Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Rab Nawaz vs Election Tribunal/Deputy Commissioner, Jhelum And Other1986 SCMR 1222 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-04
  election petitionlocal government electionvoid electionopen violencepolling stationelection tribunal jurisdictionnon-compliance with statutory rules
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the dismissal of his constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the Election Tribunal's decision declaring the local government election void due to interruption of the poll by open violence. The core legal question was whether the Election Tribunal had the jurisdiction to declare the election void on the ground that the poll was interrupted by open violence, given that rule 28 of the Local Councils (Election) Rules, 1979 vests power in the Presiding Officer and Election Authority regarding fresh polls. The Supreme Court held that the Election Tribunal acted within its jurisdiction under Rule 15 of the Punjab Local Councils (Election Petitions) Rules, 1979, as the failure of the Presiding Officer to record reasons or report the stoppage of the poll constituted a non-compliance with statutory rules that materially affected the election result. The Court laid down the principle that an Election Tribunal is fully empowered to declare an election void where statutory rules regarding polling have been violated and such failure has materially affected the election outcome.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Election Tribunal have the jurisdiction to declare an election void on the ground that the poll was interrupted by open violence?
  • Whether the failure of a Presiding Officer to report the stoppage of a poll constitutes non-compliance with statutory rules under the Punjab Local Councils (Election Petitions) Rules, 1979?
  • Can an Election Tribunal declare an election void if the result has been materially affected by the failure to comply with election rules?
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• Qutabuddin vs Sanaullah And Other1986 SCMR 43 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-12
  infructuous appealpossession of premisesdismissal of appealcivil litigationmootness
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as an appeal regarding a dispute over premises. During the pendency of the proceedings, the appellant filed an application before the Court stating that the appeal had become infructuous because the appellant had successfully obtained possession of the disputed premises. Consequently, the core legal question was whether the appeal could proceed given the change in circumstances rendering the relief sought redundant. The Court accepted the appellant's submission regarding the change in status of the subject matter. Holding that the matter had become infructuous, the Court dismissed the appeal. The key principle laid down is that where the underlying cause of action or the relief sought in an appeal is satisfied or rendered redundant by subsequent events—such as the appellant obtaining the disputed possession—the appeal becomes infructuous and is liable to be dismissed without further adjudication on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal become infructuous if the appellant obtains possession of the disputed premises during the pendency of the proceedings?
  • Can an appeal be dismissed if the relief sought has already been achieved by the appellant?
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• Qurban And Others vs Mst. Said Bibi And Other1986 SCMR 2012 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-14
  pre-emptionMangla Dam affecteesleave to appealstay of executionnotification
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a Second Appeal by the High Court, which had upheld the appellate judgment decreeing a suit for pre-emption. The suit was originally dismissed by the trial court based on a defense that the suit property was not pre-emptiable under a Government of West Pakistan, Board of Revenue notification dated 15-9-1965, but the District Judge reversed this finding. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended they were entitled to protection under the said notification as affectees of the Mangla Dam Project, supporting their claim with a certificate issued by the Commissioner, Mangla Dam Affairs and relying on precedent. The Supreme Court found that the contentions required examination and granted leave to appeal to determine whether the petitioners were entitled to protection under the notification as Mangla Dam project affectees, while also staying the execution of the decree pending the hearing of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether petitioners were entitled to protection under the notification as affectees of the Mangla Dam Project?
  • Whether the suit property was pre-emptiable in view of the Government of West Pakistan notification dated 15-9-1965?
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• Qurban Ali vs Sheroo Machi And Another1986 SCMR 1845 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-25
  leave to appealculpable homicidemurder convictionsentence reductionnature of injuryknowledge of deathcriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court, which altered the respondent's conviction from Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (murder) to Section 304, Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (culpable homicide not amounting to murder), reducing the sentence from death to six years' rigorous imprisonment. The respondent had fatally stabbed the deceased once in the chest. While the trial court convicted the respondent for murder, the High Court reasoned that the presence of only a single injury, the lack of a repeated attack despite opportunity, and the specific nature of the wound indicated that the act was committed with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death, rather than the specific intent to kill required for murder. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the evidence, specifically the nature and location of the injury, determined that the High Court's conversion of the conviction and the resulting sentence required further judicial consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the propriety of the High Court's reclassification of the offense.

  Questions settled

  • Does a single stab wound to the chest necessarily constitute murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • When does an act resulting in death fall under Section 304, Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 rather than Section 302?
  • Is the absence of repeated blows a sufficient ground to reduce a conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder?
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• Qazi Salahuddin vs The State1986 PLD Supreme Court 548 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-03
  illegal gratificationprevention of corruptionenhancement of sentenceleave to appealcivil servantcustodial sentencecondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from two cross-petitions before the Supreme Court of Pakistan: a criminal petition filed by the convict against his conviction and sentence, and a petition filed by the State seeking enhancement of the sentence. The petitioner, a civil servant employed as a supervisor in the Income Tax Department, was convicted under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 for demanding and accepting illegal gratification. The trial court sentenced him to three months' rigorous imprisonment and fine. On appeal, the High Court maintained the conviction but set aside the sentence of imprisonment, substituting it with a fine on grounds of service loss and trial delay. The Supreme Court observed that routine set-aside of custodial sentences in corruption cases contravened established precedent. The Court condoned the delay in the State's petition, found the core legal issues of conviction reappraisal and sentence adequacy of considerable importance, and granted leave to appeal in both matters.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside a sentence of imprisonment for a convicted civil servant in a corruption case and replacing it with a fine?
  • Can delay in filing a State petition for enhancement of sentence be condoned in special circumstances involving judicial practice inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent?
  • Whether the prosecution successfully established the charge of demanding and accepting illegal gratification under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Qazi Altaf Hussain And Another vs Ishfaq Hussain1986 SCMR 1427 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-02
  undue influenceregistered sale deedsuit for possessionlimitation periodpresumption of correctnessrebuttal of evidencemaintainability of suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute between two brothers regarding the ownership of a residential house, following a registered sale deed executed by their father in favor of one brother. The core legal questions concerned the maintainability of a suit for possession without seeking cancellation of a registered sale deed, the limitation period for such a challenge, and whether the findings of fact regarding undue influence and lack of consideration were sustainable. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the suit was maintainable and within time, as the limitation period commenced upon the father's death. The Court affirmed the lower appellate court's finding that the sale was vitiated by undue influence and lack of consideration. The Court established that while a presumption of correctness attaches to a registered sale deed under the Registration Act, it is rebuttable by evidence. Furthermore, a party cannot raise a new objection regarding the maintainability of a suit at the final appellate stage if it was not pressed in lower courts and the defect was curable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presumption of correctness attaching to a registered sale deed under Section 60 of the Registration Act preclude evidence of lack of consideration?
  • When does the limitation period under Article 91 of the Limitation Act commence for a suit challenging a sale deed executed by a father during his lifetime?
  • Can a defendant raise an objection regarding the maintainability of a suit for possession without cancellation of a deed for the first time at the final appellate stage?
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• Qamaruddin And Another vs Muhammad Akbar And Other1986 SCMR 698 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-20
  leave to appealjoint propertyproperty transferconcurrent findingscivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against the judgment and order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a civil revision against concurrent findings of lower courts. The core legal question involved whether the disputed Deohri and staircase formed part of the property transferred to respondent No. 1 or was used jointly by the parties following the initial allotment of the joint property. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts and the High Court were based on a proper reading of the evidence on record and that no substantial question of law warranted interference. The court affirmed that factual determinations regarding property boundaries and joint usage based on evidence will not be disturbed under revisional or appellate jurisdiction without proof of misreading, laying down the principle that concurrent findings of fact supported by record evidence remain binding before the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding property boundaries can be interfered with when based on a proper reading of evidence?
  • Does a party have a right to appeal against a High Court order dismissing a civil revision when the findings are supported by the record?
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• Qalab E Hussain vs Muhammad Nadim And Other1986 SCMR 1690 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-07-27
  landlord and tenant relationshipevictionstay orderexecution of decreetransfer of propertycontempt of courtrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a civil petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment dismissing a constitutional petition, and a related criminal original petition regarding an alleged violation of a stay order. The petitioner challenged his eviction as a tenant, denying the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship with the respondents, who had purchased the property. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' findings, holding that upon the transfer of ownership, the previous agency arrangement regarding rent collection terminated, and the new owners were entitled to receive rent. The Court rejected the petitioner's plea as flimsy. Regarding the criminal original petition, the petitioner alleged that his dispossession occurred despite a stay order issued by the Supreme Court and a subsequent recall order by the executing court. However, the Court found no evidence that the stay order was communicated to the respondents before the execution process was completed, as the bailiff's report and supporting affidavits indicated the execution was finalized prior to any notice. Consequently, both the civil petition and the criminal original petition were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the agency arrangement for rent collection between a previous owner and an agent terminate upon the transfer of property ownership?
  • Are new property owners entitled to receive rent from a tenant after serving notice under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restrictions Ordinance 1959?
  • Can a party be held in contempt for violating a stay order if there is no proof the order was communicated before the execution of the decree was completed?
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• Punjab National Silk Mills Ltd. vs National Bank of Pakistan And Another1986 SCMR 1126 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-17
  winding upcompanies actsecured creditorinability to pay debtssuspension of businessjust and equitable
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from consolidated appeals against a High Court judgment directing the winding up of the appellant private limited company under sections 162 and 163 of the Companies Act, 1913, upon applications filed by secured and unsecured creditors due to prolonged suspension of business, failure to pay debts, and insurmountable liabilities. The core legal questions examined the locus standi of secured creditors to petition for winding up, the effect of a pending civil suit on such proceedings, and whether adequate opportunity to produce evidence was denied to the appellant. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that secured creditors are not barred by law from seeking winding up when security is shown to be insufficient, that winding up proceedings can be instituted independently of prior or simultaneous civil recovery suits, and that the appellant's own dilatory conduct and failure to produce evidence precluded any claim of denial of a fair hearing. The Court established that a company's chronic closure, mounting liabilities, and failure to satisfy undisputed or inadequately secured debts justify a winding up order under the just and equitable clause.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a secured creditor has the locus standi to file an application for the winding up of a company under the Companies Act, 1913?
  • Does the prior or simultaneous institution of a civil recovery suit bar a creditor from initiating company winding up proceedings?
  • Whether winding up proceedings can be maintained against a company that has suspended its business for a prolonged period and is unable to pay its debts?
  • Does the failure of a company to substantiate its solvency and cooperate with the provisional liquidator justify a winding up order?
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• Province of Sind Through Chief Secretary And Another vs Ali Anwar1986 SCMR 1854 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-23
  service lawretrospective application of rulescivil servantspromotionseniorityregularizationservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Sind Service Tribunal, which had ruled in favor of civil servants regarding the effective date of their promotion to Grade-17. The core legal question was whether the Sind Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1975, could be applied retrospectively to regularize promotions that had already been processed under prior arrangements, and whether the government's subsequent notifications attempting to alter the effective date of promotion were valid. The Supreme Court upheld the Service Tribunal's decision, finding that the 1975 Rules did not possess retrospective effect. The Court affirmed that the government could not rely on these rules to invalidate or supersede earlier, validly issued notifications regarding the respondents' promotions. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, holding that the government's attempt to apply the 1975 Rules to the respondents' cases was legally flawed and that the respondents were entitled to the benefits of their earlier, properly regularized promotion dates. The principle established is that new service rules cannot be applied retrospectively to adversely affect vested rights unless explicitly provided.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Sind Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1975 be applied retrospectively to regularize promotions?
  • Does a new notification superseding an earlier one automatically invalidate the previous one if the new notification is legally flawed?
  • Is a government notification that relies on a misstatement of law regarding the applicability of service rules valid?
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• Province of Sind And Others vs Syed Saifur Rahman And Other1986 SCMR 1332 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-21
  requisitioning of immovable propertyejectmentdefault in payment of rentmala fide actioncolourable legislationconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Sind High Court, which had declared an order of requisitioning issued by the Deputy Commissioner under section 3 of the Sind Requisitioning of Immovable Property (Temporary Powers) Act, 1956 to be without lawful authority. The core legal question was whether the government could lawfully requisition a property already in its own occupation to frustrate an executed ejectment order arising from default in rent payments. The Supreme Court held that property already in possession of the government cannot be requisitioned, and that using requisitioning powers to bypass a final ejectment order confirmed by superior courts constitutes a mala fide, colourable, and invalid exercise of statutory power. The Court affirmed that administrative convenience, such as the education of students, does not justify unlawful government retention of premises following valid rent default orders. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can property already in the possession of the Government be legally requisitioned under the Sind Requisitioning of Immovable Property (Temporary Powers) Act, 1956?
  • Whether an order of requisitioning issued to avoid executing a final ejectment order confirmed by superior courts constitutes a mala fide and colourable action?
  • Does potential inconvenience to students studying in a school situated on demised premises justify the government's failure to comply with rent deposit orders and lawful ejectment?
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• Province of Punjab vs Ikramul Haq And Another1986 SCMR 1994 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-13
  deputationistcivil servantlienpremature retirementcompetent authorityouster clauseservice tribunal jurisdictionlimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the premature retirement of a civil servant who, while holding a substantive post in the Punjab provincial service, was inducted into the Federal Government via lateral entry without being confirmed in the new post. The core legal question was whether the Federal Government acted as the competent authority to retire the respondent under the Civil Servants Act, 1973, and whether the Punjab Service Tribunal possessed jurisdiction to set aside that order. The Supreme Court held that the respondent remained a deputationist because he retained a lien on his provincial post. Consequently, the Federal Government lacked the competency to retire him under the Civil Servants Act, 1973. The Court ruled that the ouster clause in Article 13 of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981, does not protect orders passed by an incompetent authority. The key principle laid down is that an order of retirement by a competent authority is a prerequisite for statutory immunity; where the authority lacks jurisdiction, the order is void ab initio and subject to judicial review, regardless of ouster clauses.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant who retains a lien on a provincial post while serving in the Federal Government qualify as a deputationist?
  • Can the Federal Government exercise the power of premature retirement under the Civil Servants Act, 1973, against a provincial civil servant on deputation?
  • Does the bar of jurisdiction under Article 13 of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981, protect an order of retirement passed by an authority that is not competent?
  • Can the principles of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908, be invoked to condone delay in filing an appeal before a Service Tribunal?
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• Province of Punjab Through Secretary, Education And Others vs Abdul1986 SCMR 180 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-20
  withdrawal of petitionservice tribunal appealservice mattergovernment orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions filed by the Province of Punjab through the Secretary, Education, and others against Abdul and others, challenging an order dated 16-8-1982 of the Punjab Service Tribunal. During the proceedings, the Assistant Advocate General for the Government of Punjab stated that the government had finally decided the respondents' cases on 1-8-1985, and this subsequent order had been challenged by the respondents in appeals before the Punjab Service Tribunal. Consequently, the petitioner sought permission to withdraw the petitions. The court found this request reasonable and granted it, dismissing the petitions as withdrawn while safeguarding the government's right to contest the pending appeals before the Service Tribunal on all available legal and factual pleas.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner withdraw a civil petition when the underlying grievance has been addressed by a subsequent government decision?
  • Whether withdrawal of a petition can be permitted without prejudice to the rights of parties to raise contentions before the appropriate tribunal?
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• Province of Punjab Through Chief Secretary Lahore vs M. Ikram Ul Haq And Other1986 SCMR 358 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-28
  service lawcivil servantleave to appealjurisdiction of service tribunallimitationvoid ab initiodeputation
  Summary & questions settled

