Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Habibullh Jan and 3 others vs Muhammad Hassan Khan and 6 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 93 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-30
  successioninheritanceMuslim Personal Law Shariatcustomary lawwilljoint possessionlimitationdeclaratory suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal and connected petition arise from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court concerning an inheritance and succession dispute over landed and residential property in Peshawar. The original owner, Malik Feroze Khan, had executed a will in 1911 and a gift in 1916 in favour of his wife and three daughters under customary law. Subsequent successions opened after the enforcement of the N.-W.F.P. Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act VI of 1935, leading to a declaratory suit by two daughters challenging prior mutations that excluded certain heirs according to Shariat. The core legal questions involved the impact of the 1911 will versus the application of Shariat law to successions opening after 1935, issues of limitation regarding joint possession, and the maintainability of a petition by a party who failed to appeal to the High Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and petition, holding that where succession opens after the enactment of the 1935 Act, Muslim Personal Law applies regardless of prior customs or limited ownership constructs, and co-sharers in joint possession face no limitation bar for seeking a declaration of title.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the devolution of an estate is controlled by a will made under custom or by the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act VI of 1935 when succession opens after the enforcement of the Act?
  • Does limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act bar a co-sharer in joint possession from filing a declaratory suit for title without first setting aside a long-standing will?
  • Can a petitioner invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 185(3) of the Constitution if they failed to file an appeal against the decree and judgment of the District Judge in the High Court?
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• Habib Khan vs Haji Haroon Ur Rashid1991 SCMR 1645 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-09
  ejectmentbona fide personal useres judicatarent controlleave to appealPATH Regulation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court, which had set aside an order of the Rent Controller directing the respondent's ejectment from a disputed shop. The Rent Controller had initially ruled in favor of the petitioner, finding that the requirement for the shop for personal use was bona fide. However, the High Court reversed this decision, reasoning that previous proceedings under the PATH Regulation, while not strictly constituting res judicata under Section 14 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, nevertheless precluded the petitioner's claim based on general principles of res judicata. The petitioner contends that the High Court failed to independently evaluate the evidence, relying instead on inconsistent prior decisions from Riwaji Courts, and ignored findings by the Additional Commissioner that supported the petitioner's claim. The Supreme Court, finding that the matter requires further consideration regarding the application of res judicata and the proper evaluation of evidence by the High Court, granted leave to appeal to examine these issues in detail.

  Questions settled

  • Does a decision in proceedings under the PATH Regulation operate as res judicata in subsequent rent ejectment proceedings?
  • Can a High Court set aside a Rent Controller's finding of fact regarding bona fide personal use without independent evaluation of the evidence?
  • Do general principles of res judicata apply to rent control proceedings where statutory provisions do not strictly apply?
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• Habib Bank Limited vs Dr. Munawar Ali Siddiqui1991 SCMR 1185 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-18
  personal requirementejectmentperpetual leaselease agreementoption of renewalunregistered leaseSindh Rented Premises Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the concurrent judgments of the Rent Controller and the High Court granting an ejectment order against the bank on the ground of the respondent-landlord's personal requirement. The core legal question was whether a renewal clause in an unregistered lease agreement purporting to create a lease in perpetuity could bar the landlord from seeking ejectment on the ground of personal requirement under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the concurrent findings on personal requirement were unexceptionable, that a lease in perpetuity cannot be created without a registered instrument under section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and that the leaning of the court is against perpetual renewal unless unequivocally expressed. Furthermore, the Court distinguished the precedent in Mrs. Zehra Begum and held that a clause purporting to bar ejectment for all times is repugnant to the scheme of the Ordinance. The key principle laid down is that perpetual lease covenants must be strictly proved through registered instruments and cannot override statutory grounds of personal requirement under rent laws.

  Questions settled

  • Can a lease in perpetuity be created by an unregistered lease agreement?
  • Whether a clause in a lease agreement purporting to waive the statutory right of ejectment on personal requirement overrides the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Does a covenant for perpetual renewal of a lease require strict proof and unequivocal expression?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact by the Rent Controller and the High Court regarding personal requirement open to interference by the Supreme Court?
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• Gulzar And Others vs Muhammad Anwar And Other1991 SCMR 1142 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-26
  pre-emptioncollusionimprovement of statusinheritancelis pendensindivisibility of transactionsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  These three petitions arise out of the same pre-emption case involving multiple pre-emptors and vendees. The core legal questions pertain to the validity of a pre-emption suit on the grounds of collusion, the right of a vendee to improve his status through inheritance or subsequent purchase during litigation under pre-emption law, and the onus of proving the indivisibility of suit land transactions. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that findings of fact regarding collusion against the vendor's son were unexceptionable, that the High Court was justified in allowing the vendee to retain a portion of the property through inheritance under Section 21-A of the Punjab Pre-emption Act while rejecting improvements claimed via pendente lite purchases from a co-vendee, and that the onus to prove the indivisibility of property parcels lay upon the pre-emptors asserting it. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused to all parties and the petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emption suit fails on the ground of collusion with the vendor or vendee?
  • Does a vendee improve his position against pre-emptors through inheritance and succession during litigation under Section 21-A of the Punjab Pre-emption Act?
  • Whether the rule of lis pendens applies to a purchase made from a co-vendee during the pendency of pre-emption proceedings?
  • Upon whom lies the onus to prove that two parcels of suit land are indivisible in a pre-emption case?
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• Guldar Khan vs Balakamoon Khan and 2 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 493 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-27
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptionlimitation periodresalesubsisting rightmutation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the vendee/defendant arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court which decreed a pre-emption suit. The original owner sold the disputed property by a registered deed to the first vendee, who subsequently resold it to the original owner, who then sold it to the appellant within the period of limitation. The trial court and the first appellate court dismissed the pre-emptor's suit, holding that the transfer to a person with a superior or equal right of pre-emption within the period of limitation defeats the pre-emptor's claim. The High Court reversed this decision in revision, concluding that the subsequent transfers were not proved and that a direct link between the original vendee and the ultimate transferee was lacking. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined Sections 16 and 17 of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, 1950, and held that the High Court misread the evidence on record and erred in law regarding the requirement of a direct contract. The Court reaffirmed that a resale of property to a person having an equal or superior right of pre-emption within the limitation period defeats the pre-emptor's claim. The appeal was accepted, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the dismissal of the pre-emption suit was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a resale of property to a person with an equal or superior right of pre-emption within the limitation period defeats a pre-emptor's claim?
  • Does the absence of a direct contract of sale between the original vendee and an ultimate transferee invalidate a subsequent transfer for purposes of pre-emption?
  • What are the distinct scopes of Sections 16 and 17 of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, 1950?
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• Gul Faraz Khan vs Director General Registration And Another1991 SCMR 391 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-14
  leave to appealseniorityresignationdepartmental servicediscriminationadministrative discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Gul Faraz Khan against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed his appeal concerning the counting of his seniority from the date of his initial appointment. The petitioner was previously appointed as a Statistical Assistant in the Directorate of Registration in 1974, resigned in 1981 to join another department under the condition of resignation, and was subsequently re-appointed as a Statistical Assistant in 1982. The core legal question involves whether the department has the discretion to deny the benefit of past service rendered prior to resignation, particularly when similar benefits and rights of reversion were allegedly granted to other individuals in the same department under comparable circumstances. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider the question of discriminatory treatment and whether such administrative discretion was properly exercised.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the department has the discretion to deny the benefit of past service rendered prior to resignation?
  • Does treating a government employee differently from another employee in similar circumstances amount to actionable discrimination regarding seniority?
  • Can past service be counted for seniority purposes after an employee resigns and is subsequently re-appointed?
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• Government of West Pakistan and others vs Messrs Jabees Limited1991 PLD Supreme Court 870 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-21
  entertainment dutytaxing statuteejusdem generisslot machinespayment for admissionstatutory interpretationstrict construction
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard an appeal by the Government of West Pakistan against a High Court judgment that exempted an amusement hall ('Playland') operating coin-operated slot machines from liability for entertainment duty. The core legal questions were whether mechanical slot machines providing games and amusement fall under the definition of 'entertainment' within Section 2(d) of the Entertainment Duty Act, 1958, and whether inserting coins into individual machines constitutes 'payment for admission' under Section 3(1) of the Act. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Playland was subject to duty. The Court determined that the definition of 'entertainment' using the word 'includes' is non-exhaustive, and each listed item represents an independent species. The ejusdem generis rule does not apply to restrict 'amusement' or 'game' to organized performances. Inserting coins or tokens into slot machines constitutes payment for admission to an entertainment. Furthermore, duty applies to any clear fiscal obligation, regardless of whether admission is collected by physical tickets or automated mechanical means.

  Questions settled

  • Does the operation of coin-operated slot machines constitute an 'entertainment' subject to tax under Section 2(d) of the Entertainment Duty Act, 1958?
  • Does the ejusdem generis rule apply to restrict general terms in a non-exhaustive definition using the word 'includes'?
  • Can entertainment duty be levied under the Entertainment Duty Act, 1958, when entrance to the venue is free but payments are made at individual mechanical devices?
  • Are fiscal statutes requiring payment of duty limited strictly to sales made via paper tickets?
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• Government of the Punjab through Secretary, Health Department, Lahore vs Salamat Ali Khan1991 PLD Supreme Court 699 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-09
  medical negligencetort lawbenefit of doubtdamagesprocedural evidencecivil liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment awarding damages to the respondent for the death of his minor daughter at Mayo Hospital, Lahore, attributed to medical negligence. The Supreme Court observed that while there was a strong possibility of gross negligence by the hospital staff, the trial court failed to secure vital evidence, specifically the testimony of the attending Medical Officer and the original medical records. A document produced by the respondent, purportedly issued by the doctor, lacked authenticity and its late production raised serious doubts. Consequently, the Court held that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the doubt regarding the alleged negligence. Applying the principle that the benefit of the doubt prevents a definitive finding of liability, the Court set aside the finding of guilt against the hospital staff. However, considering the respondent had already received and utilized the damages, the Court directed that the decretal amount already paid should not be recovered, allowing the respondent to retain the funds despite the appellant's success on technical grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party retain damages already paid pursuant to a judgment if the appellate court subsequently allows the appeal on the basis of benefit of doubt?
  • Does the principle of benefit of doubt apply to civil proceedings involving allegations of medical negligence?
  • What is the effect of failing to produce vital evidence, such as the testimony of an attending physician, on a claim of medical negligence?
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• Government of the Punjab Through Secretary Services, Punjab, Lahore1991 SCMR 696 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-12-06
  service lawpromotionnational pay scalesselection gradecivil servantssenioritypay revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals filed by the Government of the Punjab against the Punjab Service Tribunal's decisions, which had granted civil and district judges automatic entitlement to higher National Pay Scales (NPS) based on seniority. The core legal question was whether the grant of a higher pay scale, reserved for a percentage of posts, constitutes an automatic right based on seniority or a promotion involving selection. The Supreme Court held that the grant of a higher pay scale, even without a change in the nature of duties, constitutes a promotion. The Court reasoned that official definitions of 'promotion' include advancement to a higher grade, and the Pay Revision Rules of 1973 treat such improvements under the head of 'promotion.' Consequently, the Court ruled that such higher scales are not automatic entitlements but require an order from the competent authority based on comparative suitability and merit. The principle laid down is that any change of grade or scale for the better involves an element of selection, necessitating a formal assessment rather than automatic conferment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the grant of a higher National Pay Scale for a percentage of posts constitute a promotion?
  • Is the grant of a higher pay scale to a civil servant an automatic right based on seniority?
  • Does the absence of a change in duties preclude a pay scale upgrade from being classified as a promotion?
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• Government of the Punjab Through Chief Secretary, Punjab, Lahore vs Safdar Ali Chaudhry And Other1991 SCMR 634 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-12-16
  civil servicedeputationnext below rulepromotion policyservice tribunalstatutory interpretationforeign service
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Punjab Service Tribunal judgment that granted a civil servant promotion benefits while he was on foreign deputation. The respondent, an Assistant Conservator of Forests, sought promotion to Grade-19, claiming that his juniors had been promoted while he was abroad and that he was entitled to the 'next below rule' convention. The core legal question was whether this convention possessed statutory force superior to executive promotion policies and whether Section 9 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, guaranteed promotion prospects for deputationists. The Supreme Court held that the 'next below rule' is merely a convention, not a statutory rule, and cannot override executive policy. Furthermore, the Court clarified that Section 9 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, protects a civil servant's pay, not their prospects of promotion. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's decision, establishing that executive promotion policies, including requirements for return to the country and performance evaluations, are valid and enforceable, and that voluntary foreign deputation does not confer an automatic right to promotion.

  Questions settled

  • Does the 'next below rule' convention possess the status of a statutory rule?
  • Does Section 9 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, protect a civil servant's prospects of promotion while on deputation?
  • Can executive promotion policies validly supplement the legal framework for civil servant promotions?
  • Is a civil servant on voluntary foreign deputation entitled to automatic promotion based on the promotion of juniors?
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• Government of Sindh Through Secretary, Board of Revenue, Hyderabad And Another Government of Sindh And Another vs Niaz Ahmad And Other Abdul Ghaffar (C) General Clauses Act (X Of 1897)1991 SCMR 2293 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-02
  locus poenitentiaevested rightsleasehold landproprietary rightsBoard of RevenueConstitutional petitioncondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from twelve consolidated civil appeals regarding the implementation of a decision made by the Land Utilization Committee of the Board of Revenue on 17th June 1970, which allowed certain leaseholders under the Grow More Food Scheme to purchase their allotted lands at specified prices. The core legal question concerns whether the Government or the Board of Revenue had the authority to rescind or suspend this decision and whether the respondents had acquired any vested rights prior to such suspension. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the High Court's judgment, holding that while the competent authority possesses the power of locus poenitentiae to rescind or modify an order under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act 1897 before it takes legal effect, such power is subject to the exception that an order cannot be withdrawn to the detriment of vested rights created in pursuance thereof. The Court affirmed the remand of the cases to the Board of Revenue to ascertain whether the respondents had validly exercised their option and fulfilled relevant conditions during the interregnum between 17th June 1970 and the suspension dates of 25th and 26th January 1971.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Government possess the power of locus poenitentiae to rescind or modify an administrative decision?
  • Can an order or decision of a competent authority be withdrawn once it has taken legal effect and created vested rights in favor of an individual?
  • Whether a decision of the Land Utilization Committee creates enforceable rights before it is acted upon or communicated to the affected parties?
  • Under what circumstances can a case be remanded to the Board of Revenue for a factual inquiry regarding the fulfillment of conditions for land transfer?
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• Government of Sindh and another vs Ch. Fazal Muhammad and another1991 PLD Supreme Court 197 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-30
  Section 12(2) CPCArbitration Actfraud and misrepresentationwant of jurisdictionlimitation periodArticle 181 Limitation Actrule of finalitysetting aside award
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave arose from a High Court order dismissing an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). The appellants sought to challenge court proceedings following an arbitration award made rule of the court, citing gross fraud, lack of jurisdiction, and administrative delays/ignorance. The core legal questions pertained to the maintainability and scope of Section 12(2) CPC when challenging arbitration proceedings, and the applicable limitation period for such applications. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Section 12(2) CPC cannot be invoked to challenge an underlying arbitration award, which is governed exclusively by Sections 30, 32, and 33 of the Arbitration Act. Furthermore, a party cannot rely on Section 12(2) CPC to remedy its own negligence or failure to raise objections in original proceedings. On limitation, the Court laid down that applications under Section 12(2) CPC are governed by Article 181 of the Limitation Act (providing a 3-year period), or Article 173 (90 days) if seeking review under Section 114 CPC.

