Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Dhuman And Others vs Ghulam Sarwar And Other1985 SCMR 947 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-13
  inheritancelast male-holdercollateralsresiduariesSunni Lawsecond appealadditional evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' regular second appeal and their application for additional evidence. The core legal question concerns the determination of the last male-holder for succession purposes and whether remoteness or closeness of relationship among residuaries under Sunni Law affects their share in inheritance. The Supreme Court held that the succession opens upon the date of the death of the last male-holder, and proximity in degree to the last male-holder at that specific time determines priority in inheritance among collaterals. The Court affirmed that under Sunni Law, the table of residuaries dictates that closeness of relationship is indeed consequential in determining the devolution of inheritance. Leave to appeal was consequently refused.

  Questions settled

  • When does succession open for the purpose of determining the inheritance of collaterals from a last male-holder?
  • Does the closeness or remoteness of relationship among residuaries under Sunni Law affect their right to inheritance?
  • Can additional documents be admitted at the second appeal stage when counsel fails to support the appeal on the existing record?
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• Dewan Khan vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Multan And Other1985 SCMR 575 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-19
  urban settlementtransfer of propertyfindings of factconstitutional jurisdictionnon-claimantpossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed an Intra-Court Appeal regarding the transfer of urban property under settlement laws. The core legal question was whether the findings of fact made by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner—specifically regarding the respondents' submission of transfer applications and their possession of the disputed property—were legally sustainable. The petitioner, a non-claimant in possession of part of the property, challenged the transfer to the respondents, who were claimants. The Supreme Court observed that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner had relied on valid evidence, including a certificate confirming the respondents' application and findings that the respondents held possession through a licensee. The High Court had previously upheld these findings, noting the petitioner's failure to rebut the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that findings of fact based on material evidence cannot be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction when the petitioner fails to produce contrary proof. The principle laid down is that factual findings supported by record evidence are not subject to reappraisal in constitutional jurisdiction absent compelling evidence to the contrary.

  Questions settled

  • Can findings of fact made by a Deputy Settlement Commissioner be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction when supported by evidence?
  • Does a claimant have preference over a non-claimant in the transfer of indivisible urban property under settlement law?
  • Is possession through a licensee sufficient to establish possession for the purpose of property transfer under settlement law?
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• Daud And Others vs The State1985 SCMR 1923 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-05
  cross-casesappreciation of evidencesectarian violenceleave to appealcriminal convictionsentence enhancementacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves cross-petitions for leave to appeal arising from a violent sectarian clash at a mosque in Multan, which resulted in fatalities and injuries on both sides. The incident led to multiple criminal proceedings, with various parties convicted or acquitted by the trial court and the High Court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed several petitions: one by the convicts Daud and Suleman challenging their convictions; one by Mehraj Din challenging the acquittal of Hameed and Siddique; and one by Sultan Muhammad seeking the enhancement of sentences for Daud and Suleman. Additionally, the Court considered an appeal by Karam Din against his conviction. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the lower courts correctly applied the established principles regarding the appreciation of evidence in criminal cases, particularly in the context of cross-cases involving sectarian violence. The Court held that the petitions presented a fit case for granting leave to appeal to re-examine the evidence and the application of criminal law principles. Consequently, the Court granted leave in all petitions and ordered that all appeals be heard together.

  Questions settled

  • Does the occurrence of a violent incident between two rival sectarian groups in cross-cases necessitate a re-examination of evidence by the Supreme Court?
  • Is it appropriate for the Supreme Court to grant leave to appeal when there are conflicting findings by lower courts regarding the culpability of parties in cross-cases?
  • Should multiple appeals arising from the same criminal incident between the same parties be heard together by the Supreme Court?
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• Commissioner of Sales Tax, Lahore Zone, Lahore vs S. Muhammad Din1985 SCMR 1940 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-19
  limitationtime-barredleave to appealcertificate of fitnessincome taxdelay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan against an order passed by the Lahore High Court. The petition was filed with a significant delay of 954 days. The petitioner sought to exclude the time spent pursuing an application for a certificate of fitness to appeal, which had been filed under the Income Tax Act and subsequently refused. The core legal question was whether the period spent prosecuting an incompetent application for a certificate of fitness could be excluded from the period of limitation for filing the petition for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court held that since the application for the certificate was incompetent and the petitioner did not challenge the correctness of that determination, the time spent pursuing it could not be excluded for the purposes of limitation. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as time-barred. The judgment affirms that time spent pursuing an incompetent legal remedy cannot be excluded when calculating the limitation period for an appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the time spent pursuing an incompetent application for a certificate of fitness be excluded from the limitation period for filing a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal filed with a delay of 954 days maintainable if the delay is attributed to an incompetent application for a certificate of fitness?
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• Commissioner Of Sales Tax Zone-a, Lahore. vs M/s. Chenab Textile MillsPTCL 1985 (CL.) 205 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Sales Tax vs Messrs Zalin Ltd.1985 SCMR 1292 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-28
  sales taxrefund of taxexcess collectionretrospective legislationpending appealunjust enrichment
  Summary & questions settled

  This certificated appeal arose from a judgment of the West Pakistan High Court in a Civil Reference under the Sales Tax Act 1951, which had allowed the respondent-assessee (a hotel operator) a refund of excess sales tax paid for the assessment years 1952-53 and 1954-55. The revenue department appealed, contending that because the assessee had already collected the tax from its customers, it was not entitled to a refund. During the pendency of the appeal, Section 30-A was inserted into the Sales Tax Act 1951, requiring any person who collected excess tax to pay it to the Central Government. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the pendency of the appeal destroyed the finality of the High Court's judgment, making the case subject to the retrospective application of Section 30-A. The Court ruled that an assessee who collects excess tax from customers acts merely as an agent and cannot claim a refund for personal retention. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pendency of an appeal before the Supreme Court destroy the finality of a High Court judgment so as to subject the matter to newly enacted retrospective legislation?
  • Can an assessee claim a refund of excess sales tax under Section 27 of the Sales Tax Act 1951 if the tax was actually collected from its customers?
  • What is the legal effect of Section 30-A of the Sales Tax Act 1951 on claims for refund of excess tax collected from consumers?
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• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Karachi vs Messrs Shennihen Steamship1985 PLD Supreme Court 118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-23
  non-resident assesseeshipping companydepreciation allowanceworld incomenotional incometax assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from an income tax assessment dispute concerning a non-resident foreign shipping company for the assessment year 1956-57. The Income-tax Officer had calculated the company's taxable income under the second method of Rule 33 of the Income-tax Rules, which determines Pakistan profits based on the ratio of Pakistan freight receipts to world freight receipts. However, the officer disallowed initial and additional depreciation on ships that were registered outside Pakistan and not first installed or plied in Pakistani waters. The High Court, affirming the decisions of the appellate authorities, held that such depreciation was permissible. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's judgment, ruling that under the second method of Rule 33, the world income of a non-resident must be computed in accordance with the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1922, including all allowances under Section 10(2). The Court held that prior to the 1967 amendment, the phrase 'not having previously been used in Pakistan has been installed' did not require the physical installation of the ships in Pakistan to qualify for depreciation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether initial and additional depreciation under Section 10(2)(vi) of the Income-tax Act 1922 can be allowed for ships registered outside Pakistan and not installed in Pakistan prior to the 1967 amendment?
  • How is the world income of a non-resident shipping company to be computed under the second method of Rule 33 of the Income-tax Rules?
  • Does the application of Rule 33 of the Income-tax Rules require the entire world business of a non-resident assessee to be subjected to the provisions of the Income-tax Act 1922?
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• Commissioner of Income Tax, Central, Karachi vs Messrs Surridge and Beecheno, Advocates and Solicitors, Finlay House, Karachi1985 SCMR 1084 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-20
  income taxpartnership registrationrenewal of registrationprofit sharingpartnership deedtax assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two appeals arising from the refusal by the Income-Tax Officer to renew the registration of a law firm, Messrs Surridge and Beecheno, under the Income-Tax Act, 1922. The core legal question was whether a partnership deed is invalid for registration purposes if it lacks an explicit provision for sharing losses and contains contingent clauses regarding profit allocation. The Supreme Court held that the firm's registration was valid and the renewal was rightly granted. The Court affirmed that the absence of a specific provision for sharing losses does not invalidate a partnership deed, as such matters are governed by the Partnership Act, 1932. Furthermore, the Court ruled that profit-sharing clauses, even if contingent on future uncertainties, do not render the shares unspecified under the Act. The key principle laid down is that where a firm is genuinely constituted and its constitution remains unchanged, the renewal of registration should follow as a matter of course, provided the application is complete, and the Income-Tax Officer cannot reject renewal based on speculative contingencies regarding profit distribution.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a specific provision for sharing losses in a partnership deed invalidate the partnership for the purpose of registration under the Income-Tax Act, 1922?
  • Can an Income-Tax Officer refuse the renewal of registration of a firm on the ground that profit allocation is contingent on future uncertainties?
  • Is a firm with an unchanged constitution entitled to the renewal of its registration under the Income-Tax Act, 1922, once its initial genuineness is established?
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• Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Zone "D" vs M.A. Munim1985 SCMR 2027 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-28
  separation allowanceloss of employmentcapital receiptincome taxremuneration for past servicescessation of businessreference to High Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax against a judgment of the Sind High Court regarding the taxability of a 'separation allowance' received by an employee upon the cessation of business by his employer. The core legal question was whether the separation allowance received by the assessee constituted compensation for loss of employment and a non-taxable capital receipt, or taxable remuneration for past services under the Income-tax Act, 1922. The Supreme Court held that the High Court and the Tribunal correctly appreciated the evidence and factual position, finding that the allowance was paid solely as compensation for the loss of employment pursuant to a settlement under the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959, rather than as remuneration for past services. The key principle laid down is that payments received by an employee solely as compensation for loss of employment upon cessation of business, and not as remuneration for past services, qualify as capital receipts exempt from income tax.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a separation allowance received upon the cessation of an employer's business is taxable as a profit in lieu of salary?
  • Is a payment made as compensation for the loss of employment considered a capital receipt not liable to be taxed under the Income-tax Act, 1922?
  • Whether the Tribunal's finding of fact that a payment was made solely as compensation for loss of employment warrants interference by the superior courts?
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• Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central Karachi. vs M/s. Surridge And Beechenco-Advocates And Solicitors, Finlay House,Karachi.PTCL 1985 (CL.) 217 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-19
  renewal of registrationpartnership firmallocation of profitssharing of lossesincome tax assessmentinstrument of partnership
  Summary & questions settled

