Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Mukhtar and another vs Muhammad Ashraf alias Abdullah1989 SCMR 1468 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-26
  leave to appealinheritanceconcurrent findingsappraisal of evidencecivil revisionfindings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arose out of a suit challenging inheritance claims. The legal representatives of the deceased's sister challenged the claim of the respondent, who asserted he was the son and sole heir of the deceased. The trial court initially decreed the suit upon finding that the deceased had died issueless. However, this finding of fact was reversed on first appeal, which determined that the respondent was indeed the son of the deceased. The High Court subsequently upheld the first appellate court's judgment in its civil revisional jurisdiction. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that discrepancies in the appraisal of evidence warranted setting aside the findings of the two higher courts. The Supreme Court held that there was no justification to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the appellate court and the High Court. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact based on minor discrepancies in the appraisal of evidence?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted against a High Court revisional judgment upholding a first appellate court's finding of fact on inheritance?
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• Muhammad Zubaid and others vs Nathey Khan and others1989 SCMR 1704 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-22
  civil revisionleave to appealres judicataadministration suitinheritance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the plaintiff side against the dismissal of their civil revision by the High Court, which stemmed from a suit for administration involving the right to inherit the property of Faiz Muhammad, who died in 1950. The core legal question concerned whether the suit was barred by previous litigation. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the case stood concluded by concurrent findings of the lower courts that the suit was barred by the principle of res judicata, as supported by the facts regarding the earlier litigation presented by the petitioners' counsel. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused, and a related contempt application, not being pressed, was also dismissed. The key principle laid down is that where a suit is barred by res judicata based on concluded findings of lower courts, leave to appeal against the dismissal of a civil revision will be refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit for administration and inheritance is barred by res judicata in light of earlier litigation?
  • Will leave to appeal be refused when the lower courts concurrently find the suit to be barred by res judicata?
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• Muhammad Zikirya vs Muhammad Raees and another1989 SCMR 1475 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-04
  leave to appealenhancement of sentenceimprisonment for lifemurdermitigating factorstender agemotivecriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the complainant's side seeking the enhancement of the respondent's sentence from imprisonment for life to death in a murder case. The High Court had earlier upheld the respondent's conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and the sentence of life imprisonment, while dismissing the petitioner's criminal revision for enhancement of sentence. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the sentence of death was the more proper punishment based on the circumstances of the case, particularly considering factors such as the convict's tender age at the time of the offence and the prosecution's failure to provide details of the motive at an earlier stage. The Supreme Court held that the approach of the courts below on the question of sentence was neither illegal nor suffered from any error of principle. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that mitigating factors like tender age and lack of clear motive properly weighed in favour of maintaining the sentence of imprisonment for life.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the concurrent sentencing discretion of lower courts when based on mitigating factors like tender age?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to detail the motive at an earlier stage constitute a valid ground for withholding the death penalty?
  • Can a complainant maintain a petition for leave to appeal seeking enhancement of a sentence from life imprisonment to death?
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• Muhammad Zaman vs Mst. Zaitoon Bibi and 16 others1989 SCMR 1857 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-20
  special oathleave to appealcivil suitcompromiseestoppelevidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a defendant against whom a civil suit was decreed throughout based on a special oath administered to the plaintiff-respondent on the petitioner's own offer. The core legal question concerns whether the special oath taken involving a minor child and the Holy Qur'an was repugnant to justice and decency, or affected a third party's rights under the Oaths Act, 1873, and whether such a statement could otherwise be relied upon as material evidence or a settlement. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly distinguished the case from precedents where a third party's rights were adversely affected, and further noted that even if the strict provisions of the Oaths Act did not apply, the statement served as valid material evidence and a binding compromise or estoppel against the retracting party. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal, laying down the principle that an offer and acceptance of a special oath, even outside strict statutory bounds, can bind the parties as an evidentiary settlement or compromise.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a special oath involving a minor child is repugnant to justice and decency so as to invalidate a civil decree?
  • Can a statement made pursuant to a special oath offer be relied upon as material evidence or a compromise when the Oaths Act does not strictly apply?
  • Does an offer to be bound by a special oath create an estoppel against a party seeking to withdraw from it?
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• Muhammad Zaffar vs Province of Sind and others1989 SCMR 214 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-03-22
  student rusticationdisciplinary proceedingsmerit-based admissionstrict construction of penal rulesconstitutional petitionleave to appealadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order that dismissed a constitutional petition challenging a student's two-year rustication. The petitioner, having been denied admission to a medical college despite his merit position, made representations to higher authorities, which the college principal deemed a violation of disciplinary rules. The core legal question is whether such representations constitute a disciplinary violation warranting rustication and whether the penal provisions of the college prospectus, which must be strictly construed, were applicable to the petitioner's conduct. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the High Court failed to address the petitioner's underlying grievance regarding merit-based admission or the applicability of the disciplinary rules to his specific actions. The Court emphasized that penal provisions require strict construction and suspended the rustication order pending the final appeal. The key principle established is that disciplinary action against a student requires a clear nexus between the alleged misconduct and the student's affairs within the institution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a student's representation to higher authorities regarding admission grievances constitutes a violation of disciplinary rules?
  • Are penal provisions in a college prospectus subject to the principle of strict construction?
  • Does a college have the authority to rusticate a student for conduct that lacks a nexus to the affairs of the college?
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• Muhammad Yusuf and another vs Saeed Akhtar and another1989 SCMR 331 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-01
  specific performancesecond appealconcurrent findings of factleave to appealpre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a specific performance case where the petitioners sought to challenge the dismissal of their regular second appeal by the High Court. The trial court had rejected the petitioners' claim for specific performance in favor of a bona fide second vendee, and these concurrent findings of fact were affirmed by the District Judge and subsequently upheld by the High Court. The core legal question concerns whether interference with concurrent findings of fact is warranted in a second appeal, and whether an alternative plea of pre-emption could be sustained. The Supreme Court held that no infirmity existed in the concurrent findings of fact rendered by the lower courts, and noted that the alternative plea of pre-emption could not be pursued in light of the precedent in Sardar Ali's case. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, establishing the principle that concurrent findings of fact of lower courts will not be disturbed in second appeal absent any legal infirmity or where not properly contested below.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a second appeal regarding specific performance?
  • Can an alternative plea of pre-emption be granted when barred by established binding precedent of the Supreme Court?
  • Is leave to appeal maintainable against the dismissal of a second appeal where concurrent findings of fact contain no legal infirmity?
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• Muhammad Yousuf vs Zubair Ahmad and others1989 SCMR 502 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-31
  civil litigationinterlocutory mattertemporary injunctioncase managementjudicial delaystatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal arising from delays in the disposal of an interlocutory matter regarding a temporary injunction. The core legal question addressed by the Supreme Court pertains to the efficient management of civil litigation and the avoidance of protracted delays caused by focusing excessively on interlocutory proceedings at the expense of the main suit. The Court held that the trial court must prioritize the disposal of the suit on its merits to prevent unnecessary delays. Consequently, the Court directed the plaintiffs to produce evidence regarding the merits of the case on the next scheduled date and instructed the trial court to finalize the suit within three months of the conclusion of the plaintiffs' evidence. Furthermore, the Court ordered that the status quo be maintained until the final decision of the main suit, while granting the trial court the liberty to reconsider the temporary relief if the defendant causes unnecessary delays in the progress of the proceedings. This judgment emphasizes the judicial duty to expedite trial proceedings over interlocutory disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Should trial courts prioritize the disposal of the main suit over interlocutory matters to prevent delays?
  • Can a trial court reconsider temporary relief if a defendant causes unnecessary delays in the main suit?
  • Is it appropriate for the Supreme Court to set a specific timeline for the disposal of a suit by the trial court?
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• Muhammad Yousif Memon vs Governor of Sind1989 SCMR 263 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-04
  service lawdisciplinary proceedingsdismissal from serviceright to defenseservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges the judgment of the Sind Service Tribunal, which upheld the petitioner's dismissal from his position as an Additional Sessions Judge. The petitioner, having been dismissed by the Chief Minister of Sind following disciplinary proceedings conducted under the Sind Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, contended that he was denied sufficient opportunity to defend himself and was refused access to certain documents during the inquiry. Upon reviewing the record, the Supreme Court found that the petitioner had fully participated in the inquiry proceedings and noted that the grievance regarding the lack of opportunity to defend was not raised before the Service Tribunal. Furthermore, the Court examined the Registrar's correspondence, which clarified that the requested documents were either already in the petitioner's possession or irrelevant to his case. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner's contentions lacked substance. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming that procedural fairness was maintained throughout the disciplinary process and that the petitioner's rights were not violated during the inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant can claim denial of opportunity to defend if they fully participated in the inquiry proceedings?
  • Is a disciplinary authority justified in refusing access to documents that are either already in the possession of the accused or irrelevant to the charges?
  • Can a plea regarding the denial of opportunity to defend be raised for the first time in an appeal before the Supreme Court if it was not urged before the Service Tribunal?
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• Muhammad Yousaf vs The Commissioner, Bahawalpur Division and others1989 SCMR 757 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-30
  displaced personsconstructive possessionpartnership businessproperty transfersettlement authoritiesdivisibility of propertyallotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of a shop between two parties, Muhammad Yousaf (the appellant) and Ehsan Ali (the respondent), who were partners in business. The core legal question was whether the respondent, despite not being the original allottee, could be considered in possession of the shop for the purpose of transfer under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, given their partnership arrangement. The Settlement Authorities, upheld by the High Court, found that the shop was divisible and that both parties were in constructive possession, leading to a vertical division of the property. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the concurrent findings of the Settlement Authorities regarding the divisibility of the shop and the constructive possession of both partners were based on evidence and did not warrant interference. The Court affirmed that a partner in a business, depending on the factual circumstances and evidence of joint interest, can be deemed to be in possession of the premises, thereby justifying the equitable division of the property between the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Can a partner in a business be considered in constructive possession of the premises for the purpose of property transfer under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Does the existence of a partnership business between an allottee and another party preclude the other party from claiming possession of the shop?
  • Can Settlement Authorities order the vertical division of a shop if it is found to be divisible?
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• Muhammad Yousaf vs Rehmat Ali and others1989 SCMR 601 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-20
  oral giftspecial oathholy quranleave to appealco-defendantssuit for declaration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a plaintiff against the dismissal of his suit for a declaration of ownership based on an alleged oral gift. During the proceedings, the petitioner offered to have the primary defendant, Rehmat Ali, make a special statement on oath upon the Holy Quran, agreeing that if the defendant swore the gift was not made, the plaintiff would forfeit his claim and the suit would be dismissed. The defendant fulfilled this condition, leading to the dismissal of the suit, a decision upheld by the High Court. The core legal question concerned whether the suit could be dismissed in its entirety when only one of the co-defendants made the oath. The Supreme Court held that since the plaintiff specifically intended for Rehmat Ali alone to make the oath to decide the entire suit, he could not subsequently add new conditions regarding the other co-defendants. Consequently, the Court laid down the principle that a party is bound by the specific terms of an oath-based settlement they proposed and cannot resile from it once the opposing party fulfills the condition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaintiff challenge the dismissal of a suit based on an oath taken by a defendant when the plaintiff himself offered to be bound by that specific oath?
  • Whether a suit can be dismissed in its entirety when a plaintiff agrees to abide by the statement on oath of a single defendant among multiple co-defendants?
  • Can a party add new conditions to a special oath-based agreement after the opposing party has successfully performed the oath?
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• Muhammad Yousaf vs Muhammad alias Mamma and 5 others1989 SCMR 1268 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-08
  culpable homicidemurderalteration of convictionacquittalpetition for leave to appeallimitationcorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  These are two connected criminal petitions for leave to appeal directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had altered the principal respondent's conviction from murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, reducing his death sentence to ten years' rigorous imprisonment, while upholding the acquittal of his three co-accused. The occurrence arose out of a dispute regarding cattle grazing, resulting in fatal injuries to the deceased and simple injuries to an injured witness. The Supreme Court examined the findings of the High Court, noting that the rival versions and the circumstances surrounding the immediate cause of the occurrence—wherein cattle rounding and snapping led to a sudden altercation—justified the alteration of the conviction and the acquittal of the co-accused due to lack of independent corroboration for common intention. Furthermore, the petition seeking to set aside the acquittal was also found to be barred by time. The Supreme Court held that no interference was warranted and dismissed both criminal petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in altering the conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to nomenclature under the circumstances of the case?
  • Can an acquittal of co-accused be interfered with in the absence of independent corroboration connecting them to the common intention?
  • Is a criminal petition for leave to appeal liable to be dismissed when it is barred by time and lacks sufficient cause for condonation of delay?
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• Muhammad Yousaf and others vs Member (Consolidation), Board of Revenue, Punjab and others1989 SCMR 1562 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-26
  consolidation proceedingsprivate partitionco-sharersquestion of factleave to appealconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court, which upheld concurrent findings of revenue authorities regarding consolidation proceedings. The core legal question concerns whether a private partition of joint land among co-sharers creates a binding right to specific possession during consolidation, and whether questions of fact can be interfered with in constitutional or appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the existence of a private partition and the entitlement to retain specific possession of joint property are purely questions of fact that do not warrant interference by the apex court. The key principle laid down is that pure questions of fact settled concurrently by lower forums and revenue authorities will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court in leave to appeal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the existence of a private partition among co-sharers is a question of fact?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding land consolidation proceedings?
  • Are purchasers of land through a private partition entitled to keep joint property in their possession during consolidation?
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• Muhammad Yousaf and 7 others vs Muhammad Azim and 2 others1989 SCMR 1998 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-21
  civil revisionex parte decreepersonal serviceburden of proofappraisal of evidenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the High Court's acceptance of a civil revision. The petitioners' predecessor-in-interest had secured an ex parte declaration decree, and subsequent applications and appeals by the respondents to set aside the decree were dismissed by the lower courts. However, the High Court allowed the respondents' civil revision, holding that a dispute existed regarding personal service by the process server, whose non-examination by the petitioners failed to rebut the sworn deposition of non-service by the respondents. The core legal question concerned the burden of proof and appraisal of evidence regarding personal service of summons. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court's appraisal of evidence and its finding that the onus of proving service shifted to and remained undischarged by the petitioners suffered from no legal infirmity. The key principle laid down is that where a party provides an uncontroverted deposition on oath regarding non-service of summons, the burden shifts to the opposing party to substantiate service through appropriate evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the burden of proving personal service shifts to the plaintiff when the defendant makes an uncontroverted deposition on oath regarding non-service?
  • Does the High Court's appraisal of evidence in a civil revision regarding service of summons warrant interference by the Supreme Court when free of legal infirmity?
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• Muhammad Younus and another vs Mst. Hajira Bi1989 SCMR 1670 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-11
  rented premisesevictiondefault in rentnuisanceleave to appealappraisement of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the landlord against the judgment of the High Court, which had set aside the tenant's eviction order passed by the Rent Controller. The Rent Controller had ordered eviction on the grounds of default and nuisance. The core legal question concerned whether the tenant's conduct constituted actionable nuisance and whether the ground of default was validly established given the timing of the rent payment and the exercise of judicial discretion. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's appraisement of evidence regarding nuisance suffered from no legal infirmity and that, even assuming a default occurred, the circumstances warranted the exercise of discretion in favor of the tenant. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact on the question of nuisance by the High Court will not be disturbed absent a material defect, and courts may exercise discretion in favor of tenants regarding technical defaults depending on the facts and circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court's appraisement of evidence regarding the ground of nuisance in a rent dispute can be interfered with?
  • Is a tenant entitled to the exercise of discretion in their favor regarding a technical default in the payment of rent under the circumstances of the case?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted against the setting aside of an eviction order where findings of fact are unexceptionable?
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• Muhammad Younis and 3 others vs The Chairman, WAPDA, Lahore and another1989 SCMR 174 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-19
  service tribunallimitationdepartmental appealdismissal from serviceWAPDAexclusion of time
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants, employees of the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) working as meter clerks, were dismissed from service following allegations of recording bogus figures and causing revenue losses. Their departmental appeals before the Executive Engineer were returned, and their subsequent grievance petitions before the Labour Court were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Later, their appeals before the Superintending Engineer were rejected, and subsequent appeals before the Federal Service Tribunal were dismissed as time-barred. Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether the Federal Service Tribunal could independently consider the bar of limitation when the departmental appellate authority had not based its decision on limitation. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while an appellate court is not bound to examine limitation regarding a lower forum, it commits no illegality in doing so. Furthermore, the Court declined to interfere with the Tribunal's finding of fact that the appellants were not entitled to the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908 as proceedings before the Labour Court were not initiated with due care and caution. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Service Tribunal can on its own take into account the bar of limitation when the lower appellate authority did not base its order on limitation?
  • Are appellants entitled under section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908 to exclude the time spent prosecuting grievance petitions before a Labour Court when computing limitation for departmental appeals?
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• Muhammad Younas vs Naseer Ahmad and others1989 SCMR 1321 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-15
  evictionpersonal needtenantconstitutional jurisdictionwrit petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an eviction petition filed by landlords against their tenant for a shop situated in Lahore on the ground of personal need. The Rent Controller allowed the eviction application, but the District Judge set it aside on appeal and dismissed the application. The landlords invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, which accepted the writ petition, quashed the District Judge's order, and restored the eviction order after finding the District Judge's reasons for rejecting the plea of personal need to be untenable. The petitioner sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly interfered with the appellate court's factual findings regarding personal need in its constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the view taken by the High Court did not suffer from any infirmity and dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that the High Court may interfere in constitutional jurisdiction with an appellate rent authority's findings when such findings are based on untenable reasons and discard evidence on grounds not recognized by law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with the findings of a District Judge regarding personal need in rent matters under constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Can an appellate rent authority discard landlord's evidence on grounds not recognized by law?
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• Muhammad Younas vs Muhammad Yasin Khan1989 SCMR 1283 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-12
  pre-emptionsuit for possessionsuperior right of pre-emptionleave to appealcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld a decree for possession through pre-emption granted in favor of the respondent, Muhammad Yasin Khan. The petitioner, Muhammad Younas, challenged the lower courts' findings, arguing that the respondent failed to establish a superior right of pre-emption and that the legal precedents relied upon by the High Court were inapplicable to the facts of the case. The Supreme Court reviewed the findings of the Additional District Judge, which had been affirmed in revision, and found them to be well-reasoned, addressing both the factual and legal aspects of the dispute. The Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any superior right to purchase the land in question or to establish any error in the lower courts' application of the law. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the contentions raised and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, thereby maintaining the decree of pre-emption.