  Questions settled

  • Is an application under Section 12(2) CPC maintainable to challenge an arbitration award that was made rule of the court?
  • Can a party invoke Section 12(2) CPC to challenge a judgment or decree based on grounds or objections it failed to raise due to its own negligence or omissions in earlier proceedings?
  • What is the limitation period for filing an application under Section 12(2) CPC to challenge a judgment, decree, or order on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, or want of jurisdiction?
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• Government of Pakistan Through Secretary, Ministry Of Finance, Islamabad And Others vs Messrs Crescent Pak Industries (Pvt.) Ltd1991 SCMR 31 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-24
  sales taxexemptionimport of tallowletter of creditleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the levy of sales tax on an import of tallow. The respondent imported tallow under an import licence and letter of credit following an initial notification exempting tallow from sales tax. Subsequently, a notification issued under Section 7 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951 withdrew the exemption and levied sales tax at 12.5 per cent ad valorem. The demand for sales tax was challenged before the High Court, relying on the principle in Al-Samrez Enterprise v. The Federation of Pakistan, whereas the petitioners relied on Section 31(A) of the Customs Act and subsequent case law. The Supreme Court observed that the validity of Section 31(A) of the Customs Act and the applicability of the Al-Samrez case were under consideration in various matters. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to consider whether Section 31(A) could be invoked for levying sales tax under a notification issued after the opening of the letter of credit and the extent to which the Al-Samrez precedent applied following the withdrawal of exemption and the filing of Bills of Entry.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 31(A) of the Customs Act could be pressed into service while levying Sales Tax under a Notification issued after the opening of the Letter of Credit?
  • How far the judgment in Al-Samrez Enterprise case can still be pressed by the respondents after the withdrawal of exemption and submission of Bills of Entry?
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• Government of Pakistan Through Secretary, Communication, Islamabad1991 SCMR 1920 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-01
  land acquisitioncompensation assessmentmarket valuecompulsory acquisitionvaluation of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment affirming a Senior Civil Judge's decision regarding compensation for land acquired by the Government under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Government had acquired land for telecommunication facilities, initially awarding compensation at Rs. 15,000 per Kanal. The respondent sought a reference under Section 18 of the Act, leading the Senior Civil Judge to enhance the compensation to Rs. 60,000 per Kanal, a decision upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the compensation awarded by the lower courts was correctly assessed based on the market value of the land in the vicinity. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that evidence of nearby land sales and auction prices supported the valuation of Rs. 60,000 per Kanal. Consequently, the Court held that the lower courts' assessment was justified based on the available data. The petition was dismissed, affirming the principle that compensation must reflect the market value of the land at the time of acquisition.

  Questions settled

  • Is the compensation awarded by a court for acquired land justified when supported by evidence of sale prices of land in the vicinity?
  • Does a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 allow for the re-evaluation of compensation based on market data?
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• Government of Pakistan And Others vs Kohinoor Industries Ltd. And 31991 SCMR 450 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-06
  excise dutyproduction capacitytax abatementsynthetic yarncotton fabricsstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal filed by the Government of Pakistan against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which ruled that a manufacturer is entitled to abatement of excise duty on production capacity when the same machinery is used to produce both cotton yarn/fabrics and man-made (synthetic) yarn/fabrics. The core legal question is whether a manufacturer, assessed for excise duty on a production capacity basis for cotton products, is entitled to an abatement of that capacity duty when they simultaneously manufacture synthetic products on the same machinery, which are taxed separately. The High Court held that excise duty under Section 3(1) of the Central Excises and Salt Act 1944 cannot be charged without granting abatement for the portion of plant and machinery utilized for producing synthetic goods already subject to duty under Section 3(4). The Supreme Court, noting the petitioners' argument that the law does not envisage such abatement simply because a different, more rewarding manufacture was undertaken, granted leave to appeal to provide an authoritative pronouncement on the interpretation of the capacity duty provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Is a manufacturer entitled to abatement of capacity-based excise duty when the same machinery is used to produce both cotton and synthetic products?
  • Does the Central Excises and Salt Act 1944 permit the charging of excise duty on production capacity without granting abatement for machinery used to produce goods taxed under a different provision?
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• Government of Pakistan And Another vs Sanaullah Khan1991 SCMR 817 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-10-22
  customs auctionimport clearanceprohibited itemswrit jurisdictionconfiscation procedureadministrative discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court order directing the release of a shotgun imported by the respondent, which had been auctioned by Customs authorities. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in ordering the release of the shotgun under Section 168(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, based on the assumption that the item had been confiscated without following the procedure mandated by Section 180 of the Customs Act, 1969. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s decision was based on a factual error, as the shotgun was not confiscated but rather refused clearance due to import bans and subsequently auctioned under Section 82 of the Customs Act, 1969. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment. However, considering the respondent had already taken possession of the shotgun for over six years, the Court advised the authorities against re-auctioning the item, suggesting instead that the Customs department recover any applicable duties from the respondent. The key principle established is that judicial relief cannot be granted based on factual assumptions that contradict the established record of administrative actions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to follow the confiscation procedure under Section 180 of the Customs Act 1969 necessitate the release of goods auctioned under Section 82 of the Customs Act 1969?
  • Can a High Court order relief in a writ petition based on factual assumptions that are contrary to the record of the case?
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• Government of N.W.F.P. vs Dr. S. Haider Bukhari and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 604 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-20
  unclaimed propertypublic auctionstolen vehicledisposal of propertyauction proceedsMagistrate powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This case involves appeals arising from a civil suit filed by the respondent for the recovery of the value of a motor car and damages after the vehicle, previously sold through public auction under orders of a Magistrate, was identified as stolen property and handed over to its original owner. The core legal questions pertained to the legality of the Magistrate's order under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the disposal of unclaimed seized property, the effect of intervening sales on title, and the liability of the government for the return of auction proceeds. The Supreme Court held that the Magistrate was competent to order the sale of the vehicle under sections 523, 524, and 525 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in the absence of a traceable owner, but ruled that the government had no justification to retain the auction proceeds once the car was restored to its true owner. The Court laid down that while a bona fide judicial disposal of unclaimed property by a Magistrate protects the state and officials from tortious liability for damages in the absence of the Magistrate as a party, the government must refund the actual auction sale proceeds to the dispossessed current holder.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Magistrate is competent to direct the sale of seized abandoned property under section 525 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the owner is unknown?
  • Does a suit for damages lie against the Government for the loss of property sold through a lawful Magistrate's order without impleading the Magistrate and alleging bad faith?
  • Is the Government entitled to appropriate and retain the sale proceeds of a motor car auctioned under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 after the vehicle is handed over to its original owner?
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• Government of N. W.F.P. Through Secretary, Education Department, N.1991 SCMR 396 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-22
  service seniorityleave ex-Pakistanpromotionretrospective effectservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Government of N.-W.F.P. against a Service Tribunal judgment that granted seniority to the respondent, an Assistant Professor. The respondent had been on leave abroad when his juniors were promoted and granted seniority from the date they began functioning in the post. The petitioner contended that government instructions prohibited employees on leave abroad from obtaining seniority until they resumed duty and earned performance reports. The Supreme Court rejected these arguments, noting that the rules relied upon by the petitioner were not in force at the time of the impugned orders and lacked retrospective effect. Furthermore, the Court observed that the petitioner had already granted the respondent promotion while he was abroad, making the argument regarding his inability to function in the post inconsistent. The Court held that under the rules existing at the relevant time, employees on leave were entitled to be considered for promotion and seniority alongside their juniors. Finding no question of law of public importance, the Court refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can government instructions regarding seniority have retrospective effect if they were not in force at the time of the impugned orders?
  • Is an employee on leave abroad entitled to the same seniority benefits as juniors who were promoted and functioning in the post during the employee's absence?
  • Does the promotion of an employee while on leave preclude the government from later denying seniority on the basis that the employee was not functioning in the post?
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• Government of N W.F.P. vs Dr. S. Haider Bukhari And Other1991 SCMR 1413 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-20
  abandoned propertyauction salestolen propertymagistrate orderpolice seizuredamagessale proceeds
  Summary & questions settled

  These cross-appeals arise from a civil suit filed by the respondent for the recovery of the value of a motor car and damages after the vehicle, previously purchased through an auction following police seizure, was identified as stolen property and returned to its original owner. The core legal question concerned the liability of the Provincial Government and police officials to compensate the current possessor for the loss of a vehicle sold via a magistrate's auction under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court held that the auction sale conducted under the orders of a competent Magistrate was lawful, and in the absence of bad faith or the magistrate being impleaded as a party, a suit for damages against the Government could not be sustained. However, the Court ruled that the Government had no justification to retain the sale proceeds of the car when the vehicle itself was handed over to its original owner. Consequently, the Court reduced the decretal amount to the actual auction price of Rs.15,000. The key principle laid down is that a bona fide purchaser of property sold through a lawful magisterial auction cannot claim damages against the Government without establishing bad faith or joining the magistrate, but is entitled to the refund of the auction sale proceeds.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person from whom a previously auctioned vehicle is recovered as stolen property is entitled to recover damages from the Provincial Government?
  • Does a magistrate's order for the disposal of abandoned property under the Code of Criminal Procedure protect against a suit for damages in the absence of bad faith?
  • Is the Government entitled to retain the sale proceeds of an auctioned vehicle after the vehicle is handed over to its original owner?
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• Government of Balochistan And 3 Others vs Sarbuland Khan1991 SCMR 805 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-06
  Service TribunaljurisdictionAfghan Refugees Organisationreversionfederal employeeremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the Baluchistan Service Tribunal which set aside the termination and subsequent reversion of the respondent, a Refugee Village Administrator in the Afghan Refugees Organisation. The Government of Baluchistan challenged the Tribunal's decision, raising a preliminary objection that the Afghan Refugees Organisation is under the control of the Federal Government and, consequently, the Baluchistan Service Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to entertain the respondent's appeal, which should have gone to the Federal Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the status memorandum and letters indicated the respondent might be a federal employee, making the question of the Service Tribunal's jurisdiction central. Rather than deciding this complex jurisdictional issue for the first time at the apex court—which would impact numerous employees—the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment, and remanded the case back to the Service Tribunal to decide the jurisdictional question and all other submissions afresh.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Baluchistan Service Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain appeals of employees belonging to the Afghan Refugees Organisation?
  • Can a civil servant appointed on a substantive basis to a grade be reverted to a lower grade as a disciplinary penalty under section 12 of the Baluchistan Civil Servants Act 1974?
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• Gohar Rehman And Others vs Liaqat Ali And Other1991 SCMR 305 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-14
  temporary injunctioneasement rightlateral supportinterlocutory ordersdiscretionary reliefSupreme Court practice
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, owners of the Ritz Hotel, Murree, filed a civil suit seeking a perpetual injunction to restrain respondents from digging on an adjacent steep incline, cutting trees, and interfering with their sewerage line, alongside an application for a temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The trial court dismissed the temporary injunction application subject to conditions, which decision was modified on appeal by the Additional District Judge requiring respondents to construct a retaining wall. The High Court dismissed the subsequent revision petition. Upon a petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan evaluated contentions regarding easement rights under Sections 7 and 15 of the Easements Act. The Supreme Court held that three courts below concurrently found no prima facie case or balance of convenience in favor of the petitioners, and since it is the practice of the Court not to interfere in interlocutory matters, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent interlocutory orders refusing temporary injunctions where no prima facie case is established?
  • Can an easement right of lateral support be claimed without specific pleadings in the plaint?
  • Do the courts grant equitable interim relief when the balance of convenience does not lie in favor of the petitioners?
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• Gogai And Others vs Siraj Ahmad And Other1991 SCMR 1152 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-26
  grazing rightswrit jurisdictionconcurrent findingsChitralleave to appealremandaggrieved party
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that set aside concurrent findings of the Deputy Commissioner, Additional Deputy Commissioner, and the Additional Secretary, Home and Tribal Affairs Department, regarding grazing rights in pastures located between Kalash and Maskoor villages in Chitral. The dispute arose under the Distribution of Property (Chitral) Regulation II of 1974. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the High Court was justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact within its discretionary writ jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court seeks to determine whether, assuming there were legal defects in the lower forums' decisions, the High Court should have remanded the matter to the designated authority for a fresh decision rather than setting the findings aside entirely. Finally, the Court will address whether the writ petition was filed by an aggrieved party. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and ordered that the stay order previously granted shall continue pending the final disposal of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Was the High Court justified in upsetting concurrent findings of fact by lower forums within its discretionary writ jurisdiction?
  • If legal defects exist in lower forum decisions, is it necessary to remand the case to the designated authority for a fresh decision?
  • Does a party have the standing to file a writ petition if they are not an aggrieved party?
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• Ghulam Sarwar vs Abdul Jalil and 2 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 500 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-27
  pre-emptionexemption from pre-emptionself-occupationrepeal of statutepending proceedingsfinal judgmentnative village
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a pre-emption suit where the vendees claimed exemption from pre-emption under Section 5(c) of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, 1950, for the construction of a house. The primary legal questions were whether the vendees were entitled to this exemption despite not explicitly pleading 'self-occupation' in their written statement, and whether the pending revision petition in the High Court had lapsed under Section 35 of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, 1987. The Supreme Court held that the vendees had sufficiently established their entitlement to the exemption through evidence and the nature of the transaction, as they were natives of the village and lacked other housing. Regarding the repeal of the 1950 Act, the Court held that the 'finality' of a judgment under Section 35 of the 1987 Act refers to a judgment or decree that terminates the action in the court that rendered it, and since such a judgment existed, the pending revision was not subject to the lapse provision of Section 35(3). The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to explicitly plead 'self-occupation' in a written statement preclude a vendee from claiming exemption under Section 5(c) of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, 1950?
  • What constitutes a 'final' judgment or decree for the purposes of Section 35 of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, 1987?
  • Does a pending revision petition lapse under Section 35(3) of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, 1987, if a final judgment or decree had already been rendered by the lower courts?
  • Can temporary absence from a native village for employment purposes deprive a person of their status as a resident of that village in the context of pre-emption law?
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• Ghulam Rasul vs Assistant Commissioner, Daska And Another1991 SC M R1924 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-18
  refugee allotmentmaintenance allotmentcancellation of allotmentleave to appealdouble allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which had upheld the cancellation of the petitioner's land allotment. The core legal question was whether a refugee who was included as a family member in his father's maintenance land allotment was lawfully entitled to a separate, additional land allotment. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner, having been included in his father's family for the initial allotment, having claimed compensation regarding his father's allotted land, and having received a subsidy for a tubewell on that same land, could not claim an independent and unconnected status to obtain a separate allotment. The petition was accordingly dismissed as meritless, affirming the cancellation of the subsequent allotment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person included as a family member in a refugee father's maintenance land allotment is entitled to a separate allotment?
  • Does claiming compensation and subsidies in respect of a father' preclude a separate land allotment for a refugee claimant?
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• Ghulam Rasool vs Abdullah1991 SC M R 1964 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-29
  ex parte decreeex parte proceedingsdetentioncriminal convictionabsence of defendantMajlis-i-Shooracivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenges the judgment of the Baluchistan High Court upholding an ex parte decree and the dismissal of an appeal by the Majlis-i-Shoora. The core legal question was whether an ex parte order and subsequent decree could be lawfully passed against a defendant who was absent due to detention under a criminal conviction and whether appellate interference was barred for failure to apply under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that since the appellant's absence was involuntary due to his incarceration and the trial court had knowledge of his detention, it was obligatory for the court to issue a process to him before proceeding ex parte, rendering the ex parte proceedings illegal. The Court laid down the principle that where a party's absence is beyond their control due to detention and known to the court, ex parte proceedings cannot be legally drawn without issuing a proper process, and such illegality can be examined in appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can ex parte proceedings be lawfully drawn against a defendant who is absent due to detention under a criminal conviction?
  • Is it obligatory for a court to issue process to a detained defendant whose incarceration is within the court's knowledge before proceeding ex parte?
  • Whether an appellate court can examine the validity of an ex parte decree when no application to set it aside under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. was filed before the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Qadir vs Esab Khan And Other1991 SCMR 61 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-07
  acquittalleave to appealappreciation of evidenceeye-witness testimonySection 342 statementcriminal liabilityforensic evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against the High Court's judgment, which acquitted the respondents of murder charges. The complainant alleged that the accused, armed with firearms, killed the deceased due to a prior dispute regarding witness testimony in a separate criminal case. The trial court had convicted one accused, Esab Khan, while acquitting the others. On appeal, the High Court acquitted Esab Khan, citing the acquittal of his co-accused, the lack of corroborative evidence, the failure to send recovered weapons for forensic analysis, and the rejection of the prosecution's motive. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court's acquittal was legally sustainable. The Court held that where eye-witness testimony is disbelieved regarding certain accused, and the motive is rejected, the remaining evidence against the other accused requires careful scrutiny. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that an accused's statement under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 must be accepted or rejected in its entirety. Finding no misappreciation of evidence by the High Court, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Must a statement of an accused recorded under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be accepted or rejected in its entirety?
  • Does the acquittal of co-accused provide a valid ground for the acquittal of the remaining accused when the prosecution's evidence is disbelieved?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the motive is disbelieved and the recovered weapons were not subjected to forensic examination?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Qadir And Another vs Mst. Kundan Bibi And Another1991 SCMR 1935 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-29
  civil revisionproduction of evidencemutationdiscretion of trial courtleave to appealprocedural delay
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed their civil revision petition in limine. The petitioners had originally filed a suit for declaration and perpetual injunction regarding a revenue mutation, which was dismissed by the trial Court and subsequently upheld by the Additional District Judge. Before the High Court, the petitioners contended they were denied a proper opportunity to lead evidence on additional issues. The Supreme Court considered whether the trial Court acted arbitrarily in closing the petitioners' evidence and whether proper opportunity was afforded. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were grossly negligent in producing evidence, failed to comply with procedural requirements to submit documentary evidence alongside the plaint, and that the trial Court's discretion in closing evidence was exercised properly given the time constraints mandated by the High Court. The Court laid down the principle that parties cannot claim a right to additional time for evidence when negligent and failing to produce mandatory documents at the earliest stages, especially when judicial directions require expeditious disposal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court acts arbitrarily in closing evidence when a party fails to produce required documents and witnesses within the stipulated time?
  • Is a party entitled to additional time to produce evidence when failing to file necessary documents along with the plaint as required by procedural law?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the concurrent findings and discretionary orders of lower courts regarding the closure of evidence absent any arbitrariness?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Qadir And 3 Others vs Mst. Kundan And 2 Other1991 SCMR 1835 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-30
  inheritancetamleekco-sharerslimitationoustercivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the defendants against the dismissal of their civil revision by the High Court, upholding the lower appellate court's decision in a suit for declaration regarding inheritance and Tamleek. The core legal question concerns whether the plaintiffs' suit was barred by limitation when the defendants sought to oust their sisters from inheritance on the basis of Tamleek. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacks merit and dismissed it. The Court laid down the key principle that sisters being co-sharers shall be deemed to have remained in possession through their co-sharers, and therefore, the plea of ouster cannot be successfully raised against them to establish limitation bars.

