admitted prior to its enforcement. The Supreme Court held that the rule was validly issued under Section 15(3) of the Islamia University of Bahawalpur Act, 1975, was incorporated in the 1986-87 prospectus prior to the appellant's admission, and did not infringe fundamental rights or exhibit unreasonableness. The Court distinguished the appellant's case from connected University of Punjab cases where students were admitted prior to the notification date. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that the right to continue education is subject to institutional disciplinary rules designed to maintain academic standards.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a rule limiting the number of chances to clear the First Professional M.B.,B.S. Examination violates Fundamental Rights?
  • Can a student who fails to clear the First Professional M.B.,B.S. Examination within four available chances claim a continued right to study?
  • Does the application of a regulation regarding examination attempts to students admitted during the 1986-87 academic year constitute unlawful retrospective penalization?
  Read full judgment →
• Akbar Khan (deceased) through Rab Nawaz and others vs Mst. Khair1994 SCMR 1782 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-22
  revisional jurisdictionconcurrent findings of factleave to appealcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court exercising revisional jurisdiction. The core legal question concerns the propriety of the High Court interfering with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether such interference in revision was justified under the law. The holding establishes that the re-appraisal of concurrent findings of fact by a revisional court requires careful scrutiny regarding jurisdictional error or illegality.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact in exercise of revisional jurisdiction?
  • Under what circumstances is leave to appeal granted against the revisional order of the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Ajaib alias Ajba and others vs The State1994 SCMR 1479 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-15
  Zina-bil-Jabrhouse trespassdelayed FIRcredibility of victim testimonymedical evidencespeedy trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the judgment of the Special Court for Speedy Trials, Multan, convicting the appellants under section 458 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 10(3) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 for house trespass by night and committing Zina-bil-Jabr with two unmarried sisters. The core legal questions involved the credibility of the ocular testimony of the victims and their parents, the explanation for a minor delay in lodging the First Information Report, and the sufficiency of corroborative medical and forensic evidence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that the victims and their parents had no motive to falsely implicate the appellants in such a heinous crime, that the delay in reporting was adequately explained by the socioeconomic reality of needing political intervention to approach law enforcement, and that the medical evidence corroborated the eyewitness accounts. The court affirmed the convictions and sentences, laying down that natural and consistent eyewitness testimony from victims of sexual assault, supported by medical findings, is sufficient to maintain a conviction despite minor delays in reporting.

  Questions settled

  • Whether delay in lodging the First Information Report is fatal to the prosecution case when adequately explained by prevailing social circumstances?
  • Can the uncorroborated testimony of victims of Zina-bil-Jabr be relied upon for conviction when found consistent and natural?
  • Whether the absence of defence witnesses despite a specific plea of enmity weakens the prosecution case?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmed Nawaz vs The State1994 PLD Supreme Court 358 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-19
  criminal petitionspecial court for speedy trialsjurisdictioncoram non judicestatutory interpretationmurderleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition by a convict sentenced to death, challenging the dismissal of his criminal appeal by the Lahore High Court upholding his convictions and sentences under sections 302, 353, and 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder, assaulting a public servant, and murderous assault on a police party. The core legal question raised was whether the trial conducted by the presiding officer of the Special Court for Speedy Trials was coram non judice on the ground that he lacked the requisite statutory qualifications under section 4(2) of the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act, 1987, as opposed to the earlier Special Courts for Speedy Trials Ordinance, 1987. The Supreme Court held that since the appointment of the presiding officer was validly made while the Ordinance was in force, and section 15(3) of the Act expressly saved appointments made under the Ordinance, the challenge to his qualification was devoid of force. Furthermore, finding no merits or infirmities in the concurrent findings of the courts below, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial conducted by a judge appointed under the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Ordinance, 1987 becomes coram non judice due to the subsequent enactment of the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act, 1987?
  • Do the qualifications for a judge under section 4(2) of the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act, 1987 differ from those under the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Ordinance, 1987?
  • Are appointments made under the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Ordinance, 1987 saved by the provisions of the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act, 1987?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Subhan alias Bana and anothers vs The State1994 SCMR 1176 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-05
  suspension of sentenceinterlocutory ordercriminal appealleave to appealSupreme Court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, convicted under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life, filed an appeal before the High Court along with an application for suspension of their sentence during the pendency of the appeal. The High Court dismissed the prayer for suspension of sentence. The petitioners then moved the Supreme Court for leave to appeal against the interlocutory order of the High Court and sought suspension of their sentence. The Supreme Court held that the petition was misconceived as the matter was pending before the High Court, which was seized of all aspects of the case. Consequently, the Supreme Court ruled that approaching it at this stage against an interlocutory order of the High Court was neither warranted nor justified, and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be maintained in the Supreme Court against an interlocutory order of the High Court refusing suspension of sentence pending appeal?
  • Is it justified to approach the Supreme Court against an interlocutory order while the main appeal is pending in the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Ali vs Secretary, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan and 7 others1994 PLD Supreme Court 211 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-06
  service lawpromotion quotarecruitment rulesretrospective applicationvested rightsservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding his promotion prospects. The petitioner, a Sub-Engineer in the Public Works Department of Northern Areas, challenged the recruitment of private respondents as Assistant Executive Engineers, arguing that their appointment violated the 1980 Recruitment Rules, which mandated a 50% quota for promotees. The petitioner contended that the department had consistently exceeded the direct recruitment quota and that a subsequent 1990 notification, which reduced the promotee quota to 20%, should not apply to vacancies that arose prior to its promulgation. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the amended recruitment rules of 15-5-1990 apply retrospectively to vacancies that existed or were advertised before the amendment, thereby affecting the petitioner's entitlement to promotion under the previous regime. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to specifically examine the applicability of the amended rules to the petitioner's case, focusing on whether vested rights to promotion under prior regulations can be superseded by subsequent policy amendments.

  Questions settled

  • Does an amendment to recruitment rules apply to vacancies that arose or were advertised prior to the promulgation of the amendment?
  • Can a government notification amending recruitment quotas retrospectively affect the promotion entitlement of an employee who qualified under the previous rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Ali vs Secretary, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan And 7 Other1994 PLD Supreme Court 211 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-06
  service lawpromotion quotarecruitment rulesvested rightretrospective applicationservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Sub-Engineer in the Public Works Department of Northern Areas, sought leave to appeal against a Service Tribunal judgment regarding his promotion to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer. The petitioner contended that he was entitled to promotion under the Recruitment Rules of 1980, which allocated 50% of such posts to promotees. He argued that the department had exceeded the direct recruitment quota by filling 28 out of 35 posts through direct recruitment, and that subsequent direct recruitments further violated this quota. A central legal issue arose concerning the applicability of a 1990 amendment to the recruitment policy, which reduced the promotee quota to 20%. The petitioner argued that since the vacancies arose and advertisements were issued prior to the May 1990 amendment, the amended rules should not apply to his case. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the petitioner's right to promotion is governed by the recruitment rules in force at the time the vacancies arose or by the subsequent amended policy of 15-5-1990.

