Pakistan Case LawLatest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.
- Mst. Daulan vs Rab Nawaz And Another1987 SCMR 497 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenged the acquittal of the respondent, Rab Nawaz, by the Lahore High Court regarding a murder charge under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appellant, the mother of the deceased, contended that the High Court erred in disregarding the ocular testimony of herself and a cousin. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly applied the rule of prudence in requiring independent corroboration for the sole surviving ocular witness's testimony, given the rejection of other prosecution evidence, including the recovery of the weapon and an alleged extra-judicial confession. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s appraisal of the evidence was sound. It affirmed that the testimony of the mother, while natural, required corroboration in the absence of reliable supporting evidence, particularly when the other witness was a chance witness with strained relations. The Court established that it would not interfere with an appellate court's judgment where the evidence had been properly appraised and the conclusion reached was based on a sound application of legal principles regarding the sufficiency of proof for a capital charge.
Questions settled- Can a conviction on a capital charge be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness when other prosecution evidence is discarded?
- Is the testimony of a chance witness who is also inimical to the accused reliable without independent corroboration?
- Does an appellate court's proper appraisal of evidence warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
- Mst. Daulan And Another vs Noora And Another1987 SCMR 54 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment regarding the alienation of agricultural land inherited under custom. The core legal questions concerned whether the suit filed by the deceased’s sisters for a declaration of ownership was barred by limitation or the provisions of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, and whether the alienation of the property by a female limited owner was valid. The Supreme Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which held that the limited estate held by the petitioner terminated upon the enforcement of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, thereby invalidating the subsequent sale. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs, as co-sharers in possession, were entitled to seek a declaration, and that the suit was neither time-barred nor hit by the provisions of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. Consequently, the Court found no grounds to interfere with the lower courts' judgments, upholding the principle that limited customary estates were extinguished by the 1962 Act, precluding such alienations.
Questions settled- Whether a suit for declaration is maintainable under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act when the plaintiffs are in joint possession as co-sharers?
- Does the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, terminate a limited estate held under custom?
- Can a female limited owner validly alienate property after the enforcement of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962?
- Mst. Begum Bibi And Others vs Abdul Sattar1987 SCMR 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arose from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell Colony agricultural land. The trial court and first appellate court dismissed the suit, holding that the agreement lacked legal effect because permission from the Collector under Section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 had not been obtained. The High Court reversed these findings and decreed the suit. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decree and dismissed the appeal. The Court examined whether an agreement to sell Government colony land entered into prior to obtaining full proprietary rights or formal sanction violates Section 19 of the Act. The Supreme Court held that where proprietary rights have matured or where the agreement stipulates the transfer of property after proprietary rights are acquired or sanction is obtained, the agreement does not violate Section 19. Since the proprietary rights had already vested upon full payment, the statutory bar did not render the agreement void or unenforceable.
Questions settled- Does an agreement to sell Colony land violate Section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 if proprietary rights have already matured in favour of the vendor?
- Is an agreement to sell Government land void under Section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 when the execution of the sale deed is postponed until proprietary rights are acquired?
- Mst. Balob Egum vs Abdul Salam1987 SCMR 659 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an ejectment application filed by the petitioner, Mst. Balo Begum, against the respondent, Abdul Salam, under the Displaced Persons Act, alleging non-payment of rent. The respondent contested the application, claiming the petitioner had entered into a sale agreement renouncing her right to rent, and further alleged that the petitioner was not the true transferee of the property. The Rent Controller framed a preliminary issue regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant but declined to decide it, citing the pendency of a civil suit for specific performance filed by the respondent. The Sind High Court dismissed the petitioner's appeal in limine, affirming that the ownership dispute required civil court adjudication. Upon petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether a Rent Controller can refuse to determine the relationship of landlord and tenant simply because a separate civil suit regarding title is pending. The Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the Rent Controller's failure to decide the preliminary issue and the potential frivolousness of the respondent's plea raised substantial questions of law requiring further consideration.
Questions settled- Can a Rent Controller refuse to determine the relationship of landlord and tenant solely because a civil suit regarding title is pending?
- Is a Rent Controller obligated to decide a preliminary issue framed in an ejectment application?
- Does the pendency of a suit for specific performance automatically oust the jurisdiction of a Rent Controller to determine the relationship of landlord and tenant?
- Mst. Amina Khatoon And Others vs Abdullah Jan And Other1987 SCMR 1817 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-04-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Baluchistan High Court dated 23-7-1986, which had allowed appeals and remanded the suit to the Additional District Judge II, Quetta, for a fresh judgment and decree on merits after deciding certain legal issues. The core legal questions involved whether the civil suit was barred by the principles of res judicata and whether it was barred by limitation. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the plea of res judicata was not pressed by the petitioner's counsel, and the plea of limitation was untenable because the plaintiff had actively pursued the correction of revenue mutation entries, succeeding ultimately on 29-5-1979, rendering the suit filed thereafter well within time. The Court dismissed the petition, upholding the remand order for a decision in accordance with the law.
Questions settled- Whether a civil suit is barred by limitation when filed after the final correction of revenue mutation entries relating to the dispute?
- Can an appellate court remand a suit for a fresh judgment and decree after deciding preliminary legal issues?
- Mst. Allah Rakhi And Others vs Imdad Khan And Other1987 SCMR 1428 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the cancellation and re-verification of a claimant's property entitlement under evacuee laws. The core legal questions involve whether a property proposal made in favour of a claimant was lawfully cancelled without notice, and whether the failure of settlement functionaries to properly record and transmit verified claims can prejudice a genuine claimant's rights. The Supreme Court held that an administrative cancellation of a land proposal passed in violation of natural justice (without notice to the affected party) and based on a misreading of official records cannot be sustained, and that administrative omissions or delinquencies by settlement authorities cannot defeat a claimant's valid entitlement. The Court laid down the principle that the failure of statutory functionaries to perform their legal obligations regarding claim verification cannot be construed to the detriment of a claimant right holder, and that orders affecting property rights must strictly adhere to procedural fairness and notice.
Questions settled- Whether an order cancelling a land proposal without issuing notice to the affected party violates the rules of natural justice?
- Can the failure of settlement functionaries to correctly process and transmit a verified claim form prejudice the valuable rights of a claimant right holder?
- Whether a High Court judge exercising writ jurisdiction can act as an appellate authority over the factual findings of a Notified Officer?
- Mst. Allah Jawai And Others vs Amir Khan And Other1987 SCMR 736 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a pre-emption suit filed against the petitioners-vendees regarding the purchase of land via Mutation No. 1724. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the pre-emptors, and the first appellate court and Lahore High Court dismissed the subsequent appeal and civil revision respectively. The petitioners sought leave to appeal on the grounds that possession was transferred earlier making the suit time-barred, and that the right of pre-emption based on collateral status was declared un-Islamic. The Supreme Court held that the sale concerned an undivided fractional share of joint land incapable of physical possession, that the plea of limitation was a mixed question of law and fact not raised in the original pleadings, and that no grounds existed to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, affirming that limitation pleas not raised in pleadings cannot be entertained at appellate stages when involving mixed questions of fact and law.
Questions settled- Can a plea of limitation be raised for the first time before the first appellate court when it involves a mixed question of law and fact?
- Is physical possession capable of being taken of an undivided fractional share of joint land in a pre-emption matter?
- Whether concurrent findings of lower courts on pre-emption suits warrant interference by the Supreme Court without compelling legal grounds?
- Mst. Akhtar Bibi And Others vs Mansoor Ahmad Malik And Other1987 SCMR 1425 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute over the transfer of a house located in Krishan Nagar, Lahore, by settlement authorities. The dispute involved competing claims between the respondents and the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, Habibullah. The settlement authorities had determined that the property was indivisible and that the respondents held possession prior to the petitioners' predecessor. The High Court, exercising its writ jurisdiction, found no legal infirmity in these factual findings and declined to interfere with the transfer order. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the High Court's refusal to interfere was proper, as the findings of the settlement authorities regarding the indivisibility of the property and the priority of possession were supported by the record. The Court affirmed that in the absence of any jurisdictional error or illegality in the findings of the settlement authorities, the High Court correctly exercised its discretion to uphold the transfer. Consequently, the petition was found to be without merit and was dismissed.
Questions settled- Can the High Court interfere with the factual findings of settlement authorities regarding property transfer in writ jurisdiction?
- Does the priority of possession constitute a valid ground for the transfer of an indivisible property by settlement authorities?
- Mst. Aisha And 23 Others vs Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue And 61987 SCMR 1395 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners, Muslim legal heirs of the original allottee Muhammad Ismail of agricultural land in a Co-operative Farming Society, sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld the succession of a nominated grandson over the general heirs. The original allottee and his subsequent nominee had made successive nominations under the Society's bye-laws. The Collector had earlier resumed the land for non-payment of dues, but the Board of Revenue set aside the resumption upon clearance of dues and directed mutation in favour of all legal heirs under section 19-A of the Colonization of Government Lands Act. The High Court, however, declared the Board's order without jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine contentions that the High Court relied on an overruled precedent and that the Society's bye-laws could not override Muslim Personal Law relating to succession.
Questions settled- Whether the bye-laws of a Co-operative Farming Society can override the provisions of Muslim Personal Law relating to succession?
- Does a nominee of a member in a Co-operative Farming Society have an exclusive right to succeed to the allotted land to the exclusion of other legal heirs?
- Whether the Board of Revenue has the authority to set aside a land resumption order upon the clearance of government dues?
- Mst. Abida Hameed And Another vs Nizam Ud Din And Other1987 SCMR 76 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter originated from a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had allowed a Letters Patent Appeal concerning an urban settlement dispute involving the demarcation of two distinct properties, House No. H/7 and House No. H/8. The core legal question addressed whether the Settlement Commissioner's finding of fact regarding property demarcation was conclusive and immune from judicial review under Article 98 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The Supreme Court examined whether the Settlement Commissioner erred by relying on irrelevant evidence, such as post-partition possession, while failing to consider relevant municipal or Patwari records. The Court held that while findings of fact by a tribunal of conclusive jurisdiction are generally binding, they lose their sacrosanct status if the tribunal misreads evidence, excludes relevant records, or relies on extraneous factors. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to determine the competency of the Letters Patent Appeal and the justification for the Division Bench's interference with the Single Judge's initial judgment, emphasizing the necessity of reviewing proper property records.
Questions settled- Can a finding of fact by a tribunal of conclusive jurisdiction be subjected to judicial review if the tribunal misreads or excludes relevant evidence?
- Is a Letters Patent Appeal competent against a judgment arising from an urban settlement matter?
- Does the reliance on irrelevant evidence by a settlement authority render its findings of fact open to interference in writ jurisdiction?
- Mrs. Shamim Firdous Niaz vs Iftikhar Ahmed Syed And 5 Other1987 SCMR 1613 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-12-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter originated from an eviction petition filed by the deceased landlady, Chanda Begum, against the petitioner regarding residential premises, citing grounds of default, personal bona fide need, and nuisance. The Rent Controller granted the eviction order exclusively on the ground of personal requirement, a decision subsequently upheld by the High Court. The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the High Court's judgment. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the personal bona fide requirement of the premises by the respondents warranted interference. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the decision rested on findings of fact established by evidence on the record. The Court determined that there was no room for further re-appraisal of evidence at the appellate stage and that no substantial question of law had been raised to merit consideration. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, reaffirming the principle that concurrent findings of fact based on evidence are generally not subject to interference in further appeal.
Questions settled- Can the Supreme Court re-appraise evidence in a rent matter where concurrent findings of fact have been reached by lower courts?
- Is a finding of personal bona fide requirement for residential premises considered a question of fact?
- Mrs. Shahnoor Fazal vs Ghulam Akbar Mangi1987 SCMR 2051 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order that reversed a Rent Controller's decision, thereby dismissing an ejectment application filed by the petitioner against the respondent. The core legal question was whether a landlord can succeed in an ejectment application based on personal need when the specific grounds for that need—specifically, the insufficiency of currently vacant premises—were not pleaded in the original application or affidavit, but only emerged during cross-examination. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly identified a fatal deficiency in the petitioner's case. The Court affirmed that a party must plead and prove the specific grounds for personal need, including why existing vacant accommodation is insufficient. Because the petitioner failed to plead that the vacant flat was inadequate for her requirements, the Rent Controller erred by basing the ejectment order on evidence not supported by the pleadings. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, establishing the principle that evidence cannot substitute for necessary pleadings in rent control proceedings.
Questions settled- Can a landlord succeed in an ejectment application based on personal need if the specific grounds for that need were not pleaded?
- Is evidence adduced during cross-examination sufficient to support a claim for ejectment if the underlying facts were not pleaded in the application?
- Does a failure to plead the insufficiency of existing vacant premises preclude a landlord from seeking ejectment of a tenant on grounds of personal need?
- Mrs. M.S. Baroba vs Manzoor Ahmad1987 SCMR 1490 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court of Sind, which upheld an ejectment order against a tenant under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question is whether a landlord can seek eviction of a tenant under Section 14 of the Ordinance (personal use) when the landlord's stated intent is to demolish the premises for new construction, rather than to occupy the premises personally. The High Court had previously allowed the landlord to select one tenement for eviction. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, observing that the case raises a substantial question of law regarding the interpretation of Section 14. Specifically, the Court must determine if the ground of personal use is legally available when the landlord's objective is demolition and reconstruction, particularly where the approved building plan does not include the outhouses occupied by the tenants. The Court held that this issue is of first impression and requires authoritative interpretation, as it affects numerous similar cases.