  Questions settled

  • Does a respondent in a pre-emption suit bear the burden of establishing a superior right to purchase the land in dispute?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be granted if the petitioner fails to demonstrate a superior right of pre-emption?
  • Is a judgment of an appellate court that addresses both factual and legal aspects of a pre-emption claim considered well-reasoned?
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• Muhammad Younas vs Khushal1989 SCMR 69 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-08
  pre-emptionright of pre-emptionheritable rightimproved statusinheritance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from two appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning whether a person who did not possess a superior right of pre-emption at the time of sales could subsequently avail of an improved status acquired through inheritance to pre-empt the sales of disputed properties. The core legal question considered by the court is whether the right of pre-emption is heritable. Relying on the precedent established in Azizur Rehman and others v. Muhammad Nawaz, the Supreme Court held that the right to pre-empt a sale is not heritable. Consequently, the court established the key principle that an appellant cannot utilize an improved status acquired by inheritance subsequent to the sale to pre-empt the property. The appeals were accordingly dismissed without orders as to costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the right of pre-emption is heritable?
  • Can a person who did not possess a superior right of pre-emption at the time of sale rely on a subsequent inheritance to pre-empt the sale?
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• Muhammad Yasin and others vs Mst. Rashida Bibi1989 SCMR 779 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-17
  pre-emptionagricultural landsale-deedleave to appealShariat Ordinanceappellate practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against concurrent findings of the lower courts, which had decreed a suit for pre-emption in favour of the respondent. The petitioners, who had purchased agricultural land via a registered sale-deed in 1976, challenged the respondent's superior right of pre-emption, which was based on her status as the sister of the vendor. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that the legal basis for the respondent's superior right was not recognised under Islamic Law and contended that the High Court judge should have referred the matter to a Full Bench constituted under the Shariat Ordinance. The Supreme Court declined to entertain this contention, noting that the argument regarding the referral to a Full Bench was never raised before the learned Single Judge of the High Court. Consequently, finding no other points of law raised by the petitioners, the Court dismissed the petition. The judgment reinforces the principle that appellate courts will generally not entertain new arguments or objections that were not pleaded or raised before the lower forums.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a new contention regarding the constitution of a Full Bench under the Shariat Ordinance for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • Is a contention not raised before the High Court entertainable in a petition for leave to appeal?
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• Muhammad Yaqub vs Sirajuddin1989 SCMR 196 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-21
  statutory tenancyvoid contractpari delictosuit for declarationcivil court jurisdictionsettlement of propertyillegal agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a civil dispute concerning the ownership of property in Model Town, Lahore, originally transferred to the respondent by the Settlement Department. The parties executed an exchange deed for a portion of this property, which was subsequently found to violate the Co-operative Model Town Society's bye-laws regarding plot sub-division. The core legal question was whether the respondent could maintain a suit for declaration of title despite the illegality of the exchange deed and the respondent's lack of physical possession. The Supreme Court held that the respondent could maintain the suit based on his independent title derived from the Settlement Department, rather than the void exchange deed. The Court affirmed that a plaintiff may recover property by relying on their own title, even if the property came into the defendant's possession via an illegal contract, provided the plaintiff does not need to found their claim on that illegality. Furthermore, the Court ruled that a suit for mere declaration was maintainable because the appellant was a statutory tenant, and the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction to order ejectment under the relevant rent restriction laws.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaintiff recover property based on their own title if the defendant's possession originated from an illegal contract?
  • Is a suit for mere declaration maintainable when the defendant is a statutory tenant and the Civil Court lacks jurisdiction to order ejectment?
  • Does the doctrine of pari delicto prevent a party from asserting title independent of a void agreement?
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• Muhammad Yaqub vs Government of Baluchistan and anothers1989 PLD Supreme Court 13 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-29
  Special Courttransfer of casespeedy trialjurisdictionstatutory guidelinespublic interest
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court of Baluchistan, which had challenged the transfer of a murder case from an ordinary criminal court to a Special Court for Speedy Trials. The petitioner was being tried for murder under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code before an Additional Sessions Judge when the Government of Baluchistan transferred the case under section 5(2) of the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act, 1987. The core legal question was whether the government's power to transfer a case to a Special Court could be exercised without considering the statutory guidelines defining an 'offence' under the Act. The Supreme Court held that the power to transfer a case is conditional upon the offence satisfying the statutory guidelines of being gruesome, brutal, sensational, or shocking to public morality, and the transfer order must reflect the application of mind to these guidelines. As the impugned transfer order lacked any consideration of these guidelines, it was illegal. The appeal was allowed and the transfer order was quashed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the government can transfer a criminal case to a Special Court without considering the statutory guidelines defining an offence under the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act, 1987?
  • Does the power to transfer a case to a Special Court require the transfer order to show the existence of guidelines such as an offence being gruesome, brutal, or sensational?
  • Is a transfer order that merely reproduces the words of Section 5(2) of the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act, 1987 without factual justification legally sustainable?
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• Muhammad Yaqoob vs The Pioneer Steel Mills. Muridke and others1989 SCMR 1165 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-01
  Industrial RelationsTermination of ServiceLimitationConstitutional JurisdictionLabour CourtSpecial Leave to Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had declined to interfere with an order passed by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal. The petitioner, a former Security Inspector at Pioneer Steel Mills, had his services terminated and subsequently sought reinstatement by filing a petition under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. While the Labour Court initially accepted the petition and ordered reinstatement, the Labour Appellate Tribunal set aside this decision. The core legal question addressed was whether the High Court correctly refused to exercise its constitutional jurisdiction regarding the Tribunal's order, specifically concerning the issue of limitation. The Supreme Court examined the findings of both the appellate authority and the High Court regarding the limitation period. Holding that there was no merit in the petitioner's contention that he was unaware of the termination order, the Supreme Court affirmed that the lower courts had correctly adjudicated the matter. Consequently, the Court found no grounds to grant leave to appeal, thereby upholding the dismissal of the petitioner's claim.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to interfere with an order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal regarding the issue of limitation?
  • Can a petition under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 be maintained if the issue of limitation has been thoroughly examined by the lower appellate authority?
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• Muhammad Yaqoob and another vs Chiragh Din1989 SCMR 1377 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-10
  civil revisionoathsettlementpower of attorneycounsel authorityleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the plaintiffs against the dismissal of their civil revision by the High Court. The underlying litigation involved a suit for possession between real brothers. The High Court had dismissed the civil revision based on a settlement reached between the parties, which was predicated on an offer to make an oath and the subsequent acceptance and performance of that oath. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners challenged the validity of the High Court's order, specifically questioning the authority of their counsel to enter into such a settlement. The Supreme Court examined the power of attorney and found that the counsel indeed possessed the requisite authority to bind the petitioners to the settlement. Finding no merit in the contentions raised, the Court held that a settlement based on a duly performed oath, entered into by counsel with valid authority, is binding. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the finality of the High Court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Is a settlement based on an offer and acceptance of an oath binding on the parties?
  • Does a counsel have the authority to bind a client to a settlement if the power of attorney grants such authority?
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• Muhammad vs Additional Secretary, Government of N.W.F.P., Home and Tribal Affairs Department and 8 others1989 SCMR 995 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-22
  withdrawal of writ petitionfresh writ petitionOrder XXIII Rule 1(3) CPCmaintainabilityres judicataconstitutional petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal was filed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional writ petition. The Supreme Court considered whether a second writ petition on the same subject-matter and seeking identical relief is maintainable after an earlier writ petition was withdrawn without obtaining permission to file a fresh one. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's dismissal, holding that the petition lacked merit and was barred. Applying the principles enshrined in Order XXIII Rule 1(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the Court held that withdrawing a prior petition without liberty to institute a fresh one renders the earlier High Court order final, thereby barring a subsequent writ petition filed on the same subject-matter for similar relief. The Court affirmed that authorities executing possession must verify that the gifted land corresponds to that taken from the petitioner, and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is a second writ petition maintainable when an earlier writ petition involving the same subject-matter was withdrawn without permission to file a fresh one?
  • Do the principles of Order XXIII Rule 1(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to bar subsequent writ petitions filed for the same relief?
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• Muhammad Tufail and others vs Ghulam Rasool and another1989 SCMR 1878 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-24
  pre-emptionleave to appealcourt-feerejection of plaintSardar Ali case
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a regular second appeal by the Lahore High Court in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question is whether a decree in a pre-emption suit can be validly passed after the cut-off date established by the Supreme Court in the case of Sardar Ali (PLD 1988 SC 287). The trial court had initially rejected the plaint due to a delay in the payment of court fees, but the Additional District Judge subsequently set aside this order and decreed the suit in favour of the pre-emptors. The petitioners challenged this, arguing that under the principles laid down in Sardar Ali, no new decree could be passed in favour of pre-emptors after 31-7-1986. The Supreme Court, finding merit in the petitioners' contention regarding the applicability of the Sardar Ali precedent, granted leave to appeal, converted the petition into an appeal, and ordered the matter to be heard on the existing record.

