Pakistan Case LawLatest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.
- Mst. Roshi and Others vs Mst. Fateh and Other1982 SCMR 542 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the inheritance of one Sada, who died in 1928. The core legal question was whether the deceased was a Sunni or a Shia, which determined the distribution of his estate between his widow and collaterals. The trial court and the first appellate court concurrently held that the deceased was a Sunni. The petitioners challenged the appellate court's judgment in the Lahore High Court, arguing that the appellate judgment failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Order XLI, Rule 31, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, by not elaborately discussing the evidence. The Supreme Court held that while the appellate judgment was not ideal, it constituted substantial compliance with the law. The Court affirmed that non-compliance with the strict provisions of Order XLI, Rule 31 does not automatically vitiate a judgment if there is substantial compliance, particularly when the matter involves a question of fact rather than a complex point of law. Consequently, the concurrent findings of fact were upheld, and the petition was dismissed.
Questions settled- Does non-compliance with the strict provisions of Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 automatically render an appellate judgment a nullity?
- What constitutes substantial compliance with the requirements of Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Can a finding of fact be interfered with in a second appeal if the appellate court has substantially complied with procedural requirements?
- Mst. Riaz Begum vs Khawaja Hayatullah an Another1982 PLD Supreme Court 339 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a long-standing property dispute over an evacuee bungalow in Rawalpindi, involving two claimants, Mst. Riaz Begum and Khawaja Hayatullah, who had been in possession of separate portions of the property since 1950. The core legal question was the proper interpretation of the Chief Settlement Commissioner's order dated 16-8-1961, which directed the transfer of the bungalow 'according to their possession' following a spot inspection. The Supreme Court held that the bungalow was divisible and that the Chief Settlement Commissioner's order intended for the property to be split into two equal portions. The Court affirmed that each party was entitled to retain the portion transferred to them by the final authority in the settlement hierarchy, including their respective halves of the courtyard, outhouses, and garage. The Court further directed that the central gallery, used by both parties, should be divided lengthwise into two equal halves in the event of the building's demolition, thereby resolving the dispute regarding the allocation of the property.
Questions settled- Does the Chief Settlement Commissioner's order to transfer property 'according to possession' imply a division of the property into two equal portions when the property is structurally divisible?
- How should common areas such as a central gallery be divided when a property is split between two claimants based on their respective possession?
- Mst. Razia Begum vs Jahangir and Other1982 PLD Supreme Court 302 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave was filed by the complainant challenging the High Court's judgment reducing the death sentence awarded to respondent Jahangir under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, to imprisonment for life. The trial court had convicted the respondent for stabbing the deceased to death due to his refusal to refrain from testifying against him in a pending criminal case. The High Court had reduced the sentence on the premise that the immediate cause of the attack remained shrouded in mystery. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court misread the evidence, as eye-witness testimony showed the attack was unprovoked and directly stemmed from the prior motive. However, because the respondent had already served out his sentence of life imprisonment, the Supreme Court, relying on established precedent, declined to reimpose the death sentence to prevent double punishment. Instead, the Court enhanced the sentence by imposing a fine of Rs. 25,000 to be paid as compensation to the legal heirs under Section 544-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, allowing the appeal in part.
Questions settled- Whether the Supreme Court will reimpose a death sentence where a life sentence awarded by the High Court has already been served out by the convict?
- Whether a failure to prove an immediate cause triggers a mitigation of sentence when the origin of the attack and prior motive are established by ocular evidence?
- Can a court enhance a sentence by imposing a fine as compensation under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in lieu of reimposing a death penalty?
- Mst. Nawab Bibi Etc. vs Saifur Rehman1982 SCMR 242(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter originated as a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside an ejectment order passed by a Rent Controller. The petitioners, successors-in-interest of the property owner, sought the ejectment of the respondent, Muhammad Din, and other occupants on grounds of rent default and unauthorized subletting. While the Rent Controller initially ordered ejectment, the High Court reversed this decision, finding that service of notice upon the statutory tenant, Muhammad Din, was not proven and that the other occupants could not be treated as sub-tenants given the specific claims raised. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the High Court's findings were based entirely on factual determinations regarding the service of notice and the status of the occupants. The Supreme Court held that it does not interfere with findings of fact in such proceedings. Consequently, the petition for special leave to appeal was refused, and the petition was dismissed, reaffirming the principle that the Supreme Court will not re-examine factual findings made by lower courts.
Questions settled- Does the Supreme Court interfere with findings of fact made by the High Court in rent ejectment cases?
- Can an ejectment proceeding continue if the service of notice on the statutory tenant is not proven?
- Mst. Nawab Bibi Etc. vs Saifur Rehman Etc.S1982 SCMR 365 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil petition for special leave to appeal arises from an ejectment order passed against the respondents, who contested the proceedings alleging occupation in their own right rather than as sub-tenants of the original statutory tenant, Muhammad Din. The Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge ruled in favour of the petitioners ordering ejectment, but the Lahore High Court accepted a second appeal and set aside the ejectment based on findings regarding lack of proved service of notice on the primary tenant and the nature of the other respondents' occupancy. The core legal question concerned whether interference was warranted in concurrent or factual findings regarding service of notice and tenancy status. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that questions pertaining to the realm of fact, such as the service of notice and the existence of sub-tenancy, do not warrant interference by the apex court. The petition for special leave to appeal was accordingly refused and dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether the Supreme Court will interfere in findings of fact relating to the service of notice on a statutory tenant?
- Can a person claiming occupation in their own right be proceeded against as a sub-tenant without proof of subletting?
- Does a finding regarding the sufficiency of service of notice on a tenant raise a question of law warranting leave to appeal?
- Mst. Nasreen Rashid vs Mst. Asghari Begum Qureshi and Other1982 PLD Supreme Court 453 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises out of concurrent orders of ejectment passed against the petitioner-tenant by the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge, which were affirmed by the Lahore High Court. The ejectment was sought and granted on the ground of "nuisance" under section 13(2)(iv) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, based on allegations that the tenant kept vicious dogs, indulged in political activities, and engaged in clashes, abuse, and manhandling of the landlady and her husband, who resided in the other portion of the same bungalow. The core legal question was whether the statutory expression "nuisance to the occupants of buildings in the neighbourhood" is restricted to public nuisance affecting multiple external buildings, or whether it includes conduct affecting the occupants of a single building or a co-tenant/landlord residing in another part of the same premises. The Supreme Court held that under section 13(2)(iv) read with section 12(2) of the General Clauses Act, the plural "buildings" includes the singular, thereby covering occupants of a single building or an adjacent portion of the same building. The Court laid down that keeping ferocious dogs and resorting to acts of violence, abuse, and misbehaviour against a landlord residing in the same house constitute actionable nuisance warranting ejectment under the Rent Ordinance.
Questions settled- Whether the expression 'buildings in the neighbourhood' under section 13(2)(iv) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 includes the occupants of a single building or portion of the same building?
- Do acts of physical violence, abuse, and keeping ferocious dogs by a tenant against a landlord residing in another portion of the same house constitute 'nuisance' under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
- Does the plural word 'buildings' in a statutory provision encompass the singular under the General Clauses Act?
- Mst. Mussarrat Bashirul Hassan vs Muhammad Salim and 2 Other1982 SCMR 335 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a contempt of court application filed by Mst. Mussarrat Bashirul Hassan against three respondents for failing to vacate rented premises in accordance with an undertaking given before the Supreme Court after the dismissal of their appeal against eviction. The core legal question concerns whether the respondents committed contempt of court by breaching their solemn undertaking to vacate the entire leased premises by a specified date. The Supreme Court held that since the respondents ultimately handed over the possession of the entire ground floor during the proceedings and an inventory of the premises was jointly prepared, no further contempt proceedings were warranted. The Court disposed of the contempt application while noting that the landlady could pursue her claims for arrears of rent and property damages before the appropriate forum based on the signed inventory. The key principle laid down is that contempt proceedings arising from a breached undertaking to vacate premises may be dropped if the undertaking is eventually complied with and possession is restored, leaving financial claims to appropriate forums.
Questions settled- Whether contempt proceedings can be disposed of if the respondent complies with the undertaking to vacate the premises during the course of the proceedings?
- How should a dispute regarding the condition of vacated premises and arrears of rent be addressed when a contempt application is disposed of?
- Mst. Maqbool Bibi vs Ibrahim and Other1982 SCMR 78 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-09-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a civil dispute concerning the sanctioning of a warabandi and an irrigation outlet. The petitioner challenged the orders of the canal authorities through a declaratory suit, which was dismissed by the trial court, and subsequent appeals and a civil revision before the High Court were likewise dismissed on grounds including limitation and the raising of new points. The core legal questions involve the validity of the Divisional Canal Officer's order restoring a previous warabandi and sanctioning an outlet, and whether the suit was barred by limitation. The Supreme Court held that the matter of sanctioning the outlet and warabandi fell within the competence of the canal authorities and that the challenge to the earlier warabandi was barred by limitation. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the lower courts' concurrent findings and decisions.
Questions settled- Whether a suit challenging a historical warabandi is barred by limitation?
- Does the Divisional Canal Officer have the competence to restore a previous warabandi and sanction an outlet?
- Can a new point challenging an earlier warabandi be allowed to be raised for the first time in revision?
- Mst. Mahmuda Tehsin vs The Settlement Commissioner And Another1982 SCMR 798 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a property dispute concerning a plot of land on Mission Road, Lahore, which had been the subject of competing claims between the petitioner, an occupant, and the second respondent, an auction purchaser. Following previous litigation, the Supreme Court had directed that the petitioner’s entitlement to the land be limited to the specific portion in her actual possession. Subsequently, the Settlement Commissioner allowed the second respondent to be impleaded in the proceedings before the Deputy Settlement Commissioner to determine the remaining land rights. The petitioner challenged this decision through a writ petition and a Letters Patent Appeal, both of which were dismissed. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Commissioner acted illegally or perversely in allowing the auction purchaser to be impleaded as a party. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner exercised valid discretion, as the auction purchaser had a legitimate interest in the remaining portion of the plot. The Court affirmed that the High Court correctly declined to interfere with this administrative discretion under its limited constitutional jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Whether an auction purchaser is a necessary or proper party in proceedings to determine the entitlement of an occupant to a portion of the auctioned land?
- Does the Settlement Commissioner have the discretion to allow an auction purchaser to be impleaded in proceedings concerning the transfer of land?
- Can the High Court interfere with the exercise of discretion by a Settlement Commissioner in its constitutional jurisdiction when the decision is not illegal or perverse?
- Mst. Khurshid Begum Etc. vs MR. Ghulam Kubra Etc.S1982 SCMR 90 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners, landlords who had obtained a final ejectment order against respondent No. 3, sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that stayed execution proceedings pending the adjudication of an objection petition filed jointly by the judgment-debtor and other respondents under Order XXI, rules 97 and 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The core legal question was whether an executing court has the power to entertain and adjudicate an objection petition filed by third parties claiming an independent title or interest in the property before their actual physical dispossession. The Supreme Court held that while an executing court possesses the inherent jurisdiction to examine an objection petition from a genuine third party claiming in their own right prior to dispossession, an objection petition filed in collusion with the judgment-debtor to re-litigate matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Rent Controller is incompetent and mala fide. The Court laid down the principle that execution proceedings cannot be hijacked by the judgment-debtor or allied objectors acting on his behalf to subvert a final eviction order.
Questions settled- Whether an executing court can entertain an objection petition regarding immovable property before the actual physical dispossession of the objector?
- Can a judgment-debtor join other family members in an objection petition during execution to re-litigate issues that fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Rent Controller?
- Does an executing court possess inherent jurisdiction to determine whether a person claiming independent title is liable to be evicted under a decree passed against another?
- Mst. Jaleesa Begum vs Iqbal Ahmad Qureshi1982 PLD Supreme Court 396 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal addressed whether, following the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act by the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repealing) Ordinance, 1974, a landlord was still required to serve a notice under Section 30 of the repealed Act to a tenant before initiating ejectment proceedings. The High Court had previously held that such notice remained a mandatory requirement, viewing it as a vested right under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the ejectment order. The Court held that the protection afforded to tenants under the repealed Act vanished upon its repeal. Relying on the principle that a mere right to take advantage of an enactment without any action taken to avail oneself of it does not constitute a 'right accrued,' the Court determined that the statutory obligation to serve notice did not survive the repeal. Consequently, the landlord was not required to serve such notice for ejectment applications filed after the repeal of the Act.
Questions settled- Does the requirement of notice under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act survive the repeal of that Act?
- Is the right to receive notice under a repealed statute considered a 'right accrued' under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act?
- Can a tenant claim protection under a repealed statute if no action was taken to avail that protection prior to the repeal?
- Mst. Iqbal Begum Umar Din vs The Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation1982 SCMR 686 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-08Read full judgment →
- Mst. Hakan and Another vs Jamun and Other1982 SCMR 192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal concerns a dispute over inheritance rights between the daughters of a deceased landowner and his collaterals. The central legal question was whether the suit property was ancestral or non-ancestral, a determination critical to establishing the applicable Customary Law and the burden of proof regarding the exclusion of daughters from inheritance. The trial court and the first appellate court concurrently held the property to be non-ancestral, favoring the daughters. However, the High Court set aside these findings, relying on entries in the Riwaj-i-Am without explicitly determining the nature of the property or addressing the specific issues contested before the lower appellate court. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by failing to decide the fundamental issue of the property's character, which governs the applicable custom and burden of proof. Furthermore, the High Court improperly adjudicated issues not raised before the District Judge. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the matter for a fresh decision, emphasizing that material questions of fact must be resolved to determine the correct legal position.