Questions settled- Can a landlord seek eviction under Section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 on the ground of personal use when the actual intent is to demolish the premises?
- Does the ground of personal use under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 apply when the proposed building plan does not include the existing structures occupied by tenants?
- Mrs. Hussan Ara Bugti vs The Government of Baluchistan Through1987 SCMR 1834 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, a government employee, sought an inter-provincial transfer following her husband's transfer to Karachi. While awaiting the outcome of her transfer request, she applied for leave. Subsequently, the Department published a notice in a newspaper alleging she had failed to report for duty despite being informed of the rejection of her leave application. Relying on Rule 9(c) of the Baluchistan Civil Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1983, the authorities dismissed her from service. After her review petition was rejected, the Baluchistan Service Tribunal altered the dismissal to compulsory retirement. The petitioner challenged this before the Supreme Court, arguing she was condemned unheard, as she believed her leave was granted and never received notice of its rejection. The core legal question concerns whether the summary dismissal procedure under Rule 9(c) was validly applied without proper notice to the employee. The Court granted leave to appeal, finding that the contentions regarding the lack of proper notice and the contradictory nature of the published notice required further judicial examination.
Questions settled- Can a civil servant be dismissed for wilful absence under Rule 9(c) of the Baluchistan Civil Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1983 without proof of proper service of notice?
- Does a newspaper notice containing contradictory information regarding the status of a leave application satisfy the requirements for disciplinary action under the Baluchistan Civil Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1983?
- Is a dismissal order valid if the employee was under a bona fide impression that their leave application had been granted?
- Mrs. Haliman Hanif Moonno O vs Mrs. Ismat Kamal And 2 Other1987 SCMR 95 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, arising from a dispute over the allotment and subsequent auction of a plot of land by the Murree Improvement Trust. The core legal questions involve whether the High Court erred in failing to dismiss an appeal as improperly constituted after the petitioner, an auction-purchaser and necessary party, was removed from the array of respondents, and whether provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the Specific Relief Act 1877, and the Transfer of Property Act 1882 were misconstrued. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, determining that the contentions raised by the petitioner regarding the improper constitution of the appeal and the potential misapplication of law warranted further examination. The Court ordered that the case be heard on the existing record, permitted the filing of additional documents, and issued an interim order maintaining the status quo of the property in dispute. The key principle established is that the improper removal of a necessary party from an appeal may constitute a failure to exercise jurisdiction, necessitating judicial review.
Questions settled- Does the removal of a necessary party from the array of respondents render an appeal as not legally and properly constituted?
- Can the failure to implead an auction-purchaser in a suit concerning the property purchased at auction result in a failure to exercise jurisdiction?
- Mrs. Gunj Khatoon And Another vs The Province of Sind Through Secretary, Revenue Department, Karachi1987 SCMR 2084 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves civil appeals directed against a common judgment of the Sind High Court concerning the determination of adequate compensation for land and fruit trees acquired by the Government of West Pakistan under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for the establishment of Korangi Township. The core legal questions relate to the proper assessment of market value, the consideration of the potential value of the acquired land, and the binding nature of the claims submitted by claimants under Section 9 of the Act. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court erred by relying solely on past sales and ignoring the potential value of the land, and further affirmed that a claimant is strictly bound by the particulars of their claim submitted under Section 9. Consequently, the appeals were allowed, enhancing the compensation rates for both the acquired lands and the fruit trees, along with statutory allowances and interest.
Questions settled- Whether the market value of land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 should be determined solely by reference to past sales or by also considering its potential value?
- Is a claimant bound by the particulars and amount of compensation claimed in response to a notice under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894?
- How should the value of fruit trees standing on acquired land be assessed when direct evidence of net income is lacking?
- Mrs. B.S. Khan vs Pakistan State Oil Co. Ltd.1987 SCMR 577 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed an eviction application filed by a lessee against a sub-lessee. The core legal question is whether premises owned by the Karachi Port Trust (KPT) but leased to a private party are exempt from the provisions of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, by virtue of a government notification, thereby depriving the Rent Controller of jurisdiction over disputes between such lessees and their sub-lessees. The High Court had held that because the land belonged to the KPT, it was exempt from the Ordinance, rendering the lessee incompetent to initiate eviction proceedings. The Supreme Court, noting that the interpretation of the exemption notification and its applicability to properties perpetually leased by the KPT involves a substantial question of law affecting numerous cases, granted leave to appeal. The key principle identified is that the scope of statutory exemptions for government-owned properties must be strictly construed to determine whether they extend to sub-tenancies created by lessees of such properties.
Questions settled- Does the exemption of Karachi Port Trust premises from the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 apply to properties leased out by the Trust to private individuals?
- Is a lessee of Karachi Port Trust land competent to file an eviction application against a sub-lessee under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
- Does the Rent Controller have jurisdiction over eviction disputes involving land owned by the Karachi Port Trust?
- Moulvi Muhammad Hassan vs Muhammad Amin And Other1987 SCMR 1737 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a civil dispute over the ownership of the roof situated above shops Nos. 379 and 380 in Loralai Town. The petitioner sought a declaration and perpetual injunction against the respondents, challenging administrative orders that permitted the respondents to construct a parda wall on the roof of shop No. 379. The petitioner claimed the roof was part of his house, while the respondents asserted ownership based on the transfer of shop No. 379. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could establish title to the roof through oral evidence in the absence of documentary proof. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, holding that the petitioner failed to produce any transfer order or title deed to substantiate his claim. The Court affirmed the principle that oral evidence cannot substitute for a document of title in property disputes. Furthermore, the Court noted the significant delay of approximately twenty years in filing the suit, rendering the claim meritless. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, confirming the High Court’s findings as unexceptionable.
Questions settled- Can oral evidence serve as a substitute for a document of title in a property ownership dispute?
- Is a suit for declaration and injunction maintainable when the plaintiff fails to produce a title deed for the disputed property?
- Does a significant delay in filing a suit for property rights affect the merits of the claim?
- Mistri Muhammad Hassan And Another vs Haji Abdul Hameed Kashani1987 SCMR 1756(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-04-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal. The core legal question involves the continuation of appellate proceedings in light of a settlement reached between the contesting parties. The court's decision is to grant the request of the petitioners' counsel to dismiss the petition as withdrawn, based on the statement made by the learned counsel for the caveator that an out-of-court settlement has been successfully reached between the parties. The key principle laid down is that where parties have amicably resolved their dispute outside the court, the petition may be dismissed as withdrawn upon the request of the petitioner.
Questions settled- Can a petition be dismissed as withdrawn when the dispute has been settled outside the court?
- Whether the court will permit the withdrawal of a petition upon the request of the petitioners' counsel?
- Mistri Haji Muhammad Din vs Ali Ahmed And Other1987 SCMR 1794 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenges a High Court judgment that declared the petitioner's suit for possession of land infructuous following the expiry of the initial lease term. The core legal question is whether a suit for possession, based on a lease containing a renewal clause, becomes infructuous upon the expiry of the initial term when the lessee claims a right to renewal and the lessor subsequently grants a new lease to the occupant. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, determining that the arguments raised substantial questions of law requiring further consideration. The Court observed that the petitioner’s claim—that the lease was not ipso facto determined and that the lessee possessed a right of first refusal before the lessor could demise the property to a third party—merited examination. The holding emphasizes that a suit does not necessarily become infructuous if the underlying legal rights, specifically regarding renewal covenants and the status of the occupant, remain in dispute and require judicial determination on the merits.
Questions settled- Does a suit for possession of land become infructuous upon the expiry of the initial lease term if the lease contains a renewal clause?
- Does a lessee have a right of first refusal when a covenant for renewal of a lease is dependent on fresh terms to be agreed between the parties?
- Can a court in revisional jurisdiction declare a suit infructuous based on supervening events without determining the underlying rights of the parties?
- Miss Farhat Akbar vs Board of Intermediate and Secondary1987 SCMR 50 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the dismissal of a writ petition challenging the quashment of the petitioner's F.Sc. examination results. The petitioner, who had already passed the F.Sc. examination from the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Multan, subsequently appeared in examinations conducted by the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Bahawalpur, to improve her marks without disclosing her prior qualification, doing so in parts rather than all subjects at once. A Sub-committee recommended that the Chairman consider her case under Hardship Rules, but the Chairman declined and ordered the quashment of her subsequent results, which the Board ratified. The core legal question concerns the interpretation of Rule 17 regarding the improvement of marks and the scope of the Chairman's discretion under the Hardship Regulations. The Supreme Court held that appearing for improvement cannot be done by parts unless covered by hardship rules, and the Chairman's refusal to exercise discretion under the Hardship Regulations was not arbitrary or mala fide. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the High Court's judgment.
Questions settled- Can a candidate improve their examination marks in parts under Rule 17 of the Bahawalpur Board Rules?
- Whether the Chairman of the Board has absolute discretion under Regulation No.10 Chapter IV to grant relief in hardship cases?
- Is the exercise of discretion by the Chairman under the hardship rules open to judicial review when not shown to be arbitrary or mala fide?
- Mirza Muhammad Ayub Jan Beg vs Ministry of Finance, Islamabad And Other1987 SCMR 1616 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal concerning his retirement. The core legal question revolves around whether a civil servant, after seeking premature retirement and enjoying a substantial part of the leave preparatory to retirement, can subsequently revoke his request for retirement. The Supreme Court held that once a civil servant gives intimation for premature retirement and acts upon it, he brings an end to his service tenure unilaterally and has no power to revoke it, particularly in view of the express bar in the applicable rules and established precedent. The key principle laid down is that a government servant cannot revoke a voluntary retirement request once it has been accepted and acted upon by both parties, nor can a new factual plea regarding notice periods be raised for the first time before the apex court when it was not agitated before the Tribunal.
Questions settled- Whether a civil servant can revoke an application for premature retirement after enjoying a substantial part of the leave preparatory to retirement?
- Does a civil servant have the power to unilaterally revoke their retirement intimation after service tenure has been brought to an end?
- Can a new plea regarding the insufficiency of notice for retirement be raised for the first time in a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court?
- Mirza Maqbool Ahmad vs Shabir Hussain Shah And 3 Other1987 SCMR 1967 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-08-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns contempt of court proceedings initiated by the petitioner against the respondents, who were legal heirs of a deceased party in a previously decided Supreme Court appeal. The core legal question was whether the respondents and their counsel committed contempt by filing a civil suit challenging the property transfer order (P.T.O.) and the inclusion of specific property in the amended permanent transfer deed (P.T.D.), despite the Supreme Court having already conclusively adjudicated the entitlement of the parties in the earlier appeal. The respondents had sought declaratory relief in a lower court, which led to an interim injunction against the petitioner, prompting the contempt application. Upon review, the Court examined the conduct of the respondents and their counsel, noting that the suit attempted to re-litigate issues already settled by the Supreme Court. However, as the respondents and their counsel expressed unconditional apology, contrition, and remorse for their actions, the Court accepted these as sufficient amends. Consequently, the Court discharged the contempt notices, emphasizing that while judicial orders must be respected, genuine remorse can mitigate contemptuous conduct.
Questions settled- Can a party file a civil suit to challenge a property transfer order that has already been conclusively adjudicated by the Supreme Court?
- Does filing a suit that attempts to re-litigate a settled matter constitute contempt of court?
- Can an unconditional apology and expression of remorse serve as sufficient grounds to discharge a contempt of court notice?
- Mirza Daud Baig vs Additional District Judge, Gujranwala And Other1987 SCMR 1161 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition arose from a proceeding under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964 concerning the proper court-fee payable on a memorandum of appeal filed before the District Court against a decree of a Family Court. The petitioner contended that the flat court-fee of fifteen rupees prescribed for a plaint under Section 19 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964 (as amended in Punjab) should also apply to a memorandum of appeal, whereas the respondents argued that court-fee was payable ad valorem under the Court Fees Act 1870. The Supreme Court held that Family Courts and District Courts are Civil Courts to which the Court Fees Act 1870 applies. Applying the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the Court held that the legislative concession under Section 19 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964 applies exclusively to plaints and not to memoranda of appeal. Consequently, court-fee on a memorandum of appeal filed under Section 14 must be paid ad valorem under Article 1 of Schedule I of the Court Fees Act 1870. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Is the court-fee on a memorandum of appeal against a Family Court decree payable ad valorem under the Court Fees Act 1870 or at the fixed rate prescribed for plaints under Section 19 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964?
- Does Section 19 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964 apply to extend the nominal court-fee concession to a memorandum of appeal?
- Whether a Family Court and the District Court hearing an appeal under Section 14 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 1964 are Courts of Justice subject to the Court Fees Act 1870?
- Mirza Ashraf Ali vs Abdul Hamid And Another1987 SCMR 1654 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the High Court of Baluchistan which set aside the eviction order passed against the respondent-tenant by the Rent Controller. The petitioner-landlord sought the eviction of the respondent on the grounds of subletting and default in the payment of rent. The Rent Controller dismissed the plea of subletting but found the respondent to be a defaulter, leading to an order of eviction. Upon appeal, the High Court re-appraised the evidence and concluded that the tenant was not a defaulter, noting that the landlord had admitted receiving rent up to a certain period and that the tenant had been depositing rent in court following the landlord's refusal to accept it, without denying the landlord-tenant relationship. Furthermore, the High Court maintained the concurrent finding that subletting was not proved. The Supreme Court held that where a tenant deposits rent in court due to the landlord's refusal to accept it and does not deny the landlord-tenant relationship, no default is established. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Does the deposit of rent in court after a landlord's refusal to accept it constitute a default in payment of rent?