  Questions settled

  • Can a decree in a pre-emption suit be passed after 31-7-1986 in light of the judgment in Sardar Ali (PLD 1988 SC 287)?
  • Does the failure to pay court fees within the prescribed time justify the rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Muhammad Tufail and 2 others vs The State1989 SCMR 629 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-30
  murderocular evidencerelated witnessesmedical corroborationrecovery of weaponscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave of the Court arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction and sentence of the appellants under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Muhammad Zafar. The core legal questions involved the credibility of related and allegedly interested eyewitnesses, the corroborative value of weapon recoveries and medical evidence, and the legal effect of injuries sustained by the accused and an acquitted co-accused during the incident. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, as the eyewitness testimony was consistent, corroborated by medical evidence and blood-stained weapon recoveries, and the mere relationship of witnesses to the deceased does not render them untrustworthy when their presence is established. The Court affirmed that minor discrepancies do not undermine the prosecution case and dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of eyewitnesses can be discarded solely on the ground that they are related to the deceased?
  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused on the basis of benefit of doubt vitiate the conviction of other co-accused based on the same ocular testimony?
  • Are minor discrepancies in the statements of prosecution witnesses sufficient to discredit the entire prosecution case?
  • What is the evidentiary value of blood-stained weapons recovered from the accused in a murder trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Taj and another vs Subedar Muhammad Rasheed1989 SCMR 505 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-17
  pre-emptionconditional decreeexecution of decreedeposit of sale priceautomatic dismissalmutation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the trial court decreed the suit for possession, conditional upon the petitioners depositing the balance sale price by a specific date, failing which the suit would be dismissed. The petitioners failed to deposit the amount by the deadline, yet the land was subsequently mutated in their favor years later. The respondent challenged this execution, seeking annulment of the mutation. The trial court initially dismissed the respondent's application, but the Additional District Judge reversed this decision, a ruling affirmed by the High Court. The Supreme Court addressed whether a pre-emption decree remains valid when the mandatory deposit is not made within the stipulated time. The Court held that in the absence of a valid extension of time granted by a competent forum, the failure to deposit the pre-emption money by the deadline renders the decree void and results in the automatic dismissal of the suit. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that compliance with Order XX, Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is mandatory for the survival of a pre-emption decree.

  Questions settled

  • Does a pre-emption suit stand automatically dismissed if the pre-emption money is not deposited within the time fixed by the court?
  • Can a pre-emption decree be executed if the condition regarding the deposit of the sale price has not been met?
  • Is a formal extension of time required from a competent forum to validate a deposit made after the deadline set in a pre-emption decree?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Tahir vs The Chairman, Higher and Secondary Education1989 SCMR 599 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-15
  unfair meansdisciplinary actionstudent examinationtampering of answer bookleave to appealcircumstantial evidencewrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a student against whom disciplinary action was taken for using unfair means in an examination by tampering with an answer book, which challenge was initially dismissed by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether circumstantial material and high probability could form the basis for finding a student guilty of tampering with an answer book when the student was the sole beneficiary. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the Disciplinary Committee rightly acted on circumstantial material and high probability, and that no law or rule of evidence prohibited such an approach. The key principle laid down is that disciplinary bodies may rely on circumstantial evidence and logical probability to establish responsibility for examination malpractice where the accused is the direct beneficiary.

  Questions settled

  • Can a disciplinary committee rely on circumstantial material and probability to establish a student's guilt in examination malpractice?
  • Whether a student can be held responsible for tampering with an answer book based on being the sole beneficiary.
  • Is there any rule of evidence prohibiting the use of circumstantial material in academic disciplinary proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Suleman Sulfi vs Mst. Azra Shamim1989 SCMR 1810 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-14
  evictiondefault in payment of rentrent controllerleave to appealtime-barred petitionopportunity of hearing
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an eviction order passed against a tenant on the ground of default in rent payment. The petitioner challenged the eviction, primarily contending that the Rent Controller had unjustifiedly closed his evidence and that the High Court failed to provide sufficient opportunity for a hearing. Additionally, the petitioner argued that the factual findings regarding the default were erroneous. Upon reviewing the record, the Supreme Court found that the petitioner had been afforded fair and sufficient opportunities to substantiate his pleas before the lower forums. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioner failed to present any additional material he allegedly wished to submit when given the opportunity during the proceedings. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that there was no justification for interfering with the High Court's judgment, which had correctly upheld the eviction order based on the established default. The petition was dismissed both on the grounds of being time-barred and on its merits, with leave to appeal refused.

  Questions settled

  • Is an eviction order based on default in rent payment sustainable when the tenant was afforded sufficient opportunity to present evidence?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be dismissed on the grounds of being time-barred?
  • Does the closure of evidence by a Rent Controller constitute a valid ground for interference if the party was given fair opportunity?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Subhan vs Muhammad Saleem and others1989 SCMR 1393 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-10
  leave to appealreduction of sentenceacquittalappreciation of evidencemotivefamily honourmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the father of the deceased against the judgment of the High Court, which had acquitted one respondent and reduced the death sentence of the other respondent to imprisonment for life. The core legal question involved the propriety of the High Court's appreciation of evidence leading to the acquittal and the reduction of sentence based on the motive of family honour. The Supreme Court held that the acquittal based on appreciation of evidence warranted no interference, and the reduction of sentence by the High Court, taking into account the motive set up by the prosecution, was a valid exercise of discretion and not arbitrary. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly refused, laying down that appellate courts may consider prosecution-established motives of family honour as a mitigating factor in sentencing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an acquittal based on the appreciation of evidence by the High Court?
  • Can the motive of family honour set up by the prosecution serve as a mitigating factor for reducing a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Was the discretion exercised by the High Court in reducing the sentence arbitrary?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddique vs Muhammad Ramzan1989 SCMR 1281 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-06
  permanent injunctionleave to appealrevisional jurisdictionappreciation of evidenceburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  Muhammad Siddique filed a suit for permanent injunction against Muhammad Ramzan, which was decreed by the trial court. On appeal, the Additional District Judge set aside the decree and dismissed the suit, a decision upheld by the Lahore High Court in revision. Muhammad Siddique then sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, arguing that the agreement Ex.P1 was duly proved and that the lower appellate and high courts erred in their conclusions. The Supreme Court held that the lower appellate court had thoroughly evaluated the evidence and rightly concluded that the agreement was not proved, and that the High Court committed no material irregularity or illegality in refusing to interfere under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court declined to re-appraise the evidence and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the principle that concurrent findings of fact based on proper appreciation of evidence will not be disturbed in revisional or appellate jurisdiction absent any legal error.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with findings of fact under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when no material irregularity or illegality is shown?
  • Can the Supreme Court re-appraise evidence in a petition for leave to appeal where the lower appellate court has thoroughly evaluated the record?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddique and others vs Syed Mansoor Ali Shah1989 SCMR 511 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-31
  cantonment rent restrictionlandlord and tenantdenial of titledefault in payment of renteviction petitionnotice of transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from eviction petitions filed by the respondent against the petitioners under section 17 of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963, alleging default in rent and personal requirement for reconstruction. The petitioners denied the relationship of landlord and tenant, asserting ownership in a third party, Mst. Khurshid Jehan Begum. The Rent Controller and the Peshawar High Court both ruled in favour of the respondent, finding that the relationship existed and that the third party had no title to the property. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that once a tenant denies the relationship of landlord and tenant and fails to plead payment or tender of rent, the Rent Controller is not bound to inquire into the merits of the default ground. Furthermore, the Court clarified that no statutory provision requires a property transferee to give written notice to a tenant, and a tenant denying the landlord's title while committing a breach of the duty to pay rent is not entitled to equitable discretionary relief.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Rent Controller is required to go into the merits of an eviction case once the tenant denies the relationship of landlord and tenant and fails to plead payment of rent?
  • Does the law require a transferee of property to give a written notice of transfer to the tenant?
  • What is the effect of a tenant denying the landlord's title and setting up title in a third party regarding equitable discretionary relief?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddique and others vs Auqaf Department, Punjab through Chief Administrator at Multan and another1989 SCMR 1683 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-26
  leave to appealwaqf propertylimitation periodexclusion of timejurisdictionauqaf department
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of proceedings under the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1961, wherein a property taken over by the Auqaf Department was challenged by the petitioners. The core legal question concerns whether the time spent before various forums without jurisdiction can be excluded under the Limitation Act, 1908, to save an application under section 7 of the Ordinance from being time-barred, and whether the Supreme Court can intervene to ensure a hearing on merits. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions raised regarding the misreading of dates and the exclusion of time under section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908, warrant a detailed examination to secure justice and ensure the matter is adjudicated on its merits at least once.

  Questions settled

  • Can the time spent pursuing a remedy before forums having no jurisdiction be excluded under section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • Whether an application under section 7 of the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1961 can be dismissed as time-barred without correctly accounting for the period spent in previous litigations?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal to ensure that a litigant is afforded an opportunity of hearing on merits at least once?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddiq vs Muhammad Shafi and 4 others1989 SCMR 1466 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-10
  specific performancecontractual obligationequitable reliefburden of proofcivil revisionreadiness and willingness
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil revision dismissed by the Lahore High Court, which had affirmed the reversal of a trial court's decree for specific performance of a sale agreement. The petitioner sought specific performance of a house sale agreement, claiming that part of the balance payment was adjusted against a theft committed by the vendor's sons, an arrangement allegedly reached before a Panchayat. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to specific performance despite failing to pay the balance amount within the stipulated time, and whether the appellate court correctly assessed the evidence regarding the alleged theft and subsequent adjustment agreement. The Supreme Court held that the appellate court was justified in dismissing the suit, finding that the petitioner failed to produce key witnesses to substantiate the alleged Panchayat agreement and the theft claim. The Court affirmed that equitable relief of specific performance is unavailable where a party's conduct is not above board and where they fail to prove their readiness and willingness to perform the contract terms.

  Questions settled

  • Is a party entitled to specific performance of a contract if they fail to prove their readiness and willingness to perform their obligations?
  • Can an appellate court reverse a trial court's findings of fact if the record indicates the plaintiff failed to produce material evidence to support their claim?
  • Does the failure to produce key witnesses regarding an alleged out-of-court settlement justify the dismissal of a suit for specific performance?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddiq and others vs Fateh Muhammad and others1989 SCMR 57 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-07
  pre-emptioncivil revisionstate landnew plearevisional jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the vendees in a pre-emption matter against the dismissal of their civil revision by the High Court. The petitioners contended that the suit land was state land and therefore exempt from pre-emption. However, this plea was raised for the first time during the revision petition before the High Court, having not been raised before the lower courts. The High Court refused to exercise its revisional jurisdiction on this ground because the respondents had not been afforded an opportunity to lead evidence to rebut this belated plea. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the refusal to exercise revisional jurisdiction under such circumstances was unexceptionable. The Court laid down the principle that a new factual plea requiring evidence cannot be raised for the first time at the revisional stage if it deprives the opposing party of the opportunity to lead evidence in rebuttal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a new plea for the first time in civil revision before the High Court if it requires factual evidence that the opposing party had no opportunity to rebut?
  • Whether the High Court is justified in refusing to exercise its revisional jurisdiction when a plea of land being state land is raised belatedly?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sherin Sahibzada through Legal Heirs and 7 others vs Lal1989 SCMR 1796 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-13
  pre-emption decreeco-sharerrule of sinkersupreme court appealcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal against a pre-emption decree. The core legal questions examined by the Court are whether a pre-emption decree could lawfully be passed in favour of a respondent after a Civil Court declared him not to be a co-sharer, which formed the basis of his qualification for the suit, and consequently, whether a decree could be passed in favour of the other pre-emptor or if he would lose his claim by the application of the rule of sinker. The Court considered the petition a fit case for examination, granted leave to appeal, ordered security, directed the preparation of the appeal on the present record, and ordered status quo to be maintained subject to all exceptions. The key principle relates to the application of the rule of sinker in pre-emption suits and the necessity of maintaining foundational qualifications for pre-emption claims.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emption decree could have been passed in favour of a respondent after a declaration by a Civil Court that he was not a co-sharer?
  • Whether a decree could be passed in favour of the other pre-emptor by application of the rule of sinker?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sher and others vs Malik Muhammad Anwar Khan Tiwana1989 SCMR 90 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-11
  pre-emptiondeposit of pre-emption moneyexecution of decreepetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court upholding the dismissal of the petitioners' objection petition in execution proceedings. The core legal question involves whether a pre-emption suit stood automatically dismissed due to a delay in depositing the pre-emption money pursuant to an appellate court's conditional decree, notwithstanding a subsequent order by the Supreme Court granting further time for deposit. The Supreme Court held that the late deposit of the pre-emption amount was effectively rectified and regularized by the Supreme Court's earlier order dated 20-6-1984, which granted the pre-emptor one month's time to deposit the remaining amount. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming that the executing court and lower appellate forums correctly repelled the petitioners' objections.

