Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• M. Ataur Rehhman Alvi vs Inamur Rahman1974 SCMR 54 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-09-09
  special leave to appealappointment of receiverinterim injunctiondisputed titlestatus quocontempt of courtcivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from a consolidated order of the Sind & Baluchistan High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's applications for the appointment of a receiver, injunction, attachment of property, and contempt of court in a civil suit. The petitioner had filed a suit seeking a declaration that certain agreements executed between the parties were unenforceable and void, or alternatively for a money decree. The core legal question was whether a plaintiff with a disputed title to properties not standing in his name, and who made an alternative claim for a money decree, is entitled to the appointment of a receiver or interim injunctions pending the suit. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had no clear or established prima facie title to the properties, as they stood in the names of third parties, and therefore could not seek to deprive a person bona fide in possession by having a receiver appointed. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff with a disputed title to properties standing in the names of third parties is entitled to the appointment of a receiver pendente lite?
  • Does an alternative prayer for a money decree in the plaint affect a plaintiff's claim of having a prima facie title for the appointment of a receiver?
  • Can a court attach property situated outside its jurisdiction and standing in the name of a person who is not a party to the suit?
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• LT. Maseel Ahmad vs Punjab Sports Control Board through Director1974 SCMR 492 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-01-18
  special leave to appealcondonation of delaylimitationpauper appealbreach of contracttermination of service
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a boxing coach whose services were terminated before the expiry of his five-year contract due to the abolition of his post, filed a suit for damages for breach of contract. The trial court and the additional district judge dismissed the suit, finding that the appointment letter permitted termination upon three months' notice, which the respondent-Board had duly provided. The petitioner's second appeal in the High Court was rejected as time-barred and unstamped after his request for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act was refused due to an unsatisfactory explanation of the delay, and he failed to pay the requisite court-fee. Upon a petition for special leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly exercised its discretion in refusing to condone the delay as the lapse of time confers a valuable right on the opposing party which cannot be defeated without a satisfactory explanation for every day's delay.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the creation of a post for a specific period guarantees continued employment for that entire duration notwithstanding its abolition?
  • Whether a separate application for permission to appeal as a pauper is required for a second appeal when the appellant was permitted to sue and appeal as a pauper in prior proceedings?
  • Whether the lapse of time in civil matters confers a valuable right requiring a satisfactory explanation for each day's delay when seeking condonation under the Limitation Act?
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• LT. Col. A. H. Minhas (Represented by Heirs) vs Ghulam Ahmad and Another1974 SCMR 394 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-01
  Settlement authoritieswrit jurisdictionproperty transferindependent residential unitappurtenanceconstitutional jurisdictionmunicipal taxation records
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court order that dismissed a Letters Patent Appeal, thereby upholding a writ petition which had quashed the transfer of a property (House No. 21/456) by Settlement authorities to the appellant. The core legal question was whether the property in dispute constituted an independent residential unit or was merely an appurtenance to another house (House No. 21/508), and whether the High Court properly exercised its constitutional jurisdiction in reviewing the Settlement authorities' findings. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly determined, based on municipal taxation records and the appellant's own admissions, that the properties were distinct and separate. The Court affirmed that the Settlement authorities' decision, which ignored clear documentary evidence of the properties' independence, was an arbitrary and illegal exercise of power. The key principle laid down is that the contiguity of properties does not negate their status as independent premises in fact and law, and the High Court possesses the constitutional jurisdiction to review and correct Settlement authority findings that are based on erroneous deductions from established facts.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to review findings of Settlement authorities that are based on erroneous deductions from facts?
  • Does the contiguity of two properties necessarily imply that they constitute a single house for the purpose of transfer by Settlement authorities?
  • Is a property that is separately numbered and assessed in municipal taxation records considered an independent residential unit?
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• Lal Baz (Represented by Heirs) vs Sherdil and Other1974 PLD Supreme Court 71 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-09
  redemption of mortgagesubrogationadverse possessionlimitationrevenue recordsmortgagee rightsinheritance mutation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a suit for the redemption of mortgaged agricultural land. The core legal questions were whether the appellants, who obtained possession through a compromise redemption decree, acquired the status of subrogated mortgagees or held the land adversely, and whether the respondents' suit for redemption was barred by limitation. The Supreme Court held that the appellants, being strangers to the property, did not fall within the categories of persons entitled to subrogation under the Transfer of Property Act 1882. Consequently, they could not claim the rights of a subrogated mortgagee. Furthermore, the Court rejected the claim of adverse possession, finding that the appellants' possession was not overt, open, or hostile against the true owners, who were never notified of the revenue record corrections. The Court affirmed that the suit was essentially for the redemption of a mortgage and was filed well within the 60-year limitation period. The key principle laid down is that a person who is not a party under Section 91 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 cannot claim subrogation, and possession obtained by a stranger through a surreptitious revenue correction does not constitute adverse possession against the true owners.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person who is not a party under Section 91 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 acquire the right of subrogation upon redeeming a mortgage?
  • Can possession obtained by a stranger through surreptitious revenue record corrections be considered adverse possession against the true owners?
  • Is a suit for redemption of a mortgage governed by the 60-year limitation period under Article 148 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Does the purchase of mortgagee rights by a stranger to the property constitute subrogation?
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• L. H. Shaikh vs General Manager, Karachi Telecommunication Region1974 SCMR 82 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-07
  writ jurisdictionseniority listofficiating appointmentreversionterms and conditions of servicereduction in rankpublic servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a writ petition challenging the reversion of an Engineering Supervisor to his substantive rank by the Telecommunication Department. The petitioner contended that the reversion was based on an invalid seniority list prepared in contravention of recruitment rules. The Supreme Court addressed whether a writ petition is maintainable to challenge a seniority list or the reversion of an officiating public servant under the Constitution of 1962. The Court held that the writ petition was not maintainable because seniority is not a term or condition of service guaranteed by Article 178(3) of the Constitution of 1962, and thus cannot be enforced through writ jurisdiction under Article 98. Furthermore, on the merits, the Court affirmed that a public servant holds no lien on an officiating post, and reversion therefrom to a substantive position does not constitute a reduction in rank. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, establishing that non-guaranteed service conditions cannot be enforced via constitutional writ jurisdiction, and officiating appointments confer no vested right against reversion.

  Questions settled

  • Can a public servant invoke writ jurisdiction to challenge a seniority list under the Constitution of 1962?
  • Does an officiating public servant acquire a lien on a post that prevents reversion to a substantive position?
  • Are all terms and conditions of service enforceable through a writ petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962?
  • Does the reversion of an official from an officiating post to a substantive rank constitute a reduction in rank?
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• Kohi-Noor Textile Mills Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore1974 PLD Supreme Court 284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-05-12
  business profits taxincome-tax actlimitation periodprocedural amendmentretrospective operationassessmentfinance act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a decision of the High Court of West Pakistan concerning the assessment of business profits tax under the Business Profits Tax Act. The core legal question was whether the statutory amendments introduced by the Finance Act of 1957—which repealed section 14 of the Business Profits Tax Act and incorporated section 34 of the Income-tax Act—applied retroactively to pending proceedings, thereby barring an assessment made beyond the prescribed period of limitation, or whether such applicability was contingent upon executive modifications by the Central Board of Revenue. The Supreme Court held that the statutory amendment operated of its own force without requiring prior executive modifications and was procedural in nature, thereby applying retrospectively to pending proceedings. Consequently, the Court ruled that the assessment completed after the expiration of the limitation period stipulated under section 34 of the Income-tax Act was illegal and barred by time. The key principle laid down is that amendments to machinery or procedural provisions relating to tax assessment operate retrospectively on pending proceedings and do not require executive notifications to become operative.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of section 34 of the Income-tax Act became applicable to the Business Profits Tax Act immediately upon the enactment of the Finance Act of 1957 without waiting for modifications by the Central Board of Revenue?
  • Do statutory amendments relating to limitation and assessment machinery apply retrospectively to pending proceedings?
  • Does an assessee acquire a vested right in procedural provisions regarding the limitation for tax assessment?
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• Khudadad and 2 Others vs The State1974 SCMR 485 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-01-31
  murderdeath sentencetransportation for lifegrave and sudden provocationfamily honourcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon conversion of a petition into an appeal, limited to the question of the propriety of the death sentences imposed upon the appellants for the murder of the deceased, whose conviction was earlier upheld. The core legal question concerns the appropriate quantum of sentence in murder cases arising from motives of vindicating family honour involving an illicit liaison with a female relative. The Court held that where a crime is committed by agricultural tribes to vindicate family honour regarding females, and the circumstances approach those of grave and sudden provocation though not formally falling within the exception, the death penalty is not the proper penalty. The key principle laid down is that in such cases of family honour involving females, the ends of justice are adequately met by awarding the lesser punishment of transportation for life rather than capital punishment.

  Questions settled

  • Is death the proper penalty for a murder committed to vindicate family honour involving an illicit liaison with a female relative?
  • Does the principle regarding mitigation of sentence for crimes of family honour apply when the convict did not find the parties in a compromising position on the spot?
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• Khuda Bukhsh vs Muhammad Sharif and Another1974 SCMR 279 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-11
  evacuee propertypower of reviewdelegation of powerretrospective validationconcurrent findingssettlement authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the transfer of a double-storied evacuee property divided into a shop and a residential portion. The Settlement Commissioner had declared the property divisible, transferring the shop to the petitioner and the residential portion to the respondent. Although a delegate of the Chief Settlement Commissioner subsequently reviewed this decision and transferred the entire building to the petitioner, the Supreme Court had previously held that review order to be invalid because the power of review was abolished by Ordinance II of 1962 with effect from January 13, 1962, and no review proceedings were pending on that date. The petitioner argued that the Settlement Commissioners (Validation of Orders) Act 1972 retrospectively validated the delegate's review order. The Supreme Court held that the Act of 1972 only validates review orders where the delegation of review power was deficient, but does not revive or validate orders that neither the Chief Settlement Commissioner nor his delegates had the jurisdiction to make after the statutory abolition of the review power itself. Consequently, the concurrent findings of fact regarding prior possession and divisibility were upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Settlement Commissioners (Validation of Orders) Act 1972 validate review orders passed after the statutory abolition of the review power where no review proceedings were pending at the time of such abolition?
  • Can a legislative validation of delegated powers retrospectively confer jurisdiction that the delegating authority itself did not possess at the time the order was made?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by settlement authorities regarding prior possession and divisibility of evacuee property can be disturbed by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction?
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• Khuda Bakhsh vs Fateh Khan and Another1974 SCMR 66 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-26
  evacuee propertysettlement authoritiestransfer of propertywrit jurisdictionconcurrent findings of factpossessionallotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the transfer of an evacuee property (house No. 43, village Padhrar) to respondent No. 1. The petitioner alleged prior possession since 1947, interrupted by police occupation, and claimed illegal dispossession by the respondent. The core legal question was whether the Settlement authorities erred in fact-finding regarding the respondent's possession of the property as of January 1, 1961, which was the qualifying date for transfer under Settlement Scheme No. 7. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement authorities' findings were supported by evidence, including official records from the Patwari and the register of Scheme No. 7, which confirmed the respondent's occupation and purchase of rights from the original allottee. The Court affirmed that the High Court correctly declined to interfere with these concurrent findings of fact. The principle laid down is that where Settlement authorities have based their conclusions on a proper examination of official records and evidence, such findings of fact are not subject to reappraisal in writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with findings of fact made by Settlement authorities when those findings are supported by official records?
  • Does the occupation of an evacuee property on January 1, 1961, constitute a valid basis for transfer under Settlement Scheme No. 7?
  • Is a purchase of rights from an original allottee sufficient to establish a claim to evacuee property?
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• Khizar Hayat vs The State1974 SCMR 295 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-06
  murder convictionsentence enhancementappellate jurisdictionself-induced intoxicationspecial leave to appealcriminal liabilityInterim Constitutiondeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court judgment that enhanced a sentence of life imprisonment to death for a murder conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether an appeal lies as of right to the Supreme Court under the Interim Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan when the High Court enhances a sentence on revision. Additionally, the Court addressed whether self-induced intoxication constitutes a mitigating factor for sentencing. The Supreme Court held that, based on established precedent, such an appeal is not maintainable as of right under the Interim Constitution. Consequently, the Court treated the memorandum of appeal as a petition for special leave to appeal. On the merits, the Court upheld the death sentence, ruling that self-induced intoxication does not exculpate an offender under Section 85 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The key principle established is that voluntary intoxication does not mitigate criminal liability or sentencing where the offender demonstrates awareness of their actions, and that appellate jurisdiction as of right is strictly construed based on the specific constitutional provisions in force.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal lie as of right to the Supreme Court under the Interim Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan when the High Court enhances a sentence on revision?
  • Does self-induced intoxication constitute a valid mitigating factor for sentencing under Section 85 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a memorandum of appeal be treated as a petition for special leave to appeal when the appeal is not maintainable as of right?
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• Khan Muhammad vs Muhammad Abdullah Etc.S1974 SCMR 228 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-09
  superdaricase propertycustody of propertycriminal procedurecancellation of FIRproduction of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the custody of a tractor, which was the subject of a theft case. The petitioner challenged the respondent's continued possession of the tractor as a superdar, alleging that the respondent failed to produce the vehicle in court, thereby obstructing the recording of prosecution evidence. The respondent argued that because the police had recommended the cancellation of the initial FIR, the superdari order was no longer operative. The Supreme Court held that the mere recommendation by the police for the cancellation of a case does not automatically terminate a superdari order. The Court affirmed that a person entrusted with case property as a superdar remains under a legal obligation to produce that property in court as and when required, until a formal order regarding the final disposal of the property is passed by the competent court under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition while emphasizing the respondent's continuing obligation to produce the tractor.

  Questions settled

  • Does a police recommendation for the cancellation of an FIR automatically terminate a superdari order regarding case property?
  • Is a superdar under a continuing obligation to produce case property in court until a final order is passed under Section 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Khan Faizullah Khan vs Government of Pakistan through the Establishment Secretary, Cabinet ,Secretariat and Another1974 PLD Supreme Court 291 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-07-04
  listed postspay fixationProvincial Civil ServiceCivil Service of Pakistanretrospective application of rulesArticle 212 abatementservice tribunals jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a member of the Provincial Civil Service (Judicial Branch) of the North-West Frontier Province, challenged the fixation of his pay during periods he officiated in listed judicial posts (such as District and Sessions Judge) prior to his confirmation and ultimate elevation to the High Court. He contended that his emoluments should be governed by the 1924 Resolution of the Secretary of State for India in Council, granting him the old Indian Civil Service pay scale, and that neither the Central Government nor the Governor-General had jurisdiction to alter his terms of service retroactively to his prejudice. A preliminary objection was raised regarding the abatement of the appeal under Article 212 of the Constitution of 1973; however, the Supreme Court held the appeal did not abate because the Service Tribunal lacked jurisdiction over disputes arising prior to July 1, 1969. On the merits, the Court held that judicial listed posts were borne on the cadre of the All-Pakistan Service (formerly ICS/CSP), remaining under the rule-making power of the Central Government/Governor-General rather than the Provincial Governor. The Court affirmed that civil service rules cannot be applied retrospectively to reduce accrued salary rights. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed except for the period from August 27, 1952, to July 22, 1953, during which the appellant was declared entitled to pay under the 1924 Resolution prior to the enforcement of the 1953 Rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal pending before the Supreme Court abates under Article 212 of the 1973 Constitution if the underlying service dispute arose prior to the statutory cut-off date governing the Service Tribunal's jurisdiction?
  • Whether listed judicial posts held by members of the Provincial Civil Service fall under the rule-making authority of the Federal Government or the Provincial Governor?
  • Can administrative service rules or notifications be applied retrospectively to alter or diminish emoluments that have already accrued to a civil servant?
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• Khair Din vs Inayat and Another1974 SCMR 140 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-10-03
  cross-casesstay of proceedingscriminal trialspecial leave to appealcondonation of delayprocedural law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court order regarding the management of cross-cases arising from a single violent incident. The petitioner sought to challenge the High Court's direction that the trial of a case registered under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (murder) should proceed and conclude before the trial of a cross-case registered under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (attempted murder) could continue. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly interpreted and applied established Supreme Court precedent regarding the stay of proceedings in cross-cases. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had correctly interpreted the relevant precedent and that there was no justification to interfere with the order directing the Section 307 case to remain pending until the conclusion of the Section 302 case. The petition was dismissed on merits, although the delay in filing was condoned due to the petitioner's incarceration and the resulting ignorance of his family members.