Questions settled- Does the character of property as ancestral or non-ancestral determine the burden of proof regarding the exclusion of daughters from inheritance under Customary Law?
- Can a High Court in second appeal decide issues that were not contested before the first appellate court?
- Is a Riwaj-i-Am conclusive proof of custom without supporting instances?
- Mst. Fahmeeda Kausar vs The Settlement Commissioner and 2 Other1982 SCMR 137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a long-standing property dispute regarding the demarcation of two properties, No. 18 and No. 18/A, transferred to the respective parties under settlement laws. Following previous litigation, the Settlement Commissioner was tasked with demarcating the properties based on the Taxation record. Upon finding the Taxation record insufficient to define the specific boundaries, the Commissioner utilized historical documents, including a 1937 partition deed and mutation records, to identify the properties and prepare a site plan. The petitioner challenged this demarcation, arguing that the Commissioner exceeded his scope and disregarded her actual possession. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner acted within his authority by relying on historical records when the primary Taxation record proved ambiguous. The Court further held that questions regarding actual possession are factual in nature and that the Settlement Authority's findings, having been upheld by the High Court, do not warrant interference by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the demarcation as determined by the Settlement Commissioner.
Questions settled- Can a Settlement Commissioner rely on historical documents like partition deeds and mutation records when the Taxation record is insufficient for property demarcation?
- Is the Supreme Court bound to re-examine factual findings regarding actual possession of property that have been determined by Settlement Authorities and upheld by the High Court?
- Does a Settlement Commissioner exceed the scope of a demarcation inquiry by utilizing additional historical records to clarify ambiguous Taxation entries?
- Mst. Bhago and Others vs Masitay Khan Etc.S1982 SCMR 275 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns the restoration of land allotments to displaced persons following the reversal of confiscation orders. The appellants, Mst. Bhago and Habib, were original allottees of land in lieu of property abandoned in India. Their allotment was initially confiscated under Martial Law Regulation No. 49. Following the cessation of these proceedings, the appellants sought restoration of their land. The Chief Settlement Commissioner directed a re-examination of inheritance mutations. Subsequently, a delegate Settlement Commissioner ordered the restoration of the land to the appellants, necessitating the cancellation of subsequent allotments made to the respondents. The High Court set aside this order, ruling that the Settlement Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to review the Chief Settlement Commissioner's prior directive. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Settlement Commissioner’s order did not constitute an improper review but rather a lawful implementation of the restoration of rights following the lifting of the confiscation order. The Court affirmed that the original allotment remained valid upon the removal of the confiscation, and the Settlement Commissioner acted within his authority under Section 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958.
Questions settled- Does the lifting of a confiscation order by Martial Law Authorities automatically revive the original land allotment?
- Can a Settlement Commissioner order the restoration of land to original allottees after a prior confiscation order is rescinded?
- Does an order directing the implementation of land restoration constitute an improper review of a prior administrative directive?
- Mst. Bakhan (Represented by Her Legal Heirs) and Another vs Murad1982 SCMR 765 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the nature of proprietary rights held by a Muslim widow. The core legal question is whether proprietary rights acquired by a widow under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, are terminated under Section 3 of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, even though that provision specifically addresses the termination of a limited estate held by a Muslim female under Customary Law. The petitioners argued that the High Court failed to consider a binding precedent, Mst. Begum v. Mst. Bai (PLD 1971 Lah. 567), which applied the ratio of the Supreme Court decision in Ram Din v. Muhammad Din (PLD 1964 SC 842) to similar circumstances. Upon review, the Supreme Court found merit in the contention that the precedent supported the petitioners' position. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to determine if the statutory termination of limited estates under Customary Law extends to proprietary rights acquired under the 1912 Act.
Questions settled- Can proprietary rights acquired by a widow under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, be terminated under Section 3 of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962?
- Does the termination of a limited estate under the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, apply to rights held under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912?
- Mst. Baigan vs Abdul Hakeem and Another1982 SCMR 673 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court restoring a Regular Second Civil Appeal that had been dismissed for non-prosecution due to the non-appearance of the respondents' counsel. The petitioner contended that the restoration application was improperly allowed, arguing that the counsel's absence was negligent, that the application was filed under the wrong provision of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and that the counsel failed to submit a personal affidavit. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the counsel's absence was not due to negligence but resulted from an honest estimate of timings while attending to another bench, which was supported by his clerk's affidavit. The Court ruled that mentioning an incorrect statutory provision does not invalidate a flawless pleading, and that a counsel's explanation regarding engagement before another bench, when established, constitutes a valid ground for restoration. The Court also condemned the use of objectionable language against High Court judges in the petition's grounds.
Questions settled- Does the citation of an incorrect procedural provision in a restoration application render the application invalid?
- Can a counsel's engagement before another bench of the same High Court constitute sufficient cause for restoring an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution?
- Is a court bound to formally call upon a party to furnish evidence in rebuttal during an inquiry into a restoration application?
- Mst. Azmat Sultana vs Mst. Fakhar Jahan Begum and 2 Other1982 SCMR 355 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal was directed against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition in limine. The underlying dispute arose from an ejectment application filed by the respondent-landlady against the petitioner-tenant under the Rent Restriction Ordinance, alleging personal need for the premises, default in rent payment, and property damage. While the Rent Controller initially dismissed the application, the Additional District Judge, Multan, reversed this decision on appeal and ordered the petitioner's eviction. The petitioner challenged this appellate order before the High Court under its constitutional jurisdiction, which was subsequently dismissed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no irregularity in the High Court's order, concluding that the appellate judgment was neither passed without lawful authority nor contrary to law. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the eviction order, while granting the petitioner a three-month grace period to vacate the premises, conditional upon the continued payment of rent and a voluntary undertaking to surrender possession upon the expiry of that period.
Questions settled- Can a High Court dismiss a constitutional petition in limine if the impugned appellate order is found to be lawful?
- Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding ejectment under the Rent Restriction Ordinance?
- Can the Supreme Court grant a grace period for vacating premises upon the dismissal of a leave to appeal petition?
- Mst. Aziza Khatun Etc. vs Capital Development Authority, Islamabad1982 SCMR 1136 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition challenging the compensation awarded for land acquisition. The petitioners, whose land in village Bar Khanzada was acquired under the Capital Development Ordinance, 1960, sought higher compensation rates, arguing that their land should be valued based on rates applied to land in village Chahan. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly declined to interfere with the compensation assessment made by the Deputy Collector and Commissioner. The Supreme Court held that the assessment of market value is primarily a question of fact. Since the lower Tribunals provided cogent reasons for rejecting the petitioners' claim—specifically noting that village Chahan is situated closer to the urban area of Rawalpindi and thus possesses higher value—the High Court correctly determined that interference under its constitutional jurisdiction was not justified. The principle laid down is that where Tribunals have lawfully exercised their jurisdiction in determining factual questions like land valuation, the High Court will not interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Is the assessment of market value for land acquisition primarily a question of fact?
- Can the High Court interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction with a compensation award based on factual findings by competent Tribunals?
- Does the proximity of land to an urban area constitute a valid basis for differentiating compensation rates between villages?
- Mst. Amir Bano and Another vs Jan Muhammad and Another1982 SCMR 1027 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a pre-emption suit on the ground of limitation. The core legal question concerns the starting point of limitation for a pre-emption suit regarding agricultural land where possession was held prior to the attestation of mutation and the final decree. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the contention requiring examination of when possession is deemed taken under a sale—specifically regarding whether limitation runs from prior possession or from the attestation of mutation following a declaratory decree to which the pre-emptors were not parties—raises a point requiring consideration. Accordingly, the Court granted leave to appeal and issued an interim order restraining alienation of the land, laying down the principle that the starting point of limitation based on possession under a disputed sale transaction warrants formal appellate review.
Questions settled- From what date does limitation begin to run for a pre-emption suit where the vendee's possession of the disputed land predates the attestation of mutation?
- Does possession held under a power-of-attorney subsequently revoked constitute possession under a sale for the purposes of limitation in a pre-emption suit?
- Whether the date of attestation of mutation following a final declaratory decree serves as the date of possession for pre-emptors who were not parties to the earlier declaratory suit?
- Mst. Aisha Begum and Others vs Chairman, Federal Land Commission1982 SCMR 1074 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1960-09-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These petitions sought leave to appeal against a consolidated judgment of the Baluchistan High Court dismissing constitutional petitions filed by declarant-owners and alienees. The petitioners had made numerous alienations of agricultural land between June 1967 and 1970, which were initially scrutinized and approved by land authorities under Land Reforms Regulation 115. Subsequently, the Chairman of the Federal Land Commission, acting via suo motu revision under paragraph 29 of the Regulation, re-examined and declared these alienations non-bona fide and void. The core legal questions involved the competence of the Chairman to act singly under paragraph 29, the retrospective curing effect of Ordinance XXIX of 1978 on any initial statutory infirmities, the exhaustion of review powers, the question of limitation regarding references by the Chief Land Commissioner, and the non-provision of a hearing to alienees. The Supreme Court held that the curative provisions of Ordinance XXIX of 1978 effectively validated prior statutory and structural omissions, that the power to review had not been previously exhausted, and that although alienees were not heard by the Chairman, substantial justice was done as they were heard in the High Court and before the Supreme Court regarding the lack of bona fides in the transactions. Leave to appeal was refused and the petitions were dismissed.
Questions settled- Can the legislature enact retrospective or curative legislation to validate past administrative decisions suffering from legal infirmities?
- Whether the power of the Chairman, Federal Land Commission to review under paragraph 29 stands exhausted if a member previously referred the case for review?
- Is the Chief Land Commissioner considered an aggrieved person for the purpose of limitation under paragraph 29 of Land Reforms Regulation 115?
- Does the failure to afford a hearing to alienees before the Federal Land Commission vitiate the proceedings where they are subsequently heard before the High Court and Supreme Court?
- Mst. Afsar Jehan Begum and Othres vs Shafeqa Begum and Other1982 SCMR 946 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of a residential property originally allotted to a displaced person, S. M. Bashir. Following the death of the original transferee, the property was resumed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner due to non-payment of the transfer price. The legal heirs of the deceased challenged the subsequent transfer of the property to Mst. Afsar Jehan Begum, alleging the resumption order was invalid. The core legal question was whether the resumption order could be sustained when notice was issued to a deceased person, no demand notice was served upon the legal representatives, and the department had accepted partial payment. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, holding that the resumption order was void ab initio because it was issued against a deceased party without proper notice to the legal heirs. Additionally, the acceptance of partial payment impliedly set aside the resumption. The Court further affirmed that legal heirs could not be deprived of their rights due to procedural delays, especially where the department failed to issue mandatory demand notices.
Questions settled- Can a property resumption order be valid if issued against a deceased person?
- Does the acceptance of partial payment by the settlement department impliedly set aside a prior resumption order?
- Is a transfer of property valid if the department fails to issue a demand notice to the legal representatives of the deceased transferee?
- MRS. K. Kazmi vs Syed Kamaluddin Shah1982 SCMR 576 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from an ejectment order against a tenant who challenged the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship following the death of the original landlord and the subsequent sale of the property. The core legal question was whether the respondent, as the successor-in-interest, had established the relationship of landlord and tenant and whether the tenant's failure to pay rent constituted a default warranting eviction. The Supreme Court held that the respondent, by virtue of the registered sale deed and proper notice, validly stepped into the shoes of the original landlord, thereby establishing the relationship of landlord and tenant without requiring further attornment. The Court further held that the tenant's prolonged failure to pay rent, based on purported confusion regarding the rightful claimant, was neither genuine nor reasonable. The principle laid down is that a successor-in-interest to a property acquires the status of landlord upon notice of the transfer, and a tenant cannot unilaterally withhold rent due to vague doubts about ownership, nor can such inaction serve as a basis for the court to exercise discretion in the tenant's favor regarding eviction.
Questions settled- Does a successor-in-interest to a property require a specific act of attornment by the tenant to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant?
- Can a tenant unilaterally withhold rent payments due to uncertainty regarding the identity of the rightful landlord after the original landlord's death?
- Does the failure of a tenant to pay rent based on purported confusion about ownership constitute a valid defense against an eviction petition for default?
- MRS. Akhtar Jan vs Government of Pakistan and Another1982 SCMR 1134 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the Lahore High Court's dismissal of a writ petition challenging the non-renewal and rejection of an Overseas Employment Promoter's licence under the Emigration Ordinance 1979 following the death of the sole proprietor licensee. The petitioner contended that the licence and goodwill constituted heritable property under Muhammadan Law and that Rule 8(5) of the Emigration Rules 1979, which renders licences non-transferable, was inconsistent with Section 12 of the Emigration Ordinance 1979. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the grant or refusal of a licence falls within the discretion of the Federal Government. The Court ruled that Rule 8(5) prescribing non-transferability is consistent with Section 12 of the Ordinance, as it constitutes a statutory condition of the licence. Furthermore, the Court established that a licence terminates upon the licensee's death and cannot be claimed as a heritable property right by legal heirs.
Questions settled- Is Rule 8(5) of the Emigration Rules 1979 inconsistent with Section 12 of the Emigration Ordinance 1979 regarding the non-transferability of licences?
- Can a statutory trade or employment promoter licence be inherited as a piece of property by the legal heirs upon the licensee's death?
- Does an Overseas Employment Promoter licence terminate upon the death of the sole proprietor licensee?