  Questions settled

  • Does a change in recruitment policy apply to vacancies that arose and were advertised prior to the amendment?
  • Is a government servant entitled to be considered for promotion under the rules in force at the time the vacancy occurred?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Ali and 2 others vs The State1994 SCMR 584 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-18
  commutation of sentencedeath sentencelife imprisonmentPresidential Amnestycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon leave granted to consider the commutation of the death sentence imposed upon the appellants. The core legal question was whether the appellants were entitled to the commutation of their death sentence to life imprisonment in light of this Court's prior precedent regarding Presidential Amnesty. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution evidence against the appellants was strong and their conviction was not challenged, but relying on the precedent in Eid Muhammad v. The State, appellants No. 1 and 2 were entitled to the concession of Presidential Amnesty. Consequently, the court altered their sentence of death to life imprisonment while otherwise dismissing the appeal. The key principle laid down is that death sentences may be commuted to life imprisonment where applicable under Presidential Amnesty precedents.

  Questions settled

  • Are appellants entitled to commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment under Presidential Amnesty based on precedent?
  • Does the dismissal of an appeal against conviction preclude the reduction of a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  Read full judgment →
• Agha Muhammad Ahmed vs Tariq Amin and 6 others1994 SCMR 2032 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-11
  ejectmentpersonal needcantonment rent restrictionlandlord and tenantdefault in payment of rentleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which set aside the Rent Controller's order and ordered the tenant's ejectment from the suit premises. The core legal question concerned whether the landlords bona fidely and in good faith required the premises, consisting of shops and a residential portion, for their personal use. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's finding of fact regarding the landlords' bona fide personal need was based on a proper appraisal of evidence and was free from any misreading, non-reading, or legal infirmity. The Court laid down the principle that where a landlord's need for rented premises is found to be bona fide, the choice and suitability of the premises are matters for the landlord to determine, and the tenant cannot dictate the manner of its use, particularly when penal provisions exist in the rent statute to penalize landlords who fail to occupy the premises after eviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a finding of fact regarding the landlord's bona fide personal need recorded by the High Court is open to interference by the Supreme Court in the absence of misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  • Can a tenant dictate the suitability or manner of use of the premises when the landlord establishes a bona fide personal need?
  • Does the landlord's need for premises of a composite nature for residence and business constitute a valid ground for ejectment under the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963?
  Read full judgment →
• Aftabuddin Qureshi vs Mst. Rachal Joseph1994 PLD Supreme Court 588 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-22
  temporary injunctionspecific performanceprima facie casebalance of convenienceirreparable losstrust property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal in limine of a High Court Appeal, which had upheld an interlocutory order granting a limited temporary injunction in a suit for specific performance, declaration, permanent injunction, and damages. The plaintiff claimed ownership of trust property based on a sale agreement, whereas the defendant trustee contended that the agreements were merely for the construction of a building and the induction of tenants against 'Pagree'. The core legal question was whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss sufficient to warrant a broader temporary injunction during the pendency of the suit. The Supreme Court held that the unregistered agreement was disputed, the defendant's documents prima facie established a construction and tenancy arrangement rather than a sale, and a trustee could not lawfully sell a place of worship. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the principle that temporary injunctions will be refused where a plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case or irreparable loss, and where the balance of convenience favors the defendant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff in a suit for specific performance establishes a prima facie case for a temporary injunction based on a disputed, unregistered sale agreement?
  • Does the balance of convenience lie in favor of refusing a blanket temporary injunction when restraining the defendant from collecting rent would alter existing circumstances and cause hardship?
  • Can a trustee lawfully sell trust property dedicated as a place of worship?
  Read full judgment →
• Aftab-Ud-Din Oureshi vs Mst. Rachal Joseph1994 PLD Supreme Court 588 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-22
  specific performancetemporary injunctionprima facie casebalance of convenienceirreparable losstrust propertyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a suit for specific performance, declaration, and permanent injunction concerning a property alleged to be a Synagogue. The petitioner claimed the respondent, a trustee, had agreed to sell the property, while the respondent contended the agreement was merely for construction work and the induction of tenants, with the Trust retaining ownership and rental rights. The High Court, in its chamber and appellate jurisdiction, granted a limited injunction preventing the alienation of the property but declined to restrain the respondent from collecting rent, citing the absence of a prima facie case for the petitioner. The Supreme Court examined the material and affirmed the lower courts' findings. It held that the petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case, noting the disputed, unregistered nature of the alleged sale agreement and evidence supporting the respondent's construction-based arrangement. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, emphasizing that the petitioner could not demonstrate irreparable loss, as any pecuniary harm could be remedied if the suit were ultimately decided in his favor.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unregistered and disputed agreement of sale constitute a prima facie case for the grant of a temporary injunction?
  • Can a court grant a temporary injunction restraining the collection of rent when the plaintiff can be compensated for pecuniary loss?
  • Is a trustee legally authorized to sell a property designated as a place of worship?
  Read full judgment →
• Administrator, Market Committee; Kasur and 3 others vs Muhammad1994 SCMR 1048 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-15
  market committeenotified market areaagricultural producefreedom of tradefundamental rightsregulatory powerlicensing system
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a common judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding the shifting of an old agricultural produce market in Kasur to a newly established market premises. The respondents, dealers and commission agents, challenged the closure of the old market and the restriction compelling them to operate exclusively in the new market, claiming a fundamental right to conduct business freely. The core legal questions involved whether the establishment of a new market and the consequent prohibition of trade outside its premises under Rule 79 of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Market (General) Rules, 1979, violated fundamental rights or exceeded statutory powers under the Punjab Agricultural Produce Market Ordinance, 1978. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's judgment. The Court held that the government possesses legitimate police powers to regulate trade, relocate markets in the public interest to mitigate traffic and hygienic hazards, and mandate that transactions occur within designated market premises. The holding establishes that a trader's right to conduct business is not absolute, and reasonable legislative restrictions imposed via a licensing system or market relocation do not infringe upon constitutional guarantees.