  Questions settled

  • Should the trial of a cross-case be stayed until the conclusion of the primary case involving more serious charges?
  • Can the Supreme Court condone a delay in filing a petition for special leave to appeal if the delay is caused by the petitioner's incarceration?
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• Karam Elahi and Another vs Ch. Ali Ahmad and 5 Other1974 SCMR 43 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-28
  displaced personsland allotmentexcess allotmentlocus standisettlement commissionerspecial leave to appealFard-i-Haqiat
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a dispute concerning the cancellation of excess land allotted to displaced persons. The petitioners were initially allotted land in village Nagaur, which was later found to exceed their verified entitlement due to a misclassification of the assessment circle. The Assistant Settlement Commissioner cancelled the excess area, a decision initially reversed on appeal but subsequently restored in revision by the Settlement Commissioner. The petitioners challenged the revision order, arguing that the respondents lacked locus standi as mere informers, that the Assistant Settlement Commissioner lacked competence to cancel the allotment, and that they should retain the land as no fraud was committed. The Supreme Court held that the cancellation was based on a factual inquiry by the Officer on Special Duty, Central Record Room, and was not an exercise of independent power by the Assistant Settlement Commissioner. The Court affirmed the cancellation, noting that the petitioners held land in excess of their entitlement, and clarified that the discretion to allow retention of excess land lies solely with the Chief Settlement Commissioner.

  Questions settled

  • Does an informer have locus standi to file a revision petition against an allotment order before the Settlement Commissioner?
  • Can an Assistant Settlement Commissioner cancel an allotment made by a superior officer if acting pursuant to a directive from a higher authority?
  • Is the retention of excess land allotted to displaced persons a matter of right or a matter of discretion for the Chief Settlement Commissioner?
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• K. F. Shaifta vs Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore1974 SCMR 465 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  evacuee propertyrevisional jurisdictionSettlement Commissionerstatutory interpretationdelegation of powersDisplaced Persons Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court concerning the transfer of an evacuee house. The core legal question was whether an officer invested with the powers of a Settlement Commissioner by the Central Government under Section 9 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, could be deemed a Settlement Commissioner for all purposes, including the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Act. The Supreme Court held that once the Central Government invested an officer with the powers of a Settlement Commissioner under Section 9(1), that officer must be deemed to have been appointed as a Settlement Commissioner for all purposes under the Act. Consequently, such an officer is competent to exercise revisional powers if specially empowered by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, noting that the Act prescribes no special mode of appointment, and departmental practice supports this interpretation. The petition was dismissed as the officer was duly empowered to hear the revision petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does an officer invested with the powers of a Settlement Commissioner under Section 9 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 qualify as a Settlement Commissioner for all purposes under the Act?
  • Can an officer invested with the powers of a Settlement Commissioner exercise revisional jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Is a specific mode of appointment required for a Settlement Commissioner under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
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• Jhangrez Musa Khan (Represented by Haris) vs Faizullah Khan and Other Faizullah Khan and Other1974 SCMR 45 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-20Read full judgment →
• Jalal Din vs The State1974 SCMR 214 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-09
  criminal liabilityplea of insanityschizophreniaburden of proofpremeditationmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from the conviction of the petitioner Jalal Din under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of one Yusuf, alongside convictions under sections 307, 326, and 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerns whether the lower courts were justified in rejecting the accused's plea of insanity based on his medical history as a chronic patient of schizophrenia. The Supreme Court held that under section 84 of the Pakistan Penal Code, the crucial point of time for establishing unsoundness of mind is when the offence is committed, and the burden of proof rests on the accused, which the petitioner failed to discharge. The Court reasoned that the petitioner targeted specific individuals he considered enemies, indicating premeditation rather than a crime committed during a sudden fit of insanity. The petition was accordingly dismissed, with an observation that the State should provide medical treatment for schizophrenia during imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • At what point in time must unsoundness of mind be established under section 84 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Upon whom lies the burden of proving that an accused is entitled to the exemption of insanity?
  • Does targeting specific perceived enemies during an attack negate a plea of insanity based on schizophrenia?
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• Ismail and Another vs The State1974 SCMR 175 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-02
  special leave to appealtest identification paradeeyewitness identificationmurderappreciation of evidenceunlawful assembly
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning charges of murder and assault. The petitioners were initially tried along with others for murder and rioting. The trial court convicted the accused under sections 302/149, 148, and 323/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. On appeal, the High Court acquitted some co-accused, set aside the conviction under section 149, and held the petitioners individually liable for their specific acts, convicting them under sections 302, 326, and 323 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal questions involved the admissibility and reliability of an eyewitness's testimony regarding identification and whether a test identification parade was legally necessary when a witness recognized the assailants by face rather than by name. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a test identification parade is unnecessary where a witness is already familiar with the accused by face at the time of the incident, and declined to interfere with the High Court's concurrent appreciation of evidence. The key principle laid down is that test identification parades are required only when an accused is seen for the first time during the incident, not when the witness recognizes the accused's face but merely learns their name later.

  Questions settled

  • Is a test identification parade necessary when an eyewitness recognizes the accused by face at the time of the incident but learns their name only later?
  • Whether the evidence of an eyewitness can be discarded solely because the witness did not know the names of the accused persons at the time of the occurrence?
  • When does an accused person require a test identification parade during a criminal trial?
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• Islamic Republic of.Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Communications, Government of Pakistan vs The Settlement Commissioner, Peshawar and Another1974 SCMR 393 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-14
  condonation of delaylimitationtime-barred petitioncertificate of fitnessignorance of lawinterim constitution
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which was submitted with a delay of 108 days. The petitioner sought condonation of this delay, arguing that the time spent pursuing an application for a certificate of fitness before the Peshawar High Court—which was ultimately dismissed—should be excluded. The core legal question was whether the time wasted in pursuing a legally misconceived and incompetent application for a certificate of fitness before the High Court constitutes sufficient ground for condonation of delay under the law. The Supreme Court held that the application for a certificate was entirely misconceived, as the High Court lacked the authority to grant such a certificate under the Interim Constitution except for substantial questions regarding constitutional interpretation. The Court ruled that ignorance of the law does not excuse a party from the consequences of delay, particularly when it infringes upon the valuable rights accrued to the opposing party through the lapse of time. Consequently, the request for condonation was rejected, and the petition was dismissed as time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Does the time spent pursuing a legally misconceived application for a certificate of fitness constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay?
  • Can ignorance of the law be accepted as a valid ground to condone delay and defeat a valuable right accrued to the opposing party?
  • Under what circumstances can a High Court grant a certificate of fitness for appeal under the Interim Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan?
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• Iqbalur Rahman and Muhammad Yaqub vs The State Iltafur Rahman1974 PLD Supreme Court 83 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-29
  bail cancellationmurder caseplea of alibipre-trial bailcriminal proceduredying statementprosecution evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for special leave to appeal arising from a criminal case involving charges of murder. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in granting bail to one accused, Iltafur Rehman, based on a plea of alibi, while refusing it to another, Iqbalur Rehman. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition of Iqbalur Rehman, upholding the refusal of bail given the prima facie evidence in the F.I.R. and dying statement. Regarding Iltafur Rehman, the Court cancelled his bail, holding that the High Court erred by conducting a final adjudication on the alibi evidence at the bail stage. The Supreme Court established the principle that during bail proceedings, courts must not undertake an elaborate sifting of evidence or pre-empt the trial court’s functions. Where there are reasonable grounds to believe an accused is guilty of an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment, and prosecution evidence exists, bail should not be granted based on disputed alibi claims that require detailed examination at trial.

  Questions settled

  • Should a court conduct a final adjudication on a plea of alibi during bail proceedings?
  • Does the opinion of an Investigating Officer regarding an accused's innocence justify the grant of bail?
  • Is it permissible for a court to perform an elaborate sifting of evidence at the bail stage?
  • Can bail be granted when there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is guilty of an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment?
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• Inspector-General of Police, West Pakistan Lahore and Other vs Ghulam Muhammad, Sub Inspector1974 PLD Supreme Court 252 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-05-13
  compulsory retirementsuperannuationconstitutional amendmentautomatic retirementgovernment servicestatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondent, a police officer, was compulsorily retired after twenty-five years of service under the West Pakistan Government Servants (Further Usefulness in Public Service) Rules, 1963. The High Court set aside this retirement, relying on precedent declaring those rules ultra vires. During the pendency of the appeal, the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1966, was enacted, amending Article 178 of the Constitution of 1962 to regulate superannuation. The core legal question concerned the interpretation of Article 178(4)(b) regarding whether a government servant attaining the age of fifty-five within six months of the amendment's commencement retires automatically without a specific order. The Supreme Court held that under Article 178(4)(b), if no direction is issued by the competent authority, a government servant who reaches the age of fifty-five within the specified six-month period automatically retires upon the expiry of that period, or upon reaching the age of sixty, whichever occurs first. The Court clarified that no separate order is necessary for such automatic retirement, establishing that the constitutional provision operates independently of administrative directives in the absence of contrary instructions.

  Questions settled

  • Does Article 178(4)(b) of the Constitution of 1962 require a specific order from a competent authority to effect the retirement of a government servant?
  • When does a government servant automatically retire under the provisions of the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1966?
  • Does the expiry of the six-month period mentioned in Article 178(4)(b) of the Constitution of 1962 trigger automatic retirement for a government servant who has reached the age of fifty-five?
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• Inspector-General of Police and Other vs Ghulam Muhammad1974 PLD Supreme Court 76 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-20
  compulsory retirementterms and conditions of serviceultra viresconstitutional amendmentgovernment servantsuperannuation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenges an order of the High Court of West Pakistan setting aside the compulsory retirement of the respondent Sub-Inspector of Police, which had been ordered under the West Pakistan Government Servants (Further Usefulness in Public Service) Rules, 1963. The core legal question concerned whether the proviso to Rule 4 of the said Rules was ultra vires the 1962 Constitution. Following this Court's earlier precedent in Government of West Pakistan v. Karamatullah Khan, the appellant conceded the correctness of the High Court's decision on this point. However, the appellant sought clarification regarding whether a specific order of retirement was necessary under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution for a government servant reaching the age of 55 years. The Court held that prima facie the language of Clause (b) of sub-Article (4) of Article 178 of the 1962 Constitution, as substituted by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act 1966, does not require a specific order for compulsory retirement upon attaining the age of 55, and directed the matter to be placed before the Full Court for authoritative consideration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the proviso to Rule 4 of the West Pakistan Government Servants (Further Usefulness in Public Service) Rules, 1963, violates the terms and conditions of service guaranteed under the 1962 Constitution?
  • Does Clause (b) of sub-Article (4) of Article 178 of the 1962 Constitution, as substituted by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act 1966, require the making of a specific order for the compulsory retirement of a government servant upon reaching the age of 55 years?
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• Inayatullah vs Muhammad Shaft and 2 Other1974 SCMR 419 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-17
  criminal appealacquittaleye-witness reliabilitybenefit of doubtvicarious liabilitylalkaraappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a High Court judgment acquitting two respondents of murder charges under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the respondents, a father and son, attacked the deceased following a dispute over a debt. The High Court acquitted the accused, finding the testimony of the alleged eye-witnesses unreliable, their presence at the scene doubtful, and noting significant contradictions in their accounts. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the acquittal was based on sound principles of criminal justice. During the appeal, the principal accused died, causing the appeal to abate against him. Regarding the remaining respondent, who was only 15 at the time and accused of merely exhorting his father, the Court upheld the acquittal. It held that the High Court correctly assessed the evidence, noting the lack of independent witnesses, the suspicious absence of blood at the scene, and the implausibility of the prosecution's narrative. The Court affirmed that an acquittal based on a reasonable assessment of evidence and the benefit of doubt should not be interfered with.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appellate court justified in acquitting an accused when the presence of eye-witnesses at the scene of the crime is found to be doubtful?
  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on the basis of a 'lalkara' (exhortation) when the principal accused has died and the evidence against the alleged abettor is inconsistent?
  • Does the absence of blood at the scene of a violent crime in a busy market place undermine the credibility of the prosecution's version of events?
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• Inamul Haq and Another vs The Pakistan Refugees Rehabilitation1974 SCMR 94 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-10
  interim injunctiondiscretionary jurisdictionrefugee rehabilitationutility chargesappellate jurisdictiontemporary injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against an appellate order of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, which set aside an interlocutory injunction granted by the District Judge, Dadu. The petitioners, representing residents of Bholari Camp, had filed a civil suit challenging the legality of decisions taken at a meeting chaired by the Deputy Commissioner, Dadu, regarding enhanced electricity and water charges and the recovery of mounting arrears owed to respondent No. 1, a statutory corporation established for refugee rehabilitation. The core legal question concerned the propriety of granting an interim injunction against the enforcement of rates agreed upon in a representative meeting where arrears had accumulated. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly exercised its appellate discretion in refusing the interlocutory injunction, noting that the residents had defaulted on even the original rates and that the case raised no question of law of general importance. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court is justified in setting aside an interlocutory injunction where arrears of utility charges are mounting and plaintiffs failed to pay even at originally agreed rates?
  • Does a meeting convened by a Deputy Commissioner to address utility arrears of a statutory corporation render decisions ultra vires when representatives of residents participated without immediate objection?
  • Can an interlocutory injunction be granted in a representative suit without satisfying procedural requirements for representative actions?
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• Imam Ud Din and Another vs The Deputy Settlement & Rehabilitation1974 SCMR 499 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-27
  Evacuee propertyShop transferWrit petitionSpecial leave petitionConsequential orderRemand orderSettlement AuthoritiesAuction
  Summary & questions settled

  This case concerns the transfer of an evacuee shop, initially contested between a claimant allottee and an unauthorized occupant. After various decisions by Settlement Authorities, including a remand and subsequent auction to the petitioners, a new order was passed transferring the shop to respondent No. 2. The petitioners filed two writ petitions: one challenging a remand order (pending) and another challenging the subsequent transfer order (dismissed in limine by the High Court). The Supreme Court, on a petition for special leave, upheld the High Court's dismissal of the second writ petition. The Court held that the second writ petition was unnecessary because the impugned transfer order was wholly consequential to the remand order already under challenge in the first, pending writ petition. If the first writ petition succeeds, all subsequent consequential orders would automatically be nullified.