- Moharram Ali Shah and Another vs Secretary, Ministry of Food and Other1982 SCMR 1166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed a writ petition filed by a depot-holder challenging the cancellation of his depot by the District Food Controller, Sheikhupura. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner had been denied the right to a fair hearing, specifically regarding the allegation that he was not associated with the preliminary inquiry conducted prior to the cancellation order. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's contention was without merit. The Court observed that the petitioner had been issued a show-cause notice, had submitted a reply, and was personally heard by the District Food Controller before the adverse order was passed. Furthermore, the petitioner had also been heard by the Appellate Court and the Revisional Authority. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, establishing the principle that where an individual has been provided with a show-cause notice and afforded personal hearings at multiple stages of the administrative process, the requirement of natural justice is satisfied, and a claim of being condemned unheard cannot be sustained.
Questions settled- Can a party claim to have been condemned unheard if they were issued a show-cause notice and granted personal hearings by the original, appellate, and revisional authorities?
- Is a party entitled to be associated with a preliminary inquiry in administrative proceedings if they are subsequently given a full opportunity to be heard before the final order is passed?
- Mohan vs The State1982 SCMR 1143 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a criminal appeal filed by the appellant Mohan against his conviction for the murder of a young boy named Rajoo under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question considered by the Supreme Court pursuant to leave granted was whether the appellant's retracted judicial confession was worthy of reliance, alongside the evaluation of eyewitness testimony and recovery evidence. The court held that the conviction was well-founded based on the credible testimony of an independent eyewitness, corroborated by the recovery of a blood-stained knife and the retracted judicial confession, and accordingly dismissed the appeal, refusing to reduce the sentence below the statutory minimum. The key principle laid down is that a retracted judicial confession, when supported by natural ocular testimony and corroborative material such as the recovery of a weapon stained with human blood, can safely form the basis of a murder conviction.
Questions settled- Whether a retracted judicial confession is worthy of reliance when supported by corroborative evidence?
- Can a sentence for an offence under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code be reduced to the period already undergone?
- Is the testimony of an eyewitness not named in the first information report reliable if the witness is independent and natural?
- Mohammad Sarwar vs The State1982 SCMR 257 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-09-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the order of the Lahore High Court upholding the dismissal of the petitioner's bail application by the Additional Sessions Judge, Lyallpur. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail in a murder case on grounds of subsequent police re-investigation finding co-accused innocent, alleged discrepancies between ocular and medical evidence, and the duration of incarceration. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner, being specifically named in the first information report as the principal offender who fired a fatal shot at a vital part of the deceased's body, could not claim the benefit of doubt merely due to the exoneration of co-accused during re-investigation, nor could a detailed appreciation of evidence be undertaken at the bail stage. The Court laid down the principle that police re-investigation clearing some co-accused does not automatically entitle the main accused to bail, and appreciation of potential conflicts between ocular and medical evidence is premature at the bail stage.
Questions settled- Does the exoneration of co-accused during police re-investigation automatically entitle the main accused to post-arrest bail?
- Can a court undertake a detailed appreciation of conflicts between ocular and medical evidence at the bail stage?
- Is delay in the commencement of a trial per se sufficient ground to warrant interference by the Supreme Court in a bail matter?
- Mohammad Hussain vs Mohammad Yaqoob and Another1982 SCMR 926 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court, which had recalled an interim stay order previously granted in a writ petition. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court acted appropriately in vacating the stay order after it was established that the respondent had already obtained possession of the disputed land prior to the issuance of the status quo order, and that the petitioner had subsequently been charged with criminal trespass under the Pakistan Penal Code. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the recall of the interim stay was eminently proper given the factual circumstances regarding the delivery of possession. The Court held that where possession has already been transferred to a party before an interim order of status quo is passed, the continuation of such an order is unjustified, particularly when the petitioner's conduct involves alleged criminal trespass. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's discretion in managing interim relief in writ jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Whether an interim order of status quo can be maintained when possession of the disputed property has already been delivered to the respondent?
- Is the recall of an interim stay order justified when the petitioner is alleged to have committed criminal trespass on the subject property?
- Mistri Abdul Aziz vs Mistri Muhammad Yasin and Other1982 SCMR 1083 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition arises from a dispute over the transfer of a plot originally allotted through a Provisional Transfer Order to the respondents, who are the sons of the petitioner. The core legal question concerns whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner was justified in refusing to cancel the Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) issued in favor of the second respondent based on a subsequent agreement of association, and whether the petitioner had established the approval of a prior agreement of association in his favor. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to prove that his alleged agreement of association was duly filed and approved by any competent settlement authority, meaning no fraud was established and the first respondent was legally competent to enter into the subsequent agreement of association with the second respondent. Furthermore, once the P.T.D. was issued, it assumed finality regarding the property's transfer, placing it outside the compensation pool and precluding interference by the Chief Settlement Commissioner on the executive side. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner can cancel a Permanent Transfer Deed on the executive side after the property has gone out of the compensation pool?
- Does an unapproved and unverified agreement of association confer enforceable rights regarding the transfer of property under settlement laws?
- Does a Permanent Transfer Deed assume finality precluding executive cancellation when no prior valid agreement of association is established by a rival claimant?
- Miss Khursheed Bano vs Chairman & Member, Selection Committee, Liaquat Medical College, Hydirabad and 2 Other Ss1982 SCMR 106 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-08-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a constitutional petition challenging the refusal of medical college authorities to admit the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the selection committee was bound to accept a domicile certificate submitted after the date of interview in terms of the prospectus rules. The Supreme Court held that the case was governed by rule 12 of the prospectus, which explicitly mandates that documents received after the date of interview shall not be considered, and that any failure in producing documents on time results in disqualification or carry-over of the candidature to the next year rather than immediate acceptance. The key principle laid down is that prospectus rules regarding the strict timeline for submission of application documents must be adhered to, and authorities have no discretion to entertain belatedly filed documents unless expressly provided for by the rules.
Questions settled- Whether documents received after the date of interview can be considered for medical college admission under the prospectus rules?
- Does rule 32 of the prospectus confer any right on a candidate to claim additional time for completing application papers?
- What is the legal effect under the prospectus rules when a candidate fails to submit required documents before the date of interview?
- Miss Amtul Jamil Samy vs Secretary, Health, Government of Punjab1982 SCMR 44 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter originated as a petition challenging the admission process for medical colleges in Punjab, specifically regarding the allocation of merit marks. The petitioner, a B.Sc. first divisioner, contested the admission of respondents who, despite having lower academic marks, were granted admission to King Edward Medical College, Lahore, due to the addition of 20 marks for National Cadet Corps (N.C.C.) training. The core legal question was whether the authorities acted without lawful authority by allowing N.C.C. marks to elevate candidates from a lower academic category above the petitioner, thereby altering the merit list. The Supreme Court held that the Prospectus for the Medical Colleges in Punjab (1980-81) explicitly provided for the addition of 20 marks for N.C.C. training to the aggregate marks of candidates to determine final merit. The Court ruled that the authorities acted within their lawful authority in applying these rules. The key principle laid down is that where statutory or regulatory provisions explicitly mandate the addition of specific marks for extracurricular training to determine merit, the courts cannot interfere with the resulting admission decisions, even if such rules disadvantage candidates with higher academic qualifications.
Questions settled- Can the addition of National Cadet Corps training marks to a candidate's aggregate score be considered a lawful basis for determining admission merit?
- Does the inclusion of extracurricular training marks in a merit list constitute an action without lawful authority when provided for in the admission prospectus?
- Can a court interfere with admission decisions made by authorities strictly following the merit criteria established in the relevant medical college prospectus?
- Mirza Tasawar Ali Beg vs Abdur Rashid Khan and Another1982 SCMR 381 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the maintainability of an appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan and a request for leave to appeal regarding a property dispute. The Court held that the appeal filed by Mst. Feroze Fatima is maintainable as of right under Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, as the High Court judgment was of variance and the property value exceeded fifty thousand rupees. Furthermore, the Court granted leave to appeal to her husband, Mirza Tasawar Ali Beg, in his separate petition concerning the same property, noting that hearing the cases together would avoid contradictory decisions and address important questions of law and fact. Regarding the prayer for stay of execution of the High Court decree, the Court ordered that the status quo be maintained, allowing the respondent to retain possession of the property while preventing the petitioner from interfering, thereby balancing the convenience of both parties pending the final decision of the appeals.
Questions settled- Is an appeal maintainable as of right under Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 when a High Court judgment is of variance and involves property exceeding fifty thousand rupees?
- Can the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal to avoid contradictory decisions in related cases involving the same property?
- What criteria does the Court apply when granting a stay of execution and implementation of a High Court decree pending appeal?
- Mir Saleh Ud Din vs Qazi Zaheeruddin1982 SCMR 559 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the ejectment of the petitioner from a godown in Lahore. The petitioner claimed to be a statutory tenant under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and contended that he was neither served with notice nor impleaded in the eviction proceedings initiated by the respondent transferee against another party. After his plaint was rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and subsequent appellate and revisional proceedings determined that a fresh suit was barred under Order XXI Rule 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court. The core legal question is whether a separate suit is maintainable by a person claiming to be a statutory tenant who was not a party to the eviction proceedings and was allegedly not served under section 30. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider the conflicting positions regarding the maintainability of such a suit.
Questions settled- Whether a separate suit is maintainable by a person claiming to be a statutory tenant who was not impleaded in eviction proceedings?
- Does Order XXI Rule 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 bar a fresh suit in regard to matters specified therein?
- Is a statutory tenant entitled to notice under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 before eviction?
- Mian Mushtaq Ahmad vs Deputy Commissioner Sargodha and 11 Other1982 SCMR 775 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the decision of the Deputy Commissioner, which permitted a meeting to consider a no-confidence motion against the petitioner, the Chairman of a Town Committee. The core legal questions involved the competence of the no-confidence motion regarding statutory time limits under the relevant local government legislation and the authority of the Deputy Commissioner to reschedule the meeting after the presiding officer aborted the initial proceedings. The Supreme Court declined to decide the abstract questions of law regarding the statutory time limits because ten out of eleven members of the Town Committee subsequently voted in favor of the no-confidence motion, demonstrating overwhelming lack of confidence in the petitioner. Consequently, the Court held that the case was not a fit one for discretionary constitutional interference on technical grounds and dismissed the petition.
Questions settled- Whether a no-confidence motion against the chairman of a local council can be moved at any time after the expiry of six months or is strictly bound by the time limits in section 31 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979?
- Does the Deputy Commissioner possess the power to correct an unauthorized postponement of a no-confidence meeting by a presiding officer and fix a new date?
- Will the Supreme Court interfere with a no-confidence vote passed by an overwhelming majority of council members on the basis of procedural technicalities?
- Mian Muhammad Afzal and Others vs Government of the Punjab And Other1982 SCMR 408 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These service appeals under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 concern a seniority dispute between direct recruits and promotees/transferees within the Agricultural Engineering Department. The core legal questions were whether direct recruits could claim seniority from the date they became entitled to appointment following training, rather than their actual appointment dates, and whether ad hoc appointees could count their temporary service toward seniority. The Court held that the respondents, having been wrongfully denied appointment despite satisfying all conditions, were entitled to seniority from the date they became eligible for appointment. Conversely, the Court ruled that ad hoc appointments, being outside the prescribed rules, do not confer seniority rights. The key principle laid down is that the State is obligated to honor judicial declarations, and a civil servant wrongfully prevented from rendering service is entitled to all tangible benefits, including seniority, appurtenant to the right of appointment. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed, affirming the respondents' seniority rights and rejecting the appellants' claims based on ad hoc service.
Questions settled- Can a civil servant claim seniority from the date they were entitled to appointment if they were wrongfully denied induction into service?
- Does an ad hoc appointment confer any right to seniority upon subsequent regularization?
- Is the State obligated to honor a judicial declaration regarding the entitlement of a civil servant to an appointment?
- Can ad hoc service be counted towards seniority under the West Pakistan Agricultural Engineering Services (Class II) Rules, 1963?
- Mian Muhammad Abdullah vs West Pakistan Road Transport1982 SCMR 378 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which set aside the decree for specific performance of a contract granted in favor of the petitioner, an employee of the respondent-Board, and restored the dismissal of the suit by the trial court. The core legal question concerns the existence and enforceability of an alleged agreement to sell evacuee land made by the Chairman of the respondent-Board to its employee. The Supreme Court held that no valid, enforceable agreement existed between the parties because, at the material time, the property in question did not belong to the Board and remained part of the compensation pool vesting in the Central Government; consequently, the Chairman lacked the legal capacity to transfer property not owned by the Board, rendering any such commitment void. The Court also declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal, noting the impropriety of the transaction where a public servant sought to acquire property the department itself sought for its official needs. Leave to appeal was refused.
Questions settled- Whether the Chairman of a statutory board can legally agree to sell property that does not vest in the board but belongs to the Central Government?
- Does an endorsement on a departmental communication constitute a valid and enforceable agreement for the specific performance of a contract of sale?
- Will the Supreme Court interfere in its discretionary jurisdiction with a High Court judgment setting aside a specific performance decree tainted by a lack of valid title?
- Mian Khan, Lal Khan vs The State Jalal Andother1982 PLD Supreme Court 197 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-16Read full judgment →
- Mian Khan vs Thestate1982 SCMR 629 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-01Read full judgment →
- Mian Haji Muhammad Shafi and Others vs Syed Wilayat Ali Bokhary and Other1982 SCMR 390 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which had upheld the cancellation of a land allotment. The dispute arose over 254 kanals of land allotted to respondent Jiwana, who subsequently sold it to the petitioners. Following information that the allotment was fraudulent due to the prior satisfaction of the respondent's claim in another district, the Additional Settlement Commissioner cancelled the allotment. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Authorities acted lawfully in cancelling the allotment based on findings of fraud and the respondent's denial of the transaction. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to rebut the findings of fraud, specifically noting that the respondent had consistently denied the sale and that the petitioners failed to produce the respondent or prove the validity of their claim. The Court affirmed that the burden of proof rested on the petitioners to establish the legitimacy of their title, and their failure to participate effectively or produce evidence justified the dismissal of their petition.