  Questions settled

  • Does the relocation of an established agricultural produce market to a new site infringe upon a citizen's fundamental right to conduct trade and business under the Constitution?
  • Whether Rule 79 of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Market (General) Rules, 1979, requiring all transactions of agricultural produce to be conducted within the approved market premises, is ultra vires the Punjab Agricultural Produce Market Ordinance, 1978?
  • Does a licensee or trader acquire an absolute or vested right to carry on business indefinitely at a specific location within a notified market area?
  • Is the government empowered under the Punjab Agricultural Produce Market Ordinance, 1978, to restrict the purchase and sale of agricultural produce exclusively to newly established market premises in the interest of public welfare and traffic management?
  Read full judgment →
• Adam vs The State1994 SCMR 1090 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-14
  culpable homicidesudden fightspur of the momentreduction of sentencemurderdanda blowintention to killcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenges the High Court judgment modifying the appellant's conviction from section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to section 304, and reducing his sentence from life imprisonment to 14 years rigorous imprisonment with a fine, arising from a fatal head injury inflicted with a danda during a sudden altercation over the construction of a house. The core legal question was whether the single blow inflicted during a sudden fight without premeditation or intention to kill warranted a conviction for murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The Supreme Court held that the incident occurred on the spur of the moment without premeditation, intention to cause death, or knowledge of likelihood of death amounting to murder, thereby falling under the latter part of section 304, leading to a further reduction of the sentence to 7 years rigorous imprisonment while maintaining the fine and the benefit under section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that where an injury resulting in death is inflicted during a sudden fight without pre-meditation or intention to cause death, the offence falls under culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be altered to section 304 when a fatal injury is inflicted during a sudden fight without premeditation?
  • Does a single blow with a danda during a sudden altercation establish an intention to commit murder?
  • What is the appropriate quantum of sentence under section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the act is committed without intention to cause death or bodily injury likely to cause death?
  Read full judgment →
• Adam Khan vs Government of N: W.F.P And 4 Others1994 PLC (C.S.) 977 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-11
  seniority disputecivil serviceservice tribunalres judicataregularizationad hoc appointmentfinality of judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil appeals filed against the judgment of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, which dismissed the appellants' challenge to a seniority list placing respondents above them. The appellants, Research Assistants in the Agriculture Department, contended that their seniority should be determined based on their earlier date of appointment and subsequent regularization following Public Service Commission selection. Conversely, the respondents argued that the seniority dispute had already attained finality through a previous Service Tribunal judgment (Appeal No. 41 of 1986), which had affirmed the respondents' seniority based on their earlier regularization date. The Supreme Court held that the seniority issue was res judicata, as the appellants failed to challenge the earlier Tribunal decision that had conclusively determined the inter se seniority of the parties. The Court affirmed that once a seniority position is settled by a judicial pronouncement that attains finality, subsequent seniority lists reflecting that same position cannot be challenged through departmental representation or further appeals. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the principle that settled seniority matters cannot be reopened.

  Questions settled

  • Can a seniority list be challenged if the underlying seniority dispute has already been adjudicated and attained finality?
  • Does a failure to challenge a Service Tribunal judgment render the seniority position settled?
  • Can a subsequent seniority list be challenged if it is in conformity with an earlier, un-challenged seniority list?
  Read full judgment →
• Adam Khan vs Government of N.W.F.P and 4 others1994 SCMR 1323 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-11
  service seniorityad hoc appointmentregularization of serviceservice tribunalres judicata
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals by leave of the Court are directed against the judgment of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, which dismissed the appellants' appeals challenging a notification determining inter se seniority in the Agriculture Department. The core legal question revolves around the determination of seniority between ad hoc appointees whose services were subsequently regularized, and whether a prior unappealed judgment of the Service Tribunal regarding an earlier seniority list operates as a bar. The Supreme Court held that since an earlier appeal filed by one of the appellants against a prior seniority list reflecting the same relative position was dismissed by the Tribunal and attained finality, subsequent seniority lists in conformity therewith could not be legally challenged. The appeals were accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that where a prior decision concerning service seniority attains finality, subsequent challenges to aligned seniority lists are barred.

  Questions settled

  • Can a subsequent seniority list in conformity with an earlier seniority list that attained finality be challenged before the Service Tribunal?
  • How is seniority determined under Section 8 of the N.-W.F.P. Civil Servants Act in cases of regular appointment?
  • Does the dismissal of an earlier service appeal regarding seniority bar subsequent appeals against aligned seniority lists?
  Read full judgment →
• Abrar Ahmad Khan Tareen vs Munawar Saeed1994 SCMR 1764 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-24
  leave to appealinterim injunctionspecific performanceagreement to selltemporary injunctioncivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had dismissed in limine as time-barred a first appeal regarding an interim injunction. The underlying matter arose from a civil suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell agricultural land, wherein the trial court had granted an interim injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, restraining the petitioner from alienating the land or changing its complexion. The Supreme Court declined to enter into the merits regarding the competency of the appeal and the refusal to condone delay by the High Court, noting that the matter pertained to an interim regulatory order operative during the pendency of litigation. The Court held that parties affected by an interim injunction are entitled at any time, upon showing cause, to seek appropriate amendments or modifications, such as requesting the court to require the plaintiff to deposit or guarantee the balance sale price, particularly if there is inordinate delay in concluding the suit. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an interim injunction order passed during the pendency of a civil suit can be modified or amended upon cause being shown?
  • Can a party restrained by an interim injunction in a specific performance suit request the court to direct the plaintiff to deposit or guarantee the balance sale price?
  • Is the Supreme Court inclined to grant leave to appeal against interlocutory interim regulatory orders where the main suit is still pending?
  Read full judgment →
• Abid Hussain vs The State1994 PLD Supreme Court 641 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  murderocular evidencesentence reductionchild witnessballistic evidencecommon intentioncriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the dismissal of the appellant's appeal by the Lahore High Court, which had confirmed his conviction and death sentence for the murder of Israr Hussain. The core legal question concerned the sufficiency of the ocular evidence provided by a single witness, given the exclusion of child witness testimony and the acquittal of the appellant's co-accused father. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, finding that the ocular testimony of the complainant was consistent, credible, and corroborated by medical evidence and the report of the Fire-Arms Expert regarding the weapon used. However, the Court noted the absence of evidence regarding the immediate prelude to the shooting, suggesting a possible sudden exchange of words between the parties. Applying the principle that in the absence of evidence regarding the immediate circumstances preceding a fatal act, a sentence of death may be commuted to life imprisonment, the Court upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence from death to life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained on the testimony of a single eye-witness if corroborated by medical and forensic evidence?
  • Does the exclusion of child witness testimony necessitate the acquittal of an accused in a murder case?
  • Is a sentence of death appropriate when the prosecution fails to establish the immediate prelude or circumstances leading to the fatal shooting?
  Read full judgment →
• Abid Hussain vs The State =P L.D 1994 Supreme Court 641 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-14
  criminal appealocular evidencesingle eye-witnessballistic evidencedeath penaltylife imprisonmentsentencing mitigationmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the High Court's judgment confirming the appellant's death sentence for the murder of the deceased. The core legal question concerns the sufficiency of a single eye-witness's testimony, corroborated by ballistic and medical evidence, to sustain a conviction, and the appropriateness of the death penalty in the absence of evidence regarding the immediate prelude to the crime. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding the complainant's ocular testimony reliable and sufficiently corroborated by the ballistic expert's report and medical findings. However, the Court exercised its discretion to reduce the sentence from death to life imprisonment. The key principle laid down is that while the testimony of a single eye-witness, when corroborated by independent evidence, is legally sufficient to sustain a conviction, the court must consider the totality of circumstances in sentencing. Specifically, where the prosecution fails to establish the immediate circumstances or the prelude to a shooting, the imposition of the death penalty may be mitigated to life imprisonment, acknowledging the possibility of sudden provocation or heat of the moment.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained based on the testimony of a single eye-witness if corroborated by ballistic and medical evidence?
  • Is the death penalty mandatory in murder cases where the immediate prelude to the crime remains unproven?
  • Does the exclusion of a child witness's testimony invalidate the remaining ocular evidence provided by another witness?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdus Sattar vs Abdul Ghafoor and another1994 SCMR 481 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-23
  bail cancellationleave to appealmurdercriminal jurisprudencepost-arrest bail
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the order of the High Court granting bail to respondent No. 1, who was suspected of committing the murder of Muhammad Azam over a motive involving suspected illicit intimacy with the respondent's daughter. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in granting bail to the respondent where co-accused had made confessions without involving the respondent, and where the circumstance that the co-accused were employees of the respondent was insufficient to connect him to the offence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was fully justified in granting bail under the circumstances, as the material on record did not sufficiently charge the respondent with the commission of the offence. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed and bail was not cancelled.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail granted to an accused suspected of murder should be cancelled when co-accused confessions do not involve him?
  • Does the mere fact that co-accused are employees of a respondent suffice to connect the respondent to a criminal offence for bail purposes?
  • Under what circumstances is the Supreme Court likely to interfere with an order of the High Court granting bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdus Salam vs Additional Secretary, Home and Tas, Department And 41994 PLD Supreme Court 361 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-25
  FATA Regulationpossessory rightswrit jurisdictionadmission in pleadingsleave to appealproperty disputeapprobate and reprobate
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a Peshawar High Court judgment, which had dismissed a writ petition challenging a decision by the Home Secretary regarding a property dispute. The core dispute involved a claim for possession of a shop, where the plaintiff alleged that the petitioner, having entered into a partnership agreement, refused to vacate the premises upon the partnership's termination. The matter was initially adjudicated under the FATA Regulation, where a Tribunal and the Assistant Commissioner ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Although an Additional Commissioner initially reversed this, the Home Secretary restored the original decree. The Supreme Court examined whether the petitioner could challenge the plaintiff's possessory rights after having previously admitted in his written statement that he obtained possession from the plaintiff upon payment. The Court held that the petitioner's attempt to set up a new case regarding ownership was contradictory to his pleadings. Finding no illegality or infirmity in the findings of the Tribunal or the Home Secretary, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that a party cannot approbate and reprobate by contradicting their own prior admissions.