  These consolidated civil appeals arose from the refusal of the Income Tax authorities to renew the registration of a firm of solicitors under Section 26-A of the Income Tax Act, 1922, on the grounds that profit allocation was subject to contingencies and uncertainties and that the partnership deed omitted explicit provisions regarding the sharing of losses. The core legal question was whether the absence of a specific clause regarding the sharing of losses and the dependence of profit shares on certain contingencies rendered the instrument of partnership invalid for the renewal of registration under the Income Tax Act, 1922. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal and the High Court were correct in granting the renewal, ruling that the specific provision regarding the sharing of losses is not an essential requirement for the constitution of a valid partnership firm, and that the mechanics of profit allocation, even if subject to contingencies, sufficiently satisfied the requirement of specifying individual shares under the law. The appeals were consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the absence of a specific provision regarding the sharing of losses in an instrument of partnership renders the firm invalid for registration under Section 26-A of the Income Tax Act, 1922?
  • Is an Income Tax Officer competent to reopen the question of the initial validity and genuineness of a firm when dealing with a subsequent application for the renewal of its registration?
  • Whether the dependence of profit shares on certain contingencies and uncertainties means that the shares of the partners are not specified as required by law?
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• Commissioner of Income Tax vs Messrs Nippon Yusen Kaisha And Other1985 SCMR 2008 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-23
  income taxdepreciation allowancenon-resident shipping companyworld income assessmentFinance Act 1967statutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a series of appeals involving foreign, non-resident shipping companies and their entitlement to initial and additional depreciation allowances under the Income-tax Act, 1922. The core legal question was whether such depreciation could be claimed for ships registered outside Pakistan, not installed in Pakistan, and not plying in Pakistan. Relying on the precedent set in Civil Appeal No. K-45 of 1971, the Court held that for non-resident shipping companies whose income is assessed based on world income under the Income-tax Rules, initial and additional depreciation allowances are available. Regarding six specific appeals where the assessment years fell after the Finance Act, 1967—which amended the relevant provisions to require that a ship be 'installed in Pakistan'—the Court declined to adjudicate the issue. The Court reasoned that leave to appeal was not granted on the question of the 1967 amendment's impact, and the point was neither urged in the petitions nor addressed by the High Court. Consequently, all appeals were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Are non-resident shipping companies whose income is assessed on a world-income basis entitled to initial and additional depreciation allowances under the Income-tax Act, 1922?
  • Does the requirement that a ship be 'installed in Pakistan' for depreciation purposes apply to assessment years governed by the Finance Act, 1967?
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• Commissioner of Income Tax (C) Karachi vs Messrs Habib Bank1985 SCMR 284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-05
  capital gainsrevenue receiptincome taxadventure in the nature of tradestock-in-tradememorandum of associationinvestment realization
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding whether profits earned by the respondent company from the sale of shares in allied concerns constituted taxable revenue receipts or non-taxable capital gains. The core legal question was whether the sale of these shares, given the company's memorandum of association, amounted to an adventure in the nature of trade or business. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the profits were capital gains rather than revenue receipts. The Court reasoned that the mere authorization in a company's memorandum to invest surplus funds does not transform every sale of investment into a business activity. The holding establishes that for a transaction to be classified as business income, there must be evidence of a systematic commercial enterprise or speculative trading. Since the shares were held as long-term investments of surplus funds rather than as stock-in-trade, and the company did not engage in frequent, systematic trading, the profit realized from their sale was not taxable as business income. The judgment emphasizes distinguishing between capital accretion and trading profit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere authorization in a company's memorandum of association to invest funds automatically render all profits from the sale of such investments taxable as business income?
  • What criteria distinguish a capital gain from a revenue receipt when a company realizes profit from the sale of shares?
  • Can the sale of shares held as long-term investments of surplus funds be classified as an adventure in the nature of trade?
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• Chief Settlement Commissioner/ MBR And Another vs Retired Col.1985 SCMR 898 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-13
  settlement lawremand orderrepealing statutenotified officerexcess landleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a long-standing dispute over the extent and entitlement of excess land attached to a bungalow in Lahore. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner had previously determined the surplus area, a decision challenged by the respondent via a writ petition. The Lahore High Court remanded the matter to the Chief Settlement Commissioner for fresh measurement or reassignment to an officer not below the rank of Additional Settlement Commissioner. The Chief Settlement Commissioner and Deputy Settlement Commissioner sought leave to appeal against this remand order. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, primarily to examine whether, following the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, by the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Law (Repeal) Ordinance, 1974, the High Court possessed the legal authority to remand the case to the Chief Settlement Commissioner, rather than to the specific officer notified by the provincial government to dispose of pending proceedings under the repealing legislation. The court also noted the necessity of determining the appropriate authority under the notification issued by the Government of the Punjab.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court remand a case to the Chief Settlement Commissioner after the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Does the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Law (Repeal) Ordinance, 1974, restrict the High Court's power to remand cases to specific notified officers?
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• Chand Khan vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner And Other1985 SCMR 538 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-20
  settlement disputeN.C.H. Formleave to appeallachesdelayconduct of petitionerconstitutional jurisdictionproper documentation
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard a petition seeking leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a Constitutional petition in an urban settlement dispute. The petitioner claimed possession of the subject house since 1954 and asserted he had filed a transfer form (N.C.H. Form) in 1959 which was allegedly ignored without a hearing. The property was subsequently auctioned and later transferred to a private respondent in 1977. The petitioner only initiated legal action in 1979 via a revision petition, approximately twenty years after submitting his initial transfer form. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that the petitioner's gross delay, laches, and conduct—particularly remaining inactive for two decades despite having knowledge of proceedings as a former Patwari—precluded him from obtaining equitable relief in constitutional jurisdiction. Furthermore, the petition was improperly documented, lacking essential factual particulars. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unexplained and prolonged delay of twenty years in agitating rights regarding a settlement transfer form disentitles a petitioner from discretionary relief under constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Whether an applicant's inaction and conduct bar him from challenging the subsequent transfer of settlement property to a third party?
  • Can a constitutional petition or leave to appeal be dismissed on grounds of being improperly documented and lacking essential facts?
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• Chan Muhammad vs Shamas Gul And Other1985 SCMR 1587 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-20
  murderself-defenceacquittalappreciation of evidenceeye-witness testimonycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the acquittal of the respondents by the High Court in a murder case. The trial court had convicted the respondents for the murder of Ahmad Fayaz, rejecting their plea of self-defence. The High Court, however, overturned the conviction, finding that the complainant party was the aggressor and that the respondents acted in self-defence. The Supreme Court examined the conflicting versions of the incident: the prosecution alleged a targeted killing, while the defence contended that the complainant party initiated the altercation due to a prior dispute, leading to a situation where the accused fired in defence of his brother who had been stabbed. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's assessment of the evidence—specifically its rejection of the sole eye-witness's testimony due to his motive and its acceptance of the plea of self-defence—was unexceptionable. The Court affirmed that the mere retreat of an assailant does not necessarily negate the immediate danger to the accused, thereby upholding the acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere retreat of an assailant automatically negate the right of self-defence for the accused?
  • Can an appellate court overturn a trial court's rejection of a self-defence plea if the evidence suggests the complainant party was the aggressor?
  • Is the testimony of an eye-witness who is shown to have a motive to implicate the accused reliable?
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• Chairman, Railway Board And Others vs Hafiz Abdul Qayyum1985 SCMR 1788 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  arbitration awardlimitation periodobjections to awardrule of courtnotice of filingcontract dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding a contract of work executed between Pakistan Railways and the respondent, which was referred to arbitration. The arbitrator submitted the award to the court on 11 May 1981 in the presence of counsel for both parties, and the court adjourned the matter to 28 May 1981 for filing objections. The petitioners filed their objections on 28 June 1981, which the trial court rejected as time-barred, subsequently making the award the rule of the court. The High Court dismissed the petitioners' appeal. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that their objections were not time-barred and that the award was void on its face due to an incorrect rate allowed for dewatering charges. The Supreme Court held that since the award was filed in the presence of the petitioners' counsel, they had due notice, and their subsequent request for an extension on 23 June 1981 without raising any grievance of lack of notice confirmed this. Furthermore, the disputed rate change was unsigned and unagreed. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the presence of a party's counsel at the time an arbitration award is filed in court constitutes sufficient notice to start the limitation period for filing objections?
  • Can an objection to an arbitration award be entertained if it is filed beyond the prescribed limitation period without any valid grievance of lack of notice?
  • Whether an unsigned and unagreed amendment to a contract rate can be used to challenge the validity of an arbitrator's award.
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• Chairman, Pakistan Railway Board, Lahore vs Muhammad Ali1985 SCMR 1072 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-23
  pension arrearsinterim paymentadministrative determinationservice lawSupreme Court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application filed in the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the payment of pension arrears and ongoing pension dues owed by the Pakistan Railway Board to the respondent, Muhammad Ali. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court should determine the specific quantum of pension and arrears payable to the respondent during the pendency of existing proceedings, given that the final calculations had not yet been finalized by the appellant. The Court held that it was not the appropriate forum to adjudicate the specific controversy regarding the precise amount of pension and dues payable, as that determination remained pending. Consequently, the Court permitted the appellant to deposit a specified sum as part payment of arrears and a monthly amount towards the pension, allowing the respondent to withdraw these funds without prejudice to his claims for the remaining balance. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not undertake the initial determination of disputed pension amounts when such calculations are administrative matters currently under process by the relevant department, provided that interim arrangements are made to secure the respondent's interests.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Supreme Court the appropriate forum to determine the specific quantum of pension arrears when final calculations are still pending?
  • Can a party be permitted to withdraw deposited pension funds without prejudice to their claims for a higher amount?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to order interim payments of pension dues pending final administrative determination?
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• Chairman, Federal Land Commission And Another vs Sardar Ashiq1985 SCMR 317 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-17
  Martial Law Regulation 115revisional jurisdictionjudicial biasnatural justiceland reformsreasonable apprehension of biasremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against Lahore High Court judgments regarding the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the Chairman of the Federal Land Commission under Martial Law Regulation No. 115. The core legal questions involved whether the Chairman, sitting singly, possessed the authority to exercise revisional powers under paragraph 29 of the Regulation and whether the Chairman was disqualified from adjudicating due to bias, stemming from his prior political speeches and public statements against the respondent landowners. The Supreme Court held that while the issue of the Chairman's jurisdiction to sit singly was addressed by subsequent validation legislation, the proceedings were nonetheless vitiated by bias. The Court affirmed that justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done. It established that bias includes political hostility or excessive zeal that creates a reasonable apprehension of unfairness in the mind of a litigant. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned orders and remanded the cases to the Federal Land Commission for a fresh decision on the merits, ensuring parties are afforded full opportunity to be heard.

  Questions settled

  • Can a judge be disqualified from adjudicating a case on the grounds of political bias?
  • Does a reasonable apprehension of bias vitiate judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings?
  • Is a decision rendered by a biased authority void even if the result appears correct on merits?
  • Does the principle of natural justice require that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done?
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• Ch. Umar Din vs Government of Pakistan And Other1985 SCMR 174 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-21
  service tribunalsenioritylimitationdepartmental representationfinal ordercivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, appointed as an Assistant in the Ministry of Production in 1972 and later transferred to the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 1976, challenged a seniority list assigning his seniority from the date of his transfer. His departmental representation was met with a letter stating his seniority was under determination in consultation with the Establishment Division. Subsequently, he filed an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal, which was dismissed as time-barred and on merits. Upon further petition before the Supreme Court, the Court held that the Tribunal was justified in dismissing the appeal as time-barred because the departmental letter relied upon by the petitioner was not a final appealable order. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition while observing that the petitioner remained entitled to press for a final determination of his seniority by the Ministry since such a final decision had not yet been rendered.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an interim departmental letter regarding pending seniority determination constitutes a final appealable order under service laws?
  • Is an appeal filed before the Federal Service Tribunal beyond the prescribed limitation period from the initial representation liable to be dismissed as time-barred?
  • Does a dismissed time-barred service appeal preclude a civil servant from seeking a final determination of seniority where no final order has yet been issued?
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• Ch. Shah Muhammad And Others vs Ashiq And Other1985 SCMR 494 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-17
  withdrawal of appealcompromiselitigation strategyappellate procedurejudicial finality
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan where the appellants initially sought to withdraw their appeal, citing an amicable out-of-court compromise. Subsequently, the appellants engaged new counsel and attempted to retract the withdrawal application, alleging that the respondents had resiled from the compromise. The Court addressed the core question of whether a party, having formally filed an application to withdraw an appeal based on a compromise, can subsequently retract that request to prolong litigation. The Supreme Court held that the initial application to withdraw the appeal was made with full responsibility and must be given full effect. The Court deprecated the practice of attempting to retract such formal requests merely to extend litigation. Consequently, the Court rejected the second application and dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, emphasizing that once a party has taken a definite step to withdraw, they are bound by that action.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellant retract a formal application to withdraw an appeal based on an alleged breach of compromise by the respondent?
  • Is a party bound by a formal application to withdraw an appeal filed with the Court?
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• Ch. Rustam Ali vs Mst. Jamila Akhtar1985 SCMR 810 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-04
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentconcurrent findings of factadjustment of rentrepairs and maintenanceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondent landlady filed an ejectment application against the petitioner tenant on the ground of default in rent payment. The Rent Controller ordered ejectment, and the High Court dismissed the tenant's first appeal. In the petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that an advance deposit and adjustment towards whitewash and painting expenses negated the default. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner failed to raise the plea of the receipt in his written statement, affidavit, or cross-examination, and that the plea of adjustment for repair expenses was legally untenable without obtaining prior permission under the relevant statute. The concurrent findings of fact regarding default by the lower courts were based on evidence and warranted no interference. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, holding that concurrent findings of fact on default based on evidence cannot be disturbed, and that repair expense adjustments require statutory permission.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact on the question of default in rent can be interfered with by the Supreme Court?
  • Is a tenant entitled to claim adjustment of rent on account of repair expenses without obtaining permission under section 12 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
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• Ch. Rafiq Ahmad Shad vs The Punjab Road Transport Board And Other1985 SCMR 1919 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-23
  contempt of courtservice tribunalsupreme court jurisdictionleave to appealservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an employee of the Punjab Road Transport Board, sought contempt proceedings against the Board for failing to implement the judgment of the Punjab Services Tribunal dated 21-9-1980, which had restored his promotion to Grade-18 with consequential benefits. The Supreme Court had earlier dismissed the Board's petition for leave to appeal against the Tribunal's order. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court could entertain a contempt application for the alleged violation of a Service Tribunal's order where the Supreme Court had merely dismissed the petition for leave to appeal without issuing an independent directive or granting relief itself. The Court held that the alleged breach pertained to the order of the Punjab Services Tribunal rather than an order of the Supreme Court, rendering the contempt application before the Supreme Court incompetent. The key principle laid down is that a party seeking remedy for the non-compliance of a Tribunal's order must approach the appropriate proper forum rather than invoking the contempt jurisdiction of the Supreme Court when the Supreme Court has only dismissed a petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court can entertain a contempt application for the violation of a Punjab Services Tribunal order when the Supreme Court merely dismissed the petition for leave to appeal?
  • Is a contempt application maintainable before the Supreme Court for non-compliance of an order passed by a subordinate tribunal?
  • What is the proper forum for executing or seeking compliance with an order of the Punjab Services Tribunal?
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• Ch. Muhammad Tufail vs Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq1985 SCMR 879 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-08
  evictionpersonal usebona fide requirementleave to appealappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the dismissal of the petitioner's eviction application against the respondent. The petitioner had sought the respondent's eviction from the demised shop-premises on the grounds of default in rent payment and personal bona fide use. The Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge both dismissed the application, and the High Court similarly dismissed the petitioner's second appeal after independently evaluating the evidence regarding personal requirement. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court misread or ignored material evidence regarding the petitioner's bona fide personal requirement for the premises. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's conclusions drawn from the evidence were legitimate and did not warrant interference. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that concurrent findings of fact regarding personal requirement will not be interfered with where the lower courts have duly appreciated the evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding personal bona fide requirement in rent matters can be interfered with by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the High Court's independent evaluation of evidence in a second appeal warrant interference if the conclusions are legitimate?
  • What constitutes sufficient proof of personal requirement in shop eviction cases?
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• Ch. Muhammad Siddique vs Muhammad Rashid1985 SCMR 21 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-11
  ejectment applicationrent defaultstatutory interpretationstriking off defenseWest Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinancerent deposit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from an ejectment application filed by a landlord against a tenant for default in rent payment. The Rent Controller had directed the tenant to deposit future rent "before the 15th" of each month. The tenant deposited the rent on the 15th, leading the Rent Controller to strike off the tenant's defense for non-compliance, an order subsequently upheld by the District Court and the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the phrase "before the 15th" in a rent deposit order includes the 15th day or is exclusive of it. The Supreme Court held that the phrase "before the 15th" is clear and unambiguous, meaning the payment must be made earlier than the 15th day. Consequently, depositing rent on the 15th constitutes a default. The Court affirmed that in the absence of specific legislative intent to include the terminal date, such as using the phrase "on or before," the ordinary meaning of "before" must prevail, rendering the tenant's deposit untimely and the striking of the defense legally justified.