Questions settled- Does the burden of proof lie with the petitioners to establish the legitimacy of a land allotment when fraud is alleged by Settlement Authorities?
- Can a land allotment be cancelled if the allottee denies the transaction and the claim has been previously satisfied elsewhere?
- Is a writ petition maintainable against the concurrent findings of fact by Settlement Authorities regarding the fraudulent nature of an allotment?
- Mian Dost Muhammad and Others vs Province of Punjab and Other1982 SCMR 1078 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by petitioners displaced by the acquisition of land in Mianwali District for the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission in 1973-1974. The core legal question is whether the eviction of displaced persons from acquired land can be restrained through a temporary injunction pending their complete resettlement and receipt of alternative plots. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that once acquisition proceedings are completed and the land vests in the acquiring agency, the agency is entitled to possession, which cannot be defeated solely on the ground that resettlement arrangements remain incomplete. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts dismissing the injunction application, while granting the petitioners a two-month extension to vacate the property by consent.
Questions settled- Can the eviction of displaced persons from acquired land be restrained on the ground that their resettlement arrangements are incomplete?
- Whether land vests in the acquiring agency upon the completion of acquisition proceedings and payment of compensation?
- Does an undertaking regarding resettlement given by the Provincial Government bind the statutory commission once land acquisition is completed?
- Mian Allah Bakhsh and Another vs Mst. Bakhan Bibi Etc.1982 SCMR 514 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's dismissal of a Civil Revision. The petitioners, nephews of the deceased landowner, claimed ownership of land based on a will, a gift, and mortgage redemption. The trial court found the will unproven but the gift established, granting a declaration for a portion of the land, but did not address the prayer for an injunction to protect their possession. The first appeal and revision petition were dismissed. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the relief of injunction, as prayed for, could be refused or remain unaddressed when the petitioners were found entitled to a piece of land and were in possession, notwithstanding that their possession might exceed their exact share. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to further examine this aspect of the contention and temporarily restrained the respondents from interfering with the petitioners' possession except in accordance with the law.
Questions settled- Can an injunction to protect possession be refused or left unaddressed when a party is found entitled to land and is in possession, even if their possession exceeds their exact share?
- Does the issue of whether an injunction can be refused or remain unattended, despite established entitlement and possession, warrant further judicial examination?
- Is it permissible for a court to grant a declaration of ownership without addressing an accompanying prayer for an injunction to protect possession?
- Mian Abdullah vs Mst. Nishan Bibi and Another1982 SCMR 814 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that allowed a writ petition, ordering the eviction of a tenant from an evacuee property. The core legal question was whether a tenant, in summary rent proceedings, could challenge the landlord's title by claiming benami ownership, and whether the High Court could exercise writ jurisdiction to set aside an appellate order that erroneously adjudicated on title. The Supreme Court held that the Rent Controller and the appellate authority in rent proceedings lack jurisdiction to determine complex questions of title regarding evacuee property transferred under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Laws. The Court affirmed that a tenant, having admitted the tenancy, is estopped under Section 116 of the Evidence Act from denying the landlord's title. Furthermore, the Court established that rent authorities cannot go beyond the transfer documents issued by Settlement Authorities. Consequently, the High Court correctly exercised its constitutional jurisdiction to correct the District Judge's jurisdictional error, while preserving the parties' rights to litigate the title issue in a court of general jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Can a tenant in summary rent proceedings challenge the landlord's title by claiming benami ownership?
- Does a Rent Controller have the jurisdiction to decide questions of title regarding evacuee property?
- Is a tenant estopped from denying the landlord's title under Section 116 of the Evidence Act 1872?
- Can the High Court exercise writ jurisdiction to set aside an appellate order that erroneously decides a question of title in rent proceedings?
- Mian Abdul Qayyum vs DR. Muhammad Akram Khan1982 SCMR 1024 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a Regular Second Appeal by the Lahore High Court, which affirmed a pre-emption decree. The petitioner had sold land, which the respondent successfully pre-empted in a civil suit. During the pendency of the pre-emption appeal, the petitioner filed a separate suit to challenge the validity of the original sale, seeking to avoid the pre-emption decree. The core legal question was whether a subsequent suit challenging the validity of a sale could defeat a pre-emption decree already obtained. The Supreme Court held that the pre-emption decree remained unaffected by the subsequent litigation. The Court reasoned that the right to pre-emption accrues upon the completion of a pre-emptiable sale, and once exercised and decreed, it cannot be defeated by subsequent attempts to retract or challenge the sale. The Court affirmed that such subsequent suits are often devices to defeat pre-emption rights and do not invalidate a final pre-emption decree. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed as the issue was foreclosed.
Questions settled- Does a subsequent suit challenging the validity of a sale affect a pre-emption decree already passed?
- Can a pre-emption decree be defeated by a subsequent attempt to retract the sale?
- Does Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to a pre-emption suit where the causes of action in the two suits are different?
- Mian Abdul Latif vs Zahoor Din1982 SCMR 779 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a revision petition by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the appointment of a receiver in a pre-emption suit. A consent decree for possession by pre-emption was passed in favour of the respondent, who deposited the requisite decretal amount, but execution was delayed due to the court file being damaged by floods, necessitating reconstruction. To safeguard the respondent's interests during the delay, the Senior Civil Judge appointed a receiver over part of the suit land and crops, an order affirmed by the Additional District Judge and the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the appointment of a receiver was a fair and equitable interim measure necessitated by an act of God preventing execution, and declined to interfere in its discretionary jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that courts may appoint a receiver as an equitable measure to protect a decree-holder's rights when execution is delayed through no fault of the parties due to extraordinary circumstances.
Questions settled- Whether a receiver can be appointed to manage suit land and crops when execution of a pre-emption decree is delayed due to the destruction of the court file by floods?
- Does the appointment of a receiver in such circumstances constitute a fair and equitable exercise of judicial discretion?
- Will the Supreme Court interfere in discretionary orders passed by lower courts where the petitioner has consented to the original decree and no injustice is shown?
- Messrs Vulcan Company Limited vs The Province of the Punjab and Other1982 SCMR 430 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner entered into a contract to supply air-conditioners, which were subsequently rejected by the Government, leading to a dispute referred to arbitration. During the arbitration proceedings, the petitioner sought to inspect a summoned departmental file to cross-examine a witness. The civil court and the High Court dismissed the request on the technical ground that no formal application was made under Order XI, Rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a party can be denied the inspection of a summoned file for cross-examination due to the absence of a separate formal application under procedural rules. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and held that procedural laws are meant to facilitate justice rather than act as a clog or technical hurdle. The Court set aside the lower orders, ruling that denying inspection on such hyper-technical grounds is impermissible, and directed the trial court to allow the petitioner to inspect the file for cross-examination.
Questions settled- Whether a party can be denied the inspection of a summoned departmental file for the purpose of cross-examination solely for want of a separate formal application under Order XI Rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Is the Code of Civil Procedure intended to act as a clog on the proper dispensation of justice or as a facility for the smooth running of judicial proceedings?
- Messrs T. V. Service Station vs MRS. Parveen Anwar Afiridi1982 SCMR 261 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by a tenant against the concurrent findings of the Rent Controller, the Additional District Judge, and the High Court, which ordered the eviction of the tenant under Section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959 on the grounds of personal requirement and damage to the property. The core legal question addressed is whether the landlord's personal requirement for his own residence was genuine and in good faith, given that he desired to live independently from his step-father in the disputed property, which is an annexe. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the finding of fact regarding the landlord's good faith requirement for personal residence is unexceptionable and that the landlord cannot be compelled to reside in another person's house. The key principle laid down is that an owner-landlord is entitled to seek eviction for personal residence to maintain an independent household, and such requirement is genuine even if the landlord currently resides with a relative, provided the premises sought belong to the landlord.
Questions settled- Whether an owner-landlord's requirement for a separate residence away from a step-father constitutes a good faith personal requirement under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
- Can a landlord be compelled to reside in a house belonging to another person instead of seeking eviction for his own property?
- Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding personal requirement rendered by the lower forums?
- Messrs Super Punjab Coal Co. Ltd. vs Director of Industries & Mineral1982 SCMR 351 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter originated from a petition for special leave to appeal filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging an order of the Lahore High Court. The petitioner had sought a stay order in a pending constitutional petition (W. P. No. 4883/79), which the High Court had refused on November 19, 1979. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's refusal to grant an interim stay order in a pending writ petition warranted appellate interference. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the grant of a stay order in a pending case is a matter resting entirely within the judicial discretion of the court seized of the main matter. The Court affirmed that where a High Court, despite admitting a writ petition for regular hearing, determines that a stay order is not just or fit, such an exercise of discretion does not suffer from any legal infirmity justifying interference by the Supreme Court. The key principle laid down is that the grant of interim relief remains discretionary and appellate courts will not interfere with such refusal absent a clear legal error.
Questions settled- Is the grant of a stay order in a pending case a matter of right or judicial discretion?
- Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's refusal to grant an interim stay order in a pending constitutional petition?
- Messrs South British Insurance Co. Ltd vs Messrs Ahmad Abdul Ghani1982 SCMR 1232 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment disposes of civil appeals arising from a dispute over a C.I.F. contract for the supply of cotton yarn, where the goods were never delivered. The core legal questions involved the liability of the local seller who transferred shipping documents and the liability of the insurance company under the marine insurance policy when actual shipment and loss of goods were not satisfactorily proved. The Supreme Court held that the local seller, having transferred the valid shipping documents in good faith under a C.I.F. contract, stood exonerated from liability, as the delivery of documents symbolised delivery of the goods. Furthermore, the Court held that the plaintiff failed to discharge the burden of proving actual shipment of the goods, rendering the insurance company not liable under the policy since reliance on unverified correspondence regarding transshipment was misplaced. The key principle laid down is that under a C.I.F. contract, a seller who transfers shipping documents in good faith is absolved of liability for non-delivery of goods, and an insurer cannot be held liable without proof of actual shipment and loss covered by the policy.
Questions settled- Whether a local seller under a C.I.F. contract is absolved of liability upon transferring the shipping documents in good faith to the buyer?
- Can an insurance company be held liable under a marine insurance policy without proof that the goods were actually shipped?
- Does the delivery of shipping documents under a C.I.F. contract constitute symbolical delivery of the goods placing the risk on the buyer?
- Messrs S.M. Ilyas & Sons vs Messers S. M. Ilyas & Sons Appellants Commissioner_, of. Income Tax, Lahore Zone1982 PLD Supreme Court 259 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment arises from two civil appeals brought by an assessee, a private limited company, against the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing applications filed under Section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act. The core legal question was whether the disallowance of Rs. 18,000 paid as salary to a Director was permissible under Section 10(2)(xvi) of the Income-tax Act, and whether a question of law arose from the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal's finding. The tax authorities and the Tribunal disallowed the deduction, finding that the payment lacked commercial expediency, was not a genuine business expenditure, and was merely an arrangement to reduce tax liability. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the Tribunal's finding that the payment was not made for bona fide commercial expediency was a finding of fact based on material evidence. Consequently, no question of law arose for reference to the High Court, and the appeals were dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether a finding by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal that salary paid to a director lacked commercial expediency constitutes a finding of fact or a question of law?
- Whether the Income-tax Department can disallow a director's remuneration under Section 10(2)(xvi) of the Income-tax Act if the expenditure was not incurred for bona fide commercial expediency?
- Upon whom does the onus rest to prove that expenditure claimed as a deduction under Section 10(2)(xvi) of the Income-tax Act was incurred bona fide for business purposes?
- Messrs Roberts Cotton Association Ltd. vs The Commissioner of Income Tax, North Zone, Lahore1982SCMR 403 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns the deductibility of a loss incurred by the appellant, Messrs Roberts Cotton Association Ltd., arising from the sale of an actionable debt owed by Abbasi Textile Mills. The appellant, as part of a broader agreement between the Roberts Group and the Ali Group to transfer shareholdings, sold its outstanding debt against the Mill at a discount. The core legal question was whether this shortfall constituted a "bad debt" or "trading loss" deductible under the Income-tax Act, 1922. The Supreme Court held that the loss was not deductible. The Court reasoned that the transaction was a voluntary arrangement between two groups to sever business connections, rather than a loss resulting from the debtor's inability to pay or an expense incidental to the appellant's ordinary business operations. The Court affirmed the principle that a loss voluntarily incurred to accommodate third parties or facilitate a change in control, absent evidence of the debtor's insolvency or business necessity, does not qualify as a deductible business loss or bad debt.
Questions settled- Can a loss incurred from the voluntary sale of a debt to a third party be claimed as a 'bad debt' under the Income-tax Act, 1922?
- Is a loss resulting from an agreement to sever business connections considered a deductible 'trading loss' for tax purposes?
- Does a company's voluntary decision to sell an actionable claim at a discount to facilitate a change in shareholding constitute an expenditure laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business?