  The Province of Punjab sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had declared an order of the President of Pakistan retiring the respondent from service to be void ab initio. The respondent, initially a Punjab Government employee, had joined the Federal Government's Foreign Affairs Group via competitive examination. Following his retirement under section 13(ii) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, the respondent unsuccessfully approached the Federal Service Tribunal before succeeding in the Punjab Service Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the respondent remained a Punjab Government employee and was not a civil servant under the Federal Act, thus rendering the President's order invalid. The petitioner contended that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction due to the bar under the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981, and that the appeal was time-barred. The Supreme Court found that the petition raised substantial legal questions regarding the respondent's status, the applicability of the bar on jurisdiction, and the issue of limitation. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to provide an authoritative pronouncement on these matters.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Punjab Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to set aside an order passed by the President of Pakistan under the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Can a service appeal be considered within time if the appellant was pursuing remedies in forums lacking technical jurisdiction?
  • Does an employee who secures lateral entry into a Federal Government group remain a civil servant of the provincial government?
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• Province of Punjab And Others vs Muhammad Jalil Ur Rehman1986 SCMR 1705 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-07-26
  ejectmentrent restrictiondefault in deposit of rentconstitutional petitionleave to appealnecessary party
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 14-10-1979, which dismissed a constitutional petition arising from the striking off of a tenant's defence for non-deposit of rent under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal questions involve whether the Collector was a necessary party in an ejectment application against a provincial educational institution, and whether departmental delay constitutes sufficient ground for the Rent Controller to extend the time for depositing rent. The Supreme Court held that contentions not raised before the High Court cannot be entertained for the first time, that the Province of Punjab was properly impleaded through the Education Officer without need for the Collector, and that departmental procedures do not amount to objective unavoidability justifying an extension of time for rent deposit under section 13(6). The key principle laid down is that delay in depositing rent can only be excused upon a showing of objective unavoidability.

  Questions settled

  • Can a legal contention not raised before the High Court be entertained for the first time by the Supreme Court?
  • Whether failure to implead the Collector results in a miscarriage of justice in an ejectment application against a provincial educational institution?
  • Does departmental delay in making rent deposits constitute objective unavoidability empowering the Rent Controller to extend the time under section 13(6)?
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• Province of Punjab And Others vs Mirza Riaz Ahmad And Other1986 SCMR 55 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-27
  service mattercivil court jurisdictionservice tribunalleave to appealjurisdictional bar
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Province of Punjab against a judgment of the High Court, which had upheld the dismissal of the petitioner's appeal by the District Judge on the grounds of limitation. The respondent, a dispenser previously employed by the Health Department and later placed at the disposal of the Town Committee Samma Satta, had filed a civil suit seeking payment of salary and allowances from the Health Department after the Town Committee terminated his services and the Health Department refused his reinstatement. The civil court decreed the suit in the respondent's favor. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the civil court possessed the jurisdiction to entertain the respondent's suit, given that the dispute pertains to a service matter, which may fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal specifically to examine this jurisdictional issue, questioning whether the provisions of the Service Tribunal Act, 1974, bar the jurisdiction of civil courts in such service-related disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to entertain a suit regarding the pay and allowances of a government employee in a service matter?
  • Does the Service Tribunal Act 1974 bar the jurisdiction of civil courts in disputes concerning service matters of government employees?
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• Province of Punjab And Others vs Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue, Punjab And Other1986 SCMR 529 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-07
  border area allotmentboard of revenue jurisdictionlachesreview petitionmilitary allotmentconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from leave granted to the Province of Punjab to examine whether the Lahore High Court was justified in dismissing in limine a constitutional petition on the ground of indolence and laches. The dispute centered around the allotment of land in the border area to an army officer under the West Pakistan Border Area Regulation, 1959, which allotment was initially cancelled by the Board of Revenue and later restored upon a review petition. The core legal question examined was the jurisdictional competence of the Board of Revenue to interfere with and cancel allotments made by the Border Allotment Committee under the said Regulation. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the Board of Revenue lacked jurisdiction under the Regulation to interfere with such allotments, as the Regulation provided a specific framework and excluded the jurisdiction of outside authorities. The Court laid down the principle that an order passed wholly without jurisdiction is a nullity, and any subsequent corrective action removing such an illegal order from the scene cannot be legally objected to.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Board of Revenue have the jurisdiction to cancel or interfere with allotments made by the Border Allotment Committee under the West Pakistan Border Area Regulation, 1959?
  • Can a constitutional petition be dismissed on the ground of indolence and laches when the history of the case shows deliberate delay by state authorities?
  • Is an order passed without jurisdiction by an authority subject to legal correction, and can its removal be legally challenged?
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• Province of Baluchistan vs Sardar Muhammad Usman Khan Jogezai1986 SCMR 2010 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-24
  review petitioncondonation of delaytime-barredappeal as of rightleave to appealprocedural lapse
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for review of a Supreme Court judgment that had previously dismissed the petitioner's civil petition for leave to appeal. The petitioner sought review on the basis that they had erroneously filed a petition for leave to appeal when an appeal as of right was competent under Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition on multiple grounds. First, the court noted that the review petition itself was time-barred by 35 days, with no cogent grounds provided for condonation. Second, the court held that the petitioner could not use the review jurisdiction to correct an omission by counsel who failed to raise the argument regarding the competency of an appeal as of right during the original hearing. Finally, the court observed that even if the review were entertained, the underlying appeal as of right had already become time-barred by 27 days before the initial petition was filed, meaning valuable rights had accrued to the opposite party, precluding any relief.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party seek review of a judgment on the ground that they erroneously filed a petition for leave to appeal instead of an appeal as of right?
  • Is a review petition maintainable when the underlying appeal as of right is already time-barred?
  • Can a party rely on the omission of their counsel to raise a specific legal argument as a ground for review?
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• Principal, Pine Hills College And Others vs Moharram Ali And 2 Other1986 SCMR 1264 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-12
  civil servanttermination of serviceservice tribunaldeputationcompetent authorityleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The Principal, Pine Hills College sought leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against a judgment of the Service Tribunal which declared respondent No.1 to be in service after his termination. The core legal question concerned the validity of the termination of a civil servant serving under the West Pakistan Government Educational and Training Institution Ordinance, 1960, by an authority other than the competent appointing authority. The Supreme Court held that the termination order amounted to removal from service with a stigma, which could only be passed by the competent authority, and that an order of termination of deputation could not take effect unilaterally without government agreement. Since the respondent had passed away during the proceedings and only the right to emoluments remained, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that a civil servant governed by the Ordinance cannot be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to the competent government authority, and unilateral reversion or termination of deputation without government consent is legally untenable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order terminating the service of a civil servant on grounds of unsuitability amounts to removal from service requiring action by the competent authority?
  • Can an institution unilaterally terminate the deputation of a government employee without the agreement of the Provincial Government?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when the primary respondent has died and only the claim for past emoluments remains?
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• President of Pakistan vs Muhammad Munir1986 SCMR 1357 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-24
  service matterdischarge from serviceappointing authoritycivil revisionpleadings and issuessupreme court leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition by the Government challenges an order of the High Court dismissing its civil revision in a service matter. The respondent, a Senior Chargeman, was issued a notice of discharge from service by the Works Manager following an inquiry into allegations of illegal gratification. The respondent challenged the discharge through a civil suit, which was initially dismissed by the trial court, but his appeal was accepted by the Additional District Judge. The High Court subsequently dismissed the Government's civil revision. Both appellate forums held the notice of discharge to be invalid on the ground that it was not issued by the appointing authority, namely the Superintendent (Mechanical) Workshop, rather than on the plaintiff's original pleading regarding non-application of mind. The Government urged before the Supreme Court that the High Court erred in deciding the matter on an extraneous ground not raised in the pleadings. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the lower appellate forums and the High Court were justified in invalidating the discharge notice on a ground not put in issue.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court or appellate forum is justified in deciding a case on a ground not raised in the pleadings or put in issue?
  • Does a notice of discharge issued by an authority other than the appointing authority render the discharge invalid?
  • Can the High Court sustain a judgment on an extraneous ground not taken up by the party in the trial court?
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• Pirzada vs Mst. Abdul Marjan And Another1986 SCMR 1052 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-18
  acquittal appealmurderocular testimonyappreciation of evidencecriminal appealabscondence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a consolidated judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing state acquittal appeals concerning a murder charge. The core legal question involves determining whether the High Court erred in its appreciation of evidence and in upholding the acquittal of the respondents for murder. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's appraisal of the evidence was based on valid and tenable grounds, noting material contradictions and improvements in the ocular testimony, inconsistencies with medical evidence, and a disproved motive, and found no justification to interfere with the acquittal orders. The key principle laid down is that appellate courts will not interfere with an acquittal judgment that rests on a reasonable and tenable view of the evidence taken by the trial and high courts unless a legal defect or perverse appreciation is established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court should interfere with a concurrent order of acquittal based on a plausible view of the evidence?
  • Can minor contradictions and improvements in ocular testimony justify the rejection of witness accounts in a murder trial?
  • Does the abscondence of an accused serve as sufficient corroboration to sustain a conviction when the ocular testimony is found untrustworthy?
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• Pir Muhammad And Others vs Muhammad Farid And Other1986 SCMR 1260 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-14
  easementright of wayprescriptive easementconcurrent findingscivil revisionleave to appeallocal commission
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had dismissed their civil revision petition and affirmed concurrent findings by the trial court and the first appellate court. The dispute concerned the plaintiff's claimed right of easement (right of passage) over the defendants' land to access their cattle-sheds and houses. The trial court, relying on a local commission report and evidence of continuous usage for over twenty years, held that the plaintiff had established a prescriptive right of way. The appellate courts affirmed these findings, noting that long user raised a strong presumption of a right of way and that there was no evidence of permissive use. The Supreme Court examined the petitioners' contention that the evidence was insufficient and that the plaintiff had alternative access to a public path. Finding that the lower courts had correctly determined the controverted questions of fact regarding the immemorial and uninterrupted user of the path, the Supreme Court held that no substantial question of law existed to warrant interference. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does long-term usage of a path over another's land raise a presumption of a right of way?
  • Can a court in revisional jurisdiction interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding an easement?
  • Is a right of easement established if the claimant has alternative access to a public path?
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• Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority, Lahore And Others1986 SCMR 199 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-08
  terms and conditions of serviceprospect of promotionservice tribunalultra vires rulesdepartmental promotion examination
  Summary & questions settled

  Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether the Federal Service Tribunal correctly declared certain WAPDA service rules to be ultra vires the terms and conditions of the respondents. The respondents, who held posts as Junior Officers and were later designated as Assistant Directors in grade-17, challenged subsequent rule amendments requiring them to pass a departmental promotion examination, prescribing a minimum graduation qualification for promotion to grade-18, and stopping increments upon failure. The Federal Service Tribunal partly held the rules to be ultra vires. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, holding that terms and conditions of service do not include the prospect of promotion or the terms and conditions relating to a higher grade, and that conditions for promotion to a higher grade are not controlled by the terms enjoyed in a lower grade. The Supreme Court set aside the Tribunal's order and dismissed the respondents' service appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the terms and conditions of service of an employee include the prospect of promotion or conditions relating to a higher grade?
  • Does the prescription of a minimum graduation qualification for promotion to a higher grade violate the existing terms and conditions of lower-grade employees?
  • Whether the WAPDA has the competence to frame and amend service rules under the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority vs Malik Ahmad1986 SCMR 571 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-10
  WAPDAservice terminationSection 17(1-A)disciplinary proceedingsservice tribunal jurisdictionbona fide exercise of powerlimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the removal of a WAPDA employee under Section 17(1-A) of the Water & Power Development Act. The Service Tribunal had set aside the removal, reasoning that because disciplinary proceedings were initiated, the authority could not circumvent them by invoking Section 17(1-A) without assigning reasons or proving charges. The Supreme Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment. The Court held that Section 17(1-A) confers a distinct power on the Authority, which constitutes a term and condition of employment rather than a punitive measure. Consequently, such removal does not require a show-cause notice, assignment of reasons, or conclusive proof of guilt. The Court further clarified that the existence of concurrent disciplinary proceedings does not bar the exercise of power under Section 17(1-A). The key principle established is that while the power is broad, it must be exercised bona fide for the purposes of the Act. The matter was remanded to the Tribunal to determine the bona fide nature of the removal and to resolve the outstanding issue of limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the initiation of disciplinary proceedings preclude the Authority from exercising its power of removal under Section 17(1-A) of the Water & Power Development Act?
  • Is an order of removal passed under Section 17(1-A) of the Water & Power Development Act considered a punishment requiring the assignment of reasons?
  • Must the Authority provide a show-cause notice or establish conclusive proof of guilt before removing an employee under Section 17(1-A) of the Water & Power Development Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority vs Aftab Ahmad1986 SCMR 676 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-10
  WAPDAFederal Service Tribunaljurisdictionpremature retirementmala fideterms and conditions of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves petitions for leave to appeal filed by the Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had set aside the premature retirement of the respondents under section 17(1A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958. The core legal questions related to the jurisdiction of the Federal Service Tribunal to entertain appeals against orders passed under section 17(1A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958, and whether the termination of the respondents' services was mala fide. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Service Tribunal possesses exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate questions concerning the terms and conditions of WAPDA employees, and further upheld the Tribunal's finding that the retirement orders were mala fide, as they were issued merely to avoid the administrative trouble of adjusting the officers upon their repatriation from a subsidiary company. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to hear appeals against orders passed under section 17(1A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958?
  • Whether the termination of service or retirement of WAPDA employees under section 17(1A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958 can be set aside on the grounds of mala fides?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan vs Messrs Zeal Pak Cement Factory Limited_PTCL 1986 CL. 25 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  tax exemptionstatutory interpretationindustrial undertakingincome taxadministrative discretiontax holidaylegislative intent
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals filed by the Central Board of Revenue against High Court judgments regarding tax exemptions for industrial expansions under Section 15-BB(4) of the Income Tax Act. The core legal question was whether the Board of Revenue could lawfully deny tax exemptions by interpreting the statutory requirement of an "identifiable industrial unit" or "identifiable industrial process" to also necessitate that such units or processes be "independent" and self-contained. The Supreme Court held that the Board of Revenue’s interpretation was erroneous, as the statute contained no such requirement of independence. The Court affirmed that administrative authorities cannot impose extraneous conditions not found in the legislation to deny statutory benefits. By injecting the word "independent" into the statutory language, the Board of Revenue engaged in impermissible inter-meddling with legislative intent. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals, ruling that the assessees had satisfied the actual jurisdictional requirements of the law, and the refusal of exemptions based on the added, non-statutory criteria was unlawful and discriminatory.

  Questions settled

  • Can an administrative authority add conditions to a statute that are not explicitly provided by the legislature?
  • Does the term 'identifiable industrial unit' under Section 15-BB(4) of the Income Tax Act imply that the unit must be 'independent' and self-contained?
  • Is the refusal of a tax exemption based on an extraneous, non-statutory requirement legally sustainable?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan National Council of Arts vs Muhammad Ayub Malik1986 SCMR 1025 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-14
  lease terminationautomatic renewalholding overburden of proofmesne profitslandlord and tenantadverse inference
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a revision petition by the Lahore High Court, which upheld a decree for possession and mesne profits against the petitioner (a tenant). The core legal question was whether the lease agreement had been validly terminated by the respondent (landlord) through a notice preventing automatic renewal, or whether the lease continued by operation of law or by 'holding over'. The petitioner contended that the notice served did not explicitly refuse renewal, thus triggering automatic renewal. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proof regarding the contents of the notice, which was in his possession but withheld from evidence. The Court affirmed that the notice served was sufficient to terminate the lease upon the expiry of the initial term. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument of 'holding over', noting that the essential condition of acceptance of rent by the lessor after the lease's determination was absent. The petition was dismissed, confirming the lower courts' findings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a party to produce a document in their possession raise a presumption that the document would have been unfavorable to them?
  • Is the acceptance of rent by a lessor after the determination of a lease a necessary condition for the doctrine of 'holding over' to apply?
  • Can a lease be terminated by notice if the lease agreement stipulates automatic renewal unless notice is provided by either party?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan And Another vs Shah Bahram Irani1986 SCMR 1136 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-05
  enemy propertyvesting orderopportunity of hearingpost facto hearingleave to appealconstitutional petitionDefence of Pakistan Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Pakistan against the judgment of the Sind High Court, which had set aside federal notifications vesting the property share of an enemy in the Custodian of Enemy Property. The respondent, Shah Bahram Irani, had challenged the notifications on the ground that no opportunity of hearing was granted prior to the deprivation of property rights. The High Court allowed the petition, declaring the notifications illegal. Before the Supreme Court, the Deputy Attorney-General contended that even if a pre-decisional hearing was required pursuant to precedent, a post facto opportunity of hearing ought to be granted, expressing willingness to provide the same. The Supreme Court found the point worthy of consideration, granted leave to appeal, and directed the joinder of subsequent purchasers of the property upon application.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a notification vesting property in the Custodian of Enemy Property without a pre-decisional hearing is lawful?
  • Can a post facto opportunity of hearing be granted where a pre-decisional hearing was omitted in property vesting matters?
  • Whether subsequent purchasers of property subject to enemy property vesting notifications are necessary parties to the appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan And Another vs Muhammad Haji Gani Ltd.1986 SCMR 1075 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-04
  Bonus Vouchers Schemeimport licencecompensation claimState Bank of Pakistanadministrative circularconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment directing the State Bank of Pakistan to pay compensation to the respondent for surrendered Bonus Vouchers. The respondent, an import-export business, claimed compensation following the abolition of the Bonus Vouchers Scheme via the Finance (Supplementary) Ordinance, 1972. The State Bank rejected the respondent's application for compensation because the respondent failed to produce the Exchange Control Copy of the relevant import licence, a requirement stipulated in Circular No. 49 issued by the State Bank of Pakistan. The High Court had allowed the respondent's constitutional petition, relying on a letter from a commercial bank certifying the licence remained unutilised. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the State Bank of Pakistan was legally obligated to pay compensation in the absence of the mandatory Exchange Control Copy of the import licence as required by the governing circular. The core legal question involves the strict adherence to procedural requirements set forth in administrative circulars issued under statutory authority for the settlement of financial claims.

  Questions settled

  • Is the State Bank of Pakistan legally bound to pay compensation for Bonus Vouchers if the claimant fails to produce the Exchange Control Copy of the import licence as required by Circular No. 49?
  • Does the failure to comply with procedural requirements stipulated in a circular issued under the Finance (Supplementary) Ordinance, 1972, invalidate a claim for compensation?
  Read full judgment →
• Painda Muhammad And Others vs Deputy Commissioner Dir And Other1986 SCMR 130 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-05
  immovable property disputereview petitionlimitationcondonation of delaywrit jurisdictiondiscretionary power
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, belonging to the Utmankhel tribe, challenged orders relating to immovable property disputes under the Settlement of Immovable Property Disputes (Dir & Swat) Regulation 1972, which wound through various administrative and tribunal forums before a review petition was ultimately dismissed as time-barred by the Chairman, Tribunal Land Disputes, Dir, Swat and Chitral. A subsequent writ petition before the Peshawar High Court was also dismissed. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court rightly refused to interfere in writ jurisdiction with the discretionary order of the Tribunal Chairman declining to condone delay for a review petition. The Supreme Court held that the matter of condoning delay lay entirely within the discretion of the Tribunal Chairman and, absent any illegal, capricious, or perverse exercise of discretion, it was not open to review. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the principle that discretionary orders on limitation by specialized tribunals are immune from constitutional interference unless tainted by illegality or perversity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere in writ jurisdiction with an order of a tribunal declining to condone delay in filing a review petition?
  • Does the entertaining or not entertaining of a time-barred review petition lie within the discretion of the Tribunal Land Disputes?
  • Under what circumstances is the discretionary exercise of power regarding limitation open to judicial review?
  Read full judgment →
• N_a vs N_a1986 PLD SC 192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Customs Actsmugglingforeign currencyconfiscationdepartmental proceedingsres judicataconstitutional petitionimport restrictions
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the confiscation of foreign currency by Customs authorities from an individual who entered Pakistan from Afghanistan. The core legal question was whether the possession of foreign currency imported via an unspecified route constitutes 'smuggling' under the Customs Act, 1969, and whether the failure to declare such currency justifies confiscation. The Court held the confiscation unlawful, ruling that in the absence of a specific prohibition on the import of foreign currency under the relevant State Bank of Pakistan notification, mere possession does not constitute smuggling. The Court clarified that the definition of 'smuggling' under Section 2(s) of the Customs Act, 1969, requires a breach of restriction or an intent to evade duties. Furthermore, the Court established that departmental confiscation proceedings and criminal prosecutions are independent, concurrent remedies, meaning a criminal conviction does not create res judicata for departmental proceedings. Finally, the Court held that the obligation to declare currency applies only at the time of arrival through authorized ports, not to subsequent possession.

  Questions settled

  • Does the possession of foreign currency imported through an unspecified route constitute smuggling under the Customs Act 1969?
  • Are departmental confiscation proceedings and criminal prosecutions under the Customs Act 1969 mutually exclusive?
  • Does a criminal conviction for a customs offense constitute res judicata in departmental confiscation proceedings?
  • Is the declaration of foreign currency mandatory for individuals entering Pakistan through unspecified routes?
  Read full judgment →
• Nur Muhammad And Another Muhammad Sharif vs The State Hakim And Other1986 SCMR 174 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-07Read full judgment →
• Noorul Islam vs The State1986 SCMR 1836 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-26
  leave to appealillegal investigationjurisdiction of courtheroine recoveryProhibition OrderTazkiat-us-ShahudQanun-e-Shahadat
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Noorul Islam against the dismissal of his appeal by the High Court, which had upheld his conviction under Article 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 for possession of heroin. The core legal questions raised were whether police officers had the power to investigate and arrest under the Order given the Sind Prohibition Rules, and whether the trial court was bound to follow the procedure of Tazkiat-us-Shahud under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The Supreme Court held that an illegality in investigation does not affect the competence and jurisdiction of the trial court, and further held that objections regarding Tazkiat-us-Shahud cannot be raised for the time in the absence of cross-examination or objection during the trial. The petition for leave to appeal was consequently dismissed, establishing the principle that procedural flaws in police investigation do not vitiate a court's jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does an illegality committed in the course of a police investigation affect the competence and jurisdiction of the trial court?
  • Can an objection regarding the procedure of Tazkiat-us-Shahud be raised for the first time when witnesses were not cross-examined on the issue at trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad vs Muhammad Shafi And Other1986 SCMR 127 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-03
  counsel authorityinterlocutory matterbinding statementpetition for leave to appealcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan via a petition for leave to appeal, challenging the decision of the High Court which held that a statement made by a counsel during an interlocutory matter disposing of the entire suit is binding on the represented party. The core legal question revolves around the extent of a counsel's authority to bind their client through statements made in interlocutory proceedings that ultimately dispose of the main suit. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court's view was correct in the facts and circumstances of the case, thereby affirming that a counsel can competently make such statements and bind the party represented. The key principle laid down is that a party is bound by the statements and concessions competently made by their counsel in judicial proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a statement made by a counsel in connection with an interlocutory matter bind the represented party where the entire suit is disposed of?
  • Whether a party is bound by the statements made by their counsel during judicial proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad vs Allah Ditta And Other1986 SCMR 785 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-01
  pre-emptioncustomsecond appealburden of proofpleadings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan via a petition challenging an order of the High Court, which had accepted a second appeal and dismissed the plaintiff's pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether the plaintiff was required to establish the existence of a custom of pre-emption in the town of Pasrur on the date of the promulgation of the Punjab Pre-emption Act I of 1913 under Section 7 thereof, and whether the absence of a specific date in the framed issue prejudiced the plaintiff. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had pleaded the custom, an issue was duly framed which was comprehensive enough to cover the pleadings, and the plaintiff failed to prove the custom based on the evidence evaluated by the High Court. The Court affirmed that a party must suffer for failing to prove its own pleadings, and no grounds existed to interfere with the High Court's analytical findings. The petition was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff is required to establish the existence of a custom of pre-emption on the date of the promulgation of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913?
  • Does the failure to mention a specific date in an issue vitiate trial proceedings when the issue is comprehensive enough to cover the pleadings?
  • Can the High Court interfere in second appeal with concurrent findings of subordinate courts tainted by misreading or omission of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad And Others vs Muhammad Iqbal And Other1986 SCMR 1818 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-25
  criminal petitionalteration of convictionreduction of sentenceacquittalmurderleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves three criminal petitions arising from a judgment of the High Court concerning a murder case. Criminal Petition No. 272 of 1983 was filed by the complainant challenging the alteration of the respondent Muhammad Iqbal's conviction from section 302 to section 304-I of the Pakistan Penal Code and the reduction of his sentence to ten years rigorous imprisonment, as well as the dismissal of his criminal revision regarding the acquittal of other respondents. Criminal Petition No. 281 of 1983 was filed against the acquittal of six respondents, and Criminal Petition No. 282 of 1983 was filed by Muhammad Iqbal against his conviction. The Supreme Court heard the counsel for the parties in the first petition and examined the impugned judgment, finding the High Court's reasoning for altering the conviction and reducing the sentence to be sound and declining to interfere. Consequently, the first petition was dismissed. The remaining two petitions were dismissed as not pressed by the petitioners' counsel. The court thus upheld the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's alteration of a conviction from section 302 to section 304-I of the Pakistan Penal Code when the reasons recorded are found to be proper?
  • Can a criminal petition against acquittal and conviction be dismissed as not pressed when the counsel chooses not to press the same?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad And Others vs Assistant Commissioner, Vehari And Other1986 SCMR 292 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-02
  evacuee propertyallotment of landlimitationcondonation of delayintra-court appealnew grounds of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a second round of litigation concerning the allotment of evacuee land in Vehari. The petitioners, claiming to be locals and members of criminal tribes, challenged the allotments made to respondents in 1962, which had been upheld by a notified officer under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act 1975 and subsequently affirmed by the Lahore High Court. The Supreme Court addressed two primary issues: whether the significant delay in filing the petition (832 days) could be condoned due to the pendency of an incompetent intra-court appeal, and whether the land in question was validly treated as part of the evacuee pool. The Court held that the petition was time-barred and that the petitioners could not introduce new legal grounds not previously raised or argued before the High Court. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the lower authorities' findings that the property was validly treated as evacuee property and that the petitioners' claims lacked merit. Leave to appeal was refused on both the grounds of limitation and the merits of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner raise a new legal ground in the Supreme Court that was not argued or dealt with in the High Court?
  • Does the pendency of an incompetent intra-court appeal constitute sufficient cause to condone a significant delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Whether land allotted to evacuee members of criminal tribes constitutes evacuee property subject to the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Muhammad And Others Sher Muhammad vs The State Noor1986 SCMR 100 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-18Read full judgment →
• Noor Elahi And Others vs Muhammad Shah And Other1986 SCMR 846 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-10
  writ petitionsuppression of factslachesdiscretionary jurisdictioncompromise decreeallotmentevacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' writ petition challenging an allotment order. The core legal questions involve whether the non-mentioning of a prior civil suit and compromise decree in a writ petition is fatal when parties are in pari delicto, whether the finding of unexplained delay and laches of nine years is erroneous, and whether the High Court failed to exercise jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction because the petitioners had suppressed material facts regarding a civil suit and a compromise decree concerning the same subject-matter, and the petition indeed suffered from unexplained delay and laches. The key principle laid down is that suppression of material facts, such as a prior compromise decree on the same subject-matter, disentitles a party to discretionary constitutional relief.