  Questions settled

  • Does a pre-emption suit stand automatically dismissed if the pre-emption amount is not deposited within the time originally stipulated by the appellate court?
  • Can the Supreme Court's subsequent grant of time to deposit the pre-emption amount rectify a previous delay in making the deposit?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif vs Sher Muhammad1989 SCMR 516 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-04
  benami transactionsecond appealconcurrent findings of factleave to appealmisreading of record
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a property dispute concerning a house in Sheikhupura, where the respondent filed a declaratory suit claiming to be the real owner and alleging that the petitioner, his brother-in-law who purchased the property in 1946, was merely a 'benamidar'. The trial court and the first appellate court concurrently dismissed the respondent's suit, finding that the petitioner was not a benamidar. However, a learned Single Judge of the High Court accepted the respondent's second appeal, set aside the concurrent findings, and granted the declaration. The petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, contending that the question of ownership and benami transaction was one of fact and that the High Court erred by interfering with concurrent factual findings and misreading the record regarding the production of the original sale-deed. The Supreme Court held that the contentions required examination and granted leave to appeal, directing security for costs and preparation of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the question of whether a person is a benamidar is a question of fact?
  • Is it open to the High Court in second appeal to interfere with concurrent findings of fact by subordinate courts?
  • Does the misreading of the record by the High Court regarding the production of the original sale-deed warrant the grant of leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif vs Settlement Commissioner (Urban), Punjab and 21989 SCMR 1449 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-06
  Supreme Court of Pakistanleave to appealavailable propertyforgery and fabricationlocus standiconstitutional petitionproperty transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions directed against a common judgment of the High Court concerning the transfer of urban property. The core legal questions involve determining whether the disputed property was available property in 1974, the legal effect of a departmental report indicating the property was not available and that the transfer was procured through forgery and fabrication, and the extent of locus standi when the contest is between a vendee and a third party rather than solely between vendor and vendee. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in the connected petition to examine these questions, noting that the lower authorities and the High Court failed to provide a determinative finding on the availability of the property, and that allegations of forgery required a thorough probe rather than leaving the matter in uncertainty. The appeal was ordered to be further processed subject to addressing procedural steps regarding deceased parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the disputed property was available property at the relevant time?
  • What is the legal consequence of a transfer made on the basis of forgery and fabrication in the record?
  • Does a third party have the locus standi to challenge a transfer independently of the sale-deed between the vendor and vendee?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif vs Riasat Ali and others1989 SCMR 1973 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-08
  murdersudden quarrelright of private defenceculpable homicide not amounting to murderpetition for leave to appealexceeding right of private defence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a criminal matter where the respondent, Riasat Ali, along with others, was convicted by the trial court under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased following a sudden quarrel over a seating arrangement near a television set. The High Court acquitted two co-accused but altered Riasat Ali's conviction by applying Exception IV to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, reducing his sentence to nine years' rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the sudden fight and circumstances warranted the application of Exception IV to section 300 or Exception II relating to the exceeding of the right of private defence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that although Exception IV was not strictly applicable as the unarmed deceased was not in an advantageous position, the respondent was entitled to the benefit of Exception II to section 300 since he acted under an apprehension of simple injury during a sudden grappling and thus exceeded his right of private defence. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal and alteration of sentence was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the infliction of two knife blows on an unarmed deceased in a sudden fight brings the case under Exception IV to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does a person who exceeds the right of private defence during a sudden grappling become entitled to the benefit of Exception II to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • What constitutes taking undue advantage or acting in a cruel manner under Exception IV to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif vs Muhammad Khan and others1989 SCMR 1657 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-03
  leave to appealinconsistent pleascivil revisiondeclaratory decreejurisdiction of civil court
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a defendant's petition for leave to appeal directed against the dismissal of his civil revision by the High Court, which arose from a declaratory decree concerning the title to suit property in favour of the respondents. The core legal question revolved around whether the petitioner could simultaneously claim ownership through purchase while seeking to oust the civil court's jurisdiction based on the respondents' allegation that he was a tenant. The Supreme Court held that a party cannot be permitted to take inconsistent and self-contradictory pleas in litigation. The Court laid down the principle that discretionary relief of leave to appeal will be refused when a party attempts to approbate and reprobate by denying tenancy for its own claim of ownership while trying to rely on the adversary's assertion of tenancy solely to contest the forum's jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party take inconsistent and self-contradictory pleas regarding its status as a tenant or owner in civil proceedings?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when the petitioner attempts to approbate and reprobate regarding the jurisdiction of the forum?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif vs Muhammad Ishaque and others1989 SCMR 521 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-18
  leave to appealalteration of convictiondefence versionreduction of sentencecriminal appealappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that altered the respondents' conviction from Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to Section 304-I read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Consequently, the High Court had reduced the respondents' sentences from imprisonment for life to seven years of rigorous imprisonment. The primary legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in its assessment of the evidence by accepting the defence version presented by the accused-respondents, thereby justifying the alteration of the conviction and the subsequent reduction of the sentence. Upon reviewing the impugned judgment and considering the arguments presented by the petitioner's counsel, the Supreme Court found no merit in the petition. The Court held that the High Court had correctly evaluated the evidence and properly accepted the defence version. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, concluding that the case did not warrant the grant of leave to appeal, and the petition was dismissed accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court judgment that accepts a defence version based on the evidence?
  • Is the alteration of a conviction from Section 302 to Section 304-I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 permissible if the defence version is accepted by the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif vs Inayat Ullah1989 SCMR 1794 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-17
  civil appealconversion of petitionconnected appealsSupreme Court practiceprocedural directions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition for leave to appeal involving questions similar to those pending in another civil appeal. The core legal question concerns the appropriate procedural treatment of a petition raising identical issues to a pending appeal before the Court. The Court decided to convert the petition into an appeal, directed the deposit of security within two weeks, and ordered that the newly converted appeal be heard together with the connected pending civil appeal on the existing record with a direction to file all essential documents. The key principle laid down is that petitions raising identical questions as pending appeals may be converted and connected for joint hearing to ensure judicial consistency and efficient disposal of related litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition for leave to appeal can be converted into an appeal when similar questions are involved in a pending appeal?
  • Can the Supreme Court direct connected appeals involving the same questions to be heard together?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif vs Assistant Commissioner_Collector, Gujranwala and another1989 SCMR 616 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-22
  embezzlementdisciplinary proceedingsservice lawdismissal from servicePatwariinquiry officerPunjab Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the order of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which upheld the dismissal of the petitioner, a Patwari, from service. The petitioner was accused of embezzling land revenue collected from a Lambardar. Initially, a preliminary inquiry exonerated the petitioner, but the Collector disagreed with the findings and ordered a second inquiry. Following this second inquiry, where the petitioner was found guilty, the Collector dismissed him from service. The Commissioner and the Punjab Service Tribunal subsequently upheld this dismissal. The Supreme Court reviewed the record and found consistent evidence indicating that the petitioner had received land revenue but failed to deposit it into the government treasury in a timely manner, thereby confirming the charge of embezzlement. The Court held that the disciplinary authority acted correctly in dispensing with the petitioner's services given the established misconduct. Consequently, the petition was dismissed for lacking merit. The judgment reinforces the principle that disciplinary authorities may order further inquiries if dissatisfied with initial findings and that consistent evidence of financial misconduct warrants dismissal from public service.

  Questions settled

  • Can a disciplinary authority order a second inquiry if it disagrees with the findings of an initial inquiry?
  • Does the failure of a public servant to deposit collected land revenue into the treasury constitute grounds for dismissal?
  • Is the dismissal of a public servant justified when there is consistent evidence of financial misconduct?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif and others vs Muhammad Safdar and others1989 SCMR 1143 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-26
  special oathdecision on oathbinding statement of counselleave to appealtenant locus standi
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a review petition against a second appeal judgment relating to a suit for possession of a house. The core legal question concerns the binding nature of a statement made by a counsel offering to have the suit decided on a special oath taken by the plaintiff, and whether a tenant without title can challenge such proceedings when the owners of the property did not appeal. The Supreme Court held that the oath proceedings involved a question of fact and that the counsel's action on behalf of defendants was binding, declining to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The petition was accordingly dismissed, with certain observations regarding the counsel's conduct expunged. The key principle laid down is that matters concerning statements and offers for special oath made during trial are questions of fact, and actions undertaken by counsel in the presence of and on behalf of parties generally bind them unless successfully disproved.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a statement made by a counsel offering to have a suit decided on a special oath is binding on the defendants?
  • Can a mere tenant without title challenge a decree passed on the basis of a special oath when the actual property owners have accepted the judgment?
  • Does a finding regarding oath proceedings during trial constitute a question of fact not warranting interference in appellate jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif and others vs Ahmad Din, through his Legal Heirs and 21989 SCMR 644 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-12-10
  abatement of appealleave to appealpossession of landtenancy-at-willLaw Reforms Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed a Regular Second Appeal as having abated due to the deaths of several parties. The underlying dispute involved a suit for possession of land, where the plaintiff claimed ownership and alleged the defendants were tenants-at-will. The Civil Judge and the Additional District Judge had previously decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that the abatement of the appeal was legally incorrect because the deaths of the relevant parties occurred after the enforcement of the Law Reforms Ordinance XII of 1972. The Supreme Court found that the contention regarding the non-abatement of the appeal in light of the Law Reforms Ordinance XII of 1972 required further consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the legal provisions governing abatement were correctly applied by the High Court following the enactment of the said Ordinance.