- Messrs Premier Mercantile Service and Another vs S. M. Younus and 2 Other1982 PLD Supreme Court 79 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners, a partnership firm that converted into a private limited company without the landlords' consent, sought leave to appeal against an ejectment order. The core legal questions were whether the conversion of a partnership into a private limited company, where the members remained identical, constituted unauthorized subletting, and whether the landlords' continued acceptance of rent from the new entity constituted a waiver of their right to seek eviction. The Supreme Court held that the conversion created a distinct legal entity with different rights and liabilities, constituting unauthorized subletting regardless of the identity of the members. The Court affirmed that 'lifting the veil' of incorporation did not assist the petitioners, as the change in legal status was a unilateral act affecting the tenancy. Furthermore, the Court rejected the plea of waiver, finding that the landlords had consistently issued rent receipts in the name of the original partnership and had explicitly requested information regarding the new entity, thereby demonstrating a clear refusal to recognize the new company as the tenant. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.
Questions settled- Does the conversion of a partnership firm into a private limited company constitute subletting of rented premises?
- Can a tenant unilaterally change its legal status without the landlord's consent?
- Does the acceptance of rent by a landlord from a new entity, while issuing receipts in the name of the original tenant, constitute a waiver of the right to evict for subletting?
- Is it permissible to lift the corporate veil to determine the rights and liabilities of parties in a tenancy dispute involving a corporate entity?
- Messrs Noon Sugar Mills Ltd., Bhalwal vs The Commissioner of Income Tax, Rawalpindi1982 SCMR 416 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-12-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by Messrs Noon Sugar Mills Ltd. against a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning tax liability under the Income-tax Act, 1922. The petitioner, a public limited company, purchased heavy machinery from a non-resident Japanese company, Messrs Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Limited, under a contract requiring the petitioner to bear the tax liability on payments made for supervisory staff services. The Income-tax Officer assessed the non-resident company directly and subsequently held the petitioner to be an assessee in default for failing to deduct tax at source. The Appellate Tribunal partially ruled in favor of the petitioner, but the Lahore High Court answered the reference against the petitioner. The core legal question involves the interpretation of the phrase 'unless he is himself liable to pay any income-tax and super-tax thereon as an agent' under section 18(3-B) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. Recognizing the conflict in judicial interpretation on this issue, the Supreme Court granted special leave to appeal to settle the question of law.
Questions settled- Whether a person responsible for making payments to a non-resident company is obligated to deduct tax at source under section 18(3-B) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, when an agency relationship is in question?
- Does a company have locus standi to file an appeal against an assessment made directly on a non-resident company?
- When is a taxpayer considered an assessee in default under section 18(7) of the Income-tax Act, 1922?
- Messrs M. A. Yahyas vs Messrs Nawab Abdul Malik Estates1982 SCMR 1160 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-01-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arose from an ejectment order passed against the appellant-tenants on the ground of default in rent payment. The Rent Controller had passed a tentative rent order directing the appellants to deposit monthly rent before the 15th of each calendar month, allowing past deposits in an earlier rent case to be treated as deposits in the ejectment case. The respondents subsequently filed an application to strike off the appellants' defence due to non-compliance with the deposit order. The appellants failed to produce deposit receipts before the Rent Controller, and when the account was eventually produced before the appellate court, it revealed unexplained delays in deposits for several months. The High Court affirmed the striking off of the defence. The Supreme Court held that since the appellants were on notice for non-compliance for the entire period and failed to offer any explanation for the specific delays, there was no denial of a proper opportunity to meet the case. The appeal was dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether a tenant's defence can be struck off for non-compliance with a tentative rent order if the rent was deposited late without any explanation?
- Does a general allegation of non-compliance in an application to strike off defence deprive the tenant of a proper opportunity to defend if the tenant failed to produce deposit receipts?
- Can a tenant escape the consequences of delayed rent deposits by claiming their advocate failed to inform them of the specific deposit order?
- Messrs M. A. Hussain S. Mirza & Co., Daccas vs Messrs Pakistan1982 SCMR 1202 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from a judgment of the High Court dismissing the appellants' suit for damages for short delivery of goods against the respondent consignor. The core legal questions involved whether the consignor had shipped the full contracted quantity of M.S. Bars despite bills of lading containing the qualification 'said to be', the evidentiary value of short landing certificates, and whether appellate relief could be granted against non-appealing parties under procedural rules. The Supreme Court held that the qualification 'said to be' in bills of lading and mate receipts was attributable to the standard commercial practice of not weighing or counting iron bundles at shipment, and that short landing certificates and survey reports were inconclusive given the unexamined loose goods at the port and lack of weight verification at destination. The Court upheld the Division Bench's dismissal of the suit and affirmed that discretionary appellate powers to grant relief against other parties should not be exercised where liabilities are severable and claims were not pressed at trial. The key principle laid down is that standard commercial practices regarding the shipment of heavy metal goods qualify shipping documents without implying default, and short landing allegations require strict, uncontroverted proof of shortage at the point of shipment and discharge.
Questions settled- Whether the qualification 'said to be' in bills of lading and mate receipts alone establishes short shipment of goods?
- Do short landing certificates constitute conclusive proof of short delivery when goods are found in a loose condition at the port?
- Can an appellate court exercise discretionary powers under Order XLI, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to grant relief against non-appealing defendants whose liabilities are severable?
- What is the evidentiary significance of loading tally sheets and commercial customs in determining the quantity of heavy metal goods shipped under a C & F contract?
- Messrs International Laboratories Ltd. vs Employees' Union and Another1982 PLD Supreme Court 460 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the High Court of Sind, which had set aside an order of the Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal. The High Court had held that the dismissal of three workers was without lawful authority because they were not served with a second show-cause notice after the completion of the domestic inquiry. The core legal question was whether Standing Order 15(4) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, requires an employer to issue a second show-cause notice to an employee after the inquiry is completed but before the order of dismissal is passed. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that Standing Order 15(4) does not, in its terms, require the service of a second show-cause notice or the furnishing of a copy of the inquiry report. The Court reaffirmed its previous rulings that such requirements cannot be read into the statute under the guise of natural justice unless explicitly provided.
Questions settled- Does Standing Order 15(4) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968 require an employer to issue a second show-cause notice after the completion of an inquiry?
- Is the furnishing of a copy of the inquiry report to an accused workman a mandatory requirement under Standing Order 15(4) before dismissing them?
- Can the requirement of a second show-cause notice be read into Standing Order 15(4) under the principles of natural justice?
- Messrs Bakhsh Textile Mills Ltd. vs Pakistan and Other1982 SCMR 497 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-08-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arose from a High Court judgment dismissing the appellant's constitutional petition against departmental decisions imposing penalty and confiscation under the Central Excise Rules 1944. The appellant, a textile manufacturer, was penalised for failing to maintain up-to-date entries in its daily stock register and for storing finished excisable goods in an unapproved place. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court were whether maintenance of stock accounts under Rules 51 and 53 required proof of mens rea or constituted an absolute statutory liability, and whether non-compliance could be excused on grounds of practical difficulty or pending approval. The Supreme Court held that the penal provisions of Rules 210 and 226 create absolute statutory liability where no mental element (mens rea) is required to be proved beyond the factual breach of failing to maintain registers or store goods in approved places. The Court laid down that factual determinations made by departmental tribunals cannot be re-agitated in constitutional jurisdiction, and absolute penal provisions in tax statutes apply strictly upon the occurrence of the prohibited act.
Questions settled- Is proof of mens rea necessary to establish an offence under Rules 210 and 226 of the Central Excise Rules 1944?
- Does rule 53 read with rule 47 of the Central Excise Rules 1944 create an absolute obligation to enter daily stock accounts on the same day?
- Can a new factual contention be permitted to be raised for the first time in the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
- Does storing packed excisable goods in a place not approved by the Collector constitute an actionable breach under the Central Excise Rules 1944?
- Messrs Attock Oil Co. Ltd., Rawalpindi vs The Commissioner of Income1982 SCMR 459 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-25Read full judgment →
- Messrs Associated Cement Companies Ltd. vs The President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Other1982 SCMR 1152 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These civil review petitions challenge a previous judgment of the Supreme Court which held that a company supplanted by the Custodian of Enemy Property, while remaining an alien enemy, lacks the status of an 'aggrieved party' to challenge orders in the High Court. The petitioner contended that the Court's previous reasoning improperly allowed subordinate legislation, specifically the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance, 1965 and the Enemy Property (Custody and Registration) Order, 1965, to modify the definition of 'aggrieved party' under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962, arguing that such a modification requires constitutional legislation. The Supreme Court rejected this submission, noting that the argument had been fully addressed and decided in the original appeal. The Court held that the review petitions were essentially an attempt to reargue points already settled, which is impermissible within the limited scope of review jurisdiction. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed as lacking substance.
Questions settled- Can a company supplanted by the Custodian of Enemy Property qualify as an aggrieved party to challenge orders in the High Court?
- Is it permissible to reargue points already decided in an appeal during review proceedings?
- Can subordinate legislation modify the scope of the term 'aggrieved party' as used in the Constitution of 1962?
- Messrs Arokey Ltd. and Another vs Munir Ahmad Mughal and 3 Other1982 PLD Supreme Court 204 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-01-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a High Court order that dismissed an application to recall a previous order disposing of a constitutional petition based on a compromise. The core legal question was whether a compromise entered into by an Advocate, who held a Vakalatnama expressly authorizing such action, could be set aside due to an alleged lack of specific instructions, and whether such a challenge falls under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Advocate possessed the requisite authority under the Vakalatnama. The Court found the application failed to allege fraud, misrepresentation, or want of jurisdiction, which are the exclusive grounds for relief under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Court established that Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is a special remedy to be strictly construed, applicable only where fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of jurisdiction is pleaded. Furthermore, an Advocate with express authority to compromise in a Vakalatnama binds the client, precluding subsequent challenges based solely on the absence of specific instructions.
Questions settled- Does an Advocate holding a Vakalatnama with express power to compromise have the authority to bind the client without specific instructions for each settlement?
- What are the mandatory grounds required to challenge a judgment or order under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Can a party challenge a compromise order by claiming lack of specific instructions when the Advocate was duly empowered by a Vakalatnama?
- Messrs Ahmad Karachi Halva Merchants & Ahmad Food Products vs The Commissioner of Income Tax, South Zone, Karachi1982 SCMR 489 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-09-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arose from an order of the former High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench, which dismissed an application under Section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act 1922 seeking to direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to refer a question of law. The appellant, a manufacturer and seller of sweetmeats and food products, raised a specific ground of appeal regarding the computation and allocation of income across assessment years in its memorandum of appeal before the Tribunal, but failed to urge or press the argument during the hearing. The core legal question was whether a question of law that was included in the grounds of appeal but neither argued before nor decided by the Tribunal could be said to arise out of the order of the Tribunal under Section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act 1922. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that the phrase 'arising out of such order' does not encompass questions of law that were neither raised, argued, nor decided by the Tribunal, as grounds raised but not pressed are deemed abandoned.
Questions settled- Whether a question of law raised in the memorandum of appeal but not argued before or decided by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal can be said to arise out of the order of the Tribunal under Section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act 1922?
- Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Section 66 of the Income-tax Act 1922 to direct the reference of a question of law that was not pressed before the Appellate Tribunal?
- Messers Splendours International vs Govenment of Pakistan and Another1982 SCMR 313 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed its civil revision, thereby upholding an appellate order that set aside an ex-parte decree passed against the respondent. The core legal question was whether the appellate court acted within its discretion in setting aside the ex-parte decree based on the appraisal of evidence regarding the Government pleader's absence on the date of the decree. The Supreme Court observed that the District Judge had exercised discretion by preferring the Government pleader's statement, considering the extraordinary circumstances of public agitation and tension in Lahore on the date in question. The Supreme Court held that the petition essentially sought a re-appraisement of evidence to challenge a conclusion of fact, which did not constitute a legal error or a serious question of law warranting interference. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that appellate courts have discretion to set aside ex-parte orders when sufficient cause for absence is established, particularly under exceptional circumstances, and that such factual findings are generally not subject to review in the absence of legal error.
Questions settled- Whether an appellate court's decision to set aside an ex-parte decree based on the appraisal of evidence regarding a party's absence constitutes a reviewable error of law?
- Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the sufficiency of cause for a party's absence in civil proceedings?
- Does the exercise of judicial discretion by an appellate court to set aside an ex-parte decree, based on extraordinary public circumstances, warrant interference in revision?
- Messers Roberts Cotton Association Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income1982 SCMR 658 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This certificated appeal arose from a High Court judgment regarding the disallowance of a tax deduction claimed by the appellant, Messrs Roberts Cotton Association Ltd. The appellant had sold an outstanding debt owed to it by a textile mill to a third party (the Ali Group) at a discounted rate, suffering a loss of Rs. 4,45,882. The appellant sought to claim this loss as a bad debt, trading loss, or business expenditure. The core legal question was whether this voluntary loss, incurred during a corporate restructuring agreement between shareholder groups, was deductible under the Income-tax Act, 1922. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the loss was not a deductible bad debt or trading loss. The Court reasoned that the transaction was a voluntary relinquishment of a claim to facilitate a change in business control, rather than a loss incidental to the appellant's business operations. The key principle established is that a loss must be involuntary and incidental to the taxpayer's business to qualify as a trading loss, and a voluntary discount on a debt to facilitate a third-party agreement does not constitute a deductible business expense.
Questions settled- Can a voluntary discount on an actionable claim sold to a third party be claimed as a bad debt under the Income-tax Act, 1922?
- Does a loss incurred to facilitate the severance of business associations qualify as an expenditure laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business?
- Is a loss arising from the voluntary sale of a debt to a third party considered a trading loss incidental to the taxpayer's business?