  Questions settled

  • Whether sisters as co-sharers can be ousted from inheritance through a plea of limitation?
  • Does possession of one co-sharer constitute possession of all co-sharers for the purpose of limitation?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal succeed against concurrent findings of fact regarding inheritance and Tamleek?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Nabi vs Muhammad Asghar and 3 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 543 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-13
  past maintenanceMuslim Law of Maintenanceminor childrenfather's duty to maintainconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against a judgment of the High Court which allowed a Constitutional petition granting past maintenance to the minor children of the appellant, subject to the law of limitation. The core legal questions involved whether past maintenance could be claimed by or for minor children under Muslim Law in the absence of a prior court decree or fixation by the father, and whether grandparents providing voluntary sustenance relieve the father of his duty to maintain. The Supreme Court held that past maintenance is permissible for children just as it is for a wife, finding no valid distinction or justification to deprive children of this benefit. Furthermore, the Court held that the primary and priority-wise duty to maintain minor children rests upon the father, even if maternal grandparents or other relatives have been voluntarily providing sustenance. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can minor children claim past maintenance from their father under Muslim Law if it has not been previously fixed by a court decree or by the father?
  • Does the provision of voluntary sustenance by grandparents relieve a father of his legal duty to maintain his minor children?
  • Does the priority-wise duty to maintain minor children rest upon the father in the presence of grandparents?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mustafa And Others vs Mst. Muhammadi Begum And Other1991 SCMR 432 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-22
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantco-ownershiprelationship of landlord and tenantconstitutional petitionpurchase of share
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a long-standing ejectment proceeding initiated by the respondent landlady against the petitioner tenants on the ground of reconstruction. During the proceedings, the petitioner No.1 purchased a fractional share of the property and subsequently raised pleas challenging the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller and the relationship of landlord and tenant. The Rent Controller initially dismissed the ejectment application, but successive appeals and remands resulted in orders for eviction, which were upheld by the Lahore High Court in a constitutional petition. The core legal question was whether the purchase of a share in the joint property by a tenant extinguishes the relationship of landlord and tenant and bars ejectment proceedings. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the purchase of a share in the property by a tenant does not terminate the pre-existing relationship of landlord and tenant established through a rent deed and acknowledgment of rent. The Court laid down the principle that a tenant who purchases a fractional share of the rented property remains a tenant qua that shop and cannot resist ejectment on the ground of co-ownership without partitioning the property, and is bound by the admission of tenancy.

  Questions settled

  • Does the purchase of a fractional share in a rented property by a tenant extinguish the relationship of landlord and tenant?
  • Can a tenant resist ejectment proceedings on the ground of becoming a co-owner without partitioning the joint property?
  • Whether a tenant who has admitted the execution of a rent deed can subsequently deny the relationship of landlord and tenant?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mustafa alias Ziau vs The State1991 PLD Supreme Court 718 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-22
  last seen evidencecircumstantial evidencemurderrapeappreciation of evidenceextra-judicial confessioncorroborationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave arises from the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the appellant under section 302 and section 404 P.P.C. for the rape and murder of a minor girl. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a conviction for murder based solely on uncorroborated 'last seen' evidence, in the absence of any incriminating recoveries, motive, or credible extra-judicial confession, is sustainable. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and ordered the immediate release of the appellant. The Court held that the circumstance of the deceased having been last seen in the company of the accused is not by itself sufficient to sustain a charge of murder without further corroborating evidence such as incriminating recoveries, a strong motive, or close proximity of time, particularly when the sole 'last seen' witness is an interested witness related to the complainant and the subsequent conduct of the witnesses renders the prosecution's narrative unnatural.

  Questions settled

  • Is the circumstance of the deceased having been last seen in the company of the accused sufficient by itself to sustain a charge of murder?
  • Whether uncorroborated 'last seen' testimony from an interested or related witness can form a safe basis for a capital conviction?
  • What additional evidence is required to link an accused to a crime when relying on circumstantial last seen evidence?
  • Does the absence of enmity between a witness and an accused guarantee the truth of the witness's testimony regarding last seen evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad And Another vs Sadiq And 13 Other1991 SCMR 360 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-10-22
  suit for possessionauction purchasecivil revisionleave to appealproperty descriptionabandonment of issue
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed a Civil Revision in a suit for possession. The respondents claimed title to the suit property through an auction purchase. The petitioners, while failing to establish their own title, contended that the property belonged to the Central Government, rendering the auction sale by the Provincial Government legally ineffective. A central point of contention raised by the petitioners involved an issue concerning the correct description of the suit property and the consequences of failing to submit a Jamabandi or site plan. The Supreme Court observed that this issue had been abandoned in the trial court, re-agitated before the appellate court, but ultimately not pressed in the High Court. Finding no reasonable explanation for this conduct and determining that the property in dispute was sufficiently described and identifiable, the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal, thereby upholding the lower court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party re-agitate an issue in a higher court that was explicitly abandoned in the trial court?
  • Is a property sale invalid if the petitioners fail to prove their own title but allege the property belongs to the Central Government?
  • Does the failure to submit a Jamabandi or site plan necessarily invalidate a suit for possession if the property is otherwise identifiable?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad and another vs Ahmad Khan and another1991 PLD Supreme Court 391 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-02
  Jammu and Kashmir refugeestemporary allotmentDisplaced Persons (Land Settlement) Actcancellation of allotmentChief Settlement Commissionerwrit petitionjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan is directed against the dismissal of the appellants' writ petitions by the Lahore High Court. The core question is whether the Settlement Authorities had the jurisdiction under sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, to cancel lands temporarily allotted to Jammu and Kashmir refugees for maintenance. The Supreme Court held that lands temporarily transferred to Jammu and Kashmir refugees for subsistence and maintenance were expressly excluded from the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme and did not constitute an 'allotment' in lieu of verified claims under the Act. Furthermore, such lands fell outside the compensation pool, having become the property of the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs. Consequently, neither the Chief Settlement Commissioner nor his delegate had the jurisdiction to cancel the temporary grant or resume the land. The appeal is allowed, and the cancellation orders are declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land temporarily allotted to Jammu and Kashmir refugees for maintenance can be cancelled by the Chief Settlement Commissioner under sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
  • Does a temporary grant of land to Jammu and Kashmir refugees constitute an 'allotment' within the definition of section 2(1) of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
  • Did the delegate of the Chief Settlement Commissioner have the jurisdiction to entertain a petition for the cancellation of land held by Jammu and Kashmir refugees for maintenance only?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad and 11 others vs Bakeish and 5 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 563 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-10
  pre-emptiondivisibility of salesinker principlevendee sharesale considerationright of pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  These review petitions challenged a consolidated judgment concerning the principle of 'sinker' in pre-emption cases, specifically whether a sale transaction is divisible when the vendees' shares are specified but the individual price contributions are not. The core legal questions were whether the absence of specified price contributions prevents a sale from being considered divisible for pre-emption purposes, and whether a partial success in a pre-emption claim can retrospectively improve a vendee's status to defeat the remaining claim. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that a sale remains indivisible unless both the shares of the vendees and the proportionate price paid by each are explicitly specified. The Court rejected the argument that general principles of the Transfer of Property Act could substitute for specific price allocation. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that a pre-emptor's right is determined at the time of the suit and cannot be defeated retrospectively by a judgment that excludes a portion of the property from the pre-emption claim. The established principle remains that without clear price specification, the sale is joint and indivisible.

  Questions settled

  • Is a sale transaction considered divisible for the purposes of pre-emption if the shares of the vendees are specified but the individual price contributions are not?
  • Can the principle of sinker be avoided by inferring proportionate price contributions in the absence of explicit specification in the sale deed?
  • Does a partial success in a pre-emption claim, which excludes a portion of the property, retrospectively improve the status of the vendee to defeat the remaining pre-emption claim?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mehdi vs The State1991 SCMR 60 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-28
  post-arrest bailballistic expertdirect evidencefurther inquiryocular testimonyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal seeking post-arrest bail in a criminal case involving allegations of murder and causing injuries with firearms. The core legal question concerns the evidentiary value of ballistic expert reports vis-a-vis direct eyewitness testimony in determining whether a case falls within the scope of further inquiry for the grant of bail. The Supreme Court held that in the presence of direct, definite, forthright, and creditworthy ocular and injured testimony implicating the accused, contrary findings or opinions from a ballistic expert carry lesser weight and cannot outweigh the direct evidence. Consequently, the petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused, affirming that expert evidence is merely confirmatory or explanatory in nature and does not create a ground for further inquiry when robust direct evidence exists.

  Questions settled

  • Does a ballistic expert report outweigh direct eyewitness and injured testimony for the purpose of granting bail?
  • Can expert evidence be considered as primary evidence instead of confirmatory or explanatory evidence?
  • Whether contradictions between weapon recovery reports and direct allegations constitute a case of further inquiry under criminal law?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Jilani And 3 Others vs Ghulam Muhammad And 7 Other1991 SCMR 2001 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-26
  pre-emptionTalab-e-MowasibatTalab-e-IshhadHanafi lawjudicial restraintstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against the dismissal of a pre-emption suit by the High Court. The appellants, claiming a right of pre-emption based on land contiguity, failed to establish the proper performance of Talab-e-Ishhad. The core legal question was whether the requirements for making Talab-e-Ishhad were satisfied, particularly regarding the presence of the buyer, seller, or the subject premises. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants failed to prove that the demand was made in the presence of the buyer, seller, or on the premises, as required by established Hanafi law. The Court emphasized that Talab-e-Ishhad must confirm the earlier Talab-e-Mowasibat. Furthermore, the Court observed that recent legislation, such as the N.W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987 and the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, explicitly incorporates the requirement of 'confirmation' in the context of pre-emption demands, reflecting the necessity of ratifying the initial demand. The Court also reiterated the principle of judicial restraint, noting that long-standing interpretations of law should generally be left to the legislature to amend rather than being overturned by the judiciary.