- Can a tenant be held to be a wilful defaulter when the landlord-tenant relationship is not denied and rent was deposited due to refusal of acceptance?
- Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the allegation of subletting?
- Mirza Akram Beg vs Messrs Abdul Ghani And Other1987 SCMR 1284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal examines the correctness of a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside a finding of fact recorded by the Settlement Commissioner regarding whether a disputed residential property formed an integral part of an evacuee industrial concern, Krishna Ice Factory. The appellant, a P.T.D. holder, obtained transfer of the residential portion under Settlement Scheme No. 1, while the respondents subsequently purchased the ice factory at a public auction. The Additional Settlement Commissioner held that the appellant's transfer was erroneous because the property was part of the factory. However, the Settlement Commissioner reversed this decision upon examining pre-partition records, Khasra Amartis, and municipal assessment lists, which distinguished the factory's exact area on Khasra No. 8204 from the adjacent building site. The High Court interfered with this finding in constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner's finding of fact, being based on a thorough examination of fundamental pre-partition revenue and municipal records rather than post-partition conflicting reports, was unexceptionable and immune from interference in constitutional jurisdiction. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the Settlement Commissioner's order.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court can interfere with a finding of fact recorded by a Settlement Commissioner in constitutional jurisdiction when such finding is based on pre-partition revenue records?
- Does a subsequent auction-purchaser of an evacuee industrial concern acquire title to separate adjacent properties that were historically distinct in pre-partition records?
- Can post-partition survey reports override basic pre-partition revenue and municipal records in determining the boundaries of evacuee properties?
- Mir Muhammad Bashir vs The State1987 SCMR 894 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan examines the conviction of the appellant, a former Station Master, under section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, for the criminal breach of trust and misappropriation of railway freight charges. The appellant collected freight charges but deliberately failed to enter the arrival of the wagons and corresponding transactions in the relevant station registers until the fraud was detected during an official inspection months later. The appellant contended that the delay in remittance was a routine procedural occurrence awaiting source documents and lacked dishonest intention. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts establishing a calculated series of omissions and concealment sufficiently proved dishonest criminal intent amounting to criminal breach of trust. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction.
Questions settled- Whether the temporary detention of railway freight charges by a Station Master without entering them in official registers constitutes criminal breach of trust under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
- Does failure to record wagon arrivals and maintain statutory station registers establish the requisite dishonest intention for criminal misappropriation?
- Mian Zahid Sarfraz vs Raja Nadirspervaiz Khan And Other1987 SCMR 1107 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from an election petition filed under the Representation of the People Act, 1976, challenging the election of the respondent. The Election Tribunal decided a preliminary issue regarding the respondent's disqualification against the appellant but allowed the petition to proceed for further trial. The appellant appealed this interlocutory decision to the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether an order deciding a preliminary issue by an Election Tribunal constitutes an appealable "decision" under Section 67(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976. The Supreme Court held that the appeal was incompetent. The Court determined that the term "decision" in Section 67(3) is limited to the final orders enumerated in Section 67(1) that effectively conclude the trial of the election petition. The Court established the principle that the right of appeal under the Act is restricted to final judgments or orders that determine the merits of the controversy, thereby preventing piecemeal litigation and ensuring expeditious disposal of election matters, consistent with the legislative intent of the statute.
Questions settled- Is an interlocutory order passed by an Election Tribunal on a preliminary issue appealable under Section 67(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976?
- Does the term 'decision' in Section 67(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, encompass all orders passed by an Election Tribunal or only those enumerated in Section 67(1)?
- Can an appeal be maintained against an order of an Election Tribunal that does not conclude the trial of the election petition?
- Mian Muhammad Saleem And Others vs Mst. Hameeda Begum And Other1987 SCMR 624 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment disposes of two connected civil appeals arising from concurrent litigation concerning a disputed land transaction and a compromise agreement. The core legal questions involved the certainty of description in an agreement to sell for a decree of specific performance and whether a suit under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 could proceed when the alienees offered to satisfy the original debt in full. The Supreme Court held that where the identity of the land agreed to be sold cannot be ascertained with certainty from the terms of a compromise deed, a decree for specific performance cannot be granted. Furthermore, the Court held that if a debtor or alienee offers to satisfy the creditor's debt in its entirety, a suit under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 cannot be decreed, as the creditor has no right to set aside a transfer once the debt is tendered. The principle laid down is that uncertainty in a compromise agreement regarding property details bars specific performance, and a bona fide offer to pay off the underlying debt defeats a fraudulent transfer action.
Questions settled- Can a decree for specific performance be granted when the identity of the land agreed to be sold cannot be ascertained with certainty from the terms of a compromise deed?
- Does a suit filed under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act fail if the debtor or alienee offers to pay the full debt due to the creditors during the proceedings?
- Can a registered sale-deed be declared void and of no legal effect without a proper declaration sought in that regard?
- Mian Muhammad Munir vs Election Tribunal And Other1987 SCMR 317 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition challenging an Election Tribunal's order declaring the petitioner's election to the Lahore Municipal Corporation void. The petitioner contended that the irregularities identified by the Election Tribunal were insufficient to materially affect the election result and that there was no evidence linking the petitioner to the alleged illegalities. Upon review, the Supreme Court noted that the respondent did not dispute these contentions and consented to the setting aside of the lower court orders. Consequently, the Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, set aside the judgments of both the High Court and the Election Tribunal, and dismissed the original election petition. The judgment reaffirms the principle that for an election to be declared void based on irregularities, it must be demonstrated that such irregularities materially affected the election result and were committed with the knowledge or connivance of the returned candidate.
Questions settled- Can an election be declared void based on irregularities without evidence that they materially affected the result?
- Is it necessary to prove that election irregularities were committed with the instigation or connivance of the returned candidate to set aside an election?
- Mian Muhammad Inayat vs Haji Ghulam Nabi1987 SCMR 860 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners filed a suit to pre-empt a sale made by their father in favor of the respondent. The trial court rejected the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, citing the deliberate and contumacious underpayment of court fees, a decision upheld by the High Court. While the Supreme Court initially considered converting the petition for leave to appeal into an appeal based on the precedent in Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakoor Khan, the respondent argued that the matter had become infructuous. The respondent contended that because the right of pre-emption for lineal descendants under Section 15(a) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act had been declared repugnant to Islamic injunctions in Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Syed Kamal Shah, and no pre-emption decree had been passed in favor of the petitioners, the suit was no longer maintainable. Recognizing the significant legal importance of whether the invalidation of the statutory right of pre-emption renders pending litigation infructuous, the Court ordered the matter to be placed before a larger Bench.
Questions settled- Does the declaration of Section 15(a) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act as invalid render pending pre-emption suits based on that provision infructuous?
- Can a suit for pre-emption proceed if no decree was passed in favor of the pre-emptor prior to the invalidation of the underlying statutory right?
- Mian Farooq Iqbal And 3 Others vs Haji Nawaz Khan1987 SCMR 226 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute concerning a decree for specific performance of an agreement to sell property. The core legal question is whether a decree-holder, who is prevented from completing a transaction due to an interim injunction issued in a separate partition suit, is entitled to an extension of time to deposit the balance sale price. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the petitioners were unable to comply with the original payment deadline due to the existing injunction. Consequently, the Court directed the trial court to expedite the partition suit and granted the petitioners an extension of time to deposit the balance amount. The key principle laid down is that courts possess the equitable power to extend the time for compliance with a decree when external legal impediments, such as an interim injunction, render strict adherence to the original timeline impossible or unjust, thereby ensuring that the rights of the parties are not prejudiced by circumstances beyond their control.
Questions settled- Can a court extend the time for depositing the balance sale price in a specific performance decree if an interim injunction prevents the transaction?
- Does an interim injunction in a separate partition suit constitute a valid ground for failing to comply with a payment deadline in a specific performance decree?
- Is a court empowered to expedite the disposal of a pending partition suit when it affects the execution of a decree for specific performance?
- Messrs Zeenit Textile Mills Ltd. vs The Government of the Punjab1987 SCMR 770 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from the dismissal in default of the petitioner's writ petition by the Lahore High Court due to non-appearance, and the subsequent rejection of applications for its restoration and condonation of delay. The core legal question concerned whether the absence of a counsel whose case was suddenly fixed in a supplementary cause list could be excused where the Bar Association failed to supply him a copy of that list, and whether such publication constituted sufficient notice. The Supreme Court held that while the transmission of regular cause lists to the Bar Association constitutes sufficient notice, supplementary cause lists issued sporadically at late hours stand on a different footing, and the established practice of supplying them directly to concerned counsel must be factored in. Setting aside the High Court's orders, the Supreme Court remanded the matter for a fresh decision, directing the High Court to examine whether the Bar Association had failed to supply the supplementary list to the petitioner's counsel, and if so, to decide the case on merits.
Questions settled- Whether publication of a supplementary cause list in the Bar Association constitutes sufficient notice to a counsel whose case is fixed therein?
- Is the absence of a counsel excusable when the Bar Association fails to supply a copy of the supplementary cause list in accordance with established practice?
- Does the transmission of regular weekly or daily cause lists to the Bar Association amount to notice to all advocates whose cases are listed?
- Messrs Zeenit Textile Mills Ltd. vs The Government of the Punjab And Other1987 SCMR 775 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter originated from the dismissal of a writ petition for default by the Lahore High Court due to the absence of the petitioner and its counsel. The petitioner filed an application under Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, seeking restoration, arguing that the case was placed on a supplementary cause list that was not provided to them, rather than the regular weekly list. The High Court dismissed this application, citing the publication of the supplementary list and the lack of a formal condonation of delay application. A second restoration application was similarly dismissed, relying on precedents regarding counsel absence. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal. The core legal question concerns whether a dismissal for default is justified when a party claims lack of notice due to the non-receipt of a supplementary cause list, and whether precedents involving counsel absence in regular lists are applicable to situations involving supplementary lists. The Supreme Court held that these contentions required deeper examination, necessitating a full hearing on the merits of the restoration application.
Questions settled- Can a writ petition be dismissed for default if the cause was listed in a supplementary list not provided to the petitioner?
- Does the failure to provide a supplementary cause list to counsel constitute sufficient grounds for restoring a dismissed petition?
- Are precedents regarding counsel absence in regular cause lists distinguishable from cases involving supplementary cause lists?
- Messrs Yousuf Re Rolling Millss vs The Collector of Customs And Another1987 SCMR 1609 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Sind High Court regarding the detention of imported goods by customs authorities. The petitioner imported two consignments of goods, paid the assessed customs duties, but the goods were subsequently detained. During the pendency of the petitioner's constitutional petition challenging the detention, the respondents initiated proceedings under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969. The High Court declared the detention of the goods illegal and ordered their release, but simultaneously observed that the customs authorities were competent to initiate or continue adjudication proceedings under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969, even after the goods were cleared or released. The petitioner challenged these observations, arguing that they were legally incorrect and would prejudice their defense in the ongoing Section 32 proceedings. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, finding that the petitioner's submission regarding the validity of the High Court's observations on the maintainability of Section 32 proceedings in these circumstances warranted further consideration by the Court.
Questions settled- Can customs authorities initiate proceedings under Section 32 of the Customs Act 1969 after goods have been cleared and released?
- Does the release of detained goods invalidate subsequent adjudication proceedings under the Customs Act 1969?
- Are customs authorities authorized to detain goods under Section 32 of the Customs Act 1969 after they have already been examined and cleared?
- Messrs Tabaq Restaurants vs Messrs Tabaq Restaurant1987 SCMR 1090 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns three civil appeals regarding the registration of a trade mark and the grant of interim injunctions in a dispute between two restaurant businesses operating under the name 'TABAQ.' The core legal questions were whether a suit for 'passing off' must be filed in a District Court under Section 73 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, and whether the pendency of such a suit dictates the appellate forum under Section 76 of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the District Court is the competent forum for suits involving trade mark infringement or rights relating to trade marks, including 'passing off' actions. Consequently, the Sind High Court correctly returned the appeals for presentation before the Lahore High Court, as the pending suit in the District Court at Rawalpindi triggered the proviso to Section 76. The Court affirmed that trade marks constitute property rights protected by law, and the statutory provisions of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, provide a comprehensive framework for both registered and unregistered marks, with Section 73 being broad enough to encompass passing off claims related to trade marks.
Questions settled- Does the term 'otherwise relating to any right in a trade mark' in Section 73 of the Trade Marks Act 1940 include actions for passing off?
- Is a suit for passing off involving a trade mark required to be instituted in a District Court rather than a court of lower grade?
- Does the pendency of a suit in a District Court concerning a trade mark mandate that appeals against Registrar decisions be filed in the High Court having jurisdiction over that District Court?
- Can an interim injunction be granted to restrain the use of a trade name in a passing off action?
- Messrs Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd. vs Pak Cigarettes Labour1987 SCMR 575 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Sind High Court dated 21-5-1985, which dismissed the petitioner's Constitution Petition challenging the Federal Government's order referring an industrial dispute to the National Industrial Relations Commission (N.I.R.C.) under section 33(1) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and the subsequent awards given by respondents. The core legal question raised was whether the Federal Government was competent to make a reference under section 33(1) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, during the pendency of conciliation proceedings, and whether the dispute was of national importance warranting such reference. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the submissions made by the petitioner's counsel regarding the competency of the reference and the nature of the dispute deserved consideration by the Court. The key principle laid down is that contentious legal questions concerning the statutory powers of the Federal Government to refer industrial disputes during ongoing conciliation proceedings warrant a full hearing by the apex court.