- Mehrajuddin (Represented by His Heir) and Others vs The Settlement1982 SCMR 859 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition arises from a dispute over the transfer of a house in Rawalpindi by the Settlement authorities. The petitioners' father had filed a writ petition which was dismissed, leading to a Letters Patent Appeal. The Letters Patent Bench dismissed the appeal as not maintainable because the main contesting party, the transferee of the property, had not been impleaded as a respondent within the period of limitation. The Supreme Court examined the original court file and found that the memorandum of appeal had indeed been filed solely against the Settlement Commissioner, with the words 'and others' crossed out and process fees paid for only one respondent. The Supreme Court held that the failure to implead a necessary party within the limitation period creates a fundamental defect that cannot be cured by subsequent applications or the fact that the party's particulars were mentioned in the earlier writ petition. Furthermore, the High Court's refusal to exercise its discretion to implead the party years later, after a valuable right had accrued under the Limitation Act, was not perverse or illegal. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Is a Letters Patent Appeal maintainable when the primary contesting party and transferee of the disputed property has not been impleaded as a respondent?
- Does mentioning a necessary party's name and address in an earlier writ petition cure the failure to implead that party in the memorandum of appeal?
- Can an appellate court be compelled to exercise its discretion to implead a necessary respondent long after the expiry of the period of limitation?
- Does the inclusion of ambiguous or scored-out terms like 'and others' without disclosing names suffice to constitute proper impleadment of parties in an appeal?
- Mehr Din vs Ghulam Akbar and 2 Other1982 SCMR 967 (1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan was challenged on the grounds of being time-barred by 183 days. The petitioner sought condonation of delay, citing advanced age, ill-health, floods in his locality, and detention in jail custody under sections 107 and 151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether the petitioner established 'sufficient cause' to justify the condonation of such a significant delay. The Supreme Court observed that the application for a certified copy of the impugned High Court judgment was filed well after the expiry of the 60-day limitation period. Furthermore, the court noted that the alleged floods and jail detention occurred after the limitation period had already expired, and the claim of ill-health lacked any corroborating evidence. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate sufficient cause for the delay. The petition was dismissed as time-barred, reinforcing the principle that vague or unsubstantiated claims of hardship do not constitute sufficient cause for condoning delay in filing legal proceedings.
Questions settled- Does a claim of ill-health without supporting evidence constitute 'sufficient cause' for condonation of delay?
- Can events occurring after the expiration of the limitation period be used to justify the condonation of delay?
- Is a petition filed 183 days beyond the limitation period maintainable without proof of sufficient cause?
- Mehmood Akhtar, Etc. vs The State1982 SCMR 54 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court refusing them post-arrest bail in a case registered under sections 302, 307, 325, 149, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and murderous assault. The core legal question concerned whether subsequent police investigations and discrepancies regarding specific injuries attributed to the petitioners warranted interference with the High Court's discretion to deny bail. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that discrepancies regarding injury locations and inconsistent subsequent police investigation reports were insufficient at the leave stage to interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court in refusing bail. Consequently, the Supreme Court laid down the principle that inconsistent subsequent police investigation reports, standing alone, do not provide sufficient grounds to displace the High Court's discretion in denying post-arrest bail in heinous offences where specific fatal blows are alleged.
Questions settled- Whether subsequent inconsistent police investigation reports provide sufficient ground for interference with the High Court's discretion in refusing bail?
- Can discrepancies in injury statements regarding the location of blows justify the grant of post-arrest bail at the leave to appeal stage?
- Whether petitioners alleged to have given fatal blows on the head of a victim are entitled to post-arrest bail?
- Mehmand vs The State1982 SCMR 122 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-06-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court which maintained the appellant's conviction and death sentence for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the ocular testimony of related witnesses, in the absence of independent corroboration and despite the appellant's plea of self-defense, was sufficient to sustain a conviction. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution evidence, specifically the consistent testimony of natural eye-witnesses, established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court affirmed that where eye-witnesses are natural and their testimony is consistent, a conviction can be sustained even without corroborative evidence, particularly when there is no motive for the witnesses to falsely implicate the accused. The Court further held that the failure of the defense to produce the alleged injured party for medical examination or police investigation rendered the defense version improbable. Consequently, the conviction and sentence were upheld.
Questions settled- Can a conviction for murder be sustained on the basis of ocular testimony from related witnesses without independent corroboration?
- Does the failure of the prosecution to prove the recovery of a weapon necessarily invalidate a conviction based on other evidence?
- Is the omission of an accused's position on a site plan sufficient to discredit the testimony of eye-witnesses?
- Mehboob Elahi vs DR. Riazuddin Ahmad Etc.1982 PLD Supreme Court 165 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-01-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the maintainability of a successive ejectment application under rent restriction laws. The respondent-landlord had initially filed an ejectment petition seeking the tenant’s eviction from a shop for the personal bona fide need of his son, which was ultimately rejected by the District Judge and upheld in second appeal. Three months later, the landlord filed a second eviction petition on the identical ground. The tenant raised an objection under Section 14 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, asserting that the second application raised substantially the same issues that were finally decided earlier. The Rent Controller framed an issue on the competence of the subsequent application but ordered eviction on merits without deciding that threshold issue, an outcome later sustained by the appellate and High Court forums. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the second ejectment application was barred under Section 14 in the absence of any new element or changed circumstance.
Questions settled- Whether a second ejectment application on the ground of personal need is barred under Section 14 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance when filed without any new element or change in circumstances?
- Is a Rent Controller obligated to specifically decide an issue framed regarding the maintainability of a successive ejectment application in light of a previous final decision?
- Under what circumstances can a landlord file successive ejectment applications on the same ground of personal requirement?
- Mehboob Elahi and Others vs Administrator, Residual Properties and Other1982 SCMR 862 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a constitutional petition regarding the transfer of property under settlement laws. The core legal question was whether a property, claimed by the petitioners as residual property under Settlement Scheme No. IX, was legally available for transfer, or if it had already been validly transferred to the respondents' predecessor-in-interest as part of a larger industrial unit. The Supreme Court held that the property in question was not residual property, as it had been in the possession of the respondents' predecessor since 1952 and was part of the property previously transferred to him. The Court found that the Deputy Administrator lacked jurisdiction to transfer property that had already been transferred to another party, particularly when such transfer occurred without notice to the existing transferee. The key principle laid down is that property for which a Permanent Transfer Deed has been issued cannot be subjected to clandestine disposal behind the back of the transferee, and administrative authorities cannot exercise jurisdiction over property that is no longer residual.
Questions settled- Can a Deputy Administrator of Residual Property transfer property that has already been transferred to another party?
- Does the existence of a Permanent Transfer Deed preclude the subsequent disposal of property as residual property?
- Can a transfer of property be validly ordered without notice or hearing to the existing transferee?
- Mehar Din vs Alamdar Hussain and Another.S1982 SC M R670 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a Lahore High Court order refusing to cancel bail granted to the respondent in a murder case. The petitioner challenged the High Court's refusal to cancel bail, citing legal arguments regarding the grant of bail to an absconder. The Supreme Court noted that the petition was barred by time regarding the original High Court order. Regarding the merits, while the Court acknowledged that the petitioner's argument concerning the law on granting bail to an absconder found support in the precedent of Rao Qadeer Khan v. The State (PLD 1981 SC 93), it declined to grant leave to appeal. The Court held that because the trial had already commenced and a significant number of witnesses had been examined before the trial was transferred to a different judge, it was not a fit case for interference at that stage. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.
Questions settled- Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable if it is barred by time?
- Does the commencement of a trial and the examination of witnesses influence the Supreme Court's decision to interfere with bail orders?
- Can the Supreme Court decline to grant leave to appeal even if the petitioner's legal argument finds support in precedent?
- Mehanda vs Faqir Muhammad1982 SCMR 356 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld a decree in favour of the respondent in a pre-emption suit regarding agricultural land. The petitioner, a vendee, challenged the suit on the grounds of limitation, asserting that he had obtained physical possession of the land prior to the mutation, and contested the respondent's superior right of pre-emption. The core legal questions were whether the suit was barred by limitation based on the date of possession and whether the respondent had sufficiently established a superior right of pre-emption. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding that the petitioner's claims regarding possession were inconsistent and unsupported by revenue records, which showed a tenant-at-will in possession. Furthermore, the Court held that the respondent had adequately established his superior right of pre-emption through the Patwari's testimony and revenue records, and the petitioner failed to rebut this evidence. The judgment affirms that factual findings regarding possession and pre-emption rights, when supported by evidence and concurrent lower court findings, will not be disturbed in leave to appeal proceedings.
Questions settled- Can a vendee claim limitation in a pre-emption suit based on possession if the revenue records indicate a tenant-at-will remained in possession?
- Is the testimony of a Patwari and the Shajra sufficient to establish a superior right of pre-emption in the absence of rebuttal evidence?
- Does a contradiction between a party's pleaded case regarding the date of possession and their subsequent testimony undermine a claim of limitation?
- Maulvi Muhammad Ramzan vs Muhammad Ismail1982 SCMR 908 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the order of the High Court, which had restored an appellate order based on a compromise between the parties. The petitioner and respondent had filed rival suits claiming title to the property in dispute, which were initially decided by the civil court. During the appellate stage, the parties agreed to resolve the dispute through an oath on the Holy Quran by the respondent. Pursuant to the oath, the appeals were disposed of in favor of the respondent. Although the Additional District Judge subsequently allowed a review petition and restored the appeals for a decision on merits, the High Court set aside the review order and restored the consent-based appellate order. The core legal question concerned the propriety of interfering with a judgment and decree rendered upon the voluntary consent and undertaking of the parties. The Supreme Court held that where parties have settled the matter through a just arrangement by taking the agreed oath and the statement has been acted upon, there is no justification to release them from their undertaking or to interfere with the discretionary jurisdiction in granting leave to appeal. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether a party can be permitted to resile from a compromise or settlement reached through an oath on the Holy Quran after it has been acted upon?
- Will the Supreme Court interfere in its discretionary jurisdiction with a consent-based appellate order reflecting a just arrangement between the parties?
- Masud Akhtar vs Mst. Noor Sain and Other1982 PLD Supreme Court 234 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-11-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns civil appeals against a High Court judgment that converted time-barred revision petitions into writ petitions regarding land allotment disputes between displaced persons. The core legal question was whether the High Court could validly exercise its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution to grant relief to parties who had failed to pursue their statutory remedies within the prescribed limitation periods, and whether such conversion was legally permissible. The Supreme Court, by majority, allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and recalled the writs. The Court established that equity follows the law; a High Court cannot use its extraordinary writ jurisdiction to circumvent statutory limitation periods or to defeat legislative intent by treating time-barred statutory appeals as writ petitions. Furthermore, the Court reaffirmed the principle that a party who invokes a tribunal's jurisdiction cannot subsequently challenge that same jurisdiction in a writ petition after receiving an adverse decision, as such conduct constitutes acquiescence and precludes the grant of discretionary relief.
Questions settled- Can a High Court convert a time-barred statutory revision petition into a writ petition to circumvent limitation periods?
- Is the remedy of a writ petition available to a party who has allowed their statutory remedy to become time-barred?
- Can a party challenge the jurisdiction of a tribunal in a writ petition after having voluntarily invoked that same tribunal's jurisdiction?
- Mastan Shah vs Syed Dilawar Hussain Etc.S1982 SCMR 707 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a writ petition challenging the order of the Settlement Commissioner regarding the transfer of a shop in Multan Cantonment. The core legal question involves whether the petitioner, as a successor of the original transferee, could challenge a decades-old deed of association and subsequent transfer orders, and whether the Settlement Commissioner competently decided the remanded matter under the amended statutory provisions. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was justified in refusing to interfere with concurrent factual findings of the departmental authorities, noting that the original transferee never agitated the matter in his lifetime and the belated challenge was barred by delay and finality of the transaction. The Court established that where a matter is pending before a competent authority following a statutory amendment, it can be lawfully decided under the revised provisions without vitiating prior substantial compliance.
Questions settled- Whether a successor of an original transferee can challenge a deed of association decades after it has been acted upon by settlement authorities?
- Can a Settlement Commissioner decide a pending remanded matter under amended statutory provisions?
- Whether the High Court is justified in not interfering with questions of fact concluded by departmental authorities?
- Masood Pervaiz vs The Disciplinary Committee, University of the Punjab, Lahore and 2 Other1982 SCMR 1084 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which declined to interfere in its writ jurisdiction with a disciplinary action taken by the University of the Punjab against the petitioner for attempting to cheat by replacing inner sheets of official answer books in the First Professional M.B.B.S. Examination 1979. The core legal question was whether the disciplinary finding was based on 'no evidence' and whether the principle of natural justice regarding opportunity of hearing was violated. The Supreme Court held that the discovery of substituted sheets in the petitioner's answer book raised a strong presumption against him, and the sufficiency of material for a finding of fact falls within the exclusive domain of the university authorities. Furthermore, the court held that personal hearing was granted, a written explanation was submitted, and material could lawfully be collected in the petitioner's absence without contravening established legal precedents. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court can interfere in its writ jurisdiction with a disciplinary action taken by a university authority for examination malpractice?
- Does the discovery of substituted answer sheets inside a candidate's answer book raise a strong presumption of guilt?
- Is it mandatory for disciplinary material in a university inquiry to be collected strictly in the presence of the candidate?
