Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muhammad Yaqoob And Others vs The State1991 SCMR 1459 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-21
  suspension of sentencestatutory baildelay in appeallife imprisonmentbail pending appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arose from the High Court's rejection of an application for the suspension of sentences and grant of bail filed by the petitioners, who had been convicted of offences under sections 302, 307, 149, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The petitioners' joint appeal had remained pending for over two years due to a misplaced record. The core legal question was whether the High Court could deny statutory bail under section 426(1A)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without recording specific, cogent reasons. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that merely stating that it was not a proper case for bail does not constitute a valid reason to deny the statutory benefit. The Court converted the petition into an appeal and directed the release of the petitioners on bail, establishing the principle that the statutory right to bail after two years of pending appeal for a life sentence cannot be withheld arbitrarily without recording specific justifying reasons.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mere statement by a court that it is not a proper case for bail constitute a sufficient reason to deny statutory bail under section 426(1A)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a convict sentenced to life imprisonment entitled to bail if their appeal remains undecided for more than two years?
  • Can the statutory benefit of suspension of sentence be withheld without recording specific justifying reasons?
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• Muhammad Yaqoob And Others vs Ghulam Rasool And Other1991 SCMR 303 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-27
  specific performanceagreement to selljoint holdingsubsistence holdingmartial law regulationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from civil petitions for leave to appeal directed against a consolidated judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell state land allotted under the Chahi Scheme. The core legal questions involve whether the agreement of sale violated Martial Law Regulation No. 115 regarding subsistence holdings, and whether a decree for partial specific performance could be passed regarding a joint holding where one co-owner was not a party to the agreement. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these contentions, ordering that status quo be maintained in the meanwhile upon furnishing security for costs. The key principle noted is that questions concerning the legality of alienating joint holdings under Martial Law Regulations and the permissibility of partial specific performance warrant a full hearing by the appellate court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an agreement of sale is violative of Martial Law Regulation 115 when it leaves the seller with less than the subsistence holding?
  • Can a decree for partial specific performance be passed in respect of a joint holding when one co-owner was not a party to the agreement?
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• Muhammad Waseem vs Chief Post Master, G.P.O., Gujrat And Another1991 SCMR 1792 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-02
  service appeallimitationcondonation of delaytemporary employeetermination of serviceleave to appealsufficient cause
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's service appeal on the grounds of limitation. The petitioner, a temporary Postal Clerk, had his services terminated after failing to appear before a selection committee. Following the rejection of his departmental representation, he filed an appeal before the Tribunal, which was time-barred. The petitioner sought condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908, citing vague 'unavoidable reasons,' which the Tribunal found insufficient. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner attempted to introduce new grounds for delay, specifically claiming illness supported by medical certificates. The Supreme Court held that it could not grant leave to appeal based on a ground (illness) that was never urged or pleaded before the Tribunal. Affirming the Tribunal's reliance on established precedent regarding the sufficiency of grounds for condonation, the Court ruled that the Tribunal correctly exercised its discretion in refusing to condone the delay. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner introduce new grounds for condonation of delay before the Supreme Court that were not raised before the lower Tribunal?
  • Is a vague plea of 'unavoidable reasons' sufficient to justify condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal when the underlying service appeal was dismissed by the Tribunal due to time-barring and lack of sufficient cause for delay?
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• Muhammad Umer vs Muhammad Qasim And Another1991 SCMR 1232 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-11
  additional evidenceappellate discretionland allotmentremandcivil procedurecomplete justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil dispute over land possession and ownership. The petitioner, an allottee under the Land Reforms Regulation 64 of 1959, sued for possession after a lease expired. The trial court dismissed the suit, relying heavily on an order by the Deputy Land Commissioner cancelling the petitioner's land allotment. During the appellate stage, the petitioner filed an application under Order XLI, Rule 27, C.P.C. to introduce a subsequent order by the Land Commissioner that had set aside the cancellation of the allotment. The appellate court and the High Court declined to consider this evidence, citing the petitioner's failure to present it earlier. The Supreme Court held that the appellate court erred by failing to adjudicate upon the application for additional evidence. Citing the principle that courts should exercise discretion to admit evidence to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and do complete justice, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the lower court judgments, and remanded the case for a fresh decision, directing the trial court to consider the additional evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appellate court required to adjudicate upon an application for additional evidence filed under Order XLI, Rule 27, C.P.C. before disposing of the main appeal?
  • Can an appellate court refuse to consider additional evidence if that evidence was not available during the trial court proceedings?
  • Does the principle of doing complete justice allow for the admission of additional evidence at the appellate stage to avoid multiplicity of proceedings?
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• Muhammad Tufail Danish vs Deputy Director, F.I.A. And Another1991 SCMR 1841 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-19
  service lawlimitation periodcondonation of delaywrong legal adviceService Tribunaltime-barred appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Constable, challenged his removal from service by the Deputy Director, F.I.A. After his departmental appeal was rejected, he approached the Service Tribunal, which dismissed his appeal as time-barred. The Tribunal noted that the appeal was filed thirteen days beyond the statutory limitation period and held that incorrect legal advice provided by counsel does not constitute valid grounds for condoning delay. The petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, arguing that the delay should have been condoned. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner admitted the appeal was time-barred and that the Service Tribunal had correctly exercised its discretion in refusing to condone the delay based on the erroneous advice of counsel. Citing Section 3 of the Limitation Act, the Court affirmed that any appeal filed beyond the prescribed period must be dismissed. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that no question of law was involved, dismissed the petition, and refused leave to appeal, reinforcing the principle that wrong legal advice does not extend the period of limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Does incorrect legal advice from a counsel constitute sufficient grounds to condone a delay in filing an appeal?
  • What is the consequence under Section 3 of the Limitation Act when an appeal is filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation?
  • Can a Service Tribunal dismiss an appeal solely on the grounds of limitation?
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• Muhammad Siddiquie And Others vs Rao Manzoor Ahmad And Other1991 SCMR 1534 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-26
  evacuee propertynecessary partyallotment of propertyleave to appealwrit jurisdictionpossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' writ petition regarding the transfer of evacuee property. The dispute concerns the allotment of specific units of evacuee property, namely shops, a Chobara, and a Deori, which were subject to competing claims by the petitioners and respondents. The Settlement Commissioner had previously determined the property was divisible and allocated portions accordingly. However, the High Court, in a writ petition filed by the respondents, transferred the disputed shops to the respondents while rejecting the petitioners' application under Order I, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to be impleaded as a necessary party. The petitioners contended that as occupants in physical possession who had submitted transfer forms, they were necessary parties whose entitlement was ignored. The Supreme Court found that the petitioners' case regarding their status as necessary parties and their entitlement to the property raised arguable points requiring further examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to consider the merits of the petitioners' claim and the propriety of the High Court's order.

  Questions settled

  • Are occupants in physical possession of evacuee property who have submitted transfer forms necessary parties in writ petitions concerning the allotment of that property?
  • Can a High Court dismiss an application under Order I, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without considering the applicant's claim of entitlement and possession?
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• Muhammad Siddique vs Mst. Aziz Begum And 4 Other1991 SCMR 2407 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-18
  equitable estoppelpromissory estoppelbona fide beliefimprovement on landcompensation for constructionTransfer of Property ActMesne Profits and Improvements Act
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter involves cross-appeals concerning a dispute over a plot of land where the appellant constructed a house under the bona fide belief of ownership, while the respondent held the legal title. The core legal question concerned the application of Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and Section 2 of the Mesne Profits and Improvements Act, 1855, regarding compensation for improvements made by a person in possession. The Supreme Court held that while these statutes provide specific options for compensation or purchase, the principle of equitable estoppel applies when the true owner has, by conduct, encouraged or acquiesced in the construction. The Court affirmed that where a party spends money on improvements under a mistaken but bona fide belief of ownership with the owner's knowledge, the owner is bound by equity to compensate the occupant. The Court upheld the High Court's decision to grant a compensatory decree, emphasizing that he who seeks equity must do equity, thereby overriding strict statutory options in favor of equitable relief.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of equitable estoppel override the statutory options provided in Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and Section 2 of the Mesne Profits and Improvements Act, 1855?
  • Is a person who constructs a building on land in the bona fide belief of ownership entitled to compensation when evicted by the true owner?
  • Can a true owner who acquiesces in the construction of a building on their land by another be estopped from asserting strict statutory rights regarding the disposal of that property?
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• Muhammad Siddique And Another vs Mst. Reshman Bibi And Another1991 SCMR 1368 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-30
  gift deedpower of attorneyconcurrent findings of factleave to appealburden of proofcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed a Civil Revision filed by the petitioners. The petitioners claimed ownership of land based on a gift deed executed by respondent No. 1 through her agent, respondent No. 2, acting under a Power of Attorney. The core legal question was whether the Power of Attorney conferred the authority to make such a gift and whether the gift was validly executed. The trial court initially dismissed the suit challenging the gift, but the appellate court reversed this decision, finding that the Power of Attorney did not authorize the gift and that the donor lacked the intent to transfer the property to the petitioners. The High Court affirmed these findings, noting the burden of proof. The Supreme Court held that the validity and factum of the gift were questions of fact already concluded by concurrent findings against the petitioners. Finding no legal infirmity in the lower courts' judgments, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that findings of fact by lower courts are generally not subject to interference in this jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a general Power of Attorney automatically confer the authority to make a gift of property?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the validity of a gift?
  • Is the intent of the donor a material factor in determining the validity of a gift made through an agent?
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• Muhammad Siddioue vs Mehr Muhammad Altaf And Other1991 SCMR 345 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-20
  ejectmentdefault in rentconcurrent findings of facttenancy disputewrit jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's writ petition challenging concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding an ejectment application. The respondents had filed for the petitioner's ejectment from a plot of land and its superstructure on the grounds of default in rent payment and property damage. The petitioner contested the claim, asserting he was only a tenant of the plot and had constructed the superstructure himself, while also disputing the alleged rental rate. The Rent Controller found the petitioner to be a defaulter and ordered his ejectment, a decision upheld by the District Judge on appeal. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence and the concurrent findings of fact made by the lower courts. The Court held that there was no merit in the petition, as the findings regarding the petitioner's status as a tenant and his default were factual determinations properly adjudicated by the lower forums. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere with these concurrent findings and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact reached by lower courts in an ejectment matter?
  • Does the failure to pay rent constitute sufficient grounds for an ejectment order against a tenant?
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• Muhammad Sharif vs Zulfiqar and 4 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 1090 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  ocular testimonyinterested witnessbenefit of doubtacquittal appealcorroborationcriminal appealmurder trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the High Court's judgment acquitting the respondents of murder charges under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in rejecting the prosecution's ocular testimony and granting the benefit of doubt to the accused. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s decision was well-founded. It observed that the prosecution witnesses were highly interested and inimical towards the accused due to deep-seated election rivalry, and their testimony lacked necessary independent corroboration. The Court affirmed that when ocular evidence is tainted by partisanship and lacks corroborative support, it cannot sustain a capital conviction. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that it is loath to interfere with an acquittal unless the lower court's findings are artificial, shocking, or unreasonable, which was not the case here. The principle laid down is that in cases of severe enmity, ocular testimony from partisan witnesses requires corroboration in material particulars to be reliable, and appellate courts must exercise restraint in overturning acquittals.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on the basis of ocular testimony from highly interested and inimical witnesses without independent corroboration?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal judgment passed by the High Court?
  • Is the testimony of a witness who is a close relative of the deceased considered interested in the context of criminal evidence?
  • Does medical evidence provide sufficient corroboration for ocular testimony when the ocular evidence itself is found to be unreliable?
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• Muhammad Sharif vs Sardar And 8 Other1991 SCMR 1892 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-23
  consolidation matterconstitutional petitionquestion of factwithdrawal of appealleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a consolidation matter wherein the petitioner challenged the dismissal of his Constitutional Petition by the High Court. The core legal question involved was purely a question of fact, specifically whether the petitioner had withdrawn his appeal before the Collector. The High Court conducted an inquiry in which the Collector testified that the petitioner had indeed withdrawn the appeal. The Supreme Court held that the argument concerning the petitioner's motive or lack of justification for withdrawing the appeal was immaterial to the factual determination. Finding the concurrent finding of fact against the petitioner, the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal. Furthermore, the Court declined to make any observations regarding potential criminal or civil remedies involving allegations of falsification of record and perjury by the Collector without a proper hearing, leaving it open for the petitioner to pursue independent legal remedies if so advised.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a concurrent finding of fact regarding the withdrawal of an appeal in a consolidation matter?
  • Can a party agitate the motive or intention behind the withdrawal of an appeal when the actual fact of withdrawal is established?
  • Is it proper for the court to make observations regarding criminal or civil remedies for falsification of record against an official without a proper hearing?
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• Muhammad Sharif vs Muhammad Sharif1991 SCMR 1651 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-01
  pre-emption suitleave to appealco-sharershipcourt-feeremand order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a plaintiff in a pre-emption suit against the disposal of the respondent's First Appeal by the High Court. The High Court had held that the plaintiff's pre-emption suit stood dismissed as no decree had been passed in his favour before the cutoff date, following the rule laid down in Sardar Ali v. Muhammad Ali (PLD 1988 SC 287). The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner's suit, based on co-sharership and relationship, could survive or be continued in light of subsequent jurisprudence, particularly Ahmad v. Abdul Aziz (PLD 1989 SC 771), which allowed pre-emptors basing their suits on co-sharership to continue their proceedings. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions raised regarding the impact of subsequent case law on pre-emption suits based on co-sharership required detailed examination. The key principle laid down is that pre-emption suits involving co-sharership grounds warrant further examination when subsequent authoritative judicial pronouncements affect the applicability of earlier abatement or dismissal rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emption suit based on co-sharership can continue after the rule laid down in Sardar Ali v. Muhammad Ali?
  • Does a remand order passed by an appellate court lose efficacy if no decree was passed in favour of the pre-emptor before the critical date?
  • Whether pre-emptors who base their suits on co-sharership are entitled to continue their suits and appeals in view of the judgment in Ahmad v. Abdul Aziz?
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• Muhammad Sharif vs Muhammad Ramzan And Other1991 SCMR 1356 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-31
  leave to appealspecific performanceagreement to sellpriority of salecivil revisiongenuineness of transactioncomparison of signatures
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court accepting a civil revision filed by respondent No. 1, thereby setting aside the concurrent decrees of the trial Court and appellate Court and dismissing the petitioner's suit for specific performance. The petitioner had filed a suit for specific performance based on an agreement to sell, claiming he had paid earnest money and taken possession, but the vendor subsequently colluded with respondent No. 1 to sell the plot. The Supreme Court observed that the first vendor's denial of the agreement was contradicted by a comparison of signatures showing them to be similar to the naked eye, and that the second transaction appeared non-genuine on its face. Holding that issues concerning the priority of sale and the genuineness of the transaction with the petitioner were questions worth consideration, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal subject to a security deposit of Rs. 5,000.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted where questions concerning the priority of sale and genuineness of a transaction require determination?
  • Whether a subsequent sale transaction can override a prior agreement to sell where the second transaction appears non-genuine on its face?
  • Whether the High Court in civil revision properly set aside concurrent findings regarding the execution of an agreement to sell?
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• Muhammad Sharif vs Additional District Judge, Lahore And Other1991 SCMR 1917 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-31
  ejectmentpersonal requirementsecond ejectment applicationchanged circumstancesleave to appeallandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the concurrent orders of the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge, which ordered the ejectment of the petitioner from a commercial shop. The core legal question concerns the maintainability of a subsequent ejectment application and the determination of genuine personal requirement by the landlord. The Supreme Court held that no fixed time limit applies to changed circumstances regarding personal requirement, and a second ejectment application is maintainable after a substantial lapse of time—in this case, seventeen years—provided the landlord establishes that the requirement is genuine. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that the courts below properly satisfied themselves regarding the genuineness of the landlord's personal use requirement for himself and his son.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a second ejectment application is maintainable after the dismissal of a prior application?
  • Can a fixed time limit be prescribed for changed circumstances regarding a landlord's personal requirement?
  • What is required for a court to determine the validity of a landlord's personal use requirement in ejectment proceedings?
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• Muhammad Sharif And Others vs The State1991 SCMR 1622 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-08
  criminal appealcommon intentionocular evidencedeath penaltymurderappreciation of evidenceIslamic injunctionsmitigating circumstances
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the Lahore High Court's judgment upholding the convictions of four appellants for the murder of Mst. Sakina. The core legal question concerned the sufficiency of evidence to establish common intention and the propriety of the sentences awarded by the lower courts. The Supreme Court held that the ocular evidence provided by police officials, who were disinterested witnesses, was credible and sufficient to sustain the convictions. The Court affirmed that the murder was committed in a cruel, cold-blooded manner, rejecting the plea of provocation based on family honor. While the Court strongly criticized the trial and appellate courts for failing to impose the death penalty—emphasizing that the normal penalty for murder under both the law of the land and Islamic injunctions is death—it declined to enhance the sentences due to the absence of a formal petition for enhancement. The Court established that appellate interference is unwarranted unless there is a serious defect in the appreciation of evidence by the lower courts, and that private revenge does not constitute a mitigating circumstance in cold-blooded murders.