Questions settled- Is the Federal Government competent to make a reference under section 33(1) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 during the pendency of conciliation proceedings?
- Whether an industrial dispute must be of national importance to be referred to the National Industrial Relations Commission under section 33(1) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
- Messrs Mian Muhammad Sharif & Co. vs Commissioner of Income Tax1987 SCMR 1254 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These appeals, directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, arise out of income tax references concerning assessment years 1969-70 and 1970-71. The appellant firm, engaged in construction work, challenged the disallowance and treatment of certain business expenses relating to machinery and vehicle repairs by tax authorities who had rejected the accounts under the proviso to section 13 of the Income-tax Act, 1922 and applied a flat gross profit rate based on past history. The High Court dismissed the references as infructuous, holding that whether the disputed expenses were debited to the trading account or the profit and loss account, the net taxable profit remained unchanged and the questions were merely of academic interest. The Supreme Court examined the contentions regarding the application of section 10(2) and English precedents, and held that the High Court's conclusion was unexceptionable since the net result on income tax liability was identical under either method of accounting. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals.
Questions settled- Whether an assessment to income tax can lawfully be made under section 10 of the Income-tax Act, 1922 disregarding mandatory statutory deductions?
- Whether the Income-tax Officer is justified in rejecting account results and applying a gross profit rate based on past history when an assessee deviates from a regularly employed method of accounting?
- Whether a High Court is justified in dismissing income-tax references as infructuous when the disputed accounting treatment results in no material change to the net taxable income?
- Messrs Madina Milk and Ghee Store vs Sadiq Ali Patwa1987 SCMR 649(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-12-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal arising from a landlord-tenant dispute. The core legal question raised is whether a tenant can be held guilty as a defaulter in the payment of rent when the claimed rent is admittedly time-barred. The Court held that the submission regarding time-barred rent deserves consideration and granted leave to appeal. Consequently, the Court laid down the principle that the debatable issue of whether non-payment of time-barred rent constitutes default warrants a full hearing on appeal, during which conditional protection from eviction is granted subject to the continued deposit of rent in court.
Questions settled- Can a tenant be held guilty as a defaulter in the payment of rent if the rent in question is time-barred?
- Whether leave to appeal should be granted when a substantial question regarding time-barred rent arrears arises?
- Messrs Karachi Industrial and Textile Mills vs Muhammad Shafi1987 SCMR 1575 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of the petitioner's rent appeal regarding tenement No.G-111, Lawrence Road, Karachi. The core legal question concerned whether a tenant who withheld rent during protracted litigation before settlement authorities regarding the landlord's title can be excused from default and whether discretion should be exercised in the tenant's favour. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was a wilful defaulter who failed to pay rent pursuant to statutory notice, and affirmed the concurrent findings ordering ejectment. The Court laid down the principle that a pending dispute regarding property title before the Settlement Department does not constitute a valid ground to condone a tenant's default in the payment of rent.
Questions settled- Does a pending dispute regarding property title before the Settlement Department constitute a valid ground to condone a tenant's default in the payment of rent?
- Can discretion be exercised in favour of a tenant to relieve them from the consequences of default once they are held to be a wilful defaulter?
- Messrs Irfan & Company vs The Province of the Punjab1987 SCMR 834 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning a contractual dispute over the purchase of flood-damaged wheat. The petitioner entered into an agreement with the Provincial Government of Punjab to purchase wheat for export, but disputes arose regarding the quantity supplied and alleged breaches of contract by both parties. The trial court had awarded damages to the petitioner based on the price difference of wheat not supplied from a specific centre. The High Court, however, modified this decree, holding that the petitioner was only entitled to a refund of security and excess payments, as the underlying contract did not mandate the supply of specific quantities from particular centres. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to damages for non-supply of wheat from a specific location. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the lower appellate court correctly interpreted the contract terms and evidence, concluding that no specific obligation existed to supply wheat from the disputed centre.
Questions settled- Is a party entitled to damages for non-supply of goods when the underlying contract does not specify quantities from particular locations?
- Can a court award damages based on price differences if the contract lacks a specific obligation to supply from a designated source?
- Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. vs Messrs Super Electric Industries1987 SCMR 1068 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing an application to vacate an order suspending the execution of a money decree passed in a recovery suit. The petitioner Bank challenged the High Court's continuation of the stay of execution pending a Regular First Appeal. The core legal question considered by the Supreme Court was whether a stay order passed by an appellate court during the pendency of an appeal is governed by the time limitations prescribed under Order XXXIX, Rule 4-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applicable to suits, or by Order XLI, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applicable to appeals. Granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held that an interim stay order passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Order XLI, Rule 5 is not restricted in its duration by the provisions of Order XXXIX, Rule 4-A. The key principle laid down is that stay orders granted under Order XLI, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 do not carry the six-month statutory lifespan restriction applicable to temporary injunctions governed by Order XXXIX.
Questions settled- Whether an order staying execution of a decree passed by an appellate court under Order XLI, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is subject to the time restriction imposed by Order XXXIX, Rule 4-A?
- Does Order XLI, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 restrict the span of validity of a stay order granted in appellate proceedings?
- Messrs A.C.E. Enterprises Through Khalid Pervez vs Additional District1987 SCMR 1174 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that reversed an appellate order in an ejectment case. The landlord sought the eviction of the tenant on the ground of personal need for his sons. While the Rent Controller ordered ejectment, the Appellate Authority reversed this finding, citing a failure to properly assess the needs of all sons. The High Court, exercising constitutional jurisdiction, set aside the appellate order, holding that the lower court misread evidence and failed to apply the law as enunciated by superior courts. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that where Rent Control Authorities fail to act in accordance with the legal principles established by superior courts, such errors are subject to correction through writ jurisdiction. The Court found the High Court correctly exercised its authority in this instance. Ultimately, the petition was dismissed, though the Court granted the tenant an additional four months to vacate the premises, contingent upon a voluntary undertaking to surrender possession and continue paying rent.
Questions settled- Can a High Court interfere with findings of fact by a Rent Control Authority in its constitutional jurisdiction?
- Does a failure by Rent Control Authorities to follow the enunciation of law by superior courts justify interference in writ jurisdiction?
- Messers National Construction Co. vs Thewest Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Through Its Chairman1987 PLD Supreme Court 461 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Court arises out of a judgment of the Lahore High Court setting aside an entire arbitration award made in favour of the appellant. The dispute originated from a contract for railway track renovation awarded by the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority to the appellant. Upon completion, disputes regarding payments led to a suit for rendition of accounts, which was stayed under section 34 of the Arbitration Act and referred to an arbitrator, who awarded a specific sum across multiple items. The trial court made the award a rule of the court, but the High Court set aside the whole award upon finding two items erroneous. The core legal question was whether an award is entirely vitiated and incapable of being upheld when a portion of it is found invalid or based on error. The Supreme Court held that the invalid and separable portions of an award can be modified or struck off under section 15 of the Arbitration Act without setting aside the entire award, provided the valid parts are severable and do not depend on the invalid findings. The Court laid down that separable items in an arbitration award can be severed and the remainder maintained if they do not affect the rest of the adjudication.
Questions settled- Whether an entire arbitration award must be set aside if a part of it is found to be invalid or erroneous?
- Can the court modify or correct an arbitration award by separating the invalid portion under section 15 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
- Does the existence of a real difference or dispute constitute an essential condition for the arbitrator's jurisdiction?
- Whether an accidental error or mistake by an arbitrator amounts to legal misconduct sufficient to vitiate the whole award?
- Mehrullah Khan Kibzai And Others vs Government of Baluchistan And Other1987 SCMR 1715 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an appeal against a judgment of the Baluchistan Service Tribunal, which upheld the termination of the appellants' services. The appellants, initially appointed as ad hoc Markaz Managers, were later regularized in the Local Councils Service subject to a two-year probation period. Their services were subsequently dispensed with due to unsatisfactory work performance. The core legal questions were whether the appellants were entitled to reversion to their parent department rather than termination, and whether the termination order, citing unsatisfactory work, required formal departmental proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the appellants were appointed by direct recruitment, not transfer, and thus had no right to reversion. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that under the applicable rules, a probationer's services could be dispensed with for unsatisfactory work without formal departmental proceedings, provided the action occurred within the probationary period. The Court established that citing unsatisfactory work as a reason for termination during probation does not constitute a stigma requiring formal disciplinary inquiry, as the appointing authority retains the discretion to dispense with services under the governing service rules.
Questions settled- Can a probationer's services be terminated for unsatisfactory work without formal departmental proceedings?
- Does the mention of 'unsatisfactory work' in a termination order for a probationer constitute a stigma requiring a formal inquiry?
- Is a probationer appointed by direct recruitment entitled to reversion to a previous department upon termination?
- Mehr Din vs The Home Secretary, Government of the Punjab1987 SCMR 1407 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a constitutional petition. The core legal question raised was whether a convict under a sentence of death can be placed by jail authorities in a condemned prisoner cell before their sentence is confirmed and their appeal is disposed of. The Supreme Court of Pakistan declined to answer the abstract question because the records revealed that the sentences of death for the individuals concerned had already been confirmed by the High Court and their appeals had subsequently been dismissed by the Supreme Court, rendering their current confinement in condemned prisoner cells entirely lawful and unexceptionable. Consequently, the Court held that the case was not a fit one to resolve the hypothetical issue raised, and the petition for special leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Can a convict under a sentence of death be placed in a condemned prisoner cell before sentence confirmation?
- Whether confinement in a condemned prisoner cell is lawful after the dismissal of appeals by the Supreme Court?
- Mehboob Shah And Another vs The State1987 SCMR 14480 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arises from the concurrent convictions and sentences of death awarded to the appellants under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the double murder of Mehboob and Inayat Hussain. The core legal questions involved the assessment of ocular testimony, potential conflicts between ocular and medical evidence due to the medical officer describing certain injuries as stab wounds, and the evidentiary value of recoveries and witness relationships. The Supreme Court held that the medical evidence did not conflict with the ocular testimony, as the large dimensions of the injuries were consistent with heavy sharp-edged weapons like a hatchet or Toka, and the medical officer had mislabeled them due to inexperience. The Court further affirmed that the presence of the related eye-witnesses was natural and uncontradicted by any proven enmity. Upholding the conviction, the Supreme Court laid down the principle that apparent discrepancies between medical descriptions and ocular accounts must be evaluated in light of the actual dimensions of the injuries and weapon types, and partially allowed the appeal by commuting the death sentence of the younger appellant to imprisonment for life on account of his tender age while maintaining the death sentence of the other.
Questions settled- Whether inconsistencies between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the nature of injuries warrant the rejection of eyewitness accounts?
- Does the relationship of eyewitnesses to the deceased render their testimony unreliable in the absence of proven enmity?
- Can the tender age of an accused person at the time of the commission of the offense serve as a mitigating circumstance to commute a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
- Mehar Elahi vs Nadeem Ahmad And Another1987 SCMR 1849 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-07-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court acquitting respondent No.1 Nadeem Ahmad of a charge under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and setting aside his death sentence. The trial court had convicted the respondent based on an approver's testimony, a judicial confession recorded by a City Magistrate, an extra-judicial confession, and recoveries. However, the High Court rejected all these evidentiary items and acquitted him. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court had discarded the judicial confession on dubious reasoning—specifically, merely because the magistrate noted that the accused 'appeared to be harassed' when produced, without making any explicit finding that he was tortured, maltreated, or compelled to confess. Finding sufficient grounds to re-examine the acquittal, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and issued non-bailable warrants against respondent No.1.
Questions settled- Whether a judicial confession can be discarded solely because the recording magistrate noted the accused appeared harassed, without a finding of torture or coercion?
- Whether leave to appeal against an acquittal should be granted where the High Court relies on dubious reasoning to reject prosecution evidence?
- Maulvi Abdullah And Others vs Abdul Aziz And Other1987 SCMR 1403 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment upholding an oral gift of immovable property made by a grandfather to the son of a predeceased son. The petitioners contended that the gift was void due to lack of registration and failure to deliver possession, arguing that the memorandum of gift was inadmissible. The core legal questions were whether an oral gift of immovable property is valid under Muslim Law, whether such a gift requires a registered instrument, and the applicability of the Transfer of Property Act 1882. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under Muslim Law, a valid gift of immovable property can be effected orally provided the essential formalities—delivery of possession and acceptance by the donee—are satisfied. The Court affirmed that Section 129 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 excludes Muslim gifts from the operation of the Act, including the registration requirements of Section 123. Consequently, an unregistered memorandum merely acknowledging a completed oral gift does not invalidate the transaction. The Court found concurrent findings of fact regarding possession and acceptance were sufficient to uphold the gift.
Questions settled- Is an oral gift of immovable property valid under Muslim Law?
- Does the Transfer of Property Act 1882 apply to gifts made under Muslim Law?
- Does an unregistered memorandum of gift invalidate an otherwise valid oral gift of immovable property?
- Are the formalities of delivery of possession and acceptance essential for a valid Muslim gift of immovable property?
- Maqsood Ahmad Shaikh vs The Islamic Republic of Pakistan Through Establishment Secretary, Government Of Pakistan, Rawalpindi1987 SCMR 1562 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged the Federal Service Tribunal's dismissal of an appeal regarding the compulsory retirement of a Grade 20 officer. The central legal question was whether the disciplinary proceedings, conducted under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, were vitiated by procedural irregularities, specifically the failure to provide the accused with a copy of the inquiry report and the reliance on charges for which the accused had been exonerated. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the compulsory retirement order. The Court held that the rules implicitly require that an accused official be furnished with a copy of the inquiry report to offer an effective explanation before the Authority imposes a major penalty. Additionally, the Court ruled that the Authority cannot rely on charges for which the accused was exonerated without providing a fresh opportunity to show cause. Furthermore, the principles of natural justice must be read into statutory provisions, requiring notice and an opportunity to be heard before any adverse action is taken against a civil servant.