  Questions settled

  • Is it necessary to file a separate writ petition to challenge an order that is wholly consequential to a primary order already under challenge in a pending writ petition?
  • Do consequential orders stand nullified if the primary order from which they stem is set aside?
  • Can a High Court dismiss a writ petition in limine if the impugned order is subject to appeal and revision to higher authorities?
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• Imam Ali Shah vs Claims Commissioner/Settlement Commissioner1974 SCMR 523 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-04
  displaced personregistration of claimsland claimswrit jurisdictionleave to appealclaims commissioner
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging orders relating to the verification and entitlement of a land claim of a displaced person. The core legal question concerns whether the authorities under the Punjab Refugees (Registration of Land Claims) Act, 1949 possessed verification powers for agreed areas, and whether the respondent qualified as a 'displaced person' under the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956. The Supreme Court held that the 1949 Act and its rules did not confer verification powers and that such claims fell under the 1956 Act, while findings of fact regarding identity and the filing of claims could not be disturbed in writ jurisdiction. However, the Court found that the question of whether the respondent fell within the definition of a 'displaced person' under Section 2(1) of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956 required further examination. The key principle laid down is that the claims organization derived its powers from the 1956 Act rather than the 1949 Act, and leave to appeal was granted to examine the interpretation of a 'displaced person' who resided abroad or failed to manage Indian properties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Punjab Refugees (Registration of Land Claims) Act, 1949 provided powers of verification for claims relating to agreed areas?
  • Can a finding of fact regarding the identity of a claimant be challenged in writ jurisdiction?
  • Whether a person who resided in Iraq and did not manage properties in India qualifies as a 'displaced person' under Section 2(1) of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956?
  Read full judgment →
• Ijaz Ahmad vs The State1974 SCMR 166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-03
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationrevisional jurisdictiondying statementcause of deathcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the cancellation of pre-arrest bail by the Lahore High Court in a murder case registered under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner challenged the cancellation on three grounds: his name was absent from the First Information Report; the High Court lacked jurisdiction to cancel bail granted under section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898; and the deceased's death resulted from pneumonia rather than the injuries sustained. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the identity of the accused was sufficiently established by the deceased's dying statement, and that the cause of death is a matter for trial determination, noting the relevance of the second explanation to section 299 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Crucially, the Court affirmed that the High Court possesses inherent revisional jurisdiction under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to cancel bail orders passed by subordinate criminal courts. The petition was dismissed as the arguments lacked merit at the bail stage.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the power to cancel bail granted by a Sessions Judge under section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the identity of an accused established by a dying statement sufficient for the purpose of deciding a bail application?
  • Can the High Court exercise revisional jurisdiction under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to review orders of subordinate criminal courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Ibrar vs State1974 SCMR 271 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-17
  murderdeath sentencecommutation of sentencepresidential amnestyidentification paradeocular evidencetransportation for life
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave was directed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court confirming the conviction and death sentence of the appellant under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased. The incident arose from an altercation at a cinema booking office, following which the appellant chased the deceased and shot him fatally with a pistol. On appeal, the Supreme Court evaluated the reliability of ocular testimony from co-villagers and co-workers, the procedural validity of the identification parade, and the sentence awarded. The Court upheld the conviction, finding the eye-witness evidence credible and the identification parade valid, while noting that the killing was deliberate. However, regarding the sentence, the Court considered the general amnesty granted by the President of Pakistan commuting death sentences to transportation for life, noting that the appellant had been unable to reap its benefit solely due to his pending appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court maintained the conviction but commuted the death sentence to transportation for life.

  Questions settled

  • Whether ocular testimony of eye-witnesses who are co-villagers and co-workers of the deceased can be relied upon in the absence of private enmity?
  • Whether an identification parade can be held valid if the accused did not protest at the time of the parade and was not shown to witnesses prior to it?
  • Whether a pending appeal in the Supreme Court deprives a convict of the benefit of a general presidential commutation of death sentences to transportation for life?
  Read full judgment →
• Hassan Bakiish and Others vs Syed Afzal Shah and Other1974 SCMR 364 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-10-02
  court-fee deficiencypre-emption suitappellate jurisdictiondiscretionary powerdue diligencedismissal of appealvaluation of suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of an appeal by the Additional District Judge due to insufficient court-fee payment in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether the appellate court was justified in refusing to extend time for making up a deficiency in court-fee under the Court Fees Act, 1870, after the appellants had failed to rectify the shortfall despite multiple opportunities and clear knowledge of the correct valuation established by the trial court. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal was proper, noting that the appellants failed to exercise due diligence in ascertaining the correct court-fee payable, despite having access to the trial court record. The Court affirmed that while discretionary powers exist to allow the making up of deficiencies, such discretion is not absolute and should not be exercised to deprive the opposing party of a valuable right accrued through the appellants' negligence. The principle laid down is that a party seeking the court's indulgence to rectify a court-fee deficiency must demonstrate bona fide conduct and due diligence, especially when the correct valuation is readily ascertainable from the record.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court refuse to extend time for making up a deficiency in court-fee if the appellant has failed to show due diligence?
  • Does the court have an absolute obligation to grant time to make up a deficiency in court-fee under the Court Fees Act 1870?
  • Is a party entitled to an extension of time to pay court-fees if the correct valuation was readily available in the trial court record?
  Read full judgment →
• Hassan Akhtar vs Ghulam Hussain and Another1974 SCMR 5 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-26
  Horse Breeding TenancyBoard of RevenueRevision PetitionMartial Law RegulationColonization of Government LandsLand Revenue ActFinality of Order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over a Horse Breeding Tenancy in the District of Sahiwal. The petitioner and respondent No. 1 were rival applicants for the tenancy, which was initially granted to the petitioner by the Collector. Following an appeal by the respondent, the Commissioner upheld the Collector's decision, but the Board of Revenue subsequently accepted a revision petition filed by the respondent, cancelling the petitioner's grant and awarding the tenancy to the respondent. The petitioner challenged this in the Lahore High Court, arguing that Martial Law Regulation No. 115 had resumed such lands, rendering the grant invalid. The High Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the respondent's rights had matured prior to the regulation. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the Board of Revenue lacked jurisdiction to entertain a revision due to the finality of the Commissioner's decision under the Statement of Conditions, and that the revision was barred by the Land Revenue Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the High Court correctly rejected the arguments regarding the applicability of Martial Law Regulation No. 115 and the jurisdictional challenges.

  Questions settled

  • Does Condition No. 27 of the Statement of Conditions regarding Horse Breeding Tenancies preclude the Board of Revenue from exercising revisional jurisdiction under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act 1967?
  • Does the finality of an arbitrator's decision under the Statement of Conditions bar a revision petition before the Board of Revenue?
  • Does the promulgation of Martial Law Regulation No. 115 automatically invalidate a tenancy grant that had already matured in favor of a party prior to the regulation's enactment?
  Read full judgment →
• Hamid Khan vs Musa Khan and Another1974 SCMR 335 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-11
  power of attorneyrevocationsale-deed cancellationregistrationfictitious transactionconsideration
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court reversing lower appellate and trial court decisions and decreeing the cancellation of a sale-deed in its entirety. The respondent had executed powers of attorney in favour of another respondent to sell a portion of land, but subsequently cancelled them via a registered affidavit and public notices before the sale-deed was presented for registration. The core legal questions involved whether an affidavit was sufficient to revoke a registered power of attorney and whether revocation after execution but before presentation for registration invalidated the deed. The Supreme Court held that the transaction of sale was fictitious, collusive, and without consideration, and accordingly dismissed the appeal with costs, affirming the cancellation of the sale-deed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an affidavit is sufficient to revoke a registered power of attorney?
  • Whether the revocation of a power of attorney after the execution of a deed of sale but before the presentation thereof for registration is sufficient to invalidate the deed in toto?
  Read full judgment →
• Hamid Husain vs Government of West Pakistan and Other1974 SCMR 356 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-01-23
  civil court jurisdictionspecial tribunalDisplaced Persons (Land Settlement) Actagricultural landsikni landallotment validityrehabilitation scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the limits of civil court jurisdiction to determine the validity of land transfers under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. The appellant, having been allotted land for agricultural purposes, sought possession of specific survey numbers which were occupied by school buildings. The lower courts concurrently found that the disputed area was 'sikni' (residential) land, not agricultural land, and thus not available for transfer under the Rehabilitation Scheme. The core legal question was whether civil courts possess jurisdiction to scrutinize the validity of an allotment made by Settlement Authorities, despite statutory bars on jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the disputed land was not 'land' as defined by the Act, as it was not used for purposes subservient to agriculture. Consequently, the allotment was void. The Court affirmed that civil courts of plenary jurisdiction retain the authority to examine whether special tribunals acted within their legal jurisdiction, particularly regarding the existence of facts upon which their authority depends. The appeal was dismissed, confirming that Settlement Authorities cannot confer jurisdiction upon themselves by mischaracterizing property.

  Questions settled

  • Do civil courts have jurisdiction to determine the validity of a transfer of land made by Settlement Authorities under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
  • Can a special tribunal assume jurisdiction by making a binding determination on facts that are outside its statutory scope?
  • Does the definition of 'land' under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 include residential property not used for purposes subservient to agriculture?
  • Are civil courts empowered to scrutinize the acts of special tribunals to determine if they are in accordance with law?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Ali Bux Khan and 3 Others vs The Chief Land Commissioner, West Pakistan, Lahore and 2 Other1974 SC M R98 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  constitutional jurisdictionbar of jurisdictionmartial law regulationland commissionzamindari rightscivil court decreenatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the former High Court of West Pakistan dismissing a writ petition filed by the appellants. The appellants claimed to be the absolute Zamindari owners of disputed agricultural land whose rights were recognized by civil court decrees against the heirs of a former Jagirdar prior to the surrender of the land to the Land Commission by the said heirs. The core legal questions involved whether the constitutional bar of jurisdiction under paragraph 27 of Martial Law Regulation No. 64 applied only to orders made in strict compliance with the Regulation after the promulgation of the Constitution, and whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction under Article 98 to declare orders of the Land Commission passed without lawful authority as void. The Supreme Court held that the jurisdictional ouster under paragraph 27 is limited to orders made in substance and form in compliance with the Regulation, and that the High Court maintains jurisdiction under Article 98 to review orders not made in accordance therewith. The key principle laid down is that orders of executive authorities failing to comply with statutory regulations or violating natural justice are open to judicial review under constitutional jurisdiction notwithstanding general ouster clauses.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the bar of jurisdiction under paragraph 27 of Martial Law Regulation No. 64 is limited to orders made in substance and form in compliance with the Regulation?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution to declare an order of the Land Commission made without lawful authority to be of no effect?
  • Is a civil court decree establishing Zamindari rights binding upon the Land Commission when evaluating surrendered land?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Abdul Razzak vs Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and Another1974 PLD Supreme Court 5 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-15
  customs confiscationcontraband goodsjudicial discretionnatural justicestatutory interpretationliability of ownerwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court order dismissing a writ petition against the confiscation of a vehicle by Customs authorities. The vehicle was seized while transporting contraband goods, and the owner, who had reported the vehicle stolen, sought its release. The core legal question was whether the phrase "liable to confiscation" under Section 168 of the Sea Customs Act mandates automatic confiscation of a vehicle used to transport contraband, regardless of the owner's knowledge or complicity. The Supreme Court held that the provision does not imply automatic confiscation but vests authorities with judicial discretion. This discretion must be exercised in accordance with principles of natural justice, requiring that the owner be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. The Court established the principle that no person should be deprived of their property by way of penalty unless they are, in some measure, responsible for assisting or furthering the commission of the offence. As the authorities failed to prove the owner's involvement or knowledge, the confiscation was deemed unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the phrase "liable to confiscation" under Section 168 of the Sea Customs Act mandate the automatic forfeiture of a vehicle used to transport contraband?
  • Is proof of an owner's knowledge or complicity required before a vehicle can be confiscated under the Sea Customs Act?
  • Must Customs authorities exercise judicial discretion when determining whether to confiscate a vehicle used for smuggling?
  Read full judgment →
• Habib Ahmad Khan (Represented by His Legal Heirs) vs The Settlement1974 SCMR 90 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-09
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertyreview jurisdictionsingle unitdisplaced personsspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from protracted litigation concerning the disposal and transfer of evacuee residential premises in Rawalpindi Cantonment under settlement laws. The petitioners' predecessor-in-interest challenged the division of the property into separate units by settlement authorities and the subsequent dismissal of their writ petition by the Lahore High Court. The core legal questions involved whether a review order passed by a Settlement Commissioner was without jurisdiction due to a pending revision petition under Section 21 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and whether independent premises separated by a public road could be treated as a single unit. The Supreme Court held that the review proceedings were validly participated in and that the settlement authorities rightly treated the physically separated blocks as distinct units, as the Settlement Commissioner had no power to combine entirely independent residential premises into one unit. The petition for special leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order against which a revision petition has been preferred can be reviewed under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Can independent residential premises separated by a public road be combined into a single unit for transfer to one applicant?
  • Does participation in review proceedings without objection preclude a party from later challenging the jurisdiction to review?
  Read full judgment →
• H. Niamatullah Khan vs Mst. Shabnama and Other1974 SCMR 425 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-14
  pre-emptionco-sharerunregistered sale deedlimitationresiduary articleshariat actlimited owner
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit filed by the respondent, Mst. Shabnama, against the petitioner-vendee. The respondent claimed ownership of a share in the suit house and, in the alternative, sought pre-emption of the entire house based on her status as a co-sharer. Although her claim based on an unregistered dower deed was rejected, the appellate court and the High Court decreed her pre-emption claim, finding that her late husband was a co-sharer whose share devolved upon her under Muslim law, and that her suit was within time. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed that upon the enforcement of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, the respondent's limited estate converted into full ownership. On the question of limitation, the Court held that since the sale deeds were unregistered, no mutation was sanctioned, and physical possession was not proved to have been taken under the sale, neither Article 10 of the Limitation Act 1908 nor Section 31 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act applied. Consequently, the residuary Article 120 of the Limitation Act 1908, prescribing a six-year limitation period, governed the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Which limitation provision applies to a pre-emption suit where the sale deeds are unregistered, no mutation is sanctioned, and physical possession is not proven to have been taken by the vendee?
  • Does a Muslim widow's limited estate convert into full ownership upon the commencement of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1962?
  • Can a pre-emptor establish their status as a co-sharer through inheritance under Muslim law even if their claim based on an unregistered dower deed is rejected?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulzar Khan vs Mst. Shahzad Bibi and Another1974 PLD Supreme Court 204 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-10
  pre-emptiongift in lieu of dowerconstruction of documentquestion of lawsecond appealnature of transaction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit concerning agricultural land transferred by a husband to his wife in lieu of prompt dower. The core legal question was whether such a transaction constitutes a sale subject to the right of pre-emption or a gift exempt from it, and whether the High Court could interfere with findings regarding the nature of the transaction in second appeal. The Supreme Court held that a transfer of property in lieu of dower is essentially a gift and not a sale, and therefore, not subject to the right of pre-emption. Furthermore, the Court clarified that while inferences from evidence are findings of fact, the proper construction of a legal document is a question of law. Consequently, the High Court was competent to interpret the deed and determine the nature of the transaction. The petition was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision that the transaction was not pre-emptible.