  Questions settled

  • Is the non-mentioning of a civil suit and a resultant compromise decree in a writ petition fatal to the petition?
  • Whether unexplained delay and laches of almost nine years from the date of the impugned allotment is fatal to a writ petition?
  • Does suppression of material facts disentitle a party from invoking the discretionary constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Begum vs Barkat Ali1986 SCMR 1160 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-03
  civil revisionconcurrent findings of factinheritancedistant kindredpedigree tablerevenue recordleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil dispute regarding inheritance rights to the estate of the deceased, Ahmad Ali. The respondent claimed to be a distant kindred of the deceased, asserting his father was the brother of the deceased's maternal grandfather. While the trial and appellate courts concurrently held that the respondent failed to prove the relationship, the Lahore High Court, in revision, reviewed the evidence, including pedigree tables and admissions, and ruled in favor of the respondent. The petitioner challenged this, arguing that concurrent findings of fact should not be disturbed in revision. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts failed to give legal effect to the presumptions arising from the revenue record and established pedigree. Consequently, the High Court was competent to interfere with the findings of fact to correct the legal error. The Supreme Court affirmed that substantial justice had been done and refused to grant leave to appeal, establishing that a High Court may interfere in revision when lower courts fail to properly apply legal presumptions to established facts.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in civil revision proceedings if lower courts failed to give legal effect to established evidence?
  • Is a High Court competent to unsettle a finding of fact in revision if the lower courts ignored legal presumptions arising from the revenue record?
  • Does the failure of lower courts to apply legal presumptions to established facts justify interference by the High Court in revision?
  Read full judgment →
• Niaz Muhammad vs Additional Commissioner (Cons.) /Settlement1986 SCMR 1405 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-27
  petition for leave to appealsettlement authoritiesexcess allotmentProduce Index Unitsconstitutional jurisdictiondiscretionary power
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute over land allotments and excess Produce Index Units in village Khairpur Sadat, Muzaffargarh District. The core legal question is whether the High Court exceeded its constitutional jurisdiction under writ jurisdiction by interfering with the concurrent exercise of discretion by the Settlement authorities, which had allowed the petitioner to retain a marginal excess of land up to 25 P.I. Units without finding any element of fraud or misrepresentation. The Supreme Court held that the contention regarding the proper exercise of discretionary power by the Settlement authorities and the limits of High Court interference in writ jurisdiction requires examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the High Court erred in setting aside the concurrent findings and discretion exercised by the lower settlement authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with the concurrent exercise of discretion by Settlement authorities regarding the retention of excess land?
  • Does the allotment of excess Produce Index Units up to a certain percentage fall within the exclusive discretion of Settlement authorities in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation?
  Read full judgment →
• Niamatullah Khan vs The State1986 SCMR 2013 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-27
  bailprolonged detentionleave to appealcriminal proceduretrial delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the petitioner, Niamatullah Khan, seeking release on bail pending trial. The petitioner contended that he had been in continuous detention for a period exceeding two years since March 3, 1984, and argued that he was entitled to bail even after accounting for any delays in the trial process allegedly attributable to him. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the prolonged period of incarceration, exceeding two years, warranted the grant of bail to the petitioner despite the circumstances surrounding the trial's delay. Upon consideration of the submissions, the Supreme Court found that the point raised by the petitioner regarding the duration of his detention and the resulting entitlement to bail deserved formal consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the merits of the bail application. The Court directed that the appeal be heard on the existing record at the Peshawar Registry, while granting the parties liberty to file additional documents if necessary.

  Questions settled

  • Does a period of detention exceeding two years entitle an accused to be released on bail?
  • Can the delay in trial proceedings be balanced against the duration of an accused's incarceration when considering a bail application?
  Read full judgment →
• Nek Muhammad vs A.C., Jhelum And Other1986 SCMR 1493 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-01
  pre-emptionMangla Dam ousteecondonation of delayconstitutional petitionrevision petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Mangla Dam oustee, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the pre-emption decree granted against him in favor of a tenant. The petitioner challenged the lower revenue authorities' decisions and the Board of Revenue's refusal to condone the delay in filing a revision petition based on wrong legal advice. The Supreme Court considered the contentions regarding the condonation of delay and jurisdictional defects. The Court held that a competent authority's refusal to condone delay cannot be challenged through a constitutional petition, and mistaken legal advice does not constitute a sufficient ground for condoning delay. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal while leaving open the question concerning the interaction between section 8 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act and paragraph 25 of the Land Reforms Regulation of 1972.

  Questions settled

  • Whether refusal to condone delay by a competent authority can be challenged by way of a constitutional petition?
  • Does mistaken advice given by counsel constitute a sufficient ground for condoning delay in filing a revision petition?
  • Can a wrong decision by a revenue authority on limitation be termed as an act without lawful authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Hussain And Another vs The State1986 SCMR 203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-07
  criminal appealmurderfalsus in uno, falsus in omnibusocular testimonyrecovery of weapondelay in FIRtransportation for life
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court maintaining the conviction and sentence of the appellants for murder and causing injuries. The core legal questions involved the reliability of incriminating recoveries when co-accused were acquitted, the absence of an explanation for injuries sustained by an accused, the effect of delay in lodging the First Information Report, and whether the prosecution version could be relied upon despite the false implication of some co-accused. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal while modifying the sentence, holding that the ocular testimony corroborated by medical evidence, the recovery of a blood-stained weapon from the appellant, and the presence established by the accused's own statement sufficiently proved the guilt of the appellants. The Court laid down that minor discrepancies or partial false implication do not vitiate the entire prosecution case if core testimonies are corroborated by independent material circumstances, and clarified the application of sentencing terms regarding imprisonment for life versus transportation for life.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the recovery of incriminating articles can be accepted against certain accused when the same witness has been disbelieved regarding other acquitted co-accused?
  • Whether the prosecution version can be relied upon in the context of a definite finding that some of the acquitted accused had been falsely implicated?
  • How does an unexplained delay in lodging the First Information Report impact the credibility of the prosecution case?
  • Whether the sentence of imprisonment for life should be altered to transportation for life when the offence occurred prior to the relevant statutory amendment?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad vs The Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore And Other1986 SCMR 1168 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-22
  service tribunalremoval from serviceback benefitsreinstatementdepartmental proceedingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal upholding the petitioner's second removal from service following a remand. The core legal questions involve the applicability of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975, and the entitlement of a civil servant to back-benefits and salary for the period between an initial unlawful removal and subsequent reinstatement. The Supreme Court held that no prejudice was shown regarding the choice of disciplinary rules, but found merit in the claim for salary for the intervening period of unemployment following an invalidated removal order, relying on established precedent. Leave to appeal was accordingly granted limited to the question of back salary.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant is entitled to salary for the period between an initial removal from service and subsequent reinstatement when the removal order is found invalid?
  • Does the application of allegedly incorrect disciplinary rules vitiate departmental proceedings if no prejudice is shown?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad vs Sarfraz And Other1986 SCMR 756 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-23
  sudden fightleave to appealenhancement of sentenceacquittalculpable homicidemurderous assault
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the complainant against a High Court judgment that acquitted certain respondents and reduced the sentences of others in a murder and murderous assault case. The trial court had convicted the respondents under sections 302/149 and 307/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. On appeal, the High Court concluded the incident arose from a sudden fight, acquitted two respondents, and altered the convictions of the others to lesser offenses, significantly reducing their sentences. The complainant challenged these acquittals and sought enhancement of the sentences. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, identifying that the primary legal questions requiring determination are whether the incident truly constituted a 'sudden fight' under the law and, if the incident does not fall within the scope of Exception IV to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code, whether the sentences imposed by the High Court warrant enhancement under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The Court permitted the parties to proceed on the existing record with leave to file additional documents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an incident involving multiple injuries can be legally classified as a sudden fight under Exception IV to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Under what circumstances is it appropriate for the Supreme Court to grant leave to appeal against an acquittal and sentence reduction in a murder case?
  • Does the evidence in a case of murderous assault justify the application of Exception IV to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad vs Mst. Jando And Other1986 SCMR 528 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-02
  review petitionlimitationdelay condonationlocus standifinality of judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a review petition filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which was barred by 89 days. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner had the locus standi to file the review petition and whether the delay of 89 days in filing the same could be condoned, particularly when the petitioner had failed to refile a previous petition after it was returned for compliance, thereby allowing the impugned order to attain finality. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had no locus standi to maintain the review petition and that the delay could not be condoned as the petition constituted an impermissible attempt to reopen a matter that had already become final. The key principle laid down is that a party who fails to pursue prior proceedings diligently and allows an order to become final against them cannot subsequently invoke the jurisdiction of the court through a time-barred review petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a time-barred review petition be entertained when the petitioner allowed the underlying order to attain finality?
  • Does a party who failed to refile a returned petition have the locus standi to file a subsequent review petition against the judgment?
  • Will delay in filing a review petition be condoned where the explanation offered is lack of awareness of a judgment passed in proceedings where the party was originally involved?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad vs Fateh Muhammad1986 SCMR 1495 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-12
  pre-emptioncustomlocalityleave to appealnew abadiurban outgrowth
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging the judgment of the High Court regarding a pre-emption suit. The core legal question for determination was whether the custom of pre-emption existed in the locality where the house in dispute was situated, specifically whether Taraf Mubarik Awal constituted a distinct locality from Taraf Mubarik, and whether a suit for pre-emption could be successfully brought in respect of a house situated in a newly developed residential area and outgrowth of the city. The Supreme Court considered the contentions regarding the recent conversion of the agricultural area into a residential abadi after the creation of Pakistan and noted supporting case law presented by the petitioner. The court granted leave to appeal to examine these questions, stayed the execution of the decree, and restrained the ejectment of the petitioner in the meantime, thereby establishing that arguable questions of law regarding the existence of pre-emption customs in newly developed urban areas warrant a full hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the custom of pre-emption exists in Taraf Mubarik Awal as a part of Taraf Mubarik?
  • Can a suit for pre-emption be successfully brought in respect of a house situated in a newly developed residential area which was under cultivation until the creation of Pakistan?
  • Does the existence of pre-emption custom in an older locality extend to its subsequent residential outgrowths?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad vs Assistant Director Refugees Government of J & K And Other1986 SCMR 768(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-19
  evacuee landallotmentinheritancerefugeesettlement authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the inheritance and allotment of evacuee land originally granted to a refugee from Jammu and Kashmir, one Shahabuddin. The petitioners, claiming to be the nephew and nieces of the deceased, sought to be included in the allotment of his land. The Settlement Authorities, however, determined that only the widow and the direct children of the deceased were entitled to inherit his allotment, noting that the petitioners were already beneficiaries of an allotment made in favour of their own mother, Mst. Aisha Bibi. The High Court upheld this exclusion, reasoning that the petitioners could not claim inheritance from their uncle while he had direct heirs. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the petitioners were not entitled to deprive the respondents of their rightful share in their father's inheritance, especially given that the petitioners were already provided for through their mother's allotment. The petition was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Are nephews and nieces entitled to inherit the allotment of an evacuee land holder when the deceased has left behind a widow and children?
  • Can beneficiaries of an allotment made in favour of their mother also claim a share in the allotment of their uncle?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad And Another vs Mst. Siddiqah Begum And Other1986 SCMR 625 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-03-12
  condonation of delaytime-barred petitionspecial leave to appealcertified copyburden of prooflimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a constitutional petition in limine. The petition was filed with a delay of 195 days, and the petitioners sought condonation of this delay under the Supreme Court Rules. The petitioners contended that the delay occurred because the High Court failed to deliver the certified copy of the impugned order until May 14, 1974, despite the copy being ready on November 1, 1973. The Court examined the evidence and found that, beyond the petitioners' bare affidavit, there was no record to substantiate the claim that the Copying Agency had failed to deliver the copy upon request. Furthermore, the Court noted that even after receiving the copy, the petitioners delayed filing the appeal for over a month without any explanation. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioners failed to discharge the onus of proving sufficient cause for the delay. The petition was dismissed as time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Does a bare affidavit suffice to prove that a delay in filing an appeal was caused by the negligence of a court's copying agency?
  • Is a petition for special leave to appeal maintainable when filed significantly beyond the limitation period without a satisfactory explanation for the entire duration of the delay?
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• Nazir Ahmad And 139 Others vs Province of Punjab Through Secretary, Government Of The Punjab And Other1986 SCMR 216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-20
  withdrawal of petitionservice tribunal appealinterlocutory orderscivil miscellaneous application
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners filed a civil miscellaneous application stating that subsequent to interlocutory orders passed by the Supreme Court, the Government of Punjab issued and implemented a final order on August 1, 1985, which was challenged by the petitioners via an appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Public Service Tribunal Act, 1974. Consequently, the petitioners' learned counsel sought permission to withdraw the main petition to pursue the appeal before the Punjab Service Tribunal while reserving all legal contentions and pleas. The Supreme Court found the request justified, granted the permission, and dismissed the civil petition as withdrawn, while also disposing of the civil miscellaneous petition accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner withdraw a constitutional or civil petition to pursue an appeal before the Punjab Service Tribunal when a final order has been passed and implemented during the pendency of the proceedings?
  • Whether permission to withdraw a petition can be granted with liberty to raise legal pleas before the Service Tribunal without prejudice to contentions raised in the original petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazar Muhammad vs Tajamal Hussain1986 SCMR 1455 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-20
  pre-emptionlimitation periodconcurrent findings of factphysical possessionmutationappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the limitation period for a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether the suit, filed on 14-10-1969, was time-barred, given the vendee's contention that physical possession of the land had been taken prior to the attestation of the sale mutation on 14-10-1968. The trial and appellate courts examined the evidence, and the Additional District Judge, Gujrat, concluded that the vendee failed to prove that physical possession was obtained before the attestation of the mutation. This factual finding was subsequently upheld by the High Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court observed that the petitioner sought to challenge a concurrent finding of fact without demonstrating any misreading or non-reading of the relevant oral or documentary evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that there was no justification to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the limitation issue. The petition was dismissed, affirming the principle that concurrent findings of fact, absent any misreading of evidence, are generally not subject to interference in appellate jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a finding of fact regarding the date of physical possession be challenged in the Supreme Court if there is no misreading of evidence?
  • Does the limitation period for a pre-emption suit commence from the date of attestation of the mutation or the date of taking physical possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazar Muhammad Bhutta And Others vs Executive Engineer, Tube Well1986 SCMR 1926 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-12
  Cost of Living Allowancestatutory interpretationleave to appealdefinition of employeejudicial conflict
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Sind High Court regarding the interpretation of the term 'employee' under the Employees Cost of Living (Relief) Act, 1973. The core legal question involves determining the scope of the definition of 'employee' for the purpose of entitlement to Cost of Living Allowance benefits. The High Court's impugned judgment interpreted this term in a manner that conflicted with a previous decision by another Single Judge of the same High Court, which had held employees entitled to such benefits. Recognizing the necessity for an authoritative pronouncement to resolve this judicial conflict and clarify the statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal. The Court ordered that the appeals be heard on the existing record, thereby setting the stage for a definitive ruling on the applicability of the Act to the petitioners.