  Questions settled

  • Can a defendant in a property dispute set up a new case regarding ownership that contradicts their own written statement?
  • Does the High Court have grounds to interfere in writ jurisdiction when the findings of a Tribunal and revisional authority are free from illegality?
  • Is a party bound by admissions made in their written statement regarding the origin of their possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdus Salam vs Additional Secretary, Home and T.As. Department and 4 others1994 PLD Supreme Court 361 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-25
  leave to appealFATA Regulationpossession of shoppartnership disputewrit petitionrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing a writ petition filed against the revisional order of the Home Secretary. The core legal dispute arose from a suit for possession of a shop instituted by the respondent under the FATA Regulation, where a local tribunal rendered a majority award in favor of the plaintiff for the restoration of possession. The Assistant Commissioner decreed the suit, but the Additional Commissioner set it aside on appeal. Upon revision, the Home Secretary restored the Assistant Commissioner's decree, which decision was upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court considered whether the petitioner, having entered into possession through the respondent under a partnership and failing to prove his independent purchase of possessory rights, could resist the claim. The Court held that the petitioner's possession was permissive and he could not set up a contradictory case, and that the tribunals' findings suffered from no illegality. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the principle that a person who enters possession through another cannot set up an inconsistent case to deny that party's possessory right.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person who enters into possession of property through another under a partnership can subsequently set up a contradictory claim of ownership or independent possessory rights?
  • Does the decision of a tribunal under the FATA Regulation, upheld in revision, warrant interference in writ jurisdiction without proof of legal illegality or infirmity?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rashid vs Manzoor Ahmed and another1994 SCMR 1677 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-08
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirycriminal liabilityhatchet injuryleave to appealvicarious liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court granting post-arrest bail to the respondent, Manzoor Ahmad, in a criminal case involving the murder of the deceased, Abdul Majid. The core legal question was whether the High Court exercised its discretion properly in granting bail, given the specific allegations against the respondent. The respondent was accused of attacking the deceased with the blunt side of a hatchet, causing a simple injury on the outer side of the left thigh, while other co-accused were alleged to have caused fatal head injuries. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding no illegality or irregularity in the reasoning. The Court held that the nature of the injury attributed to the respondent—being simple and inflicted on a non-vital part of the body—justified further inquiry into his specific role and intent. The principle laid down is that where an accused's specific act is distinct from the fatal injuries caused by co-accused, and the injury attributed is simple, a case for further inquiry is established, warranting the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the infliction of a simple injury on a non-vital part of the body by one of several co-accused warrant the grant of bail pending further inquiry?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's order granting bail if no illegality or irregularity is found in the reasoning?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rashid alias Muhammad Rashid vs Muhammad Hanif and 2 others1994 SCMR 2035 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-22
  amendment of written statementcivil procedureconstitutional jurisdictiondiscretionary powerbelated amendmentwrit petitionconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which had upheld the concurrent findings of the trial court and the revisional court refusing to allow an amendment to a written statement. The petitioner sought to amend his written statement in a civil suit for permanent injunction seven years after its filing, claiming a change in the possession status of the disputed property. The trial court dismissed the application, citing the inordinate delay and the fact that the facts were within the petitioner's knowledge at the time of the original filing. The High Court declined to interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction, noting that the discretion exercised by the lower courts was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that an amendment to a written statement should not be permitted at a belated stage, particularly when the facts were known to the party from the outset and the case had already reached the argument stage. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court refuse an application for amendment of a written statement if it is filed at a belated stage after evidence has been recorded?
  • Is interference in constitutional jurisdiction warranted when lower courts have exercised their discretion to refuse an amendment to a written statement without acting arbitrarily or capriciously?
  • Is an Intra-Court appeal competent against the dismissal of a writ petition by a learned Judge in chambers under the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdulwahab vs Tariq Hassan And Another1994 PLD Supreme Court 338 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-25
  acquittalleave to appealrecovery evidencediscrepancy in evidencecriminal justiceocular evidenceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that acquitted the respondent in a criminal case. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its assessment of the evidence, specifically regarding the recovery of the weapon and the reliability of ocular and medical testimony. The Supreme Court examined the prosecution's case, noting a significant discrepancy between the recovery memo and the parcel sent to the Arms Expert regarding the weapon's identification number. Furthermore, the Court found that the ocular evidence provided by the injured witness failed to implicate the respondent, and the presence of police witnesses was rightly doubted by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's acquittal was based on sound reasoning and inherent infirmities in the prosecution's evidence. The key principle laid down is that where there are material discrepancies in recovery evidence and the prosecution fails to clarify them, such evidence is rightly discarded, and an acquittal based on such evidentiary weaknesses is consistent with the principles of administering criminal justice.

