Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Sunni Ittehad Council Versus Election Commission of Pakistan2025 PLD 67 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-07-12
  reserved seatsproportional representationelection symbolpolitical partyindependent candidatesintra-party electionsElection Commission of Pakistancomplete justice
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil appeals under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court upholding the Election Commission of Pakistan's (ECP) decision to deny the Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC) reserved seats for women and non-Muslims in the National and Provincial Assemblies following the General Elections 2024, and reallocating those seats to other political parties. Independent returned candidates had joined SIC after the elections. The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether SIC, having not won any general seats directly, was entitled to reserved seats; whether the denial of an election symbol deprives a political party of its constitutional right to field candidates; and how proportional representation for reserved seats must be calculated. By majority, the Supreme Court held that SIC was not entitled to reserved seats, as Articles 51(6)(d)-(e) and 106(3)(c) require a party to have contested and won general seats. However, the Court declared that denial of an election symbol under Section 215(5) of the Elections Act 2017 does not extinguish a political party's constitutional status under Article 17(2), and candidates nominated by PTI who filed party affiliation remained PTI candidates. Consequently, ECP's actions declaring them independent were declared ultra vires, and PTI was held entitled to its proportionate share of reserved seats.

  Questions settled

  • Does the denial or lack of an election symbol under Section 215(5) of the Elections Act 2017 affect the constitutional right of an enlisted political party to participate in elections and nominate candidates under Article 17(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can a candidate nominated by a political party ineligible to obtain an election symbol be validly treated and notified as an independent candidate by the Election Commission of Pakistan?
  • Do Articles 51(6)(d)-(e) and 106(3)(c) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 allow a political party that has not contested for and won any general seats to claim reserved seats based solely on the post-election joining of independent returned candidates?
  • Is the Explanation to Rule 94 of the Election Rules 2017 ultra vires the Elections Act 2017 and the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • How is the proportional representation of political parties for the allocation of reserved seats to be calculated under Articles 51(6)(d)-(e) and 106(3)(c) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Muhammad Imran Versus State2025 PLD 662 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-06-26
  rapefornicationDNA evidenceconsentdelay in FIRhouse-trespasssexual assaultvictim testimonygender stereotypingnon-compoundable offence
  Summary & questions settled

  This case involved a criminal petition for leave to appeal against convictions for rape and house-trespass. The core legal question was whether the act constituted rape under Section 376, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, or fornication with consent under Section 496-B, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and consequently, the appropriate charge for trespass. The majority of the Supreme Court converted the petitioner's conviction from Section 376, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, to Section 496-B, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and from Section 449, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, to Section 448, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Court held that despite a positive DNA match, the delay in lodging the FIR, the absence of resistance marks on the complainant's body, and a prior arrest of both parties for obscene acts suggested consensual intercourse (fornication) rather than rape. The dissenting opinion emphasized the conclusive nature of DNA evidence and the victim's consistent testimony, arguing against traditional presumptions regarding resistance and delay in rape cases.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for rape under Section 376, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, be converted to fornication with consent under Section 496-B, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, despite positive DNA evidence?
  • Does a delay in lodging an FIR or the absence of physical resistance marks negate a charge of rape, even with corroborative DNA evidence?
  • Is the offence of rape under Section 376, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, a compoundable offence?
  • What constitutes 'consent' in the context of sexual intercourse under Pakistani law?
  • Can a prior arrest of both parties for obscene acts under Section 294, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, be used to infer consent in a subsequent rape case?
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• Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation-FBR Versus Taj International (Pvt.) Ltd.2025 PLD 633 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-12-04
  Sales Tax Act 1990tax fraudassessment of taxpower to arrest and prosecutequashing of FIRfake sales tax invoicesSpecial Judgedue process
  Summary & questions settled

  These consolidated appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from multiple High Court judgments quashing criminal proceedings, FIRs, and arrests initiated by the Directorate General of Intelligence and Investigation, FBR, against taxpayers and persons in supply chains for alleged tax fraud and fake invoices under the Sales Tax Act 1990. The central legal issue was whether criminal prosecution and coercive pre-trial actions under Section 37A and Section 37B of the Act could be validly initiated before sales tax liability had been assessed and adjudicated under Section 11 of the Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the department's appeals and upheld the quashing of criminal proceedings. The Court held that criminal prosecution follows civil adjudication; penal provisions and fines under Section 33 are inextricably linked to the determination of tax loss or tax due. Therefore, in the absence of prior assessment, investigative audit, show-cause notice, and opportunity of hearing, registering FIRs and arresting taxpayers under Section 37A is illegal, without jurisdiction, and violative of due process under Articles 4 and 10-A of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings and registration of an FIR under Section 37A of the Sales Tax Act 1990 be initiated before the sales tax liability is determined under Section 11 of the Act?
  • Whether pre-trial arrest and detention of a taxpayer for alleged tax fraud are lawful in the absence of a prior assessment or civil adjudication of tax due?
  • Does a Special Judge under the Sales Tax Act 1990 have the jurisdiction to assess or determine the tax liability when sentencing or imposing fines under Section 33 of the Act?
  • Is the determination of tax liability through assessment a mandatory constitutional requirement under Articles 4 and 10-A before invoking penal provisions linked to tax loss?
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• Mst. Parveen Ara Versus Muhammad Hanif2025 PLD 612 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-03-07Read full judgment →
• Ishfaq Ahmed Versus Mushtaq Ahmed2025 PLD 582 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-03-13Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Shakeel Versus Additional District Judge, Faisalabad2025 PLD 572 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-02-14
  dowry recoveryfamily suitnon-joinder of partyFamily Courts Actconstitutional jurisdictioncertiorariappreciation of evidencesupervisory jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Family Court decree for the recovery of dowry articles, upheld by the First Appellate Court and the High Court. The petitioners, brothers and sister-in-law of the plaintiff's husband, raised two main arguments: non-joinder of the husband as a necessary party and improper appreciation of evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the non-joinder objection was waived as it was not raised at the earliest opportunity. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the husband was not a necessary party as the cause of action for dowry recovery was alleged against the petitioners who were in possession of the articles. The judgment reiterated that the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution is supervisory, limited to jurisdictional errors or errors of law apparent on the record, and does not extend to re-evaluating factual findings. The Supreme Court also exercises restraint in such family matters unless substantial grounds for intervention exist.

  Questions settled

  • When must an objection regarding non-joinder of a necessary party be raised in legal proceedings?
  • Is the husband always a necessary party in a family suit for the recovery of dowry articles from his relatives?
  • What is the scope of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution in scrutinizing orders issued in family suits?
  • Can the High Court re-evaluate or question factual findings made by subordinate courts based on their assessment of evidence under its certiorari jurisdiction?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court intervene in family law matters arising from an order of certiorari?
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• Muhammad Azam Versus Muhammad Aijaz2025 PLD 567 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-03-17Read full judgment →
• Shahbaz Latif Versus DIG, Pakistan Railways Headquarters Office, Lahore2025 PLD 560 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-05-19Read full judgment →
• State Versus Judge Atc No. 1, Rawalpindi2025 PLD 557 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-04-07
  Transfer of casesAnti-Terrorism CourtChief Justice's administrative powersJudicial supervisionConstitutional authoritySubordinate judiciaryExecutive influenceJudicial proprietyAdministrative order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involved petitions challenging an order by the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court concerning applications by the State to transfer cases from one Presiding Judge of the Anti-Terrorism Court to another. The core legal question revolved around the scope of the Chief Justice's supervisory authority under Article 203 of the Constitution and the propriety of remarks made regarding the conduct of state functionaries. The Supreme Court held that the Chief Justice acted within his constitutional authority under Article 203 to supervise subordinate courts and was justified in dismissing the transfer applications, especially after a reference alleging bias against the Presiding Judge was dismissed for insufficient grounds. The Court affirmed the Chief Justice's role as the administrative head responsible for protecting the judiciary from undue executive influence. It clarified that remarks on professional conduct in the impugned order, made without due inquiry, are not binding or determinative in future proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of the Chief Justice of a High Court's supervisory authority over subordinate courts under Article 203 of the Constitution?
  • Can a Chief Justice of a High Court dismiss transfer applications for cases from subordinate courts if the underlying allegations of bias lack merit?
  • Are remarks made by a Chief Justice regarding the professional conduct of judicial officers or state functionaries, without due inquiry, binding in future proceedings?
  • Is the Chief Justice of a High Court duty-bound to protect Presiding Judges of the District Judiciary from undue executive influence?
  • Under what circumstances should an administrative action by a Chief Justice, taken under Article 203 of the Constitution, be disturbed by a higher court?
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• Asjad Ullah Versus Mst. Asia Bano2025 PLD 541 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-04-22
  child custodyminor's welfarenatural guardianmother's remarriagefather's rightsGuardian and Wards Actbest interests of the childUNCRCcustody applicationvisitation rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged the concurrent dismissal of a father's application for the custody of his minor daughter, which had been upheld by the High Court. The central legal question addressed was whether a father, who had resided abroad since the minor's birth and never met her, could claim custody solely on the ground of being the natural guardian, especially when the natural mother had contracted a second marriage. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, refusing leave, affirming the lower courts' findings. The Court held that the welfare and best interests of the minor are the prime and overriding consideration in custody matters, taking precedence over all other factors, including the father's right as a natural guardian or the mother's remarriage. A mother's remarriage does not automatically disentitle her from custody if the minor's welfare is best served by her continued care, and a father's prolonged absence and lack of involvement are significant factors.