  Questions settled

  • Does the phrase 'before the 15th' in a rent deposit order include the 15th day?
  • Is a tenant in default if they deposit rent on the 15th when ordered to pay 'before the 15th'?
  • Can a court strike off a tenant's defense for failing to deposit rent by the date specified in a court order?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Sharif vs Afsar Textile Mills Ltd. And Another1985 SCMR 1865 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-05
  land acquisitionreference to courtcompensationamendment of pleadingsjurisdiction of civil courtobjection to award
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether a court hearing a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act can allow an objector to claim increased compensation for acquired land by amending the original application filed before the Collector. The appellant's land was acquired, and after being dissatisfied with the Collector's award, the appellant filed an application seeking a reference to the civil court at a reduced flat rate of compensation. During the pendency of the reference, the appellant sought to amend the claim to a higher rate. The Senior Civil Judge partially allowed the amendment, but the High Court reversed this on revision. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the jurisdiction of the court under a reference is special and strictly limited to the specific objection and matter referred. An objector is bound by their pleadings and claim presented before the Collector and cannot introduce a fresh case or enhance the compensation claim through amendment beyond the scope of the original reference.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court hearing a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act allow an objector to amend their application to claim increased compensation?
  • Is the jurisdiction of a civil court under a reference pursuant to section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act restricted to the specific objection referred by the Collector?
  • Does an objector remain bound by the claim and pleadings presented before the Collector during subsequent judicial proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Dilawar Ali Khan vs Districtfood Controller, Faisalabad And Other1985 SCMR 1096 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-21
  ration depotcancellation of authorizationSugar Distribution Orderfood grain licensingpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the cancellation of his ration depot authorization. The petitioner had been running a ration depot, and following a raid, a quantity of Atta was recovered from an adjacent house stored by his Munshi, leading to the cancellation of his authorization by the District Magistrate, which was affirmed in appeal by the Commissioner. The core legal question was whether the cancellation of an authorization issued under the Sugar Distribution Order, 1960, was justified due to irregularities committed regarding the storage of Atta. The Supreme Court held that the authorities rightly attributed the irregularity to the petitioner in his capacity as a depot holder under the applicable administrative memorandum governing such depots. The Court dismissed the petition, laying down the principle that a depot holder's authorization is liable to cancellation for irregularities committed in the general performance of depot duties as covered by governing departmental instructions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the cancellation of a depot authorization issued under the Sugar Distribution Order, 1960 can be based on irregularities concerning commodities other than sugar?
  • Can a depot holder be penalized under administrative instructions for irregularities committed in the capacity of a depot holder?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Naseer vs S.H.O., P.S. Old Anarkali And Other1985 SCMR 399 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-11-23
  First Information ReportF.I.R.writ petitionconstitutional jurisdictiondaily diaryquashing of F.I.R.
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's writ petition seeking to declare the First Information Report registered at Police Station Old Anarkali as illegal and without lawful authority. The core legal question was whether a daily diary report recorded at a police guard room prior to the formal F.I.R. constitutes the real F.I.R., and whether the High Court in writ jurisdiction can determine which information should be treated as the F.I.R. The Supreme Court held that the S.H.O. acted in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure while recording the statement and registering the case, and that the question of which information was given first in point of time falls squarely for determination by the trial Court rather than in writ jurisdiction. Consequently, the petition was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that the determination of the authentic F.I.R. among conflicting reports is a matter for the trial court during trial and cannot be adjudicated through constitutional writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the question of which information constitutes the real F.I.R. can be determined in writ jurisdiction?
  • Does a daily diary report recorded prior to a formal F.I.R. automatically render the subsequent F.I.R. illegal?
  • Is the determination of the authentic F.I.R. a matter to be decided by the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Khalil vs Ministry of Defence (Secretary) and ANOTHERs1985 PLD Supreme Court 178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-06
  premature retirementvoluntary retirementcivil servantservice tribunalCivil Service Regulationswithdrawal of retirement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the Service Tribunal dismissing the appellant's service appeal. The appellant, a civil servant, had submitted an intimation for voluntary premature retirement after completing qualifying service under Note 1 to Regulation 465-B of the Civil Service Regulations. Subsequently, he requested to withdraw his retirement intimation, which was rejected by the competent authority. The core legal question was whether a civil servant, having submitted a written intimation for voluntary premature retirement under Note 1 to Regulation 465-B of the Civil Service Regulations, has the right to withdraw or modify such intimation prior to its acceptance. The Supreme Court held that the intimation, once submitted under the said rule, is final and cannot be modified or withdrawn, as the statutory rule expressly bars any withdrawal, distinguishing it from general rules governing resignations. The Court laid down the principle that the rights of civil servants are strictly governed by statutory rules, and where a rule explicitly provides that a notice or intimation of premature retirement is final and not subject to withdrawal, the civil servant cannot unilaterally recall it.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant can withdraw an intimation for voluntary premature retirement once submitted under Note 1 to Regulation 465-B of the Civil Service Regulations?
  • Does Note 1 to Regulation 465-B of the Civil Service Regulations possess statutory force?
  • Can the general law of master and servant override specific statutory rules governing civil service tenure?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Ashfaq vs Mst. Shahida Parveen And 2 Other1985 SCMR 894 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-02-25
  ex parte decreefamily courtwrit jurisdictiondower debtmaintenance suitprocedural remedyfailure to appear
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal arising from family court proceedings where the petitioner challenged ex parte decrees granted against him in suits for dower debt and maintenance. The core legal question was whether the trial court erred in closing the petitioner's evidence and proceeding ex parte when the petitioner's counsel failed to appear on the fixed date, and whether the High Court correctly dismissed the subsequent writ petitions. The Supreme Court held that the trial court acted within its discretion, noting that the petitioner's counsel failed to appear or request an adjournment on the scheduled date. Furthermore, the Court held that the petitioner's remedy lay in seeking to set aside the ex parte decree rather than filing writ petitions against the appellate orders. The key principle laid down is that a party cannot bypass established procedural remedies for setting aside ex parte orders by invoking writ jurisdiction, particularly when the party failed to attend the trial proceedings or seek timely adjournments through counsel.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party invoke writ jurisdiction to challenge an ex parte decree without first seeking to set aside the decree in the trial court?
  • Is a trial court justified in closing a defendant's evidence when the defendant's counsel fails to appear on the date fixed for evidence?
  • Does a writ petition lie against an appellate order confirming an ex parte decree when the petitioner failed to pursue statutory remedies for setting aside the ex parte order?
  Read full judgment →
• CH. Haji Muhammad Ishaque vs Ganga Ram1985 SCMR 2043 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-11
  evictionlandlord and tenantrent depositSection 30 noticeDisplaced Persons Actstriking off defencemaintainability of ejectment petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from an eviction petition filed by the appellant against the respondent for non-payment of rent. The respondent contested the application, denying the landlord-tenant relationship and asserting ownership, while also arguing that the ejectment application was not maintainable due to the lack of service of notice under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The Rent Controller ordered the respondent to deposit rent, and upon failure to comply, struck off the respondent's defence and ordered eviction. The High Court, however, set aside this order, holding that the Rent Controller was required to first determine the issue of the Section 30 notice before ordering the deposit of rent under the Rent Ordinance. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the service of a notice under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, is a mandatory prerequisite (sine qua non) for the maintainability of an ejectment petition against a tenant occupying a property transferred to a displaced person. Consequently, an order for rent deposit made without first resolving this issue is a nullity.

  Questions settled

  • Is the service of notice under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, a mandatory requirement for the maintainability of an ejectment petition?
  • Can a Rent Controller order the deposit of rent under the Rent Ordinance before determining the issue of the service of a Section 30 notice?
  • Does an order for the deposit of rent become a nullity if the underlying ejectment petition is not maintainable due to lack of statutory notice?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Ghulam Mujtaba vs Mst. Naeema Khanum1985 SCMR 38 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-22
  ejectment proceedingsexecution proceedingsobjection petitionlandlord and tenantmala fidestatutory tenantlegal representation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a revision petition regarding an objection filed during execution proceedings for the ejectment of a tenant. The core legal question was whether an individual who acted as counsel for a tenant in ejectment proceedings could subsequently intervene in the execution stage to claim independent possession of the disputed premises. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner's objection was mala fide. The Court affirmed that the petitioner, having represented the tenant throughout the lengthy ejectment litigation, was fully aware of the proceedings and should have asserted his claim during the initial trial before the Rent Controller. The judgment establishes that a party who fails to assert a claim of independent possession during the primary ejectment proceedings, despite having full knowledge of the litigation, is precluded from raising such a claim at the execution stage. The principle of finality and the prevention of mala fide litigation are paramount in rent restriction matters.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person who acted as counsel for a tenant in ejectment proceedings later claim independent possession during execution?
  • Is an objection petition filed during execution proceedings maintainable if the intervenor had knowledge of the original ejectment proceedings?
  • Does the failure to raise a claim of independent possession during the initial ejectment proceedings preclude such a claim at the execution stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Ghulam Mujtaba vs Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore And Other1985 SCMR 57 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-22
  constitutional petitionlocus standilachesproperty transfersettlement schemespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenges a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's constitutional petition regarding the transfer of a flat in a big mansion. The core legal questions involve whether the petitioner, an occupant claiming through a licensee arrangement and acting as an informer, possessed the requisite locus standi to challenge the property's transfer, and whether he was guilty of laches. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had no right to the transfer of the property and lacked locus standi, and that his constitutional petition was rightly dismissed by the High Court due to gross laches spanning nearly two decades while he litigated indirectly through ejectment proceedings. The key principle laid down is that an informer or a person without an independent pre-existing legal right to property cannot invoke constitutional jurisdiction to challenge a transfer, particularly after inordinate delay and laches.

  Questions settled

  • Does an occupant of a property who acts merely as an informer have the locus standi to challenge a property transfer through a constitutional petition?
  • Can a party invoke the discretionary constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court after a delay of nearly twenty years in challenging a settlement transfer order?
  • Does the pendency of a departmental inquiry initiated on an informer's application clothe such person with a legal right to the transfer of property?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Abdul Hamid vs Deputy Commissioner And Other1985 SCMR 359 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-09
  local body electionnomination paperhandwriting expertalternative remedywrit jurisdictioncomplete justice
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant successfully contested a local body election for Ward No.7 of Town Committee Ghakkar but was disqualified, leading to a constitutional petition in the Lahore High Court, which was dismissed on the ground of an adequate alternate remedy via an election petition. The dispute originated from conflicting nomination papers where the same person was alleged to have proposed one candidate and seconded another, prompting proceedings before the Returning Officer, the Appellate Authority (Deputy Commissioner), and the Punjab Local Councils Election Authority. Upon remand, the Appellate Authority relied solely on a handwriting expert's report without recording oral testimony to invalidate the appellant's nomination paper, and subsequently, a candidate with fewer votes was declared the winner. Converting the petition into an appeal, the Supreme Court held that reliance solely on a handwriting expert's opinion without substantive corroborative evidence was legally defective, and that the High Court erred in refusing to exercise its writ jurisdiction where apparent illegalities existed. Invoking its powers under Article 187 of the Constitution to do complete justice, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned orders and declared the appellant as the duly elected candidate, subject to any statutory election petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can decline to exercise constitutional jurisdiction on the ground of an alternative remedy when the impugned orders suffer from patent illegalities on the face of the record?
  • Can a finding on disputed handwriting be based solely on the opinion of a handwriting expert without substantive corroborative evidence?
  • Whether an appellate authority can determine disputed questions of fact regarding signatures without recording proper evidence and examining witnesses?
  • Can the Supreme Court mold the relief and declare a candidate duly elected under Article 187 of the Constitution to do complete justice in election disputes?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Abdul Hameed vs Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Lahore1985 SCMR 927 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-24
  service senioritypromotionminor penaltypending disciplinary proceedingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal concerning his claim to seniority over respondents. The petitioner, a Temporary Engineer initially appointed in 1955 and later inducted into P.S.E. Class II, contended that his promotion case was wrongfully withheld from the Public Service Commission on account of a pending inquiry that ultimately resulted only in a minor penalty, whereas a minor penalty did not bar promotion according to government policy circulars. The core legal question is whether a government servant's promotion can be withheld and their seniority bypassed due to pending disciplinary proceedings that eventuate in a minor penalty. The Supreme Court held that in view of the applicable circular dated 7-1-1969, which provides that a minor penalty inquiry may be ignored for withholding promotion, the authorities were not justified in withholding the petitioner's case. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the matter further.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pending disciplinary inquiry resulting in a minor penalty justifies withholding a civil servant's promotion?
  • Can the denial of promotion during the pendency of departmental proceedings affect a government servant's claimed seniority?
  • Does a circular governing promotion during disciplinary proceedings override departmental discretion regarding the forwarding of cases to the Public Service Commission?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Abdul Hameed vs Secretary to Government of the Punjab C & W1985 SCMR 1410 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-15
  service tribunalpromotionsenioritysupersessionpublic service commissionadverse remarksdepartmental inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan examines whether the Government of the Punjab wrongly withheld the appellant's case from the Public Service Commission for promotion to the grade of Executive Engineer in violation of a policy circular dated January 7, 1969. The appellant, a Temporary Engineer in the Communication and Works Department, faced departmental inquiries, suffered a minor penalty, and was subsequently promoted. He claimed seniority over respondents who had been promoted during his inquiries, invoking rule 15 of the West Pakistan Services of Engineer (Building & Roads) (Class I) Rules, 1967. The Service Tribunal rejected his claim, holding that his checkered service record justified his supersession. The Supreme Court found no failure by the Government in referring the case to the Public Service Commission, noting that the 1969 circular did not apply retroactively to 1966-1967 events and that the appellant's name was duly considered. The Court further held that a minor penalty does not amount to exoneration, that subsequent expunction of adverse remarks does not invalidate prior valid consideration, and that the appellant was lawfully superseded. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of the Government to submit a civil servant's case to the Public Service Commission violates departmental policy instructions?
  • Does the imposition of a minor penalty following disciplinary proceedings constitute exoneration for the purpose of claiming pro forma promotion and seniority?
  • Whether subsequent expunction of adverse remarks invalidates an earlier recommendation of supersession competently made by the Public Service Commission?
  • Can an officer who was passed over for promotion due to a disciplinary inquiry claim seniority over juniors under the West Pakistan Services of Engineer (Building & Roads) (Class I) Rules, 1967?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch Muhammad Ibrahim vs Nasir Beg And 4 Other1985 SCMR 652 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-12
  ejectmentrent matterbona fide personal needwrit jurisdictioncompetency of writ petitionlandlord-tenant dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the tenant, Muhammad Ibrahim, challenging a judgment of the High Court dated 16-11-1981, which dismissed his writ petition concerning an ejectment order. The underlying matter originated from an ejectment application filed by the landlord against the petitioner on grounds including default and bona fide personal need. Both the Rent Controller and the appellate court had previously determined that the landlord’s bona fide requirement for the premises was proven. Upon review, the Supreme Court addressed the competency of the writ petition filed by the tenant. The Court held that the writ petition was not competent in the circumstances of the case. Furthermore, the Court observed that the High Court had thoroughly examined all arguments raised by the petitioner and provided cogent reasons for its decision. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no valid grounds for interference with the High Court's judgment and dismissed the petition. The decision reinforces the principle that writ jurisdiction is limited when lower courts have concurrently established factual findings such as bona fide personal need in rent matters.

  Questions settled

  • Is a writ petition competent against an order of a Rent Controller and an appellate court in a rent matter where findings of fact have been concurrently established?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court judgment that has provided cogent reasons for dismissing a writ petition in a rent dispute?
  Read full judgment →
• Central Board Of Revenue vs S.I.T.E.PTCL 1985 (CL) 134 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-09-04Read full judgment →
• Central Board of Revenue and ANOTHERs vs S. I. T. E_1985 PLD Supreme Court 97 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-09-05
  corporate veilconstitutional immunityfederal taxationprovincial governmentincome tax exemptionjuristic personinstrumentality of state
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment declaring the Sind Industrial Trading Estate Limited (SITE) exempt from Federal income tax. The core legal question was whether the profits of SITE, a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1913, constituted the income of the Provincial Government, thereby attracting constitutional immunity from Federal taxation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that SITE functioned as a limb of the Provincial Government. The Court affirmed the principle that the corporate veil may be lifted to ascertain the true nature of a legal entity. Upon examination, the Court found that because SITE was established, funded, and controlled by the Provincial Government, with its assets reverting to the Government upon dissolution, it operated effectively as a government department. Consequently, the Court held that the income generated by SITE was the income of the Provincial Government. Therefore, it was exempt from Federal taxation under the relevant constitutional provisions, notwithstanding its formal status as a separate juristic person. The decision underscores that substance prevails over the form of incorporation in determining constitutional immunity.