  Questions settled

  • Does a material discrepancy in the identification number of a recovered weapon between the recovery memo and the forensic parcel justify discarding the recovery evidence?
  • Can an acquittal be maintained when the ocular evidence fails to support the prosecution's version of the incident?
  • Is the Supreme Court inclined to interfere with a High Court's acquittal when the lower court has identified inherent infirmities in the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdullah vs Muhammad Hayat and 2 others1994 SCMR 90 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-06
  pre-emptionsale-deedProvincial Governmentpre-emptible landSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a pre-emption suit filed by the respondents concerning land purchased by the appellant through a registered sale-deed dated 13-3-1975. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondents. At the leave stage, the appellant contended that the disputed land was not pre-emptible based on a notification relating to the former Bahawalpur State and the principle established in precedent case-law. The Supreme Court examined the evidence showing that the suit land vested in the Provincial Government at the relevant time and followed the precedent holding that such land is not pre-emptible. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the pre-emption decree suffered from an error of law and set it aside. The appeal was allowed, and the parties were left to bear their own costs. The key principle laid down is that land vesting in the Provincial Government at the relevant time is not subject to pre-emption.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land vesting in the Provincial Government at the relevant time is pre-emptible?
  • Can a pre-emption decree be maintained in relation to land that is not pre-emptible?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdullah Jan vs The State1994 SCMR 1612 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-15
  narcoticsheroin possessionbenefit of doubtwitness credibilityrecovery evidencemashircriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which upheld the appellant's conviction under Article 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, for possession of five kilograms of heroin. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, given the significant discrepancies in the evidence regarding the recovery process and the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. The Supreme Court observed that the recovery witnesses, particularly an ex-police official who acted as a mashir, were unreliable, having suppressed material facts and perjured themselves, a finding previously noted by the Federal Shariat Court. Furthermore, the Court noted the absence of independent public witnesses despite the recovery occurring in a busy area, and the credible testimony of defence witnesses supporting the appellant's plea of innocence. Consequently, the Court held that the prosecution's case was fraught with doubt. The Supreme Court set aside the convictions, acquitted the appellant, and established the principle that where prosecution witnesses are proven unreliable and material doubts exist, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of prosecution witnesses to act as credible, independent observers in a narcotics recovery case entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt?
  • Can a conviction for possession of narcotics be sustained when the recovery witnesses are found to have perjured themselves and suppressed material facts?
  • Is the testimony of an ex-police official acting as a recovery witness sufficient to establish guilt in a narcotics case without corroboration from independent public witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdullah and others vs Muhammad Nawaz and others1994 SCMR 83 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-06-23
  evacuee propertypartition of landcivil court jurisdictionsettlement departmentpermanent injunctiondeclaration suitremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute over agricultural land, where the appellants, having purchased an undivided share of evacuee property, sought a declaration and permanent injunction against the respondents. The respondents claimed the land had been partitioned by the Settlement Department in 1971. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the appellants, but the High Court reversed this, citing a lack of jurisdiction under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958. The Supreme Court addressed whether the Civil Court possessed jurisdiction to examine the validity of the alleged partition. The Court held that if the partition was validly effected by the Settlement Department, the Civil Court could not interfere. However, if the partition was invalid, the Civil Court retained jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter, particularly following the repeal of evacuee laws in 1974. Consequently, the Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine the validity of the partition, allowing for necessary amendments to the pleadings, thereby establishing that civil courts may scrutinize the validity of administrative partitions.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Civil Court have jurisdiction to determine the validity of a partition allegedly effected by the Settlement Department?
  • Can a Civil Court effect a partition of land between parties if the Settlement Department's partition is found to be invalid?
  • Is a Civil Court barred from reviewing a partition order passed by the Settlement Department after the repeal of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdullah and 5 otherss vs Allah Ditta and another1994 SCMR 1860 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-07-19
  leave to appealKhasra Girdawarirevenue entriesallotted landcultivation rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, concerning the legal effect of revenue entries in the Khasra Girdawari recording cultivation by a deceased person. The core legal question examined by the court is whether entries in the Khasra Girdawari demonstrating cultivation by the petitioners' deceased predecessor-in-interest can avail the petitioners in claiming a right in allotted land, and whether respondent Allah Ditta was improperly given preference over them, considering that any fault in the entries lay with the Patwari rather than the deceased or the petitioners. The Court granted leave to appeal to consider these questions regarding revenue records and land preference.

  Questions settled

  • Whether entries in the Khasra Girdawari showing cultivation by a deceased person can avail the legal heirs for claiming rights in allotted land?
  • Whether a respondent can be given preference over petitioners when the defect in revenue entries is attributable to the Patwari rather than the parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Wahab vs Tariq Hassan and anothers1994 PLD Supreme Court 338 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-25
  leave to appealacquittalcriminal appealre-appraisal of evidenceweapon recovery discrepancy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which dismissed the State appeal against the acquittal of the respondent. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution successfully established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt based on ocular evidence, medical testimony, recovery of the weapon, and motive. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly appreciated the evidence, noting significant discrepancies in the weapon recovery memo regarding the pistol's description and number, lack of support from ocular and medical evidence concerning the injuries, and doubts regarding the presence of certain police witnesses. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the principle that acquittals supported by cogent reasons based on inherent infirmities in the prosecution case should not be interfered with.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an acquittal judgment by the High Court can be interfered with when the prosecution case suffers from inherent infirmities?
  • What is the legal effect of a material discrepancy in the weapon recovery memo regarding the pistol's number in a criminal case?
  • Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against acquittal when the High Court has fully and cogently addressed all contentions raised by the prosecution?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Wahab Umer through Legal Heirs vs Evacuee Trust Property1994 SCMR 1949 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-27
  review petitionevacuee trust propertyleave to appealremand of casenewly discovered document
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a review petition filed against the order of the Supreme Court dismissing a civil petition relating to an evacuee trust property dispute. The core legal question concerns whether the discovery of a new authentic document demonstrating that the disputed property is not an evacuee trust property warrants a review and reconsideration of the case. The Supreme Court accepted the review petition, set aside its earlier order, granted leave to appeal, and simultaneously accepted the appeal. Consequently, the High Court order was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the High Court for a fresh decision after considering the newly secured document. The key principle laid down is that the discovery of crucial authentic evidence affecting the foundational nature of the property constitutes sufficient ground to review a prior order and remand the matter for reconsideration to ensure complete justice.