  Questions settled

  • Can a father claim custody of a minor solely as a natural guardian if he has never met the child and resides abroad?
  • Does a mother's remarriage automatically disentitle her from the custody of a minor child?
  • What is the paramount consideration in determining an application for minor custody?
  • Does the welfare of the minor take precedence over the father's right as a natural guardian?
  • What factors are considered in determining the welfare of a minor in custody disputes?
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• Zahida Parveen Versus Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Elementary and Secondary Education, Civil Secretariat, Peshawar2025 PLD 529 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-03-17
  compassionate appointmentcivil service rulesgender discriminationexecutive constructionconstitutional personhoodstatutory interpretationultra vires
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition concerns the legality of a departmental clarification that excluded married daughters from eligibility for compassionate appointment under the deceased son/daughter quota. The petitioner, a Primary School Teacher appointed under Rule 10(4) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion, and Transfer) Rules, 1989, had her services terminated based on an executive clarification stating that married women are ineligible for such appointments. The core legal question was whether an executive authority could, through administrative clarification, restrict the scope of a statutory rule to exclude married daughters, and whether such exclusion violated constitutional guarantees. The Supreme Court held that the impugned clarification was ultra vires, discriminatory, and unconstitutional. The Court ruled that Rule 10(4) is inclusive and makes no distinction based on marital status. The key principle laid down is that executive construction cannot override or curtail the express language of statutory rules. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that marriage does not extinguish a woman's legal personhood or autonomy, and any administrative classification denying employment rights based on marital status violates the constitutional guarantees of equality, non-discrimination, and dignity.

  Questions settled

  • Can an executive clarification restrict or modify the scope of a statutory rule enacted under the Civil Servants Act?
  • Does the exclusion of married daughters from compassionate appointment under Rule 10(4) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion, and Transfer) Rules, 1989 violate the Constitution?
  • Is a woman's eligibility for compassionate appointment contingent upon her marital status under the existing civil service framework?
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• Justice Mohsin Akhtar Kayani, Judge Versus The President of Pakistan, Pak Secretariat, Islamabad2025 PLD 516 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-06-19
  transfer of High Court judgesArticle 200Article 175Aharmonious constructionIslamabad High CourtJudicial Commission of Pakistanindependence of judiciaryconstitutional petitions
  Summary & questions settled

  Constitutional petitions were filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging Notification No.F.10(2)/2024-A.II dated 1st February 2025, issued by the Ministry of Law and Justice, whereby the President of Pakistan transferred three High Court judges from Lahore High Court, Sindh High Court, and High Court of Balochistan to the Islamabad High Court under Article 200(1) of the Constitution. The core legal questions involved whether Article 200 permits the permanent transfer of High Court judges between High Courts and whether the requisite consultative process and public interest requirements were met. In his minority opinion, Afghan, J. held that Clause (1) and Clause (2) of Article 200 must be harmoniously construed together, establishing that Article 200 only provides for temporary transfers for a specified period and not permanent transfers. Permanent transfers by the President bypass the appointment mechanism under Article 175A and lack lawful authority. However, the majority bench disposed of the petitions by partially remanding the matter to the President.

  Questions settled

  • Does Article 200 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 permit the permanent transfer of a High Court judge to another High Court?
  • How must Clause (1) and Clause (2) of Article 200 of the Constitution be interpreted under the doctrine of harmonious construction?
  • Does the permanent transfer of High Court judges under Article 200 circumvent the judicial appointment process prescribed under Article 175A of the Constitution?
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• Abid Hussain Versus State2025 PLD 510 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-03-12
  murderocular evidencenatural witnessesrarest of rare doctrinedeath penaltybenefit of doubtdomestic violencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves criminal appeals against convictions for the murder of the appellants' wife and sister-in-law, respectively. The core legal question concerns the sufficiency of evidence to sustain convictions under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, specifically regarding the reliability of ocular testimony from family members and the application of the 'rarest of rare' doctrine for sentencing. The Court held that the conviction of the primary accused, Abid Hussain, was sound, as the testimony of his children was consistent, natural, and corroborated by medical and forensic evidence, justifying the death penalty for such a brutal act. Conversely, the Court acquitted the co-accused, Sabir Hussain, due to a lack of evidence establishing his presence or role in the commission of the offence. The judgment reaffirms that while ocular testimony from natural witnesses is highly probative, the prosecution must establish a clear nexus for every accused, and the death penalty is reserved for exceptionally heinous crimes that shock the collective conscience.

  Questions settled

  • Does the testimony of family members residing in the same house carry significant evidentiary value in a murder trial?
  • When is the imposition of the death penalty justified under the 'rarest of rare' doctrine?
  • Is a conviction sustainable against a co-accused when the prosecution fails to establish his presence or specific role at the crime scene?
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• Hidayat Khan Versus Mst. Nasreen2025 PLD 502 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-04-24
  leave to appealgift deeddeclaration of titleinheritance mutationconditional giftdelivery of possessionregistration of documentmarginal witnessesonus of proofexclusion of legal heirs
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal, filed under Article 185(3) of the Constitution, challenged the dismissal of a suit for declaration of title based on a gift deed and the invalidity of inheritance mutations. The petitioners claimed title to disputed property through a gift deed, which was contested by one defendant while others conceded. The trial court, appellate court, and High Court concurrently dismissed the suit and subsequent appeals/revisions. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, holding that the gift was conditional as possession was not delivered to the petitioners, and the donor retained possession during his lifetime, thus lacking a mandatory ingredient of a valid gift. The Court emphasized that a document creating future obligations or rights must be compulsorily registered under Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, read with Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Furthermore, such a document, when challenged, requires proof by two marginal witnesses as per Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, which was lacking. The petitioners also failed to justify the exclusion of other legal heirs. The concurrent findings of the lower courts were upheld, and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • What are the mandatory ingredients for proving a valid gift of immovable property?
  • Is a gift deed valid if the donor retains possession of the property during their lifetime?
  • What is the evidentiary requirement for proving an oral transaction of immovable property?
  • Is a document creating future obligations or rights compulsorily registrable?
  • What is the role of marginal witnesses in proving a challenged gift deed?
  • Does mere efflux of time extinguish the right of inheritance in cases of fraud?
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• Muhammad Naseer Butt Versus Additional District Judge, Lahore2025 PLD 499 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-05-06
  alternative dispute resolutionmediationfamily courtmaintenancesettlement agreementjudicial efficiency
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition challenging a High Court judgment that affirmed an appellate court's decision to enhance maintenance payments for the petitioner's daughters. The core legal question concerned the finality of the maintenance dispute and the potential for resolution through alternative mechanisms. Following years of protracted litigation, the Supreme Court referred the dispute to mediation under the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 2017. The parties reached a settlement agreement through this process. The Court held that the dispute should be resolved in accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement and directed the family court to draw up a decree accordingly. The judgment emphasizes that mediation represents a paradigm shift in dispute resolution, offering a non-adversarial framework that empowers parties to shape their own outcomes. It establishes the principle that courts must embrace a pro-mediation ethos, particularly in familial contexts, to mitigate the emotional and financial burdens of adversarial litigation, and that mediation should be considered a first resort rather than a last recourse to ensure efficient justice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court dispose of a pending petition for leave to appeal in terms of a mediation settlement agreement?
  • Does the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 2017 provide a valid legal framework for resolving family maintenance disputes?
  • Is the family court empowered to decree a suit based on a settlement agreement reached through mediation?
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• Shuhada Forum, Balochistan through Patron in Chief, Nawabzada Jamal Raisani, Quetta Cantt. Versus Justice (R) Jawwad S. Khawaja2025 PLD 482 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-05-07
  trial of civiliansmilitary courtscourts martialPakistan Army Actindependence of judiciaryfair trial and due processseparation of judiciary from executivefundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose regarding the constitutionality of subjecting civilians to court-martial trials under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952 ('PAA') for offences arising out of the occurrences of 9th May 2023. The core legal questions pertained to whether military courts could exercise jurisdiction over civilians without violating constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights, judicial independence, separation of powers, and international commitments. The Supreme Court held that the PAA is a disciplinary law applicable exclusively to members of the Armed Forces under Article 8(3)(a) of the Constitution and cannot exempt civilians from fundamental rights. Consequently, the court held that section 2(1)(d) of the PAA cannot be retained, and military courts, being executive bodies, lack constitutional jurisdiction to try civilians under Article 175, Article 245, and various fundamental rights. Setting aside all convictions and sentences awarded by courts martial to civilians, the Court directed the transfer of cases of under-trial prisoners to competent civilian courts and treated undergone sentences or acquittals as discharges under section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

  Questions settled

  • Whether civilians not otherwise subject to military discipline can be tried by courts martial under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952?
  • Does clause (d) of subsection (1) of section 2 of the Pakistan Army Act, 1952 qualify for exemption from fundamental rights under Article 8(3)(a) of the Constitution?
  • Is the trial of civilians by courts martial violative of the separation of judiciary from the executive under Article 175(3) and fundamental rights under Articles 9, 10, 10A, and 25 of the Constitution?
  • What is the legal effect on sentences and custody of civilians previously convicted or tried by courts martial upon declaration of such trials as being without jurisdiction?
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• Altaf Hussain Versus State2025 PLD 478 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-04-23
  illegal fishingtrawler confiscationconstructive knowledgemarine biodiversityfisheries ordinanceleave to appealvicarious liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenges a judgment of the High Court of Balochistan whereby the petitioner's trawler was confiscated following its involvement in illegal fishing under the Balochistan Sea Fisheries Ordinance, 1971. The core legal question concerned whether the registered proprietor of a vessel used in illegal fishing can claim lack of knowledge to avoid confiscation and liability. The Supreme Court held that as the owner who benefits from the vessel's operations, the petitioner bears constructive knowledge and responsibility for the illegal actions of his employees, and is not absolved of liability merely by claiming ignorance or lack of direct participation. The court established that vessel owners cannot evade statutory confiscation and accountability while profiting from illegal fishing activities, dismissing the petition and refusing leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the registered proprietor of a trawler avoid confiscation under the Balochistan Sea Fisheries Ordinance, 1971 by claiming a lack of knowledge regarding its illegal use?
  • Does a vessel owner bear constructive liability for illegal fishing activities conducted by employees on their property?
  • Whether a trawler used in illegal fishing is liable to confiscation even if the owner was not directly arrayed as an accused in the criminal case?
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• Aziz Ahmad Versus Mst. Musarat2025 PLD 469 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-04-09
  InheritanceDivorceTalaq-e-BiddatIddat periodMuslim Family Law Ordinance 1961SuccessionWidow's right to inheritDivorce effectiveness
  Summary & questions settled

  This Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that allowed a widow to inherit her deceased husband's estate, overturning lower courts' decisions. The core legal question was whether a wife, divorced through Talaq-e-Biddat, is entitled to inherit if her husband dies during her iddat period, specifically before the ninety-day statutory period mandated by the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961, has elapsed. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the High Court's finding. It held that the divorce had not become final as the husband died before the expiry of the ninety-day period stipulated in Section 7(3) of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961. The Court reiterated that succession opens at the time of death and emphasized that Talaq-e-Biddat is not rooted in divine command, and the statutory cooling-off period is consistent with Islamic principles of reconciliation and the sanctity of marriage.

