Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Ijaz Ahmed vs The State1980 SCMR 892 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-06-24
  murderschizophreniaplea of insanityunsoundness of mindmitigating circumstancedeath sentencelife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction of the appellant for the murder of a pious man in Sialkot, for which he was sentenced to death. The core legal questions examined were whether the appellant had murdered the deceased during a relapse of his schizophrenia, and whether the imposition of the death penalty was justified given evidence of his mental abnormality at the time of the offence. The Court held that while the appellant failed to prove total legal insanity under the standard required to completely exonerate him, the evidence nevertheless established that he suffered from a history of schizophrenia and was not entirely mentally normal at the time of the commission of the offence. The ratio decidendi is that lesser forms of mental abnormality and diminished responsibility do not constitute a complete legal defence to murder under Pakistani law, but such abnormality can be considered a mitigating circumstance warranting the reduction of the death sentence to life imprisonment. The Court consequently dismissed the appeal against conviction while reducing the sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the plea of diminished responsibility is available as a defence in a criminal prosecution under Pakistani law?
  • Does a history of schizophrenia automatically establish legal insanity at the time of committing an offence?
  • Can mental abnormality on the part of an accused be treated as a mitigating circumstance under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to reduce the sentence from death to life imprisonment?
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• Ibrahim Khan, Administrator, Union Council, Balochabad, Tharparkar1980 SCMR 263 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-19
  Octroi taxstatutory interpretationlocal governmentdelegated legislationreview jurisdictiontaxation powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that invalidated the levy of an Octroi tax by a Union Council. The core legal question was whether the Union Council could lawfully impose an Octroi tax based solely on the Deputy Commissioner's approval of its budget, or if such a levy required the specific previous sanction of the Government as mandated by statute. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that the levy was illegal because the Deputy Commissioner lacked the authority to sanction the tax. The Court held that while prior rules might have allowed such delegation, they were rendered inapplicable by the current statutory framework. The key principle laid down is that where a statute explicitly requires the 'previous sanction of Government' for the imposition of taxes by a local council, any prior rules or delegated authorities that conflict with this express requirement are inconsistent and therefore void, rendering any tax imposed without direct Government sanction invalid.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Deputy Commissioner validate the levy of a tax if the governing statute requires the 'previous sanction of Government'?
  • Does a judgment based on a point not argued by the parties constitute an error apparent on the face of the record under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Are rules framed under repealed statutes saved if they are inconsistent with the provisions of a new, repealing Ordinance?
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• Hayat Ali vs Miss Az1za Mahmood1980 SCMR 298 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-10-01
  ejectmentdefault in rentstriking off defencecondonation of delayrent appealurban rent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against the dismissal of his second appeal by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld his ejectment from the rented premises. The respondent had sued for ejectment on the ground of default in rent payment. The Rent Controller had initially condoned the delay in depositing arrears of rent due to the petitioner's illness, but the District Judge on appeal set aside that order, held the petitioner in default, and ordered his ejectment, which view was affirmed by the High Court. The core legal question concerned the maintainability of an appeal against an order passed under the second part of subsection (6) of section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, and the nature of 'default'. The Supreme Court held that an order determining whether a default is avoidable or excusable and either striking off the defence or condoning the non-compliance concludes the controversy and is appealable by either party. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order passed under the second part of subsection (6) of section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, is appealable?
  • When can a tenant's non-compliance with a rent deposit order be excused as an unavoidable default?
  • Does an order condoning non-compliance or striking off a defence conclude the controversy regarding default?
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• Haq Nawaz vs Kh. Shaiq Hassan and Another1980 SCMR 324 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-07
  review petitionlocus standierror apparent on the face of the recordcivil proceduretransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed against the Supreme Court's order dated 17th December 1976, in a civil petition for special leave to appeal. The petitioner sought review on the ground that they had newly discovered that the respondent was a transferee of an additional shop, supporting this claim with a P.T.O. document. The respondent, appearing in person, contended that the acquisition of the additional shop was obtained through an auction and was legally permissible. The Court held that the petitioner lacked the necessary locus standi to challenge the earlier transfer of property in favour of the respondent. Furthermore, the Court determined that it was inappropriate for the petitioner to introduce a fresh ground for review that had not been urged at any previous stage of the proceedings. Consequently, the Court found no error apparent on the face of the record to justify a review. The petition was dismissed accordingly, affirming the finality of the earlier order.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party introduce a new ground for review that was not raised at any previous stage of the proceedings?
  • Does a petitioner have locus standi to challenge a property transfer in favour of another party in a review petition?
  • What constitutes an error on the face of the record sufficient to justify a review of a Supreme Court order?
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• Hamidullah vs The State1980 SCMR 206 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-11
  murderdeath sentencepre-emption suitconfessional statementeye-witness testimonyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  Petitioner Hamidullah sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court confirming his conviction and death sentence under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Musharaf Khan. The prosecution case was that the petitioner, enraged by the dismissal of his pre-emption suit against the deceased's brother on the day of the occurrence, shot the deceased in the Main Bazar of Chitral. The prosecution relied on eye-witness testimony, motive, and a judicial confession recorded by the Deputy Commissioner. The petitioner denied the charge under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and alleged his confession was fabricated. The Supreme Court held that the eye-witnesses were natural and credible, the motive was satisfactorily established, and the confessional statement was voluntary and true. The Court concluded that the concurrent findings of the lower courts were unexceptionable in a cold-blooded murder and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of natural eye-witnesses present at the scene of the crime is sufficient to sustain a conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a retracted judicial confession be relied upon when the court is satisfied as to its voluntariness and truth?
  • Whether omission of names of certain witnesses in the First Information Report is a ground to discard otherwise reliable eye-witness accounts?
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• Haji Shah Muhammad vs Syed Sajjad Hasnain Naqvi and Others1980 SCMR 620 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-15
  settlement of claimsdisplaced personsfinality of judgmentres judicataallotment of landmukhbari applicationrestoration of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two civil petitions for leave to appeal against a common judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's challenge regarding the restoration of land previously cancelled from his entitlement. The petitioner, a displaced person, had land cancelled due to an incorrectly verified claim form. After multiple unsuccessful rounds of litigation, including a dismissed writ petition and a refused petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, the petitioner sought restoration of the cancelled land from settlement authorities. The High Court dismissed his petition and allowed the respondents' petition to have the land allotted to them as informants. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's attempt to re-open the controversy was impermissible as the matter had attained finality through previous judicial proceedings. The Court emphasized that the petitioner could not use remarks from a prior High Court order to revive a closed transaction or challenge the subsequent allotment of the land to others, as he lacked a legal right to the restoration of land cancelled due to a bogus claim.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner seek to re-open a past and closed transaction regarding land allotment after the matter has been upheld by the Supreme Court?
  • Does a remark by the High Court allowing a party to approach settlement authorities create a new legal right to restoration of land previously cancelled due to a bogus claim?
  • Is a party who has no legal right to the restoration of cancelled land entitled to challenge the legality of the allotment of that same land to other claimants?
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• Haji Muhammad and Others vs Muhammad Rafique and Another1980 SCMR 2 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-07-02
  evictionsublettingbona fide requirementconcurrent findings of factrent restrictionlandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from an eviction application filed by landlords against a tenant under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959, citing default in rent payment, unauthorized subletting, and bona fide personal requirement. The Rent Controller initially dismissed the application, but the District Judge reversed this decision on appeal, finding both subletting and the bona fide requirement established. A subsequent Second Appeal before the Lahore High Court was dismissed. The petitioners sought special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, challenging the concurrent findings of fact regarding subletting and the landlords' personal need for the premises. The Supreme Court held that findings of fact regarding subletting, where concurrent, are not subject to interference unless there is a clear misreading of evidence. The Court found the tenant's reliance on an employee register insufficient, particularly as the alleged sub-tenant was not produced as a witness. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the landlords' bona fide requirement, noting that other occupied shops did not negate the need for the premises in dispute. The petition was dismissed, affirming the eviction order.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding subletting in a rent dispute?
  • Does the existence of other shops owned by a landlord automatically negate a claim of bona fide personal requirement?
  • Is a register of employees sufficient proof to rebut a charge of subletting when the alleged sub-tenant is not produced as a witness?
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• Haji Inayatullah vs Rationing Controller, Peshawar and 5 Others1980 SCMR 204 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-14
  Atta quotalicence cancellationnatural justiceshow-cause noticewrit petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court dismissing the petitioner's writ petition regarding the reduction of an Atta quota and cancellation of a licence. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, as president of an association holding a quota for its members, possessed a personal right requiring a show-cause notice and an opportunity of hearing prior to the cancellation of the licence by the Deputy Commissioner. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding that the petitioner had no personal right in the matter, rendering any claim of being condemned unheard untenable. Consequently, upon being questioned by the court, the petitioner's counsel conceded the point and sought to withdraw the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed the legal principle that an association representative managing a collective quota holds no independent personal right therein that would mandate individual procedural safeguards upon administrative alteration or cancellation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the president of an association distributing a government quota possess a personal right in the quota requiring a pre-decisional hearing upon its reduction or cancellation?
  • Whether an administrative authority is obliged to issue a show-cause notice to a representative holding a collective quota on behalf of an association before cancelling the licence.
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• Haji Allah Ditta vs Umar Din Etc.1980 SCMR 190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-23
  bail cancellationfurther inquirymurder caseinvestigation reportcriminal procedurepost-mortem reportalibi
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the complainant, Haji Allah Ditta, seeking the cancellation of bail granted to the respondents, Umar Din, Bashir, and Mansha, by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court. The respondents were accused in a double-murder case registered under sections 302, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in granting bail when the respondents were named in the First Information Report with specific allegations. The Supreme Court reviewed the investigation reports, noting that the investigating officers, including the Inspector and D.S.P. of the Crimes Branch, had found the respondents innocent and placed them in column (2) of the challan. Furthermore, medical evidence contradicted the specific allegations of dragging and brickbatting. The Court held that the High Court correctly determined the case required further inquiry. Consequently, the petition for bail cancellation was dismissed, affirming that the grant of bail was justified given the circumstances and lack of legal error.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be granted when the investigating officer finds the accused innocent and places them in column (2) of the challan?
  • Does the existence of contradictions between the First Information Report allegations and medical evidence justify a finding of 'further inquiry' for bail purposes?
  • Is the grant of bail by a High Court sustainable when it is based on a finding that the case requires further inquiry?
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• Haji Allah Ditta vs Mst. Shahzadi Bilqis and Another1980 SCMR 41 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-15
  ejectmentdefault in rentbona fide requirementreconstruction of buildinglawful tenderlandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a rent dispute where the respondents sought the ejectment of the petitioner-tenant from a shop and Chabutara on the grounds of default in payment of rent and bona fide requirement for reconstruction. The Rent Controller ordered ejectment, which was upheld by both the Additional District Judge and the Lahore High Court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether depositing rent in the treasury without specifying the names of the landladies on the challan form constituted a lawful tender of rent, and whether a building must be dilapidated to justify a landlord's claim for reconstruction. The Court held that omitting the landladies' names on the deposit form was a deliberate failure, meaning the deposit was not a lawful tender. Furthermore, the Court ruled that a building need not be dilapidated to justify reconstruction; a landlord has a right to improve their property and utilize it profitably. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the deposit of rent in a public treasury without specifying the names of the landlords constitute a lawful tender of rent?
  • Must a building be in a dilapidated or falling condition for a landlord to establish a bona fide requirement for reconstruction?
  • Does a landlord's willingness to invest in a new construction and face statutory penalties for non-completion sufficiently establish the bona fides of a reconstruction claim?
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• Habib Rasool and Others vs Nawabzada Ihsanullah Khan and Others1980 SCMR 270 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-09-29
  Martial Law Regulation 115land reformstractor ownershipland retentionregistration of vehiclesale transaction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court decision that allowed a landowner to retain additional land under paragraph 8 of Martial Law Regulation 115 of 1972, based on the ownership of a tractor. The petitioners argued that the respondent did not qualify as an "owner" because the full payment for the tractor was completed after the critical date of December 20, 1971, and because the tractor was not registered in the respondent's name under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Supreme Court rejected these arguments. It held that the transaction was effectively completed upon the initial agreement and delivery of the tractor in February 1971, with the remaining balance treated as a debt. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the lack of formal registration in the respondent's name did not preclude a finding of ownership for the purposes of the regulation, consistent with established precedent. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, upholding the High Court's decision that the respondent was entitled to the land retention concession.

  Questions settled

  • Does the completion of full payment after the target date invalidate a claim of ownership for a tractor under Martial Law Regulation 115 of 1972?
  • Is formal registration of a tractor under the Motor Vehicles Act a mandatory prerequisite to establish ownership for the purpose of land retention concessions under Martial Law Regulation 115 of 1972?
  • Can a sale transaction be considered complete for the purpose of ownership under Martial Law Regulation 115 of 1972 if delivery occurred before the target date but full payment was made later?
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• Habib Khan vs Additional Settlement Commissioner, Multan and Others1980 SCMR 84 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-23
  Mukhbari applicationland allotmentDisplaced Persons (Land Settlement) Actconstitutional jurisdictionfinding of factmisrepresentation and fraudwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment dismissing a challenge to an order by the Additional Settlement Commissioner. The petitioner sought land allotment, alleging that a deceased allottee had obtained excess land through fraud and misrepresentation, and filed an informer application under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1959. The core legal questions were whether the High Court erred in its assessment of the evidence regarding the filing date of the informer application and whether the finding of fact by the Settlement authority regarding fraud could be disturbed in constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the finding of fact regarding fraud was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement authority and could not be challenged without demonstrating a total lack of evidence or misreading of evidence, which the petitioner failed to do. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the burden of proving the filing date of the application rested on the petitioner, and the High Court correctly evaluated the record. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a finding of fact regarding fraud or misrepresentation by a Settlement authority be disturbed in constitutional jurisdiction without proving a total lack of evidence or misreading of evidence?
  • Does the burden of proving the filing date of a Mukhbari application rest on the petitioner when challenging a finding of the High Court?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to summon original Settlement Department records to verify disputed dates of filing in a petition for special leave to appeal?
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• Gulzar Masih vs The State and Another1980 SCMR 37 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-27
  acquittalcircumstantial evidenceextra-judicial confessionabscondencemotivespecial leave to appealmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the complainant against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which set aside the conviction and sentence of life imprisonment passed against the respondent under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of a minor child. The prosecution case entirely rested on circumstantial evidence, including the testimony of a witness who allegedly saw the respondent throwing the dead body, an extra-judicial confession, motive, medical evidence, and alleged abscondence. The High Court acquitted the respondent after finding the circumstantial evidence weak, artificial, and insufficient to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's order of acquittal was perverse, arbitrary, or capricious so as to warrant interference. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had taken a possible and reasonable view of the evidence on record in disbelieving the circumstantial links. Consequently, the Supreme Court laid down the principle that an appellate court's order of acquittal based on a plausible evaluation of evidence will not be interfered with unless it is shown to be arbitrary or capricious.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order of acquittal passed by the High Court based on circumstantial evidence warrants interference by the Supreme Court when a possible view of the evidence has been taken?
  • Is the testimony of a witness who delayed reporting that they saw the accused disposing of a dead body sufficient to sustain a murder conviction?
  • Does the failure of an accused to offer an explanation for possessing a dead body automatically prove guilt in the absence of direct ocular evidence?
  • Can an extra-judicial confession be relied upon when the witness to whom it was made allowed the accused to leave freely afterward?
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• Gulsher and Others vs Custodian of Evacuee Property and Others1980 SCMR 46 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-08-04
  evacuee propertyallotment cancellationlimitation periodconstitutional petitioncompensation poolnon-evacuee declarationtitle validity
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court order that dismissed a constitutional petition regarding the status of property claimed to be evacuee. The core legal questions concerned whether an application filed under Section 22 of the Pakistan Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1957, was time-barred and whether the disputed land, which had not been treated as evacuee before the statutory target date, could be validly allotted. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, finding that the application was not time-barred as the respondents had been diligently pursuing remedies before the settlement authorities. The Court held that since the property was never treated as evacuee before the relevant date, it did not form part of the compensation pool. Consequently, the allotment made under the erroneous assumption that the property was evacuee was legally ineffective and could not confer a valid title upon the petitioners. The Court affirmed that an unauthorized allotment of non-evacuee property creates no legal right, and time spent in bona fide pursuit of other legal remedies is excluded from limitation calculations.

