Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Smt. Vidayabai and ontEas vs Noorajmal1980 SCMR 267 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-08
  evictionminor petitionerscounsel concessioncompromise of appealrent caseleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of an eviction proceeding initiated against a tenant, Jiandmal, whose heirs contested the matter after his death. The Rent Controller dismissed the eviction application, but the Additional District Judge allowed the respondent's appeal. Subsequently, the petitioners' second appeal in the Sind High Court was dismissed based on a concession made by their counsel. The core legal question revolves around whether a counsel has the authority to compromise an appeal involving minor petitioners without the court applying its mind to whether the compromise is in the interest of the minors, and the applicability of principles akin to Order XXXII Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure to rent cases. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, setting aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and remanding the matter for a fresh decision. The court held that the beneficial principle of equity enshrined in Order XXXII Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to rent cases involving minors.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the beneficial principle enshrined in Order XXXII Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to rent cases involving minors?
  • Can an appeal be dismissed on the basis of a counsel's concession when the petitioners are minors without considering their best interests?
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• Sirajuddin Khan vs Chief Engineer (Irrigation), Sukkur and Others1980 SCMR 701 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-22
  service matterlimitationcondonation of delayservice tribunalarrears of payignorance of lawabatement of suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges the dismissal of the petitioner's appeal and subsequent review petition by the Sind Service Tribunal regarding a claim for salary arrears. The petitioner, a former Store-keeper, sought payment for two periods during which his services were terminated. Following the abatement of his civil suit under Article 212(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, the petitioner appealed to the Sind Service Tribunal, which dismissed his claim. Instead of filing a timely appeal before the Supreme Court as mandated by Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, the petitioner filed a review petition before the Tribunal, which was rejected for lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner subsequently filed the present petition before the Supreme Court, seeking condonation of delay on the grounds of a mistaken belief regarding the availability of a review remedy. The Supreme Court held that ignorance of the law does not justify delay and that the petition was time-barred, as it was not filed within the prescribed 60-day limitation period following the Tribunal's initial order.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Service Tribunal possess the inherent power to review its own orders under the Sind Service Tribunal Act 1973?
  • Can ignorance of the law be accepted as a valid ground for condonation of delay in filing a petition before the Supreme Court?
  • What is the appropriate remedy for an aggrieved party after a Service Tribunal dismisses an appeal under the Sind Service Tribunal Act 1973?
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• Sind Employees' Social Security Institution vs Greaves Cotton & Co.1980 SCMR 529 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-29
  social securityestablishment definitionnotified establishmentscope of notificationremand orderprecedentlabor law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Sind High Court judgment that remanded a case to the Sind Employees' Social Security Institution. The core legal question was whether a notification extending the West Pakistan Social Security Ordinance, 1965, to a specific establishment at a particular address also encompassed employees working at the company's separate Head Office. The petitioner argued that the High Court erred in applying the Supreme Court's precedent in Kohinoor Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Sind Employees' Social Security Institution, contending that the definition of 'establishment' should be interpreted broadly to include the entire organization regardless of location. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court correctly applied the binding precedent set in the Kohinoor Chemical Co. Ltd. case. The Court affirmed that the previous interpretation of 'establishment' and 'employee' under the Ordinance was comprehensive and did not require review. Consequently, the Court upheld the remand order, maintaining that the inquiry into whether Head Office employees were connected to the notified establishment's work was appropriate under the established legal framework.

  Questions settled

  • Does a notification extending the West Pakistan Social Security Ordinance, 1965, to a specific establishment address automatically include employees working at the company's separate Head Office?
  • Is the definition of 'establishment' under the West Pakistan Social Security Ordinance, 1965, broad enough to include an entire organization regardless of the location of its various units?
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• Sikandar and 2 oTHERS vs The State1980 SCMR 71 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-04
  murdercommon intentionocular testimonyinterested witnessesprivate defenceweapon recoverycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the concurrent convictions of the three appellants by the Sessions Judge and the High Court under section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for the murder of Muhammad Yusuf. The core legal questions involved the credibility of ocular testimony from interested witnesses (the uncle and friend of the deceased), the reliability of weapon recovery evidence, and the veracity of the appellant Sikandar's plea of private defence and self-inflicted injuries. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that minor discrepancies in the testimony of truthful witnesses do not vitiate the prosecution's case, that ocular accounts supported by prompt FIRs, medical evidence, and natural presence of witnesses are reliable, and that injuries sustained by an accused during a fatal struggle do not establish self-defence where the nature and multiplicity of the victim's stab wounds demonstrate a concerted attack. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact based on a careful appraisal of ocular and medical evidence will not be disturbed by the apex court unless a material legal error is shown.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of related or interested eye-witnesses can form the basis of a murder conviction without independent corroboration?
  • Can an accused's plea of private defence be sustained when the nature, number, and placement of injuries on the deceased negate the possibility of self-inflicted or defensive harm?
  • Does the presence of minor discrepancies in the statements of prosecution witnesses render their entire account untrustworthy?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and the High Court regarding appreciation of evidence are open to interference by the Supreme Court in the absence of a legal error?
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• Sherdil vs The State1980 SCMR 636 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-22
  murderleave to appealmedical evidencecause of deathdying declarationKariArms Ordinanceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Sind, which maintained the petitioner's conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murders of his wife and her cousin, while reducing his death sentence to imprisonment for life, and also upheld his conviction under section 13-D of the Arms Ordinance. The core legal questions addressed involve the reliability of eyewitness testimony, the sufficiency of medical evidence regarding the cause of death when an autopsy is conducted months after exhumation, and the evaluation of defence witnesses in cases involving allegations of a 'Kari' motive. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding the petitioner's guilt were unexceptionable, as the medical evidence adequately connected the head injuries with the cause of death and the defence version failed to create reasonable doubt. The Court laid down that a medical officer's opinion stating a probable cause of death based on injuries observed during autopsy, when corroborated by prompt ocular testimony and the absence of any supervening cause, is sufficient to sustain a murder conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for murder can be sustained when the medical officer's opinion on the cause of death is stated as probable following an exhumation and delayed autopsy?
  • Does a discrepancy between the oral description of a weapon as a gun versus a rifle by eyewitnesses create a fatal contradiction with medical evidence?
  • Whether the testimony of defence witnesses can outweigh consistent and prompt eyewitness and dying declaration accounts supported by a proven motive?
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• Sher Muhammad vs Abdul Rashid and Others1980 SCMR 928 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-11
  allotment of landfraudulent allotmentabdication of jurisdictionconstitutional jurisdictionclerical mistakeDisplaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Actadministrative adjudication
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment regarding the cancellation of a land allotment under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act. The petitioner, an informer, alleged the respondent’s allotment was fraudulent due to a discrepancy in the recorded parentage. The delegate of the Chief Settlement Commissioner had declared the allotment fraudulent based solely on a report by an Extra-Assistant Commissioner who inspected records at the Central Record Office. The High Court set aside this order, finding that the delegate had abdicated his jurisdiction by failing to apply his own mind to the primary record. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that an adjudicatory authority cannot surrender its discretion to a third party. Furthermore, the Court held that the High Court acted within its constitutional jurisdiction by examining the nature of the inquiry conducted by the Central Record Office to ensure that its intervention did not inadvertently validate an illegality. The petition was dismissed, as the delegate's reliance on a third-party report without personal verification constituted a failure to exercise jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does an adjudicatory authority abdicate its jurisdiction by relying solely on the findings of a third party without applying its own mind to the primary record?
  • Can a High Court in constitutional jurisdiction examine the nature of an inquiry conducted by an administrative body to ensure the legality of its own order?
  • Is a discrepancy in parentage in a verified claim form necessarily fraudulent if it constitutes a clerical mistake?
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• Sher Khan and Another vs The State and Another1980 SCMR 193 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-28
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationmurderinstigationlalkaraSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Baluchistan High Court cancelling the post-arrest bail granted to the petitioners by the Sessions Court in a murder case. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the discretion exercised by the Sessions Court in granting bail where the petitioners were only alleged to have instigated the fatal attack and lacked any discernible motive. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, holding that the High Court erred in interfering with the Sessions Court's discretion, particularly given that the role attributed to the petitioners was akin to a lalkara and there was an absence of motive. The key principle laid down is that superior courts should not lightly interfere with the bail discretion properly exercised by a trial court where the incriminating material against the accused is open to further inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can validly interfere with the discretion exercised by a Sessions Court in granting bail without strong and exceptional grounds?
  • Does an allegation of instigation or lalkara alone justify the cancellation of post-arrest bail in a murder case?
  • Is the absence of a discernible motive a relevant consideration for granting bail to an accused charged with murder?
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• Sher Ali vs The State1980 SCMR 291 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-01
  death penaltycommutation of sentencemurdersentencing discretionappellate reviewmitigating circumstances
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerns the appropriate sentence for the appellant, Sher Ali, who was convicted of murder under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial court sentenced the appellant to death, a decision upheld by a majority of the Peshawar High Court following a difference of opinion between the two judges of the Division Bench. The core legal question was whether the death penalty was the appropriate sentence given the circumstances of the case, specifically the nature of the dispute and the appellant's conduct. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court's majority view regarding the sentence. The Court held that, considering the totality of the circumstances—including the nature of the altercation and the relationship between the parties—the extreme penalty of death was not warranted. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal to the extent of setting aside the death sentence and commuting it to life imprisonment, thereby establishing that the imposition of the death penalty requires a careful balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the death penalty is mandatory in cases of premeditated murder?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a sentence confirmed by a majority of the High Court bench?
  • Does the existence of a prior land dispute and the relationship between parties constitute mitigating factors for sentencing in a murder case?
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• Shahzado and Others vs The State1980 SCMR 328 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-26
  leave to appealbenefit of the doubtalibiocular evidenceinjured witnessessifting of evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The three petitioners sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Sind, which had maintained their convictions under sections 307, 323, and 326 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while acquitting their co-accused Razul on the basis of an alibi. The core legal question was whether the acceptance of an alibi and the acquittal of one co-accused on the ground of doubt requires the rejection or independent corroboration of ocular testimony against the remaining co-accused. The Supreme Court held that giving the benefit of doubt to one accused out of abundant caution does not weaken the probative value of consistent eyewitness testimony against other co-accused whose presence and participation are fully established by injured witnesses. The key principle laid down is that the doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not applicable in Pakistan, and a court is fully competent to sift the evidence, acquit one accused on doubtful grounds, and maintain the convictions of others based on reliable ocular testimony.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the acquittal of one co-accused on the basis of an alibi necessarily renders the ocular evidence doubtful against the remaining co-accused?
  • Is a court competent to sift the evidence and acquit one accused out of abundant caution while maintaining the conviction of others?
  • Does the granting of benefit of doubt to one accused weaken the probity of eyewitness testimony against co-accused?
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• Shahul Hamid vs Tahir Ali1980 SCMR 596 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-26
  res judicataestoppel against statutepublic policywithdrawal of appeallandlord and tenantcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerns an appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the applicability of the doctrine of res judicata. The appellant, Shahul Hamid, sought to challenge the lower courts' finding that his status as a tenant was concluded by a previous judgment. Previously, the appellant had obtained a favorable decree declaring him a tenant, but the defendants' appeal against that decree was withdrawn by consent, with a stipulation that the findings would not operate as res judicata in future proceedings. The core legal question was whether parties can, by consent, waive the application of the principle of res judicata or whether such an agreement is void as against public policy. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of res judicata is founded on public policy to settle litigation and cannot be waived by the consent of parties or by court orders. The Court affirmed that statutory provisions like Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure are mandatory, and there can be no estoppel against a statute. Consequently, the previous judgment remained binding, and the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can parties by mutual consent or agreement waive the application of the doctrine of res judicata?
  • Does a court order allowing the withdrawal of an appeal with a condition that findings will not operate as res judicata bind the parties in future litigation?
  • Is there an estoppel against a statutory provision like Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a court grant liberty to file a fresh suit in a manner that contradicts the mandatory provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Shah Nawaz vs Sher Bahadur and Another1980 SCMR 172 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-14
  murdercircumstantial evidenceextra-judicial confessionmitigating circumstancescriminal petitionappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from criminal petitions filed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which maintained the conviction of Sher Bahadur for the murder of Amir Khan but altered his sentence from death to imprisonment for life. The convict appealed against his conviction, while the complainant sought the restoration of the death penalty. The core legal question concerned whether the circumstantial evidence, including an extra-judicial confession, recoveries of incriminating articles such as the severed head and blood-stained weapons from the accused's room, and testimonies of last seen witnesses, was sufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the absence of direct ocular evidence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the proved incriminating circumstances and recoveries were conclusive against the accused, and upheld both the conviction and the reduction of sentence based on mitigating circumstances including the tender age of the accused and family honor. The Court affirmed that once robust circumstantial recoveries are established, theoretical speculations regarding age or state of mind cannot avail the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of lower courts on circumstantial evidence and recoveries can be sustained in the absence of ocular testimony?
  • Does the tender age of an accused combined with mitigating factors of family honor justify the reduction of a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Are recoveries of incriminating articles and weapons from a room rented and controlled by the accused sufficient to prove guilt in a murder trial?
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• Shabbir Hussain and Others vs The State1980 SCMR 522 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-07-29
  appeal against acquittalremand of caseunsoundness of mindidentification paradeconfessional statementsodomy
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court whereby a State appeal against the acquittal of the petitioners for an offence under section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code was accepted, the acquittal set aside, and the case remanded for recording additional statements and fresh decision. The trial magistrate had convicted the petitioners based on the victim's testimony, medical evidence, identification parades, and a confession. The lower appellate court set aside the conviction, influenced largely by its view that the victim was of unsound mind, alongside other infirmities in the prosecution case. The High Court reversed the acquittal without addressing those other infirmities. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, observing that the High Court ought to have examined the various points and infirmities noted by the lower appellate court before setting aside the acquittal, and stayed the remand proceedings while maintaining the petitioners' bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is required to examine all material infirmities and points considered by the lower appellate court before setting aside a judgment of acquittal?
  • Whether a judge's personal observation regarding the mental state of a witness, without expert opinion, is a sufficient ground for acquittal?
  • Whether the other evidentiary points considered in a judgment of acquittal are separable from the finding regarding the victim's mental capacity?
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• Shabbir Ahmad vs The State1980 SCMR 920 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-08
  post-arrest bailplea of alibimurdercriminal appealSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for bail filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning a criminal case involving murder and related charges under the law. The core legal question is whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail in light of the investigation findings and the plea of alibi supported by prosecution witnesses. The court decided to convert the petition into an appeal and allowed it, granting bail to the petitioner. The key principle laid down is that where the investigation report and supporting statements of prosecution witnesses lend credence to a plea of alibi, a case for further inquiry is made out, rendering the accused a fit person for the grant of post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to post-arrest bail when prosecution witnesses support a plea of alibi during investigation?
  • Can the Supreme Court convert a petition for leave to appeal into an appeal and grant bail based on the merits of the case?
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• Sh. Muhammad Alam vs Mst. Zahida Parveen1980 SCMR 679 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-29
  ejectmentpersonal needpardanashin ladybona fide needleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by a tenant against the dismissal of his second appeal by the High Court, which had upheld the ejectment order passed by the Additional District Judge. The landlady sought the eviction of the petitioner from the disputed shop on the ground of personal need. The Rent Controller initially dismissed the application, but the appellate court reversed the decision, finding the personal need duly established, a view subsequently affirmed by the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a pardanashin lady's plea of personal need for conducting business is mala fide or lacking in bona fides merely due to her status or previous disputes between the tenant and her husband. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the lower courts' concurrent findings on the bona fide personal need were well-reasoned, supported by precedent, and warranted no interference. The key principle laid down is that the pardanashin status of a landlady and minor disputes with her husband do not inherently negate the bona fides of her personal requirement for ejectment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the personal need of a pardanashin lady for business can be considered lacking in bona fides merely due to her status?
  • Does a prior dispute between a tenant and a landlord's husband render an eviction application for personal need mala fide?
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• SH. Mohammad Zaki ,SH. Rahimuddin, Etc. vs Income Tax Officer Income42 TAX 92 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-15
  WaqfMutawalliIncome Tax arrearssuccessor liabilityleave to appealtax recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding the liability of successor Mutawallis for income tax arrears incurred by their predecessor. The petitioners, who became Mutawallis of a Waqf property, challenged notices issued by the Income Tax Officer demanding payment of tax arrears left unpaid by the previous Mutawalli. The High Court had dismissed their writ petitions, holding that the successor Mutawallis were liable for the tax arrears of their predecessor under the Income Tax Act, 1922. The petitioners argued that they were not executors, administrators, or legal representatives of the deceased Mutawalli under Section 24B of the Income Tax Act, 1922, and thus could not be held personally liable for the predecessor's tax debts. The Supreme Court observed that the issue was one of first impression involving questions of law of public importance. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the validity of the High Court's interpretation regarding the scope of liability for successor trustees under the relevant tax legislation.