  Questions settled

  • Is a wife divorced through Talaq-e-Biddat entitled to inherit her deceased husband's estate if his death occurs during her iddat period?
  • Does a talaq become effective immediately upon pronouncement, or is a statutory waiting period required?
  • When does succession open in cases involving divorce and death during the iddat period?
  • What is the legal effect of Section 7(3) of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961, on the finality of a divorce?
  • Can a wife inherit from her husband if he dies before the ninety-day period under the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961, has elapsed following a divorce pronouncement?
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• Muhammad Sajid Versus Mst. Shamsa Asghar2025 PLD 461 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-04-15Read full judgment →
• Senior Joint Director Foreign Exchange Operations Division SBP Versus Federation of Pakistan2025 PLD 440 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-03-20
  constitutional validityright of appealaccess to justicefair trialdue processpre-deposit conditionunreasonable restrictionIslamic injunctionsfundamental rightsForeign Exchange Regulation Act
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court considered a petition challenging the constitutionality of Section 23C(4) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, and Rule 8 of the Adjudication Proceedings and Appeal Rules, 1998. The core legal question was whether the mandatory pre-condition of depositing the penalty amount or furnishing equivalent security for admitting an appeal infringed upon fundamental rights. The Court dismissed the petition, affirming the Lahore High Court's decision to strike down the impugned provisions as unconstitutional. The Court held that the right of appeal is a substantive fundamental right, inherent in access to justice, fair trial, and due process, guaranteed by Articles 9 and 10A of the Constitution. Imposing an excessive and unreasonable financial condition for appeal admission amounts to a denial of this right, violating constitutional provisions, principles of natural justice, and Islamic injunctions of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Is a statutory provision requiring a pre-deposit of penalty amount or security as a condition for admitting an appeal constitutional?
  • Does the right of appeal constitute a fundamental right under the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Can the legislature impose conditions on the right of appeal that are deemed unreasonable or excessive?
  • Do Islamic injunctions support the right of an aggrieved party to appeal a decision?
  • Can a statutory provision be struck down if it is inconsistent with fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution?
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• Mushtaq Versus Mst. Fatima2025 PLD 434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-01-31
  dower recoverydower deedkabinnamasufficiency of evidenceFamily Courts ActQanun-e-Shahadatconstitutional jurisdictionmisapplication of lawleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that set aside lower court decrees dismissing a family suit for dower recovery. The Supreme Court considered two main questions: the sufficiency of evidence to prove a dower deed (kabinnama) and the High Court's constitutional authority to overturn findings in a family suit. The Court held that evidentiary requirements for dower deeds under the Family Courts Act 1964 are less stringent than those under Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984. It affirmed that the testimony of a single attesting witness, corroborated by other evidence, can be sufficient to prove a dower deed in family matters. Once proved, a non-rebuttable presumption arises regarding the dower amount. The Court further ruled that the High Court was justified in exercising its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199(1)(a)(ii) of the Constitution to correct the lower courts' clear misinterpretation and misapplication of legal principles. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • What is the standard of proof required for a dower deed (kabinnama) in a family suit?
  • Can the testimony of a single attesting witness be sufficient to prove a dower deed under the Family Courts Act 1964?
  • Does a non-rebuttable presumption arise regarding the dower amount once a dower deed is proved?
  • Can the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, overturn findings of lower courts in family suits if there is a clear misinterpretation or misapplication of law?
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• Muhammad Khan alias Mithu Versus State2025 PLD 425 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-02-17
  triple murderdeath sentencelife imprisonmentcondonation of delayPakistan Prisons Rulesocular evidencemotivemitigating circumstancesinterested witnesscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment concerns an appeal against conviction and death sentence for triple murder. The Supreme Court first addressed an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal, noting the appellant's long incarceration and the Jail Superintendent's duty under Pakistan Prisons Rules, 1978, to facilitate appeals. Citing the liberal application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the Court condoned the delay. On merits, the Court upheld the appellant's conviction under Section 302(b), Pakistan Penal Code, finding the ocular account reliable and confidence-inspiring despite being from related witnesses, as no ulterior motive for false implication was established. The Court reiterated that trustworthy ocular evidence takes precedence over medical evidence. However, due to the prosecution's failure to prove the alleged motive, minor inconsistencies in evidence, and the appellant's long incarceration, the death sentence on three counts was converted to imprisonment for life on three counts, to run concurrently. Compensation under Section 544-A, Code of Criminal Procedure, was maintained.

  Questions settled

  • Can delay in filing an appeal be condoned for a convict in jail, considering the Jail Superintendent's duties?
  • Is the testimony of related or interested witnesses sufficient for conviction in a murder case?
  • Does trustworthy ocular evidence prevail over medical evidence in a criminal trial?
  • What are the consequences for the prosecution if a set-up motive is not proven?
  • Can minor inconsistencies in prosecution evidence serve as a mitigating circumstance for sentencing?
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• Federation of Pakistan through Revenue Division Versus Dewan Motors (Pvt.) Ltd.2025 PLD 394 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-01-28
  jurisdictionconstitutional benchregular benchvires of lawconstitutional interpretationSupreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023Article 191Acoram non judicejudicial overreachcase fixation
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court addressed civil petitions challenging the vires of subsection (2) of Section 221-A of the Customs Act, 1969, and, more critically, the jurisdictional competence of its benches. The core legal question revolved around whether a 'Regular Bench' could hear matters involving the constitutionality of a law or interpretation of the Constitution, particularly after the enactment of Article 191A of the Constitution and the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023. The Court held that orders previously passed by a Regular Bench in these cases were without jurisdiction and lawful authority, and thus recalled them. It was firmly established that only a 'Constitutional Bench,' as defined by Article 191A, possesses the jurisdiction to hear cases involving the original, appellate (where constitutionality of law or substantial question of constitutional interpretation is involved), and advisory jurisdictions of the Supreme Court. The Court emphasized that jurisdiction is conferred by law, not assumed by judicial order, and any act without jurisdiction is coram non judice and void.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Regular Bench of the Supreme Court exercise jurisdiction over matters involving the constitutionality of any law or a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution?
  • What is the effect of orders passed by a court or bench without lawful jurisdiction?
  • What is the role of the Committees constituted under Article 191A(4) of the Constitution and Section 2(1) of the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023, in determining bench composition and jurisdiction?
  • Does the 26th Constitutional Amendment, specifically Article 191A, clearly delineate the jurisdictional boundaries between Regular and Constitutional Benches of the Supreme Court?
  • Can a court, by a judicial order, confer or enlarge jurisdiction upon itself or any other court, tribunal, or authority?
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• Syed Masood Ali Versus Mst. Feroza Begum2025 PLD 339 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-12-26Read full judgment →
• Versus , Salahuddin Ahmed2025 PLD 280 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• 2025 PLD 2742025 PLD 274 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-01-22
  contempt of courtjudicial independenceadministrative ordersSupreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act 2023case fixationconstitutional benchjudicial ordersArticle 191A
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns contempt proceedings initiated against the Additional Registrar (Judicial) of the Supreme Court for failing to fix specific cases for hearing in compliance with a judicial order. The Registrar justified the non-compliance by citing administrative decisions made by Committees constituted under Section 2 of the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023, and Article 191A of the Constitution, which purportedly withdrew the cases from the regular Bench. The Court identified substantial questions of law regarding whether such Committees possess the authority to withdraw cases already seized by a regular Bench and whether administrative orders can override or undo judicial orders. The Court emphasized that all executive and judicial authorities must act in aid of judicial orders under Article 190 of the Constitution. The proceedings were adjourned to address whether the administrative actions of these Committees infringe upon the independence of the judiciary and the finality of judicial orders, with the Court appointing amici curiae to assist in determining these constitutional and procedural issues.

  Questions settled

  • Do Committees constituted under Section 2 of the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 and Article 191A of the Constitution have the authority to withdraw a case already seized by a regular Bench?
  • Can an administrative order issued by a Committee override or undo the effect of a judicial order regarding the fixation of a case?
  • Does the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 envisage any divisibility within the Supreme Court regarding the exercise of judicial power?
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• Abdul Salam Khan Versus Bank Al-Habib Ltd.2025 PLD 1043 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-07-18Read full judgment →
• Saleh Muhammad Versus Mst. Mehnaz Begum2025 PLD 1039 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-06-30
  Leave to appealConcurrent findingsDowerMaintenanceDowry articlesAbuse of processExemplary costsDignity of womenFrivolous litigationInfertility
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court dismissed a husband's petition for leave to appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts which had allowed the respondent-wife's claim for dower, dowry articles, and maintenance. The Court reiterated that it would not disturb concurrent findings unless there was a legal error apparent on the record, which was not found in this case. A significant aspect of the judgment addressed the petitioner-husband's persistent and aggressive allegations challenging the respondent-wife's identity as a "female" and her medical fitness for conjugal rights and childbearing, which were pursued through three tiers of judicial scrutiny despite being repeatedly refuted by medical examinations and court findings. The Court held that infertility is not a ground to deny dower or maintenance or to challenge a woman's womanhood, condemning such allegations as an abuse of process and an affront to human dignity. The Court emphasized the constitutional and moral obligation to safeguard the personal dignity of all litigants, especially vulnerable women, and imposed exemplary costs of Rs. 500,000/- on the petitioner for misusing the judicial process to inflict gratuitous humiliation.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court disturb concurrent findings of lower courts?
  • Can a husband deny dower or maintenance to his wife on grounds of her alleged infertility?
  • Is challenging a wife's identity as a 'female' to deny dower and maintenance considered an abuse of judicial process?
  • What measures can courts take to deter frivolous and humiliating litigation, especially against vulnerable parties?
  • Is infertility a valid legal ground to challenge a woman's entitlement to dower or maintenance?
  Read full judgment →
• Public Interest Law Association of Pakistan Meherbano Ahsanuddin Versus Federation of Pakistan2024 PLD 978 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-07-01Read full judgment →
• The Monal Group of Companies, Islamabad Versus Capital Development Authority2024 PLD 925 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-08-21
  environmental protectionnational parkencroachmentfundamental rightspublic interest litigationzoning regulationsstate land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeal against an Islamabad High Court order regarding the illegal operation of commercial restaurants within the Margalla Hills National Park. The core legal question was whether commercial activities, specifically restaurant operations, are permissible within a designated National Park under applicable environmental and zoning laws. The Supreme Court held that the National Park is a protected area where commercial construction is prohibited, and any lease, license, or allotment granted by the Capital Development Authority or other entities for such purposes is void. The Court affirmed that the Remount, Veterinary and Farms Directorate lacks legal status to lease state land. The ratio establishes that the protection of ecosystems and natural habitats is inextricably linked to the fundamental right to life under Article 9 of the Constitution. Consequently, the Court ordered the immediate vacation, sealing, and demolition of the illegal structures to restore the National Park, emphasizing that the State and its functionaries have an inviolable constitutional duty to preserve natural heritage for future generations, superseding private commercial interests.