  Questions settled

  • Is an allotment of property as evacuee valid if the property was not treated as evacuee before the statutory target date?
  • Can time spent pursuing remedies before settlement authorities be excluded when calculating the limitation period for an application under the Pakistan Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1957?
  • Does an allotment of property erroneously assumed to be evacuee confer a valid title upon the allottee?
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• Gul Rehman vs The State1980 SCMR 163 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-14
  murderdeath sentencedying declarationocular evidenceappreciation of evidencespecial leave to appealknife recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Gul Rehman, was convicted under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Gul Janan and sentenced to death by the Sessions Judge, D.I. Khan, which conviction and sentence were upheld by the Peshawar High Court. The petitioner sought special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The prosecution case rested on a dying declaration (lodged as the F.I.R. by the victim prior to his death), ocular testimony from two independent witnesses, the recovery of a blood-stained knife on the petitioner's pointing out, and corroborative medical and circumstantial evidence establishing that the petitioner attacked the deceased following an insult to his caste. The Supreme Court examined the record and found that the lower courts' findings were based on a proper appreciation of evidence, with the dying declaration corroborated by medical evidence and independent eyewitness accounts. Holding that no principle of law or natural justice had been violated in evaluating the evidence, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for special leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a dying declaration recorded by an Assistant Sub-Inspector can form the basis of a murder conviction without corroboration?
  • Does the recovery of a blood-stained weapon on the accused's pointing out sufficiently corroborate ocular and dying declaration evidence?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts based on the appreciation of evidence in a criminal appeal?
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• Gul Muhammad vs Hassan Khan and 4 OTHERs1980 SCMR 900 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-06-16
  pre-emption suitright of pre-emptionimprovement of positioncontiguityleave to appealfindings of factabandonment of plea
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which affirmed the decree in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether the vendees had validly improved their position regarding the right of pre-emption based on contiguity through subsequent gift and exchange transactions, and whether this issue was properly raised and pressed before the lower courts. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to press the plea of improvement before the trial court and the appellate court, despite it being framed as an issue. The Court observed that the plea of improvement could not be accepted without positive findings of fact regarding the alleged gift and exchange transactions, which were absent in the lower court proceedings. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, affirming that a party cannot seek relief on a ground that was not actively pursued or established through findings of fact in the lower forums. The judgment reinforces the principle that appellate courts will not entertain arguments that were abandoned or not pressed during the trial and first appellate stages.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a plea of improvement of position in a pre-emption suit for the first time in the Supreme Court if it was not pressed before the lower courts?
  • Is a plea of improvement in a pre-emption suit maintainable without positive findings of fact regarding the alleged underlying transactions?
  • Does the failure to press an issue before the trial and appellate courts preclude a party from relying on it in a petition for leave to appeal?
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• Gul Jamal and ANOTHERs vs The State1980 SCMR 654 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-24
  retracted confessionco-accused confessionjoint recoveryconductcorroborationmurderweapon of offence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, by special leave, arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court confirming the convictions and death sentences of the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution's case rested on the retracted judicial confessions of the appellants, along with the subsequent joint recoveries of the deceased's clothes, a blood-stained dagger, and other belongings. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether a retracted confession of one co-accused can legally corroborate the retracted confession of another under Section 30 of the Evidence Act 1872. The Court ruled that a co-accused's confession is not strictly 'evidence' as it is not on oath and cannot be cross-examined; thus, one piece of tainted evidence requiring corroboration cannot corroborate another. However, the Court distinguished between statements and physical acts, holding that the physical conduct of an accused leading to recoveries is admissible as conduct under Section 8 of the Evidence Act 1872, even if joint statements are inadmissible under Section 27. Finding sufficient independent corroboration, the Court dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the retracted confession of one co-accused be used to corroborate the retracted confession of another co-accused under Section 30 of the Evidence Act 1872?
  • Is a joint recovery statement made by multiple accused admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act 1872 if it is not clear who gave the information first?
  • Can the physical act of an accused leading the police to a place where evidence is hidden be admitted as conduct under Section 8 of the Evidence Act 1872, independent of any statement?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to establish a motive render a case doubtful when there are voluntary and corroborated confessions?
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• Gul Arab vs Adam Khan and 2 Others1980 SCMR 369 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-11
  post-arrest bailjudicial discretionattempt to murdercriminal appealappellate interferencebail cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order of the Peshawar High Court, which granted post-arrest bail to the respondents in a criminal case involving charges under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner challenged the High Court's decision, arguing that the nature of the firearm injuries sustained clearly established an offence under Section 307, rather than the lesser offence under Section 308 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 as suggested by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its assessment of the evidence and the potential classification of the offence when exercising its discretion to grant bail. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the grant of bail is primarily a matter of judicial discretion. The Court found that the High Court had provided sufficient reasons for its decision based on the material available on the record at that stage. Consequently, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion, affirming that appellate intervention is not warranted where the lower court has exercised its discretion reasonably.

  Questions settled

  • Is the grant of bail primarily a matter of discretion for the High Court?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion in granting bail?
  • Does the classification of an offence as falling under Section 307 or Section 308 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 require definitive determination at the bail stage?
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• Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 2 Others1980 SCMR 610 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-22
  writ jurisdictionadministrative lawmala fidesduresscoerciondepartmental inquiryCentral Excise Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that quashed departmental orders issued by the Central Excise and Land Customs Department against a tobacco dealer. The core legal question was whether the departmental authority's order, which imposed penalties for a tobacco shortage based on an alleged admission, was legally sustainable when the authority failed to address the respondent's specific plea that the admission was obtained through duress and coercion by an inimical inspector. The Supreme Court held that the departmental order was untenable because it failed to record a clear finding on the crucial defense of mala fides, despite the respondent's evidence regarding the inspector's bias. The Court affirmed that the High Court correctly exercised its writ jurisdiction in quashing the departmental order, as the failure to consider the plea of coercion rendered the administrative decision improper in law. The principle laid down is that administrative orders imposing penalties must address all material defenses, particularly allegations of duress, and a failure to do so justifies judicial intervention in writ proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is an administrative order imposing a penalty legally sustainable if the authority fails to record a finding on a material plea of mala fides and duress?
  • Can the High Court in writ proceedings quash a departmental order that fails to address the respondent's defense of coercion regarding an alleged admission?
  • Does the failure of a departmental authority to consider evidence of bias on the part of the investigating officer render the resulting penalty order untenable?
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• Gul vs The State1980 SCMR 839 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-24
  criminal appealocular testimonyrecovery of weaponcorroborationappreciation of evidencemurder convictionbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged the judgment of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, which upheld the appellant's conviction for murder. The appellant was originally tried alongside others for the murder of the deceased, with the prosecution relying on ocular testimony, motive, and the recovery of a blood-stained hatchet. While the High Court acquitted the co-accused due to lack of corroboration, it maintained the appellant's conviction, finding the recovery of the blood-stained hatchet sufficient corroboration of the eye-witness testimony. The appellant contended that the recovery was suspicious, citing a discrepancy in dates regarding the Chemical Examiner's report and alleging the recovery witness was biased. The Supreme Court held that since the document concerning the Chemical Examiner's dates was not put to the Investigating Officer for clarification during trial, it could not be relied upon on appeal. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the weight of evidence and the credibility of witnesses are matters of fact and evidence appreciation, which the Court would not revisit. Consequently, the conviction was upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with findings of fact regarding the credibility of witnesses and the weight of evidence?
  • Can a document not put to the Investigating Officer for clarification during trial be relied upon for the first time in appeal?
  • Does the recovery of a blood-stained weapon at the instance of an accused serve as valid corroboration for ocular testimony?
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• Glaxo Laboratories Ltd. vs Sind Labour Court No, 2, Karachi and Another1980 SCMR 152 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-01-24
  probationertermination of servicetermination simplicitermisconductindustrial employmentreinstatementstanding orders
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld the reinstatement of a probationer whose services were terminated for unsatisfactory performance. The core legal question was whether the termination of a probationer for failing to meet performance standards constitutes a termination simpliciter under the contract of service, or a dismissal for misconduct requiring compliance with the procedural safeguards of Standing Order 15 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The High Court had concluded that the termination was essentially a removal for unsatisfactory work, thereby necessitating adherence to the disciplinary procedures for misconduct. The petitioner contended that the termination was a simple contractual termination, not attracting the requirements of Standing Order 15. The Supreme Court observed that the submission involved a question of law of public importance regarding the nature of employment and the applicability of disciplinary procedures to probationers. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether such termination requires the formal procedure prescribed for misconduct.

  Questions settled

  • Does the termination of a probationer for unsatisfactory performance constitute a termination simpliciter or a dismissal for misconduct?
  • Is compliance with Standing Order 15 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, required when terminating a probationer for unsatisfactory work?
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• Ghulam Shabbir vs Bachal and Another1980 SCMR 708 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-20
  acquittal appealocular testimonydying declarationre-appraisal of evidenceinterested witnessesindependent corroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that acquitted the respondent of murder and attempted murder charges. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in setting aside the trial court's conviction based on the re-appraisal of ocular testimony and the admissibility of a dying declaration. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the High Court's acquittal. The Court held that where ocular testimony is tainted by admitted enmity, lacks independent corroboration, and involves witnesses whose presence at the scene is coincidental and doubtful, it is unsafe to rely upon such evidence. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that it will not interfere with a well-considered judgment of acquittal unless there is a compelling reason for re-appraisal of evidence. The absence of independent local witnesses and physical evidence at the crime scene further undermined the prosecution's case, justifying the High Court's decision to reject the testimony and acquit the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Is it safe to rely on ocular testimony when the witnesses have admitted enmity with the accused and lack independent corroboration?
  • Should an appellate court interfere with a well-considered judgment of acquittal based on the re-appraisal of evidence?
  • Does the absence of independent local witnesses at the scene of the crime undermine the credibility of the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Sarwar Khan vs Federation of Pakistan and 16 Others1980 SCMR 566 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-09
  service lawex-cadre postpromotionsenioritywrit jurisdictioncivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's writ petition regarding his claim to a Grade 18 post within the Family Planning Organization. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, having voluntarily accepted an ex-cadre appointment as a Social Scientist in Grade 17, could subsequently claim entitlement to promotion to Grade 18 in preference to colleagues who remained in the original cadre and were subsequently promoted. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, dismissing the petition on merits. The Court held that because the petitioner had willingly accepted a selection-based, ex-cadre post with higher status and pay, effectively bypassing his seniors at the time, he could not later challenge the promotion of those seniors within their original cadre. The key principle established is that an employee who voluntarily opts for a different career path or ex-cadre appointment, thereby gaining immediate benefits, cannot subsequently assert seniority rights or promotion claims against those who remained in the original cadre.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant who voluntarily accepts an ex-cadre appointment claim seniority over colleagues who remained in the original cadre?
  • Does the acceptance of a selection-based post preclude a civil servant from challenging the subsequent promotion of colleagues in their former cadre?
  • Is a writ petition maintainable regarding terms and conditions of service for a civil servant under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Sabir vs The State1980 SCMR 357 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-04
  illegal gratificationanti-corruptionreview petitionpublic servantcriminal convictionscope of section 161 PPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed against the Supreme Court's previous dismissal of a criminal petition challenging a conviction under the anti-corruption laws. The petitioner, a Junior Clerk, had been convicted for accepting illegal gratification from a school teacher to facilitate a transfer. The core legal questions addressed were whether the conviction was sustainable given the petitioner's alleged lack of authority to effectuate the transfer and whether there was sufficient evidence of conscious acceptance of illegal gratification. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that the petitioner's arguments had already been thoroughly considered and rejected in the original judgment. The Court affirmed that even if a public servant lacks the specific authority to perform the requested service, the act of accepting illegal gratification for rendering or attempting to render service or disservice to any person with another public servant falls squarely within the ambit of the second part of section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Consequently, the Court found no justification for reviewing its earlier decision and upheld the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the lack of authority of a public servant to perform a requested service exclude their liability under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a conviction be sustained under the second part of section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if the public servant accepted gratification for attempting to render service with another public servant?
  • Is a review petition maintainable when the grounds raised were already considered and rejected in the original judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool vs Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner and Others1980 SCMR 921 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-08
  evacuee propertyremand orderavailable propertysettlement schemeleave to appealdisplaced claimants
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court which held that the disputed evacuee residential property was not available for transfer to the petitioner. The property had been previously divided and transferred to respondents 3 to 9, but the Additional Settlement Commissioner subsequently remanded the case to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner for a fresh determination of the parties' entitlement. Following the remand, the petitioner filed an N.C.H. Form seeking transfer of the portion in his possession, which was rejected on the ground that the dispute was confined to the original parties. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the rejection, holding that property already transferred prior to Settlement Scheme No. VIII does not constitute 'available property' merely because a remand order requires a re-examination of the original parties' entitlement. The Court laid down the principle that a remand order for the limited purpose of re-examining the entitlement of existing litigants does not reopen the property to new claimants or outsiders.