Questions settled- Is an accused civil servant entitled to receive a copy of the inquiry report before the Authority imposes a major penalty?
- Can an Authority rely on charges for which an accused officer was exonerated by the Inquiry Officer without providing a fresh opportunity to show cause?
- Does the rule of natural justice require an opportunity of hearing before an Authority passes an adverse order under Rule 6-A of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973?
- Maqsood Ahmad And 10 Others vs Lahore Development Authority And Another1987 SCMR 1086 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal was filed by employees of the Lahore Development Authority (LDA) challenging the Lahore Development Authority (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Regulations, 1978, which prescribed minimum educational qualifications and experience for promotion to the posts of Assistant Directors (Accounts). The petitioners argued that the Regulations were ultra vires the Lahore Development Authority Act, 1975, and inconsistent with older service rules saved under the Act, and that the power to frame regulations could not be delegated to the Chairman. The Supreme Court held that the older rules did not provide for the posts in question, and that section 48(3) of the Lahore Development Authority Act only saved rules framed by the Trust itself, not those framed by the Provincial Government under the repealed Town Improvement Act, 1922. The Court further held that the delegation of powers was valid under the Act and that the challenge suffered from laches. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether the Lahore Development Authority is competent to frame regulations prescribing educational qualifications and experience for posts not covered by older service rules?
- Whether rules framed by the Provincial Government under the repealed Town Improvement Act, 1922, are saved under section 48(3) of the Lahore Development Authority Act, 1975?
- Can the power of the Lahore Development Authority to frame regulations be delegated to the Chairman?
- Whether a challenge to service regulations is barred by laches when there is no adequate explanation for the delay?
- Maqbool Ahmad vs Amiruddin And Another1987 SCMR 1871 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging a High Court judgment that maintained the conviction of the accused, Amiruddin, for the murder of Muhammad Akram under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while reducing his sentence from death to imprisonment for life and enhancing the fine. The accused sought leave to challenge his conviction, while a relative of the deceased sought the restoration of the death sentence. The core legal questions were whether the delay in filing the petitions should be condoned and whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the ocular testimony were sustainable. The Supreme Court held that both petitions were barred by time, and the explanations provided for the delay were unsatisfactory. Furthermore, on the merits, the Court found no reason to interfere with the concurrent assessment of the eye-witnesses who observed the accused stabbing the deceased. Consequently, the Court dismissed both petitions, affirming the principles regarding the limitation period for appeals and the weight accorded to concurrent findings of fact based on credible ocular testimony.
Questions settled- Are petitions for leave to appeal maintainable when they are barred by time and the explanations for delay are unsatisfactory?
- Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court regarding the credibility of eye-witnesses?
- Is a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 sustainable when based on the testimony of two eye-witnesses who observed the stabbing?
- Maqbool Ahmad And Others vs The State1987 SCMR 1059 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment resolves four consolidated criminal appeals where the appellants, convicted of murder and sentenced to death under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sought reduction of their sentences to life imprisonment. The sole ground raised was that their prolonged detention in death cells due to delays in the disposal of their appeals had given them an "expectancy of life," which should serve as a mitigating circumstance. The Supreme Court of Pakistan reviewed its historical jurisprudence on the doctrine of expectancy of life. The Court held that due to the changed circumstances, including the chronic backlog of cases and inevitable delays in the administration of criminal justice, the doctrine of expectancy of life no longer holds the field. Delay in the disposal of an appeal does not per se constitute a mitigating circumstance to reduce a death sentence, particularly where the crime is cruel or gruesome. The Court ruled that any commutation on the ground of delay is a matter for the executive authorities under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and consequently dismissed the appeals.
Questions settled- Whether prolonged detention in a death cell due to delay in the disposal of an appeal constitutes a mitigating circumstance for reducing a death sentence to life imprisonment?
- Does the doctrine of expectancy of life apply automatically to commute a death sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Is the commutation of a death sentence on the sole ground of delay in execution a matter for the judiciary or the executive authorities under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Maqbool Ahmad And Others vs The State1987 SCMR 342 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners were convicted of murder and murderous assault by the trial court, receiving sentences including death and imprisonment for life, which were subsequently upheld by the High Court. The petitioners sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, primarily praying for a reduction of the death sentence to imprisonment for life on the sole ground that the petitioner had suffered the agony of the death cell for about eight years. The caveator argued against treating institutional delays and delays caused by the convict's own successive appeals as a mitigating circumstance to reduce the sentence, contending that the rights of the heirs to obtain justice should not be affected. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider the contentions regarding whether prolonged delay in the execution of the death sentence due to court backlogs and successive appeals constitutes a mitigating circumstance for commuting a death sentence to life imprisonment.
Questions settled- Whether prolonged agony of the death cell resulting from the pendency of appeals constitutes a mitigating circumstance for reducing a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
- Does delay caused by filing successive appeals and court backlogs affect the right of heirs to obtain an appropriate sentence?
- Manzoor And Others vs Sardar Khan1987 SCMR 809 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal arising from a pre-emption suit. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners filed a suit for pre-emption, but the plaint initially lacked the correct court-fee. The trial court granted permission to make up the deficiency, and the plaintiff complied within the court-fixed timeframe, although this date fell after the statutory limitation period for filing the suit. The trial court decreed the suit, but the Additional District Judge set aside the decree on appeal, ruling that the deficiency in court-fee was not rectified within the limitation period. The High Court dismissed the petitioners' second appeal in limine. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting the petitioners' contention that the lower courts' findings conflicted with the rule established in Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakur Khan (PLD 1984 SC 289). The core legal question is whether a court-permitted extension for making up a court-fee deficiency in a pre-emption suit can extend beyond the limitation period without invalidating the suit. The Supreme Court found the contention regarding the conflict with established precedent worthy of consideration.
Questions settled- Can a court allow a plaintiff to make up a deficiency in court-fee after the expiry of the limitation period for a pre-emption suit?
- Does the rectification of a court-fee deficiency within a court-fixed timeframe validate a plaint even if the timeframe exceeds the original limitation period?
- Mansha vs The State1987 SCMR 1518 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the appellant under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and a sentence of death, which was subsequently converted to imprisonment for life by this Court. The core legal question concerned whether the prosecution had established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of ocular testimony, corroborative medical evidence, weapon recovery, and motive, or whether the appellant acted in the right of self-defence during a dispute over a turn of irrigation water. The Supreme Court held that the eyewitness accounts, corroborated by medical evidence and firearms expert reports, firmly established the prosecution's version of events and disproved the plea of self-defence. The key principle laid down is that where an accused sustains injuries during an initial altercation but thereafter returns armed with lethal weapons to commit murder in retaliation, the plea of self-defence is untenable, though mitigating circumstances arising from the initial fight may justify commuting a sentence of death to imprisonment for life.
Questions settled- Whether the plea of self-defence is available to an accused who returns to the scene of occurrence armed with a firearm after an initial altercation?
- Does the presence of injuries on the person of the accused necessarily establish the right of private defence in a double murder case?
- Can the capital sentence be commuted to imprisonment for life when the incident stems from a sudden quarrel and the accused sustained injuries during the transaction?
- Whether minor discrepancies in the estimation of firing distance by eyewitnesses are sufficient to discard their otherwise consistent testimony?
- Manno O Industries Ltd. vs Additional Secretary to the Government1987 SCMR 1910 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The matter arises from civil petitions seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of writ petitions by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld departmental orders requiring the petitioner company to reimburse excise duty rebates and pay penalties. The core legal question concerns whether interference is warranted with a concurrent finding of fact by departmental authorities regarding the count number of exported cotton yarn. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent finding of fact, established through laboratory tests showing the yarn counts were 19/1 rather than the claimed 21/1, calls for no interference by the constitutional courts. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact determined by competent departmental authorities will not be disturbed in constitutional jurisdiction absent any legal infirmity.
Questions settled- Whether constitutional jurisdiction can be invoked to challenge a concurrent finding of fact by departmental authorities?
- Does a laboratory test report regarding yarn counts constitute a binding finding of fact?
- Can departmental authorities order the reimbursement of excise duty rebates upon proof of misdeclaration?
- Malik Yaqoob Ali vs Sheikh Salahuddin1987 SCMR 1453 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arises from an ejectment application filed under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, concerning a dispute over the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship. The Rent Controller and the first appellate court both concurrently found that the relationship existed and ordered ejectment. However, the High Court re-appraised the evidence in second appeal and reversed these concurrent findings of fact. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in disturbing concurrent findings of fact on the question of the relationship of landlord and tenant in second appeal. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the High Court had no jurisdiction in a second appeal to interfere with concurrent findings of fact based on a mere re-appraisal of evidence, absent any procedural error, misreading, or omission of evidence. The key principle laid down is that a fallacy in appraising evidence, unless amounting to a material mistaken assumption or procedural illegality, is merely an error in finding of fact and does not justify interference in second appeal.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court is justified in disturbing concurrent findings of fact of the lower courts in a second appeal based on a re-appraisal of evidence?
- Does an erroneous finding of fact by lower courts constitute an error of law justifying interference in second appeal?
- Malik Rashid Ahmad vs Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue And Other1987 SCMR 720 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding his appointment to the post of H.V.C.(R) Sialkot. Applications were initially invited for the vacancy, and the petitioner was appointed. Respondents challenged this before the Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, who set aside the promotion holding the petitioner ineligible. The Service Tribunal upheld this view, finding that the petitioner lacked the requisite three years of experience as a Colony or Revenue Assistant under the applicable rules. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the West Pakistan Revenue Department Ministerial Service (District Cadre) Rules, 1964, as amended in 1972, required three years of experience in the Revenue Branch or Colony Branch generally, rather than specifically as a Colony or Revenue Assistant. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider whether the rule requires experience strictly in the specified category or encompasses earlier experience as a Senior or Junior Clerk.
Questions settled- Whether the requirement of three years' experience in the Revenue Branch or Colony Branch for promotion to Head Vernacular Clerk necessitates experience strictly in the same category or includes earlier experience as a Senior or Junior Clerk?
- Did the Punjab Service Tribunal correctly interpret the amendment to the West Pakistan Revenue Department Ministerial Service (District Cadre) Rules, 1964 regarding eligibility for promotion?
- Malik Muhammad Khan vs The StateP L' D 1987 Supreme Court 500 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns cross-appeals: one by a convicted patwari challenging his conviction for bribery, and another by the State seeking enhancement of the sentence reduced by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in reducing a sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone (20 days) for a corruption offense, based on grounds such as the passage of time, the agony of trial, and loss of service. The Supreme Court dismissed the accused's appeal, affirming the conviction under the relevant anti-corruption law, and allowed the State's appeal to enhance the sentence. The Court held that once guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, leniency based on the 'agony of trial' or the passage of time is inappropriate for corruption offenses. The key principle laid down is that courts must avoid awarding nominal punishments for corruption, as such leniency undermines public trust and fails to deter widespread corrupt practices, emphasizing that judicial concern for the accused must not outweigh the interests of society.
Questions settled- Is the 'agony of trial' or the passage of time a valid ground for reducing a sentence in a proven corruption case?
- Does the prevalence of corruption in society justify leniency in sentencing public officials convicted of bribery?
- Should courts award nominal punishments to public officials once their guilt for corruption is established beyond reasonable doubt?
- Malik Muhammad Arif vs The National Bank of Pakistan1987 SCMR 717 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had affirmed an ex parte decree passed by a Special Judge, Banking Court, against the petitioner for the recovery of loan amounts. The petitioner, a former employee of the National Bank of Pakistan, contended that he was abroad when the suit was filed, that he was not properly served with summons, and that the suit was time-barred. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had sufficient grounds to set aside the ex parte decree given his failure to file an application for leave to appear and defend the suit within the prescribed time. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner’s counsel had appeared on his behalf earlier without raising the issue of non-service or absence from the country. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to seek condonation of delay before the trial court despite having returned to the country prior to the filing of his application. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner failed to establish valid justification for the delay, and the petition was dismissed.
Questions settled- Can a defendant challenge an ex parte decree on the grounds of non-service if their counsel previously appeared in court without raising such an objection?
- Is a party entitled to the setting aside of an ex parte decree if they failed to seek condonation of delay for filing an application for leave to appear and defend?
- Malik Khawaja Muhammad And 24 Others vs Marduman Babar Kahol1987 SCMR 1543 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Baluchistan High Court which allowed a civil revision application, setting aside ex parte decrees passed by the Qazi, Lower Zhob and the Majlis-e-Shoora, Quetta, and remanded the suit for fresh, expeditious disposal. The suit pertained to land and grazing rights among members of different Kahols (clans). The High Court held that the Qazi passed an ex parte decree without issuing or serving summons on several contesting defendants, and did so on a date fixed merely for submitting lists of witnesses rather than a date of hearing. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's findings, affirming that an ex parte decree passed in violation of mandatory procedural requirements and principles of natural justice without proper service is a nullity. Consequently, no period of limitation runs against such a null decree. Finding no merit in the arguments raised by the petitioners, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.
Questions settled- Does limitation run against a decree passed in violation of mandatory procedural laws and natural justice?