  Questions settled

  • Does the death of a party to an appeal after the enforcement of the Law Reforms Ordinance XII of 1972 result in the abatement of the appeal?
  • Whether a regular second appeal can be dismissed as abated when the deaths of the parties occurred subsequent to the enactment of the Law Reforms Ordinance XII of 1972?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif and another vs Muhammad Latif and 3 others1989 SCMR 2040 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-11
  remand orderamendment of pleadingswritten statementapprobate and reprobatenatural justiceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that remanded a suit for declaration to the trial court for further proceedings. The petitioners had previously challenged the trial court's decree in the High Court, arguing that they were prejudiced because they were denied the opportunity to file an amended written statement following an amendment to the plaint, which violated principles of natural justice. The High Court accepted this argument, which was conceded by the respondents, and remanded the case to the trial court to rectify this error. Upon approaching the Supreme Court, the petitioners unexpectedly argued that there was no necessity for an amended written statement, effectively challenging the very relief they had successfully obtained in the High Court. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding that the High Court's decision to remand the case was fully justified given the circumstances and the petitioners' earlier position. The Court affirmed that a party cannot approbate and reprobate by challenging an order that granted them the specific relief they previously sought.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge a High Court order that grants the specific relief they previously requested?
  • Does the failure to allow an amended written statement after an amendment to the plaint constitute a valid ground for setting aside a decree?
  • Is a remand order justified when the trial court fails to provide an opportunity to file an amended written statement?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shahzada alias Shada and another vs The State1989 SCMR 1375 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-16
  leave to appealcriminal appealmurder convictionapprover testimonycorroborationreappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from two connected petitions for leave to appeal filed by convicts challenging their convictions and sentences for murder. The core legal question concerns the sufficiency and reliability of the evidence supporting the conviction, specifically whether the testimony of an approver requires independent corroboration in material particulars and the credibility of a corroboratory witness whose statement was recorded twelve days after the occurrence without a prior report to the investigating authorities. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the evidence warrants a reappraisal in the interest of justice. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to both convicts, establishing the principle that where the reliability of corroboratory testimony and approver evidence is open to serious doubt regarding timeliness and natural conduct, the case merits a thorough re-examination of the evidence through an appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal conviction rest solely on the testimony of an approver without independent corroboration in material particulars?
  • Whether the delay of twelve days in recording the statement of a crucial corroboratory witness affects the reliability of such evidence?
  • Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal when the evidence in a murder case requires reappraisal in the interest of justice?
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• Muhammad Shahzad vs Khairati Khan and others1989 SCMR 189 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-04
  leave to appealsettlement proceedingspermanent transfer deedclerical mistakeproperty disputecivil court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court which restored a trial court decree in favor of the respondent concerning the ownership and correct numbering of a disputed property originally acquired through settlement proceedings. The core legal question involved whether the disputed premises constituted two separate properties or one, and whether settlement authorities could rectify a clerical mistake in transfer documents after the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed. The Supreme Court held that the unchallenges settlement finding regarding the non-availability of the property attained finality against the petitioner, and that authorities retain the competence to rectify mere clerical mistakes that do not affect the merits or substantial rights of the parties. The court established the principle that final administrative adjudications regarding property availability are binding, and ministerial or clerical corrections to transfer documents are permissible notwithstanding the prior issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether settlement authorities are competent to correct a clerical mistake in transfer documents after the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed?
  • Does an unchallenged administrative decision regarding the non-availability of property attain finality against a claimant?
  • Can a civil court interfere with ministerial corrections of property numbers that do not affect the substantial rights of the parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shafi vs Sardar Noor Ahmad and others1989 SCMR 728 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-12-05
  settlement of propertydisplaced personpermanent transfer deedfunctus officiopendente literefugee statussettlement authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of a house under settlement laws, specifically regarding the appellant’s status as a displaced person from occupied Jammu and Kashmir. The core legal questions were whether the appellant qualified as a refugee based on documentary evidence and whether the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed (PTD) rendered settlement authorities functus officio despite pending litigation. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was indeed a refugee, citing overwhelming documentary evidence, including election records for refugee constituencies, which the lower authorities had erroneously disregarded. Regarding the PTD, the Court held that a PTD issued while an appeal or revision is pending is subject to the outcome of those proceedings and does not grant immunity from challenge. The key principle laid down is that the issuance of a PTD does not deprive settlement authorities of jurisdiction if the property transfer remains sub judice, as such a deed is issued pendente lite and remains subject to the final adjudication of pending appeals or revisions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed render settlement authorities functus officio if an appeal or revision is pending?
  • Can a Permanent Transfer Deed issued during the pendency of an appeal or revision be challenged?
  • Is a person elected to a refugee constituency considered a refugee for the purposes of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
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• Muhammad Shafi vs Mst. Razia Ghafoor and 3 others1989 SCMR 479 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-21
  leave to appealreview applicationex-parte decreelimitationnegligence of counselbreach of confidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his review application by the High Court of Sind, which had earlier refused to set aside an ex-parte decree passed against him. The original suit resulted in a decree after the petitioner's engaged counsel failed to participate at the concluding stages. The petitioner filed an application under Order IX, Rule 13 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which was dismissed as time-barred and not maintainable. A subsequent appeal and a review application were likewise dismissed. The core legal question was whether the negligence or breach of confidence by a party's own counsel constitutes a sufficient ground to reopen concluded proceedings and set aside a decree. The Supreme Court held that a counsel's breach of confidence does not justify reopening causes affecting other parties, and that a review application cannot be used as an indirect effort to achieve a rehearing of the matter. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the dismissal of the review.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the negligence or breach of confidence by a party's own counsel constitutes a sufficient ground to set aside a decree under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a review application be utilized as a means to seek a rehearing of the matter?
  • Does the breach of confidence between a client and their counsel justify the reopening of causes affecting other persons?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shafi and others vs The Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and others1989 SCMR 1811 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-22
  Ejected Tenants Schemeproprietary rightsgovernment landleave to appealallotment disputestatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal filed by lessees of government-owned land against the High Court's dismissal of their writ petition. The dispute concerns the petitioners' claim for the grant of proprietary rights over land allotted to them under the Ejected Tenants Scheme, which the authorities have denied. The petitioners challenged the denial, arguing that the condition restricting land within a five-mile limit of Sargodha City is inapplicable and that the land was classified as 'Baqaia Sarkar' rather than 'Charagah' area at the time of allotment. Additionally, they contended that the proposed use of the land for a school building is no longer relevant as the site is being relocated. The Supreme Court, noting that leave to appeal had been granted in similar cases, determined that the issues raised warranted a full examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to consider the merits of the petitioners' claims alongside other similar pending matters, while directing that the existing status quo be maintained until the final disposal of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the condition restricting proprietary rights to land outside a five-mile limit of a city is applicable to allotments under the Ejected Tenants Scheme?
  • Does the classification of land as 'Baqaia Sarkar' versus 'Charagah' affect the eligibility for proprietary rights?
  • Can the proposed public use of allotted land for a school building be a valid ground for denying proprietary rights if the site is relocated?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shafi Abbassi vs The Inspectorgeneral of Police, Lahore1989 SCMR 1153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-28
  service tribunalpolice disciplinary proceedingstransfer ordercompulsory retirementgross indisciplineleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a former Inspector in the Punjab Police against the dismissal of his service appeal by the Punjab Service Tribunal. The petitioner was transferred to the Special Branch, an order he sought to evade by requesting multiple leaves. Upon the rejection of his leave requests and his failure to resume duty or appear before the Deputy Inspector-General of Police in response to a show-cause notice, he was dismissed from service for gross indiscipline. The appellate authority altered the punishment to compulsory retirement, which the Punjab Service Tribunal upheld. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner's transfer order and subsequent disciplinary action for non-compliance and absenteeism were legally sustainable. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacked merit as there was no satisfactory explanation for the petitioner's failure to obey the transfer order or present himself before the competent authority. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming the validity of the disciplinary proceedings and the resultant penalty.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a public servant can be disciplined for failing to comply with a lawful transfer order?
  • Does unauthorized absence from duty constitute gross indiscipline warranting dismissal or compulsory retirement?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the factual findings of a Service Tribunal regarding disciplinary matters without a satisfactory explanation from the petitioner?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shabbir vs Government of the Punjab and 18 others1989 SCMR 1287 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-04
  civil serviceseniorityestoppelapprobate and reprobateservice tribunalappointment date
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a civil servant, was previously removed from service under Section 11-A of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, which allowed for the removal of civil servants appointed between January 1, 1972, and July 5, 1977. In earlier proceedings before the Punjab Service Tribunal, the petitioner successfully challenged his removal by asserting that he was a fresh appointee as of September 3, 1977, thereby falling outside the scope of Section 11-A. Subsequently, the petitioner sought to claim seniority based on an earlier appointment date of September 29, 1975. The Punjab Service Tribunal rejected this claim, leading to the present petition for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner could not approbate and reprobate by taking inconsistent positions; having secured relief by successfully arguing he was a fresh appointee from a later date to avoid the application of Section 11-A, he was estopped from claiming an earlier appointment date for the purpose of seniority. The petition was dismissed accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant claim an earlier date of appointment for seniority purposes after successfully arguing a later date to avoid removal under Section 11-A of the Punjab Civil Servants Act 1974?
  • Does the principle of approbate and reprobate prevent a litigant from taking inconsistent positions in successive legal proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sarwar vs The State1989 SCMR 772 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-30
  criminal leave to appealtriple murderdeath sentenceplea of self-defenseeyewitness testimonyappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Muhammad Sarwar against the judgment of the Lahore High Court confirming his death sentence on three counts for the triple murder of Mst. Seeman, Muhammad Yaseen, and Mst. Naziran. The core legal question examined by the court was whether the prosecution established its case beyond reasonable doubt or if the alternative version of self-defense presented by the accused in his statement was credible. The Supreme Court held that the eyewitness testimony of the injured witness and other corroborating evidence firmly established the guilt of the petitioner, and that the accused's self-serving version admitting to inflicting injuries after supposedly disarming the victim was inherently unbelievable and unjustified. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, upholding the conviction and death sentence. The key principle laid down is that where an accused presents a version of self-defense admitting to acts of violence after disarming the alleged attacker, such explanation is legally untenable and liable to be rejected when contradicted by reliable eyewitness testimony.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the statement of an accused pleading self-defense can be accepted when he admits to inflicting injuries on unarmed persons after allegedly disarming the attacker?
  • How should conflicting versions between the prosecution case and the accused's statement be evaluated by the court?
  • Whether the testimony of an injured eyewitness provides sufficient corroboration to sustain a conviction for murder?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sarwar vs Directorgeneral and others1989 SCMR 1472 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-16
  service appeallimitationtime-barred appealFederal Service Tribunalspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal filed by a former employee against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed his appeal on the grounds of being time-barred. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner had provided a valid and sufficient explanation for the delay in filing his appeal before the Tribunal. Upon review, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Federal Service Tribunal. The Court held that the petitioner was under a clear legal obligation to explain the delay in his filing, a burden he failed to discharge. Consequently, the Tribunal acted correctly and in accordance with the applicable law and rules when it dismissed the appeal as barred by time. The Supreme Court found no satisfactory explanation for the delay presented before it either, and therefore, dismissed the petition for special leave to appeal. The judgment reinforces the principle that an appellant bears the burden of justifying any delay in legal proceedings and that failure to do so justifies the dismissal of an appeal as time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appellant under a legal obligation to explain the delay in filing an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal?
  • Does the failure to provide a satisfactory explanation for delay justify the dismissal of an appeal as time-barred?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sarwar vs Assistant Commissioner/Collector, Tehsil1989 SCMR 1219 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-16
  service tribunalleave to appealreinstatementtermination of serviceconsequential benefitsback benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Punjab Service Tribunal dated 26-4-1983. The petitioner, a Patwari whose services were terminated during his medical leave, challenged the termination through departmental hierarchy and ultimately succeeded before the Punjab Service Tribunal, which ordered his reinstatement and directed that his absence from duty be treated as leave of the kind due. The core legal question raised in the petition is whether the Service Tribunal, upon reinstating the petitioner into service, failed to exercise jurisdiction by disallowing him consequential benefits such as salary and seniority towards pension. The Supreme Court held that the point raised regarding the denial of consequential benefits requires determination. Consequently, the court granted leave to appeal to examine whether a reinstated employee is entitled to back benefits and related service adjustments upon reinstatement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee reinstated into service by a Service Tribunal is automatically entitled to back benefits and salary for the period of absence?
  • Does the denial of seniority towards pension upon reinstatement constitute a failure to exercise jurisdiction by the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sarwar Butt vs Dr. Rafiuddin and others1989 SCMR 1319 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-22
  service matterdisciplinary proceedingsremoval from servicecompetence of authorityservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by a laboratory attendant challenging his removal from service at Mayo Hospital, Lahore. The petitioner was dismissed following disciplinary proceedings initiated after he allegedly refused to perform his duties regarding a patient's blood investigation and insulted a medical officer. After failing to secure relief through departmental appeals before the Medical Superintendent and subsequently the Service Tribunal, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the Deputy Medical Superintendent possessed the legal competence to remove the petitioner from service and whether the disciplinary action was vitiated by bias. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to substantiate his claims regarding the lack of authority of the removing officer or the alleged prejudice. The Court affirmed the dismissal, emphasizing that in the absence of evidence or reference to relevant rules demonstrating procedural illegality or lack of competence, the disciplinary action taken by the hospital administration remains valid and undisturbed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Deputy Medical Superintendent competent to remove a laboratory attendant from service in a hospital setting?
  • Does a failure to participate in a regular departmental inquiry preclude a petitioner from challenging the resulting dismissal order on grounds of bias?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Salehoon vs Mst. Bilquis Begum and others1989 SCMR 1478 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-13
  leave to appealdower alienationlis pendensproperty disputeregular second appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a defendant against the dismissal of his Regular Second Appeal by the High Court, concerning the validity of property alienation by one Ghulam Muhammad in favor of respondent No. 1 in lieu of dower, and a subsequent gift in favor of the petitioner during the pendency of litigation. The core legal questions involve the validity of the initial dower alienation, the effectiveness of a subsequent pendant lite transfer, and the petitioner's locus standi to challenge the same alongside jurisdictional objections. The Supreme Court held that the alienation in favor of the respondent, along with its conditions, was fully proved, rendering the petitioner's claim on merits unfounded, and thus refused to grant leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that a bona fide alienation in lieu of dower is valid and effective against subsequent alienations made during the pendency of litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an alienation of property in lieu of dower is valid against subsequent alienations made during the pendency of litigation?
  • Does a subsequent transferee during the pendency of litigation have the right to challenge a prior valid alienation in favor of another respondent?
  • Whether technical objections can override a fully proved alienation of property in favor of a respondent?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saleem vs Muhammad Ibrahim1989 SCMR 288(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-07
  civil revisionleave to appealconcurrent findings of factgiftSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a defendant in a civil suit concerning an alleged gift made by his father, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his civil revision by the High Court. The core legal question involved whether the concurrent findings of fact regarding the validity of the gift made by the respondent in favor of the petitioner could be interfered with. The Supreme Court held that the question of whether the gift was made stood concluded by concurrent findings of the lower courts and the High Court had rightly dismissed the civil revision. The Supreme Court established the principle that findings of fact affirmed concurrently by lower courts will not be disturbed in civil revision or leave to appeal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding the making of a gift be challenged in a civil revision?
  • Will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against concurrent findings of fact affirmed by the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saleem and others vs Muhammad Aslam and others1989 SCMR 600 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-08
  petition for leave to appealspecific performanceconcurrent findings of factcivil revisionagreement to sell
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court Multan Bench, which dismissed the civil revision of the petitioners. The original suit was filed by the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest for the specific performance of an agreement to sell a disputed house, which was subsequently sold to another party after the original vendor's death. The trial court, the appellate court, and the High Court all dismissed the suit through concurrent findings of fact against the petitioners. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the petitioners and finding no misreading or non-reading of the evidence, the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the core question of whether concurrent findings of fact could be interfered with in the absence of a substantial question of law. The Court held that since concurrent findings of fact were properly reached and no point of law was raised or substantiated, the petition lacked merit. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in the absence of misreading, non-reading of evidence, or a valid question of law.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in the absence of misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be maintained when no point of law is raised?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadiq vs Muhammad Sakhi through Fateh Muhammad1989 PLD Supreme Court 755 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-24
  pre-emptionabatement of suitdeath of partylegal representativessubstitution of heirscivil procedurelimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal in a pre-emption suit where the petitioner challenged the High Court's judgment accepting the respondent's regular second appeal. The core legal question addressed is whether the death of a plaintiff-respondent during the pendency of an appeal, without an application for the impleadment of legal heirs within the limitation period, causes the proceedings to abate following the amendments introduced by the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972. The Supreme Court held that under the amended provisions of Order XXII Rule 3(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the failure of legal heirs to apply for impleadment does not cause the suit or appeal to abate; the Court may proceed with the matter, and any judgment pronounced has the same force and effect as if the death had not occurred. The key principle laid down is that the 1972 amendment removed automatic abatement upon the death of a party, allowing courts to continue proceedings notwithstanding the absence of a substitution application, provided there is no proof that the legal heirs knowingly failed to seek impleadment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the death of a plaintiff or appellant during the pendency of proceedings automatically results in the abatement of the suit or appeal under the amended provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a court proceed with a suit or appeal notwithstanding the failure of legal representatives to apply for impleadment within the period of limitation?
  • What is the legal effect of a judgment pronounced after the death of a party when no application for substitution has been made pursuant to the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadiq vs Muhammad Din and another1989 SCMR 1101 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-05
  petition for leave to appealacquittalocular testimonycorroborationcross-caseunexplained injuriesmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court whereby the respondent was acquitted of the charges under sections 302, 323, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question revolves around whether the High Court was justified in disbelieving the ocular testimony regarding the respondent when the same witnesses were relied upon to convict his co-accused, and whether injuries sustained by the respondent and his wife were adequately explained by the prosecution. The Supreme Court held that no interference was warranted with the impugned judgment of acquittal, as the ocular testimony against the respondent remained uncorroborated, unlike that of his co-accused whose conviction was supported by the recovery of a blood-stained weapon, and the eyewitnesses had suppressed the origin of injuries sustained by the respondent's side in a cross-case. The key principle laid down is that where eyewitnesses conceal the true genesis of injuries sustained by the accused party in a counter-case, their testimony against that particular accused requires strong independent corroboration, and selective reliance on ocular testimony is permissible when corroborated by independent material evidence such as weapon recoveries.