  Questions settled

  • Does a remand order directing a re-examination of the entitlement of original litigants render the property 'available property' for new claimants?
  • Can an outsider intervene and claim transfer of evacuee property on the strength of a form filed after a remand order has been passed?
  • Whether the reopening of a settlement case on remand is limited to the parties who were before the appellate authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Nabi vs Rao Muhammad Usman Ali Khan1980 SCMR 751 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-12-14
  ejectmentbona fide requirementpersonal needlandlord and tenantsecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from an ejectment order passed against the petitioner on the ground of personal bona fide requirement of the landlord under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. The landlord sought eviction of the tenant on the grounds that he was residing with his son, the accommodation was insufficient, and domestic discord made separate residence necessary. The tenant contended that the landlord failed to specifically plead that his current accommodation was unsuitable and failed to discharge the onus of proving bona fide requirement. The High Court dismissed the tenant's second appeal, holding that the landlord's pleadings sufficiently implied the unsuitability of his current accommodation and that his bona fides were established by evidence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the decision, holding that the question of bona fide requirement is essentially one of fact. The Court further ruled that since the landlord was not occupying his son's house in his own right, he was entitled to seek ejectment of the tenant to occupy his own property.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a landlord's failure to explicitly plead the unsuitability of his current accommodation defeats a claim for personal bona fide requirement if such unsuitability is implied in the pleadings and established by evidence?
  • Whether a landlord residing in a house owned by his son is considered to be occupying a residential building in his own right so as to bar him from seeking eviction of his tenant under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Is the question of a landlord's bona fide personal requirement of a premises a question of fact that the Supreme Court will generally not interfere with?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad and Another vs Mst. Noor Bibi and 5 Others1980 SCMR 933 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-10
  constitutional jurisdictionconcurrent findingsfamily courtquestion of factjurisdictionpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Baluchistan High Court, which declined to interfere with concurrent factual findings regarding a property dispute. The first respondent had filed a suit in the Family Court claiming property gifted in lieu of dower, which was decreed in her favour and upheld on appeal by the District Judge. The petitioners, sons of the fifth respondent, challenged these findings and raised a new plea regarding the Family Court's jurisdiction over claims involving step-sons. The Supreme Court considered whether constitutional jurisdiction could be invoked against concurrent findings of fact supported by evidence and whether a new jurisdictional objection not raised in lower courts could be entertained. The Court held that concurrent findings of fact based on evidence cannot be disturbed in limited constitutional jurisdiction, and an objection as to jurisdiction not raised before the lower forums cannot be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact supported by evidence in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Can an objection as to the jurisdiction of the Family Court be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court when it was not raised in the lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad alias Ghulamoon vs Maula Dad and 6 Others1980 SCMR 314 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-06
  special leave to appealagreement of salecolonization of government landsmartial law regulationdeclaration and permanent injunctionestoppel by conduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which reversed the trial court's dismissal of a suit for declaration and permanent injunction filed by the purchasers against the allottee vendor. The core legal question concerned whether an allottee of government land under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 could avoid agreements of sale and eject the purchasers by relying upon section 19 of the said Act and paragraph 25 of Martial Law Regulation 64 of 1959, after having received consideration, parted with possession, and when the Provincial Government did not contest the claim. The Supreme Court held that the vendor could not be permitted to take advantage of such statutory prohibitions to the detriment of the purchasers due to his own conduct and the conduct of the Provincial Government. The key principle laid down is that a vendor who has entered into an agreement of sale, received consideration, and handed over possession of state land cannot rely on statutory restrictions against alienation to non-suit purchasers, especially where the state raises no objection.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an allottee of government land can rely on section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 to defeat an agreement of sale after receiving consideration and handing over possession?
  • Does paragraph 25 of Martial Law Regulation 64 of 1959 apply to an agreement of sale as distinguished from the actual disposition of property?
  • Can a vendor take advantage of statutory bars to deprive purchasers of the benefit of a transaction when the Provincial Government does not contest the suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain vs MRS. Chaman Sultan Shafi1980 SCMR 9 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-08-07
  bona fide requirementrent evictionconcurrent findings of factlandlord and tenantpersonal userent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the dismissal of a second appeal by the High Court, which had upheld concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the first appellate court ordering the eviction of the petitioner on the grounds of the respondent's bona fide personal requirement. The core legal question was whether the respondent's requirement for the premises was bona fide, given the petitioner's arguments regarding the respondent's existing accommodation, the timing of the eviction notice, and the lack of testimony from the respondent's children. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the respondent's bona fide need were sound and free from legal infirmity. The Court established that a landlord's requirement for premises is not negated by the mere existence of other family-owned accommodation over which the landlord has no control, nor by the failure to mention personal need in an initial notice if verbal requests were made. Furthermore, it was held that there is no legal requirement for a landlord to examine their children as witnesses to prove the bona fide nature of their accommodation needs.

  Questions settled

  • Does a landlord's failure to mention personal need in an initial notice invalidate a subsequent eviction application based on bona fide requirement?
  • Is a landlord required to examine their children as witnesses to prove the bona fide nature of their personal accommodation requirement?
  • Can a landlord's requirement for premises be considered bona fide if they have access to other family-owned accommodation over which they have no control?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Haider vs The State1980 SCMR 289 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-09-30
  murderdeath sentencecorroborationrecoverieseye-witness testimonycriminal appealmitigation of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the murder of Mst. Jindan by means of a hatchet, which was confirmed by the Lahore High Court. The core legal question involved the sufficiency and reliability of corroborative evidence, specifically regarding an infirm eye-witness and weapon recoveries, to sustain a capital conviction. The Supreme Court held that while the primary eye-witness was old and infirm requiring reliable independent corroboration, and motive was a weak piece of evidence, the testimony of an independent witness regarding the production of the blood-stained hatchet and clothes provided sufficient corroboration. Although the court noted that mitigating circumstances such as grave and sudden provocation from a prior revenge killing made imprisonment for life a more appropriate sentence, it declined to interfere with the legal death sentence. The key principle laid down is that recovery of incriminating articles through an independent witness can legally corroborate tainted ocular testimony, and appellate courts will not normally interfere with a legal sentence of death absent an error of law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the evidence of an old and infirm eye-witness requires independent corroboration to sustain a conviction for murder?
  • Can the production of blood-stained articles through an independent witness furnish sufficient corroboration of tainted ocular evidence?
  • Does evidence of motive constitute sufficient corroboration for an unreliable eye-witness in a criminal trial?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with a legal sentence of death passed by lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Abbas vs The State1980 SCMR 885 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-06
  criminal petitionculpable homicidemurderknife injuryvital organleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner Ghulam Abbas sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his criminal appeal by the High Court, which had upheld his conviction under section 304-I of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Muhammad Ibrahim and the sentence of imprisonment for life. The core legal question was whether the fatal knife blow inflicted by the petitioner on the left side of the chest piercing the heart warranted a reduction of the offense from culpable homicide not amounting to murder under section 304-I to grievous hurt under section 326 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's act of stabbing the deceased on a vital part of the body, namely the heart, reasonably gave rise to the presumption of knowledge that the injury would likely cause death, thereby attracting criminal liability for the charged offense rather than a lesser charge. The petition was accordingly dismissed as being without merit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a single knife blow to the chest piercing the heart constitutes an offense under section 304-I of the Pakistan Penal Code rather than section 326?
  • Can an accused who inflicts a knife injury on a vital part of the body be presumed to know that death is likely to result?
  Read full judgment →
• Gaul Am Hussain vs Qadar Khan1980 SCMR 136 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-23
  review petitionpre-emptionmunicipal limitsscope of reviewurban area classification
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed against a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan dated 10th April 1978, which involved a pre-emption dispute. The petitioner sought a review on the grounds that the area in question, Jangal Khel, had been historically treated as part of the Kohat Municipality since 1892, that a Civil Judge had previously declared it an urban area, and that a 1954 Notification by the N.-W.F.P. Government included the area within municipal limits. The core legal question was whether these grounds justified a review of the previous judgment. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the arguments raised were merely attempts to re-argue the case, which falls outside the scope of review jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the specific land in dispute was definitively located within the municipal limits of Kohat City based on the provided Gazette Notification. The principle laid down is that a review petition cannot be used as a mechanism for the rehearing of a case or to re-litigate points already adjudicated upon by the Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a review petition be used to re-argue points already decided in a previous judgment?
  • Does the scope of review jurisdiction permit the rehearing of a case on its merits?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan vs Muhammad Siddiq1980 SCMR 443 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-26
  Service TribunalAbatement of proceedingsArticle 212WAPDA employeesVested right of appealRetrospective operationJurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan disposed of multiple service appeals brought under Article 212 of the Constitution, concerning the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal and the abatement of pending civil court proceedings under the Service Tribunals Act 1973. The primary legal questions concerned determining the exact date on which pending court proceedings abated, whether the government possesses a right of appeal under the proviso to Section 6 of the Act, the retrospective applicability of proviso (c) to Section 4(1), and the application of the Act to WAPDA employees following statutory amendment. The Supreme Court held that under Article 212 of the Constitution (as amended), pending civil proceedings abated on 22 February 1974, the date the Service Tribunal was established, rather than the date of enactment of the Act. Such abatement accrued an immediate vested right of appeal to any party, including the Government, under Section 6. The Court further ruled that the prospective insertion of proviso (c) to Section 4(1) on 6 May 1974 did not impair rights of appeal accrued prior thereto. For newly included classes, such as WAPDA employees under the 1975 amending Ordinance, the Act applies mutatis mutandis from the extension date, causing pending civil appeals to abate on that date.

  Questions settled

  • On what specific date did pending civil court proceedings abate pursuant to Article 212 of the Constitution and the Service Tribunals Act 1973?
  • Can a government department competently file an appeal before the Service Tribunal under the proviso to Section 6 of the Service Tribunals Act 1973 after the abatement of civil proceedings?
  • Does proviso (c) to Section 4(1) of the Service Tribunals Act 1973 operate retrospectively to divest an accrued right of appeal arising from an earlier statutory abatement?
  • When a service statute is extended to a new statutory authority or class of employees by amendment, on what date do their pending proceedings before ordinary courts abate for the purposes of preferring an appeal to the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Ahmad and Others vs Masood Akhtar Shah Etc.1980 SCMR 672 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-05
  pre-emptioncourt-fee deficiencyrejection of plaintdue diligencevaluation of landspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for special leave to appeal against a High Court order regarding the rejection of plaints in pre-emption suits due to deficient court-fees. The petitioners had initially filed suits for pre-emption, but their plaints were rejected by the trial court under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for failure to make good the court-fee deficiency. While the District Judge remanded the cases for further investigation into valuation, the High Court modified this order, directing the trial court to specifically inquire whether the plaintiffs acted with due diligence and in good faith regarding the valuation and the procurement of revenue records. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court erred in its directions. The Court held that the High Court's order was legally sound and equitable, as it provided an opportunity for the plaintiffs to justify the delay or seek extension for payment of court-fees. The Supreme Court affirmed that once a court identifies a deficiency in court-fees, it possesses the jurisdiction to address the matter in accordance with the law, and dismissed the petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Does a court have the jurisdiction to address a deficiency in court-fees once the issue has been raised?
  • Is it legally permissible for a court to direct an inquiry into whether a plaintiff acted with due diligence and good faith regarding the valuation of a suit for court-fee purposes?
  • Can a trial court reject a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for failure to pay deficient court-fees after an opportunity to do so has been granted?
  Read full judgment →
• Fauji Foundation vs Shamimur Rehman1980 SCMR 924 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-29
  nationalizationmartial law regulationmala fideslacheswrit jurisdictionpublic interestlegislation validity
  Summary & questions settled

  The Fauji Foundation appealed a Sind High Court judgment that invalidated Martial Law Regulation No. 103 of 1971, which had nationalized and transferred the Rehmania Sugar Mills to the appellant. The High Court had declared the regulation void ab initio, citing personal mala fides of the then President and Chief Martial Law Administrator, Mr. Bhutto, and a lack of public interest in the acquisition. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether legislation can be struck down based on the alleged mala fides of its author, particularly when enacted by a martial law authority rather than a parliament. Additionally, the Court addressed whether the writ petition was barred by laches, given it was filed years after the regulation's promulgation and the plea of personal mala fides was introduced even later. Pending the final hearing, the Supreme Court suspended the High Court's judgment, maintaining the appellant's possession of the mill while imposing strict financial controls to protect the respondent's interests.

  Questions settled

  • Can legislation be struck down by a court on the ground of the mala fides of its author?
  • Does legislation enacted by a martial law administrator stand on the same footing as legislation passed by a parliament regarding judicial review?
  • Can a writ petition be maintained when the plea of personal mala fides is introduced through an amendment years after the cause of action accrued?
  Read full judgment →
• Faqir Muhammad vs Messrs Rashid Textile Mills Ltd. and Others1980 SCMR 387 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-15
  labour lawwrongful dismissalinquiry reportquestions of factlacheswrit jurisdictionindustrial relations
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from the dismissal of an employee, Faqir Muhammad, from Rashid Textile Mills Limited following allegations of willful property damage. After an inquiry, the petitioner was dismissed, and his subsequent challenge under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance was rejected by the Labour Court. The Labour Appellate Tribunal dismissed his appeal in limine, finding that the petitioner's claim—that he was not supplied with the inquiry report and connected documents—was factually incorrect and contradicted by the record. The Sind High Court upheld this finding and further noted that the writ petition suffered from laches, having been filed over a year after the impugned order. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner failed to raise any question of law, relying solely on the same factual assertions previously rejected by the lower forums. The Supreme Court held that since no question of law was presented for consideration, there were no grounds to grant leave to appeal. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the finality of the concurrent findings of fact made by the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by lower courts and tribunals?
  • Does the failure to raise a question of law preclude the grant of leave to appeal?
  • Can a writ petition be dismissed on the ground of laches if filed after a significant delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Ekhlas Ahmad vs Dae Health Laboratories Ltd., London and Another1980 SCMR 625 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-20
  trade mark registrationdeceptive similarityinfringementphonetic similarityvisual similarityopposition proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was directed against the judgment of the Sind High Court, which had accepted the respondents' appeal against the Order of the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks. The petitioner had applied for the registration of the trade mark 'VEST' for a hair-removing cream, which was opposed by the respondents on the ground that it was deceptively similar to their registered trade mark 'VEET' used for an identical product. The Assistant Registrar dismissed the opposition, but the High Court reversed this decision. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the proposed trade mark was barred under Section 10(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940. The Court held that when determining deceptive similarity, factors such as visual and phonetic similarity, the nature of the goods, the target customers, and surrounding circumstances must be considered. Since the respondents produced evidence of long-standing reputation and the petitioner failed to lead any evidence, and given the strong visual and phonetic similarity between 'VEET' and 'VEST', the Court dismissed the petition, finding a clear likelihood of confusion.

  Questions settled

  • What factors must be considered when determining whether a proposed trade mark so nearly resembles an existing registered trade mark as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion under the Trade Marks Act 1940?
  • Does the failure of an applicant to lead evidence or file affidavits in opposition proceedings affect the determination of deceptive similarity under Section 10(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1940?
  • Can visual and phonetic similarity between two marks for identical products, such as 'VEET' and 'VEST', justify the refusal of registration under the Trade Marks Act 1940?
  Read full judgment →
• DR. Syed Waris Ali Tirmizi vs Mst. Liaqat Begum1980 SCMR 601 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-08-17
  evictiondefault in rentirregular payment of rentburden of prooflandlord and tenantsecond appealmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against a judgment of the Sind High Court which had reversed the lower courts' orders and allowed an eviction application filed by the respondent landlord against the petitioner tenant on the ground of default in rent payment. The core legal question concerned whether a landlord's acceptance of rent at irregular or long intervals establishes an implied agreement or practice condoning delay, thereby shielding the tenant from eviction for default. The Supreme Court held that the mere fact that a landlord accepts rent at irregular intervals does not by itself prove an agreement to alter the terms of tenancy or excuse monthly defaults, and the burden of proving such an agreement lies heavily on the tenant. The Court laid down the principle that a landlord's failure to collect rent regularly or acceptance of lump-sum payments does not automatically negate default under rent restriction laws unless a clear, binding modification of the tenancy terms is properly pleaded and strictly proved.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere acceptance of rent at irregular intervals by a landlord establish an agreement to alter the monthly payment terms?
  • Where a tenant consistently pays rent in lump sums at long intervals, does this fact alone absolve the tenant from liability for default?
  • Can a High Court in second appeal interfere with concurrent findings of fact that are based on a misreading of evidence and an erroneous view of the law?
  Read full judgment →
• DR. Mirza Masud Baig vs DR. Bushra1980 SCMR 726 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-18
  minor custodywelfare of minorseducational expensesvisitation rightsSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the father challenging a High Court arrangement concerning the custody and education of his two minor sons as boarders at Aitchison College. The core legal question revolved around the custody of the minors and the financial feasibility of maintaining their expensive boarding education in light of the father's changed financial circumstances, balanced against the paramount consideration of the welfare of the minors. The Supreme Court disposed of the appeal by modifying the previous arrangement based on a consensus reached between the parties. The Court held that the custody of the minors shall remain with the mother, who undertook to bear their educational expenses, while the father was absolved from boarding and educational costs and granted visitation rights and custody during alternate Sundays and half of the summer, winter, and Eid holidays. The key principle laid down is that custody and educational arrangements for minors may be adjusted by the court in the best welfare of the children, taking into account changed financial realities of the parents.