  Questions settled

  • Can commercial activities or restaurant operations be legally permitted within a designated National Park?
  • Does the Remount, Veterinary and Farms Directorate possess the legal authority to lease land located within a National Park?
  • Is the protection of ecosystems and natural habitats a constitutional obligation linked to the right to life?
  • Can a lease agreement for commercial use of land within a National Park be declared void if it violates environmental protection statutes?
  Read full judgment →
• Umar Farooq Versus Sajjad Ahmad Qamar2024 PLD 688 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-30
  General Elections 2024nomination papersscrutiny of nomination papersproclaimed offenderfugitive from justiceabscondercandidate affidavitElection Commission of Pakistaninterim order
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil petitions for leave to appeal were converted into appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging the High Court's judgments which had set aside the Appellate Tribunal's orders accepting the appellant's nomination papers for National and Provincial Assembly seats in the General Elections 2024. The nomination papers had been contested primarily on grounds of non-disclosure of a pending criminal FIR in an affidavit and the appellant's alleged abscondance and failure to attend scrutiny in person. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the High Court's judgments, restoring the acceptance of nomination papers. The Court held that section 62(2) of the Elections Act 2017 makes personal attendance at scrutiny permissive rather than mandatory. Furthermore, an alleged absconder or proclaimed offender is not disentitled from contesting elections under the Constitution or the Act. The Court additionally ruled that the requirement of an additional affidavit under Habib Akram (PLD 2018 SC 678) was merely an interim measure applicable only to the 2018 election cycle, and its non-compliance or omission in subsequent elections entails no legal penalty or disqualification.

  Questions settled

  • Is a candidate legally mandated under section 62(2) of the Elections Act 2017 to be personally present before the Returning Officer at the time of scrutiny of nomination papers?
  • Does being an alleged absconder or a proclaimed offender disentitle a person from contesting elections under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 or the Elections Act 2017?
  • Did the interim affidavit requirement mandated in the Supreme Court judgment of Habib Akram (PLD 2018 SC 678) continue to apply to the General Elections of 2024 and subsequent election cycles?
  • Can the Election Commission of Pakistan alter the form or content of nomination papers prescribed by Parliament under the Elections Act 2017 through subordinate legislation or instructions without primary legislative amendment?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence Rawalpindi Versus Akhtar Ullah Khan Khattak2024 PLD 218 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-12-14
  land acquisitionwithdrawal from acquisitionvesting of landpossession of landeminent domainstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns land acquisition proceedings initiated by the Ministry of Defence, which sought to withdraw from the acquisition of land after possession had been taken and an award finalized. The core legal question was whether the acquiring authority retains the power to withdraw from acquisition under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, once possession of the land has already been transferred to the government. The Supreme Court held that the power to withdraw under Section 48(1) is strictly limited to instances where possession of the land has not yet been taken. Upon the taking of possession, the land vests absolutely in the government, rendering the acquisition process complete and irrevocable. Consequently, the Court ruled that the notification issued by the authorities to withdraw from the acquisition was invalid, illegal, and without jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that the statutory power to withdraw from land acquisition is extinguished the moment possession is taken, as the land then vests in the state, and the government cannot unilaterally rescind the acquisition due to a lack of funds or other administrative reasons.

  Questions settled

  • Can the government withdraw from land acquisition proceedings under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, after possession of the land has been taken?
  • Does the taking of possession of land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, vest the land absolutely in the government?
  • Is the power to withdraw from land acquisition under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, available to the acquiring authority after an award has been finalized and possession taken?
  Read full judgment →
• Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan Versus Federation of Pakistan, Islamabad2024 PLD 1199 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-10-10
  civil reviewdeflectionarticle 63avote of no-confidencelifelong disqualificationconstitutional interpretationsupreme court practice and procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil review petition was filed to review the majority short order and detailed judgment in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2022 SC 488 and PLD 2023 SC 42), which had interpreted Article 63A of the Constitution of Pakistan to mandate that votes cast by defecting parliamentarians should not be counted and that such members suffered lifelong disqualification. A five-member bench heard the review. The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the review petition, setting aside the majority short order and judgment. The Court held that the clear, unambiguous, and self-executory language of Article 63A prescribes a specific procedure involving the Party Head, the Election Commission, and an appeal to the Supreme Court, and does not permit judicial rewriting, reading words into the Constitution, discarding tainted votes, or imposing lifelong disqualification. The Court affirmed that constitutional provisions must be interpreted strictly according to their plain meaning without importing moralisms, and that courts cannot arrogate jurisdiction or circumvent explicitly laid down constitutional mechanisms.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the interpretation of Article 63A of the Constitution by the majority judgment adding the consequence of disregarding votes and lifelong disqualification is sustainable?
  • Can the Supreme Court or any court read into the Constitution a disqualification or jurisdiction not expressly provided by the text?
  • Whether the provisions of Article 63A of the Constitution are self-executory and exclude judicial intervention prior to the prescribed determination by the Election Commission?
  • Does a vote cast contrary to a parliamentary party direction warrant the rejection and non-counting of such vote under the existing constitutional framework?
  Read full judgment →
• 2024 PLD 11632024 PLD 1163 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-09-12
  contempt of courtfreedom of pressfreedom of speechdignity of manmedia accountabilitydefamationexpiation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns contempt proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court of Pakistan against various television channels for broadcasting false and contemptuous material regarding the Court and its Judges. The core legal question addressed was whether the unconditional apologies and undertakings provided by the media organizations, combined with a commitment to broadcast specific corrective content, constituted sufficient expiation to warrant the withdrawal of contempt notices. The Court held that while Article 19 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 guarantees freedom of speech and the press, this right is not absolute and does not supersede the fundamental right to dignity and privacy under Article 14. The Court accepted the unqualified apologies and undertakings as a mitigating factor and a form of expiation, consequently withdrawing the show cause notices. The key principle established is that media freedom is subject to constitutional restrictions, including the protection of human dignity, and that broadcasters bear a responsibility to verify the truth of information, as the dissemination of slander undermines institutional credibility and democratic values.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right to freedom of speech and press under Article 19 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 take precedence over the right to dignity and privacy under Article 14?
  • Can an unqualified apology and an undertaking to broadcast corrective content serve as sufficient expiation for contempt of court?
  • Is a broadcaster legally responsible for verifying the truth of defamatory material even if they are not the originator of the slander?
  Read full judgment →
• Hamza Rasheed Khan Versus Election Appellate Tribunal, Lahore High Court, Lahore2024 PLD 1028 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-03-25
  Article 62(1)(f)lifelong disqualificationelectoral disqualificationfundamental rightsself-executory provisionjudicial precedentstare decisisright to contest elections
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional-legal matter before a seven-member Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the interpretation and duration of disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of Pakistan, specifically revisiting the rule laid down in Sami Ullah Baloch v. Abdul Karim Nousherwani (PLD 2018 SC 405) that such disqualification was permanent and lifelong. The core legal questions involved whether Article 62(1)(f) is self-executory, which court is competent to issue a declaration under it, whether such disqualification can be permanent, and how it interacts with fundamental rights and section 232(2) of the Elections Act, 2017. By a majority of 6 to 1, the Court held that Article 62(1)(f) is not a self-executory provision as it lacks specified courts, procedures, and duration, and that imposing a lifetime disqualification through implied civil declarations abridges fundamental rights to contest elections under Article 17(2). Consequently, the Court overruled the Sami Ullah Baloch judgment, ruling that Article 62(1)(f) does not impose a permanent disqualification in the absence of an enabling legislative framework, thus disposing of the connected appeals and petitions accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Is Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of Pakistan a self-executory provision?
  • Whether the interpretation of Article 62(1)(f) in the Sami Ullah Baloch case imposing a permanent disqualification is legally correct?
  • Does a court of civil jurisdiction have the authority to issue a declaration under Article 62(1)(f) resulting in lifetime disqualification?
  • How does the disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) reconcile with the fundamental right to contest elections enshrined in Article 17(2) of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Gufran Ali Versus Haseeb Khan2023 PLD 536 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-05-23
  juvenilitydetermination of ageossification testconflicting age documentsbenefit of doubtexpert report evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 was filed by the complainant challenging the Islamabad High Court's order upholding the Trial Court's declaration that the respondent-accused was a juvenile at the time of the alleged murder. The core issue was the determination of the accused's age amidst conflicting birth documents and varying age estimates provided by different departments in a medical board report following an ossification test. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal, affirming the decisions of the lower courts. The Court held that where documentary evidence of age is disputed and conflicting, an ossification test serves as the best method to determine age. Furthermore, where multiple reasonable opinions or views arise from medical or other evidence, the view most favorable to the accused must be adopted. The Court also reiterated that under Section 510 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, an expert report may be admitted as evidence without requiring the expert to be called or cross-examined.