- Can a Qazi or trial court pass an ex parte decree on a date fixed only for submitting witness lists without serving proper summons?
- Is directing present defendants to informally notify absent co-defendants a valid substitute for statutory service of summons?
- Malik Javid Ali And Another vs Abdul Kadir And Another1987 SCMR 518 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal examines the correctness of concurrent convictions for bigamy under Section 494 and Section 494/109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, arising from a second marriage contracted by the female appellant during the subsistence of her first marriage. The core legal questions involved the legal effect of a divorce deed executed without giving notice to the Chairman under Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961, and whether a co-accused could be convicted for abetment of bigamy without proof of knowledge regarding the non-effectiveness of the divorce. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that failure to give notice of talaq under Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 renders the divorce ineffective and implies revocation, meaning the prior marriage subsists. The Court affirmed that Section 8 extends these requirements to other forms of dissolution. However, the Court laid down the principle that to sustain a conviction for abetment of bigamy against a second husband, there must be clear and convincing evidence of his requisite knowledge regarding the subsistence of the first marriage, extending the benefit of the doubt where such knowledge is absent.
Questions settled- Does a divorce pronounced by a husband become effective without giving notice to the Chairman under Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961?
- Can a husband take advantage of his own omission to give notice of divorce under Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 to claim that the divorce was rendered ineffective?
- Whether the provisions of Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 apply mutatis mutandis to dissolutions of marriage otherwise than by talaq pursuant to Section 8 of the Ordinance?
- Is clear and convincing evidence of the accused's knowledge regarding the subsistence of a prior marriage necessary to sustain a conviction for abetment of bigamy?
- Malik Ishtiaq Ahmad vs Muhammad Iqbal And 4 Other1987 SCMR 1902 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 10-3-1980, which modified the trial court's judgment convicting and sentencing various respondents for murder and causing injuries following a street altercation. The trial court had awarded life imprisonment under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to two accused and lesser sentences to others. On appeal, the High Court acquitted three respondents and partially accepted the appeal of Muhammad Iqbal, converting his conviction under Section 302 to Section 304-II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing him to six years' rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question before the Supreme Court involved evaluating the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, the credibility of an injured eyewitness, the adequacy of motive, and the significance of injuries sustained by the accused during the occurrence. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider the nature of the offence against Muhammad Iqbal and to reappraise the evidence against Muhammad Tufail, while dismissing the petition as to the remaining respondents.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court was justified in converting the conviction of the accused from murder under Section 302 to culpable homicide under Section 304-II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Can the testimony of an injured witness be relied upon to sustain a conviction in a murder trial?
- What is the legal effect of minor injuries sustained by an accused person during the same incident resulting in a homicide?
- Malik Ghulam Nabi And Others vs Member, Board of Revenue, Baluchistan, Quetta And Other1987 SCMR 545 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a long-standing property dispute over a house in Quetta, originally allocated to the petitioner through an earmarking scheme in 1959. The petitioner’s entitlement was challenged by the respondents, who were long-term occupants and claimed the property as displaced persons from Jammu and Kashmir, asserting they had filed the necessary transfer forms. Following extensive litigation and multiple remands, the High Court ultimately upheld the transfer of the house to the respondents. The Supreme Court, upon review, affirmed the High Court’s decision. The Court held that because the respondents had filed a valid transfer form (NCH form) on 15-7-1959, the property was legally excluded from the earmarking scheme and was not available for transfer to the petitioner. The Court emphasized that the petitioner, having no prior interest in the property and relying solely on the earmarking scheme, could not displace the respondents who had established their entitlement through the proper filing of transfer applications. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, maintaining the respondent's status as the rightful transferee.
Questions settled- Does the filing of a valid transfer form by an occupant exclude a property from being disposed of through an earmarking scheme?
- Can a petitioner claiming property solely through an earmarking scheme succeed if the property was not legally available for such allocation?
- Is a long-term occupant who has filed a transfer application entitled to the property over a subsequent allottee under an earmarking scheme?
- Malik Ghulam Nabi And Others vs Dur Muhammad And Other1987 SCMR 1756(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the form of a petition for leave to appeal. The core legal question addressed by the Court was whether the petition, which was filed with a significant delay of 258 days, could be entertained or if it should be dismissed on the grounds of limitation. Upon reviewing the circumstances presented, the Court determined that the petitioners failed to provide any valid or sufficient justification to warrant the condonation of such a substantial delay. Consequently, the Court held that the petition was time-barred and could not be proceeded with. The ratio of the decision reinforces the strict principle that the law of limitation is to be applied rigorously, and in the absence of a satisfactory explanation for delay, the Court will not exercise its discretion to condone it. As a result, the petition was dismissed as barred by time, affirming the necessity for timely filing in legal proceedings to ensure judicial finality and adherence to procedural mandates.
Questions settled- Can a petition for leave to appeal be entertained if it is filed with a delay of 258 days without valid justification?
- Is the court required to condone delay in filing a petition when no valid grounds are established?
- Mali And Others vs Muhammad Khan1987 SCMR 812 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners filed a suit for pre-emption, which was initially rejected by the trial court due to a failure to make up a deficiency in court fees. The District Judge subsequently set aside this rejection and remanded the suit for disposal. The respondent, Muhammad Khan, appealed this remand order to the High Court, which restored the trial court's order of rejection. During the pendency of the High Court appeal, the respondent died, and his legal representatives were brought on record. The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the High Court's order but filed the petition naming only the deceased respondent, Muhammad Khan, rather than his legal representatives. A preliminary objection was raised regarding the competency of the petition due to this defect. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioners had no explanation for filing the petition against a deceased party despite the substitution of legal representatives in the lower court. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as incompetent.
Questions settled- Is a petition for leave to appeal filed against a deceased respondent, without impleading the legal representatives who were substituted in the lower court, competent?
- Does the failure to implead legal representatives of a deceased party in a petition for leave to appeal render the petition liable to dismissal?
- Major (Rtd.) A.S.K. Samad vs Lt. Col. (Rtd.) A. Hussain And Another1987 SCMR 1013 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from an ejectment proceeding initiated against the appellant-tenant by the respondents. The core legal question was whether the appellant's continued deposit of monthly rent in an earlier miscellaneous rent case instead of the subsequent ejectment case constituted a non-compliance of the Rent Controller's order under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, warranting the penalty of eviction. The Supreme Court held that since the rent was being deposited regularly in court and withdrawn by the landlady, the technical failure to deposit it specifically in the ejectment case file did not amount to a contumacious disobedience of the order and could not validly entail eviction. The court laid down the principle that where a tenant deposits rent regularly in court pursuant to a bona fide prior practice known to the parties, a technical error in depositing it under the wrong case number does not justify striking off defense or ordering eviction without considering the absence of willful default.
Questions settled- Does depositing rent in an earlier miscellaneous court case instead of the subsequent ejectment case amount to non-compliance warranting eviction?
- Whether a technical failure to deposit rent in the specific case file entails the penalty of striking off defense and eviction under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance?
- Is a tenant liable for default in rent when the rent is regularly deposited in court and withdrawn by the landlord?
- Majidullah Khan vs N. W.F.P. Through Board Of Revenue And Other1987 SCMR 616 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing his constitutional petition regarding the cancellation of his land allotment. The core legal question involved whether the petitioner's claim constituted a pending case to be disposed of under the law prevailing before the repeal of settlement laws, and whether the allotment made after such repeal was valid. The Supreme Court held that the order of the High Court remanding the case to the Notified Officer for a detailed and proper determination by the tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction suffered from no legal infirmity. The Court affirmed that questions regarding pending status and disposal under repealed laws require determination by the appropriate competent forum, thereby dismissing the petition for leave to appeal.
Questions settled- Whether an allotment of land made after the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act is valid?
- Does an order remanding a settlement case to a Notified Officer for fresh determination suffer from legal infirmity?
- How are pending settlement cases to be treated upon the repeal of settlement laws and transfer of property to Provincial Governments?
- Mahmood Allias Moonda vs The State1987 SCMR 850 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-07Read full judgment →
- Mahmood Ahmed vs WAPDA Through Its Chairman1987 SCMR 2007 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is an appeal by leave directed against the order of the Federal Service Tribunal dated 19-5-1984, which dismissed the appellant's service appeal regarding his removal from service. The appellant, a Stenographer employed by WAPDA, was suspended following his arrest for accepting illegal gratification and was subsequently removed from service under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act pursuant to a general policy regarding employees facing criminal cases. The core legal question involved the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal in view of section 17(1-C) of the WAPDA Act, 1958, and the merits of the removal based on appraisal of evidence. The Supreme Court held that the jurisdictional issue stood resolved by earlier precedent and that the Tribunal's findings on the merits, being based on proper appraisal of evidence establishing illegal gratification, warranted no interference. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the principle that factual findings based on evidence by the Service Tribunal will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court absent legal infirmity.
Questions settled- Whether the Federal Service Tribunal has jurisdiction to interfere with orders passed in respect of persons employed or serving under WAPDA?
- Does a finding of fact regarding the acceptance of illegal gratification arrived at by the Service Tribunal warrant interference by the Supreme Court based on appraisal of evidence?
- Mahia And Others vs Shahia And Other1987 SCMR 976 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' Regular Second Appeal in an inheritance dispute. Petitioner No.1, convicted of culpable homicide for the murder of his father, and his children (petitioners Nos. 2 to 6) were excluded from inheriting the property of the deceased under the Muslim Law of Inheritance, on the principle that a murderer and his progeny are disqualified from inheriting from the victim. The core legal questions involve whether the exclusion applies when a conviction is under section 304 Part-II, Pakistan Penal Code, rather than murder, and whether the progeny of a murderer are similarly excluded under Muslim Law. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the matter raises a case of first impression regarding the rights of the murderer's progeny, and ordered that possession of the property be maintained pending the appeal subject to furnishing security.
Questions settled- Whether a person convicted of culpable homicide not amounting to murder is disqualified from inheriting from the victim under Muslim Law?
- Whether the progeny of a murderer are excluded from inheriting the property of the victim under the Muslim Law of Inheritance?
- Whether there is a difference of opinion amongst Muslim Jurists regarding the exclusion of the heirs of a murderer from inheritance?
- Machhia vs Mst. Panan1987 SCMR 2058 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-07-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order that upheld a lower appellate court's decision regarding the validity of a gift of agricultural land. The petitioner, the husband of the respondent, challenged a gift mutation made in 1958, approximately one month before their marriage, alleging he had neither made the gift nor transferred possession of the land. The trial court initially decreed in his favor, but the District Judge reversed this, finding the gift valid. The core legal question was whether the gift was validly made and if possession had been transferred, given the petitioner's subsequent challenge thirteen years later. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's personal involvement in reporting the gift to the Patwari and his presence during the mutation attestation established the validity of the gift. Furthermore, the Court determined that the petitioner's management of the land, even if continued, was on behalf of his wife, especially given her illiteracy. The petition was dismissed, affirming the principle that a donor's active participation in mutation proceedings and long-term acquiescence strongly support the validity of a gift.
Questions settled- Does a husband's personal reporting of a gift mutation and presence at its attestation constitute a valid transfer of property to his wife?
- Can a donor challenge the validity of a gift thirteen years after the mutation was attested?
- In the context of a gift between spouses, does the husband's continued management of the land negate the transfer of possession?
- M.C.W.Kamdia And Another vs Sajjad Hussain Khan And Other1987 SCMR 1352 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court granting anticipatory bail to the respondents. The respondents were accused of committing theft under Section 379 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, specifically regarding the removal of a crop valued at Rs. 86,800. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the removal of a crop by the very individuals who had sown it could legally constitute the offence of theft. Upon review, the Court observed that it was undisputed that the respondents had sown the crop themselves. Consequently, the Court held that a serious question existed as to whether the ingredients of the offence of theft were satisfied in such circumstances. Finding no grounds to interfere with the High Court's order granting bail, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The judgment reinforces the principle that the nature of the act and the ownership or possession of the property are critical considerations in determining the prima facie existence of a criminal offence like theft.
Questions settled- Can an individual be charged with theft for removing a crop they personally sowed?
- Does the removal of a crop sown by the accused themselves constitute an offence under Section 379 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- M. Muhammad Siddique vs Sh. Inayatullah Special Magistrate Ist Class, Lahore And Another1987 SCMR 390 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a marital dispute where a wife sought maintenance under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, before the Chairman of the Union Council. An arbitration council was constituted, including representatives for both parties. The petitioner, the husband, failed to attend certain hearings. Although he requested the re-summoning of witnesses for cross-examination and the production of his own evidence, his nominated representative on the arbitration council withdrew this application. Consequently, the maintenance claim was granted based on the consent of the representatives of both parties. After unsuccessful challenges before the Collector and in a writ petition, the petitioner sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The core legal question identified by the Court is whether a representative nominated by a party on an arbitration council acts as a quasi-judicial authority charged with decision-making duties, or merely as an agent of the party with the power to concede claims and withdraw applications. The Court granted leave to appeal to resolve this significant legal issue regarding the role of such representatives, while maintaining an interim stay order.
Questions settled- Does a representative nominated by a party on an Arbitration Council act as a quasi-judicial authority or as an agent of the party?
- Can a representative on an Arbitration Council withdraw an application submitted by the party they represent?
- Is the role of a representative on an Arbitration Council comparable to that of a judge or a party?