  Questions settled

  • Can custody and educational arrangements for minors be modified based on the changed financial circumstances of the father?
  • Is the welfare of the minor considered the primary and most important consideration in custody matters?
  • Can parents mutually agree to modify custody and visitation terms before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• DR. Abdul Majeed Memon vs Government of Sind and Another1980 SCMR 897 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-17
  non-practising allowanceservice tribunalmedical officersinterpretation of notificationsteaching institutionscivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by special leave arose against the majority decision of the Sind Service Tribunal, Karachi, which dismissed the appellant's appeal regarding entitlement to a non-practising allowance. The appellant, serving as a Medical Officer in the Medico-legal Section at Liaquat Medical College Hospital, Hyderabad, claimed the allowance pursuant to a Health Department Notification dated 6 April 1966. The central legal question was whether the phrase 'all posts of Medical Officers' in Item 7 of the Notification encompassed the appellant's position, despite the deletion of Item 17 (which explicitly mentioned posts incharge of medico-legal work) by a subsequent notification. The Supreme Court held that the words 'all posts of Medical Officers' explicitly included every Medical Officer serving in any section or department of the specified institutions. The Court concluded that Item 17 had been deleted merely as surplusage, as Item 7 already covered the appellant's post. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the majority decision of the Tribunal, allowed the appeal with costs, and affirmed the appellant's entitlement to the non-practising allowance.

  Questions settled

  • Does the expression 'all posts of Medical Officers' in a service notification cover medical officers serving in any section or department of a designated teaching hospital?
  • Whether the deletion of a specific item from a notification disentitles an officer when another comprehensive provision in the same notification continues to cover their post?
  • Can a general clause in a service notification granting allowances be restricted without express statutory or administrative words of exclusion?
  Read full judgment →
• Dost Muhammad vs Haq Nawaz and Others1980 SCMR 525 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-21
  pre-emptionright of pre-emptioncontiguityvendeeco-plaintiffabandonment of claim
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal arising from a pre-emption dispute over agricultural land in Dera Ismail Khan. The core legal questions were whether the abandonment of a claim by a co-plaintiff with a superior right of pre-emption defeats the claim of a co-plaintiff with an inferior right under the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act, and whether a vendee’s loss of contiguous land ownership post-suit but pre-decree affects their defense against a pre-emption claim. The Supreme Court held that the abandonment of a claim by a superior pre-emptor does not deprive the remaining pre-emptor of their right to pre-empt, nor does it invalidate the suit. Furthermore, the Court held that the statutory provisions regarding the loss of a right by a pre-emptor prior to a decree do not apply to the alienation of property by vendees. The Court affirmed the lower courts' dismissal of the petitioner's claim, establishing that a vendee's loss of contiguous land status after the suit does not automatically grant a pre-emptor the right to succeed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the abandonment of a claim by a pre-emptor of a higher class defeat the right of a co-plaintiff of a lower class to pre-empt a sale?
  • Does the loss of contiguous land ownership by a vendee after the filing of a pre-emption suit but before the final decree entitle the pre-emptor to succeed?
  • Does Section 16 of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act 1905 apply to the alienation of property by vendees?
  Read full judgment →
• Diyar Khan (Represented by Legal Heirs) vs Sher Farzand and Another1980 SCMR 278 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-09-29
  pre-emptioncontiguityexemption from pre-emptionfindings of factmarket valuelocal commissioner report
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a pre-emption matter filed by a vendee-defendant challenging the dismissal of his regular second appeal by the Peshawar High Court. The core legal questions involve the establishment of the right of pre-emption based on contiguity, the statutory exemption of a house from pre-emption under the relevant pre-emption law, and the evidentiary value of a local Commissioner's report regarding market value and improvements. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised by the petitioner stand concluded by concurrent findings of fact regarding the ownership of contiguous property by both respondents, the lack of proof supporting the allegation of forgery regarding the tax register entry, and the admission of the actual price paid, rendering the Commissioner's report unnecessary. The petition was accordingly dismissed, reaffirming that concurrent factual findings will not be interfered with in leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the ownership of contiguous property can be re-examined in a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Does a house qualify for exemption from pre-emption under section 5(c) of the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act 1950 when evidence establishes the vendee owned another house?
  • Is it necessary to examine a local Commissioner's report on market value when the vendee admits the actual price paid for the suit property?
  Read full judgment →
• Directorgeneral, Pakistan Coast Guards Etc. Petiti oners vs Abramjee1980 SCMR 154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-08-08
  smugglingcustoms seizureimport prohibitionCoast Guard authorityimport permitCustoms Act 1969Imports and Exports (Control) Act 1950
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves six petitions challenging a consolidated judgment of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, which had quashed orders by Customs Authorities regarding the seizure of allegedly smuggled cars. The High Court had ruled the seizures illegal, reasoning that Coast Guard officers lacked the authority to seize such goods and that cars were not prohibited items under a specific 1973 notification issued by the Central Board of Revenue. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the High Court failed to consider relevant provisions of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950, and subsequent notifications under that Act which explicitly listed cars as prohibited goods requiring import permits. Furthermore, the Supreme Court highlighted that a 1973 notification by the Central Board of Revenue had indeed empowered Coast Guard officers of specific ranks to perform the functions of Customs officers. Consequently, the High Court's judgment appeared to proceed on a misconception of law regarding both the authority of the seizing officers and the prohibited status of the imported vehicles.

  Questions settled

  • Can officers of the Pakistan Coast Guards be empowered to perform the functions of Customs officers for the seizure of goods?
  • Are cars considered prohibited goods under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act 1950 when imported without a valid permit?
  • Does a notification under the Customs Act 1969 regarding prohibited items exhaustively define all import prohibitions, or must notifications under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act 1950 also be considered?
  Read full judgment →
• Dilshad Ahmad vs The State Etc.1980 SCMR 54 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-27
  supardariinterim custodynatural justiceex parte ordercriminal revisionproperty custodyMagistrate's powers
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerns a dispute over the interim custody (supardari) of a truck, initially granted to the respondent by a Magistrate. Following the petitioner's unsuccessful revision against this order, the petitioner subsequently moved the Magistrate to cancel the respondent's custody, alleging a spurious bank guarantee. The Magistrate, without issuing notice to the respondent, cancelled the supardari and transferred the truck to the petitioner. The High Court set aside this order, citing the lack of notice and opportunity for the respondent to be heard, and directed the vehicle be kept in the Malkhana pending police investigation. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitioner's appeal, holding that the High Court correctly quashed the Magistrate's order for violating the principles of natural justice. The Court affirmed that an order transferring custody cannot be passed ex parte. Additionally, the Court ruled that because the petitioner had previously acquiesced to a revision order denying his eligibility for custody, he was precluded from re-litigating his entitlement to the truck's possession.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Magistrate cancel a supardari order and transfer property custody without issuing notice to the current supardar?
  • Does a failure to challenge a prior revision order regarding custody preclude a party from re-litigating their entitlement to that custody?
  • Is an ex parte order cancelling a supardari legally sustainable?
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• Dilbar Hussain vs Province of Punjab and Others1980 SCMR 148 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-28
  service tribunalresignationpolice constableleave to appealsubstantial question of lawpublic importance
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Police Constable, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his service appeal by the Service Tribunal regarding the acceptance of his resignation. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's resignation was voluntary or coerced by departmental authorities, and whether the case involved a substantial question of law of public importance under Article 212 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the contentions raised questions of pure fact rather than any substantial question of law of public importance, and that the Service Tribunal had properly examined the evidence to conclude the resignation was voluntary and tendered to avoid pending disciplinary proceedings. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with factual determinations of the Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution unless a substantial question of law of public importance is involved.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal lie to the Supreme Court under Article 212 of the Constitution against an order of the Service Tribunal without a substantial question of law of public importance?
  • Whether the question of whether a resignation was voluntary or coerced is a question of fact or law?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with the factual findings of the Service Tribunal regarding a voluntary resignation?
  Read full judgment →
• Daulat and OTHERSs vs The State1980 SCMR 216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-06
  criminal appealocular evidenceperjuryhostile witnesssudden fightcorroborationacquittalappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from convictions under sections 302, 324, 326, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following a violent clash between two parties. The core legal question was whether the prosecution’s ocular evidence, which was riddled with contradictions, material discrepancies, and instances of deliberate perjury, could sustain convictions in the absence of independent corroboration. The Supreme Court held that the ocular evidence was inherently unreliable, as the witnesses falsely denied the existence of a mutual fight and the injuries sustained by the accused party. The Court emphasized that when eye-witnesses commit preconcerted perjury to suppress the true origin of an occurrence, their testimony cannot be accepted without strong, independent corroboration, which was entirely absent in this case. Furthermore, the Court found that the trial and appellate courts erred in relying on lower court statements of witnesses who had been improperly declared hostile. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants, ruling that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained on ocular evidence when the witnesses have committed preconcerted perjury regarding the origin of the occurrence?
  • Is it permissible for a court to rely on the lower court statements of witnesses under Section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the witnesses were improperly declared hostile?
  • Does the failure of prosecution witnesses to admit injuries sustained by the accused party in a mutual fight render their testimony unreliable without independent corroboration?
  Read full judgment →
• Crescent Textile Mills Ltd., Lyallpur vs The Member, Central Board of Revenue (Central Excise), Islamabad and Others1980 SCMR 773 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-21
  excise dutyassessable valuewholesale cash pricestatutory interpretationtax assessmentcontractual specificationsCentral Excises and Salt Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the dismissal of a writ petition challenging the assessment of excise duty on two different qualities of cloth manufactured by the appellant. The appellant had supplied two distinct qualities of cloth, designated as T.C. 2 No. 1 and T.C. 2 No. 2, to different government departments at varying prices. The Excise Department, however, assessed both qualities at identical rates, disregarding the specifications and price differentials stipulated in the supply contracts. The core legal question was whether the Department could impose uniform excise duty rates on goods of different qualities, contrary to the statutory requirement for determining value based on 'like kind and quality.' The Supreme Court held that the assessment for the second quality was without lawful authority, as the authorities failed to consider the distinct technical specifications and contractual prices. The Court established that under Section 4 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, the Department is legally obligated to determine whether goods are of 'like kind and quality' before applying uniform assessment rates, and cannot ignore evidence of distinct specifications.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 4 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 require the Excise Department to determine if goods are of 'like kind and quality' before assessing uniform excise duty?
  • Can the Excise Department ignore contractual specifications and price differences when determining the assessable value of manufactured goods?
  • Is an assessment of excise duty based on identical rates for goods of demonstrably different qualities legally sustainable under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Sales Tax, Zone-a, Lahore vs Standard Leather42 TAX 145 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-14
  sales taxsuppressed incomemartial law regulationassessmentleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions arise from an order of the High Court Lahore relating to tax references under the Sales Tax Act 1951. The respondent assessee had filed a nil return for the assessment year 1964-65 and statements of suppressed income under Martial Law Regulation No. 32. The Sales Tax Officer rejected the respondent's plea that the case was covered by the Martial Law Regulation proceedings and made an assessment under Section 10(3) of the Sales Tax Act 1951. Upon appeal, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal reversed the assessment order and extended the benefit of the Board's circular. The High Court answered the referred question in the affirmative in favor of the assessee. The Supreme Court examined the matter and found that the High Court correctly held the case to be covered by the relevant circular provisions. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's view and dismissed the petitions for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the assessee's sales tax returns should be accepted in view of the Board's circular?
  • Does a proceeding taken under Martial Law Regulation No. 32 cover an assessment made under the Sales Tax Act 1951?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Sales Tax, Lahore Commissioner of Sales Tax, Lahore42 TAX 113 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-19
  sales taxexemptionshammer workfoundry workquestion of factreference proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves civil petitions for special leave to appeal against orders of the High Court regarding whether motor car springs and kerosene oil stoves are products of hammer work or foundry and therefore exempt from sales tax under specific government notifications. The core legal question is whether the manufacturing process of a particular article constitutes a question of law or a question of fact. The Supreme Court held that the determination of the process used for manufacturing an article is purely a question of fact and not a question of law capable of being agitated in reference proceedings before the High Court. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact by the Tribunal regarding manufacturing processes cannot be interfered with as questions of law in reference proceedings, leading to the dismissal of the petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the question of what process is used for the manufacture of a particular article is a question of fact or a question of law?
  • Are motor car springs products of hammer work entitled to sales tax exemption?
  • Are kerosene oil stoves products of foundry and hammer work entitled to sales tax exemption?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax/Sales Tax, Zone-a, Lahore vs Kausar Ice42 TAX 86 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-17
  sales taxvested rightretrospective legislationdelegated legislationexemption notification
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the assessment of sales tax for the assessment year 1959-60. The core legal question was whether a subsequent notification reducing the tax exemption limit could be applied retrospectively to take away an accrued vested right of an assessee whose assessment period commenced prior to the notification. The Supreme Court held that a right that has already accrued cannot be taken away by giving retrospective effect to delegated legislation, affirming that the assessee was governed by the earlier notification under which its turnover was exempt. The key principle laid down is that delegated legislation cannot operate retrospectively to impair or divest vested rights accrued under prior statutory notifications.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a right that has already accrued can be taken away by giving retrospective effect to delegated legislation?
  • Does a subsequent notification reducing the tax exemption limit apply to an assessment year commencing prior to such notification?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore Zone Lahore vs Nasir A. Sheikh42 TAX 80 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-02
  dividend incomestatutory exemptiontax assessmentdeductible expensesgross dividendincome tax law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a tax dispute concerning the computation of dividend income for the assessment year 1967-68. The core legal question was whether statutory exemptions under Section 4(3)(xv) of the Income Tax Act should be deducted from the gross dividend income before or after accounting for deductible expenses, such as interest. The Income Tax Officer had denied the exemption because the respondent had incurred a net loss, but the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal ruled that the statutory exemption must be excluded from gross dividend receipts before applying other provisions to determine net income. The Lahore High Court affirmed this interpretation. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, noting that the High Court's interpretation aligned with established precedent. The Court upheld the principle that statutory exemptions provided under the Income Tax Act are intended to exclude specific portions of income from the total income calculation entirely, requiring that such exemptions be applied to gross receipts prior to the calculation of net income or loss.