  Questions settled

  • Does the discovery of a new authentic document showing that a disputed property is not an evacuee trust property warrant a review of a dismissal order?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal and simultaneously accept the appeal upon accepting a review petition?
  • Under what circumstances may a matter be remanded to the High Court for a fresh decision based on newly secured documents?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Subhan vs Raheem Bakhsh and another1994 PLD Supreme Court 178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-25
  murderocular testimonyinterested witnessappellate interferencemisreading of evidencedeath penaltycorroborationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which acquitted the respondent, Raheem Bakhsh, of charges under Section 302, P.P.C., overturning his conviction by the trial court. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court's reversal was based on a misreading of evidence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to properly evaluate the ocular testimony, which was corroborated by motive, medical evidence, and ballistic reports. The Court emphasized that an appellate court must provide logical reasons when disagreeing with a trial court's findings of fact, rather than ignoring them. The Court found the ocular testimony of the two eye-witnesses to be confidence-inspiring and consistent, despite their relationship to the deceased. It rejected the High Court's reliance on minor discrepancies and misinterpretations of the investigating officer's statements regarding crime empties. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal, and restored the trial court's conviction and death sentence, finding no mitigating circumstances to justify a lesser penalty.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court set aside a trial court's finding of fact without providing logical reasons for disagreeing with the trial court's reasoning?
  • Is it a rule of law that a court cannot rely on the testimony of an interested witness to base a conviction?
  • Does the presence of multiple exit wounds corresponding to a single entry wound necessarily indicate the use of a shotgun rather than a rifle?
  • Must an appellate court consider the trial court's reasons for believing eye-witnesses before discarding their testimony as 'chance witnesses'?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Sattar through Legal Heirs and others vs Muhammad Shafiq Khan1994 SCMR 2021 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-27
  excess allotmentP.I. Unitssettlement lawscancellation of allotmentbona fide mistakeDisplaced Persons (Land Settlement) Actallotment entitlement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a dispute concerning the allotment of agricultural land to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents, who received an allotment exceeding his verified entitlement by 4551 P.I. Units. The core legal question was whether an allotment of land made in excess of a claimant's entitlement, resulting from an inadvertent mistake by Settlement Authorities rather than fraud or misrepresentation by the allottee, is liable to be cancelled under the relevant settlement laws. The Supreme Court held that such excess allotments are subject to cancellation. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment, which had protected the excess allotment, and restored the order of the Settlement Commissioner directing the cancellation of the excess land. The key principle laid down is that the power to cancel an allotment under Section 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, is exercisable even where the excess allotment occurred due to a bona fide mistake by the Settlement Authorities, as settlement must be in accordance with the law and cannot be based on an entitlement that does not exist.

  Questions settled

  • Can an allotment of land made in excess of a claimant's entitlement be cancelled if the excess was caused by an inadvertent mistake of the Settlement Authorities?
  • Does the power to cancel an allotment under Section 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 require proof of fraud or misrepresentation by the allottee?
  • Is an allotment of land valid if it exceeds the verified entitlement of the allottee?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Sattar and others vs Province of the Punjab through Collector, District Bahawalnagar1994 SCMR 527 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-24
  land acquisition5 marlas schemenon-proprietorsnecessary partycivil suitleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the dismissal of the appellants' civil revision by the High Court, which arose from the dismissal of their suit challenging the acquisition of their land for the 5 Marlas Scheme. The core legal question involves the legality of the acquisition under various provincial housing statutes and whether mandatory provisions of law were observed. The Supreme Court held that the appeal must be dismissed solely on the ground that the suit was not filed against the actual allottees for whose benefit the land was acquired, as those necessary parties were not impleaded. The key principle laid down is that a suit challenging land acquisition and subsequent allotment must be instituted against the allottees or beneficiaries in whose favour the land was allotted, failure of which renders the suit unsustainable regardless of the merits of the acquisition itself.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit challenging land acquisition for a housing scheme is maintainable without impleading the allottees of the plots as parties?
  • Does the failure to sue the actual beneficiaries of land acquisition warrant the dismissal of the suit?
  • Can a court decide the legality of a land acquisition scheme when the necessary private parties have not been joined in the litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Riaz vs Hamidan Begum and 2 others1994 SCMR 2019 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-27
  dissolution of marriageKhularestitution of conjugal rightscompensation for Khulafamily lawwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which set aside the condition imposed by lower courts requiring the respondent to return six Kanals of land as compensation for the dissolution of her marriage on the basis of Khula. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly interfered with the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the compensation for Khula. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding no legal error. The Court held that because the Family Court had already determined that the respondent was entitled to a decree of dissolution of marriage based on other grounds—specifically non-payment of maintenance, failure to perform marital obligations, and cruelty—it was unnecessary to dissolve the marriage on the basis of Khula. Consequently, the condition requiring the return of property, which was gifted by the father-in-law in recognition of services rather than as consideration for the marriage, was legally unsustainable. The principle established is that where a marriage is dissolvable on grounds other than Khula, imposing financial conditions associated with Khula is improper.