  Questions settled

  • Are successor Mutawallis personally liable for income tax arrears incurred by a predecessor Mutawalli under the Income Tax Act 1922?
  • Does Section 24B of the Income Tax Act 1922 apply to successor Mutawallis who are not executors, administrators, or legal representatives of a deceased Mutawalli?
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• Secretary, Health Department, Government of Baluchistan vs Miss1980 SCMR 189 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-03-19
  review petitioninfructuous petitionreserved seatsmootnesserror patent on the face of the record
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed by the Secretary, Health Department, Government of Baluchistan, seeking to challenge an earlier order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan that had dismissed a civil petition as having become infructuous. The core legal question was whether the court should adjudicate on the entitlement for reserved seats under category B of paragraph 13 of the Prospectus, despite the underlying issue having been rendered moot by the dismissal of the petition. The Supreme Court declined to review its prior order, holding that the controversy regarding the reserved seats did not constitute a live issue, nor did the previous dismissal contain an error patent on the face of the record. The court maintained its decision to dismiss the petition as infructuous, while clarifying that the substantive legal question regarding seat entitlement remains open for consideration should it arise in future litigation. The principle affirmed is that the court will not entertain review petitions on issues that are no longer live or where no clear error on the record exists.

  Questions settled

  • Can a review petition be entertained when the underlying issue has become infructuous?
  • Does a controversy that is no longer a live issue constitute an error patent on the face of the record?
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• Sarfraz alias Faraza. vs The State1980 SCMR 513 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-16
  murdersentence enhancementsuo motu jurisdictionpremeditationcapital punishmentocular testimonycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court judgment that enhanced the appellant's sentence from life imprisonment to death for the murder of a court bailiff. The appellant, convicted under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, challenged the enhancement of his sentence, arguing that the incident occurred suddenly without premeditation and that the trial court's original sentence of life imprisonment was appropriate. The Supreme Court addressed whether the High Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction to enhance the sentence and whether the circumstances warranted the death penalty. The Court held that the appellant's actions—attacking the bailiff upon learning of an attachment warrant and continuing to strike the victim multiple times on vital body parts while the victim was incapacitated—demonstrated clear intent to kill rather than a sudden loss of self-control. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling that the brutality of the assault and the lack of mitigating circumstances justified the imposition of the death penalty. The principle established is that repeated blows to vital organs following an initial attack negate claims of sudden provocation or lack of premeditation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the infliction of multiple blows on vital parts of a victim's body after the victim has been incapacitated negate a plea of sudden provocation?
  • Can a High Court enhance a sentence from life imprisonment to death in the exercise of its suo motu jurisdiction?
  • Is the absence of derogatory language from a public official executing a warrant sufficient to reject a claim of sudden loss of self-control by the accused?
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• Sardar vs Ghulam Nabi and Another1980 SCMR 669 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-13
  land allotmentlimitationDisplaced Persons (Land Settlement) Actwrit jurisdictioncondonation of delayrehabilitationrefugee entitlement
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arose from a dispute over land allotment under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. The petitioner, a refugee, challenged the allotment of specific land to the respondent, claiming it was originally proposed for him. The respondent had secured the allotment in 1959, and the petitioner, despite raising initial objections, failed to challenge the order for nearly a decade. When the petitioner finally appealed in 1969, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner initially allowed the appeal, but the Settlement Commissioner reversed this, ruling the appeal time-barred and holding that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, did not apply to proceedings under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. The High Court dismissed the subsequent writ petition. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that because the petitioner was present and had raised objections at the time of the original allotment, he had full knowledge of the order. Consequently, the plea of ignorance was rejected, and the finding that the appeal was hopelessly time-barred was affirmed.

  Questions settled

  • Is Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 applicable to appeals filed under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
  • Can an allottee claim ignorance of an allotment order if they were present and raised objections at the time of the original allotment?
  • Does the failure to challenge an allotment order for a decade preclude a subsequent appeal on the grounds of limitation?
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• Sardar Mir Usman Tareen vs Syed Muhammad Hassan & Sons and 21980 SCMR 871 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-08
  mining leaseencroachmentad interim injunctionadministrative instructionsnatural justicewithdrawal of petitionamendment of plaint
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a coal mining lessee, challenged an administrative letter issued by the Joint Director, Mineral Development, Baluchistan, which alleged unauthorized encroachment by the petitioner into the mining area granted to the respondents. The petitioner filed a suit for declaration and injunction, arguing that the administrative instructions were issued without a hearing, thereby violating principles of natural justice. The trial court initially granted an ad interim injunction, but this was subsequently recalled by the District Judge on appeal, and the High Court dismissed the petitioner's challenge to that appellate order. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner's counsel, recognizing the difficulty in sustaining the petition, sought to withdraw the proceedings. The Supreme Court permitted the withdrawal of the petition, granting the petitioner liberty to seek an amendment of the plaint in the trial court and to file a fresh application for an injunction. The Court clarified that such applications would be decided by the trial court in accordance with the law, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the underlying dispute.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner withdraw a leave to appeal petition before the Supreme Court while reserving the right to amend pleadings in the trial court?
  • Does the withdrawal of a petition before the Supreme Court preclude a litigant from seeking fresh injunctive relief in the trial court?
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• Salehon and OTHERSs vs State1980 SCMR 901 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-06-02
  murdercriminal appealeyewitness testimonyacquittal reversalinjured witnesscommon intentionmotive
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the High Court's reversal of a trial court's acquittal of four appellants convicted for the murder of one individual and murderous assault on two others. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in relying on eyewitness testimony that the trial court had previously rejected due to alleged discrepancies. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court was justified in its conviction. The Court determined that the inconsistencies in the eyewitnesses' statements were minor and did not detract from their overall veracity. Crucially, the Court emphasized that the presence of the injured witnesses at the scene was corroborated by the numerous injuries they sustained during the incident. Furthermore, the Court found the motive for the crime—a land dispute—and the recovery of incriminating weapons from the appellants sufficient to establish the prosecution's case beyond reasonable doubt. The judgment reaffirms that minor contradictions do not invalidate testimony when corroborated by independent medical evidence and physical facts.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of minor discrepancies in eyewitness testimony automatically render such evidence unreliable?
  • Can the presence of injuries on a witness serve as corroboration of their presence at the scene of a crime?
  • Is the reversal of an acquittal by a High Court justified when the trial court's rejection of evidence is based on minor inconsistencies?
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• Saidur Rehman vs The State1980 SCMR 950 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-12
  murderprivate defenceException 2 to Section 300 PPCpremeditationculpable homicidelife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave was filed against the decision of the Peshawar High Court maintaining the appellant's conviction and sentence of life imprisonment under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution alleged that following a dispute over a boundary line ('banna'), the appellant, armed with a pistol and accompanied by a stick-wielding co-accused, arrived at the scene, abused the deceased, and fatally shot him in the chest. During trial, an eye-witness disclosed that prior to the shooting, grappling had occurred in which the deceased overpowered the appellant. The core legal question was whether the appellant was entitled to the benefit of Exception 2 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code, thereby reducing the offence from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Part I, on the ground of exceeding the right of private defence. The Supreme Court held that Exception 2 to Section 300 was inapplicable because the appellant acted with premeditation, full preparedness, and had initiated the incident armed with a deadly weapon. The conviction and sentence under Section 302 were accordingly affirmed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused who acts with premeditation and full preparedness can claim the benefit of Exception 2 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Can an accused plead the right of private defence under Exception 2 to Section 300 PPC if he provoked the aggression while armed with a firearm?
  • Whether grappling preceding a fatal shot reduces an offence from murder under Section 302 PPC to Section 304 Part I PPC where premeditation is present?
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• Said Muhammad vs Federation of Pakistan and Others1980 SCMR 584 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-11
  customs confiscationsmugglingpilot vehiclenaka-bandistatutory interpretationconveyance seizurecustoms act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the confiscation of the appellant's vehicle by Customs authorities under the Customs Act, 1969. The appellant’s car, acting as a pilot for another vehicle suspected of carrying smuggled goods, failed to stop at a Customs road-block (Naka-Bandi) and fled. The core legal question was whether a vehicle not directly carrying contraband, but acting as an escort or pilot for smuggling, falls within the ambit of Section 164 of the Customs Act, 1969, thereby rendering it liable to confiscation under Section 156(1)(80) for failing to stop when signaled. The Supreme Court held that the statutory language of Section 164 is sufficiently broad to encompass not only vehicles directly transporting smuggled goods but also those escorting or piloting such vehicles to facilitate the smuggling mission. The Court affirmed that a road-block constitutes a valid signal to stop. Consequently, the Court upheld the confiscation, establishing the principle that pilot vehicles facilitating smuggling operations are subject to the same penal and confiscatory provisions as the primary transport vehicles under the Customs Act.

  Questions settled

  • Can a vehicle acting as a pilot or escort for smuggled goods be confiscated under the Customs Act, 1969, even if it is not carrying contraband itself?
  • Does a road-block (Naka-Bandi) established by Customs officials constitute a valid signal to stop under Section 164 of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Does the pendency of a criminal case under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 bar proceedings for confiscation under the Customs Act, 1969?
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• Said Mian and Anothes vs Mian Said Baghdad and Another1980 SCMR 429 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  appeal against acquittalnon-bailable warrantsappellate jurisdictioncomplete justiceancillary powerscriminal procedurecustody of accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a reference regarding the Supreme Court's authority to order the arrest of an acquitted person pending the disposal of an appeal against an acquittal order passed by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court possesses the power to issue warrants for the arrest of an acquitted accused during the pendency of an appeal, given the absence of an express provision similar to Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to High Courts. The Court held that it possesses such power, affirming that the order for non-bailable warrants was legal and proper. The Court reasoned that Article 187 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, which empowers the Court to issue directions for 'complete justice,' includes the ancillary power to secure the attendance of any person. Consequently, the Court has the inherent authority to order detention or arrest to ensure the effective exercise of its appellate jurisdiction and to prevent the defeat of the judicial process.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have the power to order the arrest of an acquitted person pending the disposal of an appeal against acquittal?
  • Does Article 187 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 confer upon the Supreme Court the power to issue warrants of arrest to secure the attendance of an accused?
  • Is the power to order the arrest of an accused pending appeal an ancillary or incidental power to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction?
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• Sahib Khan and Others vs Ghulam Dastgir and Others1980 SCMR 561(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-27
  condonation of delaytime barred petitionleave to appealsufficient causelimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 30-11-1973 in a land settlement case, which petition is barred by 189 days. The core legal question is whether the explanation offered by the petitioners regarding illness, inability to contact a legal adviser, and a mistaken impression about the filing of petitions during the Supreme Court summer vacation constitutes sufficient cause for the condonation of delay. The court holds that the explanation provided by the petitioners does not amount to a sufficient cause and ground for condonation of delay. The key principle laid down is that vague and unsupported assertions of illness and misconceptions regarding court vacations do not furnish sufficient ground to excuse a substantial period of delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether illness combined with a mistaken impression about court vacations constitutes sufficient cause for condoning a delay of 189 days?
  • Can vague assertions of being unable to contact a legal adviser justify the condonation of delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Sahib alias Sabel vs The State1980 SCMR 803 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-27
  eyewitness identificationcriminal appealmurder convictionmoonlight identificationcredibility of witnessesenmityappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of the appellants for murder and murderous assault under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court of Pakistan on a limited question regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification of the assailants, specifically whether the moonlight on the 8th night of the lunar month was sufficient for the witnesses to identify the accused. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the convictions. The Court reasoned that because the witnesses had prior knowledge of the appellants—a fact supported by the appellants' own admission of enmity—they could identify them despite the lighting conditions. Furthermore, the Court observed that the witnesses' credibility was bolstered by their honest admission that they could not identify a third assailant, which indicated they were not fabricating evidence to falsely implicate the appellants. The judgment establishes that eyewitness testimony identifying previously known assailants remains reliable in partial moonlight, and the failure to name unknown accomplices serves as a significant indicator of witness veracity in criminal trials.