  Questions settled

  • How is an accused person's age to be determined when documentary evidence of birth is conflicting or disputed?
  • Which view should a court adopt when a medical board report provides multiple or varying estimates of an accused's age?
  • Can an expert medical board report be admitted as evidence without calling the medical experts to testify?
  Read full judgment →
• Abid Shahid Zuberi Versus Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Cabinet Division, Islamabad2023 PLD 493 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-05-26
  inquiry commissionseparation of powerssupreme judicial counciljudicial misconductright to privacyaudio leaksinterim reliefindependence of judiciary
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a constitutional challenge to a notification issued by the Federal Government for the appointment of an Inquiry Commission under the Pakistan Commissions of Inquiry Act, 2017, to investigate leaked audio recordings involving conversations of persons connected to or including judges of superior courts. The core legal questions concern whether the Executive's appointment of sitting judges and formulation of terms of reference infringe upon the constitutional principle of separation of powers, encroach upon the exclusive domain of the Supreme Judicial Council under Article 209 of the Constitution regarding judicial misconduct, and violate fundamental rights to privacy and dignity under Articles 9 and 14. The Supreme Court held, prima facie, that the unilateral constitution of the Commission without the requisite permission of the Chief Justice of Pakistan breached settled constitutional principles, and that the inquiry intruded into exclusive judicial functions. Consequently, the Court suspended the operation of the impugned notification and the consequent proceedings of the Commission pending the next hearing. The key principles laid down relate to the trichotomy of powers, the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Judicial Council over judicial misconduct, and the protection of judicial independence and privacy.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the appointment of sitting judges to an Inquiry Commission by the Federal Government without the permission of the Chief Justice of Pakistan violates constitutional principles?
  • Does an inquiry into leaked audio recordings involving superior court judges by an executive-formed commission trench upon the exclusive domain of the Supreme Judicial Council under Article 209 of the Constitution?
  • Whether the unilateral constitution of an Inquiry Commission by the Executive violates the principle of separation of powers and judicial independence?
  • Does the surveillance and interception of communications without statutory backing violate the fundamental rights to dignity and privacy under Articles 9 and 14 of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Zahid Hussain Shah Versus Mumtaz Ali2023 PLD 470 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-05-09Read full judgment →
• Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan Versus Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Interior Islamabad2023 PLD 42 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-05-17
  anti-defectionArticle 63Apresidential referenceparliamentary democracypolitical partiesfundamental rightsdisqualificationconstitutional interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court addressed a Presidential Reference concerning the interpretation of Article 63A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, which governs disqualification on grounds of defection. The core legal question was whether Article 63A should be construed narrowly as a complete code providing only for the de-seating of a defector, or robustly to include the disregarding of votes cast contrary to party direction and potential lifetime disqualification. The Court held, by a majority, that Article 63A cannot be read in isolation but is inextricably intertwined with Article 17(2), which guarantees the fundamental rights of political parties. The Court ruled that Article 63A must be interpreted in a purposive and robust manner to protect the "healthy" operating of political parties, which are essential to parliamentary democracy. Consequently, the Court held that votes cast by a member contrary to party direction must be disregarded, regardless of whether defection proceedings are initiated. The judgment establishes that constitutional provisions must be expounded as a "living tree," evolving to meet the demands of the democratic system and ensuring party cohesion against the "cancerous" vice of defection.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Article 63A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 can be interpreted to disregard votes cast by a member contrary to party direction?
  • Does Article 63A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 constitute a complete code in itself or must it be read in conjunction with Article 17(2)?
  • Whether a declaration of defection under Article 63A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 can lead to lifetime disqualification under Article 62(1)(f)?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Sibtain Khan Versus Election Commission of Pakistan through Chief Election Commissioner, Islamabad Syed Ali Zafar2023 PLD 406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-04-04
  general electionselection commissionPunjab Assemblyextension of election dateconstitutional obligationelection programmefunds and security
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a constitutional challenge to the order of the Election Commission of Pakistan dated 22.03.2023, whereby the Commission purported to extend the date of the general elections to the Punjab Assembly beyond the constitutional timeframe. The core legal question was whether the Election Commission possesses the power under the Constitution or the law to extend election dates beyond the 90-day period stipulated in Article 224(2) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the Election Commission has no such power and declared its order unconstitutional, void ab-initio, and of no legal effect. The Court revived and restored the original Election Programme with necessary modifications, rescheduling the polling day to 14.05.2023, and issued comprehensive directions to the Federal Government, the Punjab Government, and security authorities to provide necessary funds, security personnel, and administrative aid and assistance to the Commission pursuant to Articles 148(3), 218(3), 220, and 243(1) of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Election Commission of Pakistan have the power to extend the date of elections beyond the 90 days period provided in Article 224(2) of the Constitution?
  • Can the Supreme Court revive and modify a notified Election Programme when an unlawful order has disrupted its timeline?
  • What are the constitutional duties of the Federal and Provincial Governments regarding the provision of funds and security for holding general elections?
  Read full judgment →
• Zafaran Khan Versus Nizam Ullah2023 PLD 371 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-01-24
  public appointmentprocedural irregularitydiscretionary jurisdictionliberty to workbackdoor appointmentwrit jurisdictionservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Peshawar High Court judgment that annulled the appellants' appointments to public office due to the failure to advertise vacancies in newspapers. The core legal question is whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 to set aside these appointments based on this procedural irregularity. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the High Court's decision was unfair. The Court reasoned that the lack of newspaper advertisement was a bona fide lapse caused by local insurgency, and the appointments were otherwise merit-based, not "backdoor" entries. The Court emphasized that employment is a fundamental aspect of the "liberty to work" protected by the Constitution. Consequently, the Court established that procedural irregularities in recruitment may be condoned where the process was otherwise transparent, the appointees were qualified, and annulment would cause undue hardship to long-serving employees without evidence of malice or favoritism. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the original writ petition dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court exercise discretionary jurisdiction to annul public appointments solely on the ground of a procedural irregularity in the advertisement process?
  • Does the failure to advertise government vacancies in newspapers automatically render an appointment illegal?
  • What factors should a court consider when evaluating the validity of a government appointment challenged on procedural grounds?
  • Is the right to work a fundamental right protected under the Constitution of Pakistan?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Imtiyaz Versus Ch. Muhammad Naeem2023 PLD 306 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-02-28Read full judgment →
• Efu General Insurance Limited Versus Zhongxing Telecom Pakistan (Private) Limited (Zte)2022 PLD 809 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-06-08
  demand guaranteebank guaranteestrict complianceautonomous contractencashmentcommercial lawperformance bond
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the enforcement of a demand guarantee issued by the petitioner, EFU General Insurance Limited, in favor of the respondent, Zhongxing Telecom Pakistan (Private) Limited. The core legal question was whether the respondent’s demand for encashment complied with the specific terms of the guarantee, which required a written statement confirming a breach of contract by the sub-contractor. The Supreme Court held that the demand was deficient because the respondent’s letter was primarily an extension request rather than a categorical assertion of breach. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the respondent's suit. The judgment establishes that demand guarantees constitute autonomous contracts, necessitating strict compliance with their terms. While the Court acknowledged the potential for a 'substantial compliance' test, it emphasized that this threshold is high and rarely met. The decision reinforces that issuers of demand guarantees are not liable unless the beneficiary’s demand strictly adheres to the conditions stipulated in the instrument, ensuring the autonomy and commercial certainty of such financial guarantees.

  Questions settled

  • Does the rule of strict compliance apply to demands made under a bank guarantee?
  • Is a bank guarantee considered an autonomous contract independent of the underlying dispute between the parties?
  • Can a beneficiary successfully enforce a demand guarantee without strictly complying with the notice requirements stipulated in the instrument?
  Read full judgment →
• Uzma Naveed Chaudhary Versus Federation of Pakistan2022 PLD 783 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-07-27
  sexual harassmentworkplace harassmentconstitutional jurisdictionfundamental rightsgender equalityright to dignityright to livelihoodservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against an Islamabad High Court judgment regarding a sexual harassment complaint filed by female employees against a supervisor under the Protection against Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, 2010. The core legal questions were whether the High Court could interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the Federal Ombudsman and the President, and whether the President's enhancement of the penalty was legally sustainable. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in interfering with concurrent factual findings absent misreading or non-reading of evidence. It further ruled that the President's enhancement of punishment was justified and adequately reasoned, noting that reasons for penalty enhancement need not be listed separately but can be part of the overall discussion. The Court established that delay in reporting sexual harassment is understandable due to social taboos and should not be fatal to a complaint. It emphasized that a safe working environment is a fundamental right under the Constitution, and the Act must be interpreted to promote gender equality, dignity, and the protection of all persons, including transgender individuals.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the Federal Ombudsman and the President in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Is a delay in reporting sexual harassment a valid ground to dismiss a complaint under the Protection against Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, 2010?
  • Must reasons for the enhancement of a penalty be provided under a separate heading in an administrative order?
  • Does the right to a safe working environment constitute a fundamental right under the Constitution of Pakistan?
  Read full judgment →
• Salamat Mansha Masih Versus State2022 PLD 751 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-08-23
  post-arrest bailblasphemyfair trialdue processcorroboration of evidenceIslamic jurisprudencecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail regarding FIRs registered under sections 295-A, 295-B, and 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, alleging blasphemous acts. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the evidentiary record and the circumstances of the case. The Supreme Court granted bail, holding that the prosecution's case, resting solely on the uncorroborated testimony of four witnesses, lacked sufficient material to justify continued incarceration, particularly as no incriminating evidence was recovered. The Court emphasized that in cases involving religious offenses, the State must conduct diligent, impartial investigations. It laid down that where oral testimony appears improbable, corroboration is essential to ensure a fair trial and uphold due process. Furthermore, the Court highlighted that the principle of "avoiding punishments in case of doubt" is a pivotal tenet of Islamic jurisprudence and must be rigorously applied. The Court also criticized the trial court's defective framing of charges, stressing that accused persons must be clearly informed of the specific case they are required to answer.