- M. Abdul Rashid vs The Settlement Commissioner (P) And Other1987 SCMR 1315 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the transfer of a disputed shop in Lyallpur under settlement laws. The core legal questions involved whether an informant has a vested right or locus standi to obtain the transfer of evacuee property under Notification No. SRO 824 (K)/61, and whether an associate of an informant acquires protected rights during the pendency of litigation affecting the property. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that an informant has no independent locus standi or vested right to claim the transfer of property about which information was laid, and that the power to transfer evacuee properties to non-possessing informers was extinguished with the amendment of Section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. Furthermore, the Court held that any transfer and association executed while a writ petition challenging the cancellation was pending are hit by the doctrine of lis pendens, conferring no independent rights on the associate.
Questions settled- Does an informant who lays information regarding irregular transfer of evacuee property have a vested right or locus standi to claim its transfer?
- Did the repeal of clause (b) of section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 by Ordinance II of 1962 take away the power to transfer evacuee properties to informers who were not in possession?
- Are transactions and associations made regarding a property during the pendency of a writ petition subject to the principle of lis pendens?
- Lt. Col. (Retd.) Munir Hussain And Others vs The Chief Settlement1987 SCMR 1240 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
Civil appeal arose from the Lahore High Court’s judgment dismissing a writ petition challenging an order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner regarding the disposal of resumed agricultural land. The land in question had been cancelled in 1971 from a fraudulent allottee upon information provided by the appellants. At that time, sale of the entire land was recommended in favour of bona fide vendees, while the informers were directed to stand in queue. Subsequently, legislative amendments restricted the sale to vendees to subsistence holdings and restored retrospective allotment rights to informers under the amended land settlement scheme. The High Court had held that the 1971 order was final and the informers lacked locus standi. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and set aside the High Court's findings, holding that subsequent statutory amendments improved the informers' rights while their claims were pending. Consequently, the vendees were entitled to purchase land only up to subsistence holdings under Section 3 of the 1975 Repeal Act, and the surplus land was to be allotted to the informers.
Questions settled- Whether subsequent legislative amendments conferring allotment rights on informers apply retrospectively to pending claims for resumed evacuee land?
- Whether bona fide vendees of cancelled evacuee land are restricted to purchasing only up to a subsistence holding under Section 3 of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act 1975?
- Whether an informer has locus standi to challenge the disposal of resumed land if surplus area becomes available following statutory restrictions on vendee purchases?
- Liaquat Ali And Another vs The State1987 SCMR 183 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against the refusal of lower courts to grant post-arrest bail to the petitioners, who were accused in a criminal case registered under sections 302, 307, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of one Faqir Hussain and causing injuries to two other individuals. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioners were entitled to the grant of bail given that they were in custody and the trial had not yet commenced. Upon hearing the arguments presented by the petitioners' counsel, the Supreme Court found no valid grounds to interfere with the discretion exercised by the lower courts in denying bail. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition. However, the Court issued a directive to the prosecution authorities to expedite the necessary steps for holding the trial and expected the trial court to conclude the proceedings as expeditiously as possible, emphasizing the need for timely adjudication in criminal matters where the accused remains incarcerated pending trial.
Questions settled- Does the mere fact that a trial has not yet commenced entitle an accused to the grant of bail?
- Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with the discretion of lower courts in refusing bail?
- What is the duty of the prosecution and the trial court regarding the expeditious disposal of a criminal case where the accused is in custody?
- Liaqat Hayat vs Bashir Ahmad And 2 Other1987 SCMR 1921 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-07-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment arises from two petitions for leave to appeal filed by Liaqat Hayat against the acquittal of respondents Bashir Ahmad, Misri, Abdul Haq, and Naseer Ahmad for the murder of Allah Yar Khan. The deceased was allegedly shot dead by the respondents to avenge an earlier insult. The trial court had convicted Abdul Haq and Naseer Ahmad under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while acquitting the other two respondents. Upon appeal and reference, the High Court reappraised the evidence, discarded the testimony of the sole remaining eye-witness due to unnatural presence and material contradictions, found the recoveries planted, and acquitted all the respondents. The core legal question was whether the High Court's reappraisal of evidence and acquittal of the respondents suffered from any legal error warranting interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the appraisal of evidence by the trial court and High Court suffered from no legal infirmity or violation of established principles. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent or well-reasoned findings of fact and acquittals based on a proper appreciation of ocular and circumstantial evidence unless a glaring legal error is shown.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court was justified in discarding the testimony of an eye-witness on the ground of unnatural presence and material contradictions?
- Does the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal judgment that is based on a proper reappraisal of evidence and suffers from no legal infirmity?
- Whether recoveries of crime empties and weapons that are found to be planted can be used as corroborative evidence to sustain a conviction?
- Lal Din vs Muhammad Habib And 3 Other1987 SCMR 229 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside orders passed by Consolidation Authorities regarding the petitioner's possession of disputed land. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, claiming to be a tenant under a previous owner at the time a consolidation scheme was sanctioned, could maintain that status despite a prior High Court finding to the contrary. The petitioner argued that the Consolidation Authorities were free to re-evaluate the facts upon remand. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding that the High Court's previous judgment had conclusively determined that the petitioner did not possess the status of a tenant at the relevant time. Because that earlier finding was not challenged, it became binding. The Court affirmed that the Consolidation Authorities could not ignore the High Court's conclusive verdict on the petitioner's status. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the High Court's decision to set aside the orders that had erroneously recognized the petitioner's tenancy claim.
Questions settled- Can a subordinate tribunal or authority disregard a finding of fact conclusively determined by the High Court in a previous round of litigation?
- Does a remand order by the High Court allow a lower tribunal to re-adjudicate a question of fact that was already decided against a party in the same proceedings?
- Does the change of ownership in consolidation proceedings affect the existing tenancy status of a person on the land?
- Lal Din Alias Lalu vs The State1987 SCMR 855 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-01-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court confirming his death sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. During the proceedings, the counsel and the legal heirs of the deceased submitted that the parties had arrived at an out-of-court compromise, fully compensating the heirs, and that the compromise was made voluntarily to end longstanding hostility. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and partly accepted it, reducing the petitioner's death sentence to imprisonment for life while maintaining the sentence of fine based on the compromise between the parties.
Questions settled- Can a death sentence be reduced to imprisonment for life on the basis of a compromise between the accused and the legal heirs of the deceased?
- Whether an out-of-court compromise can be considered by the Supreme Court in a criminal petition arising from a murder conviction?
- Lahore Municipal Corporation vs D.P. Edulji And 4 Other1987 SCMR 2031 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-08-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns two petitions for special leave to appeal filed by the Lahore Municipal Corporation against a judgment of the Lahore High Court. The High Court had dismissed the Corporation's intra-court appeals, thereby upholding a Single Judge's decision that declared the enhancement of octroi duty on goods brought into the Corporation's limits to be illegal and unenforceable. The core legal question was whether the Corporation had followed the mandatory procedural requirements for tax enhancement. The Supreme Court found that the lower courts correctly determined that the petitioner-corporation had failed to comply with the mandatory provisions, specifically rule 4(2), of the West Pakistan Municipal Committees (Imposition of Taxes) Rules, 1960, before imposing the increased duty. Finding no infirmity in the findings of the High Court, the Supreme Court refused the prayer for leave to appeal. The judgment reaffirms the principle that statutory procedural requirements for the imposition or enhancement of taxes by municipal bodies are mandatory and non-compliance renders such tax measures illegal and unenforceable.
Questions settled- Is compliance with Rule 4(2) of the West Pakistan Municipal Committees (Imposition of Taxes) Rules, 1960 mandatory for the enhancement of octroi duty?
- Does failure to follow mandatory procedural rules for tax enhancement render the tax illegal and unenforceable?
- Lahore Development Authority vs Abdul Qadir And Other1987 SCMR 1143 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court declining to interfere in revisional jurisdiction with a judgment of the Additional District Judge, which affirmed the trial court's decree in a dispute concerning a shack located in Alamgir Market, Lahore. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could lawfully cancel the allotment of the shack to the respondents' predecessor-in-interest without issuing a notice regarding alleged subletting, and whether interference was warranted regarding the final price of the property. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts were correct, ruling that the cancellation order was bad in law due to the failure to issue a notice to the legal successors before cancellation, and declined to interfere after nearly three decades of inaction by the petitioner in determining the final price. The key principle laid down is that an order cancelling property allotment on grounds of subletting is legally defective if issued without affording a pre-cancellation notice to the successors-in-interest.
Questions settled- Is an order cancelling the allotment of property for subletting bad in law if issued without notice to the successors-in-interest?
- Will the Supreme Court interfere in concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding property allotment and possession?
- Can a petitioner seek interference on the ground of unpaid final price after an inordinate delay of nearly three decades without indicating the final price?
- Lahore Development Authority Through Its Director General & Another vs Mian Riaz Ahmad And Other1987 SCMR 1850 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-07-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The respondents filed a suit against the Lahore Development Authority, which was decreed by the trial court under Order XII, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, based on admissions made in the Authority's written statement. The petitioners challenged this decree through an appeal before the Additional District Judge and subsequently a revision before the High Court, both of which were dismissed. Upon approaching the Supreme Court for leave to appeal, the petitioners' counsel requested an adjournment, citing ongoing out-of-court settlement negotiations. The Supreme Court, noting that this was the fourth such request for adjournment on the same grounds, refused to grant further time. The Court held that the judgments and decrees of the lower courts were legal and proper, finding no grounds for interference. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the lower courts' decisions based on the admissions in the pleadings.
Questions settled- Can a court refuse an adjournment request when it is the fourth such request based on the same grounds of out-of-court settlement?
- Is a decree passed under Order XII, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 legally sustainable when based on admissions in a written statement?
- Lady Dr. S. K. Qureshi And Another vs Mst. Khalida Rauf And Another1987 SCMR 1664 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court remanding a settlement matter to the Notified Officer for further inquiry regarding an alleged agreement of association over auctioned property. The Supreme Court considered whether the Additional Settlement Commissioner had jurisdiction to entertain a time-barred appeal without explicitly condoning the delay after the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed (PTD) to the appellant. The Court observed that the appellate authority failed to apply its mind to the question of limitation and that mere disposal of an appeal on merits does not imply condonation of delay. Furthermore, there was no credible evidence establishing the execution of the earlier alleged agreement of association, which was denied under affidavit. The Supreme Court held that the exercise of appellate jurisdiction over a time-barred appeal without condoning delay was without jurisdiction. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned orders of the High Court and the Additional Settlement Commissioner.
Questions settled- Does the mere disposal of a time-barred appeal on its merits imply that the appellate authority has condoned the delay?
- Is an order passed in an appeal barred by limitation valid if the appellate authority fails to apply its mind to and explicitly condone the delay?
- Khushi Muhammad vs Nawab Din And Other1987 SCMR 713 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court modifying convictions and sentences in a murder and hurt case. The primary legal questions involve the applicability of joint liability under section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, the sustainability of murder convictions based on interested testimony where the initial altercation arose from property damage, and the adequacy of sentences. The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the dismissal of the convict's petition and the complainant's enhancement petition, holding that the High Court's reduction of the death sentence to life imprisonment was based on sound principles given the mitigating circumstances. However, the Court granted leave to appeal to three co-accused to re-appraise the evidence regarding their individual culpability and the application of section 34, admitting them to bail pending the hearing.
Questions settled- Whether the reduction of a death sentence to life imprisonment is justified when the initial altercation arose from the deceased damaging the accused's crop?
- Can section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be applied to sustain murder convictions where there was no previous enmity, pre-meditation, or pre-concert?
- Is leave to appeal granted to re-appraise evidence regarding the culpability and sentence of co-accused petitioners?
- Whether bail should be granted to convicts whose petitions are allowed for re-appraisal of evidence when they may have already served a substantial portion of an appropriate sentence?
- Khushi Muhammad vs Mst. Atta Elahi1987 SCMR 1469 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal arises from concurrent judgments of the trial court, appellate court, and the High Court dismissing a pre-emption suit. The respondent had acquired a tract of land through a transaction involving both cash payment and a transfer of land, which the lower courts concurrently characterized as an exchange rather than a sale. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether a transaction where the major portion of the consideration is paid in money constitutes a sale rather than an exchange for the purposes of pre-emption. Granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held that the contention regarding the nature of the transaction when the major portion of consideration is paid in cash requires detailed examination. The key principle laid down is that the proportion of monetary consideration versus property transfer in a transaction determines whether it amounts to a sale or an exchange.
Questions settled- Whether a transaction where the major portion of the consideration is paid in the form of money is a sale or an exchange?
- Can a pre-emption suit be dismissed solely on the ground that the underlying transaction is an exchange?
- Khushi Muhammad vs Abdul Shakoor1987 SCMR 1473 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arose from a suit for possession by pre-emption filed by the respondent against the appellant regarding a residential Khata. The appellant contested the suit, initially arguing waiver of the right of pre-emption. Following a decree in favor of the respondent and the dismissal of his first appeal, the appellant sought revision in the High Court, raising the plea of limitation for the first time. The appellant contended that the suit was time-barred under Article 10 of the Limitation Act, 1908, arguing that possession was transferred on the date of the sale deed's execution rather than its registration. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' concurrent findings, noting that the plea of limitation was not raised in the trial court and involved a factual inquiry into when physical possession was actually transferred. The Court held that a mere recital in a sale deed does not conclusively establish the date of possession for limitation purposes. Consequently, the Court affirmed that a defendant cannot raise a limitation plea in appeal if it requires a fresh factual inquiry that was abandoned or not pursued in the trial court.
Questions settled- Can a defendant raise a plea of limitation for the first time in an appellate court if it requires a fresh inquiry into facts?