  Questions settled

  • Does the appellate court have the authority to interfere with the findings of the trial court regarding the appreciation of evidence absent a serious defect in the process?
  • Can a plea of family honor or private revenge serve as a mitigating circumstance in cases of cold-blooded murder?
  • Are police officials who witness a crime considered interested witnesses whose testimony requires corroboration?
  • Is the death penalty the normal penalty for murder under the law of the land and Islamic injunctions?
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• Muhammad Sharif And Others vs Nasir Ahmad And Other1991 SC M R1916 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-31
  temporary injunctionstatus quodiscretionary powerspecific performanceleave to appealpartnership dissolutionconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' First Appeal Against Order (F.A.O.) regarding an injunction granted by the Senior Civil Judge, Faisalabad. The underlying dispute arose from the dissolution of a partnership business involving flour mills, an ice factory, and cold storage. Following an alleged mutual division of assets, the respondents filed a suit for specific performance and challenged the petitioners' title to certain properties, obtaining a temporary injunction to restrain the petitioners from alienating the disputed property. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly affirmed the trial court's discretionary order granting a status quo injunction. The Supreme Court held that the injunction was merely regulatory in nature and that the lower courts had exercised their discretionary powers appropriately. Consequently, the Court refused to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts, noting that such discretionary orders are rarely disturbed at the leave-to-appeal stage, especially when they can be recalled upon a final adjudication of the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Should the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent discretionary orders of lower courts granting a status quo injunction?
  • Is a status quo order in a suit for specific performance considered a regulatory measure?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be dismissed when the lower courts have exercised their discretion in granting a temporary injunction?
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• Muhammad Shafi vs Abdul Hamid And Other1991 SCMR 347 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-29
  civil revisionconcurrent findings of factsite inspectionco-ownershipleave to appealmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's civil revision regarding a dispute over the co-ownership of a staircase. The respondents had filed a suit for declaration asserting that the staircase located between the parties' shops was jointly owned, providing access to their respective upper portions, and that the petitioner had no right to obstruct its use. Both the trial court and the appellate court concurrently held that the staircase was commonly owned, a finding of fact supported by the personal site inspection conducted by the Additional District Judge, who observed a door connecting the staircase to the respondents' roof. The Supreme Court addressed the petitioner's contention regarding the alleged misreading of evidence. The Court held that the concurrent findings of fact, grounded in the personal inspection of the site by the Additional District Judge, were well-founded and did not warrant interference. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming that findings of fact based on judicial site inspection are not lightly disturbed in revisional or appellate proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can concurrent findings of fact based on a personal site inspection by a judge be challenged on the ground of misreading of evidence?
  • Is a finding of fact based on a judicial site inspection sufficient to sustain a decree in a suit for declaration?
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• Muhammad Shafi Butt And Others vs Khawaja Muhammad Naseem And Other1991 SCMR 1311 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-28
  ejectment petitionrent controllercompromise agreementapprobate and reprobateconstitutional jurisdictionlandlord and tenant relationship
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as an ejectment petition filed by the respondent against the petitioners regarding a residential property in Lahore. The Rent Controller ordered the petitioners' ejectment, a decision upheld by the Additional District Judge on appeal. Subsequently, the Lahore High Court dismissed the petitioners' constitutional petition in limine. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners challenged the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller, arguing the matter should have been adjudicated by a Civil Court, and contested the validity of a compromise agreement relied upon by the lower courts, asserting it violated the Qanun-e-Shahadat. The Supreme Court rejected these contentions, finding that the compromise was entered into voluntarily and without undue influence. The Court held that the petitioners, having admitted the respondent's ownership and promised to surrender possession in the compromise, could not subsequently challenge the forum or the nature of the relationship to avoid their obligations. Emphasizing the doctrine of approbate and reprobate, the Court ruled that parties cannot be permitted to take shelter behind technicalities to renege on voluntary agreements. Leave to appeal was refused, and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who has voluntarily entered into a compromise agreement subsequently challenge the jurisdiction of the forum that recorded it?
  • Does the doctrine of approbate and reprobate prevent a party from challenging the validity of a compromise they previously executed?
  • Is a compromise agreement admitting ownership and promising surrender of possession enforceable in ejectment proceedings?
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• Muhammad Shafi And Another vs Assistant Commissioner1991 SCMR 1837 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-29
  land settlementexcess landsurrender of landalienation of landsettlement authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of a learned Single Judge of the High Court, which upheld the refusal of Settlement authorities to allow the petitioners to exercise their right of choice in surrendering excess land. The core legal question was whether landowners who have already alienated the entirety of their entitlement land retain a statutory right to choose which specific parcels of land to surrender as excess. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacked merit and dismissed it. The Court reasoned that the right to surrender excess land by choice presupposes the existence of land in the possession of the petitioner. Since the petitioners had already sold the entire land comprising their entitlement, no land remained for them to exercise any choice regarding surrender. Consequently, the claim was found to be legally untenable as the subject matter for the exercise of the right had been extinguished by the petitioners' own prior actions of sale.

  Questions settled

  • Can a landowner exercise a right to choose which land to surrender as excess if they have already sold their entire entitlement?
  • Does the right to surrender excess land exist when the petitioner no longer possesses any land?
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• Muhammad Shabbir Khan And Another vs Mst. Zubaida Bibi And Other1991 SCMR 1745 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-31
  inheritance mutationBoard of Revenuereview jurisdictionrevision petitionallotment of landrefugee propertyvexatious litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside an order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue, regarding the inheritance of land allotted to refugees following the 1947 migration. The core legal question was whether the Member, Board of Revenue, possessed the jurisdiction to review an order after a revision petition had already been dismissed on merits, and following the repeal of the relevant governing law. The Supreme Court held that the Member, Board of Revenue, lacked the jurisdiction or justification to reopen the matter through a review application after the revision petition had been dismissed on merits and the underlying law had been repealed. The Court emphasized that litigation cannot be utilized to pursue personal vendettas or unhealthy emotions against rightful heirs. The petition was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision that the review order was passed without lawful authority and was of no legal effect, thereby protecting the inheritance rights of the respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Member, Board of Revenue, have the jurisdiction to review an order after a revision petition has been dismissed on merits?
  • Can a matter be reopened through a review application after the repeal of the relevant governing law?
  • Is an order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue, in review without lawful authority if a revision petition on the same matter was previously dismissed?
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• Muhammad Sarwar Saeed vs The Director General, Pakistan Telegraph1991 SCMR 1733 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-09-26
  service appealleave to appealmisconductannual statement of assetsbenamidarcivil servantdisciplinary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against the dismissal of his service appeal by the Federal Service Tribunal, which had upheld his dismissal from service for misconduct. The charges related to the acquisition of property and an insurance policy without departmental permission and failing to disclose them in his Annual Statement of Assets. The petitioner's defence was that he was merely a benamidar and not the actual owner of the properties. The Supreme Court considered whether a civil servant is required to declare assets held in his name even if he claims to be a benamidar, and whether failure to obtain permission and make such declarations constitutes misconduct. The Court held that assets in an employee's name must be declared, and if claimed to be held benami, explanatory facts must be provided. Finding no legal infirmity in the Tribunal's conclusions and no question of law of public importance, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that failure to disclose assets standing in one's name in annual declarations or to seek prior permission, regardless of a benami plea, constitutes misconduct justifying dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant is obliged to disclose assets held in his name in the Annual Statement of Assets even if he claims to be a benamidar?
  • Does the failure to obtain departmental permission for investing money in property and insurance policies constitute misconduct?
  • Whether a petition for leave to appeal against the Service Tribunal's judgment raises a question of law of public importance under Article 212(3) of the Constitution?
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• Muhammad Samiullah Ghauri vs Secretary, Population Welfare1991 SCMR 382 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-30
  probationertermination of serviceservice tribunalreversionprobation periodleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Statistical Assistant, was appointed as a Junior Instructor in Grade 17 on a one-year probation period. Approximately five months into his probation, his services were terminated, and he was reverted to his parent department. The petitioner challenged this termination before the Service Tribunal, arguing that an inquiry into alleged misconduct should have been conducted prior to his removal. The Service Tribunal dismissed the appeal, finding that the termination was lawful as the petitioner was a probationer and the order did not cast any stigma upon him. Upon petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the termination of a probationer required a formal inquiry. The Court held that the competent authority has the discretion to dispense with the services of a probationer during the probation period without conducting an inquiry, provided no stigma is attached to the termination. Finding no illegality in the Service Tribunal's order, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that the authority acted within its legal competence.