  Questions settled

  • Can eyewitnesses reliably identify known assailants on the 8th night of a lunar month?
  • Does an honest admission by a witness regarding the inability to identify an unknown accomplice enhance their overall credibility?
  • Is prior acquaintance between the accused and eyewitnesses a relevant factor in assessing the reliability of identification?
  Read full judgment →
• Saeedur Rahman vs The State1980 SCMR 271 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-09-29
  review petitioncriminal appealappreciation of evidencecompromisedeath sentenceSupreme Court Rulestime-barred petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition was filed by the petitioner, Saeedur Rahman, seeking to challenge the Supreme Court's earlier dismissal of his jail petition regarding his conviction for murder. The petitioner had been convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge and sentenced to death, a decision upheld by the High Court and subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court. In the review petition, the petitioner argued that the complainant had duped him into transferring land based on a promise of compromise, which failed to materialize, and contended that the eye-witnesses were inimical and the forensic evidence was potentially fabricated. The Supreme Court held that the petition was time-barred and that the petitioner failed to provide any evidence, such as affidavits or the presence of the complainant, to substantiate the alleged compromise. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the arguments regarding witness enmity and forensic tampering were conjectural and constituted an attempt to re-appreciate evidence, which is impermissible in review proceedings. The Court affirmed that such grounds do not satisfy the criteria for review under the Supreme Court Rules, 1956, and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a review petition be entertained when it seeks to re-appreciate evidence already considered by the Court?
  • Does an unsubstantiated claim of a compromise between parties constitute a valid ground for review of a criminal conviction?
  • Are conjectural arguments regarding the potential manipulation of forensic evidence sufficient to warrant a review of a final judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Sabz Ali vs Yusuf Shah and Others1980 SCMR 126 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-13
  murderacquittalocular evidencemedical evidenceappreciation of evidencespecial leave to appealdiscrepancy in evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which acquitted the respondents of murder charges after setting aside their conviction by the trial court. The core legal question was whether the ocular evidence provided by the prosecution witnesses was reliable enough to sustain a conviction, particularly when contradicted by medical and forensic evidence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly appreciated the evidence, noting significant discrepancies: the absence of charring marks on the deceased (contradicting the claim of point-blank firing), the failure to account for numerous spent cartridges, the lack of bloodstains on the witness's clothes, and the failure to examine key witnesses named in the F.I.R. The Court affirmed that where ocular testimony is fundamentally inconsistent with medical evidence and physical circumstances, it cannot be relied upon. The principle laid down is that appellate courts are justified in overturning convictions where the trial court's appreciation of evidence is mechanical, ignores glaring contradictions, and fails to reconcile ocular testimony with established medical and forensic facts.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained when ocular evidence is fundamentally contradicted by medical evidence?
  • Is the appellate court justified in interfering with a trial court's finding if the trial court ignored material discrepancies in the evidence?
  • Does the failure to examine key witnesses named in the F.I.R. undermine the prosecution's case?
  • Can the abscondence of an accused provide corroboration when the primary ocular evidence is found to be untruthful?
  Read full judgment →
• Sabz Ali vs The State1980 SCMR 309 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-05
  leave to appealmurderocular evidenceinterested witnesscorroborationabscondencemotive
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Sabz Ali, sought leave to appeal against his conviction for the murder of Noor Rehman and the confirmation of his death sentence by the Peshawar High Court. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner killed the deceased due to a family grievance stemming from the deceased having divorced the petitioner's sister four years prior. The petitioner was seen fleeing the scene with a firearm immediately after the shooting occurred inside a village mosque. The core legal questions involved the credibility of related eye-witnesses, the requirement for corroboration, and alleged contradictions between the First Information Report and trial testimony. The Supreme Court held that the eye-witnesses were not 'interested witnesses' requiring corroboration merely due to their relation to the deceased, as they had no prior grievance against the petitioner. The Court further held that minor discrepancies regarding the exact posture of the deceased at the time of the shooting did not undermine the consistent testimony identifying the petitioner as the assailant, and affirmed that the death sentence was amply justified for deliberate murder.

  Questions settled

  • Whether close relatives of a deceased person can be classified as interested witnesses requiring independent corroboration?
  • Does a minor discrepancy in eye-witness accounts regarding the posture of the deceased at the time of an attack vitiate a murder conviction?
  • Is the absence of a prior grievance by prosecution witnesses against an accused relevant to assessing their credibility?
  Read full judgment →
• S. Sharif Ahmed Hashmi vs The Chairman, Screening Committee, Lahore and Another1980 SCMR 711 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-07-01
  review petitiongross lachesvoid and voidable orderscompulsory retirementlimitation periodwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition arises from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissing a writ petition against an order of compulsory retirement due to gross laches of twelve years. The petitioner challenged the previous Supreme Court decision, arguing primarily that the petition for leave to appeal was time-barred and that the retirement order was void ab initio, thereby rendering the principle of laches inapplicable. The core legal questions involved the computation of limitation for leave to appeal, the distinction between void and voidable administrative orders, and whether gross laches can bar a challenge against a void order. The court held that the petition for leave was within time upon examining the High Court copying branch registers, that an order passed by an otherwise competent authority is voidable rather than void, and that even void orders may not be struck down if barred by gross laches or where equities have accrued. The key principle laid down is that a review does not lie merely because an alternative view of the law is possible, and gross laches can bar relief against an illegal or void administrative order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a review petition is maintainable on the ground that the civil petition for leave to appeal was time-barred?
  • Is an administrative order passed by an authority otherwise competent to act, but based on a repealed statutory provision, void or voidable?
  • Whether a writ petition can be dismissed on the ground of gross laches when challenging an order alleged to be void?
  • Does a void administrative order invariably fall to the ground regardless of subsequent consequences, equities, and delay?
  Read full judgment →
• S. M. Matlub Hussain vs Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and 4 Others1980 SCMR 351 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-02
  ex parte decreeejectment suitremand orderservice of noticewrit jurisdictionrevenue authoritiesdiscretionary power
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that dismissed a writ petition regarding the ejectment of a tenant. The petitioner had obtained an ex parte decree for ejectment and recovery of rent against the respondent, which was subsequently set aside by the Collector on grounds of improper service of notice, as the petitioner had provided an incorrect address for the respondent. The Collector remanded the case for a fresh decision, a decision affirmed by the Additional Commissioner and the Member, Board of Revenue. The core legal questions involved the authority of the Collector to remand the case, the jurisdiction of the Assistant Collector post-remand, and the validity of the ex parte proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the revenue authorities acted within their competence in remanding the case for a fresh hearing to ensure both parties were heard. The Court affirmed that the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in refusing to interfere with the revenue authorities' findings, as the respondent had not been properly served, and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Collector have the authority to remand a case for a fresh decision after setting aside an ex parte decree?
  • Is the High Court's writ jurisdiction discretionary when reviewing orders passed by revenue authorities?
  • Can an Assistant Collector exercise jurisdiction over a matter after an order of remand has been passed by an appellate revenue authority?
  Read full judgment →
• S. M, Yousuf and Another vs Chief Settlement Commissioner and 2 Others1980 SCMR 411 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1960-06-24
  evacuee propertysettlement schemebuilding site transfercompensation poolpublic auctiondisplaced personssub-division of plots
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil appeals arising from a dispute over the transfer of two evacuee building sites under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal questions were whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner, with Central Government approval, could authorize the transfer of building sites by negotiation at the average auction price, notwithstanding the auction requirements in the Schedule to the Act, and whether the sub-division of a plot was legally permissible. The Supreme Court held that the 1960 policy instructions were valid, ruling that Section 10 of the Act empowers the Central Government to approve modes of transfer outside the strict provisions of the Schedule. The Court affirmed the sub-division of the plot, noting that the appellants' permanent construction did not meet the required threshold for the entire site. The key principle laid down is that Section 10 grants the Central Government broad authority to approve transfer modes, and policy instructions issued thereunder are valid, while settlement authorities may sub-divide plots where construction does not cover the requisite area of the original site.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Chief Settlement Commissioner transfer evacuee property in a manner inconsistent with the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Does the Central Government have the power to approve modes of transfer of evacuee property other than those specified in the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Are settlement authorities empowered to sub-divide an evacuee building site if the permanent construction thereon does not meet the statutory threshold for the entire plot?
  Read full judgment →
• Shamshad Ahmad vs Government of Sind and Others1980 SCMR 440 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-15
  medical college admissionnational cadet corps certificateadditional marksterminal dateconstitutional petitionexercise of discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind which dismissed the appellant's constitutional petition seeking admission to the first-year M.B., B.S. course at Liaquat Medical College, Jamshoro. The appellant failed to produce his National Cadet Corps certificate by the extended deadline of March 20, 1977, to claim twenty additional marks under section 29(c) of the National Guards Act, 1973, subsequently submitting it on June 11, 1977. The core legal question was whether the authorities could withhold admission and refuse to consider the late certificate in disregard of the statutory provisions. The Supreme Court held that the authorities were within their rights to ignore a certificate submitted after the terminal date and were under no legal obligation to consider it, as admissions are governed by the prospectus rules and candidates must fulfill essential requirements within stipulated deadlines. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether college admission can be denied for failing to submit a National Cadet Corps certificate by the extended terminal date?
  • Are educational authorities legally obligated to consider eligibility certificates submitted after the deadline fixed in the prospectus?
  • Does a candidate acquire a legal right to claim admission when they default on an essential requirement of the admission rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Riaz Mahmood Khan Mazari vs Mureed Hussain and Others1980 SCMR 548 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-09-18
  local government electionnomination paperselectoral rollcandidate eligibilityage determinationretrospective correctionwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses the rejection of the appellant's nomination papers for election to a District Council on the ground that he was under the age of 25 years on the last date for filing nomination papers, based on entries in two electoral rolls. The core legal question was whether the entry of age in an electoral roll is final and conclusive for determining the eligibility of a candidate contesting a local council election. The Supreme Court held that entries regarding age in electoral rolls are not final or conclusive for determining a candidate's exact age or eligibility for candidacy, as finality only attaches to the right to vote. The Court set aside both the appellate authority's order and the High Court's writ order, remanding the case back to the appellate authority to determine the appellant's correct age on the basis of all relevant evidence and direct fresh polling if found eligible.

  Questions settled

  • Is the entry of age in an electoral roll final and conclusive for determining the eligibility of a candidate for contesting a local council election?
  • Does the subsequent correction of an age entry by a Registration Officer operate retrospectively to validate a rejected nomination paper?
  • What is the scope of finality attached to entries in electoral rolls under the electoral laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Riaz Khalil and Others vs Sh. Muhammad Shafiq1980 SCMR 294 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-01
  interlocutory orderrent depositright of appealejectment proceedingsCantonments Rent Restriction Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises out of ejectment proceedings under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963. The Rent Controller directed the tenant petitioners to deposit arrears of rent under section 17(8) of the Act. The Additional District Judge allowed the appeal and dismissed the ejectment application. The High Court, relying on precedent, allowed the landlord's writ petition, setting aside the appellate order as without lawful authority. The core legal question was whether an interlocutory order for the deposit of rent under section 17(8) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 is appealable. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that interlocutory, provisional orders that do not decide the main dispute are not appealable unless expressly provided, to prevent fragmentary adjudication and delays in the administration of justice. The key principle laid down is that the right of appeal against interlocutory orders must be clearly granted by statute, and provisional orders regarding rent deposit do not invite a direct appeal merely because failure to comply may lead to striking off a defense.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an interlocutory order for the deposit of rent under section 17(8) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 is appealable?
  • Does the absence of the word 'finally' in section 17 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 change the provisional and incidental nature of an order directing the deposit of rent?
  • Are all orders passed by a Rent Controller appealable under section 24 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963?
  Read full judgment →
• Rehmatullah Habibullah Javed Transport, Service, Lahore vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore42 TAX 111 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-01
  Income TaxAssociation of PersonsFirm DissolutionConcurrent FindingsTax AssessmentEvidence of Business ContinuityQuestion of Law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a tax dispute where the petitioners, brothers previously operating a registered partnership firm, contested their assessment as an 'Association of Persons' for the years 1957-58 and 1958-59. The petitioners claimed the firm had been voluntarily dissolved, a contention rejected by the Income Tax Officer, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, and subsequently the Lahore High Court. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal was justified in assigning the status of an 'Association of Persons' to the petitioners given the evidence of business continuity. The Supreme Court held that the lower authorities' concurrent findings were supported by evidence, specifically that the business continued to operate under the same name, utilizing the same assets, and that the petitioners failed to produce books of account to substantiate the alleged dissolution. Furthermore, the filing of a suit for accounts by a partner contradicted the claim of dissolution. The Court dismissed the petition, affirming that where evidence supports the findings of fact, the status assigned by tax authorities remains legally sound.

  Questions settled

  • Can the status of an Association of Persons be assigned to partners if the firm fails to prove its dissolution?
  • Does the failure to produce books of account support an inference against a claim of business dissolution?
  • Can an inference drawn from facts raise a question of law in tax proceedings?
  • Is the filing of a suit for accounts by a partner evidence against the dissolution of a firm?
  Read full judgment →
• Raza Muhammad vs Deputy Commissioner/Settlement Commissioner1980 SCMR 629 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-23
  land settlementfraud and forgeryvoid ab initiowrit jurisdictionclean hands doctrineallotment cancellationdiscretionary relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court order that dismissed a writ petition against the cancellation of a land allotment. The petitioner had been allotted agricultural land based on a Q.P.R. document, which the Settlement Authorities later found to be forged, inflating the entitlement from 58 to 1198 P.I. Units. The Settlement Commissioner cancelled the allotment, finding it was obtained through fraud and forgery. The High Court upheld this cancellation, ruling that the allotment was a nullity ab initio and that the petitioner, having acted fraudulently, was not entitled to discretionary relief. The Supreme Court examined the findings of fact regarding the forgery and found no infirmity in the Settlement Commissioner's conclusion. The Court held that fraud vitiates everything, and an allotment obtained through such means is not a valid settlement in the eyes of the law. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the High Court correctly refused to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction in favor of a petitioner who did not approach the court with clean hands. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does fraud vitiate an allotment obtained under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
  • Can a court exercise discretionary writ jurisdiction in favor of a petitioner who has obtained an allotment through fraud?
  • Is an allotment based on fraud and forgery considered a nullity ab initio?
  Read full judgment →
• Rasool Bux and ANOTHERs vs The State1980 SCMR 225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-18
  murderculpable homicideinterested witnessesocular evidencerecovery of weaponsudden fightbenefit of doubtcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a murder conviction where the appellants were sentenced to death by the High Court. The core legal questions involved the reliability of related eye-witnesses, the corroborative value of weapon recoveries, and the proper legal characterization of the offense given the origin of the fight. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts were based on a total misreading of the evidence, as the eye-witnesses had falsely implicated multiple persons and suppressed their own armed participation, and the weapon recoveries failed to comply with statutory mandates or provide independent corroboration. Consequently, the conviction of the second appellant was set aside for lack of corroboration, while the first appellant's conviction was altered to culpable homicide not amounting to murder due to a sudden and unpremeditated fight. The key principles laid down include that the testimony of interested eye-witnesses lacking independent corroboration cannot sustain a murder conviction, recoveries from open public access areas disregarding procedural safeguards have no corroborative value, and a conviction may be altered from murder to culpable homicide when the origin of the occurrence is shrouded in mystery and indicates a sudden altercation.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of related eye-witnesses be accepted without independent corroboration when they have falsely implicated other accused persons?
  • Does the recovery of a blood-stained weapon from a place accessible to the general public in disregard of statutory procedural safeguards possess corroborative value?
  • Whether a murder conviction should be altered to culpable homicide not amounting to murder when the origin of the occurrence is shrouded in mystery and arises from a sudden altercation?
  • Is a conviction sustainable where the prosecution suppresses the fact that the complainant party was also armed and engaged in a scuffle?
  Read full judgment →
• Rao Muhammad Akhtar Ali vs Faiz Ahmad (Repesented by Legal Heirs)1980 SCMR 552 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-20
  land settlementSummary Military Courtconfiscation of landbogus claimlachesestoppelwrit petitiondisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order dismissing a writ petition concerning land allotment under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. The petitioner, whose land claim was declared bogus by Settlement Authorities and subsequently confiscated by a Summary Military Court in 1961, argued that the confiscation order was invalid because the underlying Settlement Authority finding was later set aside and that a Martial Law directive precluded the confiscation. The Supreme Court held that there was no evidence the Military Court relied solely on the Settlement Authority's finding, and that the confiscation was validly implemented before the relevant cutoff date specified in the policy directive. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the petitioner lacked standing to challenge subsequent allotments to third parties because his own claim was fraudulent. Additionally, the Court noted that the petition was barred by laches and the principle of estoppel, as the petitioner had long accepted the confiscation and the land had been settled on third parties. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner challenge the allotment of land to third parties if their own claim to the land has been declared bogus?
  • Does a subsequent reversal of a finding by Settlement Authorities automatically invalidate a prior confiscation order passed by a Military Court?
  • Does a writ petition suffer from laches and estoppel when the petitioner has accepted a confiscation order for a significant period and the land has been settled on third parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Raja Qurban Khan vs Begum M. M. Sharif and Another1980 SCMR 590 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-16
  ejectmentresidential buildingcommercial useconversion of buildingsecond appeallandlord and tenantgood faith requirement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves an ejectment petition filed against the petitioner tenant by the respondent landlords for a residential building known as 'Ram Cottage' in Murree, on the grounds of personal good faith requirement and unauthorized commercial use (running a hotel). The Rent Controller ordered eviction, which was upheld by the Additional District Judge on personal need, though the appellate court initially reversed the finding on commercial use. The High Court dismissed the tenant's second appeal, holding that the character of the building could not be raised as a new question of fact. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a residential building cannot be converted into a non-residential building without the written consent of the landlord and the written permission of the Rent Controller pursuant to statutory provisions. The Court laid down that putting a residential building to commercial use without statutory permission does not alter its legal character as a residential building, and public policy strictly prohibits unauthorized conversions to mitigate housing shortages and preserve residential peace.