- Masood Ahmad vs Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue and Other1982 CLC 357 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This writ petition challenges the appointment of a Lambardar (Headman) by revenue authorities, contending that the forums below erred in their application of the W. P. Land Revenue Rules, 1968, and were prejudiced by the petitioner's religious affiliation. The core legal questions were whether the appointment process was legally flawed and whether concurrent findings of fact by revenue authorities regarding the petitioner's non-residency and unsuitability are subject to judicial review. The Court held that the appointment of a Lambardar is an administrative measure, not a vested right, and that the rules governing such appointments are directory guidelines for authorities to select the most suitable candidate. It affirmed that concurrent findings of fact by exclusive statutory forums are not open to challenge in constitutional jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the petitioner's disqualification was primarily based on his status as an 'absentee' and inability to perform duties, rather than religious prejudice, and that the administrative discretion of Revenue Officers in selecting a successor should not be interfered with by the High Court.
Questions settled- Are concurrent findings of fact by revenue authorities regarding the appointment of a Lambardar subject to interference in constitutional jurisdiction?
- Does the appointment of a Lambardar confer a vested legal right upon a candidate?
- Can the disqualification criteria under Rule 18(2)(c) of the W. P. Land Revenue Rules, 1968, be applied to the appointment of a successor Lambardar under Rule 19?
- Is the appointment of a Lambardar an administrative measure or a judicial determination?
- Mashri vs Sohni and Other1982 SCMR 684 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the complainant against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had acquitted the respondents of murder charges and dismissed the petitioner's revision petition against the acquittal of two other co-accused. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in its appraisal of the evidence, specifically the dying declarations and the testimony of eye-witnesses, in reaching its decision to acquit the accused. Upon reviewing the judgments of the lower courts, the dying declarations, and the eye-witness testimony, the Supreme Court found that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the High Court had ignored or misread any material evidence. The Supreme Court, having independently reappraised the evidence, concurred with the High Court's reasoning for disbelieving the prosecution's evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that there were no grounds to interfere with the High Court's judgment. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the principle that the appellate court's findings on evidence will not be disturbed absent a showing of misreading or non-reading of material evidence.
Questions settled- Can the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal judgment if the petitioner fails to show that the High Court ignored or misread material evidence?
- Is a dying declaration sufficient to sustain a conviction if the High Court has found it unreliable upon appraisal of the evidence?
- Manzoor Hussain vs The State1982 SCMR 357 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal was filed against an order of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's application for bail pending his criminal appeal against conviction. The petitioner had been convicted under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 and Sections 468 and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The High Court had refused bail, noting that the arguments raised by the petitioner required an appreciation of evidence, which was premature at the bail stage, while simultaneously directing that the main appeal be heard on an expedited basis. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the High Court's discretionary exercise of jurisdiction in refusing bail. The Supreme Court held that since the High Court had exercised its discretion not to grant bail and had balanced the interests of justice by scheduling an early hearing for the main appeal, there was no justification for interference. The petition was consequently dismissed, affirming that the High Court's order maintained the balance of justice.
Questions settled- Should the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretionary refusal of bail pending appeal when the main appeal has been expedited?
- Is it appropriate for a court to decline bail on the grounds that the arguments raised require an appreciation of evidence?
- Manzoor Ahmad vs Muhammad Amin1982 SCMR 894(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns a tenant's challenge to an eviction order, specifically questioning whether a notice under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, must be served by the original transferee of the property or if a subsequent purchaser (vendee) can serve such notice. The appellant argued that the respondent, who purchased the property from the original transferee, failed to comply with the statutory notice requirement. The Supreme Court held that the term 'transferee' in Section 30 is not restricted to the original transferee. Upon transfer of property, the vendee steps into the shoes of the original transferee, acquiring all rights and privileges, including the right to seek eviction under Section 30. Furthermore, the Court noted that the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, rendered the requirement of such notice moot. The Court also affirmed that notices under Section 30 and Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, can be combined, and that actual knowledge of the transfer by the tenant obviates the need for a formal Section 13-A notice.
Questions settled- Must a notice under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, be served by the original transferee, or can a subsequent purchaser serve it?
- Does the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, affect the necessity of serving a notice under Section 30 for eviction proceedings?
- Can a notice under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, be combined with a notice under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
- Is a formal notice under Section 13-A of the West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, required if the tenant already has actual knowledge of the property transfer?
- Manzoor Ahmad and Others vs Fateh Mohammad and Other1982 S CM R 469 (2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of their constitutional petition by the High Court, challenging the allotment of cancelled land to respondents Nos. 1 and 2 rather than to themselves in satisfaction of their verified pending claim. The core legal question was whether the petitioners possessed a prior right of allotment over the respondents regarding the cancelled land of dual allottees. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate any factual error in the findings of the Settlement Commissioner, who established that the petitioners' surplus units had already been transferred to another district under a general order, whereas the respondents' units remained pending in the village. The Court affirmed that in the absence of material to dislodge these concurrent factual findings, the petitioners could not claim priority. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether an allottee with pending claims has a prior right of allotment over respondents whose claims remained pending in the same village?
- Can findings of fact recorded by a Settlement Commissioner be interfered with without clear and positive material on record to dislodge them?
- Mansur and Others vs The State1982 SCMR 55 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a criminal petition for leave to appeal arising out of a judgment of the High Court, which upheld the conviction and sentence of the petitioners under sections 148, 302/149, 324/149, and 323/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question raised was whether the ocular testimony and the involvement of multiple accused persons from the same family should be disbelieved on the ground of potential exaggeration or false implication of relatives. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts were sustainable where injured eye-witnesses, whose presence at the spot was unquestionable, corroborated the occurrence and the number of injuries inflicted was commensurate with the number of assailants, especially in the absence of any prior enmity or motive for false substitution. The petition was accordingly dismissed as being without merit.
Questions settled- Whether the testimony of injured eye-witnesses whose presence is established can be doubted on the mere plea of exaggeration or false implication of relatives?
- Does the correspondence between the number of injuries sustained by victims and the number of accused persons lend credence to the ocular account?
- Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding the appreciation of evidence without strong justification?
- Mansab Khan vs The State1982 SCMR 714 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a criminal conviction for murder. The petitioner, Mansab Khan, was convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the trial court and sentenced to death, a conviction subsequently upheld by the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the ocular testimony provided by the prosecution witnesses was sufficient to sustain the conviction and whether the sentence of death was appropriate given the alleged motive. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence, noting that the prosecution witnesses were closely related to the petitioner and that no evidence of enmity existed to suggest false implication. The Court held that the ocular testimony was credible and sufficient to support the conviction. Furthermore, the Court found that the lower courts had provided cogent reasons for imposing the death penalty, rejecting the argument for a lesser sentence based on motive. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the conviction and the sentence imposed by the lower courts.
Questions settled- Is ocular testimony from witnesses related to the accused sufficient to sustain a murder conviction in the absence of evidence of enmity?
- Does the existence of a weak motive for a crime necessitate the reduction of a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
- Mangta vs Lab Din and Other1982 SCMR 282 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against concurrent findings of the trial court, the Additional District Judge, and the Lahore High Court in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether a sale transaction is divisible for the purposes of pre-emption when the sale deed specifies shares for the vendees, but the consideration is paid in a lump sum. The petitioner, a vendee, argued that the transaction was divisible, allowing him to retain his superior right of pre-emption despite associating with other vendees who lacked such rights. The Supreme Court held that the mere recital of specified shares in a sale deed does not establish divisibility of the transaction if the consideration is paid in a lump sum, absent evidence of separate payments by individual vendees. Consequently, the Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions that the petitioner lost his superior right by associating with non-superior vendees, and dismissed the petition in limine, adhering to the established principle that such transactions are indivisible without proof of separate consideration payments.
Questions settled- Does the mere recital of specified shares in a sale deed render a transaction divisible for pre-emption purposes?
- Can a vendee with a superior right of pre-emption lose that right by associating with other vendees who lack such a right?
- Is a sale transaction divisible for pre-emption purposes when the consideration is paid in a lump sum?
- Mala and 7 Others vs Jahangir and 3 Other1982 SCMR 239 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners sought a review of the Supreme Court's judgment dated 25-4-1981, which dismissed their appeal. The petitioners raised two primary grounds: first, that the court failed to consider the waiver of pre-emption rights by the tenant, Jahangir; and second, that the court erred regarding the jurisdiction of the Collector and other authorities in matters involving the dispossession of a tenant by someone other than the landlord. The Supreme Court observed that while the tenant's conduct was previously considered in the context of alleged forcible dispossession, the specific issue of pre-emptive rights as a tenant was not raised or examined in the High Court proceedings. Regarding the jurisdictional argument, the Court found that the cited precedent was irrelevant as it dealt with the interpretation of 'tenant' under the Land Reforms Regulation, whereas the current matter did not involve the term 'landlord' as the petitioners suggested. Concluding that the jurisdictional questions had already been exhaustively addressed, the Court held that no grounds for review existed and dismissed the petition.
Questions settled- Can a review petition be entertained on grounds that were not raised or examined in the High Court proceedings?
- Does the Land Reforms Regulation provide for the interpretation of the term 'landlord' in the context of dispossession of a tenant?
- Major Sher Afzal vs Mst. Shamim Firdaus and Another1982 PLD Supreme Court 49 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an application for the restoration of a dismissed review petition filed by the petitioner, Major Sher Afzal, following a long-standing litigation regarding the paternity of a child and the marital status of the respondents. The petitioner sought to restore his review petition, which had been dismissed in default, and reiterated requests for additional evidence, specifically a genetic test, to challenge the finality of a decree affirmed by multiple courts over sixteen years. The Court observed that the petitioner had previously attempted to introduce similar pleas through his second wife, which were rejected for lack of bona fides, inordinate delay, and the absence of valid grounds for review. The Court held that there was no justification for reopening a case already concluded by direct oral and documentary evidence, nor for allowing a retrial under the guise of new evidence. The Court emphasized that the litigation must reach finality and that the petitioner's attempts to prolong proceedings through repeated applications and requests for adjournment constituted an abuse of the process of law. Consequently, the application for restoration was dismissed.
Questions settled- Can a party seek the restoration of a review petition after it has been dismissed in default due to the absence of counsel?
- Is a court justified in refusing to reopen a concluded case for the purpose of conducting a genetic test when sufficient direct evidence has already been adjudicated?
- Does the filing of repetitive applications by a party and their relatives to reopen a settled matter constitute an abuse of the process of law?
- Major Muhammad Suleman vs The Secretary to Government of Pakistan and Other1982 SCMR 890 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-01-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition arises from the release of a Major in the Pakistan Army, who challenged his discharge from service after being recalled from deputation with the East Pakistan Rifles. The petitioner sought a declaration that his release without an opportunity to show cause was illegal and void, arguing that his deputation removed him from Army discipline and that Pakistan Army Regulation No. 269 required a Court of Enquiry to investigate allegations against him. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the lower courts' findings. The Court held that the petitioner remained subject to the Pakistan Army Act throughout his service, including his deputation, and that his tenure was held at the pleasure of the government. Furthermore, the Court determined that the cited Regulation was directory rather than a mandatory guarantee providing a basis for civil litigation. Consequently, the Court reaffirmed the principle that civil courts cannot intervene to grant redress to Armed Forces officers regarding their discharge from service, as they do not enjoy the same tenure protections as civil servants.
Questions settled- Does an officer of the Armed Forces on deputation cease to be subject to the Pakistan Army Act?
- Is Pakistan Army Regulation No. 269 a mandatory provision that creates a cause of action for civil litigation?
- Can civil courts intervene to grant redress to an officer of the Armed Forces against discharge from service?
- Major Malik Muhammad Afzal Etc. vs Mst. Maimuna Sheikh and Another1982 SCMR 249 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-02-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises out of an eviction application filed by the respondents against the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners on the ground of default in rent payment. The Rent Controller ordered eviction after finding default and failure of the petitioners to produce evidence. The Additional District Judge allowed the petitioners' appeal based on a purported compromise found in case diary entries, holding that the respondents were bound by an offer made by their advocate. The Lahore High Court set aside the District Court's order and remanded the matter for decision on merits, holding the compromise terms were not met. Upon further petition, the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that there was no compromise whatever between the parties, and the Additional District Judge's order finding a compromise was totally erroneous. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, upholding the remand for a decision on merits.
Questions settled- Whether an advocate's conditional statement in a case diary constitutes a binding compromise between the parties?
- Can an appellate court set aside an eviction order on the basis of a non-existent compromise without examining the merits of default?
- Major (Retd.) M. Azam Khan and Another vs Town Committee and Members, Khewra and Other1982 SCMR 142 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing a challenge to the removal of the petitioner from the office of Chairman, Town Committee, Khewra. The petitioner, having submitted a resignation under alleged coercion, subsequently sought to withdraw it, arguing that under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, a resignation only becomes effective once placed before the Local Council. Simultaneously, a no-confidence motion was carried against him by a majority of the Council members. The core legal question was whether the resignation was effective without being placed before the Council and whether the High Court erred in considering the no-confidence motion's result. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that it would not interfere on technical grounds where the petitioner had clearly lost the confidence of the house. The Court emphasized that where a substantial majority of members (13 out of 18) had voted against the petitioner, he could not be thrust upon the Council based on technical or fetish pleas regarding the procedural validity of his resignation.
Questions settled- Does a resignation of a Chairman of a Local Council become effective immediately upon submission to a functionary or only after being placed before the Local Council?
- Can a court refuse to grant relief on technical grounds when it is evident that the petitioner has lost the confidence of the representative body?
- Is a Chairman entitled to remain in office if a no-confidence motion has been validly passed against him by the requisite majority?