  Questions settled

  • Is it a mandatory requirement for Talab-e-Ishhad to be made in the presence of the buyer, the seller, or on the premises subject to sale?
  • Does the term 'confirmation' in the context of pre-emption laws imply the ratification of an earlier act?
  • Should the judiciary refrain from overturning long-standing interpretations of religious or personal law in favor of legislative action?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain Shah vs Ghulam Muhammad1991 SCMR 262 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-05
  compromise agreementproperty disputesettlement of appealcivil litigationdefault clause
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as an appeal involving a property dispute between Ghulam Hussain Shah and Ghulam Muhammad. The parties presented a joint application to the Court containing the specific terms of a compromise they had reached to resolve the litigation. The core legal question was whether the Court should accept and record the compromise agreement reached by the parties to dispose of the appeal. Upon reviewing the terms, which included a payment schedule of Rs. 70,000 by the respondents to the appellant in exchange for the transfer of ownership of the suit-property, and a default clause stipulating that the appeal would be accepted if the payment was not made within six months, the Court found the compromise to be lawful. Consequently, the Supreme Court recorded the compromise and disposed of the appeal in accordance with the agreed-upon terms, establishing that parties are free to settle disputes through lawful compromise agreements which the Court will enforce as the final resolution of the matter.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court dispose of an appeal based on a compromise agreement filed by the parties?
  • Is a compromise agreement in a property dispute enforceable if it includes a default clause regarding payment?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain And Others vs Ghulam Asghar (Deceased) Represented1991 SCMR 30 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-26
  pre-emptionprinciple of sinkerco-vendeesstrangersdivisible sale
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a pre-emption suit where the courts below applied the principle of sinker because three of the four co-vendees were strangers to the property while only one was a tenant. The core legal question concerned the applicability of the rule of sinker when a vendee associates strangers in a sale transaction that is not divisible. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the principle of sinker applies and the pre-emption suit is to be decreed against the vendees where a vendee having an equal or superior right associates a stranger with an inferior right, unless the impugned sale is divisible by specifying the share and the specific price paid by each vendee. The key principle laid down is that the doctrine of sinker operates to defeat a joint sale involving strangers unless the transaction clearly demarcates individual shares and respective purchase prices.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of sinker apply when a vendee associates strangers who have an inferior right of pre-emption?
  • What conditions must be met for a sale transaction to be considered divisible in pre-emption suits?
  • What is the legal effect on a transaction when a person having an equal or superior right associates a person with an inferior right of pre-emption?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain And Others vs Allah Bakhsh And Other1991 SCMR 1386 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-03
  Shamilat landabandonmentadverse possessionlimitationsaving of shamilatanimus revertendico-sharers
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arose from a suit for possession and declaration of ownership over a share in Shamilat (common land). The predecessors-in-interest of the respondents had sold their proprietary land holdings between 1883 and 1901 to the predecessors-in-interest of the appellants, but the sale deeds did not explicitly mention the transfer of Shamilat rights. Following the partition of the Shamilat in 1957, the respondents filed a suit in 1960 claiming their share. The appellants contended that the Shamilat rights were impliedly transferred, and alternatively, that the respondents had abandoned their rights by leaving the village. The Supreme Court held that under Section 3 of the West Pakistan Land Dispositions (Saving of Shamilat) Ordinance 1959, Shamilat rights are independent of proprietary land holdings and are not transferred unless specifically mentioned in the deed. The Court further ruled that abandonment requires both physical relinquishment and a clear intention never to return (animus revertendi), which was disproved. Since adverse possession was not established, the suit was governed by Article 144 of the Limitation Act 1908 and was within time.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the sale of proprietary land automatically conveys the appurtenant Shamilat rights under the West Pakistan Land Dispositions (Saving of Shamilat) Ordinance 1959?
  • What legal elements must be established to prove the abandonment of rights in common land (Shamilat)?
  • Does the mere absence of a co-sharer from a village and non-payment of land revenue constitute abandonment of Shamilat rights?
  • Which article of the Limitation Act 1908 applies to a suit for possession of Shamilat land based on title where adverse possession is not specifically proved?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain and another vs Faiz Muhammad and 7 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 218 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-10
  inheritance mutationfemale inheritance rightsdeclaratory suitlocus standipredeceased daughterOrder XLI Rule 33 CPCinherent powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose out of an inheritance dispute concerning land left by Lal Khan, who died in 1952. Inadvertently, a surviving daughter (Mst. Mureedan) was excluded from the inheritance mutation, and instead, a predeceased daughter (Mst. Amiran) was recorded, leading to subsequent mutations in favor of her surviving husband and his children. The sons of Lal Khan filed a declaratory suit. The First Appellate Court decreed the suit, recognizing the rights of the lawful heirs, but the High Court reversed it on the ground that under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, a suit could not be decreed solely for the benefit of a non-contesting pro forma defendant (Mst. Mureedan). The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment. It held that the respondents had no locus standi to appeal. Furthermore, under Order XLI, Rule 33 of the CPC, the Appellate Court possessed ample power to grant a decree in favor of a non-appealing respondent to prevent an un-Islamic devolution depriving a female heir.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appellate court have the power under Order XLI, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure to grant a decree in favour of a non-appealing or non-contesting respondent?
  • Whether persons claiming inheritance through a predeceased daughter of the deceased land-owner have locus standi to challenge a decree passed in favour of the rightful surviving legal heirs?
  • Can a declaratory suit under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act be sustained and decreed where the primary beneficiary of the relief sought is arrayed as a respondent rather than a plaintiff?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain And 11 Others vs Government of West Pakistan And Other1991 SCMR 1641 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-26
  leave to appealAdna MalikanShamlat Dehrevenue recordpartitioncivil revisiondeclaration suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the dismissal of a civil revision by the High Court, which had affirmed the concurrent dismissal of the plaintiffs' suit for declaration by the lower courts. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioners held the status of Adna Malikan in the disputed Shamlat Deh land and whether their rights were lawfully affected or extinguished by a prior partition or consolidation of holdings under Martial Law Regulation 64 of 1959. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the factual and legal questions regarding the revenue record entries concerning the petitioners' status as Adna Malikan, the validity of their subsequent alteration, and the resultant legal effects require thorough judicial examination. The key principle laid down is that unauthorized or unassociated alterations in revenue records and partitions affecting recorded proprietary statuses like Adna Malkiyat necessitate substantive examination by the appellate forum.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the status of petitioners as Adna Malikan could be altered to Ghair Dakhilkaran through an alleged partition without associating them?
  • What is the effect of changes made in the record of rights regarding Adna Malkiyat prior to the enforcement of Martial Law Regulation 64 of 1959?
  • Does an alleged partition of Shamlat Deh land without the association of recorded Adna Malikan bind them?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hamdani vs Muhammad Iqbal And 9 Other1991 SCMR 1668 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-24
  pre-emptionIslamic law of Shufaleave to appealstatutory vacuumcivil revisionpre-emption suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by a plaintiff in a pre-emption suit against the dismissal of his civil revision by the High Court. The core legal question is whether, following the Supreme Court's decision in Government of N.W.F.P v. Malik Said Kamal Shah, which invalidated certain statutory provisions regarding pre-emption, the Islamic law of Shufa automatically filled the resulting legal vacuum in the Punjab, thereby allowing pre-emption claims to be adjudicated based on Islamic principles even in the absence of specific legislation. The petitioner argued that the Islamic law of Shufa, as practiced in other provinces, should apply to transactions occurring after the target date established in the Malik Said Kamal Shah judgment. The Supreme Court, recognizing that the questions raised are of general public importance, granted leave to appeal to further examine whether the Islamic law of Shufa became enforceable in the Punjab post-judgment. The Court's decision to grant leave signifies that the legal status of pre-emption claims in the interim period requires authoritative resolution by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Islamic law of Shufa automatically fill the legal vacuum in pre-emption law created by the judgment in Government of N.W.F.P v. Malik Said Kamal Shah?
  • Can pre-emption claims be enforced in the Punjab based on Islamic law principles for transactions occurring after the target date set in the Malik Said Kamal Shah judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Haider And Others vs Muhammad Ismail And Other1991 SCMR 1139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-24
  pre-emptionleave to appealland salesuit for pre-emptionappellate jurisdictioncivil litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against judgments of the Lahore High Court regarding pre-emption suits. The core dispute arose from the sale of land parcels by a vendor to a vendee, which were subsequently challenged by a pre-emptor. The trial court decreed the suits in favor of the pre-emptor regarding two-thirds of the land but disallowed the remaining one-third. The High Court dismissed subsequent appeals. Before the Supreme Court, the legal heirs of the pre-emptor argued that the High Court erred in denying the decree for the remaining one-third of the land, asserting that since the original suits challenged the entirety of the land parcels, the pre-emptors were entitled to seek restoration of the disallowed portions. The Supreme Court found that the submissions raised substantial legal questions requiring further consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal in the petitions filed by the pre-emptors' heirs, while dismissing the petitions filed by the original vendee. The Court directed the parties to furnish security and permitted the filing of additional documents for final adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Can a pre-emptor seek the restoration of a disallowed portion of land in a pre-emption suit if the original suit challenged the entire parcel?
  • Does the denial of a decree for a portion of land in a pre-emption suit constitute a legal error subject to appellate review?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Haider And Another vs The State1991 SCMR 268 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-15
  murderleave to appealocular evidencecommon intentionmedical corroborationrecovery of weaponmotivegeneral amnesty
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was brought before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by two convicts challenging their conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, where their death sentences had subsequently been commuted to life imprisonment under a general amnesty. The prosecution alleged that the petitioners assaulted the deceased with hatchets following a rejected marriage proposal and insulting eviction from the deceased's house, resulting in sixteen injuries and immediate death. The core legal issues revolved around whether the ocular testimony was credible despite the darkness of a winter evening, whether the recovery evidence of blood-stained clothes and weapons supported the conviction, and whether the alleged false implication on account of party faction held merit. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the ocular account was fully corroborated by medical evidence showing multiple incised wounds inflicted over sufficient time, the prompt recoveries, and the close familial relationship among the parties which negated false implication. Leave to appeal was consequently refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether close familial relationship between the accused, deceased, and eye-witnesses mitigates against the likelihood of false implication in the absence of prior deep-rooted enmity?
  • Whether the presence of numerous incised wounds on the deceased can substantiate that the occurrence lasted long enough to allow eye-witnesses attracted by alarms to arrive and witness part of the assault?
  • Whether a conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is sustainable when supported by credible ocular evidence, consistent medical testimony, and prompt recoveries of blood-stained articles?
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• Ghulam Dastgir vs Niazi And Other1991 SCMR 455 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-09
  quashment of proceedingssecond complaintprevious acquittalcriminal revisiondistinct offencesdouble jeopardy
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave is directed against the judgment of the Baluchistan High Court, which allowed an application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and quashed proceedings directed by the Additional Sessions Judge in a revision. The core legal question concerned the maintainability of a second complaint involving both identical and distinct offences following the dismissal of a prior complaint for non-prosecution and acquittal under Section 323/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the second complaint was maintainable to the extent of the new offences (Sections 406 and 420, Pakistan Penal Code 1860) and should have been processed under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, but could not proceed regarding the offence of which the accused had already been acquitted. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment, restored the second complaint strictly limited to the new offences, and clarified the bar against double jeopardy regarding the previously acquitted charge.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a second complaint is maintainable when it includes offences different from those in a previously dismissed complaint?
  • Can an accused be tried a second time for an offence for which they have already been acquitted?
  • How should a second criminal complaint involving both previous and new allegations be handled by the trial magistrate?
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• Ghulam Ali vs Akbar alias Akoor and another1991 PLD Supreme Court 957 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-12-02
  limitationcondonation of delaysufficient causegood faithpecuniary jurisdictioncounsel's negligenceappellate forum
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the High Court’s dismissal of an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which resulted in the dismissal of the appellant's appeal as time-barred. The appellant had initially filed an appeal in the District Court, despite the subject matter's value requiring filing in the High Court under Section 18 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962. The core legal question was whether the time spent pursuing an appeal in a court lacking jurisdiction, based on a counsel's erroneous advice, constitutes "sufficient cause" for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that the mistake of counsel in choosing the wrong forum does not amount to "good faith" or "due care and caution" as defined under the Limitation Act. The Court established that where the law regarding the proper forum is plain and unambiguous, a counsel's failure to identify it constitutes gross negligence rather than a basis for condonation. Consequently, the delay in filing the appeal in the correct forum could not be excused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the filing of an appeal in a wrong forum due to a counsel's mistake constitute 'sufficient cause' for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • Can time spent in a court lacking jurisdiction be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act if the proceeding was not prosecuted with due care and caution?
  • Is a client entitled to condonation of delay under the Limitation Act when the delay is caused by the ill-advice of their counsel?
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• Ghulam Abbas vs Mazher Abbas and another1991 PLD Supreme Court 1059 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-12
  murdersentence enhancementdeath penaltylesser penaltyfamily honourprivate revengemitigating circumstanceSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court whereby the sentence of death awarded to the convict for murder was reduced to imprisonment for life on the ground that the accused considered the deceased responsible for the murder of his uncle. The petitioner sought the enhancement and restoration of the death sentence. The core legal question revolved around whether the involvement of family honour and duty in avenging a previous murder constitutes a mitigating circumstance for awarding a lesser penalty, and whether there is a conflict in case-law regarding private revenge versus family honour. The Supreme Court held that there is no conflict of authority; the delicate balance of whether family honour or private revenge predominated depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case, requiring psychological analysis and rationalization by the judge. The Court further noted that interference with a sentence reduction or acquittal requires tests such as misreading of evidence or a miscarriage of justice, which were not met. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the commission of a murder out of a sense of family honour and duty to avenge a previous murder can be treated as a mitigating circumstance for awarding a lesser penalty?
  • Is there a conflict of authority in case-law regarding the distinction between private revenge and family honour in determining the quantum of sentence in murder cases?
  • What are the governing principles and tests for an appellate court to interfere with the reduction of a sentence or to enhance a sentence to death?
  • How does the presence of partial conditions of exceptions under Section 300 P.P.C. affect the discretion of the court in awarding the lesser sentence for a conviction under Section 302 P.P.C.?
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• George Masih And Another vs The Additional District Judge, Jhelum1991 SCMR 1856 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-28
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantrelationship of landlord and tenantdenial of titleconcurrent findingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' constitutional petition and upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts ordering the eviction of the petitioners from the disputed property. The respondents had filed an ejectment application on the grounds of default, personal need, damaging the property, and subletting. The petitioners resisted the application, denying the relationship of landlord and tenant and alleging that the property had been sold to petitioner No.2 under an agreement to sell. The core legal question was whether the denial of the landlord's title and the assertion of an agreement to sell ousted the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller and warranted the dismissal of the ejectment application. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts establishing the relationship of landlord and tenant were based on proper appreciation of evidence and did not warrant interference. The Court laid down the principle that mere assertion of ownership or a rival title, unsupported by valid established transfer, does not extinguish the landlord-tenant relationship where concurrent findings of fact establish the same.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the denial of a landlord's title by a tenant automatically ousts the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant be re-appraised by the Supreme Court?
  • Whether an alleged agreement to sell terminates the tenancy and justifies the dismissal of an ejectment application?
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• General Manager, National Radio Telecommunication Corporation, Haripur District, Abbottabad vs Muhammad Aslam And 2 Other1991 SCMR 86 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-21
  leave to appealdismissal from servicereinstatementback benefitssettlement of dueslabour court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the General Manager, National Radio Telecommunication Corporation, challenging the judgment of the Peshawar High Court which set aside the orders of the Labour Courts and reinstated the respondent, Muhammad Aslam, into service with back benefits. The respondent was dismissed from service following a departmental inquiry after being detected attempting to remove iron gates using a gate pass meant for chip-board. Following his dismissal, the respondent voluntarily applied for and received all his service dues, including salary, provident fund, bonus, and leave encashment, without protest. The core legal question is whether an employee who has voluntarily claimed and received all terminal service dues in full satisfaction after dismissal is subsequently entitled to challenge the dismissal and seek reinstatement. The Supreme Court granted leave to examine this question, as well as whether the dismissal was warranted for serious reasons, and suspended the payment of back benefits pending the final disposal of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee who has voluntarily claimed and received all service dues in full satisfaction after dismissal is entitled to seek reinstatement?
  • Whether dismissal from service for attempting to remove items using an irregular gate pass constitutes a serious reason justifying termination?
  • Does the acceptance of terminal benefits without protest estop an employee from challenging their dismissal before a Labour Court?
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• General Bank of Netherland Limited vs Commissioner of Incometax, Central Karachi (1991 PLD Supreme Court 675 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-27
  income taxnon-resident banking companyaccrual of incomedeemed incomeforeign securitiesstatutory depositstax liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the taxability of interest income earned by a non-resident banking company on securities deposited outside Pakistan. The appellant, a foreign bank, deposited securities with its New York branch to comply with statutory requirements under the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962. The tax authorities sought to tax the interest accrued on these securities, arguing it was income deemed to accrue within Pakistan under Section 42(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The core legal question was whether interest earned on securities held outside Pakistan, mandated by local banking regulations, constitutes income accruing or arising within Pakistan. The Supreme Court held that the Banking Companies Ordinance and its associated Rules are regulatory frameworks for banking operations and do not determine the place of income accrual for tax purposes. The Court ruled that interest income accrues to the owner at the place where the securities are issued and are payable. Since the interest was earned and received outside Pakistan, it did not constitute income accruing within Pakistan under the Income-tax Act, 1922. The Court emphasized that the first receipt of income determines taxability, not subsequent remittances.