  Questions settled

  • Is corroboration of witness testimony required in cases involving religious offenses where the evidence is purely oral and improbable?
  • Does the principle of "avoiding punishments in case of doubt" apply to the adjudication of religious offenses under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • What are the legal requirements for a validly framed charge in a criminal trial?
  • Does the State have an exclusive responsibility to prosecute offenses relating to religion under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Raja Ali Zaman Versus Evacuee Trust Property Board2022 PLD 726 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-08-04Read full judgment →
• Hadayat Ullah Versus Federation of Pakistan2022 PLD 64 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-12-17
  sacked employeesreinstatementreview petitionsfundamental rightsultra vireslegislative supremacySupreme Court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  These review petitions arose from matters concerning the constitutional validity of the Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010. By a majority decision, the review petitions were dismissed, holding the impugned legislation to be violative of Articles 4, 9, 18, and 25 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, and therefore void under Article 8. However, invoking its jurisdiction under Articles 184(3) and 187 of the Constitution, the Court issued specific molded relief regarding the terms, conditions, and restoration of the affected employees, distinguishing between those requiring aptitude or skill tests upon initial appointment and excluding employees terminated for misconduct, absence, corruption, or medical unfitness whose terminations had attained finality. The Court laid down that legislative enactments violating fundamental rights are void under Article 8, while balancing the rights of reinstated employees with those of existing regular employees and preserving the constitutional limits of judicial review.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010 violative of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Can the Supreme Court exercise powers under Articles 184(3) and 187 of the Constitution to mold relief for reinstated employees?
  • Does the reinstatement and regularization of sacked employees on one scale higher violate the rights of existing regular employees?
  • Do employees terminated for misconduct or corruption fall within the legitimate class of politically victimized employees entitled to beneficial treatment under the law?
  Read full judgment →
• Abbas Haider Naqvi Versus Federation of Pakistan2022 PLD 562 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-05-25
  acquittalcriminal breach of trustentrustmentcorruptionfiduciary capacityquashment of referenceaviation fuel
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from two constitutional petitions filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, challenging the dismissal of an application for acquittal under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and an application for transfer of trial. The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) alleged that the petitioners, employees of an oil marketing company, illegally sold aviation fuel (JP-I) in the open market as Super Kerosene Oil, causing a loss to the public exchequer and committing corruption under Section 9 of the National Accountability Ordinance 1999. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the alleged acts constituted criminal breach of trust under Sections 405 and 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Court held that entrustment of property in a fiduciary capacity is an essential ingredient of criminal breach of trust. Since the employer-company purchased the fuel in its own right, it became the owner, and no entrustment existed. Consequently, no offence under the National Accountability Ordinance 1999 was made out. The Court allowed the appeal, accepted the Section 265-K application, acquitted the petitioners, and quashed the reference.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court entertain and decide an application for acquittal under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 at a later stage of the trial if the grounds do not require appraisal of evidence?
  • Is entrustment of property an essential ingredient to constitute the offence of criminal breach of trust under Section 405 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the violation of regulatory directives or priorities regarding the distribution of a purchased commodity alter the commercial transaction into a contract of trust or constitute criminal breach of trust?
  Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Muhammad Akbar Versus Abdul Jalil2022 PLD 558 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-05-26Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Nawaz Versus State2022 PLD 523 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-05-23
  common objectcommon intentionunlawful assemblyindividual liabilityqatl-e-amdtazkiya-tul-shahoodremand of casecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from a judgment wherein the appellants were convicted for murder and attempted murder under the Pakistan Penal Code and the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The core legal question concerns the legal propriety of a trial court framing charges based on an unlawful assembly and common object under Sections 148 and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code, yet subsequently deciding the case and assigning guilt on the basis of individual liability without a definite finding regarding common intention or common object. The Supreme Court held that courts must render a definite, reasoned finding at the conclusion of a trial regarding whether an offence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code was committed in furtherance of common intention or common object, or purely on the basis of individual liability, failing which a judgment delivered in defiance of this principle is legally flawed. The Court laid down mandatory guidelines for trial courts regarding charge-framing, evaluation of evidence, and judgment writing, and remanded the matter back to the trial court to rewrite the judgment strictly in accordance with these guidelines.

  Questions settled

  • Is it legally permissible for a trial court to frame charges based on common object under Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code but deliver a judgment based on individual liability without a definite finding?
  • What are the mandatory guidelines for trial courts regarding the application of Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code in relation to common intention and common object?
  • How must a trial court evaluate the elements of common intention versus individual liability when rendering a judgment in a murder trial?
  • What is the legal consequence when judgments from both the trial court and high court fail to assign a definite finding regarding the applicability of common object or common intention?
  Read full judgment →
• Abid Hussain Versus Muhammad Yousaf2022 PLD 395 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-03
  Hibagift to minorrevocation of giftMuslim lawnatural guardiandelivery of possessionprohibited degrees
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from concurrent judgments of the lower courts and the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' suit regarding a property dispute. The core legal question centered on whether a gift of immovable property made by a father to his minor child under Muhammadan Law in 1952 could be validly revoked by the father in 1970 after possession had been accepted by the minor's mother, and whether such a revocation was lawful without a court decree. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a gift made to a relation within the prohibited degrees, particularly by a father to his minor child, is irrevocable once completed and possession is accepted by a guardian. Furthermore, the Court held that the Transfer of Property Act does not apply to oral hiba under Muslim Law, physical possession is not strictly required from a father to a minor child where bona fide intention exists, and revocation cannot be sustained without a proper court decree.

  Questions settled

  • Can a gift of immovable property made by a father to his minor child under Muhammadan Law be revoked by the father after delivery of possession?
  • Does the Transfer of Property Act 1882 apply to oral gifts or Hiba under Muslim Law?
  • Is a registered deed of revocation alone sufficient to revoke a completed gift under Muhammadan Law without obtaining a court decree?
  • Does limitation run against a void transaction where a gift revocation is non est in the eyes of the law?
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• Noor Muhammad Versus Muhammad Ashraf2022 PLD 248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-07Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Multan Zone, Rto, Multan Versus Falah Ud Din Qureshi2021 PLD 940 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-10-12Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arshad Nadeem Versus State2021 PLD 927 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-07-13
  post-arrest bailcondonation of delaysufficient causejail petitionright to libertyfair trialprohibitory clausejudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order declining post-arrest bail, accompanied by an application for condonation of a 72-day delay in filing. The core legal questions are whether the petitioner's incarceration constitutes 'sufficient cause' for condoning the delay and whether the High Court's refusal of bail was legally justified. The Court held that the incarceration of a petitioner seeking post-arrest bail constitutes 'sufficient cause' to condone delay, as prisoners face restricted access to legal remedies, and such an approach aligns with constitutional rights to liberty and fair trial. However, on the merits, the Court dismissed the petition, finding that the High Court’s refusal of bail was neither arbitrary nor perverse, as there was sufficient incriminating material on record. The Court affirmed that bail is not a punishment but a preventive measure, and the Supreme Court will not interfere with the High Court's discretion in bail matters unless it is exercised arbitrarily, perversely, or contrary to settled legal principles.

  Questions settled

  • Does the incarceration of a petitioner seeking post-arrest bail constitute 'sufficient cause' for condoning a delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's exercise of discretion in declining post-arrest bail?
  • Is the refusal of bail to an accused involved in offences falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 considered a punitive measure?
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• Human Rights Commission of Pakistan Versus Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Education2021 PLD 925 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-10-13
  Hindu Samaadhirestoration costsarrears of land revenuereligious site desecrationstate recoveryKhyber Pakhtunkhwa
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the restoration and financial accountability for the desecration and destruction of a Hindu Samaadhi located at Teri, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The core legal question addressed by the Supreme Court was whether the individuals responsible for the destruction could be held financially liable for the costs incurred by the provincial government in reconstructing and rehabilitating the site. The Court held that since the miscreants were identified and charged, they must bear the financial burden of the restoration. Consequently, the Court directed the Chief Secretary of the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to recover the total cost of Rs. 33.0669 million from the 123 identified accused persons. The Court ordered that this amount be divided among the accused and recovered as arrears of land revenue within one month. The principle laid down is that perpetrators of acts causing public damage to religious sites are liable to reimburse the state for the costs of restoration, and such recovery can be enforced through administrative mechanisms like the recovery of land revenue arrears to ensure the site's future maintenance.

  Questions settled

  • Can the government recover the costs of restoring a destroyed religious site from the individuals responsible for its destruction?
  • Is the recovery of restoration costs from identified miscreants permissible as arrears of land revenue?
  • Does the grant of bail to accused persons in criminal cases regarding site destruction preclude the state from recovering restoration costs from them?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Imran Versus State2021 PLD 903 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-08-05
  post-arrest bailprohibitory clausedishonouring chequesabscondenceproclaimed offenderrepetition of offencebail refusal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises out of an order passed by the Lahore High Court denying post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a case registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for dishonouring cheques. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to the concession of bail for an offence not falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, notwithstanding his previous criminal record and status as a proclaimed offender. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that while bail in offences outside the prohibitory clause is generally the rule and refusal the exception, the exceptions apply where there is a likelihood of abscondence or a propensity to repeat the offence. The Court laid down that a petitioner's involvement in multiple similar criminal cases and prolonged abscondence as a proclaimed offender bring the case within the recognized exceptions to the rule of bail, justifying its denial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail should be refused for an offence outside the prohibitory clause if the accused has a history of repeating the offence?
  • Does long-term abscondence and being declared a proclaimed offender constitute a valid exception to the grant of bail in non-prohibitory offences?
  • How do multiple criminal cases registered under the same offence affect the accused's entitlement to post-arrest bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Azam Saleem Versus State2021 PLD 894 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-08-06
  pre-arrest bailnon-prosecutionmaintainability of second bail petitionabuse of processdiscretionary reliefnon-appearance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of second pre-arrest bail petitions by the Lahore High Court. The core legal question was whether a second pre-arrest bail petition is maintainable after the first was dismissed for non-prosecution due to the accused's non-appearance, and whether the court should proceed to merits without first assessing the explanation for such absence. The Supreme Court held that the second pre-arrest bail petitions were not maintainable because the petitioners failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for their non-appearance in the first petitions. The Court affirmed that when a pre-arrest bail petition is dismissed for non-appearance under Section 498-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, a subsequent petition is only maintainable if the petitioner provides a valid, satisfactory explanation for the prior absence. If the explanation is unsatisfactory, the petition must be dismissed without reaching the merits. The Court further noted that the petitioners' conduct in failing to explain their absence amounted to an abuse of the court's process, disentitling them to discretionary relief.