  Questions settled

  • Can the services of a probationer be terminated without conducting a formal inquiry into misconduct?
  • Is a termination order of a probationer valid if it does not cast a stigma on the employee?
  • Does the competent authority have the discretion to dispense with the services of a probationer during the probation period?
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• Muhammad Salim Khan vs Director General, Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment And Another1991 SCMR 440 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-01
  deputationresignationwithdrawal of resignationservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an Economic Investigator in the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment, was sent on deputation to Saudi Arabia under a contract. Upon the expiry of his deputation period, his request for extension was denied in accordance with government instructions, and he was directed to return. Subsequently, the petitioner tendered his resignation, which was accepted by the competent authority. More than a year later, the petitioner attempted to withdraw his resignation, but his departmental appeal and subsequent appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal were dismissed on the ground that he had voluntarily tendered his resignation. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the petition for leave to appeal, holding that the voluntary resignation having been accepted, the petitioner could not recall it after a prolonged delay. The Court found no question of law of public importance involved, and accordingly refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government employee withdraw a resignation after it has been accepted and a considerable delay has passed?
  • Whether the Federal Service Tribunal is justified in dismissing an appeal where the employee tendered a voluntary resignation?
  • Does a petition for leave to appeal lie against the dismissal of a service appeal where no question of law of public importance is involved?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saleem Mughal vs Mst. Asfa Khatoon1991 SCMR 1476 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-08-23
  rent evictionbona fide personal uselandlord and tenant relationshipconcurrent findings of factleave to appealrent default
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a rent eviction matter where the landlord sought possession of premises based on default in rent payment and personal bona fide need. The Rent Controller ruled in favor of the landlord on all issues. On appeal, the High Court set aside the finding of default but affirmed the landlord's ownership and the bona fide requirement for personal use. Before the Supreme Court, the tenant challenged the landlord's status, arguing that the landlord's husband had acted as the lessor, and contested the bona fide need, citing the landlord's existing accommodation and the marriage of her daughters. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the lease agreement clearly established the respondent as the landlord and owner. The Court further affirmed that a landlord is entitled to seek eviction for personal use regardless of current rented accommodation, and that concurrent findings of fact regarding bona fide need, supported by evidence, are not subject to interference in the absence of legal error or misreading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a landlord seek eviction for personal use if they are currently residing in a rented house?
  • Does the fact that a landlord's husband acted as an attorney in managing property negate the landlord's ownership status?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding bona fide need subject to interference by the Supreme Court in the absence of misreading of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saleem And Others vs Ghulan Khan And Other1991 SCMR 1986 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-02
  suit for declarationperpetual injunctionburden of prooftitle to landcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil suit for declaration and perpetual injunction regarding land ownership. The petitioners claimed title to the suit land, asserting it was purchased from specific vendors. The trial court initially decreed the suit in favor of the petitioners; however, this was subsequently reversed by the Majlis-i-Shoora on appeal, a decision later upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the petitioners had sufficiently established their title to the suit land through credible evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioners failed to substantiate their claim of ownership. The Court observed that the evidence presented was insufficient, as the witnesses failed to identify the suit property, and the alleged vendors did not testify to support the petitioners' claim of purchase. The key principle laid down is that in a suit for declaration of title, the burden of proof rests squarely upon the plaintiff, and failure to establish the chain of title or substantiate the purchase through credible, consistent evidence warrants the dismissal of the claim.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a plaintiff to substantiate a claim of purchase with credible evidence warrant the dismissal of a suit for declaration of title?
  • Is a finding of fact regarding the insufficiency of evidence by lower courts open to interference in the absence of misreading of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sakhi vs Abdul Rahim And Other1991 SCMR 1883 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-05
  partition suitMuslim Lawadoptioncivil revisionleave to appealquestion of factcustomary law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a civil suit for possession through partition, where the trial court initially rejected a claim of adoption regarding the petitioner's father, holding that adoption is not recognized under Muslim Law. The District Judge subsequently reversed this finding on appeal, accepting the adoption claim. The Lahore High Court, in civil revision, set aside the appellate court's judgment, reinstated the trial court's position, and passed a preliminary decree for possession by partition. The petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its interpretation of an alleged gift deed and whether the adoption claim was valid. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to prove that the predecessor-in-interest was governed by custom validating such adoption, reiterating that adoption is not recognized under Muslim Law. Furthermore, the Court determined that the interpretation of the gift deed was a question of fact rather than law or public importance. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the High Court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Is adoption recognized under Muslim Law?
  • Does the interpretation of a gift deed constitute a question of law or public importance suitable for Supreme Court interference?
  • Must a party claiming adoption under custom prove that the predecessor-in-interest was governed by such custom?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sajjad Hussain vs Muhammad Anwar Hussain1991 SCMR 703 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-12-16
  benami transactionbenamidarburden of proofsource of considerationconcurrent findingsHouse Building Finance Corporationpower of attorney
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal with leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arising from concurrent judgments of the lower courts decreeing the respondent's suit for a declaration that the appellant was a benamidar in respect of a residential house. The core legal question pertained to whether the courts below misread evidence or failed to determine the primary source of purchase money and burden of proof in a benami transaction. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the respondent successfully established ownership by proving the source of consideration, continuous possession, custody of 41 loan repayment receipts and municipal tax documents, and a valid motive for the benami arrangement. The key principle laid down is that while the initial burden of proof rests firmly on the party alleging a benami transaction, once the evidence is evaluated and points overwhelmingly to the real owner's payment of consideration and continuous exercise of ownership rights, concurrent factual findings will not be disturbed in the absence of perversity or material misreading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact in an appeal where leave was granted on questions involving the appraisal of evidence?
  • What are the primary criteria for determining whether a property transaction is benami?
  • Does the initial burden of proof rest on the party alleging that an ostensible owner is a benamidar?
  • Whether the production of an original title deed by the ostensible owner is sufficient to negate overwhelming evidence of consideration payment and possession by the real owner?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadiq vs Muhammad Jan Khan And Other1991 SCMR 442 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-04
  leave to appealevacuee propertysettlement commissionerrevenue recordco-sharerpartitionwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing his writ petition, which had challenged the order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner (Lands) declaring the disputed land as evacuee property pursuant to an application under sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons (Rehabilitation and Settlement) Act, 1958. The core legal questions involved whether sections 10 and 11 of the said Act were applicable to give jurisdiction to the Settlement Commissioner rather than the Deputy Custodian, and whether the High Court's judgment suffered from a misreading of the revenue record concerning the rights of co-sharers in hissadari possession and subsequent sales adjustable upon partition. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions raised by the petitioner required further consideration, and ordered that status quo be maintained until the final disposal of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons (Rehabilitation and Settlement) Act, 1958 apply to declare property as evacuee, or if jurisdiction vests exclusively in the Deputy Custodian?
  • Does the sale of land by a co-sharer in excess of his share in the proprietary column require adjustment at the time of partition when co-sharers are jointly recorded in possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadiq vs Haji Abdul Majid1991 SCMR 350 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-28
  ejectment petitiondefault in rentconcurrent findings of factleave to appeallandlord and tenanteviction order
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's First Appeal from Order (F.A.O.) concerning an eviction order. The respondent landlord had initiated ejectment proceedings against the petitioner tenant, alleging default in the payment of rent for the months of September and October 1979. The Additional Rent Controller found that the petitioner had indeed committed default in the payment of rent for the specified period and consequently ordered his eviction. The petitioner challenged this decision before the High Court, which upheld the Rent Controller's findings. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner sought to challenge the concurrent findings of fact regarding the rental default. The Supreme Court observed that the facts regarding the default were admitted and had been consistently decided against the petitioner by the lower forums. Finding no legal error or justification to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, thereby affirming the eviction order.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding rent default in an ejectment petition?
  • Does an admitted default in rent payment justify an order of eviction against a tenant?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sabir vs Mst. Fatima Bibi And 13 Other1991 SCMR 1791 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-26
  pre-emptionrevisional jurisdictionconcurrent findings of factmisreading of evidenceabandonment of claim
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the High Court dated 17-4-1989, which had accepted a revision petition, set aside the concurrent judgments and decrees of the two lower courts, and dismissed the petitioner's pre-emption suit regarding land measuring 175 Kanals 18 Marlas. The core legal question concerned the limits of revisional jurisdiction and whether the High Court was legally justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact. The Supreme Court held that the petition has no force because the High Court correctly appreciated the evidence on record, noting that witnesses had established abandonment and waiver by the petitioner through his presence and refusal to purchase the land, statements which the petitioner failed to refute when he testified. The court laid down the principle that the High Court may interfere with concurrent findings of fact in revision where there is a misreading of evidence or inherent defects in the case apparent from the record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can set aside concurrent findings of fact in a revision petition?
  • Does failure to refute adverse witness testimony in evidence amount to an acceptance of those facts?
  • When can the High Court interfere with findings of fact based on a misreading of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Riaz vs Master Sajjad Hussain1991 SCMR 115 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-08-27
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentrate of rentspecial oathlandlord and tenantconditional agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court was directed against the order of ejectment of the tenant for default in the payment of rent. The core legal question was whether the rent was Rs.150 or Rs.190 per month, and whether the tenant was in default based on a statement made on special oath regarding the enhancement of rent. The Supreme Court held that the statement on special oath, when read as a whole, demonstrated that the enhancement of rent from Rs.150 to Rs.190 was conditional upon the provision of certain facilities by the landlord. Since those facilities were not provided, the landlord was not entitled to claim rent at the increased rate, and consequently, no default was established. The appeal was allowed, and the ejectment application was dismissed, laying down the principle that a conditional statement regarding rent enhancement made on special oath cannot be construed as an unconditional obligation unless the underlying condition is fulfilled.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a statement on special oath regarding the enhancement of rent can be enforced independently of the conditions attached to it?
  • Can a tenant be held in default for non-payment of an enhanced rent when the condition for such enhancement remains unfulfilled?
  • How should a statement made on special oath be interpreted in rent determination proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Riaz and others vs Fateh Muhammad and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 1099 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-26
  pre-emptionseverable transactiontenancy rightssale deedagricultural landvendees
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a pre-emption dispute involving agricultural land purchased by two sets of vendees: the appellants (tenants) and other respondents (strangers). The trial court and appellate courts rejected the appellants' claim of superior right of pre-emption as tenants, holding that by joining non-tenants in the sale, the appellants lost their status as tenants and were relegated to the position of non-tenants. The core legal question was whether the sale transaction, involving both tenants and non-tenants, constituted a single indivisible transaction or if it could be treated as severable, thereby allowing the tenants to retain their share. The Supreme Court examined the evidence and the registered sale deed, finding that the shares of the vendees were clearly specified and that each set of vendees had separately contributed their respective portions of the sale consideration. Consequently, the Court held that the transaction was severable. Applying the principle that a transaction where shares and consideration are distinct and specified can be treated as separate, the Court allowed the appeal, permitting the appellants to retain their one-half share of the land.

  Questions settled

  • Can a sale transaction involving both tenants and non-tenants be treated as severable for the purposes of pre-emption?
  • Does the joinder of non-tenants in a sale deed automatically deprive a tenant-vendee of their superior right of pre-emption?
  • What evidence is required to establish that a sale transaction involving multiple vendees is severable?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Razzaq vs The State1991 SCMR 78 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-26
  rash and negligent drivingconcurrent findingsleave to appealcondonation of delaycriminal negligencemotor vehicle accident
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the conviction of the petitioner under Section 304-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for causing the death of an eleven-year-old boy through rash and negligent driving. The petitioner, a wagon driver, was tried by a Magistrate, and his conviction and sentence of two years of simple imprisonment were upheld by both the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court. The core legal question was whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the petitioner's rash and negligent driving were sustainable, particularly given the disputed location of the accident and the mechanical condition of the vehicle. The Supreme Court condoned the delay in filing the petition but ultimately dismissed it. The Court held that the evidence, including the Motor Vehicles Inspector's report confirming defective brakes, sufficiently established the petitioner's negligence. As the lower courts had reached concurrent findings of fact based on credible witness testimony, the Supreme Court declined to reappraise the evidence, affirming that no interference was warranted in the established conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court reappraise evidence where lower courts have reached concurrent findings of fact?
  • Does driving a vehicle with defective brakes constitute sufficient evidence of rash and negligent driving under Section 304-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court condone a delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rasheed vs Mst. Shamim Akhtar1991 SCMR 1760 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-10
  review petitionidentity of propertyKhasra numbersnew grounds in reviewSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a review petition filed by the petitioner against an earlier impugned judgment. The core legal question addressed by the court is whether a new ground regarding the identity of the property, based on differing Khasra numbers, can be raised for the first time at the review stage when it was never urged before the lower courts. The court holds that such a ground is not available to the petitioner because it was neither raised at any earlier stage nor is sustainable, given that the property's description and particulars are sufficiently detailed otherwise to establish its identity beyond merely its Khasra numbers. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismisses the review petition for lack of merit, laying down the principle that new factual grounds not previously raised cannot be introduced in a review petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a new ground regarding the identity of property be raised for the first time in a review petition?
  • Is a property's identity confined solely to its Khasra numbers when sufficient alternative details of its description are available?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rasheed vs Abdul Salam and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 953 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-23
  evacuee propertyPermanent Transfer Deedcompensation poolrevisional jurisdictionsettlement authoritiestransfer of propertycivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute regarding the transfer of residential premises situated above evacuee shops. The appellant challenged the dismissal of his revision application, which had upheld the respondents' title derived from a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) issued to their predecessor. The core legal question was whether Settlement Authorities possessed the jurisdiction to cancel a validly issued P.T.D. and re-auction the property in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the issuance of a P.T.D. signifies that the property has exited the compensation pool. Consequently, Settlement Authorities lack the jurisdiction to exercise revisional powers over such property once the P.T.D. has been issued. The Court affirmed that finality attaches to such transactions, and revisional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to disturb a settled title merely because of subsequent administrative reconsiderations. The judgment reinforces the principle that a P.T.D. creates a vested right that cannot be unilaterally revoked by Settlement Authorities, thereby protecting the sanctity of titles issued under the relevant settlement laws.

  Questions settled

  • Does the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed remove evacuee property from the compensation pool?
  • Can Settlement Authorities exercise revisional jurisdiction over property after a Permanent Transfer Deed has been issued?
  • Is a Permanent Transfer Deed subject to cancellation by Settlement Authorities in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan vs Mst. Yaqoot Begum And Other1991 SCMR 819 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-03
  specific performanceagreement to sellevacuee propertypermanent transfer deedbona fide purchaserprior agreementsubsequent sale-deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court setting aside the concurrent findings of the trial and appellate courts and decreeing the suit for specific performance in favour of the first vendees. The core legal question was whether an agreement to sell executed prior to the issuance of the Permanent Transfer Deed of evacuee property, coupled with delivery of possession and payment of full consideration, could be legally enforced and take preference over a subsequent registered sale-deed executed in favour of a second vendee. The Supreme Court held that the earlier registered agreement to sell and mortgage deed were fully binding on the original owner, who was legally obligated to execute the sale-deed once the Permanent Transfer Deed was issued, and that the second vendee was not a bona fide purchaser. The Court established that an agreement to sell executed prior to the acquisition of full proprietary rights or formal transfer deeds is enforceable and takes precedence over subsequent transfers made with notice of the prior transaction.

  Questions settled

  • Can an agreement to sell executed before the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed for evacuee property be legally enforced?
  • Whether an agreement to sell executed prior to acquiring full proprietary rights is hit by statutory transfer restrictions?
  • Does a prior registered agreement to sell and mortgage take preference over a subsequent sale-deed executed in favour of a second vendee?
  • Is a second vendee who has notice of a prior mortgage and agreement to be considered a bona fide purchaser for value?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan vs Ahmad Bux And Another1991 SCMR 716 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-25
  limitation periodvacation of courtreopening of courtexclusion of timeejectment orderrented premisescertified copy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed an appeal under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 as time-barred. The core legal question was whether an appellant, whose period of limitation for filing an appeal expires while the court is closed for vacation, is entitled to the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908, to file the appeal on the reopening day, even if the application for a certified copy of the order was made after the initial limitation period had expired. The Supreme Court held that Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908, operates independently of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Court ruled that the benefit of Section 4, which allows for the filing of an appeal on the reopening day of a court, is not conditional upon having applied for a certified copy within the original limitation period. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's dismissal and remanded the case for decision on merits, establishing that Section 4 does not require a party to satisfy the conditions of Section 12 to avail its protection.