  Questions settled

  • Is a transfer of property by a husband to his wife in lieu of dower considered a sale subject to pre-emption?
  • Is the construction of a legal document a question of law or a question of fact?
  • Can a High Court interfere with a lower court's finding regarding the nature of a transaction if it involves the construction of a document?
  Read full judgment →
• Govern~41974 SCMR 237 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-03
  import and export tradeWest Pakistan Finance Actfiscal statutestrict interpretationtax liabilitymachinery import
  Summary & questions settled

  These three appeals by the Province of Sind addressed the core legal question of whether respondents who imported machinery, plants, and raw materials for their own use or the manufacture of finished goods qualified as "persons engaged in the import and export trade" under the West Pakistan Finance Acts of 1962 and 1963. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the respondents were not persons engaged in such trade because the statutes levied tax on persons whose main and regular business was imports and exports, rather than on the imported goods themselves. The Court laid down the key principles that incidental imports for personal use or manufacturing do not constitute engaging in import trade, and that fiscal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the citizen where multiple interpretations exist.

  Questions settled

  • Whether persons who import machinery, plants, or raw materials for their own use or manufacturing are "persons engaged in the import and export trade" under the West Pakistan Finance Acts, 1962 and 1963?
  • Does the tax under the West Pakistan Finance Acts, 1962 and 1963, apply to the imported goods or to the person engaged in the trade?
  • How should fiscal statutes be construed by the courts when more than one interpretation is open?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Punjab and Another and C. A. No. 40 Of 1973 LT: Coc.. J. D.1974 PLD Supreme Court 241 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-05-21
  service contractterms and conditions of serviceautonomous corporationsremuneration and allowancesexecutive instructionsstatutory powerco-operative development board
  Summary & questions settled

  These connected civil appeals concern the fixation of terms and conditions of service of Lt. Col. (Rtd.) J. D. Malik as a Member of the Pakistan Co-operative Board, established under section 3 of the West Pakistan Co-operative Development Board Ordinance (XIV of 1962). The core legal question revolves around whether a valid binding contract regarding the officer's remuneration came into existence upon his appointment and whether subsequent executive instructions or general government orders could unilaterally vary its terms. The Supreme Court held that a valid and binding contract had indeed come into existence between the Provincial Government and the respondent, determining his remuneration under section 4(3) of the Ordinance, and that neither the Provincial Government nor central executive memoranda could unilaterally alter or override those contractual terms. The key principle laid down is that terms and conditions of service determined through a specific contract freely entered into pursuant to statutory powers cannot be varied by subsequent omnibus executive orders or external memoranda unless permitted by law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a binding contract regarding remuneration comes into existence when an appointment is offered and accepted under statutory powers?
  • Can the Provincial Government unilaterally vary the terms and conditions of service of a board member after they have been determined by a valid contract?
  • Do central executive memoranda and instructions override statutory powers conferred on the appropriate authority by an Ordinance?
  • Are the terms of a written service contract precluded from being varied by extraneous evidence under the Evidence Act 1872?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Pakistan vs A. M. Khan Leghari, C. S. P., Member, Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, Lahore1974 SCM R 535 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  compulsory retirementcivil servicepublic serviceconstitutional amendmentspecial leave to appealretrospective application of lawpublic service commission consultation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal was filed by the Government of Pakistan against a High Court judgment declaring a notice of compulsory retirement issued to the respondent, a member of the Civil Service of Pakistan, as illegal and of no legal effect. The respondent had challenged the notice, arguing that Article 465-A of the Civil Service Regulations was inapplicable to former Indian Civil Service members and had been abrogated by the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958. The High Court ruled that the respondent could only be retired under the Government Servants (Further Usefulness in Public Service) Rules, 1962, which were inapplicable due to the expiry of relevant time periods. The petitioner sought leave to appeal, contending that subsequent constitutional amendments via the Constitution (Third Amendment) Act, 1965, validated the action. The Supreme Court held that even if the change in law were considered, it did not validate the impugned action because the mandatory consultation with the Central Public Service Commission, required under the amended Article 178 of the Constitution, had not occurred. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that the new law did not assist the petitioner's case.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court take into account a change in law that occurs during the pendency of proceedings?
  • Does a retrospective change in constitutional law automatically validate administrative actions taken prior to the amendment?
  • Is consultation with the Central Public Service Commission a mandatory requirement for the compulsory retirement of members of All-Pakistan Services under Article 178 of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Government Jallo Rosin & Turpentine Factory, Lahore vs Commissioner of Sales Tax, Lahore Zone, Lahore1974 SCMR 53 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-07-09
  sales taxrecovery of taxstay of recoveryreference to high courtprovincial government enterpriseconstitutional immunity
  Summary & questions settled

  These three petitions arise from orders of the Lahore High Court refusing to stay the recovery of sales tax assessed on the petitioner, a commercial enterprise of the Provincial Government manufacturing rosin and turpentine, under the Sales Tax Act, 1951. The petitioner challenged the tax assessment on constitutional grounds and filed references before the High Court, subsequently seeking a stay of recovery of the tax demand pending the outcome of the references. The High Court dismissed the stay applications, holding that the Interim Constitution provision invoked had no application and that subsection (7) of section 17 of the Sales Tax Act explicitly mandates that tax shall be payable in accordance with the assessment notwithstanding any reference to the High Court. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the core legal question of whether the recovery of assessed tax should be stayed pending reference disposal. The Court held that the clear and mandatory provisions of subsection (7) of section 17 preclude granting a stay against tax recovery despite any potential financial hardship to the enterprise. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can stay the recovery of sales tax pending a reference under section 17 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951?
  • Does subsection (7) of section 17 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951 mandate the payment of tax in accordance with the assessment notwithstanding a pending reference?
  • Can financial hardship justify the stay of tax recovery contrary to express statutory provisions?
  Read full judgment →
• Girdharilal and Others vs Settlement Commissioner and Other1974 SCMR 474 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-01-31
  evacuee propertypermanent transfer deedfunctus officiosettlement authoritiescustodiancompensation poolspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from a consolidated order of the Sind and Baluchistan High Court, which set aside orders of the Settlement Authorities cancelling Permanent Transfer Deeds (P.T.Ds.) issued in favor of displaced persons. The core legal questions involve whether the Settlement Authorities have the jurisdiction to cancel P.T.Ds. once issued, and whether properties allegedly held as non-evacuee can be addressed by settlement authorities without a proper declaration from the Custodian. The Supreme Court held that once a P.T.D. is issued and the property leaves the compensation pool, the Settlement Authorities become functus officio and lack jurisdiction to cancel the P.T.D. or deal with the property unless specifically authorized by rules. Furthermore, settlement authorities cannot determine the non-evacuee status of a property, which falls exclusively within the domain of the Custodian. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Settlement Authorities have jurisdiction to cancel Permanent Transfer Deeds after they have been issued?
  • Can the Settlement Authorities declare a property to be non-evacuee once it has been treated as evacuee property and brought into the compensation pool?
  • What is the proper forum for seeking a declaration that a property is non-evacuee after it has been managed by the Custodian?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasul and 10 Others vs Ghulam Hussain and 2 Other1974 SCMR 145 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-08
  temporary injunctioncanal authoritiesservice of noticeconcurrent findingsbalance of convenienceirreparable lossleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the concurrent refusal of the lower courts and the High Court to grant a temporary injunction in a civil suit challenging an order of the Canal authorities. The core legal question concerns the propriety of granting a temporary injunction where the Divisional Canal Officer transferred land to a new watercourse and the petitioners alleged lack of statutory notices. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the due service of notices on the petitioners could not be interfered with in leave proceedings, and that the transfer fell within the permissible margin under the Revenue Manual, negating any prima facie case, irreparable loss, or balance of convenience in favor of the petitioners. The petition was consequently dismissed. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact regarding service of notice and the absence of a prima facie case will not be disturbed by the apex court in petitions for leave to appeal against the refusal of interim injunctions.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts regarding the service of notices in a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Does the transfer of an additional area within the permissible margin under the Revenue Manual constitute a prima facie case for granting a temporary injunction?
  • Whether the refusal of lower courts to grant a temporary injunction can be set aside when no irreparable loss is shown.
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool and Others vs Ali Akbar and Other1974 SCMR 64 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-08
  writ jurisdictiondiscretionary powersubstantial justiceland allotmentres judicatasettlement proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the cancellation of their land allotment, which had been granted in lieu of 182 P.I. Units in village Koreki, Tehsil Daska. Following an appeal by respondent No. 1, the allotment was cancelled, and subsequent revisions were dismissed. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petitioners' writ petition, reasoning that the Additional Settlement Commissioner had relied on a prior, final order dated 23rd February 1967, which had already determined the classification of the lands in question. Consequently, the High Court declined to interfere, despite arguments regarding the timeliness of the respondent's appeal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's decision, emphasizing that the High Court possesses discretion under its writ jurisdiction. The Court held that the High Court is not obligated to interfere in proceedings where substantial justice has been achieved, even if those proceedings were initiated irregularly or were subject to valid legal objections. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is the High Court bound to interfere in writ jurisdiction when substantial justice has been done despite procedural irregularities?
  • Can a High Court refuse to interfere in a writ petition where a prior order on the same issue has attained finality?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain vs The State1974 SCMR 209 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-10-03
  criminal appealmurder convictionocular testimonyinjured witnessballistic evidencecorroborationcommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a criminal conviction for murder and causing hurt. The petitioner and three co-accused were tried by the Sessions Judge for the murder of Miran and causing hurt to Allah Ditta. The trial court convicted the petitioner under sections 302/34 and 323/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing him to death. On appeal, the Lahore High Court maintained the conviction under section 302/34 but reduced the sentence to transportation for life, while setting aside the conviction under section 323/34. The petitioner sought leave to appeal, challenging the reliability of related prosecution witnesses and the validity of the recovery of a crime empty. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the ocular testimony of related witnesses, who were not on inimical terms with the petitioner, was credible. The Court emphasized that the testimony of an injured witness carries significant weight and that the forensic evidence matching the crime empty to the petitioner's gun provided sufficient corroboration to sustain the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the testimony of an injured witness carry weight in a criminal trial?
  • Can the conviction of an accused be sustained based on ocular testimony corroborated by forensic evidence?
  • Are the statements of related prosecution witnesses inadmissible without independent corroboration if no enmity exists?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain Shah vs Ghulam Muhammad1974 PLD Supreme Court 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-09-10
  limitationleave to appealexclusion of timecertified copycivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by special leave arose from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Bahawalpur Circuit, which dismissed the appellant's application for a certificate of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on the ground of limitation. The High Court had refused to exclude the time spent by the appellant in obtaining copies of the judgment and decree, relying on local practice and precedent holding that Section 12 of the Limitation Act 1908 does not apply where rules do not mandate filing such copies. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, holding that Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act 1908 explicitly applies to applications for leave to appeal, making the exclusion of time spent obtaining the decree or order a positive statutory direction. The Court clarified that while Section 12(3) does not apply to applications for leave to appeal, Section 12(2) does, and the terms 'judgment' and 'order' are interchangeable in this context.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to an application for leave to appeal?
  • Can the time spent obtaining a copy of the decree or order be excluded under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act 1908 if the High Court rules do not require such copies to be filed?
  • Are the terms 'judgment' and 'order' interchangeable for the purposes of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Does Section 12(3) of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to applications for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain and 3 Others vs Khan Mukarab Khan and 3 Other1974 SCMR 365 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-07-06
  settlement lawindustrial concernagricultural landdisplaced personsremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises out of conflicting orders passed by settlement authorities regarding a piece of land measuring 24 kanals and 10 marlas, which was transferred to the appellants as an industrial concern (tannery) under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, but earlier confirmed in favour of respondents as agricultural land under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act. The appellants challenged the subsequent adverse orders through writ proceedings in the High Court, which dismissed their petition, affirming the character of the land as agricultural. The core legal question was whether the disputed land was agricultural land or an industrial concern at the relevant time for the purposes of proper transfer under the respective settlement statutes. The Supreme Court held that given the conflicting orders passed by two Additional Settlement Commissioners of co-ordinate jurisdiction regarding the same property, the matter must be remanded to the Chief Settlement Commissioner for a fresh decision after hearing both parties on the factual and legal aspects of the land's character.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land used as a tannery prior to partition constitutes agricultural land or an industrial concern under the settlement laws?
  • How should a conflict between two competing transfer orders made by authorities of co-ordinate jurisdiction be resolved under settlement statutes?
  • What is the determinative test for establishing the character of a property under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hassan Khan, B.A., LL.B. vs MR. Justice Mushtaq Hussain,1974 SCMR 595 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-04
  enrolmenttoutlegal practitionersprofessional misconductbar councilcontempt of courtreform of erring person
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition concerning the implementation of a previous judgment of the Supreme Court and the refusal of the Bar Council's Enrolment Committee to enrol the petitioner as an advocate. The core legal question was whether the respondents disregarded or disobeyed the Supreme Court's order by rejecting the petitioner's fresh application for enrolment. The Supreme Court held that the respondents did not disobey the order, as the Court had merely directed that the petitioner's application be considered afresh, which was duly done. The Court laid down the principle that while it is desirable to afford an erring person a chance to reform, the competent committee retains full jurisdiction to evaluate the petitioner's conduct, pending complaints, and professional history to grant or refuse a law license accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court's direction to consider an application for enrolment afresh obligates the Bar Council to grant the licence?
  • Does a person declared a tout continue to be so for all time to come under section 36 of the Legal Practitioners Act 1879?
  • Does the Enrolment Committee act within its jurisdiction by keeping an application for enrolment pending due to pending complaints of professional misconduct?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Ahmad Alias Ghulam Muhammad vs Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Peshawar and Other1974 SCMR 323 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-21
  writ jurisdictionlachessettlement of propertyindustrial concernauction purchaserwaiver of rightstransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenges an order of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed a writ petition regarding the transfer of a water-mill. The petitioner, who had been in occupation of the property since Partition, failed to seek its transfer or allotment, instead accepting the status of a tenant under a previous transferee. When the property was subsequently auctioned, the petitioner failed to participate in the bidding process and allowed the sale to be confirmed in favour of the respondent. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could challenge the transfer of the water-mill after failing to bid at auction and after significant delay. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the water-mill was correctly classified as an industrial concern under the relevant Settlement Scheme. The Court held that the petitioner’s claim was barred by laches due to his failure to pursue his rights diligently and his acquiescence in the transfer process. The judgment reinforces the principle that a party cannot invoke writ jurisdiction to challenge property transfers after failing to participate in established administrative procedures and allowing substantial time to lapse.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner invoke writ jurisdiction to challenge a property transfer after failing to participate in the auction process?
  • Does a significant delay in filing a petition for the transfer of property constitute laches?
  • Is a water-mill considered an industrial concern under the relevant Settlement Schemes?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghaus Muhammad and Others vs Syed Ikramul Hassan and Other1974 SCMR 526 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-05-08
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertystatutory tenantunauthorized occupantallotmentspecial leave petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave arises from an order of the Lahore High Court upholding the transfer of an evacuee shop in favor of the respondents. The core legal question concerns the validity of the transfer of the evacuee property to an allottee who had not secured physical possession, and the locus standi of unauthorized occupants who subsequently acquired possession through successive illegal transfers. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly upheld the transfer in favor of the respondents, noting that the petitioner's predecessor-in-interest had categorically admitted his status as a tenant under the transferee in prior ejectment proceedings and could not subsequently set up a hostile title. Furthermore, neither the petitioners nor their predecessors had built the property at their own expense or applied for its transfer under Scheme No. VI prior to the official transfer. The key principle laid down is that an unauthorized occupant who admits tenancy under the lawful transferee of evacuee property is estopped from subsequently denying that title or challenging the transfer without having pursued independent statutory remedies in time.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an occupant who admits tenancy under a lawful transferee of evacuee property can subsequently set up a hostile title?
  • Does an allottee of an evacuee shop who failed to secure physical possession lose the right to transfer under settlement operations?
  • Whether unauthorized occupants through successive illegal transfers are eligible for the transfer of evacuee property without prior application under Scheme No. VI?
  Read full judgment →
• Four Friends Construction Co. vs Domez Borie, Chashma Barrage, Contractors and Another1974 SCMR 461 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-11-21
  forma pauperistemporary injunctionno-demand certificateprima facie casesub-contractor recoverycivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner-Company filed an application before a Civil Judge seeking permission to sue in forma pauperis for the recovery of money as a sub-contractor, alongside an application under the Code of Civil Procedure for a temporary injunction to restrain the Water and Power Development Authority from finalizing bills payable to respondent No. 1. The trial Court dismissed the temporary injunction application, and a revision petition before the High Court was likewise dismissed. Upon a petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan considered whether a temporary injunction can be granted before permission to sue as a pauper is granted and whether the petitioner established a prima facie case in light of a previously signed no-demand certificate. The Supreme Court held that until permission to sue in forma pauperis is granted, there is no pending suit or plaint to warrant the invocation of temporary injunction provisions under the Code of Civil Procedure, and that a signed no-demand certificate constitutes prima facie evidence defeating the petitioner's claim at this stage. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a temporary injunction be granted under the Code of Civil Procedure before an application to sue in forma pauperis is granted?
  • Does the execution of a no-demand certificate negate a prima facie case for the grant of a temporary injunction in a recovery suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Feroze Khan and Another vs Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and 71974 SCMR 194 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-10
  settlement operationsindustrial concernunauthorized occupationletters patent appealdeemed possessiontransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition against an order of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, which set aside a Single Judge's decision and restored the Settlement Commissioner's order transferring the disputed property to respondents Nos. 2 to 8. The core legal question was whether Notification No. F. 3(3)/60-SI dated 11 August 1960, which deems allottees unable to obtain physical possession as being in possession for the purposes of the statute, applied to industrial concerns or was restricted to houses and shops. The Supreme Court held that the Division Bench rightly concluded the notification applied only to the transfer of houses and shops to allottees in possession, and not to industrial concerns, which the petitioners had admitted the property to be. Furthermore, petitioner Feroze Khan had already been transferred a house, barring him from receiving another. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does Notification No. F. 3(3)/60-SI dated 11 August 1960 apply to industrial concerns under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Can an allottee obtain a transfer of a property as an industrial concern when the notification relied upon governs only houses and shops?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazalur Rehman vs The State1974 SCMR 261 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-05
  murderocular evidenceidentificationretracted confessioncriminal appealdeath sentencemotive
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, by special leave, arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court which upheld the appellant's conviction and death sentence for the murder of his cousin and a murderous assault on his aunt. The appellant challenged the conviction primarily on the grounds of identity, contending that the nighttime occurrence rendered identification by the prosecution witnesses unreliable. The Supreme Court examined whether the eyewitnesses, who were related to the appellant, could have accurately identified him given the circumstances of the incident. The Court held that the conviction was sound, noting that the witnesses had no motive to falsely implicate the appellant, and their testimony regarding recognition remained unchallenged. Furthermore, the Court found that the ocular evidence was corroborated by the appellant's own retracted confessional statement and evidence of motive. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the conviction and sentence. The judgment reinforces the principle that where ocular testimony is credible, consistent with the circumstances, and corroborated by independent evidence such as a confession and motive, it is sufficient to sustain a conviction despite the darkness of the occurrence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a retracted confession be relied upon to sustain a conviction if corroborated by other evidence?
  • Is ocular testimony regarding the identity of an assailant sufficient for conviction in a nighttime occurrence if the witnesses had no motive to falsely implicate the accused?
  • Does the presence of a motive for the crime strengthen the reliability of eyewitness identification?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Rahim vs The State and Another1974 SCMR 386 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-06
  enhancement of sentencerevisional jurisdictionright of hearingshow cause against convictionunrepresented accusedmiscarriage of justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a judgment of the High Court which enhanced the appellant's sentence from two years' rigorous imprisonment to seven years' rigorous imprisonment under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court's failure to properly apprise the unrepresented appellant of his right to oppose the reference and show cause against his conviction violated the statutory mandate of Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's failure to afford the appellant a proper hearing and inform him of his rights constituted a serious procedural irregularity resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the Supreme Court accepted the appeal and set aside the enhancement order. The Court laid down the principle that Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 strictly enjoins that no prejudicial order in revision can be passed without affording the affected person a proper hearing, which includes informing an unrepresented accused of their right to show cause against both the enhancement and the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the High Court to inform an unrepresented accused of their right to show cause against conviction during a sentence enhancement reference violate Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a High Court enhance a sentence in its revisional jurisdiction without affording the accused a proper and meaningful hearing?
  • What is the legal effect of a procedural omission by the High Court to apprise an accused of the nature of enhancement proceedings conducted in a language they may not understand?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Muhammad vs Taj1974 SCMR 189 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-06
  pre-emptionevacuee propertyagricultural landtemporary allotteeconfirmed allotteeRehabilitation Settlement Scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal addressed whether the sale of evacuee agricultural land by an allottee under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme is pre-emptiable under the Punjab Pre-emption Act. The appellant filed a suit for possession by pre-emption against the sale of land allotted to the vendor, which was previously dismissed by the lower courts on the ground that the property was evacuee property barred from such suits under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957. Relying on precedent, the Supreme Court held that sales by confirmed allottees and permanent transferees of evacuee agricultural land are pre-emptiable because such rights constitute village immovable property and the statutory bar regarding evacuee property ceases to apply after acquisition by the Central Government, whereas sales by temporary allottees are not pre-emptiable. Consequently, the Supreme Court accepted the appeal, set aside the lower courts' judgments, and remanded the matter to the trial court for a decision on merits, permitting an inquiry into the exact nature of the vendor's rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the sale of evacuee agricultural land by an allottee under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme is pre-emptiable under the Punjab Pre-emption Act?
  • Does the bar on the maintainability of suits under section 16 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957, apply to evacuee agricultural lands acquired by the Central Government?
  • Are sales of land by temporary allottees subject to pre-emption?
  • Whether sales of land by confirmed allottees and permanent transferees under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 are pre-emptiable?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Hussain vs Mst. Musharizaf Sultana1974 SCMR 147 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-06
  pre-emptionevacuee propertydisplaced personsconfirmed allotteecivil court jurisdictioncompensation pool
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses whether the sale of certain evacuee property in 1960, which had ceased to be evacuee property after its acquisition under section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, was pre-emptiable, and whether a suit for pre-emption was barred under section 6 or 25 of the Act. The Supreme Court held, following previous precedent, that once evacuee agricultural land is acquired by the Central Government under section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, it ceases to be evacuee property and sales by confirmed allottees or permanent transferees are subject to pre-emption. Furthermore, section 25 of the Act does not oust civil court jurisdiction regarding pre-emption suits because such matters do not fall within the purview of authorities created under the Act. The Court dismissed the appeal, ruling that the vendor's status as a confirmed allottee could not be contested as a new plea at this stage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an evacuee property sold after its acquisition under section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 is pre-emptiable?
  • Whether a suit for pre-emption in respect of land acquired under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 is barred under section 6 or section 25 of the said Act?
  • Does section 25 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 oust the jurisdiction of civil courts with regard to pre-emption suits?
  Read full judgment →
• Faqir Muhammad and Another vs State1974 SCMR 282 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-20
  murdercriminal trespassplea of alibieye-witness testimonycorroborationacquittal of co-accusedfalse medical certificateprosecution of witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arose from the conviction and sentencing of two appellants for murder and criminal trespass under Sections 302 and 449 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial court convicted four individuals, but the High Court acquitted two co-accused on appeal due to lack of corroborative evidence regarding their specific role. The primary legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether it was safe to maintain the convictions of the appellants when two co-accused were acquitted on virtually the same prosecution evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the convictions, holding that the direct testimony of natural eye-witnesses was sufficiently corroborated against the appellants by medical evidence, recovery of weapon empties, and strong motive. The Court distinguished the appellants' role of actual direct firing from that of the acquitted co-accused. Additionally, the Court thoroughly evaluated and rejected the principal appellant's plea of alibi, finding the supporting medical documentation and doctor's testimony to be fabricated, and directed prosecution of the medical officer under Section 193 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860.