  Questions settled

  • Is it necessary to dissolve a marriage on the basis of Khula when other grounds for dissolution have been established?
  • Can a court impose a condition for the return of property as compensation for Khula if the property was gifted for services rendered and not in consideration of marriage?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts regarding Khula compensation when the underlying basis for the decree is legally flawed?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rehman and 2 others vs Shehnaz Begum and another1994 SCMR 100 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-04-08
  murderacquittalreappraisal of evidencecircumstantial evidencecriminal conspiracySupreme Court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, arising from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, examined whether the acquittal of the respondent for the murder of her husband was conjectural and contrary to the weight of evidence. The deceased was killed at night in his house, and the prosecution alleged a conspiracy between the respondent wife and her co-accused paramour, who died before trial. The trial court had convicted the respondent under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but the High Court acquitted her on appeal, holding that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt due to unreliable ocular testimony and insufficient circumstantial evidence. The Supreme Court evaluated the evidence, noting that the conduct of the natural witnesses (the sons and brother of the deceased) was inconsistent, that initial reports pointed towards dacoity, and that the direct and circumstantial evidence failed to convincingly establish the respondent's complicity. The Supreme Court held that the acquittal by the High Court suffered from no legal infirmity warranting interference, thereby dismissing the appeal and reaffirming the principle that appellate interference in an acquittal is unwarranted unless the judgment is perverse or arbitrary.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the High Court when the view taken by the High Court is a possible view based on the evidence?
  • Does the subsequent change of stance by natural witnesses regarding an initial theory of dacoity affect their credibility as eye-witnesses?
  • Whether unverified extra-judicial confessions and retracted confessional statements lacking statutory formalities hold sufficient evidentiary value to maintain a murder conviction?
  • Can a conviction for murder through conspiracy be sustained solely on weak and unverified circumstantial evidence?
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• Abdul Razzaq vs The State1994 SCMR 989 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-18
  ocular testimonyrelated witnessesmurder convictionappellate interferenceFirst Information Reportconcurrent findingssentence commutation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Abdul Razzaq, sought leave to appeal against his conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for the murder of Saulat Naveed. The trial court had sentenced him to death, which the High Court subsequently commuted to life imprisonment. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the ocular testimony of the prosecution witnesses, who were relatives of the deceased, was credible despite the defense's arguments regarding the timing of the First Information Report and the witnesses' presence at the scene. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts, ruling that the relationship of the witnesses to the deceased did not inherently detract from their credibility, especially in the absence of prior enmity. The Court rejected the defense's challenge to the timing of the First Information Report as unsubstantiated. The key principle laid down is that the testimony of related witnesses is admissible and reliable when corroborated by prompt reporting and the absence of established enmity, and that appellate courts will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding witness credibility unless a clear error is demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Does the relationship of prosecution witnesses to the deceased automatically render their testimony unreliable?
  • Can a conviction be sustained based on ocular testimony when the First Information Report is recorded promptly after the incident?
  • Should an appellate court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding witness credibility in a murder case?
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• Abdul Razzaq and 6 others vs Riasat Ali and 10 others1994 SCMR 1116 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-21
  specific performancesecond appeallis pendensappreciation of evidenceagreement to sellleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside a first appellate court's decision and restored a trial court's dismissal of a suit for specific performance. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the appellate court's findings regarding the genuineness of an agreement to sell, given the trial court's initial finding that the document was fictitious. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly identified that the appellate court had failed to properly analyze the evidence regarding the execution of the agreement, specifically noting the lack of corroborating details and the contradictory nature of the plaintiff's evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision to dismiss the suit, ruling that the appellate court's reversal was based on an improper reading of the evidence. The key principle laid down is that a second appellate court is justified in interfering with an appellate court's findings when the latter has failed to properly analyze the evidence or has misread the material on record.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with the findings of an appellate court in a second appeal if the appellate court failed to properly analyze the evidence?
  • Is a finding of fact by a trial court regarding the genuineness of an agreement to sell subject to interference in second appeal if the first appellate court misread the evidence?
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• Abdul Razique Khan vs The Province of Sindh Through The Chief1994 PLD Supreme Court 79 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-09-02
  resignation of member of provincial assemblyspeaker of provincial assemblyvoluntary resignationinquiry into resignationconstitutional petitiondemocracy and democratic values
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the judgment of the High Court of Sindh upholding the notification issued by the Acting Speaker of the Sindh Provincial Assembly that declared the appellant's seat vacant due to resignation. The core legal question was whether the Acting Speaker conducted a valid and lawful inquiry to determine the genuineness and voluntary nature of the resignation before giving effect to it. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that an authority receiving a resignation has a mandatory duty to ascertain personally not only that the document bears the member's signature, but also that it is entirely voluntary and genuinely intended to operate as a resignation. Mere comparison of signatures, prolonged absence, or non-appearance after notice do not suffice to prove these legal requirements. The key principle laid down is that courts and statutory functionaries must actively protect democratic processes by ensuring rigorous, substantive inquiries into the voluntary and intentional character of political resignations, particularly in turbulent political environments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an authority receiving a resignation from a member of a legislative assembly is legally required to verify its voluntary nature and genuine intent beyond merely comparing signatures?
  • Can a prolonged absence or non-appearance of a member after notice substitute for a positive inquiry into the authenticity of a resignation?
  • What are the essential legal requirements that must be satisfied before a political resignation can be given legal effect by the speaker of an assembly?
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• Abdul Razak vs Karachi Building Control Authority and others1994 PLD Supreme Court 512 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-31
  Karachi Building Control Authorityunauthorized constructioncompounding of offencesregularization of building plansresidential zoningtown planning regulationsdiscretionary powerssanctioned development scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil appeals with leave of the Supreme Court against a judgment of the High Court of Sindh allowing a constitutional petition filed by neighboring plot owners against unauthorized construction on a residential plot. The builder deviated from approved plans to erect multiple flats on a residential plot, which the Karachi Building Control Authority purported to regularize by compounding the offence. The core legal questions pertained to the interpretation of compounding powers under Section 19 of the Sindh Building Control Ordinance, 1979 read with Regulation 16(2) and Regulation 25 of the Karachi Buildings and Town Planning Regulations, 1979, and whether discretionary compounding can be exercised in violation of town planning rules to the prejudice of third parties. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the High Court's direction to enforce the Regulations. The Court held that compounding powers only condone criminal liability and do not empower authorities to regularize construction that alters the character of the plot or scheme or prejudices third parties' rights and public health.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the power to compound offences under Section 19 of the Sindh Building Control Ordinance, 1979 and Regulation 16 empowers the Building Control Authority to regularize unauthorized construction that changes the character and zoning of a plot?
  • Whether statutory discretionary powers to regularize or compound building violations can be exercised to the prejudice of third parties and public utility services?
  • Whether the word 'or' between clauses (b) and (c) of Regulation 16(2) of the Karachi Buildings and Town Planning Regulations, 1979 is to be construed disjunctively or conjunctively?
  • Can a building authority regularize an unauthorized construction on a residential plot without giving reasons and in deviation of sanctioned town planning limits?
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• Abdul Razak vs Karachi Building Control Authority And OtherPLD 1994 Supreme Court .512 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-31