  Questions settled

  • Does the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908, depend on whether an application for a certified copy was made within the original period of limitation?
  • Is Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908, an independent provision from Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908, regarding the computation of time?
  • Can an appeal be competently filed on the reopening day of a court if the prescribed period of limitation expired during the court's vacation?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan And Others vs The Settlement and Rehabilitation1991 SCMR 1813(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-31
  consent orderleave to appealrevision petitionmodification of orderfinality of judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition seeking leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had dismissed a Civil Miscellaneous application filed by the petitioners. The petitioners had previously sought the modification of an earlier order dated 1-2-1986, which had disposed of their Revision Petition No. 630-R of 1974. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether an order passed by the High Court with the express consent of the petitioners could be subsequently modified or challenged. The Supreme Court held that there was no merit in the petition for leave to appeal. The ratio of the decision is that a judicial order passed with the consent of the parties cannot be challenged or modified at the behest of those same parties, as the consent serves as a binding agreement to the disposition of the matter. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the original order maintained by the High Court remained valid and binding upon the petitioners.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge or seek modification of a High Court order that was passed with their express consent?
  • Does a consent order preclude a party from later filing a miscellaneous application for its modification?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rahim vs Zahoor Ahmad And 5 Other1991 SCMR 2005 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-06
  Local Bodies ElectionElection PetitionDisqualificationWAPDAElection TribunalStatutory Bar
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a High Court judgment that upheld an Election Tribunal's decision to set aside the petitioner's election to a local body. The core legal dispute concerned the petitioner's qualification to contest the election under Section 21(G) of the Baluchistan Local Government Ordinance, 1980, specifically whether the termination of his services from WAPDA constituted a disqualification, or if his resignation, as claimed, exempted him from the statutory bar. The High Court had ruled against the petitioner, finding him disqualified. Upon review, the Supreme Court noted that the two-year period mentioned in the statutory bar had already expired, rendering the disqualification temporary rather than permanent. Furthermore, the Court observed that new local body elections were imminent, making it impractical to hear the appeal in time. Consequently, the petitioner chose not to press the petition. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition while explicitly keeping the underlying legal question regarding the interpretation of the disqualification provision open for future determination.

  Questions settled

  • Does the bar contained in Section 21(G) of the Baluchistan Local Government Ordinance 1980 apply to a candidate whose services were terminated from WAPDA?
  • Is the disqualification under Section 21(G) of the Baluchistan Local Government Ordinance 1980 of a permanent nature?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Qasim Khan vs Mst. Fizatul Zuhra1991 SCMR 1910 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-31
  benami transactiondeclaratory suitleave to appealownership of propertysecond wife
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a civil suit seeking a declaration of ownership of a house in dispute and asserting that the sale-deed executed in favour of the respondent, his second wife, was a benami transaction. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the petitioner, but the Additional District Judge accepted the respondent's appeal and dismissed the suit, a decision upheld by the High Court in regular second appeal. The petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question concerned whether the transaction was benami. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the respondent was a working teacher with independent income capable of purchasing the property at the material time, and that the payment made by her father on her behalf before the Registrar demonstrated her vigilance rather than a benami nature. The court laid down the principle that where a working spouse purchases property from her own income and her father facilitates the payment, the transaction cannot be deemed benami without compelling contrary evidence, warranting no interference with concurrent factual findings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a transaction in the name of a working spouse can be declared benami when she possesses independent income?
  • Does payment made by a father on behalf of his daughter during a property purchase establish a benami transaction?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the nature of a property transaction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Noor And Another vs Member I, Board of Revenue, Balochistan And Other1991 SCMR 643 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-12-23
  circumstantial evidencecapital chargemotive and enmityabscondencecompromise in criminal caseno evidenceQanun-e-Shahadat Ordercriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from the judgment of the Baluchistan High Court upholding the conviction of the appellants under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code and section 11(3) of Ordinance II of 1968, based on circumstantial evidence consisting of enmity, abscondence, and an attempted compromise by the appellants' fathers. The core legal question was whether a conviction on a capital charge can be sustained solely on such circumstantial and hearsay evidence without any direct or substantive evidence. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the convictions, holding that none of the pieces of evidence relied upon—motive, abscondence, or an admission and compromise made by the fathers of the accused—constitute substantive or admissible evidence upon which a conviction can be legally based. The Court laid down that in the absence of direct or substantive evidence, weak circumstantial factors cannot form the basis of a conviction, and that admissions or compromises made by third parties (such as parents) are entirely meaningless in criminal trials. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 applies fully to proceedings before tribunals under Ordinance II of 1968.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused person be convicted on a capital charge solely on the basis of motive, abscondence, and a compromise entered into by their parents in the absence of direct or substantive evidence?
  • Whether an admission of guilt or a compromise made by the father of an accused person is admissible as a confession against the accused in a criminal trial?
  • Are the provisions of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 applicable to proceedings before tribunals under Ordinance II of 1968?
  • Does abscondence or the existence of enmity constitute substantive or corroborative evidence in the absence of direct testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz, Special Secretary, Cabinet Division, Through His1991 SCMR 1192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-10-06
  civil servantService Tribunalabatement of appeallegal representativesright to sueterms and conditions of servicepay fixationcivil court remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, which dismissed an appeal as abated following the death of the appellant, a civil servant. The legal representatives sought to continue the appeal concerning pay fixation and monetary claims. The core legal question was whether the right to sue survives a civil servant's death and whether their legal representatives are entitled to continue proceedings before the Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the Tribunal's decision and dismissed the appeal. The Court held that the right of appeal under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 is conferred exclusively upon an aggrieved 'civil servant' as defined under Section 2(b) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 regarding terms and conditions of service. Because the Service Tribunals Act contains no provision extending remedies to successors-in-interest, the appeal abated upon the civil servant's death, though the legal heirs remain at liberty to seek appropriate redress before a competent civil court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the right to sue before the Service Tribunal is inheritable by the legal representatives upon the death of a civil servant?
  • Does an appeal pending before the Service Tribunal abate upon the death of the civil servant who instituted it?
  • Can the successors-in-interest of a deceased civil servant maintain or continue proceedings under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 for recovery of pay or emoluments?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz vs Muhammad Khan And Other1991 SCMR 1210 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-29
  inheritance mutationleave to appealcompromise decreespes successionisrevenue estatestatus quoproperty inheritance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal arising from a property inheritance dispute involving two mutations of land. The petitioner challenged the inheritance shares sanctioned in favor of the respondent, Nawaz, following the deaths of two brothers, Nasrullah and Jamadar. While the petitioner initially contested both mutations, he subsequently limited his challenge to Mutation No. 36, which concerned the inheritance of Jamadar. The core legal question presented was whether a previous compromise between the parties, wherein the petitioner had withdrawn an appeal regarding the inheritance share, precluded him from later challenging the mutation in a subsequent suit. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal specifically regarding the petitioner's share in Jamadar's inheritance as recorded in Mutation No. 36. The Court held that the compromise, which had attained finality, raised significant legal questions regarding the binding nature of such settlements and the principle of spes successionis. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal and ordered the maintenance of the status quo regarding possession of the disputed share pending the final decision of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a compromise agreement between parties regarding inheritance shares, once finalized, preclude a subsequent suit challenging the same mutation?
  • Can a party who has withdrawn an appeal based on a compromise later challenge the underlying mutation in a new suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz vs Abdul Hakim And 11 Other1991 SCMR 2097 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-08
  land settlementproduce index unitswrit jurisdictionexcess allotmentinformer rightsdiscretionary relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that allowed respondents to retain land held in excess of their entitlement, despite an informer having unsatisfied Produce Index (P.I.) Units. The appellant had successfully informed settlement authorities that the respondents obtained excess land through misrepresentation. While the Settlement Commissioner confirmed the excess allotment and allocated the land to the appellant, the High Court intervened in writ jurisdiction, directing the sale of the excess land to the respondents. The Supreme Court considered whether the High Court should have exercised its discretion in favor of the respondents. The Court held that when a claimant with unsatisfied P.I. Units competes against a party seeking to retain land held in excess of their entitlement, the former holds preference in both law and propriety. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, ruling that the appellant's unsatisfied units must be satisfied from the excess land before the respondents can retain it, thereby correcting the High Court's improper exercise of discretionary writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a claimant with unsatisfied Produce Index Units have preference over a party seeking to retain land held in excess of their entitlement?
  • Should the High Court exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction to favor a party retaining land in excess of their entitlement against an informer with unsatisfied claims?
  • Is a finding of fact regarding excess land allotment by settlement authorities subject to interference in writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz Alias Najja vs The State1991 SCMR 111 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-11
  criminal appealpost-arrest bailstatement of witnessesconcession by StateSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal converted into an appeal, wherein the petitioner Muhammad Nawaz alias Najja sought post-arrest bail. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner was entitled to bail in light of the statements made by the prosecution witnesses. The Court examined the material witnesses produced by the Investigating Officer, who testified and supported their affidavits stating that the petitioner was not implicated in the occurrence. The learned counsel for the State conceded and could not oppose the bail plea given these statements. Holding in favor of the petitioner, the Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and granted bail to the petitioner subject to furnishing surety bonds. The key principle laid down is that where prosecution witnesses categorically disown or state on oath that an accused is not involved in the crime, and the State does not oppose the same, the accused establishes a case for the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to bail when material prosecution witnesses state on oath that he is not implicated in the occurrence?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be converted into an appeal for the grant of bail by the Supreme Court?
  • What is the effect of the State counsel's inability to oppose a bail plea based on favorable witness statements?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nabi vs The Secretary, Establishment Division, Rawalpindi1991 SCMR 1872 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-12
  service lawseniority disputework-charged appointmentad hoc appointmentregularizationservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a service dispute concerning the determination of seniority between the petitioner, an Overseer, and the respondents, who were appointed as ad hoc Assistant Executive Engineers. The core legal question was whether seniority should be reckoned from the date of initial work-charged or ad hoc appointment, or from the date of regular appointment following approval by the Public Service Commission. The petitioner challenged a revised seniority list that placed the respondents above him, arguing that prior work-charged or ad hoc service was irrelevant for seniority purposes. The Federal Service Tribunal dismissed the petitioner's appeal, upholding the revised seniority list. The Supreme Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision, holding that the respondents, having been appointed as Assistant Engineers prior to the petitioner, were correctly granted seniority over him. The Court found the Tribunal's order equitable and dismissed the petition, effectively affirming that the date of appointment to the post, relative to other incumbents, remains a primary factor in determining seniority rankings in this context.