  Questions settled

  • Whether ocular testimony can be disbelieved against one co-accused while being relied upon against another?
  • Does the failure of eyewitnesses to explain injuries sustained by the accused party affect their credibility?
  • Is corroboration through weapon recovery necessary to sustain a conviction when ocular evidence is partially doubted?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadiq vs Administrator, Residual Properties and others1989 SCMR 1510 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-01
  constitutional jurisdictionresidual propertiesremand orderleave to appeallocus standiadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed a constitutional petition filed by the petitioner, Muhammad Sadiq. The petitioner sought to challenge an order dated 13-10-1979 passed by the Administrator, Residual Properties, Multan Division, which remanded a dispute concerning a building site to the Deputy Administrator. The core legal question before the High Court was whether the petitioner possessed the standing to invoke constitutional jurisdiction to challenge an interlocutory remand order in a property dispute. The High Court, relying on the principles established in Raunaq Ali v. Chief Settlement Commissioner, held that the petitioner was not entitled to invoke such jurisdiction, noting that the petitioner failed to demonstrate sufficient grievance or legal standing to warrant interference. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, finding that the petitioner failed to make out a case for leave to appeal. The key principle reaffirmed is that constitutional jurisdiction is not to be invoked against interlocutory administrative orders where the petitioner fails to establish a compelling legal grievance or entitlement.

  Questions settled

  • Can constitutional jurisdiction be invoked to challenge an interlocutory remand order passed by an administrative authority?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to constitutional relief if they fail to establish a sufficient legal grievance regarding an administrative remand order?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadiq and another vs Jalal Khan and others1989 SCMR 959 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-24
  pre-emption suitspecial leave to appealsubsequent salesuperior right of pre-emptionequal footing
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises out of a pre-emption suit dismissed by the trial Court, decreed by the Additional District Judge, and subsequently restored in its dismissal by the High Court upon second appeal. The core legal question considered by the courts was whether the original vendees had sold the disputed land to a subsequent purchaser prior to the institution of the pre-emption suit. The Supreme Court held that the finding of the High Court in the affirmative regarding the prior sale was unexceptionable and declined to interfere. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that a pre-emption suit fails against a subsequent vendee when the transfer occurred before the institution of the suit and the pre-emptors are on an equal footing with said subsequent vendee.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emption suit can succeed against a subsequent vendee when the pre-emptor is on an equal footing with him?
  • Does a pre-emption suit fail if the original vendees sold the land to a third party prior to the institution of the suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Riaz vs Wapda and 2 others1989 SCMR 1727(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-23
  service tribunaldismissal from servicemisconductillegal gratificationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of the petitioner's appeal by the Federal Service Tribunal, which had upheld his dismissal from service on charges of serious misconduct. The petitioner was accused of misconduct bordering on criminal offences, specifically involving the receipt of an illegal gratification, which was supported by material on record, including his own admission. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the case raised any substantial question of law of public importance to warrant interference with the Tribunal's findings. The Court held that no such question of law of public importance was made out in the case. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal, thereby upholding the concurrent findings regarding the establishment of the charges and the resulting dismissal from service.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal involving concurrent findings on misconduct by a service tribunal raise a question of law of public importance warranting leave to appeal?
  • Can an admission of receiving illegal gratification support a charge of serious misconduct in service matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Riaz and others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Education, Islamabad and others1989 SCMR 469 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-17
  service appealad hoc appointmentregularization of serviceretrospective regularizationseniorityleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which accepted the service appeal of respondent No. 3 and adversely affected the seniority of the petitioners. The petitioners were initially inducted as Trained Graduate Teachers on an ad hoc basis in 1976-77 due to a ban on regular appointments, and their services were subsequently regularized in 1980 with retrospective effect from their original date of induction. The core legal question concerns the legality of granting retrospective effect to the regularization of ad hoc appointees, the availability of vacancies, and the principles governing service seniority. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the questions regarding whether there is any prohibition in law in regularizing ad hoc appointees from their original date of induction, subject to vacancies and service conditions, and the necessity of a uniform policy to avoid arbitrariness, require detailed examination. The Court directed the petitioners to implead affected parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether there is any prohibition in law in regularizing ad hoc appointees with effect from their original date of induction subject to the existence of vacancies and satisfaction of other service conditions?
  • Does the retrospective regularization of ad hoc employees require the availability of vacancies at the time of initial induction?
  • Whether a uniform policy should be followed in regularizing ad hoc appointments to avoid injustice, favoritism, or arbitrary decisions?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Razik vs Muhammad Sardar and others1989 SCMR 262 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-03-24
  non-prosecutiondismissal for non-prosecutionno instructionsprocedural defaultadvocate-on-record
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the form of a petition for leave to appeal. The core legal question concerned the procedural consequence of a petitioner's failure to provide instructions to their legal counsel despite attempts to establish contact. The court was presented with evidence, including a copy of a letter and postal receipt, demonstrating that the petitioner's Advocate-on-Record had made diligent efforts to communicate with the client but remained without instructions. Consequently, the learned counsel was compelled to plead no instructions before the court. The court's decision was to dismiss the petitions for non-prosecution. The key principle laid down is that where a petitioner fails to maintain contact with their legal counsel or provide necessary instructions for the prosecution of their case, the court is justified in dismissing the petition for non-prosecution due to the petitioner's failure to pursue the matter diligently. This ensures the efficient administration of justice and prevents the docket from being clogged by inactive or abandoned litigation.

  Questions settled

  • What is the consequence when a petitioner fails to provide instructions to their counsel?
  • Can a petition be dismissed for non-prosecution when the petitioner's counsel pleads no instructions?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rauf and anothers vs The State and others1989 SCMR 973 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-01-30
  common intentionmurderbenefit of doubtmedical evidenceeyewitness testimonycriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerns a criminal appeal against a High Court judgment that acquitted one of two co-accused in a murder case, despite the trial court's conviction. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in granting the benefit of doubt to the co-accused by attributing blunt force injuries to accidental falls, thereby disregarding the eyewitness testimony and medical evidence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s acquittal was based on a cursory examination of the evidence. The Court found that the medical evidence, which confirmed both sharp and blunt force injuries, corroborated the eyewitness accounts of the deceased's wife and mother-in-law. Consequently, the Supreme Court restored the conviction and sentence of the acquitted co-accused, ruling that the evidence sufficiently established that both assailants acted in furtherance of a common intention to commit the murder. The key principle laid down is that where medical evidence corroborates eyewitness testimony regarding multiple assailants using different weapons, courts must evaluate the collective criminal act and common intention rather than isolating individual injuries to grant the benefit of doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court acquit a co-accused by isolating individual injuries when medical evidence corroborates the presence of multiple assailants?
  • Does the presence of both sharp and blunt force injuries on a deceased support the theory of multiple assailants acting in common intention?
  • Is the testimony of close relatives of the deceased admissible and credible in a murder trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rashid and others vs Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue, Punjab and others1989 SCMR 737 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-07
  leave to appealwrit petitionstatus quocivil petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' writ petition involving questions of fact and law. The core legal question concerns the propriety of the High Court's order in light of similar matters pending before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal since leave had already been granted in a connected matter raising identical questions of fact and law. The Court ordered the appeal to be heard along with the connected civil petition and directed that the status quo previously granted shall continue until the disposal of the main appeal, subject to the deposit of security.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when identical questions of fact and law are already under consideration by the Supreme Court in a connected matter?
  • Can an existing status quo order be continued until the disposal of the main appeal upon the grant of leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan vs The State1989 SCMR 1405 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-15
  criminal misappropriationleave to appealconcurrent sentencesconsecutive sentencesfraudprovident fund
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an ex-Cashier in the Education Department, filed two separate petitions for special leave to appeal against the judgments of the Lahore High Court upholding his convictions for misappropriation of government and provident funds in multiple separate criminal cases. The core legal question concerned whether sentences awarded in two separate trials based on distinct First Information Reports can be ordered to run concurrently. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that where an accused is convicted in two different cases registered on different occasions through separate FIRs resulting in separate judgments, the sentences cannot be ordered to run concurrently. The petitions were consequently dismissed on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether sentences resulting from two separate trials on different FIRs can be ordered to run concurrently?
  • Does a conviction for misappropriation of government and provident funds warrant leave to appeal when the merits are undisputed?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan vs The Secretary, Cooperative Societies, Government of Unjab and 5 others1989 SCMR 340 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-02
  cooperative societiesnominationcondonation of delaywrit jurisdictionallotment of landlimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order that dismissed a writ petition regarding the inheritance of agricultural land allotted by a Cooperative Farming Society. The petitioner claimed entitlement to the land based on a nomination made by the original allottee, his maternal uncle, under the Cooperative Societies Act. Following the allottee's death, the Assistant Registrar divided the land between the deceased's widow and a tenant. The petitioner's subsequent revision petition before the Secretary was dismissed on grounds of being time-barred and on merits, a decision upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's nomination under the society's bye-laws conferred an exclusive right to the land and whether the High Court correctly declined to interfere with the Secretary's discretionary refusal to condone the delay. The Supreme Court held that the Secretary properly exercised discretion in refusing to condone the delay and correctly determined that the resolution regarding the petitioner's nomination was void. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming that discretionary administrative decisions regarding limitation and the validity of internal society resolutions warrant no interference.

  Questions settled

  • Does a nomination under the bye-laws of a cooperative society confer an absolute right of inheritance to allotted land?
  • Can a court interfere with the discretionary power of an administrative authority to condone or refuse to condone a delay in filing a revision petition?
  • Is a resolution of a cooperative society regarding the nomination of a member subject to judicial review if found to be void?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan vs Province of Punjab1989 SCMR 1284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-20
  lambardari grantproprietary rightstemporary lambardarpermanent lambardarleave to appealcivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order dismissing the petitioner's revision petition, which had challenged concurrent findings of the lower courts dismissing his civil suit for proprietary rights. The petitioner's father was initially appointed as a temporary lambardar and allotted land by way of a lambardari grant under a Scheme framed in the former State of Bahawalpur. The Scheme permitted proprietary rights only for permanent lambardars and was withdrawn in 1960. Although the petitioner's father became a permanent lambardar in 1963, and the petitioner later succeeded him, neither qualified under the Scheme since it had already been withdrawn before the father attained permanent status. The core legal question was whether a temporary lambardar or their successor could claim proprietary rights under a withdrawn scheme after acquiring permanent status subsequent to the withdrawal. The Supreme Court held that neither the petitioner nor his father were entitled to proprietary rights as the Scheme stood withdrawn prior to attaining permanent status. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a temporary lambardar is entitled to acquire proprietary rights under a lambardari grant scheme withdrawn before attaining permanent status?
  • Does a successor of a lambardar acquire a right to proprietary grants if the predecessor failed to qualify under the applicable scheme during their lifetime?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan vs Member (Revenue) Board of Revenue and others1989 SCMR 614 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-15
  Lambardar appointmentwrit jurisdictionadministrative discretionBoard of Revenueselection of candidates
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court (Multan Bench), which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional writ petition. The matter originated from the selection and appointment of a Lambardar, where the Collector appointed the respondent, the Commissioner reversed it on appeal in favor of the petitioner, and the Member, Board of Revenue restored the Collector's order on revision. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the selection between eligible candidates falls within the discretion of the competent authority and does not constitute an act without lawful authority. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's reasoning, holding that choosing a better candidate rests on the administrative discretion of the competent authority, which cannot be interfered with in writ jurisdiction unless shown to be without lawful authority. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the selection and appointment of a Lambardar between eligible candidates falls within the discretion of the competent authority?
  • Can the High Court interfere in writ jurisdiction with administrative discretion exercised by revenue authorities in selecting a Lambardar?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan vs Member (Rev.), Board of Revenue and others1989 SCMR 798 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-05
  pre-emptionleave to appealpre-emption decreecutoff date
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal filed by pre-emptors against the dismissal of their pre-emption claims. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a pre-emption decree could be passed in favour of a pre-emptor where no decree had been passed by any court at any stage prior to 31-7-1986. Relying on its previous precedent in the case of Sardar Ali (PLD 1988 SC 287), the Court held that since no decree was passed in favour of any of the petitioners prior to the crucial date of 31-7-1986, no decree could now be passed in their favour. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petitions, affirming the principle that pre-emption claims lacking a pre-existing decree prior to the cutoff date cannot be decreed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emption decree can be passed in favour of a pre-emptor if no decree was passed prior to 31-7-1986?
  • Does the absence of a prior decree before the crucial date bar the passing of a pre-emption decree?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan Khan vs Deputy Director Food and another1989 SCMR 1641 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-18
  leave to appealservice matterdepartmental recoveryfinding of factservice tribunalmisconduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by an Assistant Food Controller against a judgment of the Service Tribunal which dismissed his appeal concerning departmental recovery. Departmental proceedings were initiated against the petitioner and a Food Grain Inspector for a shortage of empty wheat bags at a food centre, resulting in an order imposing equal monetary recovery on both officers. While the co-accused officer deposited his share, the petitioner challenged the recovery before the Service Tribunal, arguing that he was not in charge of the empty bags and thus not liable for their loss. The Service Tribunal dismissed the appeal, finding as a matter of fact that although the bags were dispatched to the co-accused, they were actually received by the petitioner at the destination. The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether this factual finding of liability warranted interference. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, holding that since a factual finding was recorded against the petitioner establishing his receipt of the bags, no interference was called for, and consequently dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does a finding of fact by the Service Tribunal regarding the physical receipt of departmental goods bar interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Can an officer escape departmental financial liability for missing goods when it is established as a matter of fact that he received them at the destination?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ramzan and others vs Member, Board of Revenue and others1989 SCMR 1745 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-11
  leave to appealevacuee propertymortgage redemptionforeclosure decreesubsisting mortgage
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court regarding land treated as evacuee property. The petitioners contended that the land belonged to them and was mortgaged to an evacuee who obtained a final foreclosure decree against them in 1945. Despite this decree, the petitioners filed an application for redemption in 1946 under section 4 of the Punjab Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, 1938, which was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that the foreclosure decree acted as a complete bar. The core legal question was whether Section 2 of the Punjab Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, 1938, covers subsisting mortgages subject to a foreclosure decree so as to override such decree. The Supreme Court held that while the explanation to Section 2 excludes decrees for redemption, it does not exclude foreclosure decrees, leaving the 1945 final decree intact as a bar. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, laying down that foreclosure decrees are not excluded by Section 2 of the Act.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 2 of the Punjab Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, 1938 exclude a foreclosure decree obtained by a mortgagee?
  • Whether an application for redemption of mortgage is maintainable when a final foreclosure decree has already been passed against the mortgagor?
  • Does the explanation to Section 2 of the Punjab Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, 1938 apply to foreclosure decrees as it does to redemption decrees?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafique and others vs Mst. Muqaddas Begum and others1989 SCMR 1123 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-23
  leave to appealcivil revisionsuit for possessionpartitionchallenge to title
  Summary & questions settled