  Questions settled

  • Can the conviction of certain accused be sustained based on eye-witness testimony even if their co-accused were acquitted on the same evidence?
  • How does the court evaluate a plea of alibi supported by fabricated medical documents and questionable witness testimony?
  • Whether failure to raise a plea of alibi at the earliest opportunity during investigation casts doubt on its genuineness?
  • Can a court order proceedings under Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 against a medical officer who gives false evidence or fabricates medical certificates?
  Read full judgment →
• Doso Alias Dost Muhammad and Another vs The State1974 SCMR 430 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-01-23
  murderfree fightcounter-casecorroborationinjured eyewitnessesrecovery of blood-stained weaponsreduction of sentencegeneral amnesty
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, which confirmed the death sentences of the appellants for murder and dismissed their appeal. The case involves an altercation between two rival parties resulting in the death of one individual and injuries to several others on both sides, leading to a primary case and a counter-case. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court was the evaluation of eyewitness testimony, the presence of corroborative evidence in the form of blood-stained weapons recovered from the accused, and the effect of a general amnesty granted by the President on the sentence. The Supreme Court held that the incident constituted one continuous transaction and free fight where each participant was responsible for their individual acts, and found that the eyewitness testimonies of injured witnesses, corroborated by blood-stained recoveries, fully justified the convictions under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The Court laid down the principle that while related and injured eyewitnesses require corroboration, the recovery of blood-stained weapons provides sufficient corroboration to sustain a murder conviction, and further ruled that the appellants were entitled to a reduction of their death sentence to transportation for life in light of the presidential general amnesty.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the recovery of blood-stained weapons provides sufficient corroboration for the testimony of related and injured eyewitnesses in a murder trial?
  • Does an incident occurring in close proximity of time and place involving rival factions constitute one continuous transaction and free fight?
  • Whether the sentence of death should be reduced to transportation for life in view of a general amnesty granted by the President?
  Read full judgment →
• Dabir Ahmad and 10 Others vs Rizwan Khan and 3 Other1974 SCMR 240 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-07
  co-operative societiesmanaging committee electionbye-lawswholesale replacementleave to appealwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This leave petition arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan which declared the election of eleven petitioners as members of the managing committee of a Co-operative Housing Society for the year 1970-71 to be illegal. The core legal question was whether the wholesale replacement of the managing committee violated bye-law 47 of the Society, which requires the retirement of only one-third of the committee members annually. The Supreme Court held that the election was indeed contrary to the explicit provisions of the bye-law, as the Society cannot invoke powers not conferred upon it and wholesale replacement is precluded unless otherwise provided. The court established the key principle that statutory societies and their internal elections must strictly adhere to their governing bye-laws, and departures cannot be justified by administrative vacuum or prior resignations without proper amendment or compliance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the wholesale replacement of a managing committee of a co-operative society violates standard retirement bye-laws?
  • Can a co-operative society exercise powers not expressly conferred upon it by statute or its bye-laws?
  • Does the resignation of majority members validate the wholesale replacement of a managing committee contrary to its bye-laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Sales Tax (West), Karachi vs Messrs Kruddsons Ltd.1974 PLD Supreme Court 180 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-01-29
  sales tax refundretrospective legislationcurative statutepending appealunjust enrichmentcollection of excess taxsub judice
  Summary & questions settled

  This certificated appeal arose from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan on a reference under the Sales Tax Act, 1951, regarding a claim for a refund of sales tax paid by the respondent company under a bona fide mistake on items exempted by notification. The High Court had answered in the affirmative that the assessee was entitled to claim the refund. During the pendency of the appeal before the Supreme Court, legislative amendments introduced section 30-A into the Sales Tax Act, 1951, via the Finance Act, 1967 and 1968, with retrospective effect, requiring any person who collected excess or unpayable tax to deposit the same with the Central Government. The core legal question was whether subsequent retrospective legislation affects pending appeals and nullifies claims for refunds of collected unpayable tax. The Supreme Court held that the pendency of the certificated appeal destroyed the finality of the High Court's order, making the matter sub judice, and that retrospective curative legislation governs pending appeals until a final judgment is reached. The appeal was accordingly accepted and the High Court's order set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether subsequent retrospective legislation enacted during the pendency of an appeal governs the rights of the parties and affects the pending litigation?
  • Does a certificated appeal destroy the finality of a High Court judgment making the matter sub judice before the Supreme Court?
  • Whether a licensed manufacturer who mistakenly collected sales tax on exempted goods from customers is entitled to retain or claim a refund of such tax despite subsequent statutory amendments requiring payment of excess collections to the government?
  Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs and 2 Others Collector of Customs, Karachi1974 SCMR 7 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1968-09-16Read full judgment →
• Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner and Another1974 SCMR 38 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-11
  condonation of delaylimitationsufficient causegovernment departmentsspecial leave petition
  Summary & questions settled

  These two petitions for special leave to appeal arise from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a Letters Patent Appeal as barred by limitation, and the petitions themselves are delayed by 67 days. The core legal question concerns whether administrative delays and the mislaying of files in government offices constitute sufficient cause for the condonation of delay under limitation laws. The Supreme Court dismissed both petitions, holding that no sufficient cause was shown for condoning the delay and that governmental departments are not exempt from the ordinary rules of limitation. The key principle laid down is that a litigant seeking condonation of delay beyond the prescribed period of limitation must explain each day's delay, and routine departmental negligence in public offices does not furnish a sufficient ground to deprive the opposing party of a valuable right accrued through the expiry of limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mislaying of a file in a government office constitute sufficient cause for condoning a delay in filing a petition?
  • Must a litigant explain each day's delay after the expiry of the normal period of limitation?
  • Are government departments exempt from ordinary rules of limitation in the absence of express statutory provisions?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Maqbool Ahmad and Another vs Board of Revenue, West Pakistan1974 SCMR 517 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-02-20
  Board of Revenueland grantGhulam Muhammad Barrageappellate jurisdictionSind Land Revenue Codewrit petitionmechanization cultivation scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a dispute over the grant of land measuring 597 acres in Ghulam Muhammad Barrage to the appellants under the Mechanization Cultivation Scheme, part of which was later cancelled by the Member, Board of Revenue in favor of local respondents claiming perpetual cultivation rights. The core legal question concerned whether the Board of Revenue possessed the jurisdiction to hear appeals directly from the orders passed by the Director, Colonization Ghulam Muhammad Barrage. The Supreme Court held that the Board of Revenue had the requisite jurisdiction of overall superintendence and control, and that appeals did not lie to the Commissioner, Hyderabad, in light of the relevant statutory notifications issued under the Sind Land Revenue Code and the West Pakistan Agricultural Development Corporation Ordinance, 1961. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's dismissal of the writ petition, establishing that land grants made by the Director Colonization were subject to modification or cancellation by the Board of Revenue and that local claimants' rights could not be ignored.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Board of Revenue has the jurisdiction to hear appeals directly from the orders passed by the Director, Colonization Ghulam Muhammad Barrage?
  • Did an appeal lie from the orders passed by the Director Colonization to the Commissioner, Hyderabad, under the relevant notifications?
  • Whether the Board of Revenue holds overall superintendence and control over matters pertaining to the utilization of land in the barrage?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Ghulam Rasul Tarrar vs The Election Tribunal, West Pakistan and Another1974 SCMR 497 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-22
  election petitionrecriminatory petitioninfructuousabatement of proceedingsdissolution of assemblyelection dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from an election dispute involving an election petition and a recriminatory petition. The core legal question was whether these petitions remained maintainable following the dissolution of the assembly and the subsequent repeal of the governing election statute. The Supreme Court held that the proceedings had become infructuous. Relying on established precedent, the Court affirmed that when the assembly to which an election relates is dissolved, any pending election petition—whether original or recriminatory—necessarily abates and comes to an end for all purposes. The Court reasoned that the right to challenge an election is a creature of statute, and once the underlying legislative framework is repealed and the assembly dissolved, the cause of action ceases to exist. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal as infructuous, establishing the principle that election petitions do not survive the dissolution of the legislative body to which they pertain.