- Does a recital in a sale deed regarding possession conclusively establish the date of possession for the purpose of calculating the limitation period in a pre-emption suit?
- Is a defendant debarred from raising a plea of limitation on the principle of estoppel if they deliberately abandoned it in the court of first instance?
- Khushi Muhammad And Others vs The Chief Land Commissioner, Sind1987 SCMR 1630 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a dispute over the entitlement to 237 acres of land in District Jacobabad, originally leased to a third party and surrendered to the Government under Martial Law Regulation 64. The petitioners, displaced persons from Mangla Dam, were allotted this land in 1967. While the Chief Land Commissioner regularized this allotment in 1982, competing claims from respondents led to litigation. The Sind High Court remanded the matter to the Deputy Land Commissioner, who subsequently ordered the land's disposal under Paragraph 18 of Martial Law Regulation 115 of 1972. The petitioners challenged this, arguing the land was State land, not resumed land, and thus unavailable for disposal under land reform regulations. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether land surrendered under Martial Law Regulation 64 constitutes resumed land subject to the provisions of Martial Law Regulation 115 of 1972, and whether the petitioners' prior allotment and regularization precluded the land's subsequent disposal to other claimants under land reform policies.
Questions settled- Does land surrendered to the Government under Martial Law Regulation 64 constitute resumed land for the purposes of Paragraph 18 of Martial Law Regulation 115 of 1972?
- Can land previously allotted and regularized by the Chief Land Commissioner be treated as available for disposal under subsequent land reform policies?
- Is land that was leased and subsequently surrendered to the Government classified as State land or resumed land under Martial Law Regulation 69?
- Khushi Muhammad And Other vs Sher Muhammad And OtherK.L.R. 1987 Revenue Cases 29 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
Khushi Muhammad and others filed a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, which had partly allowed their appeal in a pre-emption suit. The disputed land was sold to the petitioners, and the respondents filed a pre-emption suit claiming a superior right as legal heirs of the vendors. The trial court and the High Court both ruled in favour of the pre-emptors, finding they possessed a superior right of pre-emption and that the vendees had acquiesced regarding the extension of time for depositing security. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that section 15(a) and (b), clause thirdly, of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, recognizing the pre-emption right of a successor, is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam, relying on prior case law. The Supreme Court noted that leave had already been granted in similar cases and accordingly granted leave to appeal to be heard along with those pending matters.
Questions settled- Whether the right of pre-emption granted to a successor of a vendor under the Punjab Pre-emption Act is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam?
- Does the failure of vendees to agitate against an order extending time for submitting security bonds amount to acquiescence?
- Khushi Muhammad And Another vs The State1987 SCMR 2009 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal filed by Khushi Muhammad and Maqbool against their convictions and sentences under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Muhammad Rafique. The petitioners challenged the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court, primarily arguing that the delay in lodging the First Information Report and the fact that the complainant's statement was recorded on the roadside rather than at the police station undermined the prosecution's case. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence, including the testimony of eye-witnesses Muhammad Shafi and Nazar Hussain, and found their presence at the scene natural and their testimony credible. The Court held that the procedural irregularities regarding the recording of the FIR did not diminish the credibility of the eye-witnesses or the sufficiency of the evidence. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the contentions raised, affirmed the convictions, and dismissed the petition, noting that the petitioners had already received the benefit of the lesser sentence for the offence.
Questions settled- Does a delay in lodging the First Information Report automatically affect the credibility of eye-witnesses?
- Does the recording of a complainant's statement on the roadside rather than at the police station invalidate the prosecution's case?
- Is the testimony of eye-witnesses sufficient to support a conviction for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Khushi Muhammad And 3 Others vs Sher Muhammad And Other1987 SCMR 129 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had affirmed a trial court decree granting a suit for pre-emption. The dispute arose over the sale of 510 Kanals of land, where the respondents claimed a superior right of pre-emption as legal heirs of the vendors, alleging that the sale price was inflated to deter pre-emption. The trial court and the High Court upheld the respondents' superior right and rejected the petitioners' arguments regarding the maintainability of the suit and the failure to deposit Zar-e-Panjum. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners challenged these findings, specifically arguing that Section 15(a) and (b) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913, which recognizes the right of pre-emption for a successor of a vendor, is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam, citing the precedent in Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Said Kamal Shah. Finding that leave had been granted in similar cases involving this specific legal point, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the validity of the pre-emption claim in light of the cited constitutional repugnancy.
Questions settled- Whether the right of pre-emption granted to a successor of a vendor under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam?
- Does the failure of a defendant to challenge an order extending time for the submission of security bonds amount to acquiescence?
- Khurshid Ul Haq And Others vs Multan Development Authority Through Its Director General1987 SCMR 1321 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Court examines the correctness of the Lahore High Court's judgment affirming the refusal of an interim injunction to the appellants in a pending civil suit challenging land acquisition proceedings. The appellants raised substantial questions of law regarding the legality of acquiring evacuee property, alleged changes in the purpose of acquisition, non-publication of statutory notifications, and the frustration of proceedings due to prolonged delay. The trial court, appellate court, and High Court concurrently dismissed the application for a temporary injunction, finding that possession had already been taken by the respondent Multan Development Authority, compensation had been deposited, and the balance of convenience favoured the respondents. The Supreme Court held that while the appellants raised substantial questions of law requiring a full trial, the discretionary orders refusing interim relief were unexceptionable given that the appellants were out of possession and development work was underway. The Court dismissed the appeal while protecting the appellants' interests by ordering that any improvements made during the litigation would be at the risk and cost of the respondents, and directed the trial court to conclude the suit expeditiously.
Questions settled- Whether an interim injunction can be granted to restrain a development authority from executing a housing scheme when possession of the disputed land has already been taken over and compensation deposited?
- Does the acquisition of land by a trust under the Town Improvement Act divest the property of its evacuee character upon the announcement of the award and transfer of charge under section 17-A of the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
- Are discretionary orders passed by lower courts refusing temporary injunctions open to interference by the Supreme Court when concurrent findings show that the balance of convenience favours the respondent?
- Khuda Bux vs The State1987 SCMR 1785 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, an Accounts Clerk in a Town Committee, was tried and convicted under sections 468, 471, and 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 for forging and encashing a cheque and misappropriating funds. The trial court convicted him under sections 468, 471, and 418, acquitting him of section 409. The Sind High Court dismissed his appeal while modifying his sentences. The core legal question before the Supreme Court involved evaluating the reliance placed by the High Court on accomplice evidence—specifically, testimony from bank officials and Town Committee officers whom the High Court itself deemed to be accomplices or in collusion—and whether an accused's statement could be partially relied upon to establish guilt. The Supreme Court considered the arguments challenging the conviction based on tainted evidence and contradictory statements regarding the custody of cheque books. The judgment reviews these elements without a recorded final order in the provided excerpt.
Questions settled- Can a conviction be sustained primarily on the testimony of prosecution witnesses who have been characterized by the court as accomplices in the crime?
- Whether an accused person's statement must be accepted or rejected as a whole rather than being relied upon only in part?
- Does the uncorroborated opinion of a handwriting expert regarding the body of a cheque suffice to prove forgery of signatures when bank officials and committee officers are found to be in collusion?
- Khizar Haider Malik And Others vs Muhammad Rafiq Malik And Another1987 SCMR 78 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by leave of the Court under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 examines whether the Punjab Service Tribunal correctly applied the law in restoring a departmental order that re-fixed the seniority of respondent No.1 as an Assistant Labour Officer. The core legal question concerns the interpretation of statutory rules regarding eligibility, specifically the requirement of possessing five years of practical on-the-job experience 'as such' in a specified category to qualify for promotion under a reserved quota, as well as the rules governing the determination of seniority from the date of regular appointment. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal erred in adopting a 'common sense' view to bypass the strict eligibility condition of five years' actual experience, and that mere eligibility without actual promotion and selection by the competent board does not confer a right to seniority. The Court laid down the principle that statutory service rules prescribing specific experiential conditions and selection procedures must be strictly satisfied, and seniority in a grade takes effect from the date of regular appointment.
Questions settled- Whether holding a lien on a post satisfies the requirement of having practical on-the-job experience on that post for a specified period under service rules?
- Can a civil servant claim seniority from the date of mere eligibility for promotion without actually being promoted and appointed to the post?
- Does seniority in a grade take effect from the date of regular appointment to a post in that grade under the Punjab Civil Servants Act?
- Khawaja Ghulam Hassan vs Muhammad Yar And Other1987 SCMR 1261 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute regarding the apportionment of agricultural land between a landlord and occupancy tenants following the promulgation of the Punjab Tenancy (Amendment) Act VII of 1952. The core legal controversy concerned the appropriate share of land ownership allocated to the landlord and tenants, which had been subject to conflicting revenue mutations and subsequent litigation in both civil and revenue courts. The tenants had challenged an interim order of the Board of Revenue via a Constitutional Petition in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the petition, declaring it infructuous because the underlying legal issue had been resolved in separate proceedings. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant argued that a prior civil court judgment regarding the land shares had attained finality and should not be reopened by subsequent writ proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's determination that the Constitutional Petition was infructuous was legally sound. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that issues outside the scope of the specific Constitutional Petition could not be adjudicated in the present appeal.
Questions settled- Can a Constitutional Petition be dismissed as infructuous if the underlying legal controversy has been resolved in separate proceedings?
- Does a final judgment from a civil court regarding land apportionment preclude subsequent adjudication of the same issue in revenue proceedings?
- Khan Zaman And Others vs The State1987 SCMR 1382 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal filed by Khan Zaman and others against a judgment of the High Court dated 15-8-1983, whereby their convictions under section 302 read with sections 149 and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for double murder were maintained, their death sentences were altered to imprisonment for life on each count, and the High Court ordered that the sentences should run consecutively. The core legal question was whether the aggregate of consecutive sentences of life imprisonment awarded in a single trial could exceed the twenty-five-year limit prescribed under proviso (a) of section 35(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held, following established precedent, that imposing consecutive life imprisonment terms exceeding the statutory aggregate limit is impermissible. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and modified the High Court's order by directing that the sentences of imprisonment for life on each count shall run concurrently rather than consecutively.
Questions settled- Whether consecutive sentences of imprisonment for life in a single trial can exceed the twenty-five-year limit prescribed under proviso (a) of section 35(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Should multiple sentences of imprisonment for life awarded in one and the same trial run concurrently or consecutively?
- Khan Sahib Sher Muhammad Mir vs Islamic Republic of Pakistan1987 SCMR 92 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Central Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's service appeal regarding the restoration of his full pension benefits as time-barred and without merit. The petitioner, a retired Deputy Secretary, sought restoration of his full pension after repaying the commuted portion. Following a rejection by the Ministry of Finance in 1981, the petitioner engaged in repeated departmental representations rather than filing a timely appeal before the Service Tribunal. The core legal question was whether the time spent pursuing departmental representations after a final order could be excluded from the period of limitation for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that the appeal was correctly dismissed as time-barred, affirming that time spent on repeated representations and reminders to higher authorities cannot be excluded from the statutory period of limitation. The Court established the principle that departmental redress must be sought within the prescribed legal framework, and failing to file an appeal within the statutory period after a final order renders the claim time-barred, regardless of subsequent representations.
Questions settled- Can the time spent on repeated departmental representations and reminders be excluded from the period of limitation for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
- Is an appeal before the Service Tribunal time-barred if filed after the statutory period following the communication of a final order from the Ministry of Finance?
- Khan Muhammad Khan vs The Secretary to Government of the Punjab1987 SCMR 190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a petition for special leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal against departmental action resulting in his removal from service and an order for the recovery of the value of missing wheat. The petitioner, serving as a Food Grain Inspector, faced departmental proceedings following allegations of selling wholesome wheat as damaged wheat and a subsequent shortage of 346.85 metric tons of wheat stored under his supervision. The core legal question before the court was whether any illegality or irregularity was committed during the course of the departmental proceedings that warranted interference with the Tribunal's decision. The Supreme Court held that the disciplinary action was taken in accordance with the relevant service rules, both penalties imposed were authorized by the rules, and no illegality or irregularity was pointed out in the proceedings. Consequently, the court laid down that where departmental action is regularly conducted under applicable service rules without procedural defects and no substantial question of public importance arises, leave to appeal will be refused. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether departmental proceedings resulting in removal from service and recovery of losses can be interfered with when conducted in accordance with relevant rules?
- Does a petition against the dismissal of a service appeal by the Punjab Service Tribunal raise a substantial question of public importance in the absence of procedural illegality?
- Khan Muhammad And Others vs Ishtiaq Hussain1987 SCMR 1482 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit valued at Rs. 1,60,000, initially decreed by a Civil Judge. At the time of the decree, appeals for suits of this value lay with the High Court. However, during the pendency of the appeal, Act V of 1986 amended the Punjab Civil Courts Ordinance, increasing the appellate jurisdiction of District Judges to Rs. 2,00,000. Consequently, the High Court transferred the appeal to the District Judge, Bahawalnagar, invoking its powers under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioners challenged this transfer, arguing they possessed a vested right to have their appeal heard by the High Court and that the amendment was not retrospective. The Supreme Court rejected these contentions, affirming that Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 expressly empowers the High Court to transfer pending appeals to competent subordinate courts. The Court held that litigants have no vested right to a specific forum for appeal that overrides the High Court's statutory power of transfer.
Questions settled- Does a litigant have a vested right to have an appeal heard by a specific forum?
- Does the High Court have the power to transfer a pending appeal to a subordinate court under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Can the High Court transfer an appeal to a subordinate court without notice to the parties?