  Questions settled

  • Can a question of fact regarding the character of a building be raised for the first time in second appeal?
  • Does the unauthorized use of a residential building as a hotel change its legal character to a non-residential building without statutory permission?
  • Is the written consent of the landlord and the written permission of the Controller required to convert a residential building into a non-residential building?
  Read full judgment →
• Raja George Sikandar Zaman Khan vs Raja Ghulam Sarwar Khan and Another1980 SCMR 133 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-29
  bail cancellationmisrepresentationjudicial administrationfraud on courtcriminal appealsuppression of facts
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a criminal appeal against the High Court's order granting bail to the respondent, Raja Ghulam Sarwar Khan, in a case involving an attack on the complainant's vehicle. The respondent had secured bail from the High Court primarily on the grounds of advanced age (70 years) and associated infirmity. The appellant challenged this order, contending that the respondent had deliberately misled the High Court regarding his age and health, as official service records from WAPDA indicated he was only 54 years old and actively employed as a security sergeant. The core legal question was whether bail obtained through misrepresentation and fraudulent claims regarding age and health could be sustained. The Supreme Court held that the respondent had indeed misled the High Court by falsely claiming to be 70 years old to secure bail. The Court emphasized that such sharp tactics to manipulate the administration of justice must be firmly censured. Consequently, the Court cancelled the bail, directed the respondent to surrender, and remanded him to judicial custody, while noting that he could apply for bail again after the investigation concluded.

  Questions settled

  • Can bail granted by a High Court be cancelled if it was obtained through the misrepresentation of the accused's age and health?
  • Does the use of sharp tactics to mislead a court regarding physical infirmity justify the cancellation of bail?
  • Is a government service record admissible to rebut a claim of advanced age made by an accused seeking bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Raj Mohammad and 11 Others vs Haji Mohammad Zareen and 3 Others1980 SCMR 339 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-27
  ejectment petitioncause of actionstatutory notice periodrent restriction lawmultiplicity of litigationmoulding of reliefDisplaced Persons Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged a Lahore High Court order dismissing an appeal in a rent matter. The core legal question was whether an ejectment petition filed before the expiry of the three-month statutory notice period required under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, was incompetent and liable to be dismissed for lack of a matured cause of action. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision. The Court held that forums acting under rent restriction laws are not precluded from taking cognizance of events occurring during the pendency of proceedings. Relying on the principle established in Mst. Amina Begum v. Mehar Ghulam Dastgir, the Court ruled that courts may mould relief based on altered circumstances to avoid multiplicity of litigation and shorten proceedings. Requiring a landlord to withdraw and refile a petition on purely technical grounds, where the outcome on merits would remain unchanged, does not serve the interests of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a rent controller proceed with an ejectment petition filed before the expiry of the statutory notice period under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Are forums acting under rent restriction laws permitted to take note of events occurring during the course of proceedings to mould relief?
  • Should an ejectment petition be dismissed on the technical ground of a premature cause of action if the result on merits would not change?
  Read full judgment →
• Qasim Dada vs Collector of Karachi1980 SCMR 265 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-15
  land acquisitioncompensationmarket valueco-operative societiescompulsory acquisitionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arises from a dispute regarding the determination of compensation for land acquired by the Provincial Government for the establishment of the Korangi Township in Karachi. The core legal question concerns the correct assessment of market value for compulsory land acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, specifically whether transactions involving co-operative societies, sales between relations, or speculative sales were properly excluded by the High Court in determining compensation. The Supreme Court held that the High Court provided cogent and valid reasons for excluding transactions by co-operative societies that paid inflated rates or failed to act as prudent purchasers, as well as speculative sales and transactions between relations. The Court affirmed the enhanced compensation awarded by the Letters Patent Bench and clarified that statutory allowances and interest granted under the Collector's award remain intact. The key principle laid down is that transactions not reflecting a true open-market value by prudent purchasers may be excluded when assessing compensation for compulsory land acquisition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether transactions by co-operative societies paying higher than prevailing market rates can be excluded from determining land acquisition compensation?
  • Can sales of a speculative nature or between relations be relied upon to assess the market value of acquired land?
  • Whether an enhancement of compensation rate per acre by the High Court affects the statutory allowance and interest previously awarded by the Collector?
  Read full judgment →
• Qamar Din vs Mst. Taleh Begum1980 SCMR 608 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-31
  ejectmentreconstructionrent restrictioncondition precedentsanction for reconstructionmaintainability of applicationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against concurrent orders of the lower authorities and the High Court accepting an ejectment petition against the tenant on the ground of reconstruction of the rented premises. The core legal question was whether the lack of prior sanction for reconstruction from municipal authorities at the exact time of filing the ejectment application rendered the application premature and unmaintainable. The Supreme Court held that while obtaining valid sanction is a condition precedent for the success of the ejectment application, it is not a condition precedent for the mere institution or maintainability of the application under Section 13(2)(vi) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, provided the good faith requirement is pleaded and the sanction is subsequently obtained and proved during proceedings before the Rent Controller. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing the principle that a landlord's ejectment application for reconstruction is maintainable without prior municipal sanction, provided the sanction is obtained and placed on record prior to the final decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether obtaining sanction for reconstruction from municipal authorities is a condition precedent for the institution of an ejectment application under the Rent Restriction Ordinance?
  • Does obtaining municipal sanction for reconstruction during the pendency of an ejectment proceedings cure the initial lack of sanction at the time of filing?
  • Is an ejectment application based on reconstruction maintainable if the landlord pleads good faith requirement without having secured municipal sanction at the very inception?
  Read full judgment →
• Qamar Din vs Mst. K. Taleh Begum1980 SCMR 516 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-31
  ejectmentreconstructionsanction for reconstructionmaintainability of ejectment applicationrent restrictioncondition precedentpendente lite
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from concurrent judgments of the lower fora accepting an ejectment petition against the petitioner on the ground that the rented premises were required for reconstruction. The core legal question was whether obtaining the necessary sanction for reconstruction from municipal authorities prior to the filing of the ejectment application is a condition precedent to the maintainability of the application under Section 13(2)(vi) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, or merely a condition precedent for its success. The Supreme Court held that while the bona fide requirement for reconstruction must exist at the time of filing, obtaining municipal sanction is a condition precedent for the final success and outcome of the application rather than its initial maintainability, provided the plea is raised and the sanction is subsequently obtained and proved during the proceedings. The court dismissed the petition, ruling that obtaining sanction pendente lite cures any initial defect where no prejudice is caused to the tenant.

  Questions settled

  • Is obtaining the necessary sanction for reconstruction a condition precedent to the maintainability of an ejectment application under the Rent Restriction Ordinance?
  • Whether obtaining municipal sanction for reconstruction during the pendency of an ejectment proceedings cures the defect of not having it at the time of filing?
  • Does Section 13(2)(vi) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance require municipal sanction to be present at the time of making the ejectment application or at the stage of its success?
  Read full judgment →
• Qadar Dad vs Sher Muhammad and Another1980 SCMR 843 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-09
  quashment of proceedingsinherent jurisdictionpolice pursuitjurisdictional boundariesprima facie caseprivate complaintpreliminary inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a police official, sought special leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court of Baluchistan, which had refused to quash criminal proceedings initiated against him and other police officers. The complainant alleged that the police party had unlawfully raided his shop in Baluchistan, assaulted him and his brother, and abducted them to Sindh under the guise of executing an arrest, motivated by a personal vendetta. The petitioner contended that the police were acting within their lawful authority to pursue an absconder across provincial boundaries under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and the Police Act 1861, and that the complaint was false. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court's refusal to interfere under Section 561-A was correct. The Court reiterated that inherent jurisdiction cannot be used to interrupt the ordinary course of criminal procedure where a competent court has found a prima facie case. Disputed questions of fact and conflicting versions of the incident must be resolved by the trial court after recording evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can the High Court exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash criminal proceedings?
  • Can a criminal complaint be quashed at the preliminary stage on the ground that the accused police officers claim to have acted in the lawful discharge of their duties?
  • Is it necessary for a complainant to produce the entire medical and ocular evidence during a preliminary inquiry before process can be issued against the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Putwari vs The State1980 SCMR 359 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-04
  post-arrest bailmurderaccidental injurymedical evidenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court dated August 11, 1978, whereby the petitioner's application for post-arrest bail was dismissed. The petitioner is facing prosecution along with others under sections 148, 302, and 324 read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code for rioting, causing injuries to witnesses, and the murder of a young boy by inflicting fatal blows to the head. The core legal question is whether the petitioner is entitled to bail given the contention that the fatal injuries were sustained by accident during a fight and lacked murderous intent. The Supreme Court held that upon examining the medical evidence showing multiple blunt weapon injuries to the head, it is not possible at the bail stage to accept the argument of accidental causation. Consequently, the Court upheld the High Court's decision and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the principle that multiple targeted blows to a vital part preclude a finding of accidental injury for the purpose of granting bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail should be granted when multiple blunt weapon injuries are inflicted on the head of a deceased child?
  • Can the plea of accidental injury be accepted at the bail stage in a murder prosecution?
  • Does the absence of motive alone warrant the enlargement of an accused on bail in a capital case?
  Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab vs Azmatullah1980 SCMR 932 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-11
  ejectmentdefault in rentrequisition of propertystriking off defencerent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the Province of Punjab against orders directing the ejectment of the petitioner from a building housing a government-managed school. The respondent landlord had sought ejectment on grounds of personal need and default in rent, leading to a rent controller order for rent deposit. Subsequently, the provincial government requisitioned the property under the Punjab Requisitioning of Immovable Property (Temporary Powers) Act, 1956, prompting the rent controller to initially dismiss the ejectment application as infructuous, though this dismissal was later reversed on appeal and the case remanded. Meanwhile, the rent controller struck off the petitioner's defence for non-compliance with the initial rent deposit order, resulting in successive dismissals of the petitioner's appeals and second appeals by the lower forums and the High Court. The core legal question was whether the initial rent deposit order lapsed upon the temporary dismissal of the ejectment petition. The Supreme Court held that the prior default in complying with the rent deposit order occurred before the dismissal, rendering the petitioner's contention meritless. The petition was dismissed, upholding the concurrent findings against the petitioner while granting a brief extension for possession given the educational nature of the premises.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order for the deposit of rent passed under rent restriction laws lapse when an ejectment application is temporarily dismissed and later remanded?
  • Can a tenant's defence be struck off for non-compliance with a rent deposit order occurring prior to the dismissal of an ejectment petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Pir Niaz Muhammad vs The State1980 SCMR 150 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-05
  pre-arrest bailbail before arrestnon-prosecutionabsence of petitionerpublic servantcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for pre-arrest bail filed by a public servant facing criminal charges under the Pakistan Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act II of 1947, following the refusal of pre-arrest bail by the Peshawar High Court. The core legal question concerns the maintainability and prosecution of a bail before arrest petition when the petitioner fails to make a personal appearance before the court. The Supreme Court held that the personal presence of the petitioner is an essential procedural requirement in all cases seeking pre-arrest bail. Since the petitioner was absent without providing any valid justification—notwithstanding the absence of their Advocate-on-Record due to a family bereavement—the Court dismissed the petition for non-prosecution. The key principle laid down is that an accused seeking pre-arrest bail must personally attend the court hearings, and failure to do so without sufficient cause warrants the dismissal of the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Is the personal presence of the petitioner a mandatory requirement in hearings for pre-arrest bail?
  • Can a petition for pre-arrest bail be dismissed for non-prosecution when the accused is absent without a valid explanation?
  Read full judgment →
• Peerzada Rafiq Ahmad vs Chaudhry Abdul Rehman1980 SCMR 772 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-11
  ejectmentpersonal needbona fide requirementenhancement of rentlandlord and tenantrent controllereviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which upheld the decision of the Additional District Judge granting ejectment of the tenant from a residential house on the ground of the landlord's personal bona fide requirement. The Rent Controller had initially dismissed the landlord's ejectment application, holding that the true intention was to enhance the rent, as the rent had been increased incrementally over time. The Additional District Judge reversed this order, finding that the landlord independently proved his genuine personal need, which finding was maintained by the High Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, maintaining the eviction order. The Court affirmed the legal principle that a demand for higher rent or previous rent increases does not by itself undermine a landlord's claim of personal bona fide requirement if the factum of personal bona fide requirement is independently established by evidence on record.