  Questions settled

  • Does an election petition survive the dissolution of the legislative assembly to which it relates?
  • Do pending recriminatory petitions become infructuous upon the dissolution of the assembly?
  • Does the repeal of the governing election statute render pending election petitions infructuous?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Ali Muhammad vs Government of Pakistan (Formerly Government1974 SCMR 139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-07
  compulsory retirementinefficiencypublic conduct scrutinyrailway servantsuper-constitutional law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed against the dismissal of the petitioner's civil suit challenging his compulsory retirement from service in the Traffic Accounts Branch of the N.-W. Railway, ordered on 27th June 1969 with effect from 30th June 1959. The lower courts and the High Court dismissed the suit and subsequent appeals, holding it barred under section 10 of Ordinance No. 11 of 1959. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could be compulsorily retired on the ground of inefficiency after the omission of rule 2(c) of the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Rules, 1959. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that inefficiency remained a valid ground for compulsory retirement by virtue of clauses 3, 4, and 5 of Article 6 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1959, which constituted a super-constitutional law with an overriding effect. The key principle laid down is that provisions of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1959, operate independently and override any inconsistent rules regarding the compulsory retirement of government servants before 1st July 1959.

  Questions settled

  • Can a new contention regarding the competence of the authority be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • Whether inefficiency remains a valid ground for compulsory retirement despite the omission of rule 2(c) of the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Rules, 1959?
  • Does the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1959 have an overriding effect over other inconsistent laws and rules regarding compulsory retirement?
  Read full judgment →
• Capital Development Authority, Islamabad vs Messrs Haydari1974 SCMR 41 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-18
  transfer of civil suitbank guaranteejurisdictioninterim injunctionconstruction contract
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by the Capital Development Authority seeking the transfer of Civil Suit No. 181 of 1972 pending in the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan, Karachi, to the Lahore High Court under Article 9 of President's Order No. 8 of 1970. The dispute relates to a construction contract and the invocation of a bank guarantee following alleged defaults by the contractor, which led to multiple legal proceedings across different courts. The core legal question concerned whether the suit should be transferred between high courts. The Supreme Court held that the case was not a fit one for transfer, noting that the issue of jurisdiction could be properly agitated before the Karachi High Court itself. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil suit pending in the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan be transferred to the Lahore High Court under Article 9 of President's Order No. 8 of 1970?
  • Where should the objection regarding the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court be agitated when a suit is already pending before it?
  Read full judgment →
• Brag Din vs Boota and 4 Other1974 SCMR 400 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-08
  private defenceexceeding right of private defenceculpable homicidegrave and sudden provocationmurderappreciation of evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged the acquittal of respondents Nos. 1 to 4 by the High Court on charges relating to a fatal assault and beating. The core legal questions involved whether the respondents were entitled to the plea of self-defence, whether the High Court correctly evaluated the evidence regarding injuries, and what offence, if any, was committed. The Supreme Court held that while the possibility of the right of private defence arising from an earlier altercation involving a female family member could not be excluded, respondent Boota clearly exceeded that right by inflicting a fatal spear blow on an unarmed sixteen-year-old boy, though his act fell under grave and sudden provocation amounting to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. However, the other respondents were held to be fully protected by the right of private defence. The key principles laid down relate to the limits of the right of private defence under the Pakistan Penal Code, the requirement of proving excessive harm, and the application of sudden provocation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the right of private defence extends to inflicting more harm than is necessary for the purpose of defence?
  • Does a person who exceeds the right of private defence by inflicting a fatal injury under sudden provocation commit murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder?
  • Can statements made before a committing Magistrate be used as substantive evidence without being brought on record under section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • Whether the High Court can rely on inadmissible evidence or facts not supported by the record to establish a plea of self-defence?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmad and Another vs Abdul Ghafoor and Other1974 SCMR 157 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-05
  ejectmentfamily settlementco-ownerbona fide personal useconcurrent findings of factspecial leave petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave is directed against an order of the Lahore High Court maintaining concurrent orders of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority for the ejectment of the petitioners from a shop. The core legal questions involved whether an ejectment application filed by the heirs of one co-owner without joining the other co-owner was competent, and whether the shop was required for the bona fide personal use of the respondents. The Supreme Court held that findings of fact based on a family settlement and a subsequent consent decree relinquishing the other co-owner's interest are concurrent findings of fact that cannot be reviewed or re-appreciated by the Supreme Court. The petition was dismissed with a direction to vacate the premises by a specified date subject to payment of rent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ejectment application by the heirs of a deceased co-owner is competent without joining the other co-owner?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding a family settlement and partition be reviewed by the Supreme Court?
  • Whether a consent decree in a declaratory suit constitutes cogent evidence of a family settlement regarding the partition of property?
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• Barkat Ali vs Messrs Pakistan Sanitary & Drainage Works1974 SCMR 75 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-06
  eviction proceedingstime-barred rentrent defaultstriking off defencestatutory amendmentrent controller jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a landlord's petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that set aside an order striking off a tenant's defence in an eviction proceeding. The landlord sought eviction based on alleged rental default. During proceedings, the Rent Controller ordered the tenant to deposit arrears and future rent. A dispute arose regarding whether the tenant's failure to deposit rent by the 5th of each month constituted default, given a subsequent statutory amendment extending the deadline to the 15th, and whether the landlord could claim time-barred rent. The High Court, relying on established Supreme Court precedents, held that the Rent Controller lacked jurisdiction to order the deposit of time-barred rent. Furthermore, it determined that if the time-barred rent already deposited and withdrawn by the landlord was credited against future liabilities, no default existed. The Supreme Court affirmed this reasoning, holding that the High Court correctly applied the principle that time-barred rent cannot be recovered through rent restriction proceedings and that the tenant's compliance must be assessed by accounting for all payments made.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Rent Controller have the jurisdiction to order the deposit of rent that has become time-barred?
  • Can a landlord claim default against a tenant for failure to pay rent by a specific date if the statute governing the deadline is amended during the proceedings?
  • If a landlord withdraws time-barred rent deposited by a tenant, must that amount be credited toward the tenant's future rental obligations?
  Read full judgment →
• Barkat Ali Etc. Haji Ghulam Hussain (Deceased) Etc. vs The Custodian1974 SCMR 69 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-03
  evacuee propertyunregistered sale-deedtransfer of propertybona fide purchaserwrit jurisdictioncustodian of evacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from civil petitions seeking leave to appeal against a consolidated order of the High Court, which dismissed writ petitions and a settlement revision concerning evacuee agricultural lands in Rahimyar Khan. The core legal question involves whether the disputed lands could be treated as evacuee property after 1 January 1957 in light of section 3 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act XII of 1957, and whether unregistered sale transactions passed any valid title to the claimant. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of registered sale-deeds as required by law, no title passed to the claimant, rendering his initial declaration void and his possession unauthorized, thereby attracting the exceptions under the evacuee laws. The Court further ruled that subsequent vendees could not claim protection as bona fide purchasers where the vendor lacked valid title. The key principle laid down is that unregistered sale transactions regarding immovable property in the relevant territory fail to pass title, and properties held under such invalid claims remain subject to resumption as evacuee property notwithstanding temporal bars.

  Questions settled

  • Whether unverified and unregistered agreements for sale of land in Bahawalpur State pass valid title without registration under the Transfer of Property Act?
  • Can property be treated as evacuee property after 1 January 1957 notwithstanding the bar contained in section 3 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act XII of 1957?
  • Are subsequent vendees who purchase property from a vendor with a defective title entitled to protection as bona fide purchasers without due diligence?
  Read full judgment →
• Bahadur vs Rehabilitation & Settlement Commissioner, Bahawalpur1974 SCMR 451 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-20
  land allotmentrevisional jurisdictionconcurrent findings of factcertified copyRehabilitation Settlement Schemeremandrevenue records
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment upholding a Rehabilitation Commissioner's order that reversed concurrent findings of fact regarding land allotment. The core legal question was whether a Settlement Commissioner, exercising revisional jurisdiction, could overturn subordinate findings based solely on a "certified copy" of a fard-i-taqseem produced for the first time, without verifying its authenticity or existence in the original revenue records. The Supreme Court held that the Rehabilitation Commissioner acted improperly by accepting the document at face value without a proper inquiry, especially given the absence of the original record. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order, and remanded the case to the Rehabilitation Commissioner with directions to first determine the genuineness of the document before disposing of the revision. The judgment establishes that a revisional authority must conduct a proper investigation into the authenticity of disputed evidence before relying upon it to disturb established concurrent findings of fact, particularly when the original document is missing from official records.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Settlement Commissioner in revision overturn concurrent findings of fact based on a document produced for the first time without verifying its authenticity?
  • Is a Rehabilitation Commissioner required to hold a proper inquiry when the genuineness of a document relied upon in revision is challenged?
  • What is the procedure for land allotment when a claimant's status as a sitting allottee is disputed?
  Read full judgment →
• Babu Parvez Qureshi vs Settlement Commissioner, Multan &1974 SCMR 337 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-08
  auction purchaserlocus standiwrit jurisdictionsettlement lawsconfirmation of bidvested rightcancellation of auction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the auction of property (shops) which had been previously claimed as part of a larger residential transfer under settlement laws. The core legal question was whether an auction-purchaser, whose bid had not yet been confirmed, possessed a vested right or locus standi to challenge the cancellation of that auction by the Settlement authorities. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that a mere bid at an auction, subject to confirmation, does not create a contractual or vested right until such confirmation occurs. Consequently, the auction-purchaser lacks the standing to challenge the cancellation of an auction, particularly when the Departmental Authorities have determined that the property was previously transferred to another party. The principle laid down is that an auction-purchaser whose bid remains unconfirmed cannot be considered an 'aggrieved person' entitled to invoke writ jurisdiction to contest the cancellation of the auction process.

  Questions settled

  • Does a bid at an auction, which is subject to confirmation, create a vested contractual right for the bidder?
  • Can an auction-purchaser whose bid has not been confirmed maintain a writ petition to challenge the cancellation of the auction?
  • Is an auction-purchaser considered an aggrieved person when the Settlement authorities cancel an auction on the basis of a prior transfer of the property?
  Read full judgment →
• Azhar Saleem vs Muhammad Anwar Khan Etc.S1974 SCMR 484 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-15
  second appealfinding of factdemolition and reconstructionejectmentlandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a second appeal filed in the High Court against the judgment and order of the first appellate court regarding the ejectment of a tenant, where the landlords sought the premises for demolition and reconstruction. The core legal question is whether a second appeal is maintainable in the High Court against a concurrent finding of fact under the relevant statutory provisions. The Supreme Court held that no second appeal lay to the High Court in view of the concurrent findings of fact that the landlords honestly required the demised premises for demolition and reconstruction. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact arrived at by lower appellate courts cannot be reopened in a second appeal, and lack of maintainability under sections 100 and 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure bars such second appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Does a second appeal lie to the High Court against a finding of fact regarding the requirement of premises for demolition and reconstruction?
  • Are findings of fact by the first appellate court immune from challenge in a second appeal under sections 100 and 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
  Read full judgment →
• Ayub Khan and 2 Others vs The State1974 SCMR 324 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-02
  murdercommon intentionsudden quarrelmitigation of sentencewater disputeclose-range firingcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court upholding the murder convictions of the appellants under Section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while reducing their sentences from death to transportation for life. The core legal question was whether a sudden quarrel and lack of premeditation during a dispute over water irrigation warranted mitigating the sentence from death to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the death sentences, holding that firing inherently dangerous weapons like guns from close range at vital parts of the body during an altercation without sufficient provocation constitutes deliberate, cold-blooded murder. The key principle laid down is that the mere suddenness of an encounter or an exchange of abuses does not automatically justify a lesser sentence where the offender intentionally fires fatal shots from close quarters without a valid legal excuse or grave provocation.

  Questions settled

  • Does a sudden quarrel and altercation over a water dispute automatically warrant the reduction of a murder sentence from death to life imprisonment?
  • Can the firing of a firearm from close range at vital organs during a dispute be regarded as a crime committed in hot blood justifying lesser punishment?
  • Does the absence of certainty as to which specific accused's shot proved fatal preclude the imposition of the death penalty when multiple accused fire simultaneously at vital parts?
  Read full judgment →
• Ayaz Muhammad and 2 Others vs Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and 2 Other1974 SCMR 134 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-23
  settlement lawauction saleproperty transfermultiple transferdisplaced personPermanent Transfer Deedremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a dispute over the transfer of a shop/Chaubara in Multan, initially auctioned to the appellants and subsequently transferred to the respondent by the Settlement Commissioner. The appellants, who held a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) for the property, challenged the Settlement Commissioner's order, which had set aside the auction in their favor and transferred the property to the respondent. The High Court dismissed the appellants' Letters Patent Appeal in limine. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine the legality of the Settlement Commissioner's order, particularly given that the respondent had already secured the transfer of another property. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner erred by failing to consider whether the respondent was legally entitled to a second property transfer. Consequently, the Court set aside the orders of the Settlement Commissioner and the High Court, remanding the case for a fresh determination on whether the disputed property is a shop or a house and whether the respondent is eligible for an additional transfer.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Settlement Commissioner set aside an auction sale without considering the eligibility of the claimant for a second property transfer?
  • Does the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) prevail over a subsequent transfer order in the absence of a valid entitlement order?
  • Is a person entitled to the transfer of multiple properties under the settlement laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Atta Muhammad vs Taj Mohammad and Another1974 SCMR 346 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-02
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertyallotment orderpossessionDisplaced Persons Actsettlement commissionerwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order dismissing a constitutional petition regarding the transfer of an evacuee shop. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who occupied the shop as a business partner/licensee of the respondent (the original allottee), possessed the requisite legal entitlement to claim the transfer of the property under the relevant settlement laws. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the High Court's decision. The Court held that the petitioner's occupation, being that of a licensee under the respondent, did not constitute the type of possession required for entitlement to transfer under the governing statute. The key principle laid down is that 'possession' conferring entitlement to the transfer of evacuee property, as defined in the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, must be possession obtained in pursuance of an allotment order issued by a competent authority; mere physical occupation as a licensee or partner of an existing allottee does not create an independent right to transfer.