  Questions settled

  • Can seniority be claimed based on service rendered on a work-charged or ad hoc basis?
  • Is seniority determined from the date of regular appointment following Public Service Commission approval?
  • Does an earlier appointment date as an Assistant Executive Engineer entitle an employee to seniority over an employee appointed later?
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• Muhammad Munir vs Faiz Bakhsh And Other1991 SCMR 1914 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-19
  perpetual injunctionproprietary rightsregular second appealleave to appealland dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, which had allowed a regular second appeal and restored a trial court's decree in a suit for perpetual injunction. The respondents had originally filed the suit to restrain the petitioner from interfering with their proprietary rights in land purchased from a third party. While the trial court initially decreed the suit in favor of the respondents, the District Judge subsequently allowed the petitioner's appeal. The High Court, however, reversed the District Judge's decision and restored the trial court's decree. The petitioner sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court acted illegally and ignored established legal precedents regarding the adjudication of such disputes. The Supreme Court, finding that the contention raised by the petitioner involved a question of public importance requiring further examination, granted leave to appeal. The Court ordered the provision of security for costs and permitted the parties to file additional documents for the upcoming hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court's reversal of a first appellate court's judgment in a suit for perpetual injunction involve a question of public importance?
  • Under what circumstances does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against a High Court order in a regular second appeal?
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• Muhammad Mujtaba Khan vs The Deputy Director, F.I.A. And Other1991 SCMR 1761 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-19
  dismissal from serviceauthorized officerservice tribunalpetition for leave to appealfederal investigation agencycivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Service Tribunal, whereby the dismissal of the petitioner, an A.S.-I. in Grade-5, from service by the Deputy Director, Federal Investigation Agency, was upheld. The core legal question raised was whether the proceedings were vitiated because the Deputy Director was allegedly not the competent Authorized Officer to issue the show-cause notice under the applicable rules and Standing Order. The Supreme Court held that the contention regarding the competence of the Authorized Officer was not challenged before the Tribunal and no material was produced to substantiate that the Deputy Director lacked such authority. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the decision of the Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the proceedings are vitiated if the show-cause notice is issued by an alleged incompetent authorized officer?
  • Can a petitioner challenge the competence of an authorized officer for the first time without producing supporting evidence?
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• Muhammad Mansoob Butt vs Managing Director, Pakistan1991 SC M R1755 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-22
  leave to appealdismissal from servicecharge-sheetenquiry reportservice tribunaldisciplinary action
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Service Tribunal upholding his dismissal from service following disciplinary proceedings for misconduct. The petitioner raised two primary legal contentions: firstly, that the charge-sheet failed to specify the exact punishment, mentioning only appropriate disciplinary action; and secondly, that he was not supplied with a copy of the enquiry report, thereby prejudicing his defence, relying on Syed Mir Muhammad v. N.-W.F.P. Government. The Supreme Court held, regarding the first ground, that referencing the rules prescribing punishments in the charge-sheet sufficiently satisfies legal requirements, as settled in Syed Nasir Hussain Zaidi v. Service Tribunal. Regarding the second ground, the Court held that the supply of an enquiry report is not mandatory in every case, as clarified in Sarfraz v. General Manager (Leaf), Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd., and noted that a personal hearing was afforded to the petitioner, which under service rules occurs only when a major penalty like dismissal is likely. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a charge-sheet fail to meet legal requirements if it specifies appropriate disciplinary action instead of a particular punishment?
  • Is it mandatory to supply a copy of the enquiry report to an employee in every disciplinary case?
  • Whether the failure to supply an enquiry report prejudices the defence of a civil servant who was granted a personal hearing for a major penalty?
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• Muhammad Khawaja vs Bahadur And 25 Other1991 SCMR 1538 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-29
  consolidation of holdingslimitationdiscretionary jurisdictionwrit jurisdictionleave to appealBoard of Revenue
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition regarding a consolidation of holdings dispute. The petitioner had initially failed before the Board of Revenue, which had restored the Collector's order dismissing the petitioner's appeal as time-barred. The High Court had upheld this dismissal, citing both merits and the issue of limitation. Before the Supreme Court, the primary legal question concerned the limitation period and whether the High Court should have interfered with the discretionary findings of the lower revenue forums. The Supreme Court held that the determination of limitation in this context fell within the discretionary jurisdiction of the lower forums. Consequently, the Court ruled that there was no justification for the High Court to interfere with this discretionary exercise. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, refusing leave to appeal on the grounds that the lower forums' discretion regarding limitation was properly exercised and unexceptionable. The petition was dismissed without reaching the merits of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with a discretionary finding of a lower revenue forum regarding the condonation of delay?
  • Is the determination of limitation in a consolidation of holdings case considered a discretionary matter for the lower forums?
  • Should the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal when the High Court has refused to interfere with a discretionary order of a lower forum?
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• Muhammad Khan And 6 Others vs Mst. Ghulam Fatima And 12 Other1991 SCMR 970 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-10
  amendment of written statementconstitutional petitionwrit jurisdictionrevisional ordercivil litigationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan against an order of the High Court dated 29-07-1990. The respondents had filed a suit for declaration and possession, during which the petitioners sought to amend their written statement under Order VI, Rule 17, C.P.C. The trial court disallowed the amendment application, and the subsequent revision petition was dismissed by the District Judge. The petitioners challenged these orders via a constitutional petition in the High Court, which was dismissed on the ground that a revisional order arising out of civil litigation cannot be challenged through a writ petition. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the order was legal, proper, and raised no point of law. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed. The judgment reiterates the established principle that orders passed in civil revision proceedings by competent courts cannot be assailed or reopened by invoking the constitutional writ jurisdiction of the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a revisional order arising out of civil litigation be challenged through a writ petition in the High Court?
  • Whether an order disallowing an application under Order VI, Rule 17 C.P.C. upheld in revision can be assailed under constitutional jurisdiction?
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• Muhammad Khalil And Others vs The Settlement Commissioner, Lahore1991 SCMR 448 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-28
  property transfersettlement departmentcrucial datepossessionlicenseeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the transfer of a shop situated inside Bhati Gate, Lahore, by the Settlement Department to respondent Muhammad Iqbal, which was challenged by the petitioner Muhammad Khalil. The core legal question revolves around whether the petitioner qualified as being in lawful possession of the disputed property prior to the crucial date so as to be entitled to its transfer under the relevant settlement laws. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was merely a licensee and his occupation commenced after the crucial date of 20-12-1958, whereas the respondent established continuous possession since 1954. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming the concurrent findings and transfer orders upheld by the High Court. The key principle laid down is that a licensee whose occupation of a disputed property commences after the crucial statutory date is not entitled to its transfer under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a licensee occupying a property after the crucial date is entitled to its transfer under the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act?
  • Can a person whose possession commences after 20-12-1958 legitimately object to the transfer of a shop in favour of a prior occupant?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Javed vs The State1991 PLD Supreme Court 1068 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-28
  inherent jurisdictionquashing of proceedingsprosecution sanctionabuse of processvicarious liabilityFirst Information Reporttrial court discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against the High Court's refusal to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash criminal proceedings against a bank cashier charged with offences under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appellant contended that he acted under the orders of his superiors and that the requisite sanction for prosecution was absent, thereby constituting an abuse of the process of law. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court's findings were unexceptionable. The Court emphasized that criminal proceedings should not be stifled at the outset. It ruled that issues regarding the necessity of prosecution sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and the determination of the First Information Report (F.I.R.) are matters of fact to be decided by the trial court. Furthermore, the Court clarified that if sanction is required but absent, the trial court should allow reasonable time for its procurement before considering acquittal under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Should criminal proceedings be quashed at the outset when a question of prosecution sanction remains to be determined?
  • Is the determination of whether a statement constitutes a formal First Information Report a matter for the trial court?
  • What is the appropriate procedure for a trial court when prosecution sanction is required but has not been obtained?
  • Can an accused rely on the orders of superiors to claim immunity from criminal liability?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Jalal Khan And 3 Others vs Member, Board of Revenue1991 SCMR 363 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-19
  consolidation mattercondonation of delayrevisional jurisdictionboard of revenueleave to appealwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which had upheld the revisional order passed by the Board of Revenue in a consolidation matter. The core legal question concerned whether a party who allegedly agreed to the initial consolidation scheme possessed the right to challenge it subsequently in an appeal, and whether delay could be condoned in such proceedings. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the Board of Revenue had properly dealt with the question of the challenge after admitting additional evidence, and the High Court had rightly applied its mind to the merits, finding the impugned orders unexceptionable. Accordingly, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the validity of the revisional orders and the condonation of delay by the revenue authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party who agreed to the initial scheme of consolidation has the right to challenge the same in appeal?
  • Can the Board of Revenue condone delay and make adjustments in fields during consolidation proceedings?
  • Are orders passed by the Board of Revenue in consolidation matters open to interference when the High Court has found them unexceptionable on merits?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ismail Through His Legal Heirs And Others vs Ghulam Haider1991 SCMR 1443 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-15
  right of pre-emptionsubsequent vendeesindivisible salesubstitutionappeal by leave
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave examined whether the High Court correctly interpreted the precedent in Sardar Ali and others v. Muhammad Ali and others (PLD 1988 SC 287) to deny pre-emptors a decree for the entire land despite holding them entitled to it. The original dispute arose from sales of agricultural land via mutations in favor of the first vendee, who subsequently resold a one-third share to subsequent vendees prior to the institution of pre-emption suits. The Supreme Court held that the decision in Sardar Ali's case does not bar the grant of relief resulting in an increase of area or share, provided the right to pre-empt was recognized, and that a truncated resale of a portion of the property to subsequent vendees cannot defeat the pre-emptor's claim as it divides an indivisible sale and associates strangers. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and decreed the pre-emption suits in respect of the entire land upon the condition of depositing the balance of the price.

  Questions settled

  • Does the rule in Sardar Ali's case preclude the grant of relief resulting in an increase of area or share to a pre-emptor whose right has been recognized?
  • Can a vendee defeat a pre-emption claim by reselling only a portion of the purchased property to a subsequent vendee having a superior right?
  • Does a resale of a portion of property in favor of subsequent vendees amount to dividing an indivisible sale under pre-emption law?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Irshad vs Ch. Fazal Haq And 5 Other1991 SCMR 2149 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-13
  pre-emptionpre-emption moneydeposit of pre-emption amountappellate discretionreasonable timecivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a pre-emption dispute between rival pre-emptors where the petitioner failed to deposit the pre-emption amount within the time specified by the trial court, resulting in the loss of his success. The High Court dismissed his revision, leading to the present appeal. The core legal question was whether an Appellate Court, while dismissing an appeal in a pre-emption matter, is obligated to grant the pre-emptor reasonable time to deposit the pre-emption money, and under what circumstances this discretion may be refused. The Supreme Court held that while an Appellate Court has the discretion to refuse the extension of time in exceptional cases—such as where a pre-emptor lacks funds or is merely stalling—it is generally bound to grant reasonable time for the deposit of the pre-emption amount. The Court clarified that this obligation exists even in the absence of a specific application for interim relief. Finding no exceptional circumstances to justify the refusal of time, the Court allowed the appeal and granted the appellant ten days to make the necessary deposit.

  Questions settled

  • Is an Appellate Court bound to grant reasonable time to a pre-emptor to deposit the pre-emption amount while dismissing an appeal?
  • Under what circumstances can an Appellate Court refuse to grant reasonable time for the deposit of pre-emption money?
  • Does the failure to file an appeal in one's own case preclude the Appellate Court from granting an extension of time for deposit when the subject matter is under appellate adjudication?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Irfan vs Abdul Rehman And Other1991 SCMR 153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-04
  leave to appealacquittalmurdereye-witnessappraisal of evidenceprivate complaintdefence version
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the judgment of the High Court, which had declined to set aside the acquittal of the respondents by the trial court. The petitioner alleged that his brother was murdered by the respondents in the house of one of the respondents. The prosecution's case relied heavily on a single eye-witness, whose testimony was discarded by both the trial court and the High Court due to his delayed statement, lack of immediate reporting, and distant residence. Additionally, the trial court accepted the defence version that the deceased was killed while criminally assaulting a woman. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the appraisal of evidence by the lower courts was conducted in its true perspective and that there was no basis for a re-appraisal of the evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of a sole eye-witness who fails to report the occurrence immediately and remains silent for a month can be safely relied upon to sustain a conviction?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court undertake a re-appraisal of evidence in an appeal against an acquittal?
  • Does the acceptance of a plausible defence version by concurrent findings of lower courts preclude the interference of the Supreme Court in a criminal petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal vs The State1991 SCMR 147 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-19
  murderconvictionappraisal of evidenceeye-witness accountbenefit of section 382-Bsupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against his conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased, which had resulted in a sentence of imprisonment for life and fine, subsequently upheld by the High Court. The core legal question concerned whether the concurrent findings of guilt by the courts below based on ocular testimony warranted interference and whether the defence plea of grave and sudden provocation or accidental fire during a scuffle was sustainable. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact based on natural eye-witness accounts were unexceptionable and did not warrant reappraisal of evidence, thereby dismissing the petition for acquittal. However, the Court held that the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact by lower courts based on reliable eyewitness testimony will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court absent a miscarriage of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will reappraise evidence after concurrent findings of guilt by the trial court and the High Court?
  • Is a convict entitled to the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the period spent in custody during trial?
  • Whether the defence plea of accidental fire during a scuffle can override consistent eye-witness testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal vs The Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Admn.), Naval1991 SCMR 317 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-19
  service appeallimitation perioddepartmental appealappellate orderjurisdictionservice tribunalreversion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's service appeal on the grounds of limitation. The petitioner, a former employee of the Military Accounts Department who later joined the Naval Headquarters, challenged an order reverting him from the post of Superintendent to Assistant. In his appeal before the Tribunal, the petitioner treated a letter from the Military Accountant General (Respondent No. 2) as an appellate order, which the Tribunal relied upon to calculate the limitation period. The petitioner later contended that this characterization was a mistake, as Respondent No. 2 had no jurisdiction over him, and that his departmental appeal to the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Respondent No. 1) remained undisposed of. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, primarily to determine whether the Tribunal was legally justified in dismissing the service appeal on limitation grounds by treating the letter from Respondent No. 2 as an appellate order, given the petitioner's assertion that the departmental appeal to the competent authority was still pending.

  Questions settled

  • Can a letter from an authority lacking jurisdiction over an employee be treated as an appellate order for the purpose of computing the limitation period for a service appeal?
  • Is a service appeal filed before the Federal Service Tribunal maintainable if the departmental appeal to the competent authority remains undisposed of?
  • Does the mischaracterization of a letter as an appellate order by a petitioner before the Tribunal preclude them from challenging the limitation finding on appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal vs Mst. Reshman Bibi1991 SCMR 2520 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-27
  mortgage redemptionunconscionable agreementforged sale deedevacuee propertycivil revisioncontractual fairness
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a civil suit concerning the ownership and redemption of a house in Gujrat City, originally evacuee property. The respondent, having mortgaged the property to the appellant in 1960, challenged a subsequent 1966 sale deed as a forgery. The trial court found the sale deed to be a forgery and decreed the suit, allowing the respondent to redeem the mortgage. The appellant challenged this, arguing that the mortgage deed stipulated a 40-year redemption period, which had not yet expired. The Supreme Court examined whether the 40-year term was enforceable. The Court held that the 40-year period was unconscionable and harsh, particularly given that the mortgagor was a female, suggesting she had been inveigled into an unfair agreement. Relying on the principle established in Ghulam Ali v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi (PLD 1990 SC 1), the Court ruled that the condition restricting redemption was unenforceable. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower courts' decisions to allow redemption despite the unexpired term.

  Questions settled

  • Can a mortgage deed clause imposing a 40-year redemption period be declared unconscionable and unenforceable?
  • Is a sale deed found to be a forgery valid for transferring property ownership?
  • Does the court have the authority to permit mortgage redemption before the expiry of a fixed term if that term is deemed unfair?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal vs Mst. Resham Bibi1991 SCMR 1214 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-27
  special leave to appealmortgage with possessionforged sale-deedright of redemptionevacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal concerning a dispute over a house in Gujrat City originally transferred to the respondent as evacuee property. The respondent mortgaged the property with possession to the petitioner in 1960 and allegedly sold it to the petitioner via a sale-deed in 1966. In 1984, the respondent filed a civil suit seeking a declaration that she remained the owner, that the sale-deed was a forged document, and seeking possession upon payment of the mortgage amount. The trial court found the sale-deed to be a forgery and decreed the suit, a decision upheld by the Additional District Judge and subsequently by the High Court in revision. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that under the terms of the genuine mortgage deed, redemption could not occur before the expiry of forty years, rendering the order to surrender possession prior to that period illegal. The Supreme Court held that the contention required examination and granted leave to appeal, ordering maintenance of status quo regarding possession during the appeal's pendency.

  Questions settled

  • Can a mortgaged property be redeemed before the expiry of the stipulated period mentioned in the mortgage deed?
  • Whether a suit for declaration and possession is maintainable when a sale-deed is found to be a forgery?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal vs Fazal Elahi And Other1991 SCMR 1815 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-25
  pre-emptionMangla Dam Ousteeco-vendeeleave to appealstatutory exemption
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding a pre-emption claim against him. The core legal question was whether a vendee whose share was distinctly mentioned in the sale mutation could claim protection against a pre-emption suit merely by associating with a co-vendee who held a certificate as a Mangla Dam Oustee entitled to statutory exemption. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner could not benefit from the exemption of his co-vendee where his own share was distinct and he possessed no superior or equal right against the pre-emptor on merits. The court established the principle that association with an exempt co-vendee in a sale transaction does not extend statutory protection to a non-exempt co-vendee whose individual share is separately identifiable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a co-vendee without an independent exemption can benefit from the statutory protection of another co-vendee who is a Mangla Dam Oustee?
  • Does the distinct specification of shares in a sale mutation prevent a non-exempt vendee from claiming the protection attached to an exempt co-vendee?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal Khokhar and 3 others vs The Government of the Punjab through the Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Lahore and 2 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 35 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-10-02
  seniorityvested rightretrospective seniorityrelaxation of rulesPunjab Civil Servants Act 1974Governor's powerjust and equitablearmy service countingultra vires
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan arose from a Service Tribunal judgment upholding an order of the Governor of Punjab under Section 22 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974. The Governor had relaxed rules to grant respondent No. 2—a 1975 direct recruit Assistant Engineer—retrospective seniority over the 1974 batch of directly recruited Assistant Engineers by counting his prior Army service, while also granting him pay, pension, and promotion eligibility benefits. The appellants challenged the grant of retrospective seniority, contending that seniority is a vested right under the Punjab Act and cannot be destroyed by discretionary relaxation. The Supreme Court partially allowed the appeal, holding that while Section 22 allows relaxation of rules for just and equitable treatment, it is constrained by parameters of justice and fairness and cannot be exercised to retrospectively affect or destroy the vested seniority rights of other civil servants. Consequently, the order granting retrospective seniority was declared ultra vires Section 22, whereas benefits regarding pay, pension, and promotion eligibility were upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Does seniority constitute a vested right under Section 7 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974?
  • Can the Governor exercise discretionary power under Section 22 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 to retrospectively alter seniority to the detriment of other civil servants?
  • What are the legal boundaries and parameters of the phrase 'just and equitable' under Section 22 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974?
  • Can prior military service be counted towards civil service seniority in relaxation of service rules if it destroys the accrued seniority rights of earlier direct recruits?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal Khan And Another vs Rehmat Din And Other1991 SCMR 1854 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-24
  pre-emptionpossession suitrevenue recordspattileave to appealconcurrent findings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a second appeal regarding a suit for possession through pre-emption. The core legal question was whether the plaintiffs had established their qualification as pre-emptors based on their status as owners in the specific patti where the disputed land was situated. The trial court had initially decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs, but the District Judge set aside this decree, finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove the existence of distinct pattis in the village or their ownership therein. The High Court affirmed this dismissal, noting a lack of evidence in the revenue records to support the claim. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts had properly appreciated the facts and that the oral testimony of the Patwari was insufficient to establish the claim in the absence of corroborating revenue records. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that no question of law was involved requiring interference with the concurrent findings of fact.