  Questions settled

  • Should statutory exemptions on dividend income be applied to gross dividend receipts before or after calculating deductible expenses?
  • Does the statutory exemption under Section 4(3)(xv) of the Income Tax Act exclude a portion of dividend income from the total income calculation entirely?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore Zone Lahore vs Choudhri42 TAX 119 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-03
  income taxrejection of accountsstock registerassessment yearleave to appealreference to high court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which answered a reference question in the negative. The respondent firm's book version of accounts for the assessment year 1962-63 was rejected by the Income Tax Officer due to the absence of a stock register and unverifiable sales lists, leading to an estimated profit rate and a modest addition to income. Subsequent appeals to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal resulted in partial relief and affirmation respectively. The High Court, upon an application under the Income Tax Act, addressed the question of law concerning the rejection of account books and decided it directly, finding the Tribunal's conclusions inconsistent. The Supreme Court of Pakistan evaluated the arguments and concurred with the High Court's assessment that the factual circumstances did not justify interference or the granting of leave to appeal, as no question of public importance was involved. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case there was evidence or material before the Appellate Tribunal to come to the conclusion that the account books were liable to be rejected under the proviso of Section 13 of the Income Tax Act?
  • Can the High Court proceed to decide a question of law directly upon an application under sub-section (2) of Section 66 of the Income Tax Act due to a change in the law?
  • Does the non-maintenance of a stock register alone constitute a sufficient ground for the Income Tax Officer to reject an assessee's accounts?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore vs SH. Feroze Din Allah Bakhsh, M.42 TAX 97 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-12
  partnership registrationminor partnerincome tax registrationbenefits of partnershippartnership agreementgenuine firm
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions arose from the rejection of applications for registration and renewal of registration under Section 26-A of the Income Tax Act by firms whose partnership documents included a minor as a partner. The Income Tax Officers had treated such firms as not genuine, a view reversed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and subsequently upheld by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and the Lahore High Court, following the Full Bench ruling in Messrs Ithad Textile Mills Multan vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax West Pakistan Lahore. The core legal question was whether the inclusion of a minor in a partnership agreement renders the firm invalid or non-genuine for the purposes of registration under the Income Tax Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the department's petitions, holding that the inclusion of a minor does not invalidate the partnership. The Court laid down the principle that where a partnership is constituted by adult partners, the inclusion of a minor does not invalidate the firm; rather, the document must be construed as admitting the minor to the benefits of the partnership pursuant to Section 30 of the Partnership Act, 1932.

  Questions settled

  • Does the inclusion of a minor as a partner in a partnership deed invalidate the partnership for the purpose of registration under Section 26-A of the Income Tax Act?
  • How is a partnership agreement containing a minor partner to be construed under the Partnership Act, 1932?
  • Can a partnership firm including a minor be considered a genuine firm entitled to registration?
  Read full judgment →
• Col. Abid Hussain vs The Collector of Karachi1980 SCMR 795 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-14
  land acquisitionmarket value determinationcompulsory acquisition chargespotential of landcompensation enhancementconversion charges
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the rejection of a claim for enhanced compensation for land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The core legal question concerned the correct determination of the market value of the acquired land, specifically whether the potential of the land as a building site and the exclusion of conversion charges from comparable sales were properly considered by the lower courts. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by deducting conversion charges from the sale price of comparable land, as such charges actually enhance the land's potential. Emphasizing that the potential of the land must be considered in valuation, the Court set aside the lower judgments. It fixed the market value at Rs. 2 per sq. yd. and awarded the 15% compulsory acquisition charges under Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The key principle laid down is that in determining market value, the potential use of the land must be evaluated, and arbitrary deductions from comparable sales that reflect development potential are impermissible.

  Questions settled

  • Whether conversion charges can be deducted from the sale price of comparable land when determining market value for acquisition purposes?
  • Is the potential of land as a building site a relevant factor in determining market value under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894?
  • Does the failure to award 15% compulsory acquisition charges under Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 constitute an error in law?
  Read full judgment →
• Chaudhri Muhammad Ibrahim Haleem Chishti vs Pakistan Council of Scientific and Industrial Research and Another1980 SCMR 831 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-25
  master and servantdeclaratory suitwrongful terminationcivil servantstatutory corporationcompulsory retirementmaintainability of suit
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former employee of the Pakistan Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (PCSIR), sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his declaratory suit regarding his compulsory retirement. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, an employee of a society registered under the Societies Registration Act (later becoming a statutory corporation), could challenge his termination through a declaratory suit, or if his employment was governed by the general law of master and servant. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was not a civil servant and that his employment was governed by the law of master and servant. Consequently, the Court affirmed that a suit for declaratory relief against the termination of service was not maintainable; the only available remedy for wrongful termination in such cases is a claim for damages. The Court further noted that the petitioner failed to demonstrate the applicability of civil service rules to his employment, and that the order of retirement, issued on behalf of the Chairman, was valid. The petition was dismissed as devoid of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit for declaratory relief maintainable against the termination of service for an employee governed by the law of master and servant?
  • Can an employee of a society registered under the Societies Registration Act claim the protection of rules regulating civil services?
  • Does the law of master and servant limit an employee's remedy for wrongful termination to a claim for damages?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Zahid Hussain and OTHERSs vs Dharmomal and Others1980 SCMR 645 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-09
  evacuee propertyland settlementsuo motu revisionnecessary partiesallotmentcustodianremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This case arises from appeals regarding a land settlement dispute over agricultural land in the former State of Khairpur, originally allotted to displaced persons (appellants) in 1949. The Hindu owners (private respondents) applied under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1957, seeking a declaration that they and the land were non-evacuee. Assistant Custodians ruled in their favor without impleading the allottee appellants. Subsequently, a reference was made to the Custodian for suo motu revision, which the Custodian declined to decide on merits based on an erroneous view that evacuee laws did not apply to Khairpur State. The High Court held that evacuee laws did apply, but refused to compel the Custodian to reopen the case. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that once the Custodian entertained the suo motu reference and committed an error of law, the High Court erred in not remanding the case. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's orders, and remitted the case to the Custodian to decide on merits, laying down principles regarding necessary parties and the exercise of suo motu revisional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether allottees of land are necessary parties in proceedings before the Assistant Custodian to determine the evacuee character of the property?
  • Can the High Court decline to remand a case to the Custodian for decision on merits after correcting an error of law regarding the application of evacuee laws?
  • What are the primary considerations for the exercise of suo motu revisional jurisdiction by the Custodian under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1957?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Rehmat Ali vs Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi and Another1980 SCMR 336 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-27
  Displaced PersonsCompensation BookAuction PriceResumption of PropertyWrit JurisdictionSettlement SchemeDiscretionary Relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition concerning the disposal of a shop under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The petitioner, having purchased the shop in a 1960 auction, used a bogus Compensation Book for payment. Following the discovery of the fraud, the petitioner failed to pay the auction price despite notice in 1965, leading to the cancellation of the transfer and resumption of the property by the Settlement authorities. The property was later transferred to the respondent in 1974. The core legal question was whether the Settlement authorities were required to strictly adhere to procedural formalities, such as pasting acknowledgment due slips, to validate the cancellation of the transfer. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner's finding of fact regarding the service of the registered notice was sufficient. The Court further held that the petitioner’s long-standing indifference, failure to pay the price, and knowledge of the criminal proceedings regarding the bogus Compensation Book disentitled him to discretionary writ jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is the procedural requirement of pasting an acknowledgment due slip in a file of basic importance if service of a registered notice is otherwise established?
  • Does a petitioner's failure to pay the auction price and long-standing indifference regarding property resumption disentitle them to discretionary writ jurisdiction?
  • Can a transfer of property be cancelled by Settlement authorities if the payment was made using a bogus Compensation Book?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Aslam vs Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Home Department and Others1980 PLC (C. S.) 399 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-10
  service lawpro forma promotionservice tribunal jurisdictiondepartmental representationlimitation periodfitness for promotioncivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Probation Officer, sought pro forma promotion effective from August 1, 1969, challenging the rejection of his representations by departmental authorities. After the Punjab Service Tribunal dismissed his appeal on the ground of limitation, holding that his subsequent representation was unnecessary and the appeal was time-barred, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicate the petitioner's claim for pro forma promotion. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The Court reasoned that under the Punjab Administrative Tribunals Act, 1974, no appeal lies against a departmental decision determining the fitness or otherwise of a person to be promoted to a higher post or grade. The key principle laid down is that service tribunals are statutorily barred from reviewing departmental decisions regarding the fitness of a civil servant for promotion, thereby precluding judicial interference in matters of promotion eligibility and fitness assessments.

  Questions settled

  • Does a service tribunal have jurisdiction to adjudicate an appeal against a departmental decision regarding the fitness of a person for promotion?
  • Is a claim for pro forma promotion subject to the statutory bar contained in the proviso to Section 4 of the Punjab Administrative Tribunals Act 1974?
  • Can a service tribunal entertain an appeal regarding the fitness of a civil servant to hold a particular post or be promoted to a higher grade?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Anwar Sipra vs Malik Muhammad Din Etc.1980 SCMR 32 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-24
  special leave to appealejectmentunauthorized constructionrent restrictiontenanttransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had accepted a second appeal and ordered the ejectment of the tenant-petitioner from the demised premises. The core legal questions involved whether a tenant can be ejected for raising unauthorized construction under section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 without proving that it materially impaired the value or utility of the property, and whether general principles from section 108(p) of the Transfer of Property Act can be invoked when the written rent note is silent. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner raised substantial questions of law regarding the distinction between statutory grounds of ejectment and the applicability of general law versus special rent restriction law in the presence of an express written agreement. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to the petitioner and stayed execution proceedings subject to regular payment of rent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a concession on a point of law made before a lower appellate court is binding on the parties or the High Court?
  • Does raising an unauthorized permanent structure without the landlord's consent constitute a violation of the terms of the tenancy under section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Can the general principles contained in clause (p) of section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act be invoked when a written rent note between the parties is silent on the matter?
  • Is it necessary to prove that an unauthorized construction has materially impaired the value or utility of the premises when seeking ejectment for infringing a condition of the tenancy?
  Read full judgment →
• Bostan Khan vs Ali Aksar1980 SCMR 664 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-19
  pre-emptiontenant at willsuperior right of pre-emptionKhasra Girdawarispecial leave to appealfindings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against the dismissal of his civil revision by the Peshawar High Court, which had upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts in a pre-emption suit. The dispute narrowed down to Khasra Nos. 169 and 168 after the petitioner conceded certain portions and the respondent conceded superior rights to the petitioner regarding Khasra No. 341. The respondent based his superior pre-emptive right on his status as a tenant at will under clause (3) of paragraph 25 of Martial Law Regulation No. 115 of 1972, while the petitioner challenged this through Khasra Girdawari entries. Both the District Judge and the High Court found the petitioner's reliance on the Khasra Girdawari entries to be fictitious and noted the lack of ocular evidence or testimony from the alleged tenants regarding any dispossession or abandonment of tenancy by the respondent. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the tenancy and fictitious entries were unassailable, and consequently dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a concurrent finding of fact regarding a tenant's possession and fictitious revenue entries can be assailed in a second appeal or petition for leave to appeal?
  • Does a tenant at will possess a superior right of pre-emption under paragraph 25 of Martial Law Regulation No. 115 of 1972?
  • What is the evidentiary value of Khasra Girdawari entries when found to be fictitious and unsupported by ocular evidence or the testimony of the alleged tenants?
  Read full judgment →
• Bhoop Khan vs Additional Settlement Commissioner (Land)1980 SCMR 782 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-18
  limitationcondonation of delaysufficient causepetition for leave to appealmedical certificate
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed with a delay of nine days, for which the petitioner sought condonation on the grounds of illness and the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the writ petition. The core legal question addressed by the court was whether the medical grounds and circumstances presented by the petitioner constituted sufficient cause to excuse the delay in filing the petition. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the medical certificate provided was unsatisfactory and designed to cater to special needs, and that the petitioner failed to prove he was sufficiently bed-ridden or incapacitated to prevent him from contacting a lawyer during the claimed period. Consequently, the court held that no sufficient cause existed for condoning the delay. The key principle laid down is that generalized medical certificates of doubtful authenticity, unsupported by proof of complete incapacitation from seeking legal recourse, do not constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay under limitation rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether illness of a petitioner constitutes sufficient cause for condonation of delay under limitation laws when the medical certificate is on a printed form and appears unconvincing?
  • Does the time spent in obtaining a certified copy of a writ petition justify excusing a delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal when the initial filing is already time-barred?
  Read full judgment →
• Begum Bibi and 9 OTHERSs vs Abdul Ghani and 4 Others1980 SCMR 675 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-01
  second appealconcurrent findingslegal necessitycustomary lawalienation of landancestral propertyCode of Civil Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court judgment that set aside concurrent findings of the trial court and the District Court regarding the validity of a land sale. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in second appeal, was justified in overturning concurrent findings of fact concerning the existence of 'legal necessity' for the alienation of ancestral land under Customary Law. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in interfering with these concurrent findings, as there was substantial evidence on record—including admissions by the plaintiff and testimony from the vendee—supporting the conclusion that the vendor was driven by necessity to sell the land. The Court reaffirmed that under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, a High Court cannot competently set aside concurrent findings of fact unless the lower court's judgment is contrary to law, fails to determine a material issue of law, or contains a procedural defect affecting the merits. The appeal was allowed, and the concurrent findings were restored.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court in second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 set aside concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial court and the District Court?
  • Does the duty of an alienee to conduct an honest enquiry into the 'legal necessity' for the sale of ancestral land under Customary Law vary with the circumstances of the case?
  • Is the testimony of a vendee regarding the vendor's stated purpose for selling land admissible evidence of legal necessity when not challenged in cross-examination?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashir Muhammad vs Khan Safdar and Another1980 SCMR 167 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-11
  sentence enhancementmitigating circumstancescommutation of death sentencesudden occurrencecriminal appealquantum of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the first informant, Bashir Muhammad, seeking the enhancement of a sentence imposed on the respondent, Khan Safdar. The respondent had been convicted by the Sessions Judge for the murder of the petitioner's brother under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, receiving a death sentence and a fine. On appeal, the Peshawar High Court maintained the conviction but commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life, citing mitigating circumstances including the respondent's tender age, the sudden nature of the occurrence, and the existence of a prior grievance regarding the respondent's expulsion from a colony. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the High Court's reduction of the sentence was legally justified. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's reasoning was sound and in accordance with established legal principles regarding sentencing discretion in cases involving sudden provocation and mitigating factors. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no merit in the request for sentence enhancement.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's decision to commute a death sentence when mitigating circumstances are present?
  • Does the existence of a sudden occurrence and the offender's age constitute valid grounds for reducing a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Is the maximum term of imprisonment in default of payment of compensation under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 limited to six months?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmed vs Inayat Masih and Another1980 SCMR 150 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-28
  temporary injunctionstate land allotmentejected tenants' schemeprima facie casecivil suitrevisional jurisdictioncause of action
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former temporary lessee of State land, challenged the allotment of said land to the respondent, Inayat Masih, under the Ejected Tenants' Scheme. After the petitioner's first suit challenging the 1975 allotment was dismissed, he filed a second suit claiming a new five-year lease granted in 1978 and sought a temporary injunction to restrain interference with his possession. The trial and appellate courts refused the injunction, and the High Court dismissed his revision, noting that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the respondent's prior allotment had been cancelled, thereby rendering the petitioner's subsequent lease claim dubious. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the petitioner established a prima facie case for injunctive relief. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that as the respondent's 1975 allotment remained valid and uncancelled, the land could not be validly re-allotted to the petitioner. Consequently, the petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case for a temporary injunction, and the court affirmed that no relief could be granted based on a second suit arising from the same cause of action.