  Questions settled

  • Does a demand for higher rent by itself negate a landlord's claim of personal bona fide requirement for ejectment of a tenant if personal requirement is independently proved?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan National Oils Ltd. and ANOTHERs vs Sattar Muhammad1980 SCMR 686 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-08
  mandatory injunctionright of accesshighway frontagepublic nuisancespecial damagesunauthorized constructioneasement rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a civil suit for a mandatory injunction filed by the respondent against the appellants, seeking the removal of a petrol pump constructed in front of his property, alleging it blocked his access to the highway and caused financial loss. The core legal question was whether the respondent possessed a right of frontage or access to the highway and whether the appellants’ unauthorized construction, which deviated from the sanctioned location, entitled the respondent to seek its demolition and damages. The Supreme Court held that the appellants’ construction was illegal, having been erected at a location different from the one sanctioned by authorities. The Court affirmed the principle that an owner of land adjoining a public highway holds a private right of access, and an illegal act causing special damage to an individual provides an independent cause of action for relief. Consequently, the Court upheld the order for the demolition of the petrol pump but set aside the High Court's award of damages, noting that the lower courts had not decreed such relief and the quantum was disputed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an owner of land adjoining a public highway have a private right of access to the highway?
  • Can a property owner seek the removal of an illegally constructed structure that causes special damage to their property?
  • Is an owner entitled to damages for loss of business caused by an illegal structure if such damages were not decreed by the trial or appellate courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan International Airlines and 4 Others vs Allah Ditta Bugti1980 SCMR 855 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-25
  deputationlientemporary injunctionreversionmaster and servantservice lawpublic servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against a High Court judgment upholding lower court orders that granted a temporary injunction in favor of the respondent. The respondent, originally a government servant on deputation to Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), had his services dispensed with and was directed to report back to his parent department, the Government of Baluchistan. The core legal question is whether a deputationist holding a substantive permanent post and a subsisting lien in his parent government department can challenge his repatriation or obtain an injunction restraining his reversion. The Supreme Court held that the respondent undisputedly held a lien in the Small Industries Directorate of the Government of Baluchistan and could not simultaneously hold a permanent position in PIA under fundamental service rules. Consequently, the lower courts erred in granting temporary injunctions against his reversion. The appeal was accepted and the lower orders were set aside, with the observation that the respondent's apprehension of non-acceptance by his parent department was unfounded.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government servant hold two or more permanent posts substantively at the same time?
  • Does a government servant on substantive appointment to a permanent post acquire a lien on that post?
  • Whether a court can grant a temporary injunction restraining an employer from reverting a deputationist employee who holds a subsisting lien in his parent department?
  Read full judgment →
• Noor Hassan and Another vs Tufail Ahmad and Another1980 SCMR 144 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-18
  easementperpetual injunctionrevisional jurisdictionproperty disputeconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 14th March 1978, which set aside the concurrent findings of the lower courts and allowed the respondent's civil suit for perpetual injunction regarding the use and repair of the roof of a shop. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioners had acquired a prescriptive right of easement over the roof of the respondent's shop, preventing the respondent from making repairs or further constructions. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court rightly exercised its revisional jurisdiction to correct erroneous factual findings regarding the non-existence of a superstructure and the lack of a validly established right of easement. The key principle laid down is that the long-term use of a roof as a passage or the presence of a projecting structure does not, without legal foundation or proof in title deeds, restrict an owner's right to repair or raise further constructions on their property.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the use of a shop's roof as a passage for twenty years create a right of easement preventing the shop owner from making repairs or constructions?
  • Can a claim of easement over another's property be sustained without support from title deeds or settlement records?
  Read full judgment →
• Nisar Ahmad Khawaja vs Muhammad Usman Muhammad Khan Wasan1980 SCMR 723 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-21
  contempt of courtjudicial respectunconditional apologymagistratefactual inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a contempt application filed against an Additional City Magistrate for allegedly making derogatory remarks regarding the Supreme Court during the proceedings of a criminal case under section 447 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerned whether the respondent magistrate made the attributed contemptuous remarks undermining the authority and dignity of the superior court. The Supreme Court observed that the allegations were met with a direct denial by the respondent, who asserted the application was a consequence of his refusal to entertain delaying tactics. The Court noted that in light of the respondent's unconditional and unqualified apology and his expressed respect for the judiciary, no useful purpose would be served by conducting a factual inquiry into the conflicting assertions. Consequently, the Court held that no further action was warranted. The key principle laid down is that while presiding officers of judicial institutions must show due respect to superior courts, contempt proceedings may not be pursued when the respondent tenders an unconditional apology and the allegations involve disputed questions of fact.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contempt proceedings should be pursued when the allegations of disrespectful remarks against a superior court are met with a direct factual denial?
  • Does an unconditional and unqualified apology by a judicial officer suffice to close contempt proceedings where factual controversy exists?
  Read full judgment →
• Niaz Muhammad vs Sh. Abdur Rashid and Another1980 SCMR 904 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-09
  property resumptionauction defaultservice of noticeGeneral Clauses ActSettlement Schemeconstitutional petitiontransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a constitutional petition challenging the resumption of property by the Settlement Department. The petitioner, a successful auction bidder for a shop, failed to pay the balance price within the stipulated time. The core legal questions were whether the notice of resumption served on the petitioner’s minor son was legally defective and whether the petitioner could challenge the subsequent transfer of the property to a third party despite being in default. The Supreme Court held that the resumption was lawful, noting that under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act 1897, the presumption of service applies where notice is properly addressed and dispatched. The Court further held that the petitioner’s failure to pay the admitted balance, despite receiving notice, justified the resumption. The principle laid down is that a defaulting transferee cannot enlarge the time for payment by merely raising a controversy over the amount due, and the existence of a pending application by a third party precludes the defaulting party from claiming the benefit of time-extension schemes.

  Questions settled

  • Does the service of a notice on a minor son of the addressee satisfy the requirements of service under the General Clauses Act 1897?
  • Can a defaulting auction purchaser challenge the transfer of property to a third party after the property has been validly resumed?
  • Does the mere pendency of an application by a third party for the transfer of property prevent a defaulting transferee from curing their default?
  Read full judgment →
• Niaz Dil Khan vs Northwest Frontier Province Terough Chief1980 SCMR 87 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-09
  compulsory retirementmisconductservice tribunalcompetent authoritydispensing with inquiryappellate jurisdictionservice record
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against a Service Tribunal order that upheld the compulsory retirement of a Tehsildar. The petitioner had been charged with misconduct for failing to consign 468 mutations to the record for approximately three years. The core legal questions addressed were whether the punishment order was passed by the competent authority (the Governor), whether the punishment was vitiated by considering extraneous factors (service record) not part of the charge, whether the Tribunal erred in maintaining the punishment after exonerating the petitioner of corruption, and whether the decision to dispense with a formal inquiry required recorded reasons. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the record indicated the competent authority had indeed passed the order. The Court rejected the argument that dispensing with an inquiry requires the recording of specific reasons in the absence of a rule mandating such a condition. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the Tribunal correctly exercised its appellate jurisdiction to review the propriety of the punishment, finding no legal error in the proceedings or the classification of the petitioner's conduct as misconduct.

  Questions settled

  • Does the decision to dispense with a formal inquiry in disciplinary proceedings require the recording of specific reasons by the competent authority?
  • Can an order of punishment be challenged on the basis that the competent authority merely gave 'consent' rather than passing the order itself?
  • Is the failure to consign official mutations to the record for an extended period considered misconduct for a civil servant?
  Read full judgment →
• Niaz Ali vs The State1980 SCMR 75 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-06
  retracted judicial confessionextra-judicial confessionmurderappellate jurisdictionstandard of proofcorroborationrecovery witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the double murder of his brother and sister-in-law under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial court and the High Court had relied upon a retracted judicial confession, an alleged extra-judicial confession before a witness, and the recovery of incriminating articles. The core legal question was whether the conviction could be sustained in the absence of dependable corroborative evidence when prosecution witnesses, including the recovery mashir, did not support the prosecution case, and the extra-judicial confession was unreliable. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the conviction was based on no legal evidence, as the retracted judicial confession lacked valid corroboration, the extra-judicial confession was not credible, and the recovery witness had disowned the recovery memos. The Court laid down the principle that conjectures, suspicion, and moral conviction cannot take the place of legal proof, and a conviction must rest upon legal grounds established by admissible legal testimony.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on a retracted judicial confession without independent and reliable corroboration?
  • Whether moral conviction and suspicion can take the place of legal proof in a criminal trial?
  • Can the testimony of an extra-judicial confession be relied upon when material contradictions exist between the witness and the investigating officer?
  • What is the evidentiary value of recovery memos when the attesting mashir totally repudiates the prosecution case?
  Read full judgment →
• Niamat Ali vs The Deputy Settlement Commissioner and OTHERs1980 SCMR 634 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-17
  special leave to appealevacuee propertytransfer of propertysettlement schemeauction salewrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing his writ petition, which challenged the rejection of his claim for the transfer of a burnt-down evacuee shop site. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to the transfer of the site under Settlement Scheme No. VIII read with Scheme No. VI after raising new construction post-fire, despite failing to establish prior possession or construction before the crucial date of 1961, and after the property had already been auctioned to a third party. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to establish his entitlement, as his construction was not raised before the crucial date, the property had already been disposed of by auction, and he had unauthorizedly occupied the site. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that the petitioner was rightly non-suited and the High Court's order was unexceptionable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a claimant is entitled to the transfer of an evacuee site under Settlement Scheme No. VIII where construction was raised after the crucial date?
  • Can an unauthorized occupant claim transfer of a site that has already been validly auctioned and disposed of?
  • Whether the High Court's dismissal of a writ petition regarding the refusal of transfer of evacuee property warrants interference when the claimant lacks legal entitlement?
  Read full judgment →
• New Punjab Soap Factory, Sargodha Insaf Soap Factory, Sargoda42 TAX 142 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-18
  sales taxraw material exemptionstatutory interpretationleave to appealtax liabilityfinished goods exemption
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, manufacturers of washing soap, challenged the imposition of sales tax on imported raw materials used in their production process. Following a notification abolishing sales tax on finished washing soap, the Sales Tax Officer demanded tax on the raw materials consumed. While the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal ruled that locally sourced raw materials were exempt, it upheld the levy on imported raw materials. The Lahore High Court affirmed this decision, relying on the precedent set in Noorani Cotton Corporation vs. The Sales Tax Officer, Lyallpur. The petitioners sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, arguing that the High Court's reliance on Noorani Cotton Corporation was misplaced and citing conflicting jurisprudence. The Supreme Court observed that the judgment of Akram, J. in Commissioner of Sales Tax vs. H. Mohammad Hassan & Co. appeared to support the petitioners' contention, creating a conflict requiring further examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, determining that the proper construction of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, regarding tax liability on raw materials after the exemption of finished products constitutes a significant question of law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether imported raw materials used in the manufacture of finished goods are subject to sales tax when the finished goods themselves have been granted a sales tax exemption?
  • Does the exemption of a finished product from sales tax automatically extend to the raw materials used in its production under the Sales Tax Act 1951?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Hussain Shah vs The State1980 SCMR 301 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-02
  murder convictiondying declarationocular testimonyrecovery witnessesinvestigative negligencechance witnessesabscondence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appellant, who had absconded for three years during commitment proceedings, contested the reliability of eye-witnesses, the dying declaration, and the evidence of weapon recovery. The core legal questions concerned whether the eye-witnesses were 'chance witnesses,' the validity of the dying declaration, and whether the Investigating Officer's use of an eye-witness and a relative as recovery witnesses rendered the recovery evidence unreliable for corroboration. The Supreme Court held that the eye-witnesses were independent and reliable, not 'chance witnesses,' and that the dying declaration was credible, supported by medical certification. While the Court criticized the Investigating Officer for negligence in selecting recovery witnesses—which undermined the corroborative value of the recoveries—it ruled that the testimony of the Investigating Officer himself, combined with the other strong evidence, was sufficient to sustain the conviction. The principle laid down is that while improper selection of recovery witnesses is a serious investigative lapse, it does not necessarily invalidate the conviction if the ocular testimony and dying declaration are otherwise credible and sufficient.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained if the recovery witnesses were improperly selected by the Investigating Officer?
  • Does the use of an eye-witness as a recovery witness invalidate the corroborative value of the recovery evidence?
  • Are eye-witnesses residing in the same locality as the place of occurrence considered 'chance witnesses'?
  • Is the testimony of an Investigating Officer sufficient to prove recoveries when the independent witnesses are challenged?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad Jan vs Managing Director, Fauji Textile Mills, Jhelum and Others1980 SCMR 14 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-18
  contempt of courtcompromise agreementcoercion and undue influenceemployment disputedismissal from service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a contempt petition filed under Article 204 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, by a former employee seeking to initiate contempt proceedings against respondents for allegedly flouting an order of the Supreme Court dismissing a civil petition for special leave to appeal. The core legal question is whether contempt proceedings are maintainable when a party alleges that a subsequent compromise agreement settling all employment claims was executed under coercion and undue influence. The Supreme Court held that the petition is mala fide and that contempt proceedings are not the proper forum to challenge a compromise agreement allegedly executed under coercion. The Court laid down the principle that grievances regarding the validity of a compromise agreement executed voluntarily or under alleged coercion must be pursued through appropriate alternative remedies rather than invoking the contempt jurisdiction of the court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contempt proceedings can be maintained to challenge a compromise agreement settling service claims?
  • Does a petition alleging execution of a compromise under coercion lie in contempt proceedings before the Supreme Court?
  • Can a party invoke contempt jurisdiction where an out-of-court settlement has been reached in full and final settlement of claims?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad Etc. vs Riazul Haq and Others1980 SCMR 931 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-10
  personal requirementevictiontenantlandlordconcurrent findingsspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by tenants against the High Court order dismissing their second appeal and maintaining the eviction order passed by the Additional District Judge on the ground of personal requirement of the landlords. The core legal question concerns the propriety of concurrent factual findings regarding personal bona fide need under rent laws. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower appellate court and the High Court were well-supported by the record and evidence, and no misreading or violation of legal principles was demonstrated to warrant interference. The petition was accordingly dismissed, granting the petitioners two months to vacate subject to the continuous payment of rent. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact on the question of personal requirement in rent matters unless a clear misreading of evidence or violation of law is established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding personal requirement in rent matters?
  • What constitutes sufficient ground for interfering with a finding of personal use recorded by lower courts?
  • Whether a petition for special leave to appeal can be maintained against concurrent eviction orders without showing misreading of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Nawab Din and Another vs Mst. Haseebunnisa and Others1980 SCMR 798 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-07
  agreement of associationSettlement Scheme No. VIIIcancellation of transferarrears of land revenueconstitutional petitionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for special leave to appeal concerning the cancellation of an agreement of association and subsequent transfer of a property under settlement laws. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in not remanding the case back to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner after finding the cancellation of the association agreement and subsequent transfer order to be illegal and without lawful authority. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that remanding the case would be an exercise in futility because, under the amended Settlement Scheme No. VIII, a transfer where 25% of the amount had been paid could not be cancelled or resumed; the only legal course was to recover any balance amount as arrears of land revenue. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the invalidity of the hasty cancellation and transfer.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court should remand a case for fresh decision when the initial cancellation of an agreement of association was found to be illegal?
  • Can a property transfer be cancelled or resumed under Settlement Scheme No. VIII once 25 percent of the amount has been paid?
  • What is the only legal course available for recovering a balance amount under Settlement Scheme No. VIII?
  Read full judgment →
• Nathey Khan vs Government of West Pakistan (Now Punjab)1980 SCMR 485 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-10
  workmen's compensationdamages in tortnegligenceres ipsa loquiturlimitationbar of civil suitunregistered agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the Supreme Court of Pakistan addresses whether an injured workman's civil suit for damages in tort against his employer is barred under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, and whether the suit is within the period of limitation. The appellant, a railway employee, lost parts of his legs in a train accident and filed a suit for damages based on negligence, having previously drawn a compensation sum under protest and refused an unregistered settlement. The High Court had dismissed the suit, holding it barred by sections 3(5), 19, and 28 of the 1923 Act. The Supreme Court held that drawing a deposit without instituting a claim does not bar a civil suit under section 3(5)(a), that unregistered agreements do not satisfy section 28, and that section 19 only ousts civil jurisdiction for claims under the Act, not independent tort actions. However, the Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the appellant failed to prove the respondent's negligence and that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 22 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The key principle established is that a civil suit in tort is not barred by the Workmen's Compensation Act unless the statutory bars regarding self-instituted claims or registered agreements are strictly met, and a plaintiff in tort must affirmatively prove negligence.