  Questions settled

  • Is oral testimony of a Patwari sufficient to establish the existence of a patti in a pre-emption suit in the absence of supporting revenue records?
  • Can the Supreme Court re-appraise facts where lower courts have concurrently found that a pre-emptor failed to establish their qualification?
  • Does the absence of evidence in revenue records regarding the division of a village into distinct pattis defeat a claim of pre-emption based on ownership in a patti?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal And Others vs Muhammad Sharif And Another1991 SCMR 1208 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-26
  defamationdamagescivil revisionconcurrent findingssupreme court petition
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil petitions are directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' revision petitions. The respondents had filed suits claiming damages against the petitioners for defamation and mental torture after the petitioners publicly announced in a village mosque that the respondents had become Ahmadis, causing them to be expelled from the mosque and subjected to hostile slogans. The trial court decreed the suits awarding damages, and the lower appellate court as well as the High Court upheld the decrees concurrently. The core legal question involved whether the concurrent findings of fact regarding defamation and disrepute could be interfered with by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that since concurrent findings of fact were recorded against the petitioners and they failed to establish any error warranting interference, the petitions were devoid of merit. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact on the sufficiency of evidence in civil revision matters unless a clear misreading or non-reading of evidence is shown.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding defamation in civil matters?
  • Can damages be awarded for public imputation of changing religion causing mental torture and disrepute?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal And Other, Jalal Din vs Abdul Hamid Sardar1991 SCMR 978 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-25
  pre-emption suitdeficit court-feerejection of plaintvaluation of suitcivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two civil appeals involving pre-emption suits where plaints were subjected to questions regarding the deficiency of court-fee. In the first matter, the plaintiff tentatively valued the plaint and failed to make good the deficit court-fee despite orders, leading to the rejection of the plaint by the trial court, which order was subsequently set aside by the High Court. In the second matter, the trial court decreed the suit subject to payment of a deficit court-fee, which the plaintiff paid, but the first appellate court set it aside due to the plaintiff's conduct, which decision was reversed by a Single Judge of the High Court. The core legal question was whether a plaintiff should be allowed an opportunity to make up a deficiency in court-fee when a nominal court-fee was initially fixed. Relying on the precedent of Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakoor Khan, the Supreme Court held that at least one opportunity as of right must be granted to a plaintiff to make up a determined deficiency in court-fee by a specified date, and since the trial courts failed to provide such clear orders, the Lahore High Court judgments were correct. Both appeals were dismissed with liberty for the appellants to raise other legal objections before the lower court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff is entitled to at least one opportunity as of right to make up a deficiency in court-fee?
  • Can a plaint be rejected for non-payment of court-fee without the trial court determining the exact deficiency and granting a clear opportunity to make it good by a certain date?
  • Does a deliberately fixed nominal court-fee disentitle a plaintiff from making good the deficiency if ordered by the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ilyas vs Mst. Ijazan And Another1991 SCMR 1508 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-30
  fiduciary relationshipsale-deedconsiderationconcurrent findingscivil revisioninheritanceburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a civil suit filed by the respondents, daughters of the deceased Abdul Aziz, challenging a sale-deed executed in favour of the petitioner, who was their brother-in-law. The respondents alleged that the petitioner manipulated the sale-deed for land measuring 21 Kanals 13 Marlas without paying any consideration, exploiting his fiduciary relationship with the deceased, who was old and sick. While the trial court initially dismissed the suit, the appellate court reversed this decision, finding the sale invalid. The High Court subsequently upheld the appellate court's findings, noting the lack of proof regarding the payment of consideration and the suspicious timing of the transaction shortly before the deceased's death. The petitioner sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the failure to prove the sale and the payment of consideration were sound. The Court emphasized the lack of a plausible reason for the deceased to disinherit his daughters in favour of the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Can a sale-deed be set aside if the petitioner fails to prove the payment of consideration?
  • Does a fiduciary relationship between the parties affect the burden of proof regarding the validity of a sale-deed?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the validity of a property transaction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ibrahim Azad And Another vs The Secretary, Government of Punjab Agricultural Department, Lahore And 4 Other1991 SCMR 530 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-21
  seniority rightscivil servicevested rightpromotion eligibilityservice rulesadministrative tribunalfunctional unit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the seniority and promotion rights of civil servants within the West Pakistan Agriculture Service. The appellants challenged the Punjab Administrative Tribunal's decision, which upheld the Department's practice of restricting seniority and promotion eligibility to specific "groups" created following a 1968 Governor's order. The core legal question was whether this redesignation of posts, which explicitly stated it would not affect terms of service, could lawfully override the joint seniority list mandated by the West Pakistan Agriculture Service (Research Wing) Rules, 1963. The Supreme Court held that the Department's bifurcation of seniority into groups was unauthorized and contrary to the 1963 Rules. The Court ruled that seniority is a vested right that cannot be curtailed by administrative action lacking clear legal sanction. Consequently, the Court directed the Department to maintain a joint seniority list and reconsider promotions based on service seniority and experience "in the line," rather than restricted group-based criteria. This judgment reinforces the principle that administrative redesignations cannot alter fundamental service conditions or vested seniority rights without explicit statutory authority.

  Questions settled

  • Is seniority of a civil servant a vested right that cannot be deprived except in accordance with the law?
  • Can administrative redesignation of posts be used to restrict seniority and promotion eligibility if the redesignation order explicitly states it shall not affect terms of service?
  • Does the West Pakistan Agriculture Service (Research Wing) Rules, 1963 require a single joint seniority list for the service?
  • Can a department restrict promotion eligibility to specific groups without the notification of functional units under the relevant service rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ibrahim And Others vs Faisalabad Development Authority1991 SCMR 1876 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-03
  allotment of shopsprice fixationdevelopment authoritywrit jurisdictioncontractual obligationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed an Intra-Court Appeal regarding the allotment of shops by the Faisalabad Development Authority. The petitioners, former shopkeepers in the Old Vegetable Market, had been relocated by the Authority under a development scheme. Upon the Authority's agreement to provide them with new shops, the petitioners accepted the allotment but subsequently contested the price fixed for these shops, alleging it was arbitrary and legally unjustified. The High Court dismissed their initial writ petition in limine, and the subsequent Intra-Court Appeal was also dismissed. The Supreme Court reviewed the record and submissions, noting that the petitioners had explicitly agreed to pay the price determined by the Authority. Finding no breach of law or violation of any vested right, the Supreme Court held that there was no justification for judicial interference in the price fixation process. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the lower court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge the price fixation of allotted shops after having previously agreed to pay the price determined by the development authority?
  • Does the fixation of price for shops by a development authority constitute a breach of law or vested right when the allottee has consented to the authority's determination?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain vs Rehmat Ali1991 SCMR 1888 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-30
  concurrent findings of factadverse possessiontenancyleave to appealproperty ownershiptrespasser
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts in a property dispute. The plaintiff/respondent filed a suit claiming ownership of land, while the defendant/petitioner asserted title based on an exchange deed, adverse possession, and protection under the Transfer of Property Act. The trial court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff, a decision upheld by the appellate court and subsequently the High Court in civil revision. The Supreme Court addressed whether the petitioner's claims regarding ownership could override the established findings that he was merely a tenant and a trespasser. The Court held that the petitioner's arguments were frivolous attempts to perpetuate possession and that the case was concluded by concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal, affirming that concurrent findings of fact regarding the status of possession and tenancy are not open to interference in the absence of legal error.