  Questions settled

  • Does the deposit of securities outside Pakistan for regulatory compliance under the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, render the interest earned thereon taxable as income accruing in Pakistan?
  • Does the regulatory framework of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, govern the determination of the place of accrual of income for tax purposes?
  • At what location does interest income on securities accrue for the purpose of taxation?
  • Is income that has already been received outside Pakistan chargeable to tax if it is subsequently remitted to Pakistan?
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• General Bank of Netherland Limited Messrs American Express1991 PTD 687 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-27
  income taxnon-resident banking companyaccrual of incomedeemed incomebanking regulationstax liabilitysecurities deposit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns income tax references regarding whether interest earned by a non-resident banking company on securities deposited outside Pakistan, as a regulatory requirement, constitutes income accruing or arising within Pakistan under Section 42(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The High Court had ruled in the affirmative, concluding that the securities were assets transferred to Pakistan, thus making the interest taxable. The Supreme Court reversed this decision. The Court held that the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, and its associated rules are regulatory frameworks for banking operations and do not determine the place of income accrual for tax purposes. The Court established that interest income on securities accrues to the owner based on ownership, not the physical location of the securities. Furthermore, interest accrues at the place where the securities are issued, encashable, and receivable. Since the interest was earned and received outside Pakistan, it was not taxable under the Income-tax Act, 1922. The Court emphasized that the 'receipt' of income occurs when the recipient first gains control of the money, and subsequent remittances do not create a new taxable receipt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the deposit of securities outside Pakistan for regulatory compliance under the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, render the interest earned thereon taxable in Pakistan?
  • Does the regulatory requirement to maintain capital reserves in Pakistan determine the place of accrual of interest income for tax purposes?
  • At what location does interest income on securities accrue for the purposes of the Income-tax Act, 1922?
  • Does the remittance of income already received outside Pakistan constitute a new 'receipt' of income taxable in Pakistan?
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• Fida Muhammad vs Muhammad Hayat1991 SCMR 1354 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-08-22
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantdenial of titledefault in rentpersonal needrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an ejectment order passed against a tenant by the Rent Controller, Quetta, which was subsequently upheld by the High Court of Baluchistan. The respondent landlord sought eviction based on the tenant's default in rent payments and the personal requirement of the property for his sons. The tenant contested the landlord's title, asserting a tenancy agreement with a firm rather than the respondent, and argued that rent payments were adjusted against goods provided. The Supreme Court examined whether the tenant's denial of the landlord's title was justified and whether the default and personal need were established. The Court held that the mere issuance of rent receipts in the name of a firm does not negate the established landlord-tenant relationship inherited from the deceased owner. It further ruled that the tenant's denial of title was unjustified, the default was not legally excusable through the claimed adjustment, and the findings regarding the landlord's bona fide personal need were concurrent. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the eviction order.

  Questions settled

  • Does the issuance of rent receipts in the name of a firm, rather than an individual, automatically negate the landlord-tenant relationship between a tenant and the deceased owner's heir?
  • Can a tenant justify a default in rent payment by claiming an adjustment against goods supplied to the landlord's agent?
  • Is a tenant's denial of a landlord's title considered unjustified when the tenancy relationship is established through the devolution of property?
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• Feroze Khan vs Fateh Khan And 2 Other1991 SCMR 2220 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-17
  appeal against acquittalmurderbenefit of the doubtappreciation of evidenceocular testimonycorroborationSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the High Court acquitting the respondents of murder charges. The core legal question involved the propriety of setting aside an acquittal and the principles governing the re-appraisal of evidence, particularly ocular testimony and corroborative recovery, where the High Court had discounted witness testimony and granted the benefit of the doubt. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a mere difference of opinion regarding the appreciation of evidence is insufficient to set aside an acquittal unless the view taken by the High Court is shown to be one that no reasonable person could possibly hold. The Court laid down that the extension of the benefit of the doubt to certain accused does not automatically render the eye-witnesses untruthful as to the remainder, but requires the strictest scrutiny of their testimony, and an order of acquittal will not be interfered with unless it passes the rigorous test of impossibility regarding the unreasonableness of the impugned view.

  Questions settled

  • Can an order of acquittal be set aside merely on the ground of a difference of opinion regarding the appreciation of evidence?
  • Does the acquittal of co-accused on the extension of the benefit of the doubt render eye-witnesses completely unreliable against the remaining accused?
  • What test is applied by appellate courts when evaluating the correctness of a High Court's view in an appeal against acquittal?
  • Is corroborative evidence regarding recoveries sufficient to sustain a conviction when the primary ocular testimony fails the test of strict judicial scrutiny?
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• Federation of Pakistan Through Secretary, Ministry Of Interior, Islamabad1991 SCMR 1663 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-12
  service lawdisciplinary proceedingsFederal Service Tribunalquantum of punishmentcivil servantmisconductappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Federation of Pakistan against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal. The respondent, a police official, was suspended and subsequently charge-sheeted for misconduct and inefficiency regarding the escape of two suspects from police custody. Following an inquiry, the Inspector General of Police imposed a major penalty of reduction in pay from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 950 per month with permanent effect. The respondent appealed to the Federal Service Tribunal, which modified the penalty to a reduction in pay for a limited period of three years. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the Federal Service Tribunal possesses the jurisdiction to modify the specific quantum of punishment awarded by the competent authority in disciplinary proceedings. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine this limited point regarding the scope of the Tribunal's appellate authority in reviewing administrative penalties imposed on civil servants. The case remains pending for further adjudication on this specific legal issue.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the authority to modify the quantum of a penalty imposed by a competent authority in disciplinary proceedings?
  • Can a service tribunal interfere with the specific punishment awarded for misconduct by an administrative authority?
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• Federation of Pakistan Through Secretary, Ministry Of Finance, Islamabad And 2 Others vs Jameel Ahmad Saleem1991 SCMR 1847 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-21
  disciplinary proceedingsreduction in rankmisconductservice appealmajor penaltywithholding of incrementsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Federation of Pakistan challenging a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had modified a disciplinary penalty imposed on the respondent. The respondent, a National Savings Officer, had been removed from service for misconduct, including willful absence and non-compliance with transfer orders. Following a departmental appeal, the removal was converted to a reduction in rank from BPS-16 to BPS-14. The Tribunal subsequently modified this penalty further, substituting the reduction in rank with the withholding of annual increments for four years. The petitioner argued that the Tribunal erred in its factual premise, mistakenly believing the reduction in rank placed the respondent below his initial entry grade. The Supreme Court acknowledged the Tribunal's factual error regarding the respondent's entry grade but held that the decision to impose a lesser penalty was ultimately based on the Tribunal's assessment that the respondent's misconduct did not warrant a major penalty. Finding no substantial question of law of public importance, the Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does a factual error regarding a civil servant's initial entry grade necessarily invalidate a Service Tribunal's decision on the proportionality of a disciplinary penalty?
  • Is a reduction in rank from BPS-16 to BPS-14 considered a major penalty under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973?
  • Can the Supreme Court refuse leave to appeal if the impugned judgment does not involve a substantial question of law of public importance?
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• Federation of Pakistan Through Secretary, Establishment Division, Rawalpindi And 2 Others vs Asadullah1991 SCMR 1160 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-21
  civil servicedismissal from serviceshow-cause noticecriminal convictionmoral turpitudeleave to appealFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The Federation of Pakistan and its functionaries filed a petition for leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 challenging a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dated 9-2-1988. The respondent, a Junior Auditor, had been dismissed from service by the competent authority under Rule 8(a) of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules 1973 following his conviction and sentence by a criminal court for an offence involving moral turpitude. The Federal Service Tribunal set aside the dismissal on the ground that the respondent was entitled to a show-cause notice prior to dismissal, relying on Supreme Court jurisprudence. The core legal question raised before the Supreme Court was whether a show-cause notice is mandatory prior to dismissal when action is taken pursuant to a criminal conviction involving moral turpitude, notwithstanding the procedural exemption under Rule 8 of the Rules. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine this legal proposition.

  Questions settled

  • Is the issuance of a show-cause notice mandatory prior to dismissing a civil servant whose dismissal is based on a criminal conviction involving moral turpitude?
  • Does Rule 8 of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules 1973 dispense with the requirement of a show-cause procedure upon a civil servant's conviction by a criminal court?
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• Federation of Pakistan Through Secretary, Communications, Islamabad1991 SCMR 373 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-21
  Service Tribunalleave to appealdepartmental appeallimitationadmission of guiltenquiry proceedingsreinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a decision of the Service Tribunal dated 18 September 1988, which had favored the respondent. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to examine two specific legal questions. The first question pertains to whether the Service Tribunal correctly determined that the respondent's departmental appeal was filed within the prescribed time limit. The second question addresses whether the respondent, having submitted a reply to the charge-sheet and allegedly admitted guilt regarding the charges, could still benefit from procedural irregularities in the enquiry proceedings to secure reinstatement. Pending the final adjudication of these issues, the Supreme Court suspended the operation of the impugned order passed by the Service Tribunal. The case highlights the court's role in reviewing service matters where questions of limitation and the impact of admitted misconduct on procedural fairness arise.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Service Tribunal correctly determined that the respondent's departmental appeal was filed within the prescribed time limit?
  • Can an employee who has admitted guilt to charges in response to a charge-sheet still rely on procedural irregularities in enquiry proceedings to secure reinstatement?
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• Federation of Pakistan And Others vs Punjab Steel Limited And Other1991 SCMR 393 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-12
  leave to appealwrit jurisdictionstatutory remediescustoms lawexhaustion of remedieslegislative intervention
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Federation of Pakistan against a judgment of the High Court, which had accepted the respondents' writ petitions. The core legal questions presented for the Supreme Court's consideration concern the competency of a writ petition when statutory remedies of appeal or revision under the Customs Act, 1969, have not been exhausted. Furthermore, the Court is tasked with determining whether the High Court erred in disregarding the legal effect of three specific notifications issued by the competent authority on 30-12-1987. Additionally, the petition raises the issue of whether the High Court improperly relied on the precedent established in the Al-Samrez Enterprises case, given the subsequent legislative intervention through the insertion of Section 31-A into the Customs Act, 1969, via the Finance Ordinance, 1988. Finally, the Court must decide if the High Court acted appropriately in disposing of the writ petition without providing the Federal Government an adequate opportunity to be heard. The Supreme Court, having heard both sides, granted leave to appeal to resolve these significant legal questions.

  Questions settled

  • Is a writ petition competent when statutory remedies of appeal or revision under the Customs Act, 1969, have not been exhausted?
  • Does the insertion of Section 31-A into the Customs Act, 1969, via the Finance Ordinance, 1988, render the precedent in Al-Samrez Enterprises inapplicable?
  • Is the High Court justified in disposing of a writ petition without affording the Federal Government an adequate opportunity to be heard?
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• Federation of Pakistan And Another vs Iiabib Ahmad And Another1991 SCMR 1677 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-04
  evacuee trust propertywrit jurisdictionconstitutional petitionconcurrent findingsleave to appealapprobate and reprobate
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Federation of Pakistan against the judgment of the High Court, which accepted a constitutional petition and set aside concurrent findings of the Chairman, Evacuee Trust Board and a Joint Secretary regarding an urban settlement case concerning evacuee property. The core legal question involves the propriety of the High Court exercising its writ jurisdiction to interfere with concurrent factual and legal findings, alongside issues concerning internal conflicts in the impugned judgment, the character of the property as evacuee trust property, and the principle of approbate and reprobate regarding the respondent's inconsistent pleas. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the High Court erred in its exercise of writ jurisdiction and treatment of factual aspects, directing that the interim order previously passed shall continue in operation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can competently set aside concurrent findings of fact and law rendered by administrative tribunals in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Whether a party is barred from pleading that a property is not evacuee trust property when they had earlier claimed otherwise?
  • Whether an impugned judgment suffering from internal conflict of findings and inadequate discussion warrants interference by the Supreme Court?
  • When should the High Court decline to exercise its writ jurisdiction in favour of a litigant?
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• Federation of Pakistan And 3 Others vs Muhammad Arif Goraya1991 SCMR 1664 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-13
  service tribunaldismissal from servicedepartmental inquiryreinstatementleave to appealfraud
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which accepted the respondent-auditor's appeal against his dismissal from service and ordered his reinstatement, while granting petitioners the choice to initiate fresh disciplinary proceedings. The respondent had been dismissed following departmental inquiries regarding a financial fraud. The core legal question concerns the legality and necessity of initiating fresh disciplinary proceedings and reinstating an employee where a preliminary enquiry and detailed departmental proceedings had already been conducted. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the case required further consideration as there were no conducive circumstances or necessity for a fresh enquiry given that all relevant material was already on record. The implementation of the impugned order of the Tribunal was suspended.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Service Tribunal is justified in ordering reinstatement while permitting fresh disciplinary proceedings on the same charges?
  • Is a fresh departmental enquiry necessary when all relevant material has already been placed on record during previous proceedings?
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• Federation of Pakistan And 2 Others vs Major (Retd.) Wazir Ahmad And Other1991 SCMR 2284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-14
  civil servantsmilitary pensionpay fixationre-employmentservice tribunalarmed forces
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by special leave from the judgments of the Federal Service Tribunal concerning retired Armed Forces personnel who were permanently inducted into civil departments and had their military pensions deducted from their civil pays by the Accountant-General. The respondents successfully challenged these deductions before the Tribunal, which held that section 17 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 guaranteed full pay for the civil post without such deductions. The core legal question is whether the competent authority is legally empowered under the relevant rules to deduct military pensions when fixing the pay of re-employed military personnel in civil departments under the Civil Servants Act, 1973. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the Tribunal's judgments, holding that section 17 makes a civil servant's entitlement to pay explicitly subject to the relevant rules, including Regulation 526 of the Civil Service Regulations, which permits the competent authority to take military pensions into account when fixing pay in civil employment. The Court laid down the principle that section 17 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 does not confer an unqualified right to pay, but is duly regulated and qualified by applicable service rules regarding pay fixation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether section 17 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 gives an unqualified right to a civil servant to receive the full pay of a post without deductions?
  • Does Regulation 526 of the Civil Service Regulations remain valid and applicable after the enactment of the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Is the competent authority legally empowered to deduct military pensions when fixing the pay of retired military personnel re-employed in civil departments?
  • Do rules regarding the fixation of pay operate as a qualification upon the statutory right to pay under section 17 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
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• Federation of Pakistan and 2 others vs Major (Retd.) Muhammad Sabir Khan1991 PLD Supreme Court 476 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-23
  writ jurisdictionArticle 199disputed questions of facttitle disputepossession of landproper forumCivil Court remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan was directed against a judgment of the High Court of Balochistan, which had allowed a Constitutional Petition filed by the respondent seeking restoration of possession of disputed agricultural land and a declaration against his dispossession. The respondent claimed ownership via registered and unregistered sale deeds, whereas the appellants contended the land belonged to the Government of Balochistan for use by Mahsud Scouts and remained under their control. The core issue before the Supreme Court was whether writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution could be invoked to resolve serious disputes regarding title and possession of land involving contested documents. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in exercising writ jurisdiction because the matter hinged upon disputed documents, conflicting versions, and serious factual controversies that could only be determined through a proper trial and recording of evidence. Allowing the appeal and setting aside the High Court's judgment, the Supreme Court ruled that constitutional jurisdiction is not the appropriate forum for resolving contested questions of title and possession.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Constitutional Petition under Article 199 of the Constitution is maintainable to resolve serious factual controversies regarding title and possession of land?
  • Can the High Court in writ jurisdiction adjudicate upon disputed documents and conflicting factual versions without recording evidence through a proper trial?
  • Should parties involved in a bona fide title and possession dispute be relegated to seek remedy before a Civil Court instead of the High Court in writ jurisdiction?
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• Federal Land Commission Through Its Secretary vs Mst. Bibi Mehr UN Nisa1991 SCMR 420 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-14
  Land Reforms Regulationjurisdictional factconstitutional jurisdictionsecondary evidencealienation of landadministrative lawjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  The Federal Land Commission sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that declared its order under the Land Reforms Regulation to be without lawful authority. The dispute concerned whether certain land alienations occurred before or after the crucial date of 1-3-1967. The Commission had disregarded secondary evidence (certified copies of a statement made on 25-2-1967) because the original record was untraceable, relying instead on suspicion regarding the timing of mutation entries. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, holding that the High Court correctly exercised its constitutional jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that an administrative authority's finding on a jurisdictional fact does not enjoy immunity from judicial review. It established that where an administrative officer is empowered to act only upon the existence of certain circumstances, the objective existence of those circumstances is a condition precedent for the order's validity. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that suspicion cannot substitute for proof, and secondary evidence must be considered when primary records are unavailable, particularly regarding the genuineness of alienations.