- Majid vs Qutab Din and Other1982 SCMR 212 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-10-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a review petition by the Lahore High Court, which originated from a dispute over the allotment of land under settlement laws. The core legal question was whether, after the Additional Settlement Commissioner had exercised revisional powers regarding an allotment, the Settlement Commissioner retained the authority to further exercise revisional powers under the relevant statute. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the revisional powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, once exercised by a delegatee such as the Additional Settlement Commissioner, are exhausted. Consequently, the Settlement Commissioner, being another delegatee, lacked the jurisdiction to exercise revisional powers a second time. The Court held that the second revision petition was incompetent following the promulgation of Ordinance No. XIII of 1964, which removed the authority for such successive exercises of revisional power. The principle established is that where statutory revisional powers are delegated, the exhaustion of that power by one delegatee precludes another delegatee from exercising the same power in the same matter.
Questions settled- Can a Settlement Commissioner exercise revisional powers after the Additional Settlement Commissioner has already exercised such powers in the same matter?
- Does the exhaustion of revisional powers by one delegatee of the Chief Settlement Commissioner preclude another delegatee from exercising the same power?
- Is a second revision petition competent after the promulgation of Ordinance No. XIII of 1964?
- Maj. M. A. Halim vs Hakim Muhammad Ashraf and Other1982 SCMR 953 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal against the confirmation of an auction sale of a jointly owned bungalow property in a partition suit. The core legal question was whether a party who participated in and consented to an auction process by seeking adjournments to produce a higher bidder can subsequently challenge the auction proceedings as a nullity due to alleged procedural irregularities in the proclamation of auction. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner, having persuaded the trial court to act upon his own solemn statement and request for time, was estopped from going back on his representation and could not challenge the validity of the auction. The key principle laid down is that a party who invites or consents to a judicial course of action and secures adjournments based on their own undertaking cannot subsequently turn around and impugn the resulting order on the grounds of procedural irregularities.
Questions settled- Whether a party who obtains adjournments to produce a higher bidder can subsequently challenge an auction on grounds of procedural irregularities?
- Does an auction proclamation drawn up by an auctioneer rather than the court render the auction proceedings void?
- Can a party go back on a solemn statement made before the trial court regarding the confirmation of an auction sale?
- Mairaj Begum vs Ejaz Anwar and Other1982 PLD Supreme Court 294 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal by special leave was filed against a Lahore High Court judgment acquitting the respondent of a murder charge. The prosecution alleged that the respondent stabbed the deceased due to an illicit liaison with his sister, whereas the respondent claimed self-defence and grave and sudden provocation inside his house. The Supreme Court examined the standard for interfering with an acquittal and evaluated whether the High Court improperly appreciated the evidence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by misreading material evidence, ignoring eye-witness testimony, and failing to proper juxtapose the prosecution and defence versions. Rejecting the complete defence of self-defence, the Court found that the deceased had intruded into the respondent's home to pursue an illicit relationship, provoking the respondent into losing self-control and repeatedly stabbing him. Applying Exception 1 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, the Supreme Court set aside the acquittal under Section 302, convicted the respondent under Section 304(I) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and sentenced him to ten years' rigorous imprisonment.
Questions settled- Under what circumstances can the Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment of acquittal in a criminal case?
- Does an absconding fugitive lose the right of audience and representation through legal counsel before the Supreme Court?
- Whether finding a person intruding into one's home pursuing an illicit liaison with a family member constitutes grave and sudden provocation under Exception 1 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Mahr Ghulam Nabi vs Muhammad Shafiq and Another1982 SCMR 196 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-04-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of an application for the cancellation of bail previously granted to respondent No. 1, who was accused in a murder case under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The bail was initially granted by the High Court on the ground of inordinate delay in the commencement of the trial. Subsequently, an application for cancellation of bail was filed, relying on a Supreme Court precedent that mere delay was not a ground for bail, but the High Court dismissed it, holding that an order granting bail could not be recalled without cogent reasons such as misrepresentation or abuse of concession. The Supreme Court held that the impugned order was correct when passed and that subsequent events, such as a newly registered case under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code, cannot invalidate a past correct order, though the petitioner could seek cancellation of bail in the appropriate court based on those subsequent events. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether inordinate delay in the commencement of a trial can form the basis for granting bail in a murder case?
- Can an order granting bail be recalled in the absence of cogent reasons such as misrepresentation or suppression of facts?
- Whether subsequent events occurring after the passing of an order can be made the basis for obtaining the reversal of that order on appeal?
- Mahmoodul Hasan and Othsrss vs Sayed Ghazanfar Ali Shah and Other1982 SCMR 377 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an eviction order issued by the Rent Controller, which was subsequently upheld by the Additional District Judge and the High Court. The core legal question was whether a default in rent payment committed by an original tenant, for which an application to strike off the defence had been filed during his lifetime, could be used as grounds to strike off the defence and evict his successors after his death. The Supreme Court held that the eviction proceedings and the specific complaint regarding the default were initiated during the original tenant's lifetime. Although the landlords temporarily ceased pursuing the application, they did not waive their right to seek ejectment. Consequently, the Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, ruling that the Rent Controller could legitimately strike off the defence of the successors based on the established default of the predecessor. The principle laid down is that where an application for striking off a defence due to rent default is initiated during the tenant's lifetime, the right to pursue such ejectment persists against the successors.
Questions settled- Can a landlord seek the eviction of a deceased tenant's successors based on a rent default committed by the original tenant?
- Does a temporary decision not to pursue an application for striking off a defence constitute a waiver of the right to seek ejectment?
- Can a Rent Controller strike off the defence of a successor tenant for a default committed by the predecessor?
- Mahmood vs Salim Zia and Other1982 SCMR 993 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-03-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition and a subsequent Letters Patent Appeal regarding a mukhbari (informer) application filed under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. The petitioner had alleged that the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents obtained land allotments through fraud and misrepresentation. The Additional Settlement Commissioner initially entertained the application but later dismissed it on the ground that proceedings could not continue against a deceased person. The High Court, in writ jurisdiction, dismissed the petition, holding that an informer possesses no vested right to challenge the rejection of their information. The Letters Patent Appeal was subsequently dismissed as incompetent under the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the dismissal of the Letters Patent Appeal legally sound but granted leave to appeal against the Single Judge's order. The Court held that the legal status and rights of an informer to challenge the rejection of their application, particularly in light of statutory provisions and subsequent repealing legislation, require further judicial consideration.
Questions settled- Does an informer have a vested right to challenge the rejection of their application under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
- Is a Letters Patent Appeal competent against an order passed by a Single Judge in writ jurisdiction under the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972?
- Can proceedings initiated by an informer continue against the legal heirs of a deceased respondent?
- M. Nazir vs S. Shaukat Ali1982 SCMR 985 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-04-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The respondent filed an ejectment application against the petitioner under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, based on a bona fide personal requirement. The Rent Controller directed the petitioner to deposit arrears and future monthly rent pursuant to section 13(6) of the Ordinance. The petitioner delayed depositing the rent for September 1976 by one day, attributing the delay to his wife's illness. Consequently, the Rent Controller struck off the petitioner's defence and ordered eviction, a decision upheld by the Additional District Judge and the Lahore High Court in limine. The petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, arguing that the default was not wilful and should be condoned. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Rent Controller lacks the legal power to condone a delay in depositing rent under section 13(6) of the Ordinance.
Questions settled- Whether the Rent Controller has the power to condone delay in depositing rent under section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
- Does a one-day delay in depositing monthly rent constitute a default under section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
- M. M. K. A. Zai vs Settlement Commissioner, Karachi and Another1982 SCMR 788 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment disposes of a civil petition for special leave to appeal and two criminal appeals arising from a dispute over the identity of an evacuee property, known as Raja Mansion in Karachi, sold by private negotiations following an auction. The core legal questions involve determining whether a disputed fifth property unit was part of the sale and whether the inclusion of this unit in the Permanent Transfer Order (P.T.O.) constituted fraud under criminal law. The Supreme Court held that the disputed fifth unit was never part of the auction or private negotiations, making its inclusion in the P.T.O. void, but acquitted the appellants of criminal charges on the ground that the requisite criminal intent (mens rea) for cheating under Section 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was not established beyond reasonable doubt due to overlapping property numbers and ambiguous auction proceedings. The key principle laid down is that while administrative authorities can correct erroneous entries in transfer documents to reflect the actual property sold, criminal convictions require clear proof of fraudulent intent rather than mere negligence or administrative errors.
Questions settled- Whether property numbers or well-known boundaries determine the true identity of an evacuee property sold by the Settlement Department?
- Does the lack of a prescribed time limit under Section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 validate suo motu revisions after a significant delay?
- Whether the inclusion of an un-auctioned property unit in a Permanent Transfer Order necessarily constitutes a deliberate and fraudulent act under Section 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Whether an offence relating to the fraudulent procurement of an evacuee property document falls exclusively under Section 27 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 or constitutes a substantive offence under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- M. Latif Qureshi vs The State1982 SCMR 101 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-11-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court which dismissed as premature an application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the quashment of criminal proceedings pending before a Magistrate. The core legal question was whether a petition for quashment challenging the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to proceed against an accused can be entertained before the Magistrate himself determines his own jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed no error in finding the quashment petition premature, as the objection regarding jurisdiction should first be raised before and determined by the Magistrate. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that a Magistrate must take up an objection regarding his jurisdiction in the first instance, dispose of it by a speaking order at the outset, and only proceed on merits if he concludes that he possesses the requisite jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Whether a petition for quashment of criminal proceedings challenging a Magistrate's jurisdiction is premature when filed before the Magistrate determines the jurisdictional issue?
- Must a Magistrate decide an objection regarding his jurisdiction by a speaking order at the outset of proceedings?
- LT. Col. Sardar Farooq Shaukat Khan Lodhi vs Taleh Muhammad Etc.S1982 SCMR 886 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-01-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the terms and conditions of a tenancy under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912. The core legal questions presented to the Supreme Court involve the procedural requirements for the resumption of tenancy following a breach of conditions. Specifically, the Court is tasked with determining whether the resumption of a tenancy is contingent upon affording the tenant an opportunity for rectification, and how Section 27 of the Act interacts with the rectification provisions found in Section 24 and the relevant Scheme. Furthermore, the Court must examine the relationship between clauses (xxvi) and (xxix) of the Scheme regarding rectification opportunities. Additionally, the petition questions the propriety of granting relief in writ jurisdiction when the initial tenancy period had expired without renewal, and when the respondent had previously withdrawn a civil suit concerning the same grievance without obtaining permission to refile. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to resolve these issues, emphasizing the necessity of interpreting the statutory framework governing state land tenancies.
Questions settled- Is the resumption of a tenancy under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, subject to providing the tenant an opportunity for rectification?
- What is the effect of Section 27 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, on the rectification provisions contained in Section 24?
- Can a writ petition be maintained regarding a tenancy dispute if the petitioner previously withdrew a civil suit on the same matter without permission to refile?
- Liaquat Ali vs The State1982 SCMR 21 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-10-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from the judgment of the High Court upholding the petitioner's conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the sentence of death for the murder of his paternal-uncle. The core legal question involves the sufficiency of solitary ocular testimony and the presence of mitigating circumstances regarding the manner of occurrence and age. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the appreciation of evidence and the credibility of witnesses are questions of fact, and in the absence of any violation of legal principles governing the appreciation of evidence, interference is unwarranted. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not reappraise evidence or interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts unless a legal principle regarding evidence appreciation has been violated.
Questions settled- Whether the testimony of a solitary eye-witness is sufficient to sustain a murder conviction?
- Can the Supreme Court reappraise evidence in a criminal petition for leave to appeal?
- Does the absence of evidence regarding how an occurrence began constitute a mitigating circumstance for commuting a death sentence?
- Liaqat vs The State1982 SCMR 1085 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners filed a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of their criminal revision by the High Court, which had maintained their conviction and sentence under sections 366 and 323 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 as passed by a Magistrate Section 30, Lahore. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether re-appreciation of evidence is a valid ground for granting leave to appeal. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent appreciation of evidence by the lower courts cannot be re-examined merely on the ground that the courts below failed to correctly appreciate the evidence, as this does not constitute a valid ground for the grant of leave to appeal. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, laying down the principle that the Supreme Court will not grant leave to appeal solely on the contention of incorrect appreciation of evidence by the lower courts.
Questions settled- Is incorrect appreciation of evidence by lower courts a valid ground for the grant of leave to appeal by the Supreme Court?
- Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact based on appreciation of evidence?
- Liaqat Shah and 4 Others vs The State1982 SCMR 305 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a criminal conviction for murder. The petitioners, five brothers, were convicted by the trial court for the murder of four individuals, receiving death sentences, which were maintained by the High Court. The prosecution case relied on eyewitness testimony and the recovery of firearms. However, the High Court acquitted a co-accused, Mst. Batan, noting that the prosecution had improved its case by falsely implicating her. The petitioners challenged their convictions, arguing that the unreliability of the prosecution's case regarding Mst. Batan necessitated independent corroboration for the remaining accused, which they contended was lacking for most petitioners. Additionally, the petitioners submitted a compromise deed between the parties. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to re-evaluate the evidence, specifically to determine whether the lower courts adhered to established principles of criminal evidence appreciation, particularly regarding the reliability of witnesses whose testimony was found partially fabricated, and to consider the legal implications of the compromise deed in a capital case.
Questions settled- Does the finding that the prosecution improved its case by falsely implicating one co-accused necessitate independent corroboration for the conviction of the remaining accused?
- What is the effect of a compromise deed on a conviction for murder in a capital case?
- To what extent must evidence be reappraised when the prosecution's case is found to be partially unreliable?