  Questions settled

  • What is the correct interpretation of the term 'employee' under the Employees Cost of Living (Relief) Act, 1973?
  • Are employees entitled to the benefit of Cost of Living Allowance under the Employees Cost of Living (Relief) Act, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazar Hussain vs Muhammad Alias Muhammad Ali And Other1986 SCMR 1421 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-05
  leave to appealcommon intentionsentence reductionextenuating circumstancescriminal liabilitymurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a criminal matter involving the murder of Manzoor Hussain. The trial court convicted four respondents under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing one to death and others to life imprisonment. On appeal, the High Court acquitted two respondents, upheld the conviction of the first respondent but reduced his sentence to life imprisonment, and altered the conviction of the third respondent to Section 324/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner challenged the High Court's judgment regarding the sentence reduction of the first respondent and the conviction alteration of the third respondent. The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the High Court's discretion in reducing the first respondent's sentence, noting the existence of extenuating circumstances related to the motive. However, the Court found prima facie merit in the contention that the third respondent's role warranted liability under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal solely regarding the third respondent while dismissing the petition concerning the others.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretion in reducing a death sentence to life imprisonment when extenuating circumstances exist?
  • Does the participation of an accused in a murder, where common intention is shared, warrant conviction under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 rather than Section 324/34?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazar Baz vs Suleman And Another1986 SCMR 1542 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-10
  civil revisionpossessionregistered sale-deedadverse possessionrevenue recordjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against the judgment and order of the Peshawar High Court arising from a civil revision regarding a dispute over land possession and ownership. The core legal questions involve whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by interfering with a question of fact and misreading evidence, and whether the petitioner matured title through adverse possession or estoppel. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings and the High Court's review of evidence correctly established the respondent as the lawful owner by purchase through a registered sale-deed, and that the petitioner's revenue entries were a result of a mistake rather than establishing adverse possession. The petition was consequently dismissed, affirming that interference with findings of fact is unwarranted where the documentary and oral evidence substantiate ownership.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with a question of fact in exercise of its civil revision jurisdiction?
  • Does an entry in the column of cultivation alone establish adverse possession or ownership?
  • Can a petitioner claim title to disputed land on the basis of a mistaken entry in the revenue record?
  Read full judgment →
• Nawazish Ali And Others vs Bashir Ahmad And Other1986 SCMR 215 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-18
  constitutional jurisdictionwritten statementrevision applicationinterlocutory orderpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, which dismissed a constitutional petition challenging the District Judge's order allowing a revision application and permitting the filing of a fresh written statement. The core legal question concerns the propriety of the High Court's refusal to interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction with the interlocutory order of the District Judge regarding pleadings. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly declined to exercise its constitutional jurisdiction because the District Judge acted with ample jurisdiction in granting permission to submit a fresh written statement. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it, affirming that discretionary constitutional jurisdiction is properly withheld where a subordinate court possesses and validly exercises its jurisdictional competence over procedural matters.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can refuse to exercise constitutional jurisdiction against an order allowing a fresh written statement?
  • Does a District Judge have jurisdiction to permit the submission of a fresh written statement in revision?
  Read full judgment →
• Nawab Haii Muhammad Dawood Khan And Others vs Muhammad Usman1986 SCMR 1102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-08-19
  Specific Relief Actsuit for possessiondispossessiondue process of lawlease expirylessor and lesseemultifariousnessleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Sind High Court, which affirmed a trial court decree in a suit filed under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877. The plaintiffs, lessees of agricultural land, alleged they were forcibly dispossessed by the defendants (lessors) without due process of law. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering restoration of possession. The defendants challenged this, arguing the suit was not maintainable, improperly valued, and barred by Martial Law Regulation 115, while also asserting that the lease period had expired, thereby entitling them to re-entry. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine several critical legal questions, including whether the requirements of Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 were satisfied, whether the suit suffered from multifariousness, and whether a lessor’s contractual right of re-entry upon lease expiry constitutes 'due process of law' under the Act. The Court also sought to determine if lessees could maintain a suit for possession against owners when the lease period had expired and whether the trial court should have exercised its discretion to decline relief.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit for possession under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 is maintainable by a lessee against a lessor after the expiry of the lease period?
  • Does a specific covenant in a lease agreement authorizing a lessor to re-enter upon the expiry of the lease constitute 'due process of law' under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877?
  • Is it necessary for plaintiffs to establish juridical possession to succeed in a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877?
  • Can a trial court exercise discretion to decline relief under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 even if the formal conditions of the statute are satisfied?
  Read full judgment →
• Nawab Ahmad Rauf Khan vs Muhammad Hussain And Other1986 SCMR 1667 (1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-21
  petition for leave to appealcriminal appealconviction and sentencemurdercommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Sind High Court dated 5-2-1985, whereby the respondents' appeal was allowed and their conviction and sentence under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code were set aside. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court committed any error in law in setting aside the conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court held that the impugned judgment of the High Court was based on well-settled principles of law governing criminal justice and warranted no interference. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming that findings based on sound criminal jurisprudence shall remain undisturbed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court judgment setting aside a conviction that is based on well-settled principles of criminal justice?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be dismissed when no exception in law can be taken against the impugned judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• National Bank of Pakistan vs Muhammad Iqbal1986 SCMR 234 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-20
  departmental enquiryright to cross-examinationdismissal from servicenatural justiceservice lawconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which set aside the dismissal of the respondent from service at the National Bank of Pakistan. The core legal question was whether the departmental enquiry proceedings were vitiated by the denial of the right to cross-examine witnesses. The High Court had found that although the Enquiry Officer examined numerous witnesses, the respondent was denied the opportunity to cross-examine them, and their statements were subsequently used against him. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, confirming that the record supported the finding that the respondent was denied this essential right. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the principle that in departmental enquiries, the failure to provide an accused employee the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses whose statements are used against them renders the resulting dismissal order illegal and without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of an Enquiry Officer to allow an accused employee to cross-examine witnesses render a dismissal order illegal?
  • Is the right to cross-examine witnesses a mandatory requirement in departmental enquiry proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• National Bank of Pakistan vs Muhammad Amir Khan And Other1986 SCMR 1230 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-07
  additional evidencewrongful dismissalcivil procedureremand of caseservice lawmaterial irregularityofficial record
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of civil revisions by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld decrees in favor of the respondents declaring their dismissal from service by the petitioner Bank as illegal. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in law by refusing to allow the production of additional evidence—specifically the inquiry file and related proceedings—which the Bank argued would prove that the dismissal followed due process. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts failed to exercise their jurisdiction properly and acted with material irregularity by declining the Bank's application to produce this official record, especially given that the respondents had previously acknowledged the existence of the file in their own list of reliance. The Court established the principle that where official records are central to determining the legality of disciplinary proceedings, and their existence is not genuinely disputed, courts should exercise their discretion to admit such additional evidence to ensure a just and fair adjudication of the controversy. Consequently, the cases were remanded for fresh decisions following the admission of the additional evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court acts with material irregularity by refusing to admit official inquiry records as additional evidence when such records are central to the dispute?
  • Does a party's prior acknowledgment of the existence of a document in their list of reliance support the admission of that document as additional evidence?
  • Is a challenge to the legality of disciplinary proceedings distinct from a denial that such proceedings ever took place?
  Read full judgment →
• Nathu Khan vs The State1986 PLD Supreme Court 82 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-14
  suo motu revisionsentence enhancementdeterrent punishmentrapemitigating circumstancescriminal revisionheinous crimes
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a High Court judgment that exercised suo motu revisional jurisdiction to enhance the petitioner's sentence from two years to eight years of rigorous imprisonment following a conviction for rape. The petitioner, convicted under Section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, contended that his advanced age should serve as a mitigating factor for sentence reduction. The Supreme Court addressed whether the petitioner's age warranted leniency in the context of a heinous crime. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that advanced age is not a mitigating factor but rather an aggravating one, as greater responsibility is expected of older individuals. The Court affirmed the High Court's enhancement of the sentence, emphasizing that once guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt, courts must impose exemplary and deterrent punishments for heinous offenses. The ratio establishes that lenient sentencing for serious crimes fosters public insecurity and the perception of impunity; therefore, judicial responses must be robust to demonstrate that society and the State do not tolerate such conduct.

  Questions settled

  • Does the advanced age of an accused convicted of a heinous crime constitute a mitigating circumstance for sentencing purposes?
  • Is the High Court empowered to exercise suo motu revisional jurisdiction to enhance a sentence imposed by a lower court?
  • What is the judicial policy regarding the imposition of deterrent sentences for heinous offenses once guilt is established?
  Read full judgment →
• Nasir Ud Din And Another vs Settlement Commissioner Multan and Bahawalpur Division And Other1986 SCMR 448 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-02
  settlement lawstransfer of propertycomposite propertyN.C.H. Formagreement of associationlocus standisupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute over the transfer of a composite property comprising shops and residential units under settlement laws. The core legal question examined was whether the appellants possessed any entitlement to the transfer of a residential unit within the property. The Supreme Court held that the appellants failed to substantiate the filing of the requisite N.C.H. Form for the transfer and lacked locus standi to challenge the transfer of the property to the respondents, who had lawfully acquired it through an agreement of association and compensation adjustment. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that a party without a substantiated application or legal entitlement to property transfer cannot challenge the transfer of composite property made in favour of eligible claimants and associates in accordance with settlement laws.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the appellants had any entitlement to the transfer of a residential unit of the composite property?
  • Does a party lacking a substantiated N.C.H. Form have the locus standi to challenge the transfer of settlement properties?
  • Is the transfer of a composite property in favour of a claimant and non-claimant through an agreement of association in consonance with the settlement laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Nasir Pervaiz vs The Additional District Judge And 2 Other1986 SCMR 1709 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-07-28
  personal requirementevictionlandlord and tenantbona fidesleave to appealrented premises
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a constitutional petition challenging an eviction order. The petitioner-landlord sought the eviction of the respondent-tenant on the grounds of personal requirement and default in rent payment. The appellate court and the High Court rejected the eviction application, primarily reasoning that the landlord's failure to prove the default ground undermined the bona fides of his personal requirement claim. Furthermore, the courts below found that the landlord's previous possession of a rented shop, which he vacated in favor of his father or brother, indicated a lack of bona fide intent. The core legal question is whether a landlord's possession of a rented shop, or the possession of such a shop by a family member, legally bars the landlord from seeking eviction of a tenant from their own property on the grounds of personal requirement. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the lower courts erred in law by treating these factors as a bar to establishing bona fide personal requirement.