  Questions settled

  • Can concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the status of a party as a tenant or trespasser be challenged in a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Does a claim of adverse possession successfully negate a finding of tenancy in a property dispute?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain vs Fateh Muhammad1991 SCMR 1887 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-29
  transfer of civil suitdiscretionary powerconvenience of partiesappellate interferencespecific performance
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dated 28th June 1989, which allowed a transfer application filed by the respondent under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioner had instituted a suit for specific performance of a contract before the Senior Civil Judge at Leiah. The respondent sought transfer of the suit to Sahiwal on grounds of advanced age, ill-health, apprehension of danger to life, and lack of proper representation by counsel at Leiah. The High Court transferred the suit to Sahiwal as an equidistant venue for both parties. The core legal question was whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in transferring the suit. The Supreme Court held that the High Court exercised its discretion for cogent reasons and dismissed the petition, establishing that appellate interference in the discretionary transfer of a civil suit is unwarranted when supported by sufficient justification.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil suit can be transferred under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on the ground of the defendant's ill-health and advanced age?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the discretionary order of the High Court regarding the transfer of a suit without sufficient grounds?
  • Is the equidistant location from the abodes of both parties a valid consideration for transferring a suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain vs Allah Dad and 13 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 1104 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-27
  ex parte decreedate of hearingcivil procedureremandwritten statementtemporary injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a civil suit where the appellant challenged an ex parte decree passed against him. The core legal question was whether a court can pass an ex parte decree on a date fixed merely for the filing of a written statement or a reply to a miscellaneous application, rather than a date of hearing. The Supreme Court examined the order-sheet, which revealed that the date in question was fixed for filing a reply to a temporary injunction application, not for filing a written statement. The Court held that such a date does not constitute a date of hearing for the suit itself. Furthermore, the Court clarified that there was no specific order requiring the defendant to file a written statement under the relevant procedural rules on that date. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for a decision on merits. The judgment reinforces the principle that an ex parte decree cannot be passed on a date not fixed for the hearing of the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Can an ex parte decree be passed on a date fixed only for the filing of a reply to a miscellaneous application?
  • Is a date fixed for the filing of a written statement considered a date of hearing for the suit?
  • Does the absence of a court order requiring the filing of a written statement preclude the passing of an ex parte decree on a procedural date?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain And Others vs Punjab University Academic Staff1991 SCMR 1155 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-24
  writ jurisdictionsuo motuallotment of landHigh Court powersjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the scope of the High Court's writ jurisdiction in the context of suo motu actions. The petitioners challenged a High Court judgment that had set aside an allotment of land made to petitioner No. 6 in 1973, despite the fact that this specific allotment was not challenged in the underlying writ petition (Writ Petition No. 402-R of 1976). The core legal question was whether the High Court, in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, possesses the authority to issue a writ suo motu regarding matters not raised by the parties. The Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot issue a writ suo motu while deciding a writ petition. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order insofar as it declared the 1973 allotment to be without lawful authority. The Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the original allotment, establishing the principle that the High Court's writ jurisdiction is confined to the issues properly brought before it and does not extend to suo motu interventions.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court issue a writ suo motu while deciding a writ petition?
  • Is a High Court order setting aside an allotment of land valid if the allotment was not challenged in the writ petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain And Others vs Mst. Razia Rana And Other1991 SCMR 1769 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-30
  leave to appealland disputetitle to propertyburden of proofinfirmity of title
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Muhammad Hussain and others against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 30-6-1987, concerning a dispute over a piece of land situated in Mianapura, Sialkot City. The core legal question is whether a party can claim land based on the infirmity of the opposing party's title without establishing an independent right or title in themselves. The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff or petitioner cannot succeed on the basis of any infirmity in the defendant's or respondent's title without first demonstrating their own valid right or title to the property in question. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, establishing that a party must rely on the strength of their own title rather than the weakness of their opponent's.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner succeed in claiming land based solely on the infirmity of the respondent's title?
  • Is it necessary for a party claiming a piece of land to establish their own right or title before challenging the opposing party's title?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain and others vs Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Chairman, Railway Board, Lahore and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 385 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-03
  revisional jurisdictionLabour Appellate TribunalLabour CourtPayment of Wages ActIndustrial Relations Ordinancestatutory interpretationappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arose from a dispute regarding the revisional jurisdiction of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal over orders passed by a Labour Court under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The appellants, railway employees, sought extra wages, which the Authority granted. The Railway Administration appealed to the Labour Court, which dismissed the claim. The Labour Appellate Tribunal subsequently set aside the Labour Court's order. The High Court, however, declared the Tribunal's order void, ruling that the Tribunal lacked revisional jurisdiction over matters arising under the Payment of Wages Act. The Supreme Court resolved the conflict between High Courts, holding that when a Labour Court exercises appellate jurisdiction under the Payment of Wages Act, it acts within its statutory functions under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Consequently, proceedings before the Labour Court under the Act are deemed proceedings under the Ordinance, making them subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case for consideration of other pending grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Labour Appellate Tribunal possess revisional jurisdiction over orders passed by a Labour Court in its appellate capacity under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936?
  • Are proceedings conducted by a Labour Court under the Payment of Wages Act considered proceedings under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Does the conferment of appellate jurisdiction on a Labour Court under the Payment of Wages Act make its decisions final and immune from the revisional powers of the Labour Appellate Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hayat vs Muhammad Shakar And Another1991 SCMR 1328 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-25
  land allotmentclaimant allotteeauction confirmationlocus standiintra-court appealwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's Intra-Court Appeal, which had challenged the dismissal of his writ petition concerning land allotment. The core legal question involves the validity of cancelling a claimant allottee's land allotment on the ground of non-possession and whether a person in whose favour an auction was never confirmed possesses locus standi to maintain a writ petition or intra-court appeal. The Supreme Court held that possession is not an essential condition for the confirmation of land allotted to a claimant allottee, and an unconfirmed auction confers no vested right to challenge subsequent administrative orders through constitutional remedies. The petition was accordingly dismissed, upholding the concurrent judgments of the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether possession is an essential condition for the confirmation of land allotted to a claimant allottee?
  • Does an unconfirmed auction give the auction-purchaser a sufficient right to maintain a writ petition or intra-court appeal?
  • Whether an allotment of land can be cancelled without affording an opportunity of hearing to the claimant allottee?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hashim And 3 Others vs Settlement Commissioner (Lands)1991 SCMR 1564 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-22
  allotment cancellationdisplaced personsbogus claimvoid ab initioleave to appealsettlement of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld an order by the Settlement Commissioner (Lands) cancelling the petitioners' land allotment. The dispute originated when land reserved for the petitioners, who were displaced persons, was subsequently allotted to the respondents. While the Additional Settlement Commissioner initially restored the allotment to the petitioners, the Settlement Commissioner (Lands) later reversed this, cancelling the petitioners' rights. The petitioners challenged this before the High Court, which dismissed their petition. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that the respondents' claim was based on a bogus claim form that had been cancelled as void ab initio, meaning the respondents lacked a valid legal basis to claim the disputed land. The Supreme Court found that the petitioners' contention regarding the fraudulent nature of the respondents' claim raised a substantial legal issue requiring further examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal and directed that the status quo be maintained pending the final adjudication of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does an allotment based on a bogus claim form constitute a void ab initio transaction?
  • Can a party who acquires rights from a claimant whose claim was subsequently cancelled as bogus maintain a valid interest in the disputed land?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif vs Muhammad Farooq And Other1991 SCMR 1744 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-31
  transfer of propertytenancystatus quoleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the transfer of disputed premises and the status of tenancy. The core legal question involves whether the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents was a tenant of the petitioner and whether the plea of tenancy was properly raised and considered. The Court held that the petitioner's consistent case was that the property stood transferred in his favour and was given to the respondents' predecessor-in-interest after vesting in the petitioner, meaning the plea of tenancy was not newly raised before the High Court. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, ordered security of Rs. 5,000, and directed that status quo be maintained regarding the property, prohibiting alienation or change of character during the pendency of the appeal. The key principle laid down is that established factual positions regarding tenancy and property transfer raised consistently throughout the proceedings must be duly considered.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plea of tenancy raised consistently throughout the proceedings can be deemed to have been raised for the first time before the High Court?
  • Can status quo be ordered during the pendency of an appeal concerning disputed property transfer?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif And Another vs Secretary, Ministry of Education And Other1991 SCMR 1674 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-14
  service lawseniority listex-cadre postFederal Service Tribunalleave to appealcivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioners' appeals regarding their seniority status. The petitioners, recruited as Research Scholars (Grade 17) in the Islamic Research Cell of the Ministry of Education, challenged the exclusion of their names from the seniority list of Education Officers. While one member of the Tribunal supported the petitioners' claim, the majority held that the post of Research Scholar was an ex-cadre position, thus justifying their exclusion from the seniority list. Upon review, the Supreme Court noted that the Tribunal was divided on the issue, creating a significant legal controversy regarding the classification of the petitioners' posts and their entitlement to seniority alongside other officers inducted under the same scheme. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the respondent department was legally justified in treating the petitioners differently from other officers inducted into service under the same initiative. The Court directed that the appeals proceed on the existing record with the liberty to file additional documents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the post of Research Scholar in the Ministry of Education constitutes an ex-cadre post for the purpose of seniority determination?
  • Is the respondent department justified in treating officers inducted under the same scheme differently regarding their placement on a seniority list?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif And Another vs Abdul Aziz Since Dead Now1991 SCMR 1903 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-17
  pre-emptioncustom of pre-emptionsub-divisionconcurrent findingspetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a pre-emption suit filed by the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents against the sale of a house situated in Mohallah Shah Chan Chiragh, Rawalpindi. The core legal question was whether Mohallah Shah Chan Chiragh constituted a recognized sub-division and whether the custom of pre-emption existed therein at the commencement of the Pre-emption Act. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff, a finding which was subsequently affirmed by the District Judge on appeal and further upheld by the High Court in second appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that concurrent findings of fact by all three lower courts regarding the existence of the custom of pre-emption were fully supported by the evidence on record and warranted no interference. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent factual findings of lower courts concerning the existence of a local custom of pre-emption unless they are shown to be perverse or without evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the custom of pre-emption existed in Mohallah Shah Chan Chiragh at the commencement of the Pre-emption Act?
  • Whether Mohallah Shah Chan Chiragh is a recognized sub-division for the purposes of pre-emption?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the existence of a local custom of pre-emption?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Haleem And Another vs The Model Town Cooperative1991 SCMR 1231 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-31
  civil suitacquisition of propertycooperative societysettlement schemepermanent injunctionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a Regular Second Appeal by the High Court in a suit for declaration and permanent injunction. The dispute arose from the acquisition of land by the Respondent Cooperative Society, with the petitioners claiming ownership based on the operation of Settlement Scheme No. 7. The core legal question was whether the civil suit was competent given the acquisition proceedings and whether the disputed land was immune from such acquisition. The Supreme Court declined to grant leave to appeal, holding that even assuming the petitioners' ownership, it was highly doubtful that the civil suit was maintainable or that the land was immune from acquisition. The Court observed that the petitioners' remedy, if any, lay in seeking compensation, potentially in the form of an alternative plot of land as per the Society's rules and applicable law. Consequently, the Court refused to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts, emphasizing that the civil litigation route was not the appropriate forum for challenging the acquisition in these specific circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil suit competent to challenge the acquisition of land by a cooperative society?
  • Can a claimant of land acquired by a cooperative society seek compensation in the form of an alternative plot?
  • Does the operation of Settlement Scheme No. 7 automatically grant immunity from land acquisition?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Habib Khan vs Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited and another1991 PLD Supreme Court 183 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-09-02
  Group InsuranceWorkmen's CompensationStanding Orders OrdinanceIndustrial RelationsJurisdiction of CommissionerSuperannuationBeneficial Legislation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a High Court judgment that quashed an order of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, which had awarded Group Insurance benefits to the appellant, a former employee of the respondent company. The core legal questions were whether the Commissioner possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate claims under Standing Order 10-B of the West Pakistan (Industrial and Commercial Employment) Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, and whether the appellant was entitled to such benefits after being retired upon reaching the age of 55. The Supreme Court held that the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation is the competent forum for such claims, as the phrase "in the same manner" in Standing Order 10-B(5) incorporates both the procedural framework and the adjudicatory authority of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the industrial award created a binding right to continued employment contingent upon medical fitness, not mere employer discretion. The key principle established is that beneficial labor legislation must be construed to provide effective remedies, and the statutory reference to the "manner" of determination necessarily includes the designated forum.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims for Group Insurance under Standing Order 10-B of the West Pakistan (Industrial and Commercial Employment) Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968?
  • Does the phrase 'in the same manner' in Standing Order 10-B(5) of the West Pakistan (Industrial and Commercial Employment) Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, include the forum for adjudication?
  • Can an employer exercise absolute discretion to deny continued employment to a worker after age 55 when an industrial award mandates retention subject to medical fitness?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Fazil And Others vs Mst. Sughran Bibi And Other1991 SCMR 1371 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-28
  special oathQanun-e-Shahadatsecond regular appeallegal representativesmutationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a second regular appeal concerning a disputed land sale mutation. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners had filed a suit challenging the sale as fictitious and without consideration, which was dismissed by the trial court and the first appellate court. During the second appeal, an offer was made by one of the legal representatives under Section 163 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, to have the dispute decided based on a special oath on the Holy Quran by one of the respondents. The respondent took the special oath, and the High Court dismissed the appeal accordingly. The petitioners sought leave to appeal on the ground that the legal representative who made the offer lacked authority to bind the other co-heirs. The Supreme Court held that since the same counsel represented all legal representatives in the High Court without raising any objection to the authority or the special oath procedure, and given that the original plaintiff had made a similar proposal, the petitioners were bound by the proceedings. The petition was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether co-heirs are bound by a special oath offer made by one of the legal representatives in the presence of and without objection from their common counsel?
  • Can a party resile from an offer to be bound by a special oath under Section 163 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 after the opposing party has taken the oath?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Eisa And 6 Others vs Khair Ud Din1991 SCMR 1942 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-30
  leave to appealconcurrent findings of factcivil revisioncancellation of sale deedfraudwant of considerationmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed a Civil Revision arising from a suit for the cancellation of a sale deed. The petitioners, successors-in-interest to the original plaintiff, challenged the sale deed on grounds of fraud and lack of consideration. The trial court and the appellate court had concurrently ruled against the plaintiff on these factual issues. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners attempted to raise new arguments regarding the minority of their predecessor and an alleged admission by his father. The Supreme Court observed that these specific pleas were not pressed before the High Court, which had correctly focused on the concurrent findings of fact regarding fraud and consideration. Finding no misreading or non-reading of evidence by the lower courts, the Supreme Court held that concurrent findings of fact do not warrant interference unless a legal defect is demonstrated. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that issues not raised or pressed before the High Court cannot be agitated for the first time in the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a plea in the Supreme Court that was not pressed before the High Court?
  • Do concurrent findings of fact by lower courts warrant interference by the Supreme Court in the absence of misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable when the underlying controversy relates solely to concurrent findings of fact?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Din and others vs Ghulam Muhammad Naseem Sindhu and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-09-16
  evacuee propertypermanent transfer deedexcess areaplinth areasettlement authoritiesdisplaced personsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the setting aside of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner's order regarding excess land attached to an evacuee property. The core legal question was whether Settlement Authorities could determine excess area exceeding three times the plinth area of a transferred house after the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed and the repeal of settlement laws. The Supreme Court, by a majority view, held that land in excess of three times the plinth area does not form part of the transferred house and remains available for disposal, and that authorities are competent to determine excess area notwithstanding the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed, provided such excess land was not legally transferred. The key principle laid down is that a Permanent Transfer Deed does not protect land that exceeds three times the plinth area of a house if such excess land was never legally transferred to the transferee.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land exceeding three times the plinth area of an evacuee house forms part of the transferred house under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Can Settlement Authorities determine excess area attached to a transferred property after the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed?
  • Did the office of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner cease to exist for all purposes upon the repeal of the evacuee laws?
  • Whether occupants in possession of excess land have the locus standi to challenge orders concerning the disposal of such excess land?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Boota vs Deputy Commissioner, Sialkot1991 SCMR 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-26
  Service Tribunalleave to appeallimitation periodmisconductunauthorized realization of moneypublic importance
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against a decision of the Service Tribunal. The petitioner challenged the findings of the Tribunal, which had upheld disciplinary action against him based on his own admission of receiving an unauthorized sum of Rs. 200 from a complainant. The Supreme Court first addressed a preliminary objection regarding the limitation period, noting that while the petition appeared barred by 142 days, the Tribunal's own narration of facts indicated the petition was within time. On the merits, the Court found that the petitioner had admitted to realizing money without legal authority or official duty. Consequently, the Court held that no question of law of public importance arose that would warrant further examination or the grant of leave to appeal. The petition was dismissed, affirming that an admission of misconduct by a public servant regarding unauthorized financial transactions precludes the necessity for further judicial review by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does an admission of misconduct by a public servant regarding unauthorized financial transactions raise a question of law of public importance?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be considered within limitation if the Tribunal's own narration of facts contradicts the calculation of delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Boota And Others vs Additional Deputy Commissioner (G), Additional Settlement Commissioner, Sahiwal And Another1991 SCMR 859 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-27
  land settlementinformermukhbarsitting allotteedisplaced personsallotment cancellationretrospective effect
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a dispute over land allotment between 'informers' (mukhbar) and 'sitting allottees'. The core legal question was whether an informer held a preferential right to land over sitting allottees, particularly following the withdrawal of the informer concession under the West Pakistan Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme and subsequent legislative amendments. The Supreme Court held that the informer's claim lapsed upon the withdrawal of the concession, as no allotment had been made prior to that date. Furthermore, the Court ruled that under Section 14(1-A) of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, as amended, informers could not override the rights of sitting allottees. The Court established that the amendment has retrospective effect, thereby protecting the appellants' possession. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the order confirming the land in favor of the appellants, affirming that informers cannot displace sitting allottees.