  Questions settled

  • Is a second pre-arrest bail petition maintainable if the first was dismissed for non-prosecution due to the accused's non-appearance?
  • Must a court determine the validity of an explanation for non-appearance before deciding a second pre-arrest bail petition on its merits?
  • Does the failure to provide a satisfactory explanation for non-appearance in a prior bail petition constitute an abuse of the court's process?
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• Inam Ullah Versus State2021 PLD 892 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-08-13
  pre-arrest bailsuccessive bail petitionabuse of process of courtad interim bailwithdrawal of bail petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his second pre-arrest bail petition by the High Court, after his first petition for pre-arrest bail in a criminal case registered under sections 324, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was withdrawn without arguments on merits. The core legal question addressed was whether an accused person can file successive pre-arrest bail petitions and repeatedly obtain ad interim bail without providing a satisfactory explanation for the withdrawal of the prior petition. The Supreme Court held that while an accused may approach the court with a successive pre-arrest bail petition if the earlier one was withdrawn without a decision on merits, the court must not entertain the second petition or grant ad interim bail unless the accused furnishes a satisfactory explanation for the withdrawal of the first petition. The key principle laid down is that filing successive pre-arrest bail petitions without justifiable cause constitutes an abuse of the court process, and failure to provide a satisfactory explanation renders the second or successive pre-arrest bail petition non-maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused can file a successive pre-arrest bail petition after withdrawing the earlier one without arguments on merits?
  • Is it mandatory for an accused to furnish a satisfactory explanation for withdrawing a prior pre-arrest bail petition when filing a second petition?
  • What are the consequences if an accused fails to provide a satisfactory explanation for withdrawing an earlier pre-arrest bail petition and filing a fresh one?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rashid Versus State Ch. Ahmad Khan Gondal2021 PLD 804 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Rai Muhammad Riaz Versus Ejaz Ahmed2021 PLD 761 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-12-24Read full judgment →
• Lung Fung Chinese Restaurant, Lahore Versus Punjab Food Authority2021 PLD 684 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  food safetysealing of premisesproportionality principleprecautionary principlefundamental rightsadministrative discretiondue process
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a challenge to the actions of a Food Safety Officer (FSO) who sealed a restaurant under the Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011. The core legal question was whether the FSO possessed the lawful authority to seal business premises under section 13(1)(c) of the Act, and whether such power, if it existed, was consistent with constitutional protections. The Supreme Court held that the power of the FSO to seal premises under section 13(1)(c) was unconstitutional and illegal because the Act provided no legislative guidelines, parameters, or remedial mechanisms for such an action, rendering it arbitrary and discriminatory. The Court emphasized that food safety legislation must adhere to principles of proportionality, risk analysis, and scientific basis. It clarified that the 'precautionary principle' is applicable only in cases of scientific uncertainty regarding health risks, not for routine enforcement against unhygienic conditions. Consequently, the Court struck down the power to seal premises under section 13(1)(c) and the corresponding reference in section 31(2), ruling that enforcement must rely on less intrusive measures like improvement notices, fines, or seizure of specific items.

  Questions settled

  • Is the power of a Food Safety Officer to seal premises under section 13(1)(c) of the Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011, constitutional?
  • Does the Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011 provide a remedial mechanism for a food operator against the sealing of their premises?
  • Under what circumstances is the 'precautionary principle' applicable in food safety regulation?
  • Can a Food Safety Officer publicize proceedings against a food business before a conviction has attained finality?
  Read full judgment →
• Justice Qazi Faez Isa Versus The President of Pakistan2021 PLD 667 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-04-26
  review petitionjudicial reviewSupreme Judicial Councilconstitutional petitionlegal effectsuperior court judge
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns review petitions filed against the Supreme Court's earlier short order and detailed judgment dated 19.06.2020 and 23.10.2020, respectively, in Constitution Petition No. 17 of 2019. The core legal question addressed was the validity of the directions issued in the previous judgment, which had initiated proceedings against a superior court judge. By a majority decision, the Supreme Court allowed the review petitions. The Court held that the directions contained in paragraphs 4 to 11 of the impugned short order and the supporting detailed reasons were recalled and set aside. Consequently, the Court declared all subsequent proceedings, actions, orders, information, and reports initiated in pursuance of those directions to be illegal and without any legal effect. It was further directed that such proceedings or reports could not be considered or acted upon by any forum or authority, including the Supreme Judicial Council. This decision effectively nullified the prior directives, ensuring that the actions taken pursuant to the original order ceased to have any legal consequence.

  Questions settled

  • Can directions issued in a previous judgment regarding proceedings against a judge be recalled in review?
  • Are proceedings initiated by the Supreme Judicial Council pursuant to a recalled judgment valid?
  • What is the legal status of actions taken under a court order that is subsequently set aside?
  Read full judgment →
• Justice Qazi Faez Isa Versus The President of Pakistan Mrs. Sarina Faez Isa2021 PLD 639 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-02-22
  review jurisdictionconstitution of benchesSupreme Court Rules 1980master of the rosterjudicial reviewmajority judgmentnumerical strength of bench
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns miscellaneous applications seeking the reconstitution of a review bench to hear petitions filed against a majority judgment of the Supreme Court. The core legal question was the interpretation of "same Bench" under Order XXVI, Rule 8 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, specifically regarding the numerical strength and composition of a bench tasked with reviewing a majority decision. The Court held that review jurisdiction is limited to unanimous or majority judgments that are enforceable. It determined that while the numerical strength of a review bench must match the original bench, the composition is subject to the principle of practicability and the Chief Justice's prerogative as master of the roster. The Court established that a review bench should ideally include the author judge or a member of the majority, but it is not mandatory to include dissenting judges from the original bench. The principle laid down is that the Chief Justice exercises discretion in bench constitution, guided by the need for substantial compliance with Rule 8, ensuring the review bench maintains the original bench's numerical strength while prioritizing judicial efficiency and practicability.

  Questions settled

  • What is the required numerical strength of a bench hearing a review petition against a majority judgment?
  • Does the term 'same Bench' in Order XXVI, Rule 8 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 mandate the inclusion of all judges who heard the original matter?
  • Is a minority judgment amenable to review under Order XXVI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980?
  • To what extent is the Chief Justice's prerogative to constitute benches limited by the requirement of 'same Bench' in review proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Justice Qazi Faez Isa Versus The President of Pakistan2021 PLD 595 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-04-13
  right to informationfundamental rightscourt proceedingslive-streamingaudio recordingpublic importancejudicial transparency
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a Civil Miscellaneous Application filed by the petitioner in a review petition, seeking access to information regarding court proceedings. The core legal question was whether the public possesses a fundamental right under Article 19-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, to access information, specifically through live-streaming or audio-visual recording of court hearings in matters of public importance. The Court, by a majority of 6 to 4, dismissed the specific application filed by the petitioner. However, the Court recognized that Article 19-A imposes an obligation on State institutions, including the judiciary, to ensure the realization of the fundamental right of citizens to access information in matters of public importance, such as cases under Article 184(3). The Court held that the public has a right to know how proceedings are conducted in such cases. Consequently, the Court directed the Registrar to facilitate the audio recording of the specific review petition hearings and make them available on the official website, while also initiating steps to regulate live-streaming and technological infrastructure under Article 191 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right to access information under Article 19-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 extend to the audio-visual recording of court proceedings?
  • Are proceedings conducted under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 considered matters of public importance for the purpose of public access?
  • Does the judiciary have an obligation to provide technological infrastructure to facilitate public access to court hearings?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kulsoom Rasheed Versus Noman Aslam2021 PLD 579 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-02-23Read full judgment →
• National Saving Central Directorate, Islamabad Versus Muhammad Farooq Raja2021 PLD 320 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-11-02
  Bahbood Saving Certificate Schemedual nationalitylocus poenitentiaepromissory estoppellegitimate expectationpublic functionaryaccrued rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the eligibility of a dual national to participate in the Bahbood Saving Certificate Scheme. The petitioner, the National Saving Centre, sought to recover profits and convert the respondent's investment, alleging ineligibility due to the respondent's dual nationality status. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could retroactively deny benefits after having accepted the investment and allowed the respondent to accrue rights under the scheme. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner, as a public functionary, had a duty to scrutinize eligibility prior to accepting the investment. Having failed to do so, the authority could not subsequently withdraw the accrued rights, as the action was barred by the principle of locus poenitentiae. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation precluded the authority from acting to the detriment of a citizen who acted in good faith. The petition was dismissed, upholding the respondent's eligibility and the finality of the accrued benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a public authority retroactively withdraw benefits from a scheme after accepting an investment and allowing rights to accrue?
  • Does the principle of locus poenitentiae prevent a government authority from recovering payments made due to its own lack of prior scrutiny?
  • Are the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation applicable to the actions of public functionaries regarding investment schemes?
  • Does Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act 1897 require public authorities to act fairly and reasonably when exercising statutory powers?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Balochistan Versus Abdul Rauf2021 PLD 313 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-10-14
  Caretaker GovernmentPublic RecruitmentVested RightAdministrative LawMerit-based AppointmentJudicial Review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil appeals filed by the Government of Balochistan against a High Court judgment that directed the appointment of respondents to various government posts. The respondents claimed a right to appointment based on recommendations made by a Recruitment Committee constituted by a Caretaker Government. The core legal questions were whether a Caretaker Government possesses the mandate to undertake permanent recruitment and whether candidates acquire a vested right to appointment merely by participating in a selection process. The Supreme Court held that a Caretaker Government is restricted to managing day-to-day administrative affairs and lacks the authority to make permanent appointments or policy decisions with far-reaching consequences. Furthermore, the Court ruled that no vested right to appointment accrues to candidates simply by appearing for tests or interviews, particularly when the recruitment process lacks transparency and merit-based documentation. The Court established that the government retains the right to abandon or restart recruitment processes for valid reasons. Consequently, the High Court’s judgment was set aside, and the government was directed to conduct a fresh, transparent recruitment process.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Caretaker Government have the legal mandate to make permanent appointments or take policy decisions?
  • Does a candidate acquire a vested right to appointment merely by participating in a recruitment process?
  • Can the government abandon a recruitment process and re-advertise posts if the initial process lacks transparency?
  Read full judgment →
• Justice Qazi Faez Isa Versus The President of Pakistan2021 PLD 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-06-19
  Presidential ReferenceSupreme Judicial Councilindependence of judiciaryjudicial accountabilitymisconductwealth statementmoney launderingmalice in laworiginal jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This landmark constitutional petition was filed by Mr. Justice Qazi Faez Isa, a serving judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging the maintainability and validity of a Presidential Reference filed against him before the Supreme Judicial Council under Article 209 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Reference alleged misconduct for failing to declare foreign properties in the United Kingdom held in the name of his spouse and children, purportedly violating Section 116 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001, along with implications of money laundering and violations of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947. A ten-member bench of the Supreme Court allowed the petitions, quashing the Reference and abating the show-cause notice issued by the Supreme Judicial Council. The court held that the Reference suffered from fatal legal and procedural defects, including a lack of proper prior authorization for investigation, a premature and legally flawed interpretation of Section 116 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001, and the absence of an independent application of mind by the President. Simultaneously, the court directed the Federal Board of Revenue to initiate tax verification proceedings against the judge's family.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Presidential reference filed under Article 209 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 can be quashed on the ground of serious legal and procedural defects amounting to malice in law?
  • Does a judge of the superior court bear a legal obligation under Section 116 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 to declare assets held independently by his spouse and adult children?
  • Can the Assets Recovery Unit be lawfully constituted as an attached department of the Cabinet Division through executive notifications under the Rules of Business 1973?
  • Whether the President of Pakistan is bound to apply an independent mind and obtain objective legal advice before forwarding a reference against a judge to the Supreme Judicial Council?
  • Does the ouster of jurisdiction under Article 211 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 bar the Supreme Court from reviewing pre-reference proceedings and abating a show-cause notice based on a vitiated reference?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Ubaidullah Versus Government of Punjab2020 PLD 599 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-14
  disability quotaemployment rightspersons with disabilitiessanctioned postsreasonable accommodationrights-based approachpublic employment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a challenge to the denial of employment under the disability quota for the post of Senior Elementary School Educator (Arabic). The core legal question is the proper mechanism for calculating and allocating the 2% disability quota for employment under the Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance, 1981, specifically whether the quota should be based on advertised vacancies or total sanctioned posts. The Supreme Court held that the disability quota must be calculated based on the total sanctioned posts of an establishment, rather than the number of advertised vacancies, to prevent the exclusion of persons with disabilities. The Court established that the quota should be apportioned across different categories of posts based on sanctioned strength to ensure equitable representation. Furthermore, the judgment emphasizes a rights-based approach to disability, mandating "reasonable accommodation" in the workplace and prohibiting the use of derogatory terminology for persons with disabilities in official communications. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower court orders and directed the authorities to reconsider the petitioner's case in accordance with these principles.