  Questions settled

  • Does a landlord's failure to prove the ground of default in rent payment necessarily invalidate the bona fides of a claim for personal requirement?
  • Does a landlord's possession of a rented shop, or the possession of such a shop by a family member, legally preclude the landlord from seeking eviction of a tenant from their own property on the ground of personal requirement?
  Read full judgment →
• Nasir Ahmad Shaikh vs Mrs. Nahid A. Shaikh And Other1986 SCMR 1621 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-24
  family court jurisdictionmaintenanceconstitutional jurisdictionestoppelfinality of judgmentnew pleacollateral proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged a High Court judgment dismissing a constitutional petition against a maintenance decree. The petitioner, a husband, sought to challenge a 1982 family court maintenance decree by claiming, for the first time in constitutional proceedings, that he was an Ahmadi and thus his marriage to a Muslim woman was void, rendering the Family Court's jurisdiction inapplicable. The High Court rejected this plea, noting that the petitioner had previously admitted in his written statement to being a Sunni Muslim and had not raised this issue during the original trial or subsequent appellate proceedings. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that a party cannot raise entirely new factual pleas for the first time in constitutional jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court held that the original maintenance decree had attained finality as it was not challenged in the appropriate appellate forum, and the petitioner’s attempt to reopen the matter through collateral proceedings was impermissible. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a new factual plea for the first time in constitutional jurisdiction that contradicts their earlier pleadings?
  • Is a maintenance decree that was not challenged in the appropriate appellate forum open to challenge through collateral proceedings?
  • Does a party's admission of their religious status in a written statement preclude them from later claiming a different status to invalidate a marriage?
  Read full judgment →
• Nasim Ahmad Siddiqul vs Collector of Customs And Other1986 SCMR 1669 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-23
  service appealdismissal from serviceleave to appealFederal Service Tribunaljudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dated 21-10-1985, which had dismissed the petitioners' appeals challenging their dismissal from service. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Federal Service Tribunal erred in its adjudication of the petitioners' dismissal, thereby warranting the exercise of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. Upon reviewing the record and hearing the arguments presented by the petitioners' counsel, the Supreme Court found no valid justification for interference with the Tribunal's decision. The Court held that the Federal Service Tribunal had comprehensively addressed all pleas raised by the petitioners and provided valid, proper reasons for rejecting them. Consequently, the Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision and dismissed both petitions. The principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the findings of the Federal Service Tribunal where the Tribunal has duly considered the relevant pleas and provided sound, reasoned justifications for its conclusions in service-related dismissal matters.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have grounds to interfere with a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal where the Tribunal has already addressed and rejected the petitioner's pleas with valid reasons?
  • Is a dismissal from service appealable before the Supreme Court after the Federal Service Tribunal has upheld the dismissal?
  Read full judgment →
• Naseem Ahmad And Others vs Mst. Sabira Begum1986 SCMR 1973 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-29
  consent orderappointment of receivercivil revisionrendition of accountsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of Sind which dismissed the petitioners' revision application challenging the appointment of a receiver in a suit for declaration and rendition of accounts. The core legal question concerns the validity of a consent order passed by the lower appellate court appointing the respondent's husband as a receiver based on the agreement of counsel. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of an affidavit from the petitioners' counsel in the High Court denying the consent recorded by the appellate judge, the contention regarding lack of consent cannot be entertained, and contentions against the appointment are barred by the consent order. The key principle laid down is that a consent order recorded by a court cannot be challenged on the ground of absence of consent without proper contemporaneous substantiation such as an affidavit before the reviewing forum, and that grievances regarding the conduct of a receiver or expeditious disposal of the suit must be addressed before the trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order passed with the consent of parties' counsel can be challenged in revision without an affidavit from the counsel denying such consent?
  • Can contentions regarding the suitability of a receiver be entertained when the appointment was made through a consent order?
  • What is the appropriate remedy if a court-appointed receiver fails to perform functions satisfactorily?
  Read full judgment →
• Narain Das vs Pakistan And Other1986 SCMR 1080 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-18
  citizenshipPakistan Citizenship Actsecond appealappreciation of evidenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  These two civil petitions for special leave to appeal arise out of suits seeking declarations of Pakistani citizenship and restraint from removal from Pakistan. The trial court dismissed the suits, but the District Judge reversed the findings and decreed the suits in favour of the plaintiffs, holding that they were citizens of Pakistan under Section 3(a) of the Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951. Upon second appeals, the High Court set aside the appellate decrees and restored the trial court's dismissal. The petitioners contended before the Supreme Court that the High Court improperly interfered with the appreciation of evidence in second appeal and misinterpreted Section 3 of the Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951. The Supreme Court held that the points raised regarding evidence appreciation and statutory interpretation deserved consideration, and accordingly granted leave to appeal while continuing the interim protective order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in interfering with findings on appreciation of evidence in a second appeal?
  • How should Section 3 of the Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951 be interpreted regarding persons born in territories included in Pakistan?
  • Are persons born in Pakistan before independence who hold domicile certificates deemed citizens of Pakistan under the Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951?
  Read full judgment →
• Nannu (Nannu Khan) And 10 Others vs The State1986 SCMR 540 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-01
  leave to appealprivate defence of propertysudden fightprovocationtrespassfire-arm injuriesindividual liability
  Summary & questions settled

  The eleven petitioners sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had partly accepted their appeals against convictions under sections 302 and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The dispute arose over an open space where one of the petitioners, having failed in a civil suit for possession under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, stacked hay, leading to an armed clash between the parties resulting in one death and numerous injuries. The core legal questions involved whether the petitioners were entitled to the right of private defence and whether the incident constituted a sudden fight attracting exceptions to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioners initiated the conflict through an act of trespass and provoked the occurrence, they could not claim the right of private defence, nor was it a sudden fight. The petition was dismissed and leave to appeal refused, establishing that a party provoking a conflict through unlawful intrusion cannot claim self-defence or sudden fight exceptions.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person who initiates a conflict through an act of trespass claim the right of private defence?
  • Whether a fight deliberately invited by the accused's own provocative act qualifies as a sudden fight under section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Does the acquittal of some co-accused automatically shake the credibility of the prosecution case against the remaining convicts?
  Read full judgment →
• Naimat Ali vs Mirza Abdul Rashid Baig And Other1986 SCMR 1015 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-02-28
  contempt of courtunconditional apologywithdrawal of suitsufficient amendsSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from contempt proceedings before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question concerned the acceptance of apologies tendered by the respondents and their counsel for actions relating to a civil suit and judicial proceedings. The court held that unconditional apologies tendered by the private respondents, along with the withdrawal of the underlying civil suit from the court of the Civil Judge, Lahore, and the contrition shown by counsel, constituted sufficient amends to resolve the matter. Consequently, the court decided to consign the matter to the record regarding both the respondents and the Civil Judge, concluding that no further proceedings were necessary. The key principle laid down is that unconditional apologies and remedial actions, such as the withdrawal of contested proceedings, may be accepted as sufficient amends to close contempt or related proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Are unconditional apologies and withdrawal of the underlying suit sufficient amends to consign contempt proceedings to the record?
  • Whether further proceedings are necessary against a judicial officer when apologies have been accepted and the matter resolved?
  Read full judgment →
• Naeem Ur Rehman And Others vs Muhammad Anwar And Other1986 SCMR 1488 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-11
  pre-emptionamendment of plaintpartial pre-emptionbona fide mistakecivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 14-6-1980, which allowed a civil revision and recalled the trial court's permission allowing the appellants to amend their pre-emption plaint. The core legal question was whether the omission of 5 marlas of land in the original plaint was a deliberate and negligent act barring amendment or a bona fide mistake correctable by law. The Supreme Court held that the omission of the 5 marlas was a bona fide mistake rather than a deliberate act, as the pleadings and the underlying sale mutation clearly manifested the intention to pre-empt the entire land sold. The Court laid down the principle that where an omission to include a small portion of land in a pre-emption suit is shown to be a bona fide mistake apparent from the pleadings and mutation, and an application for amendment is promptly made, the trial court is justified in permitting the amendment under Order VI, Rule 17, read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the omission of a small portion of land in a pre-emption plaint constitutes a deliberate act or a bona fide mistake correctable by amendment?
  • Can a trial court permit the amendment of a plaint under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to include left-out land in a pre-emption suit?
  • Whether a civil revision is maintainable against an order of the trial court allowing the amendment of a plaint for a bona fide omission?
  Read full judgment →
• Naeem Ur Rehman And Others vs Abdul Aziz And Other1986 SCMR 1961 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-12Read full judgment →
• Naeem Engineering Corporation And Others vs Government of Punjab1986 SCMR 316 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-09-07
  civil proceduresummoning of witnessesofficial witnesseslist of witnessesdismissal of suitleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against a consolidated judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing their civil revision petitions. The petitioners had filed suits for recovery against the respondent, which were contested. During the proceedings, the relevant departmental record was taken over by the Anti-Corruption Department. The trial court refused the petitioners' application to issue process to official witnesses on the ground that the list of witnesses was filed beyond the stipulated period of seven days after the framing of issues, subsequently closing the petitioners' evidence and dismissing the suits, which decisions were upheld in revision. The Supreme Court observed that the trial court had previously been summoning the witnesses and that the departmental record was in official custody, rendering the complete transfer of the burden of producing official witnesses to the plaintiffs unjustified. Consequently, the Court converted the petitions into appeals and granted leave to examine the matter further on the legal plane.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit can be dismissed solely because the list of witnesses was filed beyond seven days of the framing of issues when official witnesses are involved?
  • Is it the responsibility of the court to assist in summoning official witnesses whose records are held by another government department?
  • Does the refusal to issue process for official witnesses under the circumstances warrant interference in appellate jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Nabi Bakhsh vs Ehsanul Haque And Other1986 SCMR 370 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-06
  pre-emptionamendment of written statementconstructive res judicataabuse of processleave to appealconsent decree
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a pre-emptor, sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld the trial court's decision allowing the respondents to amend their written statement in a pre-emption suit. The respondents had previously failed in attempts to amend their written statement to introduce a claim of a superior right of pre-emption based on a gift. Following these failed attempts, the respondents obtained a consent decree regarding the same gift and subsequently filed a new application to amend their written statement, asserting the gift and the decree as a superior right, alongside a challenge to the repugnancy of pre-emption law to the Quran and Sunnah. The petitioner contended that the amendment was inordinately delayed, barred by the principle of constructive res judicata, and constituted an abuse of the court's process. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, determining that the legal points raised regarding the propriety of allowing such amendments after previous failed attempts and the application of constructive res judicata required further examination by the Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a defendant amend a written statement to introduce a plea that was previously rejected by the court?
  • Does the principle of constructive res judicata bar an application for amendment of a written statement if a similar request was previously denied?
  • Does the obtaining of a consent decree on a matter previously rejected in a pending suit justify a subsequent amendment to the written statement?
  Read full judgment →
• M/s. Electric Lamp Manufacturers Of Pakistan Limited, Karachi. vs ThePTCL 1986 CL. 79 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Sales TaxRetrospective OperationCentral ExciseStatutory InterpretationJurisdictionTax RecoveryNotification
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a company manufacturing electric bulbs, challenged a demand notice issued by the Deputy Collector of Central Excise for the recovery of sales tax on glass shells consumed during the period from October 1977 to March 1981. The petitioner contended that glass shells were raw materials exempt from sales tax and that the Deputy Collector lacked the legal authority to issue the demand or recover tax for the period preceding July 1, 1981, as the powers of Sales Tax Officers were only conferred upon Customs/Central Excise officers effective from that date via a Central Board of Revenue notification. The High Court dismissed the petition, ruling that tax recovery machinery provisions should be construed liberally and that the demand arose upon the adjudication order passed in 1983. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court granted leave, noting the significant legal question regarding whether the notification conferring sales tax powers on Customs/Central Excise officers could operate retrospectively to cover assessments for periods prior to its issuance, especially given the savings clause in the notification regarding pending assessments.

  Questions settled

  • Can a notification conferring powers under the Sales Tax Act 1951 be construed to have retrospective effect in the absence of express language?
  • Does a Deputy Collector of Central Excise have the authority to recover sales tax for a period prior to the date they were conferred the powers of a Sales Tax Officer?
  • Do the savings provisions in Sales Tax Circular No. 7 of 1981 restrict the jurisdiction of newly appointed officers regarding tax assessments pending before the previous authorities?
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• M/s. Burque Corporation Kara-Chi And Another vs Collector Central ExcisePTCL 1986 CL. 263 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  sales tax exemptiontax classificationcustoms dutystatutory interpretationimport dutyinfant foodfiscal statute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns four civil appeals challenging a High Court judgment regarding the imposition of sales tax on imported NIDO powdered milk. The appellants contended that NIDO, being an infant food, fell under an exemption notification issued under the Sales Tax Act, 1951, which exempted "milk food for infants and invalid foods" from sales tax. The core legal question was whether NIDO powdered milk qualified as food exclusively for the use of infants, thereby satisfying the criteria for tax exemption under the relevant notification. The Supreme Court examined the product's marketing materials, noting that while the appellants argued it was an infant feeding formula, the product packaging explicitly stated it was for the "whole family." The Court held that because the product was not meant for the "exclusive use by infants," it did not qualify for the exemption. The Court affirmed the High Court’s decision, establishing the principle that for a product to qualify for a specific tax exemption based on its intended use, it must be demonstrably and exclusively marketed for that specific purpose.