  Questions settled

  • Does an informer's application for land allotment lapse if no allotment is made before the withdrawal of the relevant concession?
  • Can an informer override the rights of sitting allottees in the allotment of land?
  • Does Section 14(1-A) of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, have retrospective effect regarding the rights of informers?
  • Is an order passed by an Additional Settlement Commissioner acting as a revision authority without jurisdiction void?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Boota And 2 Others vs Provincial Government Through Collector, Faisalabad And Other1991 SCMR 1329 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-22
  evacuee propertyallotment of landland donationconsent orderAssistant Rehabilitation Commissionercivil suitrevision petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil suit concerning a dispute over 4 kanals and 6 marlas of evacuee land forming part of Killa No. 2, Square No. 26 in Chak No. 44g/Gt, Tehsil Samundri. The entire killa had originally been allotted to the petitioners' deceased father, who voluntarily offered it for the establishment of a school in 1954. Consequently, the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner confirmed the allotment of the whole killa in favor of the school in 1957 in the presence and with the consent of the father. Over 21 years later, the father instituted a civil suit claiming ownership and possession over a portion of the killa. The suit was initially decreed by the trial court, but the decision was reversed on appeal by the Additional District Judge, and the petitioners' revision petition was subsequently dismissed by the High Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the allotment was consented to and remained unchallanged for decades without evidence of possession, thus dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party who consented to an allotment of evacuee land to a public institution can challenge the transaction after a lapse of over two decades?
  • Can a claim of ownership over allotted evacuee property be sustained without producing evidence of possession during the intervening period?
  • Should leave to appeal be granted against concurrent findings upholding an unchallenged allotment order made by an Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Binyamin vs Water and Power Development Authority And Other1991 SCMR 383 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-19
  service appealdismissal from servicelimitation periodmisconductconcurrent findings of factleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal against his dismissal from service as a Lower Division Clerk. The core legal question concerns whether the Tribunal erred in dismissing the petitioner's service appeal on grounds of limitation and merits, where the petitioner was found guilty of misconduct involving the ante-dating of applications and accepting incorrect addresses. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacked merit as the departmental appeal and the appeal before the Tribunal were admittedly barred by time, and concurrent findings of fact regarding the proven misconduct were recorded by the Enquiry Officer and the Tribunal. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact on departmental misconduct, coupled with an appeal barred by limitation and devoid of legal infirmity, do not warrant interference by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal before the Service Tribunal filed after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation is maintainable?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Enquiry Officer and the Service Tribunal regarding employee misconduct?
  • Is an employee dismissed after a regular inquiry entitled to relief when the departmental appeal and service appeal are both barred by time?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bashir vs Sakhawat Hussain1991 SCMR 846 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-21
  personal bona fide needejectmentlandlord and tenantrent controllermedical store
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises out of an ejectment application filed by the landlord against the tenant under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, on the grounds of default, subletting, and personal bona fide need to open a medical store. The Rent Controller dismissed the application, but the High Court reversed the decision and allowed eviction on the ground of personal need. The tenant appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the landlord's requirement lacked bona fides because he was affluent, owned other properties, and had sought eviction of an adjacent shop. The Supreme Court held that a landlord is the best judge of his own requirements, and the mere fact that the landlord is rich or owns other properties does not negate his bona fide personal need, especially when his testimony regarding his intention to open a medical store was not effectively challenged in cross-examination. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the High Court's judgment with a six-month grace period granted to the tenant to vacate the premises.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a landlord's personal need for commercial premises can be challenged solely on the ground that the landlord is affluent or owns other properties?
  • Is it open to the tenant or the court to dictate the choice of premises to a landlord seeking eviction for personal use?
  • What is the effect of a lack of cross-examination on the landlord's assertion of personal need during rent proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bashir vs Munshi Muhammad Siddique And Other1991 SCMR 1875 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-30
  property transferpossessionwrit jurisdictionentitlementcut-off date
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court order that had allowed a writ petition in favor of the respondent. The core legal dispute concerned the entitlement to the transfer of a shop under relevant property transfer schemes. The petitioner, who was in possession of the shop, argued that his possession alone entitled him to the transfer, regardless of who had constructed the property. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, noting that the shop had been constructed by the respondent and rented to the petitioner's son, who never applied for its transfer. The Court held that because the petitioner was not in possession of the shop on the crucial date of 1-1-1976, he lacked the requisite legal standing for its transfer. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling that the petitioner had no valid claim to the property. The judgment reinforces the principle that entitlement to property transfer is contingent upon meeting specific statutory conditions, including possession on the prescribed cut-off date, rather than mere occupation.

  Questions settled

  • Is possession of a property on the crucial date a mandatory requirement for its transfer?
  • Does a person in possession of a shop have an automatic right to its transfer regardless of who constructed it?
  • Can a petitioner claim entitlement to property transfer if they were not in possession on the prescribed cut-off date?
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• Muhammad Bashir And Others vs Chairman, Punjab Labour Appellate1991 SC MR 2087 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  back benefitsreinstatementindustrial relationsburden of proofgainful employmentworkmancontributory negligence
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals address the entitlement of workmen to back benefits upon reinstatement following illegal termination and the burden of proof regarding gainful employment during the period of severance. The Court held that back benefits do not automatically follow an order of reinstatement. Whether such benefits are 'just and proper' under Section 25-A(5) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance depends on whether the dismissal was wholly unwarranted or if the workman's own conduct contributed to the situation. Two key principles were affirmed: (a) back benefits are not an automatic consequence of reinstatement; and (b) the burden of proof lies on the employer to show the workman was gainfully employed, provided the workman has at least orally asserted they were not. The Court emphasized that back benefits are compensatory, not punitive. Applying these principles, the Court dismissed the appeals, finding that in one case the workman's contributory negligence justified the denial of benefits, and in the others, the failure to assert non-employment or the presence of blameworthy conduct precluded the claim.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order of reinstatement automatically entitle a workman to back benefits?
  • Who bears the burden of proof to establish whether a workman was gainfully employed during the period of his severance from service?
  • What is the scope of the Labour Court's power under Section 25-A(5) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 regarding the grant of back benefits?
  • Does a workman's failure to orally assert that he was not gainfully employed elsewhere disentitle him from claiming back benefits?
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• Muhammad Baran and others vs Member (Settlement and Rehabilitation), Board of Revenue, Punjab and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 691 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-29
  writ jurisdictiondiscretionary reliefsettlement lawsfraud and forgeryremand orderrepeal of statutessoiled handsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that remanded settlement cases to the Member, Board of Revenue. The appellants contended that after the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, by Act XIV of 1975, no settlement authority possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate matters not pending on July 1, 1974. The Supreme Court addressed whether the High Court’s writ jurisdiction could be invoked to set aside orders involving allegations of fraud and forgery. The Court held that writ jurisdiction under Article 199 is discretionary and intended to foster justice. It affirmed that the High Court is not bound to interfere in all circumstances, particularly where doing so would restore unjust orders or aid parties with 'soiled hands' who committed fraud. The Court ruled that the High Court acted fairly by remanding the case for a proper inquiry into the alleged fraud, as this approach protected the interests of justice and innocent third parties. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed, upholding the High Court’s discretionary power to grant partial relief.

  Questions settled

  • Is the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution discretionary in nature?
  • Can the High Court refuse to exercise its writ jurisdiction if the petitioner has committed fraud or has 'soiled hands'?
  • Does the High Court have the power to grant partial relief in a writ petition instead of dismissing it in its entirety?
  • Can the High Court remand a case to a settlement authority for inquiry into fraud even if the relevant settlement laws have been repealed?
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• Muhammad Bakhsh And Another vs Mst. Zainab Bibi And 6 Other1991 SCMR 2397 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-15
  proprietary rightsfemale tenantalienation of landMuslim Personal Lawsuccessiongift validitycolonization of government lands
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal concerns the validity of a gift of land made by a female tenant who acquired proprietary rights after inheriting tenancy rights from her father. The core legal question was whether the female tenant became a full owner upon acquiring proprietary rights, thereby possessing unrestricted power to alienate the land, or if her rights remained limited by statute. The Supreme Court held that the female tenant did not become a full owner. Under Section 30-A of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) (Amendment) Act, 1944, her power of alienation was restricted, as the land was originally allotted to a male tenant. Furthermore, the Court applied the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act, 1962, determining that succession must follow Muslim Personal Law. Consequently, the gift was invalid to the extent that it exceeded her legal share. The principle established is that a female tenant acquiring proprietary rights in land originally held by a male tenant remains subject to statutory alienation restrictions, preventing her from gifting the entire property to the exclusion of other legal heirs.

  Questions settled

  • Does a female tenant who acquires proprietary rights in land originally allotted to a male tenant become a full owner with unrestricted power of alienation?
  • How does Section 30-A of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) (Amendment) Act, 1944 affect the alienation rights of a female tenant?
  • Does the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act, 1962 govern the succession of land originally held by a male tenant under the Colonization of Government Lands Act?
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• Muhammad Aziz and others vs Syed Haider Ali Shah and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 1080 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  pre-emptionpre-emption decreeIslamic law of pre-emptionShufaSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan in four appeals, wherein the learned counsel for the appellants conceded that no decree had been passed in favour of the appellants/plaintiffs prior to 31st July, 1986, rendering their pleas untenable in light of settled precedent. The core legal question concerned the viability of pre-emption claims in the absence of a pre-existing decree before the crucial cutoff date, following the jurisprudence established in Sardar Ali v. Muhammad Ali (PLD 1988 SC 287) and subsequent rulings. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the appellants could not succeed without a pre-existing decree before the specified date. The key principle laid down is that pre-emption claims failing to meet the temporal and substantive requirements established by authoritative judicial pronouncements regarding the law of pre-emption cannot be maintained, and litigants must be properly advised by the Bar regarding Islamic law principles of pre-emption to avoid frivolous litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a pre-emption suit succeed if no decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff before 31st July, 1986?
  • What is the effect of the settled case-law following Sardar Ali v. Muhammad Ali on pending pre-emption matters?
  • What role does the Bar play in advising litigants regarding the Islamic law of pre-emption and avoiding frivolous litigation?
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• Muhammad Azim vs Mst. Munawar Begum And Other1991 SCMR 1215 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-04
  civil revisionpermanent injunctiontemporary injunctionevacuee propertyleave to appealbuilding constructionrejection of plaint
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a civil suit instituted by the petitioner seeking a permanent injunction to restrain the respondents from demolishing or damaging any portion of a disputed century-old evacuee property through excavation and construction. The trial court dismissed the suit under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and vacated the interim injunction with certain directions, which decision was partly modified in appeal by the Additional District Judge who remanded a preliminary issue regarding cause of action while maintaining the vacation of the interim injunction. A subsequent civil revision before the High Court was also dismissed. The core legal question concerned whether the lower courts properly evaluated the facts and the status of the sanctioned building plan in declining interim relief and disposing of the suit. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to consider the contentions raised, noting that the sanctioned plan had reportedly been cancelled and that ongoing construction threatened material damage to the petitioner's portion of the property, and consequently restrained the respondents from raising any construction pending the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil court can reject a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in a suit for permanent injunction concerning structural damage to a property?
  • Can an appellate court remand a suit for decision on a preliminary issue while upholding the vacation of an interim injunction?
  • Whether interim injunctive relief should be granted to restrain construction activities when the underlying building plan has been cancelled?
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• Muhammad Azam vs Pakistan International Airlines Corporation1991 SCMR 381 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-29
  service matterhabitual absencemisconductcompulsory retirementservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges an order of the Service Tribunal, which had converted the petitioner's dismissal from service into compulsory retirement. The petitioner, employed as a Sanitation Worker, was dismissed by the respondent for habitual absence from duty, specifically for 51 days during 1985. Before the Service Tribunal, the petitioner admitted to the unauthorized absence but attributed it to his mother's illness, a claim he failed to substantiate. The Service Tribunal concluded that the petitioner had wilfully absented himself and was guilty of misconduct, noting that the petitioner had waived a formal departmental inquiry. The Supreme Court reviewed the findings and held that the Service Tribunal's conclusion regarding the petitioner's habitual absence and the rejection of his excuse was sound and not open to exception. The Court determined that no question of law was involved in the petition. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that the Service Tribunal's decision regarding the finding of misconduct was justified based on the evidence presented.

  Questions settled

  • Does the unauthorized absence of an employee for 51 days constitute sufficient grounds for a finding of misconduct?
  • Can an employee who admits to unauthorized absence during an inquiry later challenge the finding of misconduct on the basis of unproven personal circumstances?
  • Is a Service Tribunal's finding of fact regarding habitual absence open to interference by the Supreme Court when no point of law is involved?
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• Muhammad Azam And Others vs Abdul Rehman And Other1991 SCMR 1546 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-06
  leave to appealcompetency of suitadjudication on meritsjurisdictionfindings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging the judgment of the High Court. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court, having determined that a suit filed before the Qazi Dalbandin under the Baluchistan (Civil Disputes) Shariat Application Regulation, 1976 was incompetent, acted correctly in nevertheless proceeding to decide the matter on merits and recording findings of fact regarding land ownership. The Supreme Court held that having found the suit incompetent, the High Court ought not to have rendered findings on the merits and questions of fact. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, allowed the petition, recalled the prior interim order, and directed that the appeal be heard on the existing record with liberty to file additional documents. The key principle laid down is that a court or forum, upon determining that a proceeding or suit is incompetent before it, should refrain from adjudicating the matter on its merits.

  Questions settled

  • Should a court decide a suit on its merits after holding that the suit was not competent?
  • Can findings of fact regarding land ownership be sustained when the initial forum's proceedings are found to be incompetent?
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• Muhammad Ayub Khan vs Saadat Khan And 2 Other1991 SCMR 2291 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-27
  possession suitrevenue recordconcurrent findingsKhasra numberJamabandiland encroachmentburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a suit for possession of land, where the appellant challenged concurrent findings of the trial court, the first appellate court, and the High Court, all of which dismissed the suit. The core legal question was whether the appellant successfully established ownership of the disputed land, given significant discrepancies in the Revenue Record regarding the area of Khasra No. 1343. The appellant argued that the area had increased due to the shifting bed of a watercourse (Kassi), but failed to provide evidence supporting this claim. The Supreme Court held that the sudden, unexplained increase in the area recorded in the 1946-47 Jamabandi, coupled with a corresponding unexplained reduction in the respondents' adjoining land, rendered the entry unreliable. Consequently, the Court upheld the concurrent findings of fact made by the lower courts, noting that the appellant failed to justify interference with those findings. The principle laid down is that where revenue entries show an unexplained, anomalous increase in land area that contradicts historical records and adjoining land measurements, such entries may be discarded in favor of established historical data.

  Questions settled

  • Can an unexplained increase in land area recorded in a Jamabandi be relied upon to establish ownership in a suit for possession?
  • Is the Supreme Court of Pakistan empowered to interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by lower courts in a suit for possession?
  • Does a shift in the bed of a watercourse automatically grant ownership of the accreted land to the owner of the adjacent Khasra number?
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• Muhammad Aslam vs Abdul Rehman And Two Other1991 SCMR 1357 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-31
  specific performanceleave to appealsecond appealconcurrent findingsappellate jurisdictioncontract enforcement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which had accepted the respondents' Regular Second Appeal, thereby overturning the concurrent findings of the trial court and the first appellate court in a suit for specific performance. The petitioner, who had successfully obtained a decree for specific performance in the lower courts, challenged the High Court's interference with these concurrent judgments. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the respondents' failure to abide by the agreement was justified in fact and law, whether the petitioner was entitled to specific performance, and whether the High Court's exercise of its second appellate jurisdiction to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts was legally sound. The Court determined that these issues required a deeper examination and accordingly granted leave to appeal, while maintaining the existing stay order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in interfering with concurrent judgments of the trial court and the first appellate court in a second appeal?
  • Is a party entitled to specific performance of a contract when the other party fails to abide by the agreement?
  • Was the failure of the respondents to abide by the agreement justified in fact and law?
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