  Questions settled

  • Does physical occupation of an evacuee shop as a business partner of the allottee confer an independent entitlement to the transfer of the property?
  • How is 'possession' defined for the purpose of entitlement to the transfer of evacuee property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Can a licensee of an allottee claim a superior right to the transfer of evacuee property over the original allottee?
  Read full judgment →
• Aslam and Another vs Mst. Kamalzai and Other1974 PLD Supreme Court 207 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-17
  inheritancecustomary lawlimited ownerShariat Application Actlimitationoustersuccession
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a dispute over inheritance shares following the death of a female limited owner who held property under customary law. The core legal questions were whether the North-West Frontier Province Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1935, required the reopening of the entire estate of the last male owner upon the termination of a limited interest, and whether the suit for a share in the estate was barred by limitation. The Supreme Court held that the Act does not authorize the reopening of inheritance for estates that had already vested absolutely in heirs under custom. Instead, succession under the Act only opens in respect of the specific property held by the female limited owner as a limited estate. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the suit was barred by limitation, as the male heirs had held the property as absolute owners to the exclusion of others, which constituted ouster. The principle established is that Section 4 of the Act applies only to the distribution of limited estates held by females, not to the entire estate of the last male owner.

  Questions settled

  • Does the North-West Frontier Province Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1935, allow for the reopening of inheritance for estates already vested absolutely in heirs under custom?
  • Upon the termination of a female limited owner's interest, does succession open for the entire estate of the last male owner or only for the property held by the limited owner?
  • Does the possession of property by customary heirs to the exclusion of other potential heirs constitute ouster for the purposes of limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• Asad Mumtaz Ali Khan and Another vs Mst. Naeema Khanum1974 SCMR 167 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-30
  special leave to appealejectmentrestoration of appeallegal representativessufficient causerent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a second appeal filed by the petitioners against the dismissal of their application for the restoration of an appeal. The underlying matter involved an ejectment application filed against the original tenant, during the pendency of which a rent deposit order was passed under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. Upon the tenant's death, the initial appeal was consigned to the records due to failure to bring legal representatives on record. Subsequent applications for restoration and impleadment were dismissed by the lower appellate courts. The Supreme Court of Pakistan considered the contentions regarding the competency of successive restoration applications and the sufficiency of cause for non-appearance. The Court held that since the main ejectment application had meanwhile been decreed and the final order passed without stay of proceedings, the academic contention regarding the competency of the restoration application required no interference. Furthermore, the Court found no merit in the argument that the High Court failed to consider sufficient cause, as the High Court had duly examined and resolved that question. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application for restoration of a previous application for restoration of an appeal is competent?
  • Does the final decreeing of an ejectment application render academic a challenge concerning the restoration of an intermediate appeal?
  • Whether the High Court is justified in refusing to interfere with the lower appellate court's finding on sufficient cause for non-appearance?
  Read full judgment →
• Arif Ud Din vs Noor Hussain and 5 Other1974 SCMR 117 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1956-05-31
  stamp dutybondagreementpromissory notecontemporaneous transactioninitial obligationnovation
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by special leave from an order of the High Court of Lahore holding that a document executed concurrently with a promissory note was a composite bond and agreement under the Stamp Act and ordering it to be impounded for deficiency in stamp duty and penalty. The core legal question was whether the said document, which recited a loan taken under a separate promissory note and stipulated conditions for forming a partnership along with a penal clause for failure to do so, constituted a 'bond' or merely an 'agreement'. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and held that the document was an agreement and not a bond, as it did not independently create an obligation to pay the pre-existing debt but merely served as a reference to the liability already secured by the contemporaneous promissory note which was intended to be kept alive. The key principle laid down is that an instrument cannot be classified as a bond unless it itself creates an initial, independent obligation to pay money, and where a document is executed as part of the same transaction as a promissory note and merely references that antecedent liability without intending to create a novation or a fresh monetary obligation, it remains an agreement rather than a bond.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an instrument that recites a pre-existing loan taken under a separate promissory note and provides for damages upon failure to perform a collateral act constitutes a bond under the Stamp Act?
  • Can a document be classified as a bond if it does not independently create an obligation to pay money but merely refers to a liability already secured by a contemporaneous promissory note?
  • Does the execution of a promissory note alongside an agreement in a single transaction preclude the later document from operating as a bond?
  • What constitutes an express obligation to pay money under the statutory definition of a bond?
  Read full judgment →
• Anwar Beg vs Riaz Hussain and 3 Other1974 SCMR 479 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-01-18
  limitation periodgift deedpower of attorneydelivery of possessionremand ordersuit for declaration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the validity of a gift deed executed by an attorney on behalf of a donor, Allah Ditta Qureshi, in favor of the attorney's wife. The respondents challenged the gift, alleging the power of attorney was a forgery and the donor was incapacitated, further contending that possession was never delivered. The trial court initially ruled the suit was within the limitation period under Article 120 of the Limitation Act 1908. The Lahore High Court set aside this finding, remanding the case to determine if the power of attorney was genuine and if possession was delivered, noting that the applicable limitation period depends on these factual findings—specifically, whether the suit falls under Article 120 or Article 91 of the Limitation Act 1908. The petitioner sought leave to appeal, arguing the suit was time-barred. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the question of limitation cannot be determined without first establishing the factual basis regarding the execution of the power of attorney and the delivery of possession.

  Questions settled

  • Can the question of limitation be determined before establishing the factual validity of the power of attorney and delivery of possession?
  • Does a suit challenging a gift deed fall under Article 120 or Article 91 of the Limitation Act 1908 depending on the proof of possession?
  • Is it appropriate for a High Court to remand a case for trial on merits when the issue of limitation is inextricably linked to disputed facts?
  Read full judgment →
• Amir Zada Khan vs Chief Electioncommissioner and 2 Other1974 PLD Supreme Court 236 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-01
  presidential electionnomination paperselectoral rollscrutiny of nominationdirectory and mandatory provisionselection petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition sought leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed in limine a constitutional petition challenging the validity of the nomination of respondent No. 3 for election to the office of President of Pakistan. The core legal question was whether the failure to accompany nomination papers with an attested copy of the electoral roll, as required by the Presidential Election Rules, 1973, constituted a mandatory and substantial defect necessitating the rejection of the nomination papers. The Supreme Court held that the non-filing of the attested copy was not a material defect where the eligibility of the candidate was already established aliunde—being a sitting member and Speaker of the National Assembly—and where the defect was remedied prior to the scrutiny by the Returning Officer. The Court ruled that such a procedural requirement was directory rather than mandatory in the circumstances and that the Returning Officer rightly exercised discretion not to reject the nomination. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to accompany a nomination paper with an attested copy of the electoral roll constitute a mandatory and substantial defect invalidating the nomination under the Presidential Election Rules, 1973?
  • Can a defect in a nomination paper regarding the non-filing of an electoral roll extract be remedied before the time of scrutiny by the Returning Officer?
  • What is the scope of the Returning Officer's discretion under rule 5 of the Presidential Election Rules, 1973, in dealing with technical defects in nomination papers?
  Read full judgment →
• Amir Rawan vs Rawan Khan and Other1974 SCMR 246 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-10
  murderacquittalcorroborationinterested witnessrecovery of weaponsspecial leave to appealcriminal evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which acquitted the respondents of murder charges. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court erred in rejecting the prosecution's evidence, specifically the testimony of interested witnesses and the alleged recovery of firearms. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s acquittal was justified. The Court established that the mere arrest of accused persons near the scene of the incident, particularly in a region where carrying firearms is customary, does not serve as sufficient corroborative evidence of guilt. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that without ballistic matching or reliable independent testimony regarding the recovery of weapons, such recoveries cannot sustain a conviction. The Court also noted that the testimony of interested witnesses requires independent corroboration, which was absent here, especially given that a neutral witness contradicted the prosecution's account, thereby casting significant doubt on the presence of the alleged eyewitnesses. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recovery of firearms from accused persons near the scene of a crime, in a region where carrying arms is customary, constitute sufficient corroborative evidence of guilt?
  • Can a conviction be sustained based solely on the testimony of interested witnesses when a neutral witness contradicts their account?
  • Is the testimony of an investigating officer sufficient to prove the recovery of weapons when the only independent witness's presence at the scene is doubtful?
  Read full judgment →
• Amir Bakhsh and Other vs Allah Yar and Other1974 PLD Supreme Court 124 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-15
  customary lawlimited estatelast full ownerancestral propertyshariat application actlimitation periodalienation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan concerning a suit for possession of agricultural lands originally owned by a proprietor governed by custom. The core legal questions involved the determination of the identity of the last full owner for succession under the West Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948, the definition of ancestral property regarding different classes of plaintiffs, and the applicable limitation period for challenging alienations made by a limited female owner. The Supreme Court held that under section 3 of the Shariat Act, succession must be traced to the last actual full owner, which was the issueless son rather than his father, and that property is not ancestral qua collaterals unless held by a common ancestor. The ratio decidendi establishes that the last full owner for statutory succession is the person who actually held the heritable estate, and the special provisions of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920 apply only where the property is proven ancestral qua the specific plaintiffs.

  Questions settled

  • Who constitutes the last full owner for the purpose of succession under section 3 of the West Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948?
  • Does the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920 apply to property that is not ancestral qua the plaintiffs?
  • Whether a daughter acts merely as a conduit to pass on property as ancestral property to her sons under customary law?
  • Which article of the Limitation Act, 1908 governs a suit for possession filed by reversioners upon the termination of a widowed mother's limited estate?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta vs Muhammad Rafique and Other1974 SCMR 173 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-04
  evacuee propertyconstitutional petitionlachessettlement authoritiestransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal is directed against an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a constitutional petition regarding residential evacuee properties. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner was entitled to challenge the transfer of evacuee properties to the respondents after inordinate delay and without availing remedies before the Settlement authorities or properly impleading necessary parties. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly dismissed the petition due to the petitioner's gross laches, failure to challenge the transfer of one unit despite notice, lack of possession regarding the other unit, and failure to bring legal representatives of a deceased respondent on record within time. The key principle laid down is that discretionary constitutional relief will be refused to a party guilty of unexplained delay, laches, and failure to pursue statutory remedies or properly implead parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition can be maintained against the transfer of evacuee property after a lapse of several years?
  • Does failure to challenge a property transfer before Settlement authorities bar relief in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • What is the effect of failing to bring the legal representatives of a deceased respondent on record within the statutory period in a constitutional petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta vs Hajijan Muhammad and 3 Other1974 PLD Supreme Court 113 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-24
  evacuee propertyinformer rightsvested rightdisplaced persons compensationsettlement schemebelated application
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave concerns the disposal of a house under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The appellant, an enforcement constable, laid information that the house was concealed evacuee property, prompting the Chief Settlement Commissioner to transfer it to him under S.R.O. No. 824(K)/1961 pursuant to section 10(b) of the Act. Subsequently, respondent No. 1's writ petition was partially allowed by the High Court, holding that the repeal of section 10(b) by the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1962 voided the transfer and that the rejection of respondent's belated transfer form was illegal. The core legal questions involve whether an informer acquires a vested right to property upon providing information, the effect of the repeal of section 10(b) on pending informer proceedings, and the validity of entertaining belated transfer forms. The Supreme Court held that an informer does not acquire a vested right or independent locus standi in the property, that pending informer proceedings lapsed with the repeal of section 10(b) without creating vested rights under the General Clauses Act, and that the Chief Settlement Commissioner could entertain belated applications. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an informer who provides information regarding concealed evacuee property acquire a vested right to obtain the transfer of that property?
  • What is the legal effect of the repeal of clause (b) of section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 on pending proceedings initiated by informers?
  • Whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner has the authority to entertain belated C.H. Forms for the transfer of evacuee properties under Settlement Scheme No. I?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Dino and 2 Others vs Mohammad Umar and 2 Other1974 SCMR 411 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-03
  agricultural landco-ownershipburden of proofsecond appealpartitiontitle declarationadverse possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a second appeal judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which dismissed the appellants' suit for a declaration of title and permanent injunction regarding agricultural land. The core legal question was whether the appellants' deceased father, Azizullah, was a joint purchaser and equal co-sharer of the disputed land held in the name of respondent No. 3, Saindad, or merely looked after the property as a manager (Kamdar). The Supreme Court held that the appellants failed to establish their ownership, finding their claims of joint purchase, partition, and oral acknowledgment self-contradictory and unsupported by reliable evidence, while contemporary registered documents confirmed exclusive ownership by Saindad. The key principle laid down is that mere physical possession and payment of land revenue or installments, absent credible proof of investment or co-ownership, do not suffice to establish a proprietary share against recorded title and consistent contemporaneous documentary evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether mere physical possession and payment of land revenue are sufficient to establish co-ownership in agricultural land held in another person's name?
  • Does a second appeal lie against findings of fact by the first appellate court when the evidence has been considered?
  • Can oral testimony contradicting prior consistent registered documents and written statements be relied upon to prove a share in property?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Muhammad vs Ali Muhammad and 5 Other1974 SCMR 22 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-07-10
  right of private defenceactual physical possessioncriminal liabilityaggressiondisputed landacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that acquitted respondents previously convicted by the trial court for murder and related offences. The core legal question was whether the respondents, who were in actual physical possession of disputed land, had the right of private defence of person and property when the complainant party attempted to forcibly retake possession. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that in criminal law, actual physical possession is the material factor. The Court held that since the complainant party attempted to regain possession by force, they were the aggressors, thereby entitling the respondents to exercise their right of private defence. Furthermore, because the respondents sustained injuries on vital body parts during the altercation, they were justified in their actions and did not exceed the right of private defence. The key principle laid down is that a person in actual physical possession of property, even if their title is disputed or subject to pending litigation, is entitled to resist dispossession by force, and such resistance does not constitute a criminal offence if the right of private defence is not exceeded.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person in actual physical possession of land have the right to resist forcible dispossession?
  • Can a party that attempts to retake possession of land by force be considered the aggressor in a criminal altercation?
  • Does the right of private defence of person and property extend to causing death if the defender is attacked on vital parts of the body?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Muhammad and Another vs Ch. Muhammad Tufail and Another1974 SCMR 68 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-09
  statutory tenancyejectment petitionauction-purchasersettlement departmentrent controllerremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court upholding the remand of an ejectment case by the Additional District Judge for a fresh decision on merits by the Rent Controller. The core legal question concerns whether occupants of a property transferred by the Settlement Department become statutory tenants under the auction-purchaser upon receiving notice under Section 30 of the relevant Act, notwithstanding initial allegations of subletting. The Supreme Court held that where occupants in possession of the property at the time of auction receive proper notice from the transferee, a statutory tenancy is duly created in their favour, precluding them from denying such status. The key principle laid down is that notice under Section 30 of Act XXVIII of 1958 to persons in possession at the time of property transfer creates a statutory tenancy relationship between the transferee and the occupants.