  Questions settled

  • Does drawing a compensation sum deposited by an employer with the Commissioner amount to instituting a claim under section 3(5)(a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 so as to bar a civil suit?
  • Is an agreement for compensation between an employer and a workman enforceable as a bar to a civil suit if it has not been registered under section 28 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923?
  • Does the ouster of civil court jurisdiction under section 19 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 extend to a common law suit for damages in tort based on negligence?
  • When does the period of limitation begin to run for a personal injury suit based on negligence resulting in amputation under the Limitation Act, 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Nadir Shah vs The State1980 SCMR 402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-20
  criminal breach of trustmisappropriationseparate chargesretrialacquittalenabling provisionsbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a cashier at Bannu Woollen Mills, faced seventeen trials for criminal breach of trust under section 408 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, involving various sums received between 1959 and 1963. The trial magistrate acquitted him in all cases, citing procedural defects under sections 222(2) and 234 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and general accounting discrepancies. The Peshawar High Court allowed the State's appeals, set aside the acquittals, and remanded the cases for retrial. On further appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the High Court acted legally in setting aside the acquittals. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of sections 222(2) and 234 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are enabling rather than mandatory, and their non-use does not warrant acquittal unless prejudice or a failure of justice is shown under section 225. Drawing a distinction between cases where amounts were eventually deposited and those where they were not, the Supreme Court partly accepted the appeals, restoring the acquittals on the basis of benefit of doubt for the first category, while upholding the remand for retrial in the second category.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions relating to the framing and combination of charges under sections 222(2) and 234 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are mandatory or merely enabling?
  • Does the failure to combine charges under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically vitiate a trial or warrant an acquittal without proof of prejudice?
  • Can an acquittal based on generalisations and without proper examination of evidence in criminal breach of trust cases be legally set aside?
  • What constitutes criminal breach of trust and dishonest misappropriation under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in cases involving temporary retention of funds?
  Read full judgment →
• N. M. Khan (Represented by Legal Heirs) and Others vs DR. Abdur Rauf1980 SCMR 528 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-15
  Local Commissionerdemarcation of boundarymunicipal recordSupreme Court of Pakistanproperty dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from two appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the demarcation of boundary lines between two residential properties, Nos. 45 and 47 Empress Road, Lahore. During the hearing, the Court had previously appointed the Chief Engineer of the Lahore Municipal Corporation as a Commissioner by consent of the parties to demarcate the boundary line using the earliest available authentic municipal and taxation record. The core legal question was whether the report submitted by the Local Commissioner complied with the directions of the Court. The Supreme Court held that instead of strictly demarcating the boundary line, the Commissioner had attempted to devise a more equitable way of dividing the houses, thereby exceeding his mandate and failing to follow the Court's directions. Consequently, the Court refused to accept the Commissioner's report. The key principle laid down is that a Local Commissioner must strictly adhere to the specific terms and directions of the judicial appointment order rather than substituting their own judgment on equitable division.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a report submitted by a Local Commissioner who fails to follow the specific directions of the court can be accepted?
  • Can a Local Commissioner devise an equitable division of properties instead of performing the ordered demarcation?
  Read full judgment →
• Mutwakil Shah vs Muhammad Din and 3 Others1980 SCMR 96 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-14
  criminal appealacquittalinterested witnessesblood feudappreciation of evidencemurdersupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court acquitting three respondents who had been previously convicted by the Sessions Judge under sections 148, 302, 307, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution case alleged that the respondents along with others attacked the complainant and the deceased due to a prior blood feud. The High Court acquitted the respondents, holding that the eye-witnesses were interested witnesses belonging to a rival faction. The Supreme Court considered the arguments and evidence, noting that the High Court delivered a well-reasoned judgment properly disbelieving the interested eye-witnesses. Furthermore, the ballistic evidence regarding empty cartridges did not conclusively identify the perpetrators of the fatal shots, and the prosecution had falsely implicated multiple persons where injuries could have been caused by the absconding and deceased accused alone. Consequently, the Supreme Court declined to reappraise the evidence and dismissed the petition for special leave to appeal as devoid of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a well-reasoned judgment of the High Court acquitting the accused based on the assessment of interested witnesses?
  • Can the evidence of eye-witnesses belonging to a rival faction with a blood feud be safely relied upon without independent corroboration?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will reappraise evidence in a criminal petition where the High Court has properly evaluated the testimony of witnesses and medical/ballistic evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muntazim and Others vs Haji Aslam Khan1980 SCMR 284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-09-29Read full judgment →
• Munshi vs Muhammad Ishaque and Another1980 SCMR 466 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-22
  ex parte appealrehearing of appeallimitation periodservice of noticespecial leave to appealfinding of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a dispute over a quarter in Hyderabad, where the plaintiff's suit for declaration and injunction was initially decreed by the civil court. The lower appellate court subsequently accepted the defendant's appeal ex parte. The plaintiff filed an application for rehearing under Order XLI, Rule 21, Code of Civil Procedure, stating he had no knowledge of the hearing date as the previous date had been left unattended due to the judge's leave. The lower appellate court set aside the ex parte order and dismissed the appeal on merits, a decision upheld by the High Court in revision. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the limitation period for an application for rehearing of an ex parte appeal under Article 169 of the Limitation Act runs from the date of the decision or from the date of knowledge when notice of the hearing was not duly served. The Supreme Court held that the notice referred to in Article 169 means the notice of the actual date on which the appeal is disposed of, and since no notice of the hearing date was served and the application was filed within time from the date of knowledge, the petition was meritless and dismissed. The key principle laid down is that the limitation period under Article 169 of the Limitation Act 1908, where notice of the hearing was not duly served, commences from the date the applicant acquired knowledge of the decree.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for an application for rehearing of an ex parte appeal under Article 169 of the Limitation Act run from the date of the decision or from the date of knowledge when notice was not duly served?
  • Does the 'notice of the appeal' referred to in Article 169 of the Limitation Act mean the initial notice of the appeal or the notice of the specific date on which the appeal is disposed of?
  • Can a finding of fact based on the personal affidavit of counsel regarding the absence of a hearing date be interfered with in special leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Mulla Abdul Hakeem vs Commissioner Kalat and Others1980 SCMR 368 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-11
  restoration of possessioncriminal trespasswrit jurisdictionremand orderCriminal Law (Special Provisions) Ordinanceinterim possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a High Court order dismissing a writ petition concerning the restoration of possession of property following a criminal trial under the Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Ordinance, 1968. The petitioner was initially convicted of trespass, and an order for the restoration of possession to the complainant was passed. Although the conviction was subsequently set aside on appeal and the case remanded for retrial, the order for restoration of possession remained undisturbed. The core legal question was whether the order of restoration of possession should be set aside merely because the conviction was set aside and the case remanded, or because the dispute could be civil in nature. The Supreme Court held that the mere fact that the subject matter of the order could be a civil dispute does not render the restoration order unlawful. Furthermore, the Court held that since the appellate forum had the discretion to set aside the restoration order during remand but did not do so, and the petitioner is still facing prosecution, no interference is warranted. The Court clarified that if the petitioner is finally acquitted, they may move for appropriate orders regarding possession.

  Questions settled

  • Does the setting aside of a conviction and remand of a criminal case automatically invalidate an order for the restoration of possession passed during the trial?
  • Is an order for the restoration of possession unlawful merely because the underlying dispute could be characterized as a civil dispute?
  • Can an appellate court exercise discretion to maintain an order of restoration of possession while remanding a case for retrial?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammadi Steamship Co, Ltd. vs Messrs A. R. Muhammad Siddiq and Another1980 SCMR 432 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-15
  carriage of goods by seaburden of proofshort deliverydamaged cargoinherent vicecarrier liabilitybailee
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns four consolidated appeals arising from a High Court judgment regarding claims for damages for short delivery and damaged cargo during sea transit. The core legal question addressed is the burden of proof in actions for damages for short delivery or delivery in damaged condition under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1925. The Supreme Court held that once a cargo owner proves that goods were not delivered or were delivered in a damaged condition after shipment, the onus shifts to the carrier to prove that the loss or damage falls within the specific exceptions provided in Article IV of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1925. If the carrier successfully brings the case within such an exception, the burden shifts back to the shipper or consignee to prove that the damage was caused by the carrier's negligence. The Court affirmed that the carrier, as a bailee, bears the responsibility to explain the loss or damage and prove reasonable care, and that exception clauses do not protect carriers against their own negligence.

  Questions settled

  • What is the burden of proof in an action for damages for short delivery or damaged cargo under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1925?
  • Does the phrase 'shipped in apparent good order and condition' in a bill of lading constitute an admission by the carrier regarding the condition of the goods?
  • Can a carrier rely on the exception of 'inherent defect, quality or vice' if the damage was caused by the carrier's negligence?
  • Is a carrier, as a bailee, required to prove that reasonable care was exercised when goods are delivered in a damaged condition?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yusuf vs Mst. Nafeesa Khatoon and Others1980 SCMR 385 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-14
  past maintenanceHanfi lawFamily Court jurisdictionrestitution of conjugal rightsprompt dowerwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of concurrent decisions of the lower courts and the High Court dismissing the petitioner's challenges against a maintenance decree granted to his wife. The core legal question was whether a Family Court possesses the jurisdiction under Hanfi law to grant past or arrears of maintenance to a wife. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that Family Courts possess jurisdiction to grant past maintenance as no prohibition against it is prescribed under the relevant statutory framework, affirming the prior binding precedent of the court on the matter. The key legal principle laid down is that the jurisdiction of Family Courts regarding the grant of maintenance is governed by statute rather than strict traditional interpretations of Hanfi law that prohibit past maintenance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Family Court has the jurisdiction under Hanfi law to grant a decree for past maintenance?
  • Does the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 prohibit the award of past maintenance?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yunus Malik vs Mst. Zahida Irshad1980 SCMR 184 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-07
  ejectmentdefault in renttenancy holding overadvance renturban rent restrictionstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave arose from an ejectment order against a tenant for non-payment of rent. The petitioner, having leased a bungalow, continued as a tenant holding over after the lease expired. The landlady sought eviction, alleging default in rent payments starting from January 1975. The Rent Controller found the tenant a willful defaulter, a decision upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the statutory term "rent due" under Section 13(2)(i) of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 encompasses rent stipulated to be paid in advance under a tenancy agreement, or if it only accrues at the end of the rental period. The Supreme Court held that the agreement between the parties governs the timing of payment. Consequently, "rent due" includes rent payable in advance as per the contract. Failure to pay such rent within the statutory grace period constitutes default, justifying ejectment. The Court affirmed that contractual stipulations for advance rent are enforceable and do not lose their character as rent.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'rent due' under Section 13(2)(i) of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 include rent stipulated to be paid in advance under a tenancy agreement?
  • Can a tenant be evicted for failing to pay rent in advance where the tenancy agreement stipulates such payment?
  • Does a tenant holding over after the expiry of a lease remain bound by the original terms and conditions regarding rent payment?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousuf vs Shamsuddin1980 SCMR 519 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-05
  restoration of appealdismissal in defaultnon-prosecutionjudicial discretiontenancy disputeevictionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court, which refused to restore a second appeal that had been dismissed in default for non-prosecution. The petitioner, a tenant facing eviction for the reconstruction of a shop, had his second appeal dismissed after neither he nor his counsel appeared on the scheduled hearing date. The petitioner sought restoration, citing his counsel's absence abroad and the failure of the counsel's clerk to note the case in the cause list. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court's refusal to restore the appeal constituted an illegality or an improper exercise of judicial discretion. The Court held that the explanation provided for the non-appearance was insufficient to warrant restoration. It found no illegality in the High Court's decision, noting that the discretion was exercised in accordance with accepted principles of justice and equity. Furthermore, the Court observed that the petitioner had already surrendered possession of the premises in execution of the ejectment decree, rendering the petition meritless. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is the failure of a counsel's clerk to note a case in the cause list a sufficient ground for the restoration of an appeal dismissed in default?
  • Does the refusal of a High Court to restore an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution constitute an illegality if the explanation for absence is deemed insufficient?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yar Khan vs Deputy Commissionercumpolitical Agent, Loralai and Another1980 SCMR 456 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-20
  domicile certificatepermanent residencecitizenship of Pakistancancellation of domicileeducational institution seatsconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of a constitutional writ petition by the High Court, which had upheld the cancellation of the petitioner's domicile certificate by the District Magistrate, Loralai. The core legal question concerned whether the District Magistrate had the jurisdiction to cancel the domicile certificate, and whether concepts of domicile and permanent residence were distinct. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that 'domicile' of Pakistan and 'permanent residence' in a specific locality are distinct legal concepts, noting that a domicile certificate signifies domicile of the country rather than of a specific province or district, and that Form P-1 of the Pakistan Citizenship Rules had previously caused confusion regarding this distinction. The Court ruled that the District Magistrate possessed the authority to cancel a domicile certificate obtained upon incorrect assertions or false claims, particularly where it was utilized to secure reserved educational seats under a misrepresentation of permanent residency. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Are domicile and permanent residence distinct legal concepts under the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951?
  • Does a domicile certificate granted under the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951 confer domicile of Pakistan or of a specific province or district?
  • Does a District Magistrate have the jurisdiction to cancel a domicile certificate obtained through false representations or material concealment?
  • Is a citizen of Pakistan by birth required to apply for a domicile certificate to be considered domiciled in Pakistan?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad vs Mst. Sharfan and Others1980 SCMR 343 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-28
  occupancy tenantrevenue recordsdeclaration of rightssecond appealtenancy rightsconcurrent findings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal against the dismissal of the petitioner's second appeals by the High Court, which had overturned the trial court's decree in favor of the plaintiff. The petitioner sought a declaration of his status as a 'Mustagil Doam', a specific category of occupancy tenant, regarding the suit land. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had established his claimed tenancy rights, particularly in light of conflicting oral evidence and entries in the revenue records. The Supreme Court examined the evidence and the findings of the lower appellate courts. The Court held that the petitioner failed to substantiate his claim through either oral evidence or the revenue records. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, affirming the findings of the lower appellate courts that the petitioner did not establish the requisite tenancy status. The judgment reinforces the principle that appellate courts will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact where the evidence, including revenue records, fails to support the petitioner's claim and no legal justification for interference is demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaintiff succeed in a claim for declaration of tenancy status based on oral evidence alone when revenue records do not support the claim?
  • Does an appellate court have grounds to interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding tenancy status when the evidence is insufficient?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Taj and Another vs The State1980 SCMR 348 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-01
  leave to appealmurderself-defenceaggressor partycorroborationeyewitness testimonyunsound mindSection 465 CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan was filed by two brothers convicted of four murders and sentenced to death by the trial court, a decision upheld by the Lahore High Court. The prosecution alleged that the petitioners assaulted their sister/wife and subsequently killed four unarmed relatives who attempted to intervene and save her by climbing onto the roof. The main legal questions pertained to whether the complainant party was the aggressor, whether the petitioners were entitled to the plea of self-defence, whether the sole eyewitness required corroboration, and whether the trial court was required to hold an inquiry into the petitioner's sanity under Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that the physical evidence, number of injuries, recovery of blood-stained weapons, and motive fully corroborated the prosecution eyewitness and established the petitioners as the aggressors. Furthermore, the record failed to show that the accused appeared of unsound mind at trial so as to trigger Section 465. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • When does the duty of a trial court to hold an inquiry into an accused's unsoundness of mind under Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 get triggered?
  • Can a plea of self-defence be sustained when physical evidence and circumstances demonstrate that the accused was the aggressor against unarmed victims?
  • Is the testimony of a single natural eyewitness sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder if corroborated by recovery of blood-stained weapons and medical evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siraj vs Pakistan and 4 Others1980 PLC (C. S.) 398 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-29Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddiq vs Abdul Shakoor1980 SCMR 169 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-08
  dismissal for defaultservice of noticerestoration of suitgross negligenceleave to appealsuppression of factscounsel's authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the dismissal of a suit for default and the subsequent refusal of the High Court to restore it. The core legal questions concern whether the dismissal of the suit for default was justified despite the petitioner's claim of non-service, and whether a party may raise a new argument regarding the nature of the hearing date for the first time before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that service of notice upon the petitioner’s counsel constituted valid service on the petitioner, and the repeated absence of both the petitioner and his counsel amounted to gross negligence, justifying the dismissal for default. Furthermore, the Court held that a party cannot raise new questions of fact or law in the Supreme Court that were not agitated in the courts below. The Court also emphasized that the suppression of material court orders is fatal to a petition. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming that procedural defaults by counsel bind the litigant and that appellate review is limited to issues raised in lower forums.