  Questions settled

  • Can the corporate veil be lifted to determine if a company is a department of the Provincial Government for tax immunity purposes?
  • Is the income of a company formed by the Provincial Government exempt from Federal taxation under the Constitution?
  • Does the formal incorporation of a body as a company under the Companies Act, 1913, preclude it from being treated as a government department for tax purposes?
  Read full judgment →
• Capt. Dr. Nabi Ahmad vs The Ministry of Defence, Military1985 SCMR 1649 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-10-21
  cantonment servantdual employmentprivate practicemisconductremoval from servicemala fidesconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Medical Officer in the Cantonment General Hospital, challenged his removal from service for misconduct arising from his acceptance of part-time employment as an Assistant Surgeon with the Railway Department without the prior sanction of the Director, Military Lands and Cantonments. The petitioner contended that such employment fell within the permitted scope of private practice and that the disciplinary action was motivated by mala fides. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's dismissal of the constitutional petition, holding that a distinction exists between undertaking private practice—where the practitioner remains master of his own time—and entering into an employment contract under the control and supervision of another employer, which is prohibited under Rule 24 of the Pakistan Cantonments Servants Rules, 1954 without prior sanction. The Court further ruled that allegations of mala fides against public functionaries must be based on specific, conclusive facts and cannot be inferred merely from administrative reversals on appeal. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does taking up part-time employment with another department constitute prohibited employment under Rule 24 of the Pakistan Cantonments Servants Rules, 1954, or is it permissible as private practice?
  • What are the essential ingredients of the concept of 'employment' in the context of service rules?
  • Are general allegations of personal animus or administrative reversals sufficient to establish mala fides against a public functionary?
  • Does a Cantonment servant violate service discipline by subjecting himself to the control and supervision of another employer without the prior sanction of the Director?
  Read full judgment →
• Capt. Azmat Hayat Khan And Others vs Yousaf Masih And Other1985 SCMR 1503(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-29
  leave to appealsettlementrevision petitionmaintainabilitywrit petitionstatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that accepted a constitutional writ petition filed against the order of the Deputy Commissioner exercising the powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Sargodha. The Chief Settlement Commissioner had dismissed a revision petition filed under Section 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 challenging an allotment made in 1960 on the ground that it was not maintainable. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court properly exercised its jurisdiction in declaring the Chief Settlement Commissioner's order without lawful authority without adverting to the preliminary finding regarding the non-maintainability of the revision petition. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine this issue, directed security to be deposited, and ordered the maintenance of status quo during the pendency of the appeal. The judgment highlights that the High Court must consider key procedural findings made by lower forums when reviewing their decisions in writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court properly exercises its jurisdiction when declaring an order without lawful authority without considering the lower forum's finding that the underlying proceedings were not maintainable?
  Read full judgment →
• Bundu Shah And Others vs Wilayatullah1985 SCMR 1305 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-07
  ex parte appeallimitation periodcondonation of delaydue noticecause listrehearing of appealprocedural law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against an order dismissing applications for the rehearing of appeals decided ex parte. The core legal question was whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 applies to applications for the rehearing of an appeal under Order XLI, Rule 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and whether notice via a cause list constitutes due notice regarding limitation. The Supreme Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 is inapplicable to applications under Order XLI, Rule 21, as no legislative enactment extends its scope to such proceedings. Furthermore, the Court rejected the contention that appellate proceedings are a mere continuation of the suit to allow the importation of original-side procedures. The Court affirmed that publication in the official cause list constitutes due notice to parties. The key principle laid down is that procedural provisions regarding the condonation of delay are strictly construed and cannot be applied by implication or analogy to proceedings not explicitly covered by the governing statute. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to an application for the rehearing of an appeal heard ex parte under Order XLI, Rule 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does publication of a hearing date in the court's cause list constitute due notice to the parties for the purposes of limitation?
  • Can the provisions for setting aside ex parte decrees in original suits be applied to appellate proceedings by analogy?
  Read full judgment →
• Bulanda vs Munshi And 5 Other1985 SCMR 872 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-08-20
  land allotmentsitting allotteesrevisional jurisdictionwrit jurisdictionnatural justicesettlement proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the allotment of 256 Kanals 3 Marlas of land in village Khola, Tehsil and District Mianwali, between two parties who were both sitting allottees with unsatisfied claims. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner initially allotted the entire land to the respondents, citing the petitioner's failure to file an objection. Upon appeal, the appellate authority ordered a proportionate distribution of the land between the parties, recognizing their equal status as sitting allottees. However, a revisional authority subsequently overturned this decision, reinstating the original allotment solely because the petitioner had failed to object during the initial proceedings. The High Court declined to interfere with this revisional order. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, identifying a core legal question regarding whether the revisional authority was justified in setting aside the appellate order based solely on the lack of an objection, particularly when the petitioner alleged the initial proceedings occurred without proper notice. The Court further questioned whether the High Court erred in refusing to exercise its writ jurisdiction in these circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Is a revisional authority justified in setting aside an appellate order solely on the ground that no objection was raised during initial proceedings, despite allegations of lack of notice?
  • Does the High Court have a duty to interfere in a revisional order that ignores the equal status of sitting allottees in land distribution?
  • Can an allotment order be sustained if the proceedings before the Deputy Settlement Commissioner were conducted without notice to the affected party?
  Read full judgment →
• Bomanshaw Burjorji Gazdar And Another vs Mst. Mumtaz Begum And Other1985 SCMR 554 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-11
  specific performanceagreement of salelimitationleave to appealcontract performancefinding of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that decreed a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale. The core legal questions were whether the agreement of sale was sufficiently proven and whether the suit for specific performance was barred by limitation. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, upholding the High Court’s decision. It found that the High Court correctly relied on correspondence and the conduct of the parties to establish the existence of the agreement, a finding of fact that was not open to exception. Regarding limitation, the Court affirmed that where no specific date is fixed for the performance of a contract, the limitation period commences only when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. Consequently, the suit was held to be within time, as the refusal occurred upon the petitioners' failure to acknowledge the legal notice served upon them.

  Questions settled

  • When does the period of limitation commence for a suit for specific performance where no date for performance is fixed in the contract?
  • Can a finding of fact based on correspondence and the conduct of parties be challenged in a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Does the failure to acknowledge a legal notice constitute notice of refusal of performance for the purpose of limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• Blunda vs Muhammad Din And Other1985 SCMR 141 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-22
  leave to appealconstitutional petitionsettlement lawslachesrevisional jurisdictionurban settlementdisplaced person
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed a constitutional petition concerning an urban settlement property dispute. The petitioner, a non-claimant displaced person, had been transferred the property in 1959, but this transfer was later ignored, and the property was auctioned. The High Court dismissed the petitioner's constitutional challenge on the grounds of laches and the lack of revisional jurisdiction by the Settlement Commissioner in 1975 due to the repeal of settlement laws. The petitioner contended that the constitutional petition was filed promptly after the Settlement Commissioner's refusal to exercise jurisdiction, thereby negating laches, and argued that the matter constituted a pending case where the Settlement Commissioner retained authority despite the repeal of the relevant laws. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the High Court correctly applied the principles of laches and whether the Settlement Commissioner possessed the requisite jurisdiction to grant relief in a pending case notwithstanding the repeal of settlement laws.

  Questions settled

  • Does a constitutional petition filed shortly after a Settlement Commissioner's refusal to exercise jurisdiction suffer from laches?
  • Does the repeal of settlement laws divest a Settlement Commissioner of the authority to grant relief in a pending case?
  Read full judgment →
• Bibi Jamal And 3 Others vs Member, Board of Revenue II And Other1985 SCMR 2096 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-01
  evacuee propertycompensation poolauction transferconstitutional petitionlachesdiscretionary reliefsettlement laws
  Summary & questions settled

  These four appeals by leave of the Supreme Court arose from a judgment of the Baluchistan High Court dismissing constitutional petitions relating to the disposal of evacuee property under displaced persons laws. The core legal questions involved whether the auction-transfer of evacuee property made in 1960 was a nullity due to pending custodian proceedings at the time of the 1959 acquisition notification, and whether subsequent administrative orders validly protected the auction-purchaser's rights. The Supreme Court held that any initial defect in the 1960 auction transfer was cured by the subsequent acquisition notification issued in 1970, which regularised the transaction in favor of the auction-purchaser, and that the appellants could not acquire rights through orders passed behind the auction-purchaser's back without making him a party. Furthermore, equitable considerations and laches disentitled the appellants from discretionary constitutional relief. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a defect in an auction transfer of evacuee property due to pending custodian proceedings at the time of the 1959 acquisition notification is cured by a subsequent acquisition notification issued in 1970?
  • Can an order affecting property rights be passed behind the back of a valid auction-transferee without making him a party to the proceedings?
  • Do equity and laches bar the grant of a discretionary constitutional writ against a long-standing property transfer?
  Read full judgment →
• Begum Zahoorul Haq And Others vs Ch. Muhammad Younus And Another1985 SCMR 1657 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-03
  evictionpersonal needbona fide requirementrent restrictionleave to appeallandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from eviction proceedings concerning a residential house in Lahore, where the landlord sought ejectment of the tenants on the ground of personal need. The Rent Controller dismissed the application, noting the sufficiency of the landlord's current accommodation, his prior eviction attempts, and his efforts to sell the property with vacant possession. However, the appellate court reversed the dismissal and ordered ejectment, a decision upheld when the High Court summarily dismissed the tenants' constitutional petition. The core legal question addressed was whether the appellate authority failed to properly consider relevant statutory provisions regarding the bona fides of the landlord's personal need. The Supreme Court held that the lower appellate court had indeed evaluated the evidence concerning the landlord's bona fides and need for accommodation, and since the points regarding the proposed sale were not properly urged before the High Court, they could not be entertained. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, granting the appellants four months to vacate the premises.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the appellate court failed to consider the bona fides of the landlord's personal need under the relevant provisions of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance?
  • Can a contention regarding a proposed sale of the disputed premises be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court when it was not urged before the High Court?
  • Whether the landlord established a sufficient and bona fide requirement for the disputed premises under the law?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashirud Din and Others vs The Additional District Judge and Others1985 PLD Supreme Court 220 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-17
  ejectmentrent restrictionpersonal requirementsublettingres judicatafresh cause of actionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from a rent matter where the petitioners, tenants of a shop, sought to challenge the concurrent findings of the lower forums directing their eviction on the grounds of subletting and personal requirement. The core legal question was whether a subsequent ejectment application filed by a landlord is barred under section 14 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, when an earlier ejectment application had been dismissed. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the principle of res judicata embodied in section 14 does not bar a subsequent ejectment application where a fresh cause of action has arisen or where circumstances have substantially changed after the disposal of the previous proceedings, such as an increase in the landlord's family or needs with the passage of time. Furthermore, the court held that fresh grounds, such as subletting not raised in the earlier petition, are not barred. The key principle laid down is that section 14 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, does not preclude subsequent ejectment applications grounded on fresh causes of action or substantially changed circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Does section 14 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 bar a subsequent ejectment application when a fresh cause of action has arisen?
  • Whether the principle of res judicata applies to rent restriction proceedings when circumstances have substantially changed since the previous application?
  • Can a landlord file a second ejectment application on grounds not raised in the earlier dismissed petition?
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• Bashir Ud Din Ahmad vs Muhammad Shakil And Other1985 SCMR 150 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-22
  settlement disputebuilding siteurban agricultural landdeclarationnotificationdisplaced personsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which allowed a Constitution Petition relating to a settlement dispute over land. The core legal question concerns whether land declared as a building site by the Chief Settlement Commissioner under section 2 (3) of the Displaced Persons Land Settlement Act, 1958, could be validly allotted as urban agricultural land prior to the issuance of a subsequent notification, notwithstanding that the statute only required a declaration. The Supreme Court held that the law merely required a declaration by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, and the subsequent issuance of a notification—even if done voluntarily—did not dilute or postpone the legal effect of the earlier valid declaration. Consequently, the subsequent allotment of the land as agricultural land was without lawful authority, and the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed. The key principle established is that where a statute prescribes a 'declaration' for categorizing property, the absence of a statutory requirement for a notification does not render the prior declaration ineffective upon the issuance of such a notification.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land declared as a building site under section 2(3) of the Displaced Persons Land Settlement Act, 1958 can be allotted as agricultural land?
  • Does a subsequent notification regarding a building site dilute the effect of an earlier declaration made by the Chief Settlement Commissioner?
  • Is a notification legally required for a declaration made under section 2(3) of the Displaced Persons Land Settlement Act, 1958 to take effect?
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• Bashir Ahmed vs Mst. Shahzadi Begum1985 SCMR 1335 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-14
  specific performancebreach of contractsale of propertyreadiness and willingnessconcurrent findingscontractual obligationsunilateral cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment affirming a decree for specific performance of a property sale agreement. The core legal question was whether the petitioner (vendor) or the respondent (vendee) breached the contract. The petitioner argued that the respondent failed to pay the balance price and that the contract was cancelled due to the respondent's requests for extensions. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was responsible for the breach, as he failed to obtain necessary tax clearances within the stipulated period. The Court found that the respondent had acted promptly and remained ready and willing to perform. The subsequent change in law regarding tax certificates did not excuse the petitioner's prior failure to perform. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts, noting that the petitioner's claims of oral requests for extensions were unsubstantiated and that he failed to demonstrate bona fides. The principle established is that a party in default of their own contractual obligations cannot unilaterally rescind the contract or blame the other party for non-performance.