  Questions settled

  • Does the receipt of notice under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 by occupants in possession at the time of property transfer create a statutory tenancy?
  • Can occupants who acknowledge notice and offer rent to an auction-purchaser deny their status as tenants under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Ahmad and Others vs The State1974 SCMR 163 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-21
  post-arrest bailbenefit of doubtcommitment proceedingsevaluation of evidencespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal against the refusal of bail by the Lahore High Court in a case registered under sections 148, 302, 307, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether superior courts, when considering bail during the pendency of commitment proceedings, are bound to review and evaluate the recorded evidence to give an opinion on its reliability and resolve doubts in favor of the accused. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that superior courts should not ordinarily undertake the function of evaluating evidence or expressing opinions on its reliability while commitment proceedings before a magistrate are ongoing, as this would embarrass and hamper the magistrate in discharging statutory responsibilities. The key principle laid down is that superior courts must avoid preempting the committal court's evaluation of a prima facie case during ongoing commitment proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether superior courts must examine evidence and express an opinion on its reliability during ongoing commitment proceedings when deciding bail?
  • Should the benefit of doubt arising from evidence led before a committing magistrate be resolved at the bail stage by a superior court?
  • Does a superior court's evaluation of evidence for bail embarrass the magistrate conducting commitment proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Al Mahmood Industries (Pakistan) Ltd. vs The Trading Corporation of Pakistan Ltd. and Another1974SCMR 51 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-03
  writ jurisdictionalternative remedyarbitration clausecontractual disputeconstitution petitionmaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order dismissing a constitution petition as not maintainable. The petitioner challenged an increase in the price of imported pig iron by the Trading Corporation of Pakistan following the devaluation of the rupee. The High Court had dismissed the petition, citing the existence of an arbitration clause in the agreement and the availability of alternative remedies, noting the dispute arose from a private contract. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the matter was not suitable for writ jurisdiction. The Court held that when a dispute involves contractual obligations and disputed questions of fact, and where an adequate alternative remedy—such as arbitration or a civil suit—is available, the exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction is inappropriate. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioner failed to directly challenge the underlying government notification, instead focusing on the Corporation's actions. The principle established is that writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to bypass contractual arbitration clauses or to resolve factual disputes when other adequate legal remedies exist.

  Questions settled

  • Is a constitution petition maintainable when an adequate alternative remedy, such as arbitration, exists for a contractual dispute?
  • Can writ jurisdiction be invoked to resolve disputed questions of fact arising from a contract?
  • Does the existence of an arbitration clause in a commercial agreement preclude the filing of a constitution petition?
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• Akhtar Hassan Khan vs The State1974 SCMR 457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-16
  illegal gratificationanti-corruptionjurisdictionpublic servantsentence enhancementtrap case
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing the appellant's appeal against his conviction under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and enhancing his sentence. The core legal questions were whether an official can be convicted under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code when the illegal act fell outside his direct territorial jurisdiction, and whether offences under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 constitute separate offences that cannot be lumped together. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that it is sufficient for the purposes of section 161 that the accused represented himself to be capable of rendering the official service, and that section 161 is a species of offence included within section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, meaning they can be charged together without causing prejudice. The key principle laid down is that criminal liability under anti-corruption laws attaches when a public servant represents they can perform an official service, regardless of strict internal jurisdictional boundaries, and dual charging under overlapping penal provisions is permissible absent demonstrated prejudice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a public servant be convicted under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code if the official act in question was outside his specific territorial jurisdiction?
  • Whether offences under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 must be tried separately or can be charged together?
  • Is it necessary for a conviction under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code that the accused actually possessed the formal power to render the promised service?
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• Ahrar Muhammad and Other vs The State1974 PLD Supreme Court 224 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-13
  post-arrest baildelay in trialabuse of process of lawcriminal trial delaybail pending trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave is directed against an order of the Sind & Baluchistan High Court refusing to enlarge fourteen appellants on bail. The appellants had been in custody and undergoing protracted trial proceedings since their arrest between May 1968, facing repeated delays spanning over three years during trial. The core legal question was whether inordinate and unjustified delay in the prosecution of a case, amounting to an abuse of the process of law, can constitute a sufficient ground for granting bail. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and held that while mere delay is not ordinarily a ground for bail, scandalous, shocking, or inordinate delay amounting to an abuse of the process of law can be treated as a sufficient ground for enlarging an accused on bail, particularly where prosecution evidence has concluded and tampering is no longer possible. The key principle laid down is that gross and unjustified judicial and prosecutorial delays entailing an abuse of the court's process warrant granting bail to prevent flagrant injustices.

  Questions settled

  • Can inordinate and unjustified delay in a criminal trial amount to an abuse of the process of law sufficient to grant bail?
  • Is mere delay by itself a sufficient ground for the granting of bail under Pakistani jurisprudence?
  • Does the conclusion of prosecution evidence remove the risk of tampering with evidence when considering bail applications based on delay?
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• Ahmad Nawaz Shah vs Chief Land Commissioner, Punjab1974 SCMR 448 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-16
  Land Reforms Regulation 1972minor's propertyoral giftMuslim Lawnatural guardianvoid ab initiotransfer of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the validity of an oral gift of land made by a minor declarant under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972. The petitioner, a minor, purported to gift land to his infant sister, a transaction subsequently declared ineffective by the Chief Land Commissioner and upheld by the Lahore High Court as void ab initio under Muslim Law. The core legal question was whether the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972, by defining 'person' to include a minor and providing specific exceptions for gifts, empowered a minor to make a gift otherwise prohibited by Muslim Law. The Supreme Court held that the Regulation is a prohibitory statute intended to invalidate certain transfers, not an enabling provision that validates transactions otherwise void under personal law. The Court affirmed that the Regulation does not override the fundamental incapacity of a minor to gift property under Muslim Law, nor does the status of a natural guardian grant plenary power to transfer a minor's property without strict adherence to legal conditions. The petition was dismissed, confirming the gift was a nullity.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of 'person' in the Land Reforms Regulation 1972 empower a minor to make a gift of land otherwise prohibited by Muslim Law?
  • Is the Land Reforms Regulation 1972 an enabling statute that validates transfers of land otherwise void under personal law?
  • Does the status of a natural guardian under Muslim Law grant plenary power to transfer a minor's property?
  • Can a gift of land made by a minor be considered valid if it does not meet the requirements of Muslim Law, regardless of the Land Reforms Regulation 1972?
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• Ahmad Ghani vs Settlement Officer, Sialkot and Other1974 SCMR 102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-30
  evacuee landlimitationcondonation of delaybogus transactionsettlement authoritiestime-barred petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order that dismissed a revision petition regarding the allotment of evacuee land. The core dispute arose after land was confirmed in the name of a deceased person, Rehmat A.I., followed by subsequent purported sales to Shaukat A.I. and eventually the petitioner. The Chief Settlement Commissioner declared these transactions bogus, a finding upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court addressed two primary issues: the merits of the transaction and the limitation period for filing the petition. The Court found the petitioner's explanation for a 35-day delay in filing—blaming the Copying Section for failing to notify him of the copy's readiness—to be vague and insufficient, noting the petitioner's own negligence in applying for the copy. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as time-barred. The Court held that without a satisfactory explanation for delay, condonation cannot be granted. Furthermore, regarding the petitioner's request to retain the land upon payment of market value, the Court clarified that no judicial order was required, as the petitioner could seek relief directly from Settlement Authorities if permitted by the relevant scheme or rules.

  Questions settled

  • Is a delay in filing a petition excusable when the petitioner fails to provide a specific explanation for the initial delay in applying for a certified copy?
  • Can a transaction involving the allotment of land to a deceased person be considered valid?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to direct Settlement Authorities to allow the retention of land on payment of market price if the relevant rules already provide for such a remedy?
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• Abdus Sattar vs Muhammad Anwar and 6 Other1974 PLD Supreme Court 266 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-05-09
  appraisal of ocular evidencebenefit of doubtinterested witnessescorroborationmurderarsoncriminal appealrestoration of conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the acquittal of six respondents by the Lahore High Court for the murders of two persons who were burnt to death alongside a wheat stack. The core legal question concerns the proper appraisal of ocular evidence and whether the High Court erred in disbelieving interested eye-witnesses and accepting a defence theory of death by lightning. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's reasoning was speculative, conjectural, and led to a grave miscarriage of justice, affirming that the victims were deliberately thrown into a raging fire by the respondents. The ratio laid down is that the testimony of related or partisan eye-witnesses cannot be discarded on surmises where their presence is natural, corroborated by medical evidence regarding the time of occurrence and cause of death, and supported by independent witness testimony. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the acquittal, restored the trial court's judgment, and confirmed the death sentences.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of related or partisan eye-witnesses can be discarded solely on the ground of their relationship with the deceased?
  • Does the failure of eye-witnesses to physically intervene against armed assailants necessarily negative their presence at the scene of the crime?
  • Whether an appellate court can reverse an order of acquittal based on speculative and conjectural reasoning unsupported by the record?
  • Does the presence of semi-digested food in the stomach at post-mortem examination reliably corroborate the prosecution's stated time of occurrence?
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• Abdur Razaq vs Bahadur Khan and Other1974 SCMR 330 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-04
  criminal proceduredisputed landpossessionmagistrate orderhigh court judgmentlease
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises out of proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the possession of disputed land. The Magistrate had declared Party No. 1 entitled to possession and ordered restoration if dispossessed. However, a learned Single Judge of the High Court set aside the Magistrate's order, holding it illegal for failing to state who was found in possession on the relevant date, and finding upon evidence that the respondent was the lessee in possession up to the end of Rabi 1971, prior to the initiation of the proceedings. The core legal question concerns the legality of a magistrate's order under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without determining possession on the relevant date. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's decision, finding no substance in the petition. The Court affirmed that an order under Section 145 must properly determine and specify possession on the relevant date.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 illegal if it fails to state who was found to be in possession of the property on the relevant date?
  • Can a magistrate restore possession under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without properly determining prior possession?
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• Abdul Shakoor and 2 Others vs A. S. Tasneem and 2 Other1974 SCMR 463 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-22
  temporary injunctionprima facie caseColonization of Government Lands Actvoid agreementsubleasebalance of convenienceirreparable loss
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court upholding the District Judge's vacation of a temporary injunction granted to the petitioners by a Civil Judge. The petitioners claimed possession and rights over agricultural land under a registered agreement with the lessees (respondents). The High Court found the agreement void under Section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 due to lack of prior written permission from the Commissioner or authorized officer to sublet or transfer the land, thus disentitling the petitioners to a prima facie case. The petitioners argued before the Supreme Court that examining complex legal questions regarding the agreement's validity exceeded the scope of Order XXXIX Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that evaluating a prima facie case permits the court to examine the prima facie legal validity of the claim, and an injunction cannot be granted solely based on possession or expenditure when the underlying agreement is legally void under Section 19.

  Questions settled

  • Does the evaluation of a prima facie case under Order XXXIX Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 permit a court to examine the legal validity of the contract upon which the suit is based?
  • Can a temporary injunction be granted solely on the basis of possession and expenditure when the underlying agreement is prima facie void under Section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act 1912?
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• Abdul Rashid Khan and 2 Others vs Mst. Nasim Akhtar1974 SCMR 509 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-05-07
  pre-emptionexecution of decreestay orderrestoration of possessionoperation of stay ordercommunication of order
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a suit for possession through pre-emption concerning agricultural land in Muzaffargarh. The trial court decreed the suit, and the District Judge modified the payment amount on appeal. Subsequently, the respondent filed a regular second appeal before the Lahore High Court, which stayed the execution of the decree on 9th May 1973. However, on the same day, the petitioners obtained constructive possession of the land pursuant to a warrant issued on 8th May 1973. The respondent applied for restoration of possession, which the High Court granted on 5th November 1973, ordering status quo as on 9th May 1973. The petitioners sought leave to appeal against this order, arguing against the Lahore High Court's precedent. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that an order staying execution operates from the moment it is made by the court, not from the time it is actually communicated to the executing court. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a stay order issued by an appellate court operate from the time it is passed or from the time it is communicated to the executing court?
  • Can possession taken in execution after a stay order has been passed by a higher court be restored even if the executing court was unaware of the stay order?
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• Abdul Rahim and Other vs Home Secretary, Government of West1974 PLD Supreme Court 109 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-04
  writ jurisdictionTribal AreaChitral Statejurisdictional barsitus of propertyterritorial jurisdictionrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave concerned whether an order dated 23-7-1964 passed by the Home Secretary to the former Government of West Pakistan, affirming in revision an order of the Political Agent regarding land situated in the former Chitral State, was subject to the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution despite the constitutional bar in Article 223(5). The appellants contended that because the final appellate/revisional authority was located within the High Court's territorial jurisdiction, writ jurisdiction applied. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under Article 223(5), the phrase 'in relation to a Tribal Area' is of wide import and establishes a prohibition based on the nexus or connection to the Tribal Area. The location of the subject-matter land and the residence of the parties in the Tribal Area provided the decisive nexus. The apex seat of the authority passing the final order was not decisive. Consequently, the High Court lacked jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the location of the final revisional authority within the High Court's territorial limits confer writ jurisdiction over a dispute concerning property situated in a Tribal Area?
  • What is the scope and effect of the constitutional bar under Article 223(5) of the 1962 Constitution regarding High Court jurisdiction in relation to a Tribal Area?
  • Does the Supreme Court and High Courts (Extension of Jurisdiction to Certain Tribal Areas) Act 1973 operate retrospectively?
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• Abdul Manan and 12 Others vs Mst. Rahim Jan and 11 Other1974 SCMR 301 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-16
  shamilathaqiat landCustomary Lawreversionerslimited ownerabsolute ownerArazi Pidriburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged a High Court order declaring the respondents owners of shamilat land appurtenant to haqiat land. The core legal question was whether the disputed property was ancestral, inherited by the vendor from her husband under Customary Law, or paternal property, making her an absolute owner, and whether the sale included the proportionate share in the shamilat. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants, claiming as reversioners of the vendor's husband, failed to discharge the burden of proving the property belonged to him. The Court determined that the description of the property as 'Arazi Pidri' (paternal land) and the vendor as the daughter of her father, rather than the wife of her husband, established her as the absolute owner. Consequently, the sale was valid, and the transfer of the haqiat land effectively included the proportionate share in the shamilat, rendering the reversioners' challenge ineffective.

  Questions settled

  • Does the description of land as 'Arazi Pidri' in a sale deed indicate that the property is paternal rather than ancestral?
  • On whom does the burden of proof lie when reversioners challenge a sale made by a widow?
  • Does the sale of haqiat land implicitly include the proportionate share in the shamilat?
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