  The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal against the dismissal by the High Court of their civil revision, which had arisen out of a suit for possession through partition. During the hearing, the learned counsel for the petitioners raised technical points but failed to point out any reliable or cogent evidence to establish that the title of the respondents, as challenged by the petitioners, was not validly established. Finding the petitioners' case to be weak on merits regarding the challenge to title, the Supreme Court held that it was not a fit case for the grant of leave to appeal. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly refused. The key principle laid down is that leave to appeal will be refused when the petitioner fails to point out cogent and reliable evidence to substantiate weak challenges to the established title of the opposing party in partition and possession matters.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal can be granted when the petitioner fails to point out reliable and cogent evidence supporting their challenge to the respondents' title?
  • Is a civil revision arising out of a suit for possession through partition maintainable without cogent evidence on title?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafiq vs Tasleemul Hasan1989 SCMR 470 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-14
  rent controlrelationship of landlord and tenantjurisdiction of rent controllerlocus standiejectment orderundertaking
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court concerning rent control proceedings. The respondent-landlord filed an ejectment application against Abdul Hamid, alleging default in rent and personal use. The petitioner intervened, claiming he was the actual tenant, but the Rent Controller and the High Court both held that no relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the petitioner and the respondent. However, the High Court simultaneously recorded an undertaking from the petitioner to vacate the premises and ordered the execution of an eviction order. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and held that once the authorities determined the petitioner was not a tenant and lacked locus standi, they possessed no jurisdiction over him to pass an ejectment order or enforce an undertaking. The Court ruled that the Rent Controller, being a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, could not exercise authority over a non-tenant, and set aside the High Court's order directing the execution of the eviction against the petitioner while allowing proceedings against the actual tenant to proceed on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Rent Controller have jurisdiction to pass an ejectment order against a person found not to be a tenant?
  • Can an intervenor who is held not to be a tenant be bound by an eviction undertaking in rent proceedings?
  • What is the extent of jurisdiction of a Rent Controller as a tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafiq and another vs Sardar and another1989 SCMR 455 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-03
  civil revisionpermanent injunctionpleadingsframing of issuesalienation of landState landabandonment of plea
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the sale of State land. The respondent filed a suit for a permanent injunction to protect his possession of the land, which he claimed to have purchased from the second petitioner. The trial court initially dismissed the suit, but the Additional District Judge decreed it in favor of the respondent. The petitioners subsequently filed a civil revision before the Lahore High Court, which was dismissed. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that the land transfer violated Section 19 of the Colony Act due to a lack of required sanction and argued that the second respondent lacked the authority to alienate the land. The Supreme Court held that these pleas could not be entertained at the revisional stage because they were not raised in the written statement nor were issues framed regarding them at the trial stage. By failing to seek an additional issue at the trial court, the petitioners were deemed to have abandoned these arguments. The petition was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a new legal plea in a civil revision that was not pleaded in the written statement or framed as an issue at the trial stage?
  • Does the failure to request an additional issue at the trial court constitute an abandonment of a plea regarding the authority to alienate land?
  • Is a court justified in refusing to consider arguments regarding statutory violations if those arguments were not raised during the initial trial proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Pervez Ehsan Ullah vs The State1989 SCMR 1388 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-05
  transfer of criminal casesfair trialhostility of local barleave to appealcriminal trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court, which declined the petitioner's request to transfer two criminal cases, including one for double murder, from District Sargodha to another district. The core legal question was whether the hostility of the local Bar Association, press condemnation, and the alleged inability to secure local legal representation warranted the transfer of the trial in the interest of a fair trial. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacked substance, noting the absence of concrete evidence such as the actual resolution of the Bar Association or affidavits showing that local lawyers refused to accept the brief. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, emphasizing that matters of case transfers without substantial questions of law should ordinarily conclude at the High Court level. The key principle laid down is that mere allegations of local hostility and press condemnation, unsupported by verifiable evidence regarding the refusal of legal representation, are insufficient to justify the transfer of a criminal trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does the passing of a condemnation resolution by a local Bar Association automatically warrant the transfer of a criminal trial to another district?
  • Is unverified press condemnation and the absence of affidavits from lawyers declining briefs sufficient proof of denial of legal representation for case transfer?
  • Should petitions regarding transfer of criminal cases without substantial questions of law of public importance be entertained by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz vs The State1989 SCMR 124 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-09
  double murderdeath sentenceimprisonment for lifemotivegrave and sudden provocationcriminal appealappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the conviction of the appellant for the double murder of his sister and niece, for which he was sentenced to death. The core legal question was whether the death penalty was appropriate given the disputed nature of the motive and the appellant's plea regarding the immoral character of the deceased. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding the evidence of guilt overwhelming, but reduced the sentence from death to imprisonment for life. The Court held that the prosecution's alleged motive—a dispute over a 'Watta' marriage arrangement—was weak, contradicted by circumstances, and unsupported by independent evidence. Conversely, the appellant’s contention regarding the deceased's immoral conduct, while not definitively establishing 'grave and sudden provocation,' cast sufficient doubt on the prosecution's narrative. The Court established the principle that where the prosecution’s alleged motive is disproved or remains shrouded in mystery, and the circumstances suggest a potential, albeit unproven, motive of honour or provocation, the imposition of the extreme penalty of death is not warranted.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove the alleged motive for murder entitle the convict to a reduction of the death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained when the motive alleged by the prosecution is found to be weak or disproved?
  • Is the death penalty appropriate when the motive for the crime remains shrouded in mystery?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz vs Muhammad Muslim and others1989 SCMR 1285 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-05
  leave to appealacquittalcriminal appealreasonable doubtprosecution evidenceappellate interference
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed an application under Section 417(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, thereby upholding the trial court's acquittal of five respondents in a criminal case. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in refusing leave to appeal against the acquittal, given the evidentiary challenges and the existence of competing theories regarding the incident. The Supreme Court found that the crime was an unnoticed occurrence and the prosecution failed to establish a case free from reasonable doubt. The Court observed that the prosecution and defense versions presented parallel theories, with the defense version appearing more plausible. Specifically, the Court noted the physical impossibility of the alleged injury mechanism and the failure of the prosecution to prove the intent to kill. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal, affirming that where prosecution evidence is unreliable and two compatible theories exist, the acquittal must stand. The judgment reinforces the principle that an appellate court will not interfere with an acquittal when the prosecution case is riddled with doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court interfere with an acquittal when the prosecution evidence is unreliable and creates reasonable doubt?
  • Is leave to appeal against an acquittal justified when the defense version appears more plausible than the prosecution's theory?
  • Does the existence of two compatible parallel theories regarding the commission of a crime warrant the dismissal of an appeal against acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz vs Muhammad Aslam and others1989 SCMR 495 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-17
  leave to appealcivil revisionadmissibility of evidenceappellate jurisdictionquestion of law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's civil revision and upheld the decision of the District Judge. The petitioner challenged the lower courts' findings, arguing that they relied upon inadmissible evidence in violation of Section 50 of the Evidence Act. The Supreme Court examined the record, specifically the statement of one of the plaintiffs, to determine whether the lower courts had contravened the statutory requirements regarding the admissibility of evidence. Upon review, the Court found that the evidence relied upon was not inadmissible and that the lower courts had correctly complied with the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act. Concluding that the impugned judgment contained no error of law and involved no question of public importance requiring further examination, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal. The decision affirms the finality of the lower courts' concurrent findings on evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the reliance on evidence by lower courts constitute an error of law if it complies with Section 50 of the Evidence Act?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable when there is no error of law or question of public importance?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz and another vs Hassain Ahmad and 13 others1989 SCMR 52 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-06
  pre-emptionleave to appealRegular First Appealsummoning of recordquestions of factvendeesland price determination
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal was instituted by the vendees against the judgment of the High Court dismissing their Regular First Appeal in a pre-emption dispute. The petitioners primarily contended that the High Court dismissed their appeal without formally summoning the trial court record, and additionally challenged concurrent findings regarding ownership of the estate and the determination of the land price. The Supreme Court examined the tenor and contents of the High Court's judgment, particularly noting references to exhibited documents from the lower court, and held that the record was either formally summoned or duly made available for deciding the appeal, thereby rejecting the procedural objection. The remaining contentions regarding ownership and land valuation were identified as pure questions of fact supported by the record. Finding no justification or legal flaw to warrant interference with the High Court's judgment, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate judgment can be challenged for non-summoning of the record when its contents demonstrate that exhibited lower court documents were duly considered?
  • Whether concurrent findings on pure questions of fact regarding ownership and land valuation warrant interference in a petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Naseem Sipra vs Secretary, Government of the Punjab1989 SCMR 1149 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-10
  adverse remarksannual confidential reportsservice tribunalleave to appealcondonation of delayservice record
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three petitions for leave to appeal filed by the petitioner against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had dismissed his appeals seeking the expunction of adverse remarks recorded in his annual confidential reports for the years 1979 and 1980. Although the petitions were filed with a delay of ten to fourteen days, the Supreme Court, in the interest of justice, condoned the delay to examine the merits of the case. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal's decision to uphold the adverse remarks was legally sound and within its jurisdiction. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the Tribunal had thoroughly examined the petitioner's service record and reached a decision in accordance with the law. Consequently, the Court found no grounds for interference, as the impugned order was neither contrary to law nor lacking jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that in the absence of any substantial question of law of public importance, leave to appeal could not be granted. Accordingly, all three petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court condone a delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal in the interest of justice?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with a Service Tribunal's decision if it is based on a thorough examination of the service record?
  • Is a substantial question of law of public importance required for the grant of leave to appeal in service matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Najeeb vs Mst. Talat Shahnaz and others1989 SCMR 119 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-05
  maintenancedivorced wifeiddat periodminor childrenconstitutional petitionfamily law
  Summary & questions settled

  These two petitions arose from family disputes where the petitioners were directed to pay maintenance to a wife and minor children, respectively. After their constitutional petitions were dismissed by the High Court, the petitioners sought leave to appeal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether an ex-wife could apply for maintenance under Section 9 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 for the period when the wedlock was intact and for the iddat period. The Court held that an application by a divorced wife for maintenance covering the period of intact wedlock and the iddat period is competent, as she is covered by the term 'wife' within the meaning of Section 9 of the Ordinance. Regarding the second petition, where the petitioner argued that a minor daughter had married and was no longer entitled to maintenance, the Court noted this point was not raised before the trial court and dismissed the petition, allowing the petitioner to apply to the trial court for variation of the maintenance order.

  Questions settled

  • Can a divorced wife apply for maintenance under Section 9 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 for the period when the marriage was intact and for the iddat period?
  • Is a divorced wife considered a 'wife' under Section 9 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 for the purpose of claiming past maintenance and iddat maintenance?
  • Can a petitioner raise a new factual plea regarding a minor child's marriage and maintenance entitlement for the first time before the appellate or constitutional court without having raised it before the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Muzaffar Malik vs Pakistan, through Secretary and others1989 SCMR 1514 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-18
  service matterinfructuous petitionseniority disputeadministrative remedyPunjab Constabulary
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging an administrative matter regarding the petitioner's employment status. The petitioner, a Sub-Inspector, had been absorbed into the Punjab Constabulary. The core legal question before the Court was whether the petition remained maintainable given that the primary relief sought—absorption into the service—had already been granted. The Court held that since the petitioner had already been absorbed into the Punjab Constabulary, the petition had become infructuous. Regarding the petitioner's additional grievances concerning seniority and associated service benefits, the Court declined to adjudicate these issues, noting that the petitioner had not exhausted appropriate administrative remedies. The Court dismissed the petition while granting the petitioner liberty to pursue his claims regarding seniority and benefits before the relevant competent authority. The key principle laid down is that where the primary relief sought in a petition has been rendered moot by subsequent events, the petition becomes infructuous, and ancillary service disputes should be addressed through proper departmental channels rather than by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a petition become infructuous when the primary relief sought has already been granted?
  • Can the Supreme Court adjudicate claims regarding seniority and service benefits when the petitioner has not first approached the relevant competent authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Mushtaq vs Province of Punjab and others1989 SCMR 1682 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-29
  evacuee landauctiondeputy commissionerapprovalcivil suitleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the auction of agricultural land held under the scheme for disposal of unallotted evacuee rural agricultural land. The core legal question is whether an auction of evacuee land accepted by the Assistant Commissioner creates a binding ownership right without the mandatory statutory approval of the Deputy Commissioner or designated authorities. The Supreme Court held that since the applicable scheme explicitly subjects any auction to the approval of the Deputy Commissioner, Colonization Officer, or Settlement Officer, and such approval was validly refused following an inquiry into lack of proper publicity, the cancellation of the auction proceedings was lawful and without jurisdictional defect. The petition was accordingly dismissed, laying down the principle that an auction under the settlement scheme remains incomplete and confers no title until it receives the requisite statutory approval from the designated competent authority.