  Questions settled

  • Does a finding on a jurisdictional fact by an administrative authority enjoy immunity from constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Can an administrative officer's determination of the existence of circumstances required for an order bind the courts?
  • Is suspicion a valid substitute for proof in determining the date of land alienation?
  • Should secondary evidence be utilized when the original record of a declaration is untraceable?
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• Fazlur Rehman And Another vs The State1991 SCMR 1577 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-30
  criminal breach of trustfraudulent mutationsfictitious power of attorneymens reaanti-corruptionland dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal appeals arise from a common judgment of the Peshawar High Court upholding the conviction of the appellants under Section 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act in relation to fraudulent land mutations executed through an alleged fictitious power of attorney. The core legal question was whether the prosecution sufficiently established the fabrication of the power of attorney and the requisite mens rea of the accused appellants in the fraudulent transfer of allotted land. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the fabrication of the power of attorney through expert handwriting analysis or judicial comparison and found no mens rea or criminal liability in the conduct of the appellants and revenue officials. The Court consequently accepted the appeals, set aside the convictions, and acquitted the appellants, laying down the principle that mere suspicious land transactions without proof of forged documentation or guilty intention cannot sustain a criminal conviction under anti-corruption and cheating laws.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for cheating and corruption can be sustained regarding a disputed power of attorney without expert handwriting or finger print verification?
  • Does the mere identification of a vendee before a revenue officer by a relative constitute a criminal offence absent proof of a fraudulent transaction?
  • Can revenue officials be held criminally liable for attesting a mutation when a formally complete power of attorney is presented before them?
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• Fazal Muhammad vs Shah Baig And 2 Other1991 SCMR 1465 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-05
  revenue entrieslimitationbarred by timedeclarationmandatory injunctioncivil petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Baluchistan High Court, which had allowed a revision application and set aside the appellate judgment of the Majlis-e-Shoora that had decreed the petitioner's suit. The core legal question concerned the correctness of revenue entries and whether the plaintiff's suit for declaration and mandatory injunction regarding correction of revenue entries was barred by time, given that the petitioner had knowledge of the settlement records and remained silent for nearly twenty years. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly concluded that the suit was hopelessly barred by time and that the plaintiff failed to prove joint possession or take timely steps during the settlement operations. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, laying down the principle that unexplained and prolonged delay, coupled with admissions from the plaintiff's own witnesses regarding awareness of adverse revenue entries, renders a suit for correction of revenue entries time-barred and unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit for correction of revenue entries is barred by time when the plaintiff remains silent for a prolonged period despite knowledge of adverse entries?
  • Can a court entertain a suit that is manifestly barred by time based on the plaint and statements of the plaintiff's own witnesses?
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• Fazal Karim And Others vs Muhammad Boota And Another1991 SCMR 2157 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-19
  revisional jurisdictionprivate complaintsummoning of accusedfurther inquiryCode of Criminal Procedure 1898dismissal of complaintcriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court order that upheld a Sessions Court's revisional direction requiring a Magistrate to summon the accused in a private complaint case. The core legal question was whether a Sessions Judge, exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 436 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, is strictly limited to ordering "further inquiry" under Section 202, or if the Judge may direct the Magistrate to summon the accused directly without such inquiry. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Sessions Judge possesses the authority to direct the Magistrate to summon the accused directly. The Court reasoned that Section 436 must be read in conjunction with Sections 202, 203, and 435. Since a Magistrate has the discretion to summon an accused without inquiry under Section 202, the revisional court, upon finding an order of dismissal illegal or improper, may direct the Magistrate to perform any act the Magistrate was originally empowered to do, including summoning the accused without further inquiry. This interpretation ensures procedural practicality and aligns with the broader powers of revision.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Sessions Judge, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 436 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, direct a Magistrate to summon an accused without ordering further inquiry?
  • Does the power of a Sessions Judge to order 'further inquiry' under Section 436 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 preclude the direct summoning of an accused?
  • Is a Magistrate empowered to summon an accused in a private complaint case without conducting a preliminary inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Fazal Hussain vs Musharaf Sultana1991 SCMR 487 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-12
  leave to appealpre-emptionwithdrawal of pre-emption moneycivil revisionpossessiondecree
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a civil revision, arising out of pre-emption litigation. The core legal question concerns the legal effect of a pre-emptor withdrawing the pre-emption money from court without permission following the dismissal of their suit, and whether such withdrawal renders the pre-emption decree totally ineffective or results in the dismissal of the suit, notwithstanding the subsequent re-deposit of the amount upon the revival of the suit in revision. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contention raised by the petitioner—that the withdrawal of the pre-emption money without the court's permission distinguishes this case from precedents permitting such withdrawal and results in the loss of the pre-emption right—requires detailed consideration. The key principle noted is that the propriety and legal consequences of withdrawing pre-emption money without express judicial permission warrant a full review by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the withdrawal of pre-emption money without the permission of the court after the dismissal of a pre-emption suit render the decree totally ineffective?
  • Whether withdrawal of the pre-emption amount defeats the pre-emptor's claim on technical grounds when the amount is subsequently re-deposited after the success of a revision petition?
  • Can a pre-emptor maintain a decree for possession after withdrawing the pre-emption deposit without prior judicial sanction?
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• Fazal Hussain And Another vs Suleman Khan And Another1991 SCMR 56 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-03
  Murder convictionTheftJudicial confessionCircumstantial evidenceRecovery of stolen propertyLast seen evidenceDeath sentenceMitigating circumstancesMinority plea
  Summary & questions settled

  This order disposed of two petitions: one by the complainant for enhancement of compensation and another by the convict against his conviction for murder and theft. The core legal question was whether the conviction, based on a judicial confession and other circumstantial evidence, should be upheld, and if the death sentence should be commuted due to the convict's alleged young age. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and sentence, finding sufficient material to connect the accused to the crime, including a judicial confession, recovery of stolen goods, false identity, recovery of the weapon, and last seen evidence. The Court held that the mere youth of an accused is not a sufficient mitigating circumstance to avoid the normal penalty of death, especially when the accused's mens rea, betrayal of trust, and mature understanding of the crime are evident. Consequently, both petitions were dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder and theft be sustained based on a judicial confession, recovery of stolen goods, false identity, weapon recovery, and last seen evidence?
  • Is the mere youth of an accused a sufficient ground for awarding a lesser punishment than the normal penalty of death for murder?
  • Does a plea of minority, raised for the first time at a later stage and supported by a post-offence birth register entry, have evidentiary value?
  • Can mens rea be inferred from an accused's actions such as disclosing a wrong name and betraying trust?
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• Fazal and 7 others vs Allah Ditta and 3 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 1010 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-12
  Malkan-e-DehmueensWajabularzRewaj-e-Aamevictionadverse possessioncivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a civil dispute concerning the possession of a Haveli in village Jamalpur, Tehsil Nankana. The respondents, identified as 'Malkan-e-Deh' (village owners), sought a declaration of ownership and eviction of the appellants, who were 'mueens' (village helpers) in long-standing occupation. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the Additional District Judge decreed it, and the High Court maintained this decision in revision. Leave to appeal was granted to determine whether the 'Malkan-e-Deh' could legally evict the appellants, considering the entries in the 'Wajabularz' and 'Rewaj-e-Aam'. During the proceedings, the appellants failed to advance arguments on the specific point for which leave was granted, instead attempting to re-argue ownership and adverse possession, which were rejected. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on merits. However, the Court facilitated a settlement where the respondents voluntarily permitted the appellants to retain possession as licensees, subject to specific conditions regarding continued occupation and construction. The Court commended this resolution as an act of grace and Islamic brotherhood, disposing of the matter accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Can Malkan-e-Deh evict village mueens from a Haveli based on entries in the Wajabularz and Rewaj-e-Aam?
  • Does the failure to argue the specific point for which leave to appeal was granted warrant the dismissal of the appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Fateh Muhammad vs Abdul Ghafoor And Other1991 SCMR 1310 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-09-04
  pre-emptioncollateral relationshipadmissibility of evidencepedigree tableleave to appealoral evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's regular second appeal regarding a pre-emption suit. The petitioner, a vendee, had purchased land in 1970, which was subsequently pre-empted by two rival claimants on the basis of being collaterals of the vendor. The trial court decreed the suits in favour of the respondents, and the appellate courts affirmed these decisions. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the oral evidence presented to establish the relationship between the vendor and the pre-emptors was admissible and sufficient under the law, specifically regarding the requirement to express the special source of knowledge for such testimony. The petitioner contended that the pedigree tables relied upon were incomplete and failed to prove the requisite relationship. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the points raised regarding the admissibility and sufficiency of evidence required further consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the lower courts' findings suffered from legal infirmities regarding the proof of collateral relationship.