  Questions settled

  • Can a temporary lessee obtain an injunction against a prior allottee of State land if the prior allotment has not been cancelled?
  • Does a second suit based on the same cause of action as a previously dismissed suit entitle a plaintiff to temporary injunctive relief?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to a temporary injunction when the validity of their underlying lease is contested by an existing, uncancelled allotment?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmad vs Sanaullah and Another1980 SCMR 668 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-29
  stay of executionconditional stay orderfailure to furnish securityleave to appealdiscretionary relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court refusing to stay the execution of a decree during the pendency of an appeal. The core legal question is whether a party who fails to comply with a conditional stay order by not furnishing required security can subsequently obtain a fresh stay order or claim the benefit of the initial order. The Supreme Court held that the stay order was effective only upon furnishing security, and the petitioner's failure to comply for a prolonged period precluded them from obtaining a fresh stay order or invoking the court's discretion. The court established the principle that non-compliance with a conditional stay order vitiates the relief granted, and ignorance of conditions or failure of the trial court to inform does not excuse contravention or entitle the defaulting party to a second exercise of discretion.

  Questions settled

  • Does a conditional stay order cease to be effective if the petitioner fails to furnish security as ordered?
  • Can a party who has contravened a condition to furnish security obtain a fresh stay order for the execution of a decree?
  • Does ignorance of a condition requiring security excuse non-compliance with a stay order?
  Read full judgment →
• Barkat Ali and Others vs Bashir Ahmad and Others1980 SCMR 731 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-08
  Board of Revenuerevisional jurisdictionjudicial powersstatutory interpretationcoram non judiceallotmentadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning agricultural land disputes and the legality of an order passed in suo motu revisional proceedings by Mr. S. M. Nasim, who was conferred powers of a Member, Board of Revenue for disposing of colony judicial cases. The core legal question was whether a person could be appointed by the government merely to exercise certain powers of a Member of the Board of Revenue without being formally appointed as a full-fledged Member under section 3(2) of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, 1957. The Supreme Court held that the government lacks the power to confer only partial judicial powers or distribute business directly, as the distribution of business falls within the plenary jurisdiction of the Board under section 6 of the Act. The Court affirmed that unless a person is duly notified as a Member under section 3(2), they cannot exercise the judicial functions of the Board, rendering orders passed by such persons coram non judice. The appeal was dismissed, leaving the revisional proceedings pending for decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Government has the power to confer partial powers of a Member of the Board of Revenue on a person without appointing them as a full-fledged Member under the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, 1957?
  • Does the power to distribute judicial business among members of the Board of Revenue vest in the Government or the Board of Revenue itself under section 6 of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, 1957?
  • Are orders passed in revisional proceedings by a person not validly notified as a Member of the Board of Revenue considered coram non judice and without lawful authority?
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• Bakhtawar Etc vs Amin Etc1980 PLJ Supreme Court 252, 1980 SCMR 89 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-30
  status quoviolation of injunctioninherent jurisdictionexecution of orderscivil prisondouble jeopardywatercourse
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order upholding a District Judge's directions requiring the petitioners to restore a demolished watercourse (khal) and ordering their detention in civil prison for failing to comply. The petitioners had allegedly demolished the khal in violation of a status quo order issued during the pendency of their appeal regarding a temporary injunction. The core legal questions involved whether a court possesses inherent jurisdiction to order the restoration of a status quo ante when an injunction is violated, and whether proceedings for executing such a restorative order constitute double jeopardy alongside penal proceedings for disobeying the injunction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a court has inherent power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to compel the restoration of the original position when a party contravenes an injunction for its own advantage, and that the execution/enforcement of an order is legally distinct from punishment for its disobedience under Order XXXIX Rule 2(3), C.P.C. The key principle laid down is that securing compliance with a court order through execution provisions is an independent mechanism separate from penal consequences for civil contempt or breach.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court has inherent jurisdiction to direct the restoration of the original position when a party violates a status quo order?
  • Does the enforcement of a restorative order through civil imprisonment amount to double jeopardy when proceedings for breach of an injunction are also initiated?
  • Can provisions relating to the execution of decrees under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be applied to the execution of orders?
  • Is punishment for the civil offense of disobeying an injunction distinct from the execution of the relevant court order?
  Read full judgment →
• Bakhir and Others vs The State1980 SCMR 481 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-06
  ocular evidencepolice witnessesspecial leave to appealappreciation of evidencemurdercorroborationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment maintaining the petitioners' convictions for murder and related offenses under the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerned the reliability of ocular evidence provided by police witnesses, whom the defense alleged were biased and not present at the crime scene. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions, finding that the High Court correctly appraised the evidence. The Court held that the police witnesses were credible eye-witnesses, as their presence was corroborated by the immediate arrest of the accused at the crime scene and the recovery of physical evidence, including a blood-stained hatchet and bullet cases. The Court further determined that the acquittal of a co-accused did not undermine the convictions of the petitioners, as there was overwhelming independent evidence of their participation. The principle established is that police testimony is admissible and sufficient to sustain a conviction when corroborated by circumstantial evidence and the arrest of the accused at the spot, and that the acquittal of one co-accused does not necessarily invalidate the convictions of others.

  Questions settled

  • Is the testimony of police witnesses admissible and sufficient to sustain a conviction in a murder case?
  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused automatically invalidate the conviction of other co-accused persons?
  • Can a conviction be sustained based on ocular evidence when the identification of a specific weapon is not fully established?
  Read full judgment →
• Baig Muhammad vs The State1980 SC MR 43 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-24
  pre-trial baildiscretionary jurisdictioncriminal investigationsimple injurybail refusalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the refusal of bail by the High Court in a criminal case involving charges under sections 307, 436, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and section 13-D of the Arms Ordinance. The petitioner, Baig Muhammad, was accused of setting fire to a thatched hut and firing a revolver at the complainant, causing injury. The core legal question was whether the High Court acted unreasonably in denying bail despite the medical evidence indicating the complainant's injury was simple in nature. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's refusal of bail was a proper exercise of discretionary jurisdiction, particularly as the case was still under investigation. The Court affirmed that the mere nature of the injury does not automatically entitle an accused to bail when serious allegations are pending investigation. The petition was dismissed, with the liberty granted to the petitioner to file a fresh bail application once the challan is submitted to the trial court, to be decided on its own merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the simple nature of an injury automatically entitle an accused to bail during the investigation stage?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's discretionary order refusing bail if the order is not unreasonable?
  • Is a fresh application for bail permissible after the submission of a challan in court?
  Read full judgment →
• Bahadur Sher vs Lal Shah1980 SCMR 277 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-09-29
  pre-emptionShamilat landplaint interpretationcivil revisionland dispositionsale deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit concerning the sale of land, including 'Shamilat' (common) land. The petitioner, a vendee-defendant, challenged the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which had decreed the respondent's suit for pre-emption. The core legal question was whether the respondent's suit for pre-emption was defective for failing to specifically mention 'Shamilat' land in the plaint, thereby allegedly violating the requirements of the West Pakistan Land Dispositions (Saving of Shamilat) Ordinance, 1959. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the lower courts correctly interpreted the pleadings and evidence. The Court found that the respondent had effectively pre-empted the sale of the 'Shamilat' land by using the phrase 'mae jumla hukuk mutaliq aan arazi mutadawia' (along with all rights pertaining to the land in dispute). The Court affirmed that the appreciation of evidence by the lower courts, which included examining the sale deed, mutation, and party depositions to determine the intent to pre-empt, was sound and did not contravene any legal principle.

  Questions settled

  • Can a suit for pre-emption succeed if the plaint uses general language to include 'Shamilat' land rather than specifying it explicitly?
  • Does the appreciation of evidence by lower courts regarding the intent to pre-empt 'Shamilat' land constitute a legal error if based on the totality of pleadings and depositions?
  • Does Section 3 of the West Pakistan Land Dispositions (Saving of Shamilat) Ordinance 1959 prohibit the pre-emption of 'Shamilat' land if the land is not specifically described in the plaint?
  Read full judgment →
• Azim Gul vs Gulbat Khan and Others1980 SCMR 702 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-21
  murderattempted murderappreciation of evidenceacquittalballistic expertdelay in FIRdeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions filed against the judgment of the High Court, which had upheld the conviction and death sentence of Gulbat Khan for murder and attempted murder under sections 302 and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while acquitting two co-accused of tender age. The core legal questions pertained to the proper appreciation of ocular testimony, the effect of delay in lodging the first information report, the identification of the weapon used, and whether the acquittal of the co-accused involved any legal error in the appraisal of evidence. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the guilt of the petitioner, supported by unimpeachable corroboratory evidence and ballistic expert reports, suffered from no legal infirmity. The Court laid down that concurrent findings based on the proper appreciation of ocular and medical evidence by the High Court do not warrant interference unless a glaring legal error or miscarriage of justice is established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether delay in lodging the first information report vitiates the prosecution case when the names of the assailants are disclosed at the earliest opportunity?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with concurrent findings of fact based on the appreciation of ocular testimony without proof of a material legal error?
  • Whether discrepancies in the statements of prosecution witnesses regarding minor details affect the core reliability of the eyewitness account?
  • Whether the participation of co-accused can be excluded on grounds of age and improbability of association while maintaining the conviction of the principal offender?
  Read full judgment →
• Attaullah and Others vs Punjab Province and Another1980 SCMR 191 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-24
  Settlement Scheme No. VIIEvacuee propertyLeave to appealRural building transferCompensation poolCleavage of opinion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal regarding the ownership of a katcha shop, classified as evacuee property, located in a rural area. The dispute centers on the interpretation of Settlement Scheme No. VII, specifically regarding the date upon which such rural property stood transferred to its occupant. The petitioners argued that the relevant date for transfer was 1-1-1961, based on their predecessor's occupation, which would have removed the property from the compensation pool and rendered subsequent eviction and transfer orders void. Conversely, the lower courts held that the relevant date was 7-8-1961, the date of the Scheme's enforcement. The Supreme Court observed a significant conflict of judicial opinion within the Lahore High Court concerning this specific date. Finding that the petitioners' contention was supported by existing case law, the Court determined that this cleavage of opinion required resolution. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to settle the legal position regarding the transfer date under Chapter V of Settlement Scheme No. VII, while ordering that the petitioners' possession of the property remain undisturbed pending the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • What is the relevant date for the transfer of rural buildings to occupants under Chapter V of Settlement Scheme No. VII?
  • Does a property pass out of the compensation pool once it is transferred to an occupant under Settlement Scheme No. VII?
  Read full judgment →
• Aslam Pervaiz vs The State1980 SCMR 307 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-02
  murderappreciation of evidenceocular testimonymedical evidenceprompt FIRspecial leave to appealfire-arm injury
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the petitioner's conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and section 13 of the West Pakistan Arms Ordinance 1965, resulting in a sentence of imprisonment for life and concurrent rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question revolved around the proper appreciation of evidence, specifically the reliability of medical evidence, ocular testimony, and the recovery of the weapon in a murder case stemming from a dispute over a love affair. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the prosecution had successfully established the guilt of the petitioner through medical evidence, credible independent ocular testimony, prompt lodging of the First Information Report, and corroborating ballistic evidence. The key principle laid down is that where courts below have meticulously scrutinized copious and consistent evidence—including medical, ocular, and expert testimony—without violating any principles of appreciation of evidence, the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of guilt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minor variations in the trajectory of a bullet as shown by medical evidence are sufficient to discredit reliable ocular testimony?
  • Does the prompt lodging of an FIR exclude the possibility of substitution of an accused person?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact based on proper appreciation of evidence by the courts below?
  Read full judgment →
• Asif Ali vs Vicechairman, Pakistan Railways, Lahore and Others1980 SCMR 11 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-07-28
  service appealpromotionseniority-cum-fitnessability testnon-selection postreversion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the dismissal of a service appeal by the Central Service Tribunal regarding the reversion and supersession of the petitioner, a railway employee, who was passed over for promotion after refusing to appear in a mandatory ability test. The core legal question is whether the employer's requirement of an ability test for promotion to a non-selection post violates applicable promotion rules based on seniority, and whether a senior employee can refuse such a test. The Supreme Court held that the employer is legally competent to prescribe an ability test as a valid method for determining a candidate's fitness for promotion, notwithstanding the general rule of seniority-cum-fitness. The Court laid down the principle that an employee cannot dictate the mode of assessing fitness to the authorities, and refusal to undergo a lawfully devised ability test justifies passing over the employee for promotion and loss of seniority.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employer prescribe an ability test as a condition for promotion to a non-selection post when promotion rules require consideration of seniority and fitness?
  • Does an employee have the right to refuse a lawfully required ability test for promotion and dictate the mode of assessing fitness?
  • Does an employee who refuses to undergo a mandatory ability test retain a valid grievance regarding supersession and loss of seniority?
  Read full judgment →
• Anwarul Hassan vs The State1980 SCMR 649 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-12
  circumstantial evidencelast seenmurder convictionrecovery of weaponevidentiary valuecriminal appealspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenges a conviction under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, affirmed by the High Court, for the murder of the deceased. The core legal question is whether circumstantial evidence—specifically the deceased being last seen in the company of the accused, the establishment of a motive, and the recovery of blood-stained clothes and a weapon at the instance of the accused—is sufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of ocular testimony. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding that the chain of circumstantial evidence was complete and consistent with the guilt of the accused. The Court affirmed that delay in sending recovered items to a chemical examiner does not automatically invalidate the evidence unless the identity of the items is successfully challenged. The judgment reinforces the principle that circumstantial evidence, when cogent and consistent, is sufficient for conviction, and that the absence of local witnesses for recoveries does not inherently discredit the investigation if the witnesses are otherwise credible.