  Questions settled

  • Whether NIDO powdered milk qualifies for sales tax exemption as food exclusively for infants?
  • Does the intended use of a product, as indicated by its packaging, determine its classification for tax exemption purposes?
  • Can a product marketed for general family consumption qualify for a tax exemption granted exclusively for infant food?
  Read full judgment →
• Mushtaq Hussain vs Chief Land Commissioner And Other1986 SCMR 477(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-25
  dismissal for non-prosecutionabsence of appellantshow-cause noticenon-deposit of securitysupreme court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by way of an appeal arising from a show-cause notice issued to the appellant for failing to deposit security and engaging an Advocate-on-Record. When the case was called for hearing, no representative appeared on behalf of the appellant. Consequently, the court inferred a lack of interest in prosecuting the matter. The Supreme Court held that where an appellant fails to appear and prosecute the appeal, the same is liable to be dismissed. The key principle laid down is that an appeal may be dismissed for non-prosecution in the absence of the appellant or their legal representative.

  Questions settled

  • What is the consequence of the appellant's failure to appear and prosecute the appeal?
  • Can an appeal be dismissed when no one is present on behalf of the appellant?
  Read full judgment →
• Mushtaq And Others vs The State1986 SCMR 169 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-18
  bailleave to appealjudicial discretioncriminal procedureappellate interference
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners filed a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court dated 23-9-1985, which had dismissed their application for bail. The Supreme Court of Pakistan reviewed the arguments presented by the petitioners' counsel and examined the impugned order of the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court had properly exercised its judicial discretion in refusing to grant bail to the petitioners. Upon consideration, the Supreme Court found that the petitioners failed to demonstrate any valid grounds to warrant interference with the judicial discretion exercised by the High Court. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal. The judgment reaffirms the principle that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the discretionary orders of the High Court regarding bail unless a compelling case for such interference is established by the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with the judicial discretion of the High Court in bail matters absent strong grounds?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing bail maintainable if no error in discretion is shown?
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• Mushtaq Ahmed vs The State1986 SCMR 626 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-10
  illegal gratificationanticorruptionFederal Investigation Agencyjurisdictioncriminal trialbail petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition filed by the petitioner, a Patwari, who was apprehended during a raid while accepting illegal gratification and subsequently convicted under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code by the Special Judge Anti-Corruption, with his appeal dismissed by the Lahore High Court. The core legal question raised was whether the criminal proceedings were void ab initio because the Federal Investigation Agency Inspector lacked jurisdiction to arrange the raid concerning a provincial public servant. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacks merit, noting that the cited precedent was distinguishable and that the petitioner was properly tried and convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether criminal proceedings initiated by an Inspector of the Federal Investigation Agency against a provincial public servant are void ab initio?
  • Does an Inspector of the Federal Investigation Agency have jurisdiction to arrange a raid for offences concerning provincial public servants?
  • Does the lack of jurisdiction of an investigating officer vitiate a trial conducted by a court of competent jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Mushtaq Ahmad vs The State1986 SCMR 1585 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-30
  criminal revisionalteration of convictionculpable homicideright of private defenceenhancement of sentencerevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner was tried under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder, but the trial court convicted him under Section 304, Part II, sentencing him to five years' rigorous imprisonment. The complainant filed a revision petition in the High Court under Sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking conversion of the conviction to Section 304, Part I. The High Court altered the conviction to Section 304, Part I, and enhanced the sentence to seven years' rigorous imprisonment. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that an accused convicted under Section 304, Part II, is impliedly acquitted of Part I as they contemplate distinct offences, and the High Court could not alter the conviction in exercise of its revisional powers. Furthermore, since the petitioner had already served his original sentence and been released, re-arresting him was undesirable. The appeal was allowed and the High Court's order was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can alter a conviction under Section 304 Part II to Section 304 Part I in exercise of its revisional powers?
  • Does conviction under Part II of Section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code operate as an implied acquittal from an offence under Part I?
  • Can a sentence be enhanced in revision when the accused has already served the substantive sentence originally awarded?
  Read full judgment →
• Munir Ahmad vs Mst. Salma Begum1986 SCMR 81 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-08-20
  rent controlevictionbona fide personal requirementconcurrent findings of factleave to appeallandlord-tenant dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Sind High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld an eviction order passed by the Rent Controller. The core legal question was whether the respondent landlady had established a bona fide personal requirement for the demised premises to justify the eviction of the tenant. The Supreme Court examined the evidence regarding the respondent's family composition, noting that she had four growing children and required additional space for their proper accommodation and education. The Court found that the respondent's existing accommodation was insufficient for her family's needs and that the disputed premises could be combined with her current residence to form a composite unit. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the concurrent findings of fact reached by the lower courts. The key principle laid down is that where concurrent findings of fact regarding the bona fide personal requirement of a landlord are supported by evidence, the appellate court will not interfere with such findings.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding a landlord's bona fide personal requirement when supported by evidence?
  • Does the growing age and educational needs of a landlord's children constitute a valid ground for establishing a bona fide personal requirement for eviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Municipal Committee, Faislabad vs Burma Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Company Ltd1986 SCMR 1475 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-23
  leave to appealmunicipal taxationimported for saleterritorial limitsoctroi
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, concerning the interpretation of octroi or municipal tax laws regarding goods imported within the territorial limits of the Municipal Committee. The core legal question is whether goods unloaded and stored within the municipal limits of Lyallpur, and subsequently loaded and delivered to the importer's agents outside those limits for further transportation, can be legally construed as having been 'imported for sale therein'. The Court granted leave to examine the facts, circumstances, and relevant law governing the transaction. The holding establishes that the matter requires detailed examination as to the precise nature of the movement and storage of goods in relation to municipal taxation limits. The key principle laid down involves the determination of territorial nexus and the exact statutory interpretation of 'imported for sale' under municipal fiscal enactments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether goods unloaded and stored within municipal limits before being transported outside are imported for sale therein?
  • What constitutes the taxable import of goods within the territorial limits of a municipal committee?
  Read full judgment →
• Mumtaz Ali And Others vs Additional Deputy Commissioner And Other1986 SCMR 1467 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-10
  compromise decreereopening of compromiseclarification of orderexcess land allotmentunsatisfied unitsleave to appealcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of an application seeking correction and clarification of a High Court order, which had been passed based on a compromise between the parties. The petitioners, whose predecessors-in-interest had pending land allotment units, challenged an allotment made to respondent No. 3, who allegedly held land in excess of his entitlement. A compromise was reached in the High Court, allocating specific land to the petitioners. Subsequently, the petitioners sought to reopen the matter, arguing that some of their units remained unsatisfied and that respondent No. 3 still held excess land. The core legal question was whether a decision settled by compromise could be reopened or clarified on these grounds. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a matter settled by compromise, where parties were aware that some units would remain unsatisfied, cannot be reopened merely to satisfy further claims or correct perceived imbalances. The principle established is that compromise decrees, once entered into with full knowledge of the facts, are binding and should not be disturbed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a decision based on a compromise between parties be reopened if some claims remain unsatisfied?
  • Can a compromise decree be clarified or corrected under Sections 151, 152, and 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure if the parties were aware of the facts at the time of the compromise?
  • Does the existence of excess land held by one party justify reopening a matter already settled by compromise?
  • Are parties bound by a compromise decree even if they later discover that some of their entitlements remain unfulfilled?
  Read full judgment →
• Mullah Ahmed vs Assistant Commissioner, Sibi And 7 Other1986 SCMR 1624 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-05
  appeal by leaveconstitution petitionreview petitionlimitationcondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave is directed against two judgments of the Baluchistan High Court whereby a constitution petition and a subsequent review petition filed by the appellant were dismissed. The respondents raised a preliminary objection that the appeal against the primary judgment dismissing the constitution petition was time-barred. The appellant's counsel conceded this position and sought condonation of delay, but the oral submissions failed to establish valid justification, leading the Supreme Court to treat the appeal as time-barred regarding that order. Concerning the second impugned order which dismissed the review application, the Supreme Court found the High Court's reasoning legally sound and unexceptionable. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the appeal lacked merit and dismissed it, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether oral submissions for the condonation of delay constitute sufficient justification when an appeal is time-barred?
  • Can an appeal be maintained against a judgment when it is filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation?
  • Whether a High Court's dismissal of a review application warrants interference by the Supreme Court when based on sound legal reasoning?
  Read full judgment →
• Mukhtar Ahmad vs Muhammad Ilyas And Another1986 SCMR 634 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-23
  appeal against acquittalculpable homicidemurdercommon intentionfemoral artery injuryintent to killalteration of conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal against acquittal through leave of the Supreme Court arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had altered the conviction of the respondents from section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to section 304-II, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, setting aside their death sentences and sentencing them to ten years' rigorous imprisonment for the murder of Fayyaz Ahmad. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly held that the intention to kill was lacking because the accused, as laymen, could not be expected to know the precise locale of the femoral artery. The Supreme Court held that the nature of the injuries, plunged deep down into the body in a classical killing style and found sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, clearly attracted clause thirdly of section 300, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, constituting murder under section 302. The Supreme Court laid down that where cumulative injuries caused by lethal weapons to vital parts are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requisite intention to cause such bodily injury as is sufficient to cause death is established, and the High Court erred in converting the conviction to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in altering the conviction from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder on the ground that laymen could not know the locale of the femoral artery?
  • Does the infliction of multiple deep incised wounds on vital parts of the body with lethal weapons establish the intention to cause death under section 300 clause thirdly of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • When can an appellate court interfere with the conversion of a conviction under section 302 to section 304-II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Mukhtar Ahmad Junejo and 2 Others vs Province of Sind and Others1986 PLD Supreme Court 560 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-24
  seniority disputeservice tribunal jurisdictionterms and conditions of servicevested rightconstitutional jurisdictioncivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comprises three consolidated civil appeals raising a core legal question as to whether the Sind Service Tribunal is competent to entertain appeals concerning seniority disputes of civil servants. The Sind Service Tribunal had previously declined jurisdiction, reasoning that seniority is not a vested right under section 8 of the Sind Civil Servants Act 1973 and thus does not form part of the terms and conditions of service. This view was challenged before the Sind High Court, which held that seniority is indeed a term and condition of service and that the Service Tribunal possesses exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate seniority disputes, thereby ousting the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 pursuant to Article 212. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the view of the High Court, holding that seniority disputes fall within the terms and conditions of service and are cognizable by the Service Tribunal under section 4 of the Sind Service Tribunals Act 1973. The Supreme Court accordingly set aside the impugned orders of the Tribunal and remanded the cases for decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Sind Service Tribunal is competent to entertain appeals concerning seniority disputes?
  • Does a civil servant possess a vested right to a particular seniority under section 8 of the Sind Civil Servants Act 1973?
  • Is seniority considered a term and condition of service for the purpose of the Service Tribunals Act?
  • Whether the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 is ousted in matters of seniority by virtue of Article 212?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhibullah Khan vs Sadiq Khan1986 SCMR 270 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-19
  revisional jurisdictionlandlord and tenantconcurrent findingsmisreading of evidenceejectment suitrent deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from an ejectment suit filed by the respondent against the appellant regarding two shops. The trial court and the first appellate court concurrently held that no relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties, leading to the dismissal of the suit. The respondent challenged this in the High Court, which exercised its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, reversed the concurrent findings, and decreed the suit, concluding that the rent deed was proved and the tenancy relationship established. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact regarding the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court correctly exercised its revisional jurisdiction because the lower courts had misread the evidence. Specifically, the appellant's own written statement and the testimony of the respondent's witness, Shah Pasand Khan, confirmed the respondent's ownership and the tenancy. The principle established is that a revisional court may interfere with concurrent findings of fact when such findings are based on a misreading of evidence or a failure to consider material evidence on record.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does a misreading of evidence by lower courts justify interference by the High Court in revision?
  • Is a party bound by admissions made in their written statement regarding the ownership of the property in dispute?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zaman Khan vs The Additional Chief Land Commissioner And Another1986 SCMR 1121 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-03
  oral giftMuslim lawminor doneeland reformsmutationconstitutional jurisdictionbona fide intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the validity of oral gifts of agricultural land made by a father to his minor sons, which were challenged by land reform authorities during the implementation of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972. The core legal question was whether the gifts were complete and valid under Muslim law despite the subsequent rejection of mutation entries and the donor's temporary retraction. The Supreme Court held that the gifts were valid, ruling that the entries in the Roznamcha Waqiati provided unequivocal evidence of the donor's bona fide intention and the transfer of possession. The Court clarified that under Muslim law, a father's gift to a minor child does not require formal acceptance or transfer of possession, only a bona fide intention. Furthermore, the Court held that the subsequent failure to confirm mutations or the donor's later attempt to repudiate the gifts did not invalidate the transactions. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower authorities' orders and the High Court judgment, declaring the gifts valid and directing the land commission to give effect to them.