  Questions settled

  • Can a vendor unilaterally cancel a contract for the sale of property when they have failed to perform their own obligations within the stipulated time?
  • Does a subsequent change in law regarding tax clearance certificates absolve a vendor of their failure to perform contractual obligations during the period when such certificates were required?
  • Is a party required to pay the balance of the consideration before the execution of the sale deed if the contract does not explicitly mandate it?
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• Bashir Ahmad vs Zahoor Ahmad And Another1985 SCMR 1247 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-26
  urban settlementconstitutional petitioncancellation of transferre-auctionsettlement authoritiesleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which allowed a constitutional petition filed by the respondent challenging an urban settlement proceeding. The core legal question concerns the legality of re-auctioning a transferred property without first properly cancelling and resuming the original transfer in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The Supreme Court held that the initial cancellation of the transfer in favour of the respondent was without lawful authority and that the subsequent attempts by the Settlement Authorities to correct the error and regularise the auction were futile because the property was not available for re-transfer while the earlier transfer remained intact. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that a property cannot be validly re-auctioned without lawful cancellation and resumption of the subsisting earlier transfer, and subsequent administrative corrections cannot retrospectively validate an unlawful auction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a property can be put to re-auction without lawful cancellation and resumption of an earlier transfer?
  • Can subsequent administrative attempts by Settlement Authorities to correct procedural errors retrospectively validate an unlawful auction?
  • Does a property remain available for re-transfer when a prior transfer order in favour of another party is still intact?
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• Bashir Ahmad vs Shafi And Other1985 SCMR 469 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-27
  ex parte ordernullityRent Controllerrestitution of possessionsetting aside ex parte orderexecution of decreeeviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave was directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellant's constitutional petition against the Rent Controller's order. The appellant had obtained an ex parte eviction order against the respondents under Section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. Subsequently, the Rent Controller set aside the ex parte eviction order upon finding that service had not been duly effected and ordered restitution of possession to the respondents. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court were whether a Rent Controller has jurisdiction to recall an ex parte eviction order passed without service, and whether a Rent Controller possesses the power to order restitution of possession. The Supreme Court held that an ex parte eviction order passed without service is a nullity, which the Rent Controller is competent to set aside to revive the eviction application. Furthermore, while executing an ejectment order, the Rent Controller acts in the capacity of a civil court and is competent to deal with questions of restitution of possession.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Rent Controller have jurisdiction to recall and set aside an ex parte eviction order passed without due service of process?
  • Whether an ex parte eviction order passed without service of process constitutes a legal nullity?
  • Does a Rent Controller have the power to order restitution of possession while executing an order of ejectment?
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• Bashir Ahmad vs Sarfraz Arshad1985 SCMR 83 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-21
  leave to appealejectmentpersonal requirementbona fidesrent restrictiontenantlandlord
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Bashir Ahmad against a High Court order dismissing his writ petition in a rent dispute. The respondent-landlords sought the tenant's ejectment from a shop in Okara on the ground of personal requirement. The Rent Controller ordered ejectment, but the appellate court reversed it, holding that the landlords failed to prove their bona fides. The High Court subsequently accepted the landlords' writ petition, relying on section 13(4) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance as providing sufficient safeguard to establish bona fides. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that personal requirement cases are distinguishable from reconstruction cases, as the statutory penalties differ, and therefore positive evidence of bona fides is required for personal need. The core legal question concerns whether the statutory safeguard under section 13(4) alone establishes a landlord's bona fides in personal requirement cases. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider the contentions, suspended the operation of the impugned order, and directed the appeal to be heard on the same record.

  Questions settled

  • Does the statutory safeguard under section 13(4) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 alone establish a landlord's bona fides in a case of personal requirement?
  • Is positive evidence of a landlord's bona fides required in ejectment cases based on personal need as opposed to reconstruction?
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• Bashir Ahmad vs Rent Controller And Other1985 SCMR 540 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-24
  ejectment applicationpersonal bona fide requirementconcurrent findingsre-appraisal of evidenceconstitutional petitiondual nationalityrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that set aside concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge regarding an ejectment application. The landlord, a British national of Pakistani origin, sought the eviction of the tenant from a shop in Rawalpindi, citing personal bona fide requirement. The lower courts had dismissed the application, doubting the landlord's intent to settle in Pakistan given his foreign residency and family status. The High Court, however, allowed the landlord's constitutional petition, reasoning that his foreign nationality and employment did not disqualify him from seeking possession, and that the statutory protection under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, provided sufficient safeguards against misuse. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the High Court correctly re-appraised the evidence and did not rely on conjectures. The Court affirmed that the High Court possesses the authority to interfere with concurrent findings when they are based on an improper reading of evidence, and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquisition of foreign nationality disqualify a landlord from seeking eviction on the grounds of personal bona fide requirement?
  • Can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in rent matters?
  • Does the statutory provision for restoring possession to a tenant if a landlord fails to occupy premises serve as a sufficient safeguard against mala fide ejectment claims?
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• Bashir Ahmad vs Malik Khyzar Hayat And Other1985 SCMR 990 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-09
  civil service promotionad hoc appointmentDepartmental Promotion Committeeregularization of servicejurisdiction of District Judgeservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a civil servant, sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding his promotion to the post of Civil Nazir. The core legal question was whether a promotion made by the Senior Civil Judge without the recommendation of the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) constituted a regular appointment under the Punjab Civil Servants Act 1974. The Supreme Court held that since the appointment was made without DPC consultation, it could not be considered a regular promotion under the prescribed rules. However, the absence of a DPC did not negate the appointing authority's power; rather, it rendered the appointment ad hoc. The Court further affirmed that the District Judge acted within jurisdiction in entertaining the grievance, as Section 21 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act 1974 allows for representation where no formal right of appeal exists. The Court directed that the petitioner continue as an ad hoc employee until a regular appointment is made in accordance with the law, thereby ensuring the appointment process is regularized.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appointment made without the recommendation of a Departmental Promotion Committee constitute a regular promotion under the Punjab Civil Servants Act 1974?
  • What is the legal status of an appointment made by an appointing authority in the absence of a constituted Departmental Promotion Committee?
  • Does a District Judge have the jurisdiction to entertain a grievance against a promotion order made by a Senior Civil Judge when no formal right of appeal exists?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmad vs Government of the Punjab And Other1985 SCMR 333 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-27
  service tribunalcondonation of delayabatement of proceedingscivil servantsenioritycounsel negligenceSupreme Court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a civil servant's appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution against the Punjab Service Tribunal's refusal to condone a four-day delay in filing an appeal under section 8 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974. The appellant's constitutional petition in the High Court had abated automatically upon the establishment of the Service Tribunal, giving him ninety days to file an appeal before the Tribunal. The core legal question concerned whether the Service Tribunal's refusal to condone the minor delay caused by counsel's failure to keep informed warranted interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that statutory abatement is automatic, that the Tribunal possesses exclusive jurisdiction to exercise discretion regarding the condonation of delay, and that gross negligence or ignorance of law on the part of counsel does not automatically furnish a sufficient ground for condonation of delay against the opposing party. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the abatement of a constitutional petition upon the establishment of a service tribunal is automatic or requires a formal court order?
  • Does gross negligence or ignorance of law on the part of a counsel provide a sufficient ground for the condonation of delay in filing an appeal?
  • Is the exercise of discretion by the Service Tribunal in condoning or refusing to condone delay within its exclusive jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmad vs District Judge, Malakand And Other1985 SCMR 533 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-27
  ejectmentpersonal needlandlord and tenanttransfer of propertywrit jurisdictionremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Peshawar High Court dated 30-9-1984, which set aside the appellate order of the District Judge and remanded the ejectment matter for re-examination of the landlord's personal need. The petitioner, a tenant of a shop, faced an ejectment application filed jointly by the original owner and his son, to whom the shop was transferred via a partition deed. While the Rent Controller ordered ejectment on the ground of personal need, the District Judge reversed it, holding the transfer to be a device. The High Court interfered in writ jurisdiction and remanded the matter. The core legal question concerns whether the validity of a property transfer between a father and son impacts the ground of personal need for ejectment, and the effect of the landlord's non-appearance before the Rent Controller. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's interference was justified as the District Judge misdirected himself regarding the relevance of the property transfer, affirming the remand to examine personal need and permitting the examination of the landlord.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the validity of a property transfer from a father to a son is relevant to the ground of personal need for ejectment?
  • Can a father seek ejectment of a tenant on the ground of the personal need of his son without transferring the property to him?
  • Does the non-appearance and failure of the landlord to personally testify before the Rent Controller affect the proof of personal need?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmad vs Ahmad Ul Haq Siddiqui1985 SCMR 1232 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-09-25
  specific performancesale agreementadditional evidenceappellate stagecivil procedureleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind dismissing the petitioner's intra-court appeal and affirming the decree for specific performance of a sale agreement dated 23-12-1972 executed in favour of the respondent concerning a commercial plot. The core legal question revolves around the effect of a subsequent written endorsement dated 9-1-1973 providing for the rescission of the contract upon the return of advance money or, alternatively, the acceptance of the balance consideration, and whether the High Court was justified in refusing an application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to lead additional evidence at the appellate stage. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in refusing additional evidence, as Order XLI Rule 27 does not permit a party to fill up lacunae or patch up weaker parts of its case on appeal. The petition was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether additional evidence can be allowed under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to enable a party to fill up lacunae or patch up a weaker part of its case?
  • Is a party entitled to specific performance of a contract for sale when the vendor fails to establish his willingness and ability to rescind the contract under a subsequent supplementary writing?
  • Whether the refusal of an appellate court to permit additional evidence at the appellate stage warrants interference by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmad vs Additonal Distric Judge Ghjranwala And Other1985 SCMR 955 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-08
  ejectmentrent restrictionbona fide neednon-residential buildinglandlord and tenantleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a tenant, sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing his constitutional petition against an ejectment order. The landlord had sought eviction based on rent default, unauthorized alterations, and personal bona fide need. The Rent Controller ordered eviction based on the bona fide need of the landlords' sons, a finding affirmed by the appellate court and the High Court. The petitioner contended that the premises were used for industrial purposes, thus falling outside the Rent Restriction Ordinance, and challenged the shift in the landlords' stated need from themselves to their sons during evidence. The Supreme Court held that the premises fell within the statutory definition of a non-residential building used for business or trade, confirming the Rent Controller's jurisdiction. Regarding the shift in the stated need, the Court found that the bona fide need of the successors (the sons) was established and caused no prejudice to the petitioner. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the lower courts' decisions.

  Questions settled

  • Does a premises used for business or trade fall within the definition of a non-residential building under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Can a landlord's ejectment application based on personal need be sustained if the evidence establishes the bona fide need of the landlord's successors?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmad Malik vs The State And Another1985 SCMR 684 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-26
  quashment of criminal proceedingsabuse of processcounterblast litigationcriminal proceedingscivil disputeharassment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed an application for the quashment of criminal proceedings. The core legal question was whether criminal proceedings, initiated as a counterblast to a civil suit regarding property inheritance, should be quashed when the parties have demonstrated an intent to resolve their disputes and the complainant has shown no interest in pursuing the criminal case. The Supreme Court observed that the parties were litigating primarily to harass one another and that the criminal case was filed as a retaliatory measure against a pending civil suit. Given that the complainant failed to appear despite notice and the parties expressed a willingness to withdraw their respective litigations, the Court held that continuing the criminal trial would be an exercise in futility. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and ordered the quashment of the criminal proceedings. The judgment reinforces the principle that criminal courts should intervene to prevent the abuse of process where criminal litigation is clearly used as a tool for harassment in civil disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings be quashed when they are initiated as a counterblast to a civil suit for the purpose of harassment?
  • Is the absence of a complainant in appellate proceedings a relevant factor in determining whether to quash criminal proceedings?
  • Does the court have the authority to quash criminal proceedings if continuing them would be an exercise in futility?
  Read full judgment →
• Basara And Others vs Khushi Muhammad And Other1985 SCMR 449 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-23
  evacuee propertystate landconstitutional jurisdictionconveyance deedrehabilitation settlement schemesettlement commissioner
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had accepted a Constitution Petition and declared an order of the Settlement Commissioner to be without lawful authority. The core legal question involved whether certain state land, in respect of which auction-purchasers had paid the price but migrated before conveyance deeds were executed, could be treated as concealed evacuee property and allotted to respondents. The Supreme Court held that the Provincial Government had no jurisdiction to declare property as evacuee and that 'treating' property as evacuee must be done by a competent authority like the Custodian or Rehabilitation Authority before the cut-off date. Furthermore, since the land was continuously recorded in revenue records as State land and never treated as evacuee property prior to 1st January 1957, the High Court erred in interfering with the Settlement Commissioner's finding of fact. The appeal is allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the Settlement Commissioner's order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Provincial Government has the jurisdiction to declare a property as evacuee property?
  • Can land where a purchase price was paid by evacuees without execution of a conveyance deed be classified as hidden evacuee property without being treated as such by a competent authority before 1st January 1957?
  • Whether a finding of fact recorded by a Settlement Commissioner regarding the status of property can be interfered with in the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Barkat Ali vs The State And Another1985 SCMR 556 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-08-08
  acquittalleave to appealinterested witnessescorroborationcriminal appealmotive
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges the acquittal of the respondent, Umra, by the High Court for an offence under Section 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The respondent was originally tried alongside five others; while four co-accused were convicted, the respondent was acquitted by the High Court, which upheld the convictions of the others based on corroboration of interested eye-witness testimony through medical evidence and motive. The petitioner contended that the respondent also possessed a motive that should have served as sufficient corroboration for the eye-witness testimony against him. The Supreme Court examined the record to determine whether there was evidence to support the petitioner's claim regarding the respondent's motive. Upon review, the Court found that the petitioner failed to point to any evidence on the record substantiating the existence of such motive for the respondent. Consequently, the Court held that there was no basis to interfere with the High Court's acquittal of the respondent, as the necessary corroboration was absent. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the conviction of co-accused be maintained when eye-witnesses are interested but corroborated by medical evidence and motive?
  • Is the absence of evidence regarding motive sufficient grounds to uphold an acquittal where corroboration of interested witnesses is required?
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• Ballia And Others vs The State1985 SCMR 854 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-20
  ocular testimonychild witnessrecovery evidenceSection 103 CrPCmitigating circumstancescapital punishmentcriminal appealmotive
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the convictions and sentences of the appellants for the murder of five individuals. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of ocular testimony from alleged chance and child witnesses, the admissibility of recovery evidence where public witnesses were not from the locality, and the sufficiency of motive. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions, ruling that the ocular evidence was credible, consistent, and corroborated by medical reports and recoveries. Regarding the admissibility of recoveries, the Court held that Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which mandates local witnesses for searches, does not strictly apply to recoveries made at the instance of an accused. The primary requirement is the respectability of the witness rather than their locality. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that while the prosecution's case was proven, the age of one appellant, his lack of a leading role, and the absence of a direct motive constituted mitigating circumstances. Consequently, the Court maintained the convictions but commuted the death sentence of the youngest appellant to life imprisonment, dismissing the remaining appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to recoveries made at the instance of an accused?
  • Can the testimony of a child witness be sufficient to sustain a conviction on a capital charge without strong corroboration?
  • Is the evidence of a police officer regarding recoveries admissible if public witnesses are not produced?
  • Does the age of an accused and the lack of a leading role in a crime constitute mitigating circumstances for sentencing?
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• Bakhtawar Shah And Others vs Member, Board of Revenue And Other1985 SCMR 348 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-27
  pre-emptiontenantlesseeBanjar QadeemMartial Law Regulation 115land revenue
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of a pre-emption suit filed by respondent Fazal Wali to pre-empt the sale of agricultural land on the ground of being a tenant. The revenue authorities and the High Court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, holding him to be a self-cultivating lessee entitled to pre-emption under paragraph 25 of Martial Law Regulation 115. Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court to examine whether the portion of the land recorded as Banjar Qadeem was pre-emptible and whether a self-cultivating lessee qualified as a tenant. The Supreme Court held that the appellants could succeed only regarding the portion of land recorded as Banjar Qadeem as the scope of leave was confined thereto, and that a self-cultivating lessee did not qualify as a tenant under the relevant legal framework. The appeal was accordingly allowed in part, reducing the pre-empted area by the Banjar Qadeem portion.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a self-cultivating lessee qualifies as a tenant for the purpose of claiming a right of pre-emption under paragraph 25 of Martial Law Regulation 115?
  • Does the definition of tenant introduced by the Land Reforms (North-West Frontier Province Amendment) Ordinance 1981 operate retrospectively?
  • Whether land recorded as Banjar Qadeem can be pre-empted on the ground of tenancy when not shown to be under the actual cultivation of the tenant?
  Read full judgment →
• Bakhta And Others vs The State1985 SCMR 97 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-12
  bail cancellationsurrender to custodyleave to appealnon-appearancecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the petitioners challenging an order of the High Court, which had cancelled the bail previously granted to them by the Additional Sessions Judge, Jhang, and ordered them to be taken into custody. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a petition for leave to appeal against an order cancelling bail can be entertained or heard when the petitioners have failed to surrender themselves to custody in compliance with the High Court's order. The Supreme Court held that the petition could not be heard because the petitioners had failed to surrender themselves in pursuance of the High Court's order, despite being granted an adjournment on a previous occasion to facilitate their appearance. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that a petitioner seeking relief from the Supreme Court against an order of bail cancellation must first surrender to custody, and the Court will not entertain or adjourn such a petition if the petitioners remain at large and fail to appear before the Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition for leave to appeal against a bail cancellation order be heard if the petitioners have not surrendered to custody?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to grant adjournments when petitioners fail to appear to surrender in a bail matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Bakhsh Elahi vs Qazi Wasif Ali1985 SCMR 291 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-03-11
  summary evictionlandlord and tenantpersonal requirementstatutory interpretationSind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979disqualificationretirement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the interpretation of Section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, specifically regarding the summary eviction of a tenant by a retired landlord. The core legal question was whether a landlord, who is a member of the specified class entitled to summary eviction, can invoke this provision if they were previously in occupation of another building owned by them but subsequently vacated or rented it out, or if they argue such other building is unsuitable. The Supreme Court held that the disqualification under Section 14(2) applies if the landlord is in occupation of another building owned by them at the time the right to summary eviction accrues. The Court ruled that the right is exhausted once the landlord comes into occupation of another building or rents out their own building after the right accrues. Consequently, the landlord cannot revive this right by unilaterally parting with possession of other properties. The principle established is that the summary procedure is a special privilege, and if the landlord occupies another building capable of the same use, the statutory bar applies regardless of claims of unsuitability.