  Questions settled

  • Is circumstantial evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder in the absence of ocular evidence?
  • Does a delay in sending recovered incriminating articles to a chemical examiner automatically invalidate the evidentiary value of such articles?
  • Can the testimony of witnesses for recoveries be rejected solely because they are not from the immediate locality of the recovery?
  Read full judgment →
• Amir Abdullah vs The State1980 SCMR 51 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-09-29
  criminal appealdouble murderocular testimonydying declarationmedical evidenceappreciation of evidenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and death sentence imposed on the appellant for the double murder of his brother and sister-in-law. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of ocular testimony that conflicted with medical evidence regarding the distance of firing, and whether a dying declaration could sustain a conviction when the certifying doctor was not examined and the parties had a history of hostility. The Supreme Court held that the conviction could not be sustained. The Court found the ocular testimony unreliable because the medical evidence of tattooing and scorching on the victims' bodies indicated a close-range shooting, directly contradicting the witness's claim of a long-range attack. Furthermore, the witness's presence at the scene was deemed doubtful as he was not mentioned in the FIR or inquest report. Regarding the dying declaration, the Court ruled that, given the background of intense family hostility, it was unsafe to rest a conviction on this solitary piece of evidence alone. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained on ocular testimony that is fundamentally contradicted by medical evidence regarding the distance of firing?
  • Is a dying declaration sufficient to support a conviction in a case involving significant inter-party hostility?
  • Does the failure to examine the doctor who certified a declarant's fitness to make a dying declaration render the declaration unreliable?
  Read full judgment →
• Amanullah vs Abdul Ghani and Another1980 SCMR 573 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-12
  consent orderwithdrawal of petitionrehearingsettlement agreementmisconceived application
  Summary & questions settled

  This miscellaneous application sought the rehearing of a Petition for Special Leave to Appeal that had previously been dismissed as withdrawn by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The petitioner contended that the opposite party had resiled from the settlement agreement that originally prompted the withdrawal of the petition, thereby necessitating a rehearing on the merits. The Supreme Court dismissed the application as misconceived. The Court held that since the petition was dismissed upon the express prayer of the petitioner in the presence of both parties, the subsequent breach of the underlying settlement agreement by the opposite party did not constitute valid grounds to recall or set aside the consent order. The Court clarified that while the petitioner might possess other legal remedies to address the breach of the settlement, the withdrawal of the petition was a final act that could not be undone by simply seeking a recall of the consent order. The principle established is that a consent order dismissing a petition as withdrawn cannot be reopened due to a subsequent breach of the settlement agreement.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition for leave to appeal, dismissed as withdrawn pursuant to a settlement, be reopened if the opposite party subsequently resiles from that settlement?
  • Does the breach of a settlement agreement provide sufficient grounds to recall a consent order dismissing a petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Rakha and Another vs Government of the Punjab and Others1980 PLC (C. S.) 397 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-24
  transfer of civil servantcivil servicewrit jurisdictionaggrieved personmala fidepublic interestposting and transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, civil servants in the Health Department, challenged their transfer orders, alleging the transfers were malicious, capricious, and intended to disrupt their personal lives, specifically regarding their children's education. They argued that they should have been suspended rather than transferred while an inquiry under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules, 1975 was pending. The Lahore High Court dismissed their writ petition, holding that under the West Pakistan Health Department Ministerial Service (Sub-Regional) Rules, 1965, civil servants are liable to transfer within the province and no evidence of mala fide intent was established. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the High Court's decision. The Court held that under Section 9 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, a civil servant has no vested right to remain posted at a specific location and is liable to be transferred anywhere within or outside the province. Consequently, as the transfer did not adversely affect their terms and conditions of service, the petitioners were not 'aggrieved persons' entitled to invoke constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant have a vested right to remain posted at a specific location?
  • Can a civil servant challenge a transfer order on the grounds of personal inconvenience or hardship?
  • Is a civil servant an 'aggrieved person' under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 when transferred without a change in terms and conditions of service?
  • Does Section 9 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 authorize the transfer of a civil servant to any post within or outside the province?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta vs Ghulam Nabi alias Nabi Bakhsh and Others1980 SCMR 360 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-08
  agricultural landevictionKhasra GirdawarilesseetenantMartial Law Regulationdue processwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that allowed a respondent's writ petition challenging his eviction from agricultural land. The petitioner, a landlord, had successfully applied to Revenue Authorities to change the respondent's status in the Khasra Girdawari from 'tenant' to 'lessee', subsequently obtaining an eviction order. The High Court held that even if the respondent were a lessee, he was entitled to protection under Martial Law Regulation No. 115 if he was in actual cultivating possession, similar to a tenant-at-will. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding that the High Court did not interfere with the Revenue Authorities' correction of the land records, but correctly identified that the respondent's eviction was without lawful authority. The Court held that a person in cultivating possession cannot be evicted without due process, and the mere classification as a 'lessee' rather than a 'tenant' does not automatically strip an occupant of protections against arbitrary dispossession. Consequently, the High Court's decision to declare the eviction unlawful was upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person classified as a 'lessee' in revenue records lose the protection against eviction afforded to a 'tenant' under Martial Law Regulation No. 115 if they are in actual cultivating possession?
  • Can a landlord evict an occupant from agricultural land without due process of law?
  • Is a writ petition maintainable against an eviction order where the occupant is excluded from statutory remedies available to tenants due to their classification as a lessee?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Dino and 15 Others vs Haji Islamuddin and 2 Others1980 SCMR 15 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-26
  execution proceedingspart performanceauction purchaserattachment of propertyres judicatasale certificatespecific performance
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave arose from execution proceedings where the petitioners, as legal heirs of the original objector, sought to resist the delivery of possession of an attached house to an auction-purchaser. The core legal question was whether the petitioners could assert a right to retain possession based on an agreement to sell and the doctrine of part performance under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act 1882, despite the predecessor’s repeated failures to establish this claim in prior litigation. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were precluded from re-agitating the issue. The Court observed that the predecessor had previously filed objections under Order XXI, Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and subsequent suits, all of which were dismissed or abated. Consequently, the claim to retain possession against the decree-holder and the auction-purchaser had been conclusively rejected by the courts. The principle laid down is that where a claimant fails to successfully vindicate a claim of possession based on part performance in multiple prior proceedings, they cannot reopen the matter during execution after the sale has been confirmed and a certificate issued.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person in possession of attached property under an agreement to sell raise objections to attachment based on Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 after their previous claims have been dismissed?
  • Does the dismissal of objections under Order XXI, Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 preclude a party from re-agitating the same issue in subsequent execution proceedings?
  • Can legal heirs of a deceased objector reopen litigation regarding property title after the original objector's suits and revisions were dismissed or abated?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Bakhsh Etc. vs Ghulam Shabbir Shah1980 SCMR 789 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-02
  abatement of appealindivisible transactionjoint purchaselegal representativessecond appealsuit for declaration
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners filed a suit for declaration of ownership based on an alleged verbal sale of land, which was dismissed by the trial court and the first appellate court. During the pendency of their second appeal in the High Court, one of the co-plaintiffs died. Despite an objection regarding the abatement of the appeal being raised, the petitioners failed to bring the legal representatives of the deceased on record, leading the High Court to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it had abated in toto. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the matter. Upon review, the Court observed that the plaint claimed a joint purchase without specifying individual shares or the apportionment of consideration paid by the vendees. Consequently, the Court held that the transaction was indivisible. Applying the principle that the death of one co-purchaser in an indivisible transaction results in the total abatement of the suit, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision and dismissed the petition, confirming that the appeal could not proceed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the death of a co-plaintiff in a suit involving an indivisible joint purchase result in the total abatement of the appeal?
  • Can an appeal proceed when a co-appellant dies and their legal representatives are not brought on record?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Khan vs Shah Zaman and 8 Others1980 SCMR 332 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-26
  criminal petitioncondonation of delaylimitationalteration of convictionenhancement of sentencewrong legal advice
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition, filed from the complainant's side, challenges the judgment of the Peshawar High Court which altered the convictions and sentences of the respondents originally awarded by the trial court for offenses including murder, rioting, and hurt. The core legal question concerns the propriety of altering convictions from murder to lesser offenses and whether the delay in filing the petition for enhancement of sentences and setting aside of acquittals should be condoned. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petition is barred by 33 days and declined to condone the delay based on the unverified ground of wrong legal advice by counsel, lacking the requisite affidavit. The key principle laid down is that delay in filing petitions for enhancement of sentences or against acquittals will not be condoned lightly on the mere assertion of wrong advice by counsel without proper supporting affidavits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether delay in filing a petition for enhancement of sentence can be condoned on the ground of wrong legal advice by counsel without an affidavit from the counsel?
  • Will the Supreme Court condone a 33-day delay in filing a petition against the alteration of convictions and sentences based on unverified assertions of legal misadvice?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Khan vs Malik Muhammad Amir Khan--Petitioner1980 SCMR 474 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-25
  post-arrest bailabscondencecorroborationinterested witnessmurdermitigating circumstancesprivate revengeeye-witness testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This order resolves three petitions for leave to appeal arising from a murder prosecution under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 13 of the Arms Ordinance 1965. The petitioner was convicted of murdering a practicing lawyer due to long-standing family enmity, based on eye-witness testimony supported by evidence of prolonged abscondence. The trial court convicted three accused, but the High Court acquitted two co-accused on benefit of doubt while maintaining the petitioner's conviction and death sentence, using his one-year abscondence as necessary corroboration. The Supreme Court evaluated whether prolonged abscondence could serve as valid independent corroboration and whether private revenge or family honor constituted mitigating circumstances for sentencing. The Court held that while abscondence must be evaluated in light of the absconder's antecedents and explanation, prolonged abscondence without satisfactory explanation provides decisive corroborative value to natural and truthful eye-witnesses. Further, private revenge does not constitute a mitigating circumstance. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can prolonged abscondence serve as independent corroboration to support the testimony of interested eye-witnesses?
  • Does private revenge or family enmity constitute a mitigating circumstance to reduce a death sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can an employee or clerk of a deceased victim be categorized as an independent witness for the purpose of corroborating eye-witness testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali F Din vs Khadim Hussain1980 SCMR 767 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-01
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentholding overexpired leaseadvance rentpersonal needstatutory tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from an ejectment order passed against the petitioner on the grounds of default in rent payment and personal bona fide need of the landlord. The petitioner contended that upon the expiry of the written lease deed, the condition requiring advance payment of rent by the 5th of each month ceased to apply, and the statutory period of sixty days under Section 13(2)(i) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 became applicable. The Supreme Court of Pakistan rejected this contention, affirming the rule laid down in Muhammad Ashraf v. Muhammad Sharif (PLD 1971 Lah. 610). The Court held that a tenant continuing in possession after the expiry of a lease by efflux of time remains governed by all the terms and conditions of the expired agreement, including the mode and time of rent payment. Consequently, failure to pay advance rent as stipulated in the expired lease constituted a default. The Court also declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact regarding the landlord's bona fide personal need, dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant continuing in possession after the expiry of a written lease remains bound by the terms and conditions of the expired agreement regarding the mode and time of rent payment?
  • Does the acceptance of late rent by a landlord in the past operate as a permanent waiver of the advance payment clause in a lease agreement?
  • Whether the statutory sixty-day period for rent payment under Section 13(2)(i) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 applies when an expired lease agreement stipulated a specific date for advance payment?
  Read full judgment →
• Akhlaq Ahmad vs Karachi Port Trust and Another1980 SCMR 810 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-18
  civil procedureinterim injunctionrevisional jurisdictionevacuee propertynotice requirement
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a property dispute concerning an area of 170 sq. yds. in Karachi. The petitioner, claiming as a lessee under the Evacuee Property Trust Board, filed a civil suit against the Karachi Port Trust after the latter attempted to demolish structures on the land. The trial court dismissed the suit entirely for want of statutory notice under the Karachi Port Trust Act, but the first appellate court dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding interim relief because the Karachi Port Trust gave a written assurance not to evict the petitioner from an admitted area of 230 sq. yds. The Sind High Court in revision set aside the trial court's dismissal of the plaint but declined to interfere with the discretion exercised against the petitioner regarding the disputed 170 sq. yds. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to show any error of law or jurisdictional defect in the impugned revisional order, noting that the Evacuee Property Trust Board itself did not support the petitioner's claim to the disputed 170 sq. yds. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil suit can be dismissed in limine for want of notice under section 87 of the Karachi Port Trust Act?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the concurrent exercise of discretion regarding interim relief under revisional jurisdiction without showing a jurisdictional defect?
  • Whether a lessee can claim interim injunction over disputed property when the superior lessor board does not support the lessee's claim?
  Read full judgment →
• Akbar Ali vs Mst. Atiq Khatoon1980 SCMR 382 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-13
  review petitionevacuee propertyrent defaultejectmentwaiver of rightsstatutory noticenew plea in review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed against the Supreme Court's dismissal of a civil petition for special leave to appeal regarding an ejectment order. The petitioner, an occupant of evacuee property, challenged an eviction order granted on the grounds of rent default. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could avoid eviction by raising a new argument in review proceedings—specifically, that a prior application to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner regarding rent payment cured the default—and whether such an application constituted a waiver of the landlady's right to seek ejectment. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that the new ground could not be raised for the first time at the review stage. Furthermore, the Court determined that the petitioner had clearly defaulted on rent payments following the statutory notice, and the landlady's prior application to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner did not constitute a waiver of her right to seek ejectment under the relevant rent restriction laws. The principle established is that review petitions cannot be maintained on grounds not previously raised before the High Court or the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a new legal ground be raised for the first time during review proceedings if it was not agitated before the High Court or the Supreme Court?
  • Does an application to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner regarding rent payment constitute a waiver of a landlord's right to seek ejectment under the West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Is a tenant liable for ejectment if they fail to pay rent for more than six months after receiving a statutory notice of transfer and demand?
  Read full judgment →
• Aijaz Khan vs Rai Sahib Roop Chand and 2 Others1980 SCMR 195 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-14
  evacuee propertycustodian of evacuee propertynon-evacuee statussettlement departmentauctionwrit jurisdictionproperty status
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal concerns a dispute over the status of two plots of land in Karachi, which the petitioner claimed were evacuee property acquired through a government auction. The respondent, the original owner, had previously been declared a non-evacuee by the Custodian of Evacuee Property in 1950. The core legal question was whether the property, despite the owner's non-evacuee status, became evacuee property due to entries in the Custodian's register or by being "treated as" evacuee property under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the property was not evacuee property. The Court established that mere book entries in the Custodian's register do not constitute evidence of property being "treated as" evacuee property without factual proof of such treatment, such as the collection of rent or occupation by refugees. Furthermore, the Court clarified that Section 3(1) of the 1957 Act requires that property must have been treated as evacuee immediately before January 1, 1957, which was not established in this case.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere entry of a property in the Custodian's register, without evidence of actual treatment as evacuee property, render it evacuee property?
  • Can property be classified as evacuee property if the owner has been declared a non-evacuee by the Custodian?
  • What constitutes 'treating' a property as evacuee property under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957?
  • Does Section 3(1) of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957, allow property to be deemed evacuee if it was not treated as such immediately before January 1, 1957?
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• Ahmad Din and Others vs Mst. Nawab Bibi1980 SCMR 873 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-03
  special leave to appealco-shareradmissibility of evidenceminor representationlimitation periodMuslim personal lawsuccession
  Summary & questions settled

  Mst. Nawab Bibi filed a suit for joint possession of agricultural land and a house as the daughter and legal heir of the propositus, Ilam Din. The trial court decreed the suit, and the district judge dismissed the subsequent appeal. The High Court dismissed the defendants' revision petition regarding the agricultural land while remanding the matter regarding the house. The defendants sought special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, raising contentions regarding the representation of a minor legal representative, the admissibility of criminal court proceedings to determine the date of death of the propositus, and the limitation period for a co-sharer's suit. The Supreme Court held that allowing a minor to be represented by her mother as a guardian was proper, that the criminal court record showing the propositus as alive in 1950 was admissible since no contemporaneous objection was raised, and that the suit was within limitation as the plaintiff was a co-sharer and the cause of action arose from the mutation order. The petition for special leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the grant of an application to bring a minor legal representative on record through her mother constitutes valid representation by a guardian?
  • Can an objection regarding the admissibility of a document exhibited without objection before the trial court be raised at the Supreme Court stage?
  • Whether a suit for joint possession by a co-sharer is barred by limitation when adverse possession is not proven?
  • Does a criminal court order declaring a person an absconder serve as a relevant fact in determining whether that person was alive during the relevant year?
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• Ahmad Bakhsh vs The State1980 SCMR 3 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-05
  briberyillegal gratificationdecoy witnesstrap raidconcurrent findingsappreciation of evidencecorruption
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a conviction for bribery under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The appellant, a Patwari, was accused of demanding a bribe to provide a copy of a khatuni. A trap was laid by the Anti-Corruption Department, involving a decoy witness and a raiding party led by a Magistrate. The marked currency notes were recovered from the appellant's co-accused. The appellant contended that the conviction relied solely on the uncorroborated testimony of a decoy witness and offered an alternative explanation for the possession of the notes, which he failed to substantiate. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was supported by concurrent findings of the lower courts, which were based on credible evidence, including the recovery of the marked notes and the testimony of the raiding party. The Court affirmed that the evidence of a decoy witness, when corroborated by other witnesses and physical evidence, is sufficient for conviction. The appeal was dismissed as the appellant failed to demonstrate any misreading of evidence or error of law in the lower courts' concurrent findings.