  Questions settled

  • Is oral evidence regarding a relationship between a vendor and a pre-emptor admissible without the witness expressing their special source of knowledge under the Evidence Act 1872?
  • Does the failure to connect pedigree tables constitute a failure to prove a collateral relationship in a pre-emption suit?
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• Fateh Muhammad And Others vs Naziran Bibi And Other1991 SCMR 207 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-01
  pre-emptioncourt-fee deficiencydismissal of appealprocedural fairnessopportunity to rectifyregular second appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerns a dispute between rival pre-emptors regarding the dismissal of a Regular Second Appeal by the High Court due to a deficiency in court-fee. The appellants' suit was initially decreed, but the first appellate court set aside this decree on merits. Subsequently, the High Court dismissed the appellants' Second Appeal solely because of an admitted deficiency in the court-fee, without addressing the merits of the case. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in dismissing the appeal without affording the appellants an opportunity to rectify the court-fee deficiency. Relying on the principle established in the case of Siddique Khan (PLD 1984 SC 289), the Supreme Court held that the High Court should have provided the appellants at least one opportunity to make up the deficiency before applying punitive measures. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case for a decision on the merits, deeming the Second Appeal as pending.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appellate court required to grant an opportunity to make up a court-fee deficiency before dismissing an appeal?
  • Can an appeal be dismissed solely on the ground of deficient court-fee without first allowing the appellant to rectify the defect?
  • Does the failure to provide an opportunity to rectify court-fee deficiency warrant the setting aside of an appellate dismissal order?
  Read full judgment →
• Fateh Khan vs Boze Mir1991 PLD Supreme Court 782 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-29
  pre-emption suitpurchase money depositexecution of decreelimitationinterpretation of statutesact of courtcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a pre-emption suit where the trial court decreed the suit ex parte and directed the appellant to deposit the remaining purchase money 'before 20-4-1983'. The appellant deposited the amount on 20-4-1983. The executing court rejected the execution application on the ground that the deposit was made out of time, a decision ultimately upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether, under Order XX, Rule 14(1) of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.), a court has the option to direct the deposit of purchase money either 'on' or 'before' a specified date, or whether 'on or before' must be treated as a composite, mandatory phrase. The Supreme Court held that 'on or before' is an integrated, composite phrase that must be used jointly to give the debtor the option of paying on the final day or earlier. Since the trial court failed to specify the date in accordance with this mandatory rule, the successful pre-emptor could not be penalized for an act of the court. The appeal was allowed, and the execution was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the phrase 'on or before' in Order XX, Rule 14(1) of the Civil Procedure Code is a composite phrase or can be used disjunctively by a court?
  • Does a trial court have the discretion under Order XX, Rule 14(1)(a) of the C.P.C. to direct a pre-emptor to deposit purchase money strictly 'before' a specified date to the exclusion of 'on' that date?
  • Can a successful pre-emptor's suit be dismissed for late deposit if the trial court's deposit order failed to comply with the mandatory terminology of Order XX, Rule 14(1)(a) of the C.P.C.?
  Read full judgment →
• Farzand Ali And Another vs Muhammad Yasin And Other1991 SCMR 1540 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-14
  leave to appeallandlord and tenantevictionurban rent restrictionjoint property
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court setting aside an eviction order passed against respondent No. 1 under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. The petitioners sought the eviction of respondent No. 1 from a part of House No. 3/2 on the ground of default in rent. The Rent Controller dismissed the application, holding no landlord-tenant relationship existed, but the Additional District Judge reversed this finding and ordered eviction. The High Court accepted respondent No. 1's writ petition, reasoning that a prior civil court statement regarding joint possession of an adjacent plot barred the eviction proceedings. The core legal question was whether the civil court arrangement regarding the adjacent plot precluded eviction from the disputed house. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that as the parties had confused the boundaries of the separate properties and treated them as one, the High Court ought to have directed them to the Civil Court for final determination of title and possession.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an agreement regarding joint possession of an open plot in a civil suit bars eviction proceedings concerning a separately allotted house?
  • Should the High Court direct parties to a Civil Court for final determination when boundaries and identities of contiguous properties are confused?
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• Farid Khan And Another vs Jabbar Khan Through Legal Heirs; And Other1991 SCMR 309 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-13
  leave to appealinheritance disputeburden of proofmutationwithholding of documents
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had allowed a revision petition and restored the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' suit regarding inheritance. The core legal question concerns whether the plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest, Waris Khan, was a full brother or a consanguine brother of the deceased Sargand Khan, and thereby entitled to a share in the estate. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proof to establish that Waris Khan was a full brother, and further noted that the petition was improperly documented due to the withholding of important documents (Ex.D-2 and Ex.D-3) referred to by the lower courts. The principle laid down is that a petition for leave to appeal must be properly documented with all relevant exhibits, and failure to provide necessary documents can result in the dismissal of the petition, alongside the affirmation of findings on the burden of proof in inheritance disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the plaintiffs discharged the burden of proof to establish that their predecessor-in-interest was a full brother of the deceased?
  • What is the consequence of failing to provide important documents and exhibits in a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Whether a consanguine brother is entitled to share in the property of the deceased alongside a full brother under the applicable inheritance rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Faqir Muhammad and others vs Mst. Muhammad Bibi and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 590 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-26
  pre-emption suitforgeryplaintprocedural irregularityOrder VI Rule 14 CPCimpersonationclean hands doctrineratification of illegal acts
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the plaintiff’s plaint and Vakalatnama were found to contain forged thumb-impressions rather than those of the plaintiff. The trial court and the first appellate court dismissed the suit, finding that the plaint was not properly instituted. The Lahore High Court, however, set aside these findings, treating the non-signing of the documents as a curable procedural irregularity under Order VI, Rule 14, C.P.C. The Supreme Court of Pakistan reversed the High Court’s judgment. The Court held that while Order VI, Rule 14 permits the curing of defects arising from bona fide oversight or inadvertence, it does not extend to cases involving forgery, impersonation, or mala fide conduct. The ratio established is that courts of law exist to assist litigants approaching with clean hands; therefore, where pleadings are forged, the defect is not a mere irregularity but a fundamental illegality that cannot be ratified or cured. Consequently, the Court dismissed the suit, emphasizing that judicial indulgence is unavailable to parties guilty of fraudulent acts.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaint bearing forged signatures or thumb-impressions be cured under Order VI, Rule 14, C.P.C.?
  • Does the doctrine of curing procedural irregularities apply to pleadings involving forgery or mala fide conduct?
  • Can an illegal act, such as the forgery of a Vakalatnama, be ratified by the court?
  • Is a suit maintainable if the plaint and Vakalatnama are not signed or thumb-impressed by the plaintiff?
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• Faqir Gul vs Chief Engineer And Other1991 SCMR 1804 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-14
  service appeallimitation periodtermination of servicetime-barredFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed in limine the petitioner's appeal against his termination from service as a Lineman-II. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner's appeal, filed nearly a decade after the termination order, was maintainable given the significant delay. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to file the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation of two months. Consequently, the Court affirmed the decision of the Federal Service Tribunal, ruling that the termination order was not subject to departmental appeal or challenge before the Tribunal after the expiry of nine years. The key principle laid down is that service appeals must be filed within the statutory period of limitation, and an inordinate delay of nine years renders such an appeal time-barred and non-maintainable. The petition was dismissed as not being a fit case for further consideration.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appeal against a termination order maintainable if filed nine years after the order was passed?
  • What is the prescribed period of limitation for filing an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal?
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• Falak Sher vs The Additional District Judge, Faisalabad And Other1991 SCMR 1882 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-10
  rent matterconcurrent findingsconstitutional jurisdictionwrit petitionagreement to sellleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition in limine, upholding the concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge directing the petitioner to vacate the demised premises and deposit the mortgage money. The core legal question concerns the scope of interference by a High Court in writ jurisdiction regarding concurrent findings of fact rendered by competent rent tribunals. The Supreme Court held that concurrent findings of fact recorded by competent tribunals regarding the non-existence of an agreement to sell cannot be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction in the absence of any illegality, jurisdictional error, misreading, non-reading of evidence, or disregard of superior court principles. The petition was accordingly dismissed as devoid of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact recorded by rent tribunals can be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does an agreement to sell oust the jurisdiction of a Rent Controller when lower tribunals find no such agreement exists?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable against the dismissal of a constitutional petition where no legal error is shown?
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• Faiz Ahmad vs Deputy Postmaster General, Lahore And Other1991 SCMR 368 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-18
  service tribunalremoval from servicedepartmental inquirymisconductleave to appealpostal department
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing the petitioner's appeal against his removal from service as a postman in the Postal Department for withholding money order payments. The core legal question raised was whether the Tribunal erred by limiting its examination to procedural irregularities in the departmental inquiry rather than reviewing the proof of the charge. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the contention was based on wrong premises because the Tribunal had in fact perused the record and concurred with the inquiry findings regarding the petitioner's misconduct. The key principle laid down is that where a service tribunal examines the record and concurs with factual findings of misconduct, a petition for leave to appeal raising unsubstantiated claims of limited review has no merits and will be refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Service Tribunal is required to examine whether a departmental charge was proved rather than only looking for procedural irregularities?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted against the dismissal of a service appeal where the Tribunal has concurred with the finding of misconduct based on the record?
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• Faiz Ahmad And 16 Others vs Muhammad Sharif Khan And 8 Other1991 SCMR 689 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-12-06
  revisional jurisdictionBoard of RevenueCommissionerrevenue courtstenancy lawhierarchy of courtssuo motu powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter addresses leave to appeal granted to examine the correct interpretation of section 56 of the N.-W.F.P. Tenancy Act, 1950, specifically whether it bars a revision by the Board of Revenue where the Commissioner has already exercised revisional powers. The core legal question involves the nature and extent of the revisional powers possessed concurrently by the Board of Revenue and the Commissioner under the Act, and whether the exercise of jurisdiction by one exhausts the remedy to bar the other. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in applying analogies from section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, finding instead that the revisional powers of the Board of Revenue and the Commissioner under section 56 are concurrent but not co-extensive in a manner that excludes the Board of Revenue from examining orders passed by the Commissioner. The Court laid down the principle that the Board of Revenue retains its overarching supervisory and revisional jurisdiction over subordinate authorities, including the Commissioner, in line with the hierarchical structure established by the Tenancy Act.

  Questions settled

  • Whether section 56 of the N.-W.F.P. Tenancy Act, 1950 bars a revision petition before the Board of Revenue once the Commissioner has exercised revisional powers?
  • Are the revisional powers of the Board of Revenue and the Commissioner under the N.-W.F.P. Tenancy Act, 1950 co-extensive so as to exclude the jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue over orders passed by the Commissioner?
  • Can limitations from section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be imported into the interpretation of revisional powers under the N.-W.F.P. Tenancy Act, 1950?
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• Faheemuddin vs Sabeeha Begum and another1991 PLD Supreme Court 1074 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-10
  polygamyMuslim Family Lawsaggrieved personlocus standicriminal complaintquashment of proceedingsArbitration Council
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the dismissal of a petition under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 by the Lahore High Court, wherein the appellant challenged criminal proceedings initiated against him under section 6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 for contracting a second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage without obtaining prior permission from the Arbitration Council. The core legal question was whether the second wife has the locus standi to file a criminal complaint as an "aggrieved party" under the Ordinance, given that such legislation is typically intended to protect the rights of the first wife. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the second wife qualifies as an aggrieved person and a party competent to file the complaint, as she suffers direct legal, social, and emotional grievances from the husband's failure to obtain statutory permission. The key principles laid down are that the connotation of "aggrieved person" in matrimonial and penal contexts must be interpreted expansively rather than restrictively, and that a second wife is directly affected by the criminal omission of the husband.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the second wife has the locus standi to file a criminal complaint against her husband for contracting a polygamous marriage without permission under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961?
  • Can a second wife be considered an aggrieved person within the meaning of section 6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961?
  • Does the term "party" in Rule 21 of the rules framed under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 restrict the right of complaint exclusively to parties who participated in prior proceedings before the Arbitration Council?
  • What is the proper legal interpretation of the word "aggrieved" in the context of matrimonial offenses and special penal statutes?
  Read full judgment →
• Emmanual Ojagar And Others vs Miss Rozina Mall1991 SCMR 1863 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-13
  possessionallotmenttrespasserlicenseecivil litigationtitle declarationrecovery of possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which affirmed a decree for possession of a residential property in favour of the respondent, Miss Rozina Mall. The petitioner had previously engaged in multiple rounds of unsuccessful litigation, including a failed suit for declaration of title and a failed suit for perpetual injunction, both of which established that the petitioner lacked legal title to the property. In the third round of litigation, the respondent sought recovery of possession, asserting that the petitioner occupied the property as her licensee. The trial court decreed the suit in her favour, a decision upheld by the appellate court and the High Court. The Supreme Court examined whether the respondent, as an allottee of the house, possessed sufficient title to maintain an action for possession. The Court held that the allotment created a clear right in the property, allowing the allottee to maintain an action for possession against an unauthorised occupant. Consequently, the Court found the petitioner to be a trespasser without legal right to possession and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does an allotment of property create sufficient title for an allottee to maintain an action for possession against an unauthorised occupant?
  • Can a person who has previously failed to establish title to a property in earlier litigation continue to claim a right to retain possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Eid Muhammad And Another vs The State1991 SCMR 1422 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-13
  death sentencecommutation of sentencepresidential amnestymurdercriminal appealbenefit of section 382-B
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction and death sentence of the petitioners under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Shamas Khan, along with compensation orders under section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioners' death sentence should be maintained or altered in light of executive clemency. The Supreme Court held that in view of the amnesty ordered by the President, the sentence of death imposed upon the petitioners must be converted to imprisonment for life, with liberty to apply for revival of the petitions on merits if the amnesty order is set aside. The Court laid down the principle that presidential amnesty warrants the commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment while preserving the right to seek disposal on merits if the amnesty is subsequently revoked, along with the statutory benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • How does a presidential amnesty affect a death sentence imposed under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Are petitioners entitled to the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when their death sentence is converted to life imprisonment?
  • What recourse is available to convicted persons if an executive amnesty order is subsequently set aside?
  Read full judgment →
• Ehsan Ul Haq vs Shahnaz Begum And Other1991 SCMR 362 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-13
  family courtmaintenance allowanceinstalment paymentfinancial hardshipsupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging the concurrent findings of the Family Courts regarding the fixation of maintenance. The core legal question concerns the propriety of the maintenance allowance awarded to the respondent and the mode of its payment considering the financial standing of the petitioner. The Supreme Court held that no good ground existed to interfere with the quantum of maintenance fixed at Rs. 1,000 per month by the Family Courts. However, taking into consideration the straitened financial circumstances of the petitioner, the court modified the manner of payment, permitting him to pay the outstanding balance in seventeen equal monthly instalments subject to strict default conditions. The key principle laid down is that while appellate or revisional courts will not ordinarily interfere with concurrent factual determinations regarding maintenance amounts without valid cause, equitable relief in the schedule of payment may be granted to a judgment debtor facing proven financial hardship, coupled with default clauses to protect the decree-holder's rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of Family Courts regarding the fixation of maintenance without good ground?
  • Can a petitioner be allowed to pay maintenance arrears in instalments in view of straitened circumstances?
  Read full judgment →
• E. in C, G.H.Q., Rawalpindi vs Muhammad Ashraf Bajwa1991 SCMR 1653 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-07
  government servantunauthorized absenceleave extensiondisciplinary actionservice tribunalreinstatementmedical leave
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the E. in C., G.H.Q., Rawalpindi against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had reinstated a government servant (a Superintendent in the M.E.S.) who was removed from service following an extended absence. The respondent claimed he was absent due to illness (Tuberculosis) and had submitted medical certificates for leave extensions, though he was subsequently informed of his removal from service. The core legal question identified by the Supreme Court is whether a government servant who fails to formally apply for an extension of leave after the expiry of sanctioned leave, and who remains continuously absent from duty, is subject to departmental disciplinary action. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine this issue further, noting that the question requires detailed consideration. Consequently, the Court stayed the implementation of the Federal Service Tribunal's order pending the final outcome of the appeal, while allowing the parties to submit additional documents.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government servant who fails to apply for an extension of leave after the expiry of sanctioned leave and remains absent be subject to departmental disciplinary action?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Zulfiqar Haider vs Riaz Mahmud1991 SCMR 1298 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-29
  specific performanceoral agreementleave to appealsale of landdecree modificationcontract enforcement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal arising from a dispute over the specific performance of an oral agreement for the sale of a plot of land. The petitioner agreed to sell a property to the respondent, but subsequently sold a portion of the land to a third party, Faheem-ul-Islam, prior to the initiation of the suit. The trial court decreed the specific performance of the agreement, and the High Court modified this decree, maintaining it only for the remaining portion of the land not sold to the third party. The respondent did not challenge the sale to the third party, which attained finality. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the original agreement for sale remains intact and capable of specific performance despite the inconsistent decree resulting from the partial sale of the property. The Court granted leave to appeal to examine the viability of the specific performance decree under these circumstances and ordered a stay of execution regarding the remaining land pending the final decision of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can an oral agreement for the sale of land be specifically performed if a portion of the property has already been sold to a third party?
  • Does the partial sale of property subject to an agreement for sale render the original agreement incapable of specific performance?
  • Is a decree for specific performance maintainable when it is inconsistent with the actual availability of the property due to a prior third-party transfer?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Syed Anwar Ali Shah vs Government of N. W.F.P. Through Chief1991 SCMR 770 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-13
  service matterpromotionseniorityretrospective promotionsupersessionleave to appealservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding his promotion and seniority. The petitioner, an Assistant Professor, contended that he became eligible for promotion to BS-19 in 1981, but his promotion was delayed while juniors were promoted. He argued that he was entitled to retrospective promotion effective from 1981, citing the precedent of a colleague, Dr. Muhammad Hanif Qureshi, who was granted such relief. The petitioner alleged that the failure to grant him retrospective promotion resulted in his supersession by junior officers. The core legal question before the Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to retrospective promotion to rectify the alleged supersession and ensure parity with similarly situated colleagues. Upon reviewing the contentions, the Supreme Court held that the case warranted further consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, determining that the issues raised regarding seniority and the timing of promotion required a deeper examination of the departmental actions and the principles of service law governing such promotions.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil servant entitled to retrospective promotion when a junior officer has been promoted earlier?
  • Does the failure to consider a senior officer for promotion while promoting juniors constitute grounds for judicial review of service matters?
  • Can a service tribunal's order denying retrospective promotion be challenged on the basis of discriminatory treatment compared to other employees?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Sabir Zameer Siddiqui vs Mian Abdul Malik and 4 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 226 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-21
  service lawseniority disputead hoc appointmentvested rightsService Tribunal jurisdictionretrospective regularizationcivil servantPunjab Service Tribunals Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This service appeal concerns a seniority dispute between government employees. The primary legal questions addressed were whether departmental comments submitted in a High Court writ petition constitute a final order enabling Service Tribunal jurisdiction, and whether the retrospective regularization of ad hoc appointments can lawfully prejudice the vested seniority rights of other civil servants. The Supreme Court held that the departmental comments, having been treated as a final order by the High Court, permitted the appellant to approach the Service Tribunal. The Court ruled that seniority is a vested right in Punjab that cannot be overridden by the Governor except in accordance with law. Consequently, the retrospective regularization of respondent No. 1’s appointment, which adversely affected the appellant's seniority, was declared without lawful authority. Additionally, the Court found that seniority determinations based on erroneous interpretations of service rules and non-existent transfer provisions were invalid. The appeal was allowed in part, granting the appellant seniority over respondents 1, 2, and 4, while upholding the position regarding respondent 3 based on established selection principles.

  Questions settled

  • Can departmental comments submitted in a High Court writ petition be treated as a final order for the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of a Service Tribunal?
  • Does the Governor have the authority to regularize an ad hoc appointment from a retrospective date if such action adversely affects the vested seniority rights of other civil servants?
  • Does the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974, mandate the abatement of pending civil suits concerning terms and conditions of service?
  • Is seniority a vested right that cannot be overridden by the Governor except in accordance with the law?
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• Dr. Sabir Zameer Siddiqui vs Mian Abdul Malik And 4 Other1991 SCMR 1130 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-20
  senioritydirect recruitsPublic Service Commissionolder-in-age principlereview petitionservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for review regarding the determination of seniority between two direct recruits selected through the Public Service Commission. The petitioner contended that his seniority should not be adversely affected by a delay in assuming charge, which was attributable to the department, and argued that the 'older-in-age' principle should be applied to resolve the seniority dispute. The Supreme Court examined the established principles governing seniority for direct recruits. The Court held that when candidates are selected through the Public Service Commission, their merit position assigned by the Commission determines seniority, regardless of the date they assume charge. The Court further clarified that the 'older-in-age' formula is not a primary rule of seniority but is only applicable as a tie-breaker when two candidates assume charge on the same date. Finding no merit in the petitioner's submissions regarding the misapplication of these principles, the Court dismissed the review petition, affirming that the established merit-based seniority criteria must prevail over the petitioner's proposed alternatives.