  Questions settled

  • Are the three requirements of a valid gift under Muslim law applicable to a gift made by a father to his minor child?
  • Does the failure to confirm a mutation entry invalidate a completed oral gift under Muslim law?
  • Can a High Court review a finding of fact by a subordinate tribunal in constitutional jurisdiction if that finding ignores material evidence?
  • Does a donor's subsequent attempt to repudiate a gift invalidate a transaction that was already complete?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Zaheeruddin (Anwar) vs The State1986 SCMR 620 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-05
  cross-examinationrecall of witnessdiscretionary powerinterest of justicecriminal trialright to cross-examineSection 540 CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a revision petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld a trial court's refusal to recall a prosecution witness for cross-examination. The core legal question was whether the trial court erred in exercising its discretion under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 by denying the accused an opportunity to cross-examine a witness who had testified in the absence of the accused's counsel. The Supreme Court held that the interest of justice necessitated the recall of the witness. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed the same, and remanded the case to the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, with directions to afford the petitioner or his counsel a proper opportunity to cross-examine the witness before proceeding with the trial. The key principle established is that the trial court's discretionary power to summon or re-summon witnesses under Section 540, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, must be exercised in a manner that ensures the accused is not deprived of the fundamental right to cross-examine witnesses, particularly when the witness is available and the request is made promptly.

  Questions settled

  • Does a trial court have the discretion to refuse the recall of a witness for cross-examination when the witness is available and the request is made promptly?
  • Is it a valid exercise of judicial discretion to deny an accused the opportunity to cross-examine a prosecution witness who testified in the absence of the accused's counsel?
  • Can the Supreme Court remand a case to the trial court to ensure the accused is afforded the opportunity to cross-examine a witness?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yusuf vs The State1986 SCMR 182 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-23
  ZinaHudood Ordinanceleave to appealsentence computationcriminal convictionSection 382-B CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by Muhammad Yousaf against the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which upheld his conviction and sentence under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The petitioner had been convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge for committing Zina with a woman to whom he was not married, resulting in a sentence of five years' rigorous imprisonment, whipping, and a fine. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the conviction was supported by the evidence and whether the sentence imposed was excessive. Upon reviewing the evidence, the Supreme Court found that the petitioner had indeed eloped with the complainant and engaged in sexual intercourse with her while unmarried, thereby confirming the conviction under section 10(2) of the Ordinance. The Court held that the conviction was justified and the sentence was not excessive. However, the Court granted the petitioner the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the computation of his remaining sentence. The petition was dismissed, subject to this modification.

  Questions settled

  • Does the act of eloping and engaging in sexual intercourse with an unmarried woman constitute an offence under section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979?
  • Is a convict entitled to the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in the computation of their sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yusuf And Others vs The State1986 SCMR 1984 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-20
  post-conviction bailbail pending appealnature of injuriescriminal appealcommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the High Court's dismissal of a bail application filed by petitioners convicted under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioners, along with a co-accused, were convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sargodha, with the co-accused receiving a death sentence and the petitioners receiving life imprisonment. Their appeals against conviction are currently pending before the High Court. The core legal question addressed was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail pending the disposal of their appeals, given the nature of the injuries attributed to them. The Supreme Court observed that the injuries attributed to the petitioners were simple and caused by 'Sotas'. Noting that interim bail had previously been granted by the Court on 13-8-1986, the Court converted the petition into an appeal and directed that it be fixed for an early hearing. The judgment reinforces the principle that the nature of injuries and the specific role attributed to an accused are critical factors in determining the grant of bail pending appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Are petitioners entitled to bail pending appeal when the injuries attributed to them are simple in nature?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a bail application be converted into an appeal by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousaf vs Director General, Pakistan Rangers1986 SCMR 1637 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-10
  leave to appealcompulsory retirementFederal Service Tribunalmisconductdepartmental enquiryfresh pleaservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal against an order of compulsory retirement from service. The petitioner, a member of the Pakistan Rangers, was compulsorily retired following a departmental inquiry after failing to report for duty upon the expiry of leave and submitting a medical certificate from a private practitioner, contrary to applicable rules. Before the Supreme Court, the sole ground raised by the petitioner was that the sentence imposed was overly harsh. The Supreme Court held that since the plea regarding the severity of the sentence was not raised before the Service Tribunal, it could not be permitted to be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court. The Court further noted that because the punishment awarded was legal, interference was not justified, and accordingly dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a fresh plea regarding the severity of a disciplinary sentence be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court when it was not raised before the Federal Service Tribunal?
  • Does the Supreme Court justify interference with a departmental punishment that is otherwise legally awarded?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Younas And Others vs Muhammad Akhtar1986 SCMR 1258 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-04-15
  adverse possessionpre-emption decreerevenue recordleave to appealappellate judgmentco-sharerstenancy
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, unsuccessful plaintiffs, sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed their revision petition, thereby affirming concurrent findings against their claim of ownership over specific land. The petitioners asserted ownership through adverse possession, arguing they remained in possession for over twelve years following a pre-emption decree obtained by the defendant in 1965, which they claimed was never executed. The Supreme Court examined the revenue records, noting the petitioners were recorded as tenants or co-sharers rather than exclusive owners. The Court held that the petitioners' claim of adverse possession was untenable, particularly as they had accepted the pre-emption money from the defendant, confirming the defendant's title. While the Court acknowledged the appellate court's failure to strictly adhere to the procedural requirements of Order XLI, rule 31, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, it determined that no substantial question of law warranted further interference. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that the petitioners failed to establish hostile, exclusive possession sufficient to override the defendant's established title.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party claim adverse possession over land after accepting the pre-emption money for that same land?
  • Does the failure of an appellate court to strictly comply with Order XLI, rule 31, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, automatically necessitate the grant of leave to appeal?
  • Is possession recorded as a tenant or co-sharer sufficient to establish adverse possession against the true owner?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yasin vs The State1986 SCMR 1641 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-06-01
  criminal convictionconcurrent findingsleave to appealrash and negligent drivingrevision application
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Sind High Court, which had dismissed a revision application and upheld the petitioner's conviction under Section 304-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner had been sentenced to two years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 3,000. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the petitioner's guilt under the charged section were sustainable. Upon hearing the arguments of the learned counsel, the Supreme Court found no grounds to take exception to the concurrent findings of the three courts below, which had concluded that the prosecution successfully proved the case against the petitioner. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the petition lacked merit and dismissed it. The judgment reinforces the principle that the Supreme Court will generally not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts when the prosecution has successfully established the guilt of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in a criminal revision matter?
  • Is a conviction under Section 304-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 sustainable when supported by concurrent findings of three lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yasin vs Karim Bakhsh1986 SCMR 1528 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-06
  leave to appealejectmentbona fide personal uselandlord and tenantinconsistent evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by tenant Muhammad Yasin against the eviction order passed in favor of landlord Karim Bakhsh, successor of original landlord Maula Bakhsh. The core legal question concerns whether a landlord can be permitted to lead evidence inconsistent with the specific plea taken in the ejectment application—specifically, seeking eviction for personal use while adducing evidence that the premises are required for the use of sons—and whether an eviction order can be sustained on that basis. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that this question requires detailed consideration and granted leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that material inconsistencies between the landlord's pleaded case in an eviction application and the supporting evidence adduced at trial present a substantial question of law warranting further examination by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a landlord be allowed to lead evidence inconsistent with the plea taken in the application for ejectment?
  • Whether an eviction order can be passed on the basis that the premises are required for the male children of the landlord when his pleaded case was personal use?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yasin Khan vs Rehmat Khan And Other1986 SCMR 1700 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-12
  compromiserejection of plaintbar of suitsuppression of factscivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal directed against identical orders of the Lahore High Court dismissing revision applications, which upheld the rejection of the petitioner's plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioner had filed a civil suit seeking a declaration that a compromise entered into by the respondents in prior proceedings before the Supreme Court was inconsequential to the petitioner's rights regarding disputed land. The core legal question was whether the rejection of the plaint and the holding that the suit was barred under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 were legally correct. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court rightly declined to interfere as the suit was barred under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and further noted that the petition was liable to be dismissed due to the suppression of material facts concerning the dismissal of a prior civil review petition. The key principle established is that a suit challenging a judgment or compromise obtained in such manner is barred under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and suppression of material judicial history warrants dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit challenging a compromise decree is barred under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the suppression of material facts, such as the dismissal of a prior review petition, warrant the dismissal of a leave to appeal petition?
  • Is the rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 justified when the suit is barred by law?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yaseen And 11 Others vs The State1986 SCMR 173 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-12
  bail applicationwithdrawal of petitionleave to appealcriminal proceduretrial court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by Muhammad Yaseen and 11 others against an order of the High Court, which had previously dismissed their application for bail in a criminal case. The petitioners were accused of serious offenses, including attempted murder and arson, involving the blocking of a road and the burning of a truck. Upon the matter coming before the Supreme Court, the counsel for the petitioners requested to withdraw the petition. The stated intention behind this withdrawal was to allow the petitioners to approach the trial court directly with a fresh bail application based on new grounds. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition as not pressed. The judgment establishes the procedural principle that where a petitioner seeks to pursue bail on fresh grounds, they may withdraw a pending petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court to seek relief from the trial court in the first instance.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner withdraw a petition for leave to appeal to seek bail from the trial court on fresh grounds?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal dismissible if the petitioner requests to withdraw it as not pressed?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yar vs Muhammad Sharif And Another1986 SCMR 1271 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-03-03
  Board of Revenuejurisdictionremanddistribution of businesswrit petitionadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a challenge to orders issued by the Member (Judicial), Board of Revenue, Punjab, and the Additional Commissioner (Revenue), regarding the binding nature of recommendations made by the District Remount Officer upon the Collector. The petitioner contended that the Board of Revenue authorities erred in their legal interpretation and that the Member (Judicial) lacked the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate the specific matter. Furthermore, the petitioner argued that the High Court failed to adequately address these jurisdictional and procedural contentions when dismissing the initial writ petition. Upon review, the Supreme Court examined the distribution of business among Members of the Board of Revenue pursuant to the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, 1957. The Court determined that the question of jurisdiction regarding the allocation of business among Board Members was a substantial legal issue requiring consideration. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed the same, and remanded the case to the High Court with a direction to decide the matter afresh, specifically addressing the jurisdictional questions raised by the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Board of Revenue have the authority to distribute business among its members under the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, 1957?
  • Is the High Court required to address jurisdictional challenges raised in a writ petition regarding the authority of a Member of the Board of Revenue?
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• Muhammad Yaqub vs Muhammad Nasrullah Khan and Others1986 PLD Supreme Court 497 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-20
  specific performanceevacuee propertysettlement operationscompensation bookreadiness and willingnessoral agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit for specific performance of a contract concerning the transfer of an evacuee shop. The appellant, a non-claimant displaced person, entered into an association agreement with a claimant displaced person (the respondent) who paid the full transfer price of the shop through her compensation book. The parties executed a written agreement allowing the appellant to purchase the shop within five years by paying the price the respondent had paid to the Settlement Department, while paying monthly rent in the interim. The appellant subsequently sought specific performance, asserting an oral agreement that he was only liable to pay fifty percent of the adjusted claim value. The trial court, appellate court, and High Court all dismissed the suit. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld these findings, holding that the appellant failed to prove the alleged oral agreement and did not perform his part of the contract, including the payment of rent. The Court reiterated that a plaintiff seeking specific performance must allege and prove readiness and willingness to perform the contract as it actually was, rather than as the plaintiff unilaterally interpreted it.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff seeking specific performance of a contract must allege and prove readiness and willingness to perform the contract as it actually was, rather than as they unilaterally interpreted it?
  • Can a party to a written agreement for the transfer of property rely on an unproven oral agreement to reduce the purchase price stipulated in the written contract?
  • Does the failure of a purchaser to pay agreed interim rent and the actual price paid by the seller to the department defeat a claim for specific performance of a re-conveyance agreement?
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• Muhammad Umer (Deceased) Through L. R's And Another vs Dr. Ameena1986 SCMR 1850 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-08-23
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentleave to appealrent controllerlandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Sind High Court dated 24-3-1986, which maintained the order of the Rent Controller directing the ejectment of the petitioners from the suit shop on the ground of default in rent payment. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioners were wilful defaulters in the payment of rent and whether the rent fixed was legal and proper. The Supreme Court held that the findings of the lower forums regarding the default in payment of rent and the lack of evidence supporting adjustments for repairs or a lower rent amount were unexceptionable. The petition was accordingly dismissed, finding no merit in the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact by rent tribunals regarding default in rent payment, supported by evidence, will not be interfered with by the Supreme Court in the absence of legal infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether tenants who fail to bring cogent evidence of rent payment are wilful defaulters?
  • Can unverified expenses for repairs claimed by a tenant be adjusted towards rent without the landlord's consent?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by the Rent Controller and the High Court regarding default in rent are open to interference in leave to appeal?
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• Muhammad Tariq And Another vs The State1986 SCMR 515 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-12-02
  criminal trespassright of private defencemurder convictionbenefit of doubtacquittalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two criminal petitions arising from a murder conviction. The petitioner, Muhammad Tariq, was convicted under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Abdul Hameed, while his co-accused, Mohammad Asif, was acquitted by the High Court. The incident occurred during a dispute over land excavation, where the deceased allegedly trespassed onto the petitioner's land. The petitioner contended that the deceased committed criminal trespass, invoking the right of private defence of property, and argued that the offence, if any, fell under Section 304 rather than Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in the petitioner's case, finding merit in the argument regarding the right of private defence and the potential misapplication of the murder statute. Conversely, the Court dismissed the complainant's petition seeking the enhancement of the sentence and challenging the acquittal of the co-accused, finding no illegality in the High Court's decision to grant the co-accused the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right of private defence of property extend to causing death when the deceased commits criminal trespass?
  • Can a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be converted to Section 304 if the accused exceeded the right of private defence?
  • Is the acquittal of a co-accused based on the benefit of the doubt sustainable when the evidence against them is insufficient?
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