  Questions settled

  • Is the testimony of a decoy witness sufficient to sustain a conviction for bribery if corroborated by other evidence?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the appreciation of evidence if no misreading or omission is shown?
  • Does the failure of an accused to examine a material witness in support of their defense plea allow the court to draw an adverse inference against the accused?
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• Ahmad Ali Memon vs The Government of Sind and Others1980 SCMR 260 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-20
  service appeallimitation periodtime-barredleave preparatory to retirementdepartmental reviewservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Divisional Forest Officer, challenged his retirement and the subsequent denial of leave preparatory to retirement (LPR). Following the rejection of his LPR application on December 7, 1973, the petitioner sought departmental review, which was ultimately dismissed by the Chief Minister in 1976. He subsequently appealed to the Sind Service Tribunal, which dismissed the appeal as time-barred. The Supreme Court examined whether the appeal was filed within the statutory limitation period prescribed by the Sind Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The Court held that even assuming the petitioner had a right to departmental review, he failed to file his appeal before the Tribunal within the mandatory timeframe after the expiry of the ninety-day period for departmental decision-making. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the appeal was time-barred under the proviso to section 4 of the Sind Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, establishing that statutory limitation periods for service appeals are strictly enforced regardless of pending departmental representations.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pendency of a departmental review extend the limitation period for filing an appeal before a Service Tribunal beyond the statutory timeframe?
  • When does the cause of action arise for a civil servant aggrieved by the denial of leave preparatory to retirement?
  • Is an appeal before a Service Tribunal time-barred if filed after the expiration of the ninety-day period prescribed for departmental decision-making?
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• Abdus Saboor Khan vs Karachi University and Another1980 SCMR 558 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1965-06-02
  interim reliefacademic disciplineunfair meansbalance of convenienceprovisional admissionstudent rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as an appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning a student's request for interim relief to continue his engineering studies while an appeal regarding allegations of unfair means in an examination remained pending. The appellant sought authorization to join the next higher class, arguing that he had achieved first-class marks and that the university's allegation was based on the premise that his neighbor copied from him, rather than the reverse. The University contended that answer books showed clear evidence of copying. The Supreme Court, without deciding the merits of the underlying dispute, focused on the balance of convenience regarding the appellant's academic progression. The Court held that interim relief should be granted to prevent the interruption of the appellant's studies, reasoning that if the appeal were successful, the student would avoid academic loss, whereas if the appeal failed, the University would suffer no injury by his provisional admission. Consequently, the Court directed the provisional admission of the appellant to the next higher class, subject to the final outcome of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a student be granted provisional admission to a higher class pending the final adjudication of an appeal regarding examination malpractice?
  • Does the balance of convenience favor allowing a student to continue studies when the outcome of an appeal regarding unfair means is pending?
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• Abdur Rehman Butt vs Mst. Aisha Bibi Etc.1980 SCMR 137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-17
  special leave to appealcondonation of delaysufficient causelimitation periodtime-barred petitionmedical certificate
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's writ petition concerning the disposal of a property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The petition was barred by 149 days, and the petitioner filed an application for condonation of delay supported by a medical certificate stating he suffered from rheumatoid arthritis. The core legal question was whether sufficient cause was shown to condone the inordinate delay in filing the petition. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that his illness rendered him unable to move about or impart necessary instructions for filing the petition within the period of limitation. Consequently, the Court found no sufficient cause for condoning the delay and dismissed the petition as time-barred, affirming the principle that medical grounds alone, without proof of incapacitation from filing, do not warrant the condonation of delay.

  Questions settled

  • Whether illness supported by a medical certificate constitutes sufficient cause for condoning a delay in filing a petition for special leave?
  • Is a petitioner required to prove that illness incapacitated them from giving instructions in order to condone delay?
  • Can delay in re-filing a petition be condoned without explaining the period of limitation elapsed after the expiry date?
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• Abdur Rehman (Represented by Legal Hews) and 4 Others vs Mohabbat1980 SCMR 282 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-09-29
  limitationdeclaratory suitrevenue recordco-sharersshamilat landpossessionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the Letters Patent Appeal Bench of the Peshawar High Court which decreed the respondents' suit for a declaration of ownership and possession in respect of suit land. The respondents filed the suit claiming to be owners in possession as hissadars since time immemorial, challenging contrary revenue entries. While the trial court, district judge, and single judge of the high court differed on the issue of limitation, the letters patent bench decided in favor of the respondents. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners challenged the judgment solely on limitation. The Supreme Court declined to interfere, holding that since the courts below concurrently found the respondents to be in possession since time immemorial, and the land forms part of the shamilat land in which the petitioners are co-sharers who can seek partition, the petitioners suffered no tangible grievance or material prejudice. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a declaratory suit regarding revenue record entries by a co-sharer in possession face a bar of limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can leave to appeal be refused where the petitioners suffer no material prejudice and have the remedy of partition available as co-sharers in shamilat land?
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• Abdur Rauf Khan vs Collector, Central Excise & Land Customs, Peshawar and 3 Others1980 SCMR 114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-15
  customs seizureburden of proofredemption finenon-duty paid vehicleimport prohibitionconfiscation of goodsCustoms Act 1969
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment upholding the confiscation of a motor vehicle by Customs authorities. The petitioner purchased a Mercedes Benz, which was subsequently seized by police for lacking proof of lawful import. The Deputy Collector of Customs confiscated the vehicle and imposed a penalty, later modified by the Collector of Customs to a redemption fine and payment of taxes, waiving the personal penalty. The petitioner challenged the seizure and the imposition of the fine, arguing the seizure was illegal for non-compliance with statutory notice requirements and that the Collector lacked authority to impose fines without sufficient evidence. The Supreme Court held that the burden of proving lawful import and payment of duty lies on the possessor of the goods under the Customs Act, 1969. The Court affirmed that the seizure was lawful and the Collector’s findings were supported by evidence, noting that the petitioner failed to prove lawful acquisition. The Court established that where goods are seized for suspected illegal import, the onus of proving lawful authority or payment of duty rests entirely upon the person in possession.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proving lawful import and payment of duty lie on the person in possession of the goods under the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Can a vehicle be confiscated under the Customs Act, 1969, if the possessor fails to provide proof of lawful import or duty payment?
  • Is the seizure of goods by police authorities illegal if the owner is not provided with the grounds of seizure in writing at the time of the action?
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• Abdur Rashid vs Hakeem Muhammad Siddique1980 SCMR 570 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-10
  rent evictionbona fide requirementlandlord and tenantconcurrent findingsappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an eviction order passed by the Rent Controller and upheld by the appellate courts. The landlord sought the eviction of the tenant from a shop, claiming it was required for his son's homeopathic practice. The tenant contended that the application was not bona fide, citing a prior rent increase and the fact that the son was already practicing in a 'Chaubara'. The Rent Controller initially dismissed the application, but the Additional District Judge reversed this, finding that the rent increase was due to higher local taxes and that the existing 'Chaubara' was insufficient for the son's requirements. The Lahore High Court dismissed the tenant's subsequent appeal. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the appellate courts, noting that a ground-floor shop is inherently more accessible for a dispensary than a 'Chaubara'. The Court affirmed that the landlord's requirement was bona fide and dismissed the petition, while granting the tenant four months to vacate the premises.

  Questions settled

  • Does a prior increase in rent necessarily negate the bona fide nature of a landlord's requirement for eviction?
  • Can a court consider the accessibility of a ground-floor shop versus a 'Chaubara' in determining the suitability of premises for a professional practice?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact by appellate courts regarding the suitability of premises for a landlord's needs subject to interference by the Supreme Court?
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• Abdullah Khan and 2 Others vs Fazalur Rehman and 7 Others1980 SCMR 165 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-14
  leave to appeallimitation periodcondonation of delayland acquisitionmortgagee rightsprocedural delaycertified copy
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over land acquisition and mortgagee rights, wherein the petitioners challenged a High Court judgment dated 26-10-1977. The primary legal question concerned whether the significant delay in filing the petition could be condoned based on the petitioners' assertion that a rehearing application was pending in the High Court, rendering the judgment's announcement premature. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding that the High Court was the sole competent forum to adjudicate disputes regarding the announcement of its own orders. Furthermore, the Court observed that the petitioners had applied for a certified copy of the judgment well beyond the prescribed limitation period, providing no satisfactory explanation for this failure. Consequently, the Court found the petition hopelessly time-barred. The principle laid down is that procedural disputes regarding the announcement of a lower court's judgment must be addressed before that court, and an unexplained failure to adhere to statutory limitation periods for filing appeals or obtaining certified copies precludes the Supreme Court from entertaining the matter.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Supreme Court the appropriate forum to resolve a dispute regarding the date of announcement of a High Court judgment?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be entertained when the application for a certified copy of the impugned judgment is filed beyond the limitation period?
  • Does the pendency of an application for rehearing in the High Court justify the delay in filing an appeal in the Supreme Court?
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• Abdul Salam vs The State1980 SCMR 142 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-19
  post-arrest bailequality of treatmentco-accusedineffective firingbail principles
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Abdul Salam, sought special leave to appeal against the dismissal of his bail application by the Peshawar High Court in a case involving charges under sections 307, 353, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and section 13 of the Arms Ordinance. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail, given that a co-accused, Sher, facing similar allegations of ineffective firing on a police party, had already been granted bail. The Supreme Court observed that the lower courts failed to apply correct legal principles regarding bail and neglected the principle of equality of treatment for similarly situated accused persons. Finding no distinction between the petitioner's case and that of the co-accused, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, accepted it, and granted bail to the petitioner, subject to the provision of substantial security. The judgment emphasizes that courts must ensure consistent treatment of accused persons in similar circumstances when adjudicating bail applications.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused person entitled to bail if a co-accused facing similar allegations has already been granted bail?
  • Does the failure to maintain equality of treatment between similarly situated accused persons constitute a valid ground for the Supreme Court to grant bail?
  • Should bail be refused when the alleged offence involves ineffective firing causing no injury?
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• Abdul Rehman vs Muhammad Hayat Khan Etc.1980 SCMR 311 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-05
  quashment of proceedingscriminal breach of trustcheatingdishonoured chequesdisputed questions of factcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from criminal petitions for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's applications for the quashment of criminal proceedings under section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code. The petitioner is facing prosecution under sections 419 and 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code on allegations of purchasing timber and issuing post-dated cheques that were subsequently dishonoured. The core legal question concerns whether criminal proceedings ought to be quashed under section 561-A when the case involves disputed questions of fact regarding the transaction and the intent of the accused. The Supreme Court held that disputed questions of fact, such as the circumstances of issuing the cheques and whether the dispute is purely civil in nature, require investigation through the recording of evidence by the trial court and cannot be resolved in quashment proceedings. The Court affirmed that the High Court rightly refused to quash the proceedings, establishing that factual controversies must be determined by the appropriate trial court rather than at the leave to appeal stage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether criminal proceedings can be quashed under section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code when the case involves disputed questions of fact?
  • Can a dispute involving the issuance of dishonoured cheques be classified as purely civil without recording evidence at the trial stage?
  • Whether the High Court is justified in refusing to interfere with criminal proceedings that require factual investigation by the trial court?
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• Abdul Rehman vs Fazal Karim and Another1980 SCMR 758 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-27
  evictionpersonal requirementlandlord deathremandadditional evidencerent restrictionappellate proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an eviction application filed by a landlord against a tenant on grounds of default and personal requirement. The Rent Controller initially dismissed the application, but the District Judge reversed this, finding the landlord's personal requirement proven. During the pendency of the tenant's second appeal in the High Court, the original landlord died. Both parties sought to introduce new evidence regarding the requirement of the premises, as the original landlord's personal need was no longer the operative issue. The High Court refused to allow additional evidence and dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the death of the original landlord created a fundamentally new situation. The Court held that where a landlord dies during appellate proceedings, the question of personal requirement must be re-evaluated in light of the legal heirs' needs. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case, directing the High Court to permit both parties to lead evidence on the issue of personal requirement under the relevant rent legislation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the death of a landlord during the pendency of an appeal regarding personal requirement necessitate the production of fresh evidence?
  • Can an appellate court refuse to allow evidence regarding the personal requirement of legal heirs when the original landlord dies during the appeal?
  • Is a tenant entitled to challenge the personal requirement of legal heirs if the original landlord dies after the initial eviction order?
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• Abdul Razzaq vs Postmaster General1980 SCMR 337 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-27
  service lawdepartmental inquirydismissal from serviceFederal Service Tribunalquantum of punishmentjudicial reviewmisconduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the dismissal of a postal clerk from service following a departmental inquiry into allegations of misconduct. The petitioner challenged the order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had upheld his dismissal by the departmental authorities. The core legal questions were whether the Tribunal failed to properly examine the evidence regarding the charges and whether it failed to assess the propriety of the punishment imposed. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Tribunal had adequately reviewed the evidence, noting that the Inquiry Officer and the departmental authority had thoroughly examined the case and reached reasonable conclusions. The Court further held that the Tribunal's failure to explicitly discuss the quantum of punishment did not invalidate the order, as the finding of guilt on multiple charges implicitly justified the dismissal. The judgment reaffirms that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the factual findings of a Service Tribunal where the Tribunal has properly applied its mind to the evidence and the departmental proceedings are found to be regular and free from perversity.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a Service Tribunal's order if the Tribunal has reviewed the evidence and reached a non-perverse conclusion?
  • Is a Service Tribunal's order invalid if it fails to explicitly discuss the quantum of punishment despite upholding the finding of guilt?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to re-examine evidence in a service matter if the lower Tribunal has already properly evaluated it?
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