  Questions settled

  • Does the disqualification under Section 14(2) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 apply if a landlord was in occupation of another building owned by them at the time the right to summary eviction accrued?
  • Can a landlord revive the right to summary eviction under Section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 by parting with possession of other buildings after the right has accrued?
  • Is the unsuitability of another building owned by the landlord a valid ground to bypass the statutory disqualification under Section 14(2) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmad vs The State1985 SCMR 584 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-03-14
  leave to appealcondonation of delayocular evidencefalse implicationcorroborationmotive as double-edged weaponself-defence pleamurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a jail petition for leave to appeal filed by the petitioner, who was convicted of murder by the Additional Sessions Judge and sentenced to death, a sentence subsequently reduced to life imprisonment by the Lahore High Court. The petition was time-barred by 159 days. The primary legal issue before the Supreme Court of Pakistan was whether it was safe to sustain the conviction based solely on ocular evidence where the eye-witnesses had falsely implicated at least three co-accused who were acquitted, and where there was no recovery and the medical evidence cast substantial doubt on the prosecution case. The Supreme Court held that where eye-witnesses have falsely implicated innocent persons, their tainted testimony requires sufficient corroboration. The Court observed that motive alone, being a double-edged weapon due to mutual hostility, could not suffice as corroboration, and the rejection of a plea of self-defence did not relieve the prosecution from corroborating tainted ocular testimony. Consequently, the Supreme Court condoned the delay and granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether it is safe to sustain a conviction based solely on the uncorroborated ocular evidence of eye-witnesses who have falsely implicated several innocent co-accused?
  • Can evidence of motive serve as sufficient corroboration for tainted ocular evidence where mutual hostility makes motive a double-edged weapon?
  • Does the falsity or rejection of an accused's plea of self-defence relieve the court from the requirement of seeking independent corroboration for tainted ocular evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Bahadur and ANOTHERs vs The State and ANOTHERs1985 PLD Supreme Court 62 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-10-22
  revisional jurisdictioncancellation of criminal caseSection 173 Cr.P.C.administrative orderjudicial proceedingsMagistrate's powerspolice report
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerned whether a Magistrate, when concurring with a police report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to discharge an accused and cancel a registered criminal case, acts as a "Court" in judicial proceedings, thereby rendering the order subject to the High Court's revisional jurisdiction under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that a Magistrate, in such circumstances, does not function as a criminal Court. The Court reasoned that while the Magistrate must act fairly and honestly, there is no lis (controversy) before them, no duty to hear parties, and no finality or irrevocability attached to the order, as the complainant remains free to institute a private complaint on the same facts. Consequently, the act is administrative rather than judicial, and the order is not amenable to revisional jurisdiction under Sections 435 to 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The impugned High Court order asserting revisional jurisdiction was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Magistrate act as a criminal Court when concurring with a police report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to cancel a criminal case?
  • Is an order by a Magistrate cancelling a criminal case based on a police report subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the cancellation of a criminal case by a Magistrate under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 constitute a final judicial determination that prevents the institution of a private complaint on the same facts?
  Read full judgment →
• Badrul Hassan Wasti And Another vs Shujaatullah And Other1985 SCMR 1309 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-09-23Read full judgment →
• B . K . Shaikh vs The State And Other1985 SCMR 1291 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-09
  attachment of propertyobjection to attachmentjurisdictionproclamation for person abscondingrefusal to exercise jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the attachment of household goods in Karachi pursuant to a warrant issued by a Magistrate in Rawalpindi under sections 87 and 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The appellant, claiming ownership of the attached moveable property, filed an objection application before the District Magistrate South, Karachi, who endorsed the attachment order. Instead of deciding the application, the District Magistrate directed the appellant to approach the Special Judge Central, Karachi, who subsequently dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction. The High Court also dismissed the appellant's revision petition in limine. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the statutory procedure under sections 87 and 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was followed. The Court held that under Section 88(6-B) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, an objection to an attachment of property endorsed by a District Magistrate can be preferred in the Court of such District Magistrate. Consequently, the District Magistrate was under a legal duty to decide the application, and his failure to do so amounted to a refusal to exercise jurisdiction. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to the District Magistrate for decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a District Magistrate who endorses an attachment order has jurisdiction to entertain and decide objections to the attachment under Section 88(6-B) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does a District Magistrate's direction to an objector to seek relief from another court, despite having statutory jurisdiction under Section 88(6-B) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, constitute a refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested by law?
  Read full judgment →
• Azizullah vs Muhammad Ali And Other1985 SCMR 2036 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-05
  criminal appealacquittalocular testimonywitness credibilitySection 164 statementmiscarriage of justicespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an acquittal judgment passed by the High Court, which set aside the convictions of two respondents previously found guilty of murder by the Sessions Judge. The respondents had been convicted under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Hamzo Khan, based on ocular testimony and circumstantial evidence. The High Court acquitted the respondents, reasoning that the prosecution witnesses were unreliable due to certain omissions in their statements recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner challenged this acquittal, arguing that the High Court incorrectly treated every omission in the Section 164 statements as a material contradiction, thereby causing a miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court, noting that the incident occurred in broad daylight and was reported promptly, found that the High Court's approach to evaluating witness testimony warranted further examination. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the case required review to determine if the acquittal disregarded established principles of criminal justice administration.

  Questions settled

  • Does every omission in a statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 necessarily constitute a material contradiction?
  • Under what circumstances may the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against an acquittal judgment passed by the High Court?
  • Is the treatment of all omissions in prior statements as contradictions a valid legal principle for assessing the credibility of prosecution witnesses?
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• Azizul Haq vs Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and Sargodha And Another1985 SCMR 895 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-01-20
  urban settlementauction proceedingsreserve pricewrit jurisdictionproperty disputeremand orderadministrative discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the auction of an urban property initially purchased by the petitioner in 1961. Following the petitioner's application for a price reduction due to the property's dilapidated condition, the property was resumed and subsequently re-auctioned to the respondent at a significantly lower reserve price, which had not been approved by the competent authority. The Settlement Commissioner set aside both auctions, directing a fresh disposal of the property. The High Court, however, interfered with this order, favoring the respondent. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court's interference was unwarranted, as the reduction of the reserve price for the second auction was unauthorized and improper. The Court affirmed that the Settlement Commissioner’s decision to set aside the auction was neither without lawful authority nor improper. Consequently, the Supreme Court restored the Settlement Commissioner's order for a fresh disposal of the property, directing that such re-auction be restricted between the original petitioner and the respondent to ensure fairness and avoid third-party involvement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere in the exercise of discretion by a Settlement Commissioner regarding the cancellation of an auction?
  • Can a property be re-auctioned at a reduced reserve price without the approval of the competent authority?
  • Is a re-auction of property valid if conducted while an appeal regarding the property's resumption is pending?
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• Azizuddin vs Muhammad Ismail And Other1985 SCMR 666 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-09
  evacuee propertycustodian jurisdictionres judicatapartition deedregistrationspecific performanceconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the High Court quashing an order of the Custodian of Evacuee Property which had declared certain agricultural land to be non-evacuee property. The core legal question concerned whether earlier decisions of the High Court operated as res judicata to bar the Custodian from exercising exclusive jurisdiction under section 22 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957 to determine the nature of the property, and whether an unregistered third partition deed relied upon by the appellant was valid. The Supreme Court held that while the Custodian possesses exclusive jurisdiction to determine the nature of property unhindered by findings of civil or settlement authorities, the Custodian's finding in this case was based on legally flawed and factually incorrect assumptions, notably ignoring the compulsory registration requirements under section 17 of the Registration Act 1908. The Court laid down that although settlement authorities cannot conclusively determine property nature, an unregistered partition deed involving immovable property exceeding one hundred rupees is inadmissible to create or extinguish rights without registration, and the Custodian's order was rightly quashed in constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of res judicata bar the Custodian from determining the evacuee or non-evacuee nature of property under section 22 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957 in light of prior High Court decisions?
  • Is an unregistered instrument of partition concerning immovable property compulsorily registrable under section 17 of the Registration Act 1908?
  • Whether settlement authorities or civil courts have the jurisdiction to record a binding determination regarding the evacuee nature of a property.
  • Does an agreement to sell create any right, title, or interest in immovable property under evacuee property laws?
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• Aziz Ur Rehman vs Settlement Commissioner And Other1985 SCMR 1271 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-21
  lacheswrit jurisdictionproperty transfersettlement lawdelay in litigationevacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the dismissal of his writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which had rejected his challenge to a 1960 property transfer on the grounds of laches. The core legal question was whether a petitioner, who had himself initiated the rectification of a property transfer in favour of his father in 1960, could challenge that same transfer twenty-one years later in 1981. The Supreme Court observed that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner's 1960 order explicitly stated the rectification was made upon the petitioner's own representation. Consequently, the petitioner had full knowledge of the transfer at the time it occurred. The Court held that the petitioner could not be permitted to challenge an order after such an extensive delay of twenty-one years. The principle laid down is that a party who has personal knowledge of and has actively participated in the procurement of an administrative order is barred by the doctrine of laches from challenging that order after an inordinate and unexplained delay.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner challenge an administrative order after a delay of twenty-one years when they had prior knowledge of the order?
  • Does the doctrine of laches apply to a writ petition challenging a property transfer order that the petitioner themselves facilitated?
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• Aziz Ahmad vs Secretary to the Government of Pakistan, Finance1985 SCMR 368 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-08
  civil service seniorityservice tribunal jurisdictionlimitation periodcause of actiondepartmental representationstatutory bar
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding seniority disputes. The petitioner, a civil servant, sought to challenge a departmental decision from 1951 regarding his seniority, which had been rejected at the time. After approximately 30 years, the petitioner renewed his representation, which was again rejected by the department in 1982. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal could entertain an appeal against a departmental decision made prior to July 1, 1969, and whether a fresh representation in 1980 could create a new cause of action to bypass statutory limitations. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, holding that the appeal was barred by the proviso to Section 4(1) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The Court established that a fresh representation regarding a long-settled matter does not create a new cause of action to circumvent statutory time bars, and administrative instructions to departments to waive technical objections are not binding on the Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a fresh representation regarding a long-settled departmental decision create a new cause of action?
  • Is the Federal Service Tribunal competent to entertain an appeal against a departmental order passed before 1st July 1969?
  • Are administrative instructions issued by the Establishment Division regarding the waiver of technical objections binding on the Service Tribunal?
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• Aziz Ahmad Rathore vs Province of the Punjab And Other1985 SCMR 142 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-10
  review petitionleave to appeallimitationtime-barredservice mattersterms and conditions of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed by the petitioner against an order of the Supreme Court dated 3-11-79, which refused leave to appeal to the opposite party. The petitioner sought review, claiming grievance regarding specific observations made in the concluding paragraph of that order. The petition was filed with a delay of 308 days, for which the petitioner offered the explanation that the original order was passed in his absence. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had valid grounds for review and whether the delay could be condoned. The Court held that the grievance was misconceived, clarifying that when leave to appeal is refused, the underlying order remains intact, and any observations must be read consistently with that intactness. Furthermore, the Court established that a grievance regarding such directions only arises if the Government takes subsequent actions affecting terms and conditions that are legally impermissible. Consequently, the Court dismissed the review petition on the grounds of being time-barred, affirming that the petitioner's concerns were premature and legally unfounded.