  Questions settled

  • Does service of notice on a party's counsel constitute valid service on the party?
  • Can a party raise a new question of fact or law in the Supreme Court that was not raised in the courts below?
  • Is the dismissal of a suit for default justified where both the party and their counsel are absent on multiple hearing dates?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif vs The State1980 SCMR 313 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-06
  post-arrest bailmurderfurther inquiryFIR delaycommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Muhammad Sharif against the orders of the Sessions Court and the High Court refusing him post-arrest bail in a murder case. The petitioner was specifically charged along with co-accused for the murder of Khushi Muhammad, having allegedly inflicted a soti blow in furtherance of common intention. The core legal questions involved whether a two-day delay in the FIR and conflicting statements gathered during re-investigation pointing towards another person constituted grounds for further inquiry warranting bail under criminal procedure. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was fully justified in refusing bail, as the petitioner was directly named in the FIR, supported by medical evidence and a challan submitted by the investigating officer. The key principle laid down is that where an accused is directly implicated by name in the FIR for a capital offence and challaned, minor discrepancies like delayed reporting and statements recorded during re-investigation favouring third parties do not automatically establish a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delay in lodging the first information report automatically entitle an accused to post-arrest bail in a murder case?
  • Whether statements collected during a re-investigation pointing toward another person create a case for further inquiry when the petitioner is directly named in the FIR?
  • Is an accused charged with an offence punishable with death or transportation for life entitled to bail when a challan has been submitted against him and he is directly implicated by the complainant?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shamshad vs Haji Allah Rakha1980 SCMR 397 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-12
  redemption of mortgagepreliminary decreemortgage suitCode of Civil Procedureexecution of decreereconveyance of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the redemption of a mortgaged property. The respondent filed a suit for redemption, which the trial court and the first appellate court decreed in his favour, finding the transaction to be a mortgage rather than a sale. However, the decree issued was a simple decree rather than the preliminary decree required by the Code of Civil Procedure. The core legal question was whether the decree in a redemption suit must strictly adhere to the procedural requirements of Order XXXIV, Rule 7, Code of Civil Procedure, even if no rendition of accounts is sought. The Supreme Court held that the decree was legally deficient as it failed to incorporate the mandatory directions for reconveyance, delivery of documents, and transfer of possession. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower orders and remanded the case for rectification. The key principle established is that in redemption suits, the court is mandatorily required to pass a preliminary decree under Order XXXIV, Rule 7, Code of Civil Procedure, ensuring all necessary procedural directions are included to make the decree executable.

  Questions settled

  • Is a decree in a redemption suit valid if it fails to comply with the procedural requirements of Order XXXIV, Rule 7, Code of Civil Procedure?
  • Must a court pass a preliminary decree in a redemption suit even when there is no dispute regarding the rendition of accounts?
  • Does the failure to include directions for reconveyance and possession in a redemption decree render it unexecutable?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saleh and Another vs Mehar Shah and Others1980 SCMR 261 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-13
  State landcivil court jurisdictiontemporary injunctionBoard of Revenuefraudlandless Harispecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court order that upheld a temporary injunction granted to the respondent in a civil suit regarding the possession of State land. The core legal question was whether the civil court possessed jurisdiction to entertain the suit, given the statutory bars under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, and the Sind Land Revenue Act, 1967, particularly concerning orders passed by the Board of Revenue. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, noting that the petitioners had failed to raise the plea of jurisdiction before the trial or appellate courts. The Court held that because the objection regarding jurisdiction required evidence and the previous orders were based on allegations of fraud and misrepresentation, the issue could not be summarily decided at the appellate stage. The Court affirmed that the plea of jurisdiction should be raised and adjudicated before the trial court, directing that the suit be decided on its merits within one year, while maintaining the status quo regarding the temporary injunction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea regarding the jurisdiction of a civil court be raised for the first time in a revision petition before the High Court?
  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to entertain a suit challenging an order of the Board of Revenue if the order is alleged to have been obtained by fraud?
  • Is a plea of jurisdiction that requires the leading of evidence appropriate for determination in a revision petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Saeed and Others vs Abdur Razzak and Others1980 SCMR 480 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-22
  ejectmentlandlord and tenant relationshipestoppelrent restrictionspecial leave to appealvesting of property
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought special leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order dismissing their second appeal regarding an ejectment order. The core legal questions were whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties and whether the property in dispute was exempt from the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, on the basis that it vested in the Federal Government under the Jammu & Kashmir (Administration of Property) Ordinance, 1961. The Rent Controller, District Judge, and High Court concurrently held that the relationship of landlord and tenant was established, noting that the petitioners were estopped from denying this relationship under the Evidence Act, 1872. Furthermore, the courts found that the evidence was insufficient to prove the property vested in the Federal Government. The Supreme Court upheld these concurrent findings, ruling that the definition of 'landlord' in the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, included those entitled to receive rent, and that the petitioners failed to demonstrate any error in the lower courts' reasoning. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of 'landlord' under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, include a person entitled to receive rent?
  • Are tenants estopped from denying the relationship of landlord and tenant under Section 116 of the Evidence Act 1872?
  • Can a tenant challenge the title of a landlord after having executed a rent note in their favour?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadiq and Others vs The State1980 SCMR 203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-13
  post-arrest bailcriminal conspiracyF.I.R. omissionspecial leave to appealimminent trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan against the judgment of the Sindh High Court, which refused post-arrest bail to the petitioners in a murder case registered under F.I.R. No. 170 at Police Station Gambat, District Khairpur. The petitioners argued that they were entitled to bail because their names were not mentioned in the F.I.R. Conversely, the State pointed out that the petitioners were implicated under Section 120-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for criminal conspiracy, supported by confessional and witness statements recorded during investigation. The Supreme Court declined to grant leave, holding that where the trial is set to commence shortly on a date fixed by the trial court, it is inappropriate for an appellate court to evaluate the merits of the case in a bail application. The petition for special leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the omission of an accused's name in an F.I.R. automatically entitles them to bail when they are implicated under Section 120-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 during investigation?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will evaluate the evidentiary merits of a case for granting bail when the trial is scheduled to commence imminently?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rizwanul Hussain vs Ch. Ali Ahmad and Others1980 SCMR 559 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-23
  constitutional petitioninheritancerefugee claimmutationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his Constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld an order remanding a mutation matter for fresh inquiry regarding inheritance of a refugee right-holder. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly refused to interfere with an order directing a factual inquiry into inheritance claims where the initial mutation recorded an incorrect relationship. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner was recorded as the son of the deceased—a fact admittedly incorrect—while his alternative claims were based on adoption or will, the mutation required reconsideration through a proper factual inquiry. The Court dismissed the petition, ruling that questions of fact requiring proper inquiry do not warrant constitutional interference at a premature stage, laying down the principle that entitlement based on adoption or will differs fundamentally from inheritance as a direct son, justifying administrative rectification and fresh determination.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a mutation recording an incorrect relationship of an heir requires reconsideration and fresh inquiry?
  • Can entitlement based on adoption or will be equated with inheritance as a direct son for the purpose of property mutation?
  • Does the High Court properly dismiss a constitutional petition where factual controversies require determination through a proper administrative inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz for Muhammad Ahsan vs Haji Muhammad Khan and Another1980 SCMR 57 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-12
  quashment of proceedingscriminal complaintspurious chequespremature petitionSection 561-A CrPCspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court, which had dismissed his petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the quashment of criminal proceedings initiated against him. The complainant had filed a complaint alleging offenses under Sections 406, 419, and 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, concerning the issuance of spurious cheques. The High Court had declined to quash the proceedings, reasoning that the application was premature because no evidence had yet been recorded, thereby preventing a proper assessment of the parties' respective stands. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Pakistan found no error in the High Court's order. The petitioner's counsel failed to demonstrate any legal infirmity in the impugned decision and ultimately did not press the arguments regarding the merits of the case. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the petition lacked merit and dismissed it, affirming the principle that quashment proceedings are generally premature before evidence has been recorded in the trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Is a petition for quashment of criminal proceedings under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 premature if filed before any evidence has been recorded?
  • Can the High Court quash criminal proceedings based on the merits of the case before the trial court has recorded evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz and 4 Others vs Allah Wasaya and 6 Others1980 SCMR 181 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-23
  pre-emptionwithdrawal of petitioncompetency of petitionreview applicationcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from pre-emption suits filed regarding agricultural land purchased by the petitioners. The suits proceeded through the Civil Judge and Additional District Judge, leading to a revision and subsequent review application in the High Court under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, which were dismissed. Earlier, the petitioners had filed a civil petition in the Supreme Court against the High Court's judgment, which was unconditionally withdrawn in chambers by their counsel without seeking or obtaining permission to file a fresh petition. The core legal question is whether a subsequent petition for leave to appeal is competent when a prior petition involving the same subject-matter was unconditionally withdrawn. The Supreme Court held that the subsequent petition is barred under the applicable rules regarding withdrawal of suits and petitions. The key principle laid down is that where a party withdraws a petition without obtaining permission from the court to institute a fresh one based on formal defects or sufficient grounds, they are precluded from filing a fresh petition in respect of the same subject-matter.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a subsequent petition for leave to appeal is competent after the unconditional withdrawal of a previous petition involving the same subject-matter?
  • Does the withdrawal of a petition without permission to institute a fresh one preclude the filing of a subsequent petition?
  • How do the provisions regarding the withdrawal of suits apply to petitions before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Mujtaba vs Ghulam Ali and Others1980 SCMR 7 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-09-30
  pre-emptionlis pendenspendente lite transferright of pre-emptionlimitation periodrepresentative-in-interest
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the pre-emption of a land sale. The original vendees purchased land in 1961, and the plaintiff filed a pre-emption suit. During the pendency of this suit, and after the limitation period for filing a pre-emption suit had expired, the original vendees transferred the land to the petitioner. The petitioner argued that he possessed an equal right of pre-emption, thereby defeating the plaintiff's claim. The Supreme Court addressed whether a transfer of property made by a vendee pendente lite, after the limitation period for a pre-emption suit has lapsed, can defeat the original plaintiff's right of pre-emption. The Court held that such a transfer is subject to the principle of lis pendens and cannot defeat the plaintiff's suit. The subsequent transferee is merely a representative-in-interest of the original vendee and cannot assert his own pre-emptive rights to defeat the pending litigation. The Court affirmed that the law prevents a vendee from transferring property to a third party to frustrate a pre-emption suit once the limitation period has expired.

  Questions settled

  • Can a vendee defeat a pending pre-emption suit by transferring the property to a person with an equal or superior right of pre-emption after the limitation period has expired?
  • Does the principle of lis pendens apply to a transfer of property made by a vendee during the pendency of a pre-emption suit?
  • Is a subsequent transferee of property, acquired during the pendency of a pre-emption suit, entitled to assert his own pre-emptive rights to defeat the plaintiff's claim?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ismail Etc. vs Muhammad Sarwar Etc.1980 SCMR 254 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-07-17
  pre-emption suitminor defendantguardian ad litemlimitation periodamendment of plaintmisdescription of partynullity of suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil matter arises from a pre-emption suit instituted against multiple defendants, including one who was initially misdescribed as a major in the plaint but was later recognized as a minor, leading to an amendment of the plaint to appoint a guardian ad litem. The core legal question was whether a suit filed against a minor defendant described as a major is a nullity and whether amending the plaint to properly represent the minor after the period of limitation has run out amounts to adding a new party, thereby rendering the suit time-barred under the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court held that the initial institution of the suit against the minor remains competent and does not constitute a nullity, and the subsequent appointment of a guardian ad litem is not a substitution or addition of a new party. The Court established that correcting the description of a minor defendant or appointing a guardian is a procedural step subsequent to institution, meaning the limitation period is saved from the original date of filing and does not attract Section 22 of the Limitation Act.