  Questions settled

  • Does the date of assuming charge determine seniority for direct recruits selected through the Public Service Commission?
  • When is the 'older-in-age' formula applicable for determining seniority between two direct recruits?
  • Does a delay in assuming charge caused by the department entitle a recruit to seniority based on merit position regardless of the date of joining?
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• Dr. Muhammad Akhtar vs The Secretary, Government of N. W.F.P., Health and Social Welfare Department, Peshawar And Other1991 SCMR 23 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-11
  service lawad hoc appointmentregularizationreversioncivil servantN.W.F.P. Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Medical Officer in the Health Department of the Government of N.W.F.P., challenged his reversion from the post of Senior Registrar (BPS-18) to Medical Officer (BPS-17). Initially appointed as Senior Registrar on an ad hoc basis, the petitioner claimed that the enactment of the N.-W.F.P. Act No. I of 1988 regularized his appointment to the post of Senior Registrar (BPS-18) effective from January 23, 1988. Despite this, while on deputation abroad, the government issued an order reverting him to his previous rank and appointing another doctor in his place. His departmental appeal and subsequent appeal before the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal were dismissed. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the provisions of the N.-W.F.P. Act No. I of 1988 conferred regular status upon the petitioner, thereby rendering his subsequent reversion illegal, void, and ultra vires. The Court found the matter fit for further examination and granted leave to appeal, allowing the parties to proceed on the existing record with the option to file additional documents.

  Questions settled

  • Does the N.-W.F.P. Act No. I of 1988 confer regular status upon an ad hoc appointee holding a post on the date of its enactment?
  • Can a civil servant who has been regularized under the N.-W.F.P. Act No. I of 1988 be lawfully reverted to a lower grade without specific legal justification?
  • Whether an order of reversion issued after the regularization of a post under the N.-W.F.P. Act No. I of 1988 is ultra vires.
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• Dr. Ghulam Hussain And 6 Others vs Qazi Rehmatullah And Another1991 SCMR 1267 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-10-07
  criminal complaintsanction for prosecutionscheduled offencespecial court jurisdictiontrial courtPakistan Penal Code
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a criminal complaint involving charges under sections 302, 307, 436, 219, 218, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The primary legal question concerned whether the appellants, who were not public servants, required prior sanction for prosecution, and whether the inclusion of an offence under Section 436, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, necessitated the transfer of the case to a Special Court under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975. Following the precedent set in a connected appeal arising from the same facts, the Supreme Court held that since the appellants were not public servants, no prior sanction for prosecution was required. Regarding jurisdiction, the Court observed that while Section 436, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, is a scheduled offence triable by a Special Court, the presence of other charges, specifically Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, maintained the jurisdiction of the Court of Session. The Court dismissed the appeal, directing the appellants to move the trial court regarding the specific charge under Section 436, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while the trial proceeds on other charges.

  Questions settled

  • Is prior sanction for prosecution required for accused persons who are not public servants?
  • Does the inclusion of a scheduled offence under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act 1975 automatically oust the jurisdiction of the Court of Session when other non-scheduled offences are also charged?
  • Can a trial court proceed with a case involving both scheduled and non-scheduled offences?
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• Dr. Farooq Hamid And Others vs Kaka Muhammad Khan And 6 Other1991 SCMR 1235 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-07
  compromiselandlord and tenantreconstructioncontempt of courtcivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from civil appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning a landlord-tenant dispute over commercial premises. The core legal question involved the lawful resolution of the eviction and reconstruction dispute through a mutually agreed compromise between the parties. The Supreme Court of Pakistan accepted the written compromise agreement filed by the parties, disposing of the appeals in terms of the settlement. The court held that the parties must strictly adhere to the agreed conditions, which permitted the landlord to reconstruct the building subject to the tenants retaining their right of occupation in the newly constructed shops, with rent to be subsequently determined by the Rent Controller. The key principle laid down is that appellate courts may dispose of matters in accordance with lawful compromises reached between contesting litigants, and that breach of solemn undertakings given to the court pursuant to such settlements constitutes contempt of court.

  Questions settled

  • Can appellate proceedings be disposed of in terms of a written compromise reached between landlords and tenants?
  • Whether breach of an undertaking given to the court pursuant to a settlement terms amounts to contempt of court?
  • How is the rent of newly-reconstructed premises determined when parties agree to such terms in a compromise?
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• Dr. Abdur Rauf And Other, Major (Retd.) Mufti Nazar Muhammad And Other vs Sh. Muhammad Iqbal And Other Government of the Punjab And Other1991 SCMR 483 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-05
  town planning schemerelaxation of building prohibitionlocus standiopen space reservationwrit petitionCity of Lahore Corporation Act 1941leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This common order disposes of two petitions for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that invalidated orders of the Government of Punjab. The provincial government had granted relaxed sanction to convert permanently prohibited green open spaces into residential plots within private town planning schemes approved under Section 260 of the City of Lahore Corporation Act, 1941. Private plot purchasers successfully challenged the relaxation orders via writ petitions. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that private respondents lacked locus standi and that the underlying land remained private property. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's judgment, holding that proper statutory procedure for altering an approved scheme was not followed and jurisdictional requirements were not met. Relying on precedent, the Court affirmed that plot owners possessing a personal interest in the performance of a statutory duty have sufficient locus standi to file a writ petition. Further, while ownership of open space is not automatically divested from the scheme's framer, permanent building prohibitions under an approved statutory scheme cannot be arbitrarily removed. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does a purchaser of a residential plot in an approved town planning scheme have locus standi to challenge a government order relaxing statutory building prohibitions on reserved open spaces?
  • Can the government dispense with or remove permanent building prohibitions under an approved town planning scheme without following the prescribed statutory procedure?
  • Does the approval of a town planning scheme prohibiting building operations on green open spaces automatically divest the original landowner of ownership of that land?
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• Dr. Abdul Raziq vs Mr. Mubeenul Haq Khan And Other1991 SCMR 1527 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-11
  leave to appealevictionpersonal bona fide requirementlandlord and tenantrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the order of the Baluchistan High Court upholding the eviction of the petitioner from the disputed premises on the grounds of personal bona fide requirement and subletting. The core legal question concerns whether a landlord's plea of personal bona fide requirement is negated or rendered lacking in bona fide merely because the eviction application was filed prior to the landlord shifting to the city where the premises are located. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a landlord seeking eviction on the ground of personal requirement is not expected to sit idle and their bona fide need is not affected by being away or filing the application prior to relocating. The key principle laid down is that prior filing of an eviction application before physical relocation does not invalidate the landlord's claim of personal bona fide requirement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether filing an eviction application prior to shifting to the city proves a lack of bona fide personal requirement?
  • Does a landlord's absence or engagement in gainful occupation elsewhere affect their claim of personal bona fide requirement for a rented premises?
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• Dr. Abdul Hafeez vs Province of Punjab through the Secretary Education, Lahore and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 165 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-11
  first appealdismissal in liminesummoning of recordrent restrictioncantonment rentprocedural requirementremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the summary dismissal of a first appeal by a Single Judge of the Lahore High Court without summoning the lower court's record. The High Court had held that a prima facie case must first be established before summoning the record and hearing the respondents under Section 24(3) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act 1963. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether a first appeal preferred under the said provision could be disposed of in limine without summoning or examining the record. The Court held that the plain language of Section 24(3) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act 1963, as amended by Ordinance IX of 1985, mandates that the High Court make an appropriate order only after perusing the record and giving the parties an opportunity of being heard. Drawing a parallel with similar provisions in the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959, the Court ruled that the duty to call for the record is imperative, and a first appeal cannot be dismissed in limine. The appeal was allowed, and the case was remanded.

  Questions settled

  • Can a first appeal preferred under Section 24(3) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act 1963 be summarily dismissed without summoning or examining the record of the case?
  • Whether the requirement to peruse the record and hear the parties under Section 24(3) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act 1963 is directory or mandatory?
  • Does the appellate authority under rent restriction laws have the power to dismiss a first appeal in limine without calling for the record from the Controller?
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• Dost Muhammad vs Member, Board of Revenue (Settlement and Rehabilitation Wing) And Other1991 SCMR 84 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-25
  leave to appealproperty transferlachesevictiontenant attornmentsettlement and rehabilitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, whereby the petitioner challenged the transfer of certain shops and houses through a P.T.O. and P.T.D. issued in favour of the respondents' predecessor-in-interest. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner could belatedly challenge the transfer documents decades after their issuance and after having previously attorned as a tenant to another party. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner was guilty of gross negligence and delay in prosecuting his claim, having failed to challenge the transfer from 1959 until 1984, and that his belated attempts were merely designed to forestall an eviction decree passed against him. The key principle laid down is that gross laches, negligence, and acquiescence—such as attorning as a tenant—disentitle a party from seeking discretionary relief against long-standing property transfers.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge a property transfer order and permanent transfer deed decades after their issuance?
  • Does attorning as a tenant to another party preclude a person from subsequently claiming ownership of the same property?
  • Will a belated attempt to secure property transfer be entertained when it is initiated merely to forestall an eviction decree?
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• Dost Muhammad vs Babar Munir1991 SCMR 415 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-20
  leave to appealevictionbona fide personal needlandlord and tenantCantonment Rent Controllerprovisional transfer order
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a tenant of a shop situated in the Cantonment area of Rawalpindi, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding his eviction order passed by the Cantonment Rent Controller on the ground of bona fide personal need of the respondent landlord. The core legal questions involved whether pending litigation regarding the property's transfer under rehabilitation laws bars eviction proceedings, and whether the withdrawal of a prior eviction petition by the landlord's predecessor disables the current landlord from seeking ejectment. The Supreme Court held that the existence of a provisional transfer order (P.T.O.) establishes the statutory landlord-tenant relationship independently of ongoing title disputes, and that the predecessor's withdrawal of a prior petition does not estop the current owner from proving his own independent personal need. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly refused, while granting the tenant three months to vacate upon conditions of regular rent payment and peaceful surrender.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pendency of a challenge regarding the transfer of property under rehabilitation laws bar eviction proceedings by a provisional transferee?
  • Whether the withdrawal of a prior eviction petition by a predecessor-in-interest inhibits the right of a subsequent transferee to seek ejectment on the ground of personal need?
  • When does the entitlement of a transferee under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act arise to establish a statutory relationship with the tenant?
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• Dinar Wali Khan And Others vs Rehman Deyar And Other1991 SCMR 1660 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-26
  leave to appealwrit jurisdictionland disputeownership claimChitral
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal concerning a dispute over the ownership of land in the erstwhile State of Chitral, where both parties claimed ownership declarations. An Additional Deputy Commissioner had declared the land State property in 1975, while the Federal Land Commission later found in favour of one set of petitioners for half the property, a decision that remained largely unaltered upon review by the Chairman, Tribunal Land Disputes Swat and Chitral. A subsequent writ petition in the High Court was dismissed, but the Division Bench additionally held that the relief granted to the opposing petitioners was unjustified, prompting cross-petitions for leave to appeal. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court is whether the High Court could, in its writ jurisdiction, deprive a party of the advantage gained from lower forums. The Court granted leave to appeal in both petitions to examine this and other raised questions, requiring security of Rs.5,000 in each case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can in its writ jurisdiction deprive a party of the advantage gained from lower forums?
  • Can ownership claims regarding land in the erstwhile State of Chitral be adjudicated through constitutional petitions?
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• Din Muhammad vs Eidu1991 SCMR 1787 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-28
  mortgage deedconditional salefraudulent contractcivil revisionland disputeappellate findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order dismissing a civil revision. The dispute concerned a land transaction involving 49 Kanals 6 Marlas of land, where the petitioner claimed ownership based on a document he characterized as a mortgage deed with conditional sale, while the respondent contended it was merely a simple mortgage. The core legal question was whether the transaction was valid or vitiated by fraud. The trial court initially decreed the suit in favor of the petitioner, but the appellate court reversed this decision, finding the transaction was a simple mortgage and that fraud had been committed against the respondent. The Supreme Court upheld the lower appellate court's findings, noting that the petitioner's own witnesses failed to support the claim of a settled bargain and that the consideration amount was disproportionately low compared to the property's actual value. The Court held that a contract based on fraud cannot be enforced or upheld, thereby dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court enforce a contract that is found to be based on fraud?
  • Does a finding of fact regarding fraud by lower courts warrant interference in civil revision?
  • Is a transaction involving a significantly undervalued property subject to scrutiny for fraud?
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• Din Muhammad vs Additional Commissioner, Quetta Division, Quetta1991 SCMR 810 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-04
  building plan approvaldemolition of wallprivate land vs public roadmunicipal appellate authoritydisputed question of factjurisdiction of civil courtconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arose from a judgment of the Baluchistan High Court concerning a dispute over a boundary wall separating Ram Bagh Colony from a street leading to Stewart Road in Quetta. The factory owners (respondents) secured a revised building plan to open a gate onto Ram Bagh Road, which was opposed by the appellant, leading the Municipal Administrator to prohibit breaking the wall. On statutory appeal, the Additional Commissioner ordered the wall's demolition, finding the route necessary for factory access. The High Court dismissed the appellant's constitutional petition, holding that the appellate authority was competent to record a finding of fact regarding whether the road was private or public. The Supreme Court partly disagreed with the High Court's reasoning, holding that the municipal appellate authority, when dealing with building plan approvals, possessed no jurisdiction to conclusively decide disputed questions of title or determine whether a lane was private or public. The Supreme Court upheld the petition's dismissal but clarified that parties must resolve the disputed factual controversy before a competent civil court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a municipal appellate authority dealing with building plan approvals possess the jurisdiction to conclusively determine whether a lane is a private passage or a public road?
  • Can a municipal authority or its appellate forum order the demolition of a private wall to provide access over disputed property?
  • Whether disputed questions of title and status of land as private or public can be conclusively determined in constitutional writ proceedings rather than before a civil court?
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• Dilshad vs Mst. Musarat Nazir and another1991 PLD Supreme Court 779 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-23
  Khuladissolution of marriagereturn of benefitswrit jurisdictiondiscretionary reliefSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a former husband against the affirmation of the dissolution of marriage on the ground of Khula` through writ jurisdiction by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in refusing to order the return of monetary benefits to the petitioner in its writ jurisdiction while upholding the dissolution of marriage. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that where the petitioner failed to insist upon the determination and return of monetary benefits at the proper stage before the lower forums, such relief could not be granted in the highly discretionary writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The Court further noted that initiating a fresh civil suit for the same purpose would be a futile exercise. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused, and the impugned judgment was upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party claim the return of monetary benefits in writ jurisdiction upon the dissolution of marriage through Khula if no such insistence was made at the proper stage below?
  • Whether the High Court is bound to issue directions for the return of benefits while upholding a dissolution of marriage on the ground of Khula in discretionary writ proceedings?
  • Is it appropriate to file a fresh civil suit for the recovery of monetary benefits after failing to seek the same during Khula proceedings?
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