  Questions settled

  • Does the refusal of leave to appeal by the Supreme Court render the underlying order intact?
  • When does a cause of action arise for a petitioner aggrieved by observations made in an order refusing leave to appeal?
  • Can a review petition be entertained when it is filed with a significant delay without sufficient justification?
  Read full judgment →
• Ayub Khan vs Punjab Local Councils Election Authority, Lahore And Other1985 SCMR 642 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-03Read full judgment →
• Awal Gul vs Zawar Khan and arHERss1985 PLD Supreme Court 402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-27
  post-arrest bailabscondencebail cancellationblood feudcriminal procedurefugitive from law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a Peshawar High Court order granting bail to respondents accused of double murder and attempted murder. The core legal question was whether the accused's abscondence disentitled them to the concession of bail. The Supreme Court held that unexplained, noticeable abscondence generally disentitles an accused to bail, as such conduct thwarts investigations and prevents the collection of evidence. The Court emphasized that a fugitive from law loses certain procedural and substantive rights. While the High Court had granted bail based on the nature of the blood feud and lack of specific role attribution, the Supreme Court ruled this was improper given the respondents' abscondence. Consequently, the Court cancelled the bail of four respondents who had absconded for significant periods, while maintaining bail for two others whose abscondence was deemed negligible. The principle laid down is that abscondence is a critical factor in bail adjudication, and an accused cannot seek the reward of bail after evading the law, as custody often provides better protection than remaining at large.

  Questions settled

  • Does unexplained abscondence by an accused person disentitle them to the concession of bail?
  • Can abscondence be treated as a piece of evidence for corroboration of eye-witnesses at trial?
  • Is the fear of retaliation a valid justification for abscondence in bail proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Atta Muhammad vs Chutta And Other1985 SCMR 833 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-12-04
  pending appealjurisdictionKalat Statemerger of statestransfer of casesexecution of decreeright of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a long-standing land dispute initiated in 1925 in the former Kalat State. After a decree was passed in favor of the appellant, execution difficulties arose, leading the Wazir-e-Muarif to dismiss the appellant's suit on April 1, 1953. The appellant filed an appeal against this dismissal before the Ruler/Wazir-e-Azam of Kalat on May 3, 1953, under the Dasturul Amal Diwani of Kalat State. Following the merger of Kalat into West Pakistan, the appellant's efforts to seek a hearing on the merits were repeatedly dismissed by the High Court on the mistaken assumption that no such appeal was pending. The Supreme Court examined the original record and found that the appeal dated May 3, 1953, was indeed filed and remained undisposed of. Under Section 7(5) of the Establishment of West Pakistan Act 1955, pending appeals stood transferred to the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was entitled to at least one statutory appeal on the merits, set aside the High Court's order, and directed the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan to expeditiously dispose of the pending 1953 appeal on its merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal properly filed before the Wazir-e-Azam of the former Kalat State stands transferred to the High Court upon the merger of the State under the Establishment of West Pakistan Act 1955?
  • Can a litigant be deprived of their statutory right of appeal on the merits due to administrative confusion or incorrect factual findings regarding the pendency of the appeal?
  • Does the filing of an incompetent appeal before an unauthorized forum affect the pendency of a validly filed appeal before the competent authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Atta Muhammad And Others vs Mst. Mehtab Bxbi And Another1985 SCMR 144 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-03
  power of attorneysub-registrarattestationpardanashin ladiesfraud and misrepresentationburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding a disputed power-of-attorney. The core legal question was whether a power-of-attorney executed before and duly attested by the Sub-Registrar must be given conclusive effect in all circumstances. The Supreme Court held that the statutory attestation by a Sub-Registrar is rebuttable, and it must be determined from the facts of each case whether such attestation can be implicitly acted upon. The Court found that where Pardanashin ladies reposed trust in their brother for property management through a special power-of-attorney, the brother abused that trust to create a general power-of-attorney for selling the land without their knowledge or consent, rendering the Sub-Registrar's attestation inconclusive. The key principle laid down is that the evidentiary value of a Sub-Registrar's attestation of a power-of-attorney is rebuttable and open to judicial scrutiny based on surrounding circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a power-of-attorney executed before and attested by the Sub-Registrar must be given conclusive effect in all circumstances?
  • Is the attestation of a power-of-attorney by a Sub-Registrar rebuttable under the law?
  • Can a special power-of-attorney executed by Pardanashin ladies for management be converted into a general power-of-attorney to sell land without their knowledge and consent?
  Read full judgment →
• Ata Ullah Khan vs Muhammad Shaft And Other1985 SCMR 478 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-21
  land settlementdisplaced personsagricultural landurban propertyfinding of factwrit petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's writ petition concerning the transfer of land comprising various Khasra numbers situated in village Mian Mir, Lahore. The petitioner had moved an application under section 10/11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, contending that the disputed property was urban land rather than agricultural land. The settlement authorities examined the revenue records and found the property to be agricultural. The High Court declined to interfere with this concurrent finding of fact. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was fully justified in declining to interfere with a finding of fact. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner, having already received an allotment of specific Khasra numbers under Scheme No. VI, could not lay claim to the transfer of other portions of the land upon the assertion that they were urban plots. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in declining to interfere with a concurrent finding of fact recorded by settlement authorities regarding the nature of land?
  • Can a person who has already received an allotment of land under Scheme No. VI lay claim to the transfer of other portions of land upon an assertion that they are urban plots?
  • Whether an application under section 10/11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 can succeed when revenue records establish the land to be agricultural?
  Read full judgment →
• Ata Muhammad And 6 Others vs The State1985 SCMR 181 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-11-11
  murderprevious judgmentrelevancy of judgmentscorroborative piece of evidencefirearm recoveryballistic matchcommutation of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellant's appeal in a murder case. The appellant, Ata Muhammad, was convicted along with another under sections 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for the murder of Salehoon and sentenced to death, which the High Court maintained while acquitting his co-accused. The core legal question was whether a subsidiary finding of fact in a previous judgment involving the same accused—specifically, rejecting the recovery and forensic matching of a gun—acts as a bar or is conclusive in a subsequent criminal trial relating to a different murder. The Supreme Court held that under sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act 1872, previous judgments are generally irrelevant unless their existence is a fact in issue or relevant under other provisions; subsidiary findings of fact in prior judgments are not conclusive and do not bind the court in a subsequent trial, as each case must be decided on its own evidence. However, noting that it could not be proven whose specific shot caused the death, the Court dismissed the appeal regarding the conviction under section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life, while enhancing the fine.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a subsidiary finding of fact recorded in a previous criminal judgment regarding the recovery of a weapon is binding or conclusive in a subsequent trial of the same accused?
  • Are previous judgments and their findings of fact relevant under section 43 of the Evidence Act 1872 to prove the truth of facts decided therein in a separate trial?
  • Can a court in a subsequent criminal case rely on evidence of weapon recovery and forensic matching that was discarded in an earlier trial due to a lack of prosecution evidence?
  • Whether the capital sentence for murder should be commuted to imprisonment for life when it cannot be determined whose specific shot caused the fatal injury among multiple armed assailants?
  Read full judgment →
• Asif Shah vs The State1985 SCMR 850 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-30
  murderdying declarationenhancement of sentencedeath penaltymedical evidencepremeditationocular testimonycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a direct appeal by the convict against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which accepted the complainant's revision and enhanced the appellant's sentence from imprisonment for life to death for the murder of Ghulam Muhammad. The core legal questions involved the reliability of the dying declaration, particularly regarding a thumb-impression instead of a signature, medical opinion on survivability and consciousness, and the presence of premeditation. The Supreme Court held that the dying declaration was authentic and voluntary, that expert medical opinion cannot override positive ocular and circumstantial evidence with mathematical precision, and that the presence of the armed accused at the dead of night near the victim's house established premeditation and malice aforethought. The court affirmed the conviction and the sentence of death, ruling that the normal penalty of death was well-deserved in cases of calculated and cold-blooded murder.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a dying declaration is rendered unreliable merely because it bears a thumb-impression instead of the signature of a literate declarant?
  • Can expert medical testimony regarding the time and onset of unconsciousness override direct ocular and circumstantial evidence?
  • Whether the presence of an armed accused at the dead of night near the victim's house establishes premeditation for the purpose of sentencing?
  • Under what circumstances is the enhancement of a sentence from imprisonment for life to death justified?
  Read full judgment →
• Asian Food Industries Ltd., And Other vs Pakistan And OtherPTCL 1985 (CL.) 483 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-03
  customs tariffliquid glucoseclassificationP.C.T. headingad valorem dutychemical examiner reportestoppel
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants, confectionary manufacturers, challenged a Sind High Court judgment dismissing their constitutional petitions regarding the proper customs tariff classification of imported liquid glucose. The customs authorities had reclassified the imported liquid glucose from Pakistan Customs Tariff (P.C.T.) Heading 17.02-A ('chemically pure glucose' taxed at 25% ad valorem) to Heading 17.02-B ('other' taxed at 62-1/2% ad valorem) based on chemical examiner reports distinguishing commercial glucose from dextrose. The Supreme Court examined the P.C.T. headings, Chapter Notes, Brussels Nomenclature Explanatory Notes, and technical dictionary definitions. The Court held that the imported liquid glucose qualifies under P.C.T. Heading 17.02-A for the lower rate of duty, noting that the departmental reclassification based on shifting expert reports was untenable and that the commodity fell squarely within the scope of the glucose heading. The appeals were accordingly accepted with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether liquid glucose imported in drums is properly classifiable under P.C.T. Heading 17.02-A as chemically pure glucose or under Heading 17.02-B as other sugars?
  • Does a long-standing departmental practice prevent customs authorities from re-evaluating the chemical composition and classification of an imported commodity based on expert reports?
  • Whether commercial glucose composed of dextrose, maltose, and dextrin is synonymous with D-glucose chemically pure under the Pakistan Customs Tariff?
  Read full judgment →
• Asian Food Industries Ltd. And Others vs Pakistan And Other1985 SCMR 1753 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-04
  Pakistan Customs Tariffcustoms dutyclassification of goodsdepartmental practicepromissory estoppelchemically pure glucoseliquid glucose
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from four civil appeals by special leave challenging a Sind High Court judgment that dismissed constitutional petitions filed by confectionery manufacturers. The appellants challenged the reclassification of imported liquid glucose from Pakistan Customs Tariff (P.C.T.) Heading 17.02-A ('chemically pure glucose' at 25% ad valorem) to Heading 17.02-B ('other' at 62.5% ad valorem). The core legal questions were whether a long-standing departmental practice estopped customs authorities from reclassifying the commodity, and whether commercial liquid glucose qualified as 'chemically pure glucose' under Heading 17.02-A. The Supreme Court held that while estoppel does not control a technical expert in bona fide analyzing a chemical, the department's reclassification was legally untenable. The Court analyzed P.C.T. Chapter 17 notes and dictionary definitions, determining that Chapter 17 governs sugar confectionery products rather than pharmaceutical products, and that liquid glucose properly falls under Heading 17.02-A. The Supreme Court accepted all four appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and declared the appellants liable to customs duty under P.C.T. Heading 17.02-A.

  Questions settled

  • Does a change in a chemical examiner's report justify the reclassification of an imported commodity under the Pakistan Customs Tariff?
  • Whether long-standing departmental practice estops customs authorities from reclassifying an imported commodity under a different tariff heading?
  • Does imported commercial liquid glucose qualify as chemically pure glucose under Heading 17.02-A of the Pakistan Customs Tariff?
  Read full judgment →
• Ashiq Hussain vs The State And Other1985 SCMR 2059 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-01-14
  leave to appealacquittalinjured witnessreappraisal of evidencemurdercriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the complainant against a High Court judgment that acquitted five respondents of murder charges. The incident involved a fatal attack on the deceased, Shakuruddin, and injuries to his son, Ashiq Hussain, allegedly committed by neighbors following a minor dispute. The trial court had convicted the respondents under sections 302/149 and 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, relying on the testimony of injured witnesses and medical evidence. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in acquitting the respondents despite the testimony of an injured eyewitness and the lack of prior enmity between the parties. The Supreme Court held that the submissions regarding the credibility of the injured witness and the absence of prior hostility carried sufficient force, particularly concerning the respondent Muhammad Bashir, who was alleged to have inflicted the fatal hatchet blow. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to reappraise the evidence specifically regarding Muhammad Bashir, while dismissing the petition against the other respondents, thereby upholding their acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of an injured eyewitness be considered sufficient for conviction without corroboration when there is no previous enmity between the parties?
  • Is the Supreme Court justified in granting leave to appeal against an acquittal if there is a prima facie case regarding the credibility of an injured witness?
  • Does the absence of prior hostility between neighbors increase the reliability of eyewitness testimony in a murder case?
  Read full judgment →
• Ashiq Ali And Another vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Multan And Other1985 SCMR 576 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-19
  urban settlement casetransfer of propertyconstitutional jurisdictiondiscretionary jurisdictionindivisible propertypossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing an Intra-Court Appeal regarding the transfer of urban property. The property in question was transferred by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner to respondents Nos. 2 and 3, who were found to be in possession through their licensee and were claimants for its transfer. The petitioners challenged the transfer through constitutional jurisdiction, raising contentions regarding the indivisibility of the property without conscious application of mind and the maintainability of the findings of fact concerning possession. The High Court's Single Judge and the Intra-Court Appeal Bench repelled both arguments. The core legal question concerned the propriety of interfering with the discretionary exercise of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner's power to treat the property as indivisible and the factual findings on possession. The Supreme Court held that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner acted within his discretionary jurisdiction in treating the property as indivisible, and the refusal of the High Court to interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction was unexceptionable. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Deputy Settlement Commissioner has the discretionary jurisdiction to treat an urban property as indivisible for transfer?
  • Can the High Court interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction with the discretionary exercise of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner regarding the indivisibility of property?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact with regard to the possession of property maintainable in constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali vs The Province of Punjab And Another1985 SCMR 644 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-10
  Interim orderWrit petitionStay orderPremature petitionTentative observationsFinal determinationHigh Court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged an interim order issued by a Single Judge of the Lahore High Court during the pendency of a writ petition. The interim order, which confirmed a stay in favour of the Forest Department, contained strong observations stating that the petitioner had no right to the land in question, and that the Forest Department was its full owner. The petitioner contended that these observations amounted to a practical acceptance of the writ petition, making further proceedings a mere formality, and thus sought to challenge the interim order. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed, holding that the writ petition was still pending and the observations, despite their strong language, were of a tentative nature and did not constitute a final determination of the case. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition as premature, affirming that the High Court still had to finally decide the matter.