  Questions settled

  • Does an auction of evacuee agricultural land create binding ownership rights without the approval of the Deputy Commissioner?
  • Can the Deputy Commissioner refuse to approve an auction held under the evacuee land scheme upon finding procedural irregularities?
  • Whether an auction conducted by the Assistant Commissioner is complete without the sanction required under the scheme?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Munir vs Election Tribunal (Local Councils), Peshawar1989 SCMR 1108 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-08
  local council electionelection petitionno evidenceconstitutional jurisdictionpleadingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that set aside an Election Tribunal's decision in a local council election dispute. The core legal question was whether the Election Tribunal acted lawfully in declaring the petitioner the winner based on allegations that three minor voters had cast ballots for the respondent, thereby altering the election outcome. The High Court had overturned the Tribunal's decision, finding that the petitioner had failed to raise this specific plea in his pleadings and, crucially, that there was no evidence presented to support the claim that the alleged minors had voted or that they had voted for the respondent. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the Tribunal's findings were based on no evidence. The Court held that where a tribunal reaches a conclusion without any evidentiary basis, the High Court is justified in exercising its constitutional jurisdiction to correct the error. The principle laid down is that an election result cannot be altered based on allegations unsupported by evidence or pleadings.

  Questions settled

  • Can an Election Tribunal declare a candidate elected based on allegations not raised in the pleadings?
  • Is a High Court justified in interfering with an Election Tribunal's decision when there is no evidence to support the Tribunal's findings?
  • Does the lack of evidence regarding the identity and voting preference of alleged minor voters invalidate an election challenge?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Munir Malik vs The Government of Punjab through Secretary, S & Gad1989 SCMR 1471 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-27
  Annual Confidential Reportadverse remarksservice tribunallimitationnatural justicecondemned unheardcivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding the expunction of adverse remarks in his Annual Confidential Report (A.C.R.). The petitioner, an Extra Assistant Commissioner, challenged the adverse remarks—specifically regarding his integrity and public conduct—arguing that he was condemned unheard and that no proper inquiry was conducted. The core legal questions were whether the Tribunal correctly dismissed the appeal on the grounds of limitation and whether the principles of natural justice were violated during the departmental proceedings. The Supreme Court observed that the Tribunal had correctly identified the appeal as time-barred and declined to condone the delay. Furthermore, the Court found no merit in the contention that the petitioner was denied a fair hearing, noting that the petitioner had absented himself from proceedings using medical certificates, which the authorities viewed as a tactical maneuver. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, affirming that no rules or principles of natural justice were violated.

  Questions settled

  • Can a service tribunal decline to condone a delay in filing an appeal against adverse remarks?
  • Does the absence of an officer from inquiry proceedings based on medical certificates constitute a violation of natural justice?
  • Is an inquiry mandatory before recording adverse remarks in an Annual Confidential Report?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Mumtaz Ahmad Khan vs The Member, Federal Land1989 SCMR 1862 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-19
  writ petitionwithdrawal of petitionlocus standileave to appealland reformsaggrieved party
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed against a High Court judgment that had granted relief to the respondents in a writ petition. The petitioner, who had originally filed a joint writ petition with the respondents challenging the annulment of a land gift by the Federal Land Commission, subsequently withdrew from the High Court proceedings. Despite the petitioner's withdrawal, the High Court proceeded to adjudicate the petition on behalf of the remaining respondents, who were the donees of the land, and ruled in their favor. The petitioner then sought leave to appeal this judgment. The core legal question was whether a party who voluntarily withdrew from a writ petition in the High Court could subsequently challenge the judgment rendered in favor of the remaining parties. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner, having withdrawn from the contest, lacked the standing to challenge the judgment. The Court affirmed that the remaining respondents, as the primary aggrieved parties, were entitled to the fruits of the judgment, and the petitioner could not deprive them of that relief after abandoning the litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who has voluntarily withdrawn from a writ petition in the High Court subsequently file a petition for leave to appeal against the final judgment?
  • Does the withdrawal of one co-petitioner from a joint writ petition preclude the remaining petitioners from pursuing the matter to a final judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Mukhtar Tikka vs The Government of Punjab and anothers1989 PLD Supreme Court 150 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-19
  ad hoc appointmentmartial law instructionpublic service commissiontermination of serviceintra-court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellant's Intra-Court Appeal against the termination of his ad hoc appointment as a Deputy Superintendent of Police. The appellant was initially appointed on an ad hoc basis in relaxation of rules by the Punjab Government. Subsequently, Martial Law Instruction No. 21 was issued to regularize ad hoc appointments, requiring cases to be reviewed by the appropriate selection authority. The appellant's case was referred to the Punjab Public Service Commission, which declared him suitable for the post. However, the Governor subsequently declared him ineligible and terminated his services, a decision upheld by both a Single Judge and a Division Bench of the High Court. The core legal question was whether the Provincial Government could terminate the services of an ad hoc appointee after the Public Service Commission had found him suitable under Martial Law Instruction No. 21. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the termination order, holding that once the competent selection authority recommended the appointee as suitable pursuant to the Martial Law Instruction, the Provincial Government could not arbitrarily declare him ineligible and terminate his services.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Provincial Government can terminate the services of an ad hoc appointee after the Public Service Commission has found him suitable under Martial Law Instruction No. 21?
  • Does an ad hoc appointee have the right to challenge termination of service under constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Is it obligatory upon the Provincial Government to act upon the recommendation of the Public Service Commission regarding regularisation under Martial Law Instruction No. 21?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Maobool Hussain vs Mst. Razia Begum1989 SCMR 1620 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-28
  leave to appealcivil revisionTamleekcourt-fee deficiencydeclaration and possessionconcurrent findings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a defendant against the dismissal of his civil revision by the High Court, which upheld the decree in a suit for declaration and possession concerning a disputed Tamleek. The core legal question involves the propriety of the concurrent findings of fact regarding the Tamleek and the consequences of failing to make up a deficiency in court-fee within the stipulated time. The Supreme Court held that no substantial error of law or principle was committed by the lower courts in their appraisal of the material, and the findings of fact were unexceptionable. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal, holding that the case was not a fit one for interference under revisional or appellate jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in refusing to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact regarding the disputed Tamleek?
  • Does the failure to make up the deficiency in court-fee within the time granted by the Court warrant the dismissal of the appeal?
  • Are there any substantial errors of law or principle in the appraisal of material that would justify the grant of leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Luqman vs Shahmand and another1989 SCMR 929 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-12-15
  leave to appealintention to killgrievous hurtblunt weaponcriminal liabilityappellate interference
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had altered the respondent's conviction from murder to voluntarily causing grievous hurt. The respondent was initially convicted by the trial court under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for causing the death of the deceased using a blunt weapon (Sota). On appeal, the High Court concluded that the respondent lacked the requisite intention or knowledge to kill, citing the nature of the weapon and the specific injuries sustained, and consequently reduced the conviction to Section 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The petitioner, the son of the deceased, challenged this finding, arguing that the repeated blows to the head and neck of an elderly victim clearly demonstrated an intention to kill. The Supreme Court found that the contentions raised by the petitioner regarding the High Court's assessment of the respondent's intent and the nature of the injuries warranted further examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal and issued a bailable warrant for the respondent's arrest.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the repeated use of a blunt weapon on the head and neck of an elderly person can establish an intention to kill under the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Does the nature of the weapon used and the specific injuries sustained preclude a finding of intent to commit murder?
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• Muhammad LATIFPetitiner vs Muhammad Hanif and 2 others1989 SCMR 1105 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-06
  leave to appealenhancement of sentenceacquittalmotivepre-planned murdercriminal liabilityLalkara
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the complainant against a Lahore High Court judgment that maintained the conviction of respondent Muhammad Hanif for murder but reduced his sentence to life imprisonment, and acquitted co-respondent Khadim Hussain. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in acquitting the co-accused and reducing the sentence of the principal accused. The Supreme Court examined the prosecution's case, which alleged the deceased was attacked by the respondents. The High Court had acquitted Khadim Hussain, attributing to him only a 'Lalkara' (incitement) and noting his prior involvement in a 1967 incident. Regarding Muhammad Hanif, the High Court reduced the sentence because the prosecution failed to establish a clear motive or immediate cause for the 1981 attack, given the long lapse since the 1967 incident. The Supreme Court found no substance in the petitioner's argument that the murder was pre-planned. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, dismissing the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a proven motive for a murder justify the reduction of a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Can a conviction be maintained while reducing the sentence based on the failure of the prosecution to establish an immediate cause for the crime?
  • Is an acquittal based on the attribution of only a 'Lalkara' to an accused legally sustainable in a murder case?
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• Muhammad Latif and others vs Muhammad Akram and others1989 SCMR 1259 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-22
  consolidation of holdingsland mutationtransfer of landconsolidation proceedingsstatutory prohibitionvoid transaction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court, which had upheld the decisions of the Board of Revenue and the Additional Commissioner regarding disputed land mutations. The core legal question was whether land mutations attested during the pendency of consolidation proceedings, without the requisite sanction of the Consolidation Officer, were legally valid and enforceable. The petitioner had sought to rely on these mutations to claim additional land, despite the respondent's denial of any sale. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the transactions were void ab initio. The Court affirmed that under Section 24 of the Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960, a landowner is strictly prohibited from transferring or dealing with any part of their holding during the pendency of consolidation proceedings without prior sanction from the Consolidation Officer. Consequently, the Court established that any transfer executed in violation of this statutory prohibition confers no legal benefit or rights upon the transferee, rendering the mutations ineffective for the purpose of the consolidation scheme.

  Questions settled

  • Can a landowner transfer or deal with their holding during the pendency of consolidation proceedings without the sanction of the Consolidation Officer?
  • Are land mutations attested without the sanction of the Consolidation Officer during consolidation proceedings legally valid?
  • Does a transfer of land made in violation of Section 24 of the Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960 confer any rights upon the transferee?
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• Muhammad Khan vs Feroze Din1989 SCMR 1028 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-04
  evacuee propertydemarcation reportsettlement authoritiescivil court jurisdictionproperty disputedue process
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a property dispute between two parties regarding the ownership of a specific godown, which both claimed to have purchased through public auction as evacuee property. The appellant relied primarily on a demarcation report prepared by a Settlement Inspector to assert his title. The core legal question was whether this demarcation report was valid and binding upon the Civil Court. The Supreme Court held that the demarcation proceedings were illegal and invalid. The Court reasoned that the Settlement Inspector had acted without the authorization of a competent authority, as the order for demarcation was issued by an accountant rather than the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. Furthermore, the report was prepared without notice to the respondent, and the document itself contained suspicious cuttings and overwritings. Consequently, the Court affirmed the lower appellate court's decision to reject the report and dismiss the suit, establishing the principle that a demarcation report prepared without lawful authority and without notice to affected parties carries no legal weight and does not preclude judicial scrutiny.

  Questions settled

  • Can a demarcation report prepared by a Settlement Inspector without notice to the affected party be considered valid?
  • Is a demarcation report prepared under the direction of an unauthorized subordinate official, rather than the competent authority, legally binding?
  • Does a Civil Court have the authority to disregard a demarcation report that is found to be procedurally illegal and unreliable?
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• Muhammad Khan vs Faqir Hussain Khan and 3 others1989 SCMR 1164 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-08
  leave to appealacquittalforgeryinheritance claimadmissibility of documentsquestion of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in a criminal complaint filed under Section 193/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner alleged that the respondents committed forgery by misrepresenting the date of death of Mst. Hashmate Bibi to claim an inheritance share. The Magistrate acquitted the respondents after finding insufficient evidence, and the Lahore High Court dismissed the subsequent appeal, ruling that the petitioner's evidence regarding the date of death was inadmissible under Section 78 of the Evidence Act 1872. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner challenged these findings. The Supreme Court held that the determination of the date of death was a question of fact, which the lower courts had correctly concluded in favour of the respondents based on credible evidence. The Court affirmed that the petitioner's documentary evidence lacked material authenticity compared to the official record produced by the Union Council. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, upholding the acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Is the determination of a date of death based on conflicting evidence considered a question of fact that appellate courts should generally not disturb?
  • Does a document regarding death occurring in pre-partition India require authentication under Section 78 of the Evidence Act 1872 to be admissible in evidence?
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• Muhammad Khan and another vs Mst. Zubaida Begum and 6 others1989 SCMR 1111 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-10
  pre-emption suitright of pre-emptioninheritability of pre-emptiontenancy rightssuccessor tenantleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment dismissing a writ petition in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question is whether the right of pre-emption, specifically when granted to a tenant under Martial Law Regulations, is inheritable and whether it survives the death of the original tenant if the successor does not meet the necessary tenancy requirements at all relevant stages of the suit and decree. The petitioners argued that the right of pre-emption is not inheritable and that the successor tenant, Muhammad Nazir, did not qualify as the tenant at the relevant times, whereas the eldest son, who might have qualified, had relinquished the tenancy. The Supreme Court, finding that these submissions regarding the inheritability of the pre-emption right and the application of the Punjab Tenancy Act require deeper examination, granted leave to appeal. The Court held that the legal questions raised regarding the survival of the pre-emption right post-death of the original tenant warrant a full hearing on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Is the right of pre-emption granted to a tenant under Martial Law Regulations inheritable upon the death of the original tenant?
  • Does a pre-emption suit based on tenancy survive if the successor tenant does not maintain tenancy status at all relevant stages of the litigation?
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