  Questions settled

  • Is a pre-emption suit filed against a minor defendant described as a major considered a complete nullity?
  • Does the appointment of a guardian ad litem for a minor defendant amount to the addition or substitution of a new party under Section 22 of the Limitation Act?
  • Can a plaint be amended to correct the description of a minor defendant and appoint a guardian ad litem after the period of limitation for the suit has expired?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ishaq vs Abdul Qayyum and. Another1980 SCMR 563 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-02
  leave to appealsettlement authoritiestransfer of propertyclaimant statusfraudulent claimpast and closed transaction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which directed the Settlement Authorities to reconsider the entitlement of respondents for the transfer of a disputed house. The petitioner had originally secured the transfer of the property on the sole ground of being a claimant. However, subsequent proceedings before the Claims Commissioner established that the petitioner's claim verification was fraudulent and he was an imposter, resulting in the cancellation of his verified claim and compensation book. Although initial litigation protected the transfer of the house as not being a direct consequence of the claim verification, the Supreme Court ultimately restored a judgment that left the question open for the Settlement Authorities. The core legal question was whether the transfer of property based on a fraudulent claim could be re-examined and whether the matter was a past and closed transaction. The Supreme Court held that the matter was not past and closed, and the Settlement Authorities were fully competent to re-examine the petitioner's entitlement since his initial preference was entirely based on his status as a claimant. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the transfer of evacuee property obtained on the basis of a fraudulent claim can be reconsidered by the Settlement Authorities?
  • Does a finding by the Claims Commissioner that a person is an imposter affect their entitlement to property transferred on the basis of being a claimant?
  • Can proceedings regarding the transfer of property be treated as a past and closed transaction when the foundational claim has been set aside by superior courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Idrees vs Mst. Shamim Akiitar1980 SCMR 787 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-28
  ex parte ejectmentdefault in rentnon-appearancesufficient causepetition for leave to appealrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner-tenant's second appeal against an ex parte ejectment order. The landlady sought the tenant's eviction on the ground of default in rent payment, leading to an ex parte ejectment order by the Rent Controller after the tenant failed to appear. The tenant's applications to set aside the ex parte order and subsequent appeals before the Additional District Judge and the High Court were successively dismissed. The core legal question was whether the tenant had shown sufficient cause for non-appearance and whether the ex parte order and subsequent findings on default were sustainable. The Supreme Court held that the tenant's explanation for non-appearance was false and rightly disbelieved by the lower forums, noting that the tenant admitted he had not even engaged counsel prior to the ex parte order. The Court concluded that without establishing sufficient cause for absence, the High Court erred in examining evidentiary receipts without first crossing the hurdle of the ex parte ejectment order. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant can seek the setting aside of an ex parte ejectment order without establishing sufficient cause for non-appearance?
  • Is a plea of searching for counsel sufficient to excuse non-appearance when the party failed to appear before the Rent Controller throughout the day?
  • Whether an appellate or revisional court should examine evidentiary receipts without first determining the validity of an ex parte ejectment order?
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• Muhammad Ibrahim Etc. vs Muhammad Munir Madni Etc.1980 SCMR 754 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-01
  temporary injunctionco-ownersjoint holdingrevisional jurisdictionirreparable lossleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks special leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court which granted a temporary injunction in a suit for declaration and permanent injunction, restraining the petitioners from digging earth on land leased by one of the co-owners for a brick-kiln. The core legal question was whether a single co-owner of joint undivided property can lease land and permit a third party to dig earth without the consent of the other co-owners, and whether the High Court could interfere in revision with concurrent orders of the lower courts refusing temporary injunctions. The Supreme Court held that one co-owner cannot exclusive lease or alter the character of joint undivided holding without consent, and the failure of the lower courts to appreciate the irreparable loss from deep digging constituted a material irregularity correctable in revision. The petition was dismissed, affirming the interim injunction against digging while permitting the existing brick-kiln to operate.

  Questions settled

  • Can a co-owner of joint undivided property enter into a lease agreement and hand over possession to a third party without the consent of the other co-owners?
  • Does extensive digging of earth up to a depth of several feet on joint land constitute an irreparable loss and a radical change in the property's nature warranting a temporary injunction?
  • When can the High Court interfere in revisional jurisdiction with orders passed by the courts below regarding temporary injunctions?
  • Whether the failure of lower courts to consider the potential irreparable loss of property amounts to a material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction?
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• Muhammad Hussain Shah Etc. vs Bashir Ahmad and Another1980 SCMR 28 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-17
  bail cancellationwitness intimidationcriminal appealpost-arrest bailprosecution witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against the cancellation of bail by the High Court. The petitioners were originally granted bail by the Sessions Judge in a case involving charges under sections 302, 307, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The High Court subsequently cancelled this bail on the grounds that, while released, the petitioners murdered one prosecution witness and injured another in the pending case. The petitioners contended that one of them was not named in the initial First Information Report. The Supreme Court observed that multiple witnesses had implicated both petitioners during the police investigation. The Court held that the murder and injury of prosecution witnesses in the pending case created a clear risk of intimidation to the remaining witnesses. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling that the cancellation of bail was justified due to the petitioners' conduct while on bail, which threatened the integrity of the ongoing trial proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is the cancellation of bail justified when an accused person murders or injures prosecution witnesses while released on bail?
  • Does the failure to name an accused in the First Information Report preclude the cancellation of bail if subsequent investigation implicates them?
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• Muhammad Hassan vs Government of Sind and Others1980 SCMR 400 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-11
  compulsory retirementservice lawcolourable exercise of powershow-cause noticeservice tribunalspecial leave to appealstigma
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Sind Service Tribunal, which upheld the compulsory retirement of a police officer after twenty-five years of service. The petitioner contended that his retirement was a colourable exercise of power, arguing that the order was motivated by previous departmental proceedings and a show-cause notice that had been dropped. The core legal question was whether a retirement order, issued following dropped departmental proceedings, constitutes a removal or dismissal requiring a show-cause notice, or if it remains a valid retirement simpliciter. The Supreme Court held that since the retirement order carried no stigma and was not based on misconduct, it did not amount to removal or dismissal. Consequently, the Court found the petitioner's reliance on precedents involving misconduct-based terminations inapplicable. The Court affirmed that where a retirement order is issued without stigma, it does not trigger the procedural protections required for disciplinary removal. The petition for leave was dismissed, as the Court declined to address academic questions regarding the Tribunal's reasoning.

  Questions settled

  • Does a retirement order issued after twenty-five years of service, which contains no stigma, constitute a removal or dismissal requiring a show-cause notice?
  • Can a retirement order be challenged as a colourable exercise of power solely because it followed a dropped show-cause notice?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to grant leave to appeal to address academic questions regarding the reasoning of a Service Tribunal?
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• Muhammad Hasham Khan vs Malik Bashir Ahmad1980 SCMR 801 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-11
  contempt of courtwritten statementfalse denialsservice matterconstitutional petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against the order of the High Court of Baluchistan dismissing the petitioner's contempt application. The petitioner had filed a service-related constitutional petition in which respondents filed a delayed written statement containing allegedly false denials. The petitioner initiated contempt proceedings, which were later dismissed by the High Court after hearing the matter on a request for early disposal. The core legal question was whether the delayed filing of a written statement and making incorrect denials therein constitute contempt of court, and whether the High Court's dismissal order lacked proper application of mind and adequate opportunity of hearing. The Supreme Court held that the late filing of a written statement permitted by court time allowance and incorrect denials of facts do not automatically constitute contempt of court without proof of intention. The Court dismissed the petition, laying down that mere delay in filing pleadings or incorrect factual denials in a written statement do not amount to contempt unless a clear intention to obstruct justice is established.

  Questions settled

  • Does the late filing of a written statement beyond the time allowed by the court constitute contempt of court?
  • Does the incorrect denial of certain facts in a written statement always constitute contempt of court?
  • Can a court hear and decide a main contempt application when it is fixed for hearing on an application for early disposal?
  • Whether an order dismissing a contempt application without elaborate discussion constitutes a non-speaking order lacking application of mind?
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• Muhammad Haroon vs The State1980 SCMR 725 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-22
  inherent jurisdictionquashment of proceedingsdouble jeopardystay of proceedingscriminal procedureprosecutorial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of Sind, which disposed of an application filed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner, facing separate prosecutions under the Customs Act and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act for the same underlying facts, sought to stay one proceeding to avoid prejudice to his defense, specifically regarding the non-prosecution of a co-accused. The core legal question was whether the High Court could direct the prosecution to proceed with only one case at a time when multiple prosecutions arise from the same transaction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's impugned order, which directed the prosecution to proceed with only one case at a time at their discretion, was clear and sufficient to address the petitioner's grievance. The Court affirmed that while double punishment for the same facts is impermissible, the High Court correctly exercised its inherent jurisdiction to regulate the sequence of trials in the interest of justice. The petition for leave to appeal was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court, under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, direct the prosecution to proceed with only one case at a time when multiple prosecutions arise from the same facts?
  • Does the simultaneous prosecution of an accused for different offences arising from the same transaction violate the principle against double punishment?
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• Muhammad Haroon vs District Food Controller, Bahawalpur and Another1980 SCMR 720 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-05
  ration depotlicence cancellationinter-court appealcompetency of appealmartial law instructionalternate remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from civil petitions for special leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of Inter-Court Appeals by the Lahore High Court. The petitioners' ad hoc or temporary licences for running Ration Depots were terminated pursuant to Martial Law Instruction No. 22 upon the recommendation of the Depots Allotment/Review Board. The petitioners challenged their termination through writ petitions, which were dismissed in limine, and subsequent Inter-Court Appeals were likewise dismissed as incompetent under the proviso to subsection (2) of section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, because the applicable law provided an alternate remedy of appeal. The core legal question was whether an appeal was competent against the termination order under the applicable law. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that an appeal was indeed available to the Deputy Director under sub-clause (2)(h) of Clause (6) of the West Pakistan (Foodstuffs) Distribution Order, 1967, rendering the High Court's dismissal of the Inter-Court Appeal correct, while clarifying that the time spent bona fide in pursuing remedies before the High Court could be pleaded for condonation of delay if appeals were now filed before the appropriate authority. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Inter-Court Appeal is competent against an order of a Single Judge of the High Court when the underlying law provides for an appeal to a tribunal or authority?
  • Does the West Pakistan (Foodstuffs) Distribution Order, 1967 provide for an appeal against the cancellation of a ration depot licence?
  • Can time spent bona fide in pursuing a remedy before a wrong forum be pleaded as an excuse for limitation?
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• Muhammad Hanif vs Sabir and Another1980 SCMR 568 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-09
  special leave to appealevacuee propertyallotment cancellationwrit petitionequitable reliefremand
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing his writ petition in limine. The dispute relates to land allotments following the 1947 Partition, where the petitioner claimed as the nephew of the alleged deceased allottee, Sabir, while the first respondent claimed to be Sabir himself, alleging he was still alive. After protracted litigation and remands, the Assistant Commissioner acting as a notified officer restored the land to the petitioner on an ex parte basis. The Additional Commissioner subsequently remanded the case for a fresh decision, which the High Court upheld despite finding the order technically not revisable, on the ground that equitable relief ought not to be granted to perpetuate injustice or deny a hearing on merits. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court rightly refused equitable relief in the interest of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is bound to grant equitable relief under Article 199 when an order is found to be technically not revisable?
  • Can an ex parte decision affecting property rights be set aside in the interest of justice to allow a hearing of both parties?
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• Muhammad Hanif vs Ghulam Rasul and Others1980 SCMR 340 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-28
  pre-emptionburden of proofwithholding evidencedocumentary evidenceoral evidenceadverse inferencesuperior right of pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's suits for pre-emption. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who claimed a superior right of pre-emption based on being a collateral of the vendors and an owner in the Patti/estate, had discharged the burden of proof regarding these claims. The petitioner relied on oral evidence, having intentionally withheld available documentary evidence, specifically the pedigree-table and Jamabandi. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proof. The Court affirmed that when the best available documentary evidence is intentionally withheld by a party, adverse inferences are justified. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that oral evidence regarding relationship and ownership is inadmissible when documentary evidence is available and withheld, citing the provisions of the Evidence Act. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petitions and dismissed them, confirming that the High Court committed no illegality in its assessment of the evidence and the resulting presumption against the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Does the intentional withholding of available documentary evidence by a party justify an adverse inference regarding the facts sought to be proved?
  • Is oral evidence admissible to prove relationship and ownership in a pre-emption suit when the relevant documentary evidence was available but withheld?
  • Does the burden of proof regarding the superior right of pre-emption lie on the claimant?
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• Muhammad Ghiasuddin vs Khan Alam and Others1980 SCMR 146 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-18
  redemption of mortgagelimitation periodevacuee propertyrehabilitation and settlement authoritiesspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's second appeal concerning land in Kohat. The plaintiff originally filed a suit for a declaration of ownership and redemption of an evacuee-mortgage, which was decreed by the trial court and upheld by the appellate and high court. The core legal question revolved around whether the application for redemption of the mortgage was barred by the sixty-year period of limitation, and whether the Rehabilitation and Settlement Authorities possessed jurisdiction to order redemption as opposed to the Custodian of Evacuee Property. The Supreme Court held that the redemption application was filed well within the limitation period calculated from the accrual of the right of redemption, and that the jurisdictional plea regarding the authority of the Rehabilitation and Settlement Authorities could not be raised for the first time before the apex court. The petition was accordingly dismissed on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application for the redemption of mortgage rights was barred by limitation when calculated from the date the right to redeem accrued?
  • Can a new plea regarding the jurisdiction of Rehabilitation and Settlement Authorities versus the Custodian of Evacuee Property be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
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• Muhammad Essa vs The State and 3 Others1980 SCMR 848 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-24
  judicial confessionghairatappreciation of evidenceculpable homicideocular evidencegrave and sudden provocationbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that acquitted two respondents and reduced the conviction of a third respondent from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The core legal questions concerned the propriety of the High Court’s reappraisal of ocular evidence and the legal requirement to accept a judicial confession in its entirety. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court correctly identified the unreliability of the prosecution’s ocular witnesses, who were distant from the scene and biased. Since the prosecution failed to prove its case through other means, the Court relied on the accused’s judicial confession. The key principle laid down is that where a conviction rests solely on a judicial confession, that confession must be accepted in toto. Consequently, because the accused’s confession included a specific plea of ghairat (grave and sudden provocation), the Court upheld the application of the First Exception to Section 300, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, justifying the conviction under Section 304, Part I, rather than Section 302.

  Questions settled

  • Must a judicial confession be accepted in its entirety if the prosecution's case rests solely upon it?
  • Does a plea of ghairat in a judicial confession bring an offense under the First Exception to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is an appellate court entitled to interfere with a trial court's appreciation of ocular evidence if the findings are based on flawed premises?
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