  Questions settled

  • Can strong observations made in an interim order be challenged before the final decision of the main case?
  • Do observations in an interim order, however strongly worded, constitute a final determination of the case?
  • Is a petition challenging an interim order premature if the main writ petition is still pending?
  Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali And Others vs Abdul Ghaffar Abdul Rehan1985 SCMR 1300 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-06
  rent restrictionevictionbona fide requirementreconstructioncommercial tenancyleave to appealjudicial conflict
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that reversed an eviction order granted by a Rent Controller. The Rent Controller had allowed the landlords' application for eviction on the grounds of bona fide requirement for reconstruction. However, the High Court overturned this decision, reasoning that because the tenant occupied a shop in a commercial building, and the proposed reconstruction was for residential purposes, the tenant was ineligible for the protections afforded under the relevant rent control legislation. The petitioners challenged this interpretation, arguing it conflicted with established Supreme Court precedents regarding the rights of tenants during reconstruction. The Supreme Court, noting a divergence in its own previous rulings on the interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions, determined that the issue was of significant general legal importance affecting numerous cases. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to resolve the conflict in judicial opinion. Given the complexity and the need for an authoritative ruling, the Court directed that the appeal be heard by a larger Bench of at least five judges.

  Questions settled

  • Does the conversion of a commercial building to a residential building during reconstruction affect a tenant's rights under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Is a tenant of a shop in a commercial building entitled to protection under Section 13(5B) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 when the landlord seeks eviction for reconstruction?
  Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali Alias Bhola And Another vs The State1985 SCMR 1040 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-10
  criminal appealmurder convictiondeath sentenceocular testimonysentence mitigationleave to appealtrivial motive
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against the conviction and sentence of the petitioners for murder and causing injury. The petitioners were convicted under Sections 302/34 and 324/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased and causing injury to his brother following a dispute over a small service charge. The High Court had previously dismissed their appeals and confirmed the death sentences. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the conviction was sustainable based on the ocular testimony and whether the sentence of death was appropriate given the circumstances of the incident. The Court held that the lower courts correctly appreciated the evidence regarding the guilt of the petitioners, finding no grounds to interfere with the conviction. However, noting that the underlying dispute involved a trivial amount of money and followed an exchange of abuses, the Court granted leave to appeal specifically to consider the appropriateness of the death sentence. The principle established is that while ocular testimony may sufficiently prove guilt, the proportionality of a death sentence may be reviewed when the motive involves a trivial dispute.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal solely to consider the appropriateness of a sentence while upholding a conviction?
  • Does a trivial motive for a crime provide grounds for reviewing the imposition of a death sentence?
  • Is ocular testimony corroborated by medical evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder?
  Read full judgment →
• Arshad Umar and ANOTHERs vs Begum Nazrul Askari1985 PLD Supreme Court 38 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-09-24
  bona fide personal requirementejectmentrent controllerlandlord and tenantcross-examinationburden of proofcivil petition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arises out of a common judgment of the High Court of Sind which set aside the dismissal of rent applications filed by the respondent-landlady for the ejectment of her tenants on the ground of bona fide personal use and occupation. The core legal question was whether the failure of the landlady and her married son to personally appear in the witness-box and subject themselves to cross-examination is fatal to a claim of bona fide personal requirement. The Supreme Court held that the omission of the landlord or the beneficiary child to personally appear and depose is not fatal to the case, provided sufficient evidence is otherwise brought on record to satisfy the Rent Controller. The Court affirmed that the relevant statute prescribes no specific limitations or mandatory nature of evidence required to prove good faith, and the satisfaction of the Rent Controller is to be based on the overall material placed before him by the parties. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of a landlord to personally appear in the witness-box is fatal to a claim of bona fide personal requirement?
  • Does section 15(2) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 prescribe any specific nature of evidence required to prove good faith?
  • Can the satisfaction of the Rent Controller regarding personal requirement be established through the testimony of an attorney or family member?
  Read full judgment →
• Arshad Mahmood vs The State1985 SCMR 561 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-09
  criminal appealappraisal of evidenceillegal gratificationreduction of sentenceleave to appealcorruption
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, whereby the petitioner's conviction under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code was maintained, but his sentence was altered. The core legal question raised was whether an appellate court is legally obliged to appraise the evidence afresh under section 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 even when the counsel does not challenge the conviction, and whether the High Court failed to peruse the record before disposing of the appeal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had indeed perused the evidence, as evidenced by its explicit observation that ample evidence connected the appellant to the crime, and dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that an appellate court satisfies its duty to examine the record when it records its assessment that ample evidence supports the conviction, even if the appellant's counsel chooses not to orally challenge the conviction on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appellate court obliged to appraise the evidence afresh under section 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the counsel does not challenge the conviction?
  • Whether an appellate judgment is illegal if passed without perusing the record or examining the evidence?
  • Can a sentence of rigorous imprisonment be altered on the ground of a protracted trial and small amount of illegal gratification?
  Read full judgment →
• Arbab Ali vs Khamiso And Other1985 SCMR 195 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-09-02
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationfurther inquirymurderous assaultmedical evidencesupreme court practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Sind High Court granting bail to respondents in a case involving a murderous assault under section 307 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court correctly evaluated the medical evidence and properly applied the provisions regarding further inquiry under the Code of Criminal Procedure when granting bail. The Supreme Court found that the High Court was under a misapprehension regarding the nature and location of the injuries, notably overlooking a substantial incised wound on the parietal region of the scalp which attracted penal provisions carrying a prohibitory clause. The Court held that bail under the provision for further inquiry requires a definite conclusion that there are no reasonable grounds for believing the accused committed a non-bailable offence. Ultimately, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal while clarifying the legal requirements for bail based on further inquiry and suggesting the petitioner move the High Court for bail cancellation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be allowed on the ground of further inquiry without a definite conclusion that there are no reasonable grounds for believing the accused committed a non-bailable offence?
  • Does a mistake in appreciating the nature and location of injuries by the High Court warrant interference or a remedy for bail cancellation?
  • What are the prerequisites for granting bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure when an offence falls within the prohibitory clause?
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• Anwar And Others vs The State1985 SCMR 1123 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-06
  sudden fightculpable homicidemurderheat of passioncommon intentionprivate defencewater disputesentence reduction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan examines the nature of the offence committed in a double murder case arising from a sudden dispute over the turn of canal water (Warabandi). The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in convicting the appellants under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, given the evidence of a sudden fight in the heat of passion without premeditation. The Supreme Court held that the parties engaged in a sudden mutual fight upon a sudden quarrel where both sides were armed and sustained injuries, and the prosecution witnesses had minimized their role. Consequently, the Court held that the case fell within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The key legal principle laid down is that where a homicide is committed during a sudden fight without premeditation in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, and the accused do not act in a cruel manner or take undue advantage, the conviction is properly altered from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a fight arising suddenly over a water dispute without premeditation attracts Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 be altered to Section 304 Part I when injuries were inflicted from both sides during a close fight?
  • Whether the absence of premeditation and the presence of a sudden quarrel negate the finding of premeditated murder?
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• Anjuman Intizamia, Jamia Masjid Kalan Through Haji Noor Ahmad Its1985 SCMR 1203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-03
  compromisesettlementdisposal of appealscivil litigationappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the form of appeals involving the Anjuman Intizamia, Jamia Masjid Kalan. The core legal question presented to the Court was whether the pending appeals could be resolved through a mutual compromise reached between the contesting parties. Upon review, the Court examined the terms of the compromise agreement, which was duly signed by the respective counsel and other relevant parties. Finding the terms of the settlement to be reasonable and acceptable, the Court exercised its discretion to dispose of the appeals in accordance with the terms of the compromise. The Court held that the litigation should be concluded based on the agreement reached by the parties, thereby settling the dispute without further adjudication on the merits. No order as to costs was issued. The principle laid down is that the Supreme Court may dispose of appeals in terms of a reasonable compromise agreement voluntarily entered into and signed by the contesting parties.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court dispose of appeals in terms of a compromise agreement signed by the contesting parties?
  • Is a compromise agreement signed by counsel and parties a valid basis for the disposal of pending appeals?
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• Amjad Parvez vs Province of the Punjab And Other1985 SCMR 1018 (2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-23
  medical college admissionNational Cadet Corpsstatutory concessionprospectusdivision adjustmentequityadditional seats
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute regarding admission to medical colleges in Punjab against reserved seats for the Dera Ghazi Khan district. The appellant, a Second Division F.Sc. candidate, was denied admission despite obtaining an aggregate score of 617 marks after adding 20 statutory marks for completing National Cadet Corps (NCC) training under the National Guards Act 1973. The selection authorities, relying on the college prospectus, argued that the addition of NCC marks could not alter a candidate's division to allow them to compete with First Divisioners. The Supreme Court resolved a conflict of decisions between the Lahore and Sind High Courts, holding that a college prospectus lacks statutory force and cannot override or whittle down the clear statutory concessions granted under Section 29(c) of the National Guards Act 1973. Consequently, adjusted marks must be treated as entitling a candidate to compete in the higher division. However, on equitable grounds, the Court declined to dislodge already admitted students and directed the creation of additional seats to be offered to higher-merit candidates first, with the appellant as a beneficiary in case of forfeiture.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of a medical college prospectus can override or limit the statutory concessions granted under the National Guards Act 1973?
  • Does the addition of twenty marks for National Cadet Corps training under the National Guards Act 1973 allow a Second Division candidate to compete alongside First Division candidates if their adjusted score reaches the First Division threshold?
  • Can a court direct the creation of additional academic seats as an equitable remedy for a candidate wrongfully deprived of admission due to an incorrect interpretation of rules?
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• Amir Zaman vs Mahboob And Other1985 SCMR 685 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-12-02
  appeal against acquittalreappraisal of evidenceocular testimonymedical evidencescorchinginterested witnesschance witnessdefence versionbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal was filed by the complainant against the judgment of the Lahore High Court acquitting two respondents of murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal for the reappraisal of evidence regarding the respondents. The prosecution asserted that the respondents shot the deceased from a distance of about 100 feet following a motive rooted in prior civil litigation testimony. Upon reviewing the record, the Supreme Court concurred with the High Court's findings that the eye-witnesses were interested or chance witnesses whose accounts contained material improvements and clear suppressions. Crucially, the medical evidence contradicted the ocular testimony, as autopsy revealed three firearm entry wounds with scorching, indicating close-range shots rather than two long-distance shots. Furthermore, injuries sustained by the accused party and women on their side supported the defence plea of a mutual fight rather than unprovoked aggression. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt and dismissed the appeal, upholding the acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether conflict between medical evidence indicating close-range firing and ocular testimony claiming long-distance shots justifies an acquittal?
  • Whether the suppression of injuries sustained by the accused party undermines the credibility of prosecution eye-witnesses?
  • Can an order of acquittal be set aside when the eye-witnesses are related, make material improvements, and contradict medical findings?
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• Amir Khan vs Mst. Gohran And Another1985 SCMR 1847 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-24
  bailconspiracy to murderdiscretionary ordercriminal appealproviso to Section 497post-arrest bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed against an order of the Lahore High Court, which granted bail to a respondent accused of conspiring with others to murder her husband. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court’s exercise of discretion in granting bail, specifically invoking the proviso to Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, was legally flawed or perverse. The Supreme Court, upon review, determined that the High Court’s order was neither illegal nor perverse. The Court held that the grant of bail was a discretionary exercise by the High Court, and in the absence of compelling reasons to suggest the order was improper, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the decision. Consequently, the bail granted to the respondent was maintained. The judgment reinforces the principle that the Supreme Court will generally refrain from interfering with a discretionary bail order passed by a High Court unless such an order is demonstrated to be legally unsustainable or perverse, particularly when the accused's circumstances align with the statutory provisions for bail.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Supreme Court empowered to interfere with a discretionary bail order passed by the High Court if the order is neither illegal nor perverse?
  • Does the proviso to Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to cases involving conspiracy to murder?
  • Can a bail order be challenged in the Supreme Court solely on the basis of the sufficiency of evidence regarding conspiracy?
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• Amir Bakhsh And Others vs Sanwal Khan And Another1985 SCMR 2010 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-06-24
  specific performanceagreement to sellsubsequent purchaserprior noticenovation of contractleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a dispute over agricultural land measuring approximately 72 acres, concerning rival agreements to sell executed by the owner in favour of the first purchaser and subsequent purchasers (petitioners). The first purchaser filed a suit for specific performance of contract, which was decreed by the trial Court after finding that the subsequent purchasers had prior notice of the earlier transaction. The High Court dismissed the subsequent purchasers' first appeal. Upon a petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that the lower courts misread the evidence regarding their knowledge at the time of the initial agreement and erred in holding that the first agreement was superseded by a novation. The Supreme Court held that prima facie there was no clear admission in the testimony of the witness establishing the petitioners' knowledge at the relevant time, and that important questions regarding notice and novation required consideration. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal while recording an undertaking from the respondent not to alienate or encumber the land pending the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether subsequent purchasers had notice of a prior agreement to sell at the time of entering into their own agreement?
  • Whether a subsequent agreement can operate as a novation superseding an earlier agreement to sell?
  • Whether the concurrent findings of lower courts regarding the knowledge of a prior transaction are sustainable on the evidence on record?
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• Amir And Others vs Mahlla1985 SCMR 1487 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-04-23
  concurrent findings of factpossession of propertyleave to appealrevision petitionownership disputecivil litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed a revision petition against an appellate judgment of the Additional District Judge, Sargodha. The lower appellate court had affirmed a trial court decree ordering the petitioners to surrender possession of certain Kothas (structures) to the respondent. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the concurrent findings of fact regarding the respondent's ownership of the land upon which the Kothas were constructed, and the subsequent entitlement to possession, warranted interference by the apex court. The Supreme Court held that the respondent had successfully established ownership of the land, and the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below were sound. Finding no legal error or sufficient grounds to disturb these factual determinations, the Court dismissed the petition. The judgment reaffirms the principle that the Supreme Court will generally decline to interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts unless a compelling legal ground or misappreciation of evidence is demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding land ownership in a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Is a landowner entitled to the possession of structures built upon their land when ownership is established?
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• Amir And Another vs Sardar Ahmad1985 SCMR 1223(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-16
  civil revisionpossession suitclosure of defencefailure to produce evidencepetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against a judgment of the High Court dismissing the petitioners' civil revision. The respondent had filed a suit for possession of a piece of land on the ground of encroachment. During the trial, the defendants failed to produce their evidence on the designated date, whereupon their defence was closed by the trial court under Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and the suit was decreed in favor of the plaintiff. The petitioners' subsequent appeal before the District Judge and civil revision before the High Court were both dismissed. The Supreme Court considered the record and heard the petitioners' counsel, finding no flaw in the impugned judgment. The Court held that the High Court was fully justified in dismissing the civil revision where the defendants failed to adduce evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal as being without merit, affirming the principle that failure to produce evidence warrants the closure of defence under the applicable procedural rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court is justified in closing the defence of defendants who fail to produce evidence on the fixed date?
  • Can a civil revision be maintained against concurrent findings of lower courts where no legal flaw is shown in the impugned judgment?
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