  building controlunauthorised constructionregularisation of buildingcompoundable offenceurban planningamenity plotzoning regulationsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two civil appeals directed against a common judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which allowed a constitutional petition filed by neighbouring residents seeking to restrain unauthorised and illegal construction of multi-storeyed flats on a residential plot. The core legal questions involved the scope of the Karachi Building Control Authority's power to compound offences and regularise building violations under the Sindh Building Control Ordinance, 1979, and the Karachi Buildings and Town Planning Regulations, 1979, and whether such regularisation can override zoning laws and prejudice third parties. The Supreme Court held that while the Authority has discretion to compound criminal liability or minor regularisable infractions, it lacks the legal authority to regularise major structural breaches that fundamentally change the character of a property—such as converting a residential bungalow site into multi-storeyed commercial flats—in violation of public interest and third-party rights. The Court laid down that statutory discretionary powers vested in public functionaries must be exercised reasonably, fairly, and consistently with the objectives of urban planning and environmental safety.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Karachi Building Control Authority has the power to regularise building constructions that violate zoning regulations and change the character of a residential property?
  • Is the discretion of a public authority to compound building offences subject to the rights of third parties and public safety?
  • Can the word 'or' between clauses of a building regulation be construed as 'and' to restrict the regularisation power of a building authority?
  • Does a builder who creates a fait accompli during litigation by continuing construction under the cover of a court order retain any equitable right to relief?
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• Abdul Rauf vs Abdul Razzak and anothers1994 PLD Supreme Court 476 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-31
  malicious prosecutiondamagesdischarge of accusedreasonable and probable causemalicefavorable terminationcivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by leave from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh which had decreed a suit for damages for malicious prosecution in favour of the respondent. The core legal questions involved the necessary ingredients to sustain an action for malicious prosecution, specifically whether an order of discharge constitutes termination of prosecution in favour of the accused, and whether malice and absence of reasonable and probable cause were duly established. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court erred in reversing the concurrent findings of the lower courts, as the plaintiff failed to prove that the prosecution terminated favourably (having only been discharged due to unserved witnesses), failed to plead or prove malice, and failed to establish the absence of reasonable and probable cause where the police had submitted a challan after investigation. The key principle laid down is that in a suit for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must affirmatively prove all essential ingredients including malice and want of reasonable and probable cause, and a mere discharge for lack of prosecution witnesses does not establish that the original criminal charge was false or malicious.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential ingredients a plaintiff must prove in a suit for damages for malicious prosecution?
  • Does an order of discharge under section 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 amount to a termination of prosecution in favour of the accused for the purposes of a malicious prosecution suit?
  • Can malice be inferred solely from the fact that an accused person was eventually discharged due to the non-appearance of prosecution witnesses?
  • Is a private individual who lodges a first information report or sends a telegram to the police liable for malicious prosecution when the police independently submit a challan after investigation?
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• Abdul Rauf vs Abdul Razzak And Another1994 PLD Supreme Court 476 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-31
  malicious prosecutiondamagesreasonable and probable causemalicedischarge of accusedpolice challanspecial damages
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil appeal arose by leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging a High Court decree awarding damages for malicious prosecution to Respondent No. 1. The dispute stemmed from a criminal complaint lodged by the appellant via telegram regarding industrial disruption by mill workers. Following police investigation and submission of a challan, the criminal case was dismissed and the accused discharged under Section 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 because prosecution witnesses could not be produced after prolonged delay. The trial and appellate courts dismissed the respondent's damages suit, but the High Court reversed them in second appeal. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court decree, holding that to establish malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must strictly plead and prove that the prosecution ended in his favour, was initiated with malice, and lacked reasonable and probable cause. The Court held that discharge due to witness unavailability does not equate to termination in favour, police submission of a challan indicates prima facie reasonable cause, and special damages cannot be granted absent strict proof.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order of discharge under Section 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for want of prosecution evidence constitute termination of criminal proceedings in favour of the accused for maintaining a suit for malicious prosecution?
  • Can a suit for damages for malicious prosecution succeed without specific pleadings and affirmative proof of both malice and absence of reasonable and probable cause?
  • Does the submission of a challan by the police following investigation create a prima facie presumption of reasonable and probable cause in favour of the complainant?
  • Can special damages in a tort action for malicious prosecution be awarded without specific particulars and strict proof on record?
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• Abdul Rashid vs Mst. Saeeda Begum and another1994 SCMR 1888 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-02
  ex parte judgmentrevisional jurisdictionrestoration of applicationinherent powersmiscellaneous proceedingscivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arises from an order dismissing an application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to set aside a revisional judgment passed in the absence of the appellant's counsel. The core legal question was whether an application for setting aside or recalling an ex parte judgment or order passed in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction is maintainable under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that such an application is maintainable, relying on section 141 and Order IX read with the inherent powers of the court. The Court laid down the principle that procedural provisions relating to the restoration of cases are intended to advance justice, and unless expressly prohibited, procedural remedies such as setting aside ex parte orders remain available in civil proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application for setting aside or recalling a judgment passed ex parte in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction is maintainable?
  • Do the provisions of section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 attract the applicability of Order IX to civil revision proceedings?
  • Can inherent powers under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be invoked to restore a revision application dismissed in default?
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• Abdul Majid and 5 others vs Muhammad ASHRAFrespondent1994 SCMR 115 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-16
  pre-emption suitlimitation periodmutation attestationoral saleKhasra Girdawariphysical possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit filed by the respondent, challenging the timeliness of the suit. The core legal question was whether the suit was filed within the period of limitation, specifically whether the limitation period commenced from the date of the oral sale (alleged to be 1960) or from the date the mutation was attested (9-10-1970). The petitioners, as vendees, contended that they had taken actual physical possession of the land long before the mutation was attested, citing Khasra Girdawari entries from 1969 as evidence. The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the High Court and the trial court, which had rejected the petitioners' reliance on the Khasra Girdawari entries due to the significant delay in their creation relative to the alleged date of sale. Consequently, the Court held that the suit was filed within time, as it was brought within one year of the mutation attestation. The decision reinforces that evidentiary documents created long after an alleged event may be insufficient to establish the date of possession for limitation purposes in pre-emption matters.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for a pre-emption suit based on an oral sale commence from the date of the alleged sale or the date of mutation attestation?
  • Can Khasra Girdawari entries created years after an alleged sale be relied upon to establish the date of physical possession for the purpose of limitation?
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• Abdul Hamid vs The StateK.L.R. 1994 Criminal Cases 64 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-24
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationOffence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) OrdinanceabductionNikah Namafurther inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court rejecting the petitioner's bail application. The petitioner was challaned under sections 10 and 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 on allegations of abducting the complainant's daughter, Mst. Shumaila Gul, for the purpose of Zina, confining her, and committing forcible rape. The petitioner contended that the FIR was lodged after a delayed period without proper explanation and that the prosecutrix had contracted a voluntary marriage with him, supported by a Nikah Nama and statements allegedly made before a Magistrate and a lady DSP. The core legal question concerned whether the prosecutrix had gone with the petitioner and contracted marriage of her own free will, considering her status as an educated adult and documentary evidence. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that in view of the background and documentary evidence regarding the alleged voluntary marriage, the petitioner was entitled to bail, thereby setting aside the High Court's order and restoring the Sessions Court's order granting bail. The key principle laid down is that where an educated adult prosecutrix's voluntary movement and marriage are supported by contemporaneous documents and statements at the bail stage, further inquiry into her consent warrants the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail should be granted when an educated adult prosecutrix's voluntary marriage and movement are supported by documentary evidence at the bail stage?
  • Does an unexplained delay in lodging the FIR in a Zina case support the grant of bail to the accused?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will restore a bail order of the Sessions Court when the High Court has improperly cancelled it in the face of supporting documentary evidence?
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