  Questions settled

  • How should the 2% disability quota be calculated for employment in an establishment?
  • Should the disability quota be based on the number of advertised posts or the total sanctioned strength of an establishment?
  • Is an establishment required to provide reasonable accommodation to employees with disabilities?
  • Can an establishment shift the disability quota to different categories of posts if specific posts are unsuitable for persons with disabilities?
  Read full judgment →
• Sikandar Hayat Versus State2020 PLD 559 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-28
  death penaltyexpectancy of lifereview petitioncondonation of delaycriminal appealjuvenile justicecommutation of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed by two convicts on death row for over 25 years, seeking to revisit their death sentences confirmed by the Supreme Court in 2002. The core legal questions addressed were whether a review petition filed after a 16-year delay is maintainable, whether the "rule of expectancy of life" warrants commutation of the death sentence, and whether the petitioners' claim of juvenility at the time of the offense is valid. The Court held that while the juvenility claim lacked merit, the delay in filing the review petition was condonable given the petitioners' active pursuit of legal remedies. Applying the "rule of expectancy of life," the Court held that prolonged incarceration in a death cell while pursuing judicial remedies constitutes a mitigating circumstance. Consequently, the Court commuted the death sentences to life imprisonment. The key principle laid down is that while the rule of expectancy of life is not a uniform mandate, it serves as a relevant mitigating factor for commuting capital sentences when a convict has endured excessive incarceration during the pendency of their legal challenges.

  Questions settled

  • Can a review petition in a criminal case be entertained after a significant delay of several years?
  • Does prolonged incarceration in a death cell while pursuing legal remedies constitute a mitigating circumstance for commuting a death sentence?
  • Is the rule of expectancy of life a mandatory ground for commuting a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Can a convict's claim of juvenility be re-examined after the final confirmation of a death sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Javed Akhtar Versus State2020 PLD 419 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-06-04
  qatl-i-amdsudden provocationmedical evidenceforensic reportSection 302(c) PPCcriminal appealpremeditation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment upholding the petitioner's conviction for qatl-i-amd while reducing his death sentence to life imprisonment. The petitioner argued that material contradictions between ocular and medical evidence existed and that his actions fell within the ambit of Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, citing lack of premeditation and sudden provocation. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding the prosecution's case established beyond reasonable doubt. The Court held that medical doctors are not qualified to determine firing distance, which is the domain of forensic experts. Furthermore, the Court clarified that domestic disputes often lack independent witnesses, so the absence of such testimony does not invalidate the motive. Crucially, the Court ruled that the petitioner’s conduct—arming himself and reloading to fire multiple times—demonstrated extreme cruelty and premeditation, thereby excluding the application of Section 302(c) PPC or the exceptions to the erstwhile Section 300 PPC. The Court affirmed that taking undue advantage against unarmed victims precludes claims of sudden provocation or sudden fight.

  Questions settled

  • Can a medical doctor determine the distance from which a firearm was discharged?
  • Does the absence of independent witnesses to a domestic dispute invalidate the prosecution's case regarding motive?
  • Does the act of arming oneself against unarmed victims and reloading a weapon constitute 'undue advantage' under the exceptions to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 apply to cases involving premeditated cruelty?
  Read full judgment →
• Adamjee Insurance Company Ltd. Versus Muhammad Ramzan2020 PLD 414 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-02
  Insurance Tribunalinterlocutory orderconstitutional jurisdictionstatutory appealInsurance Ordinancewrit jurisdictionright to file written statement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the scope of the appellate remedy provided under Section 124 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, specifically regarding interlocutory orders passed by an Insurance Tribunal. The petitioner challenged an order closing its right to file a written statement, which the High Court dismissed, citing the availability of a statutory appeal. The Supreme Court addressed whether such miscellaneous orders are appealable under the Ordinance. The Court held that Section 124(2) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, restricts the right of appeal to final decisions adjudicating insurance claims or penalties exceeding a specified monetary threshold. Consequently, miscellaneous interlocutory orders do not fall within the scope of Section 124 and are not subject to statutory appeal. The Court affirmed that sub-constitutional legislation cannot curtail the constitutional jurisdiction of High Courts. Therefore, aggrieved parties may invoke the constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to challenge such interlocutory orders. The Court established that while the legislative intent is to expedite insurance claims, constitutional remedies remain accessible when statutory avenues are unavailable for non-final orders.

  Questions settled

  • Are miscellaneous interlocutory orders passed by an Insurance Tribunal appealable under Section 124 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000?
  • Can sub-constitutional legislation curtail the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the right of appeal under Section 124(2) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, extend to orders that do not finally adjudicate an insurance claim or penalty?
  Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Zakia Hussain Versus Syed Farooq Hussain2020 PLD 401 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-05-18
  specific performancesale agreementlocal commissionattorney as witnesstime is essence of contractdiscretionary reliefcivil procedureconcealment of facts
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute over a sale agreement for an apartment, where the appellants (vendors) unilaterally cancelled the contract, alleging the respondent (vendee) failed to pay the balance on time. The respondent sued for specific performance. The Supreme Court addressed whether an attorney, lacking personal knowledge of all facts, is a competent witness under Order III, Rules 1 and 2, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and whether evidence recorded by a local commission is admissible. The Court held that an attorney may testify if they possess relevant knowledge or if the principal's absence is justified, and that evidence recorded by commission with party consent is valid. The Court found the appellants acted in bad faith by concealing the lack of legal construction approval for the property. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the decree for specific performance. It emphasized that specific performance is a discretionary equitable relief under Section 22, The Specific Relief Act 1877, and that time is not of the essence unless clearly stipulated by the parties' conduct and agreement.

  Questions settled

  • Is an attorney who lacks personal knowledge of all material facts a competent witness under Order III, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can evidence recorded by a local commission be admitted in a civil suit if the parties consented to the commission's appointment?
  • Does the mere mention of a payment date in a sale agreement automatically make time the essence of the contract?
  • Is the grant of specific performance under Section 22 of The Specific Relief Act 1877 a discretionary remedy?
  Read full judgment →
• Chaklala Cantonment Board, Rawalpindi Versus Ahmad Kamal Nasir2020 PLD 386 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-12
  TIP TaxCantonment Boardproperty valuationstamp dutytaxation powerdelegated legislation
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals were filed by various Cantonment Boards challenging judgments that restricted their authority to unilaterally determine the value of immovable property for assessing Transfer of Immovable Property (TIP) Tax. The appellant Boards contended that under Section 60 of the Cantonments Act 1924 and relevant S.R.O.s, they possessed the authority to assess the market value of properties independently of the valuation tables notified by District Collectors under Section 27-A of the Stamp Act 1899. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeals, holding that any determination affecting the financial burden on an assessee must be backed by express statutory authorization, in line with Article 77 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Court observed that the Cantonment Boards lacked a structured legal mechanism, criteria, or public objection process for such valuation, rendering the process arbitrary. It further emphasized that having divergent property valuations for the same transaction across different government tiers creates executive disorder and public inconvenience.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Cantonment Board unilaterally determine the market value of immovable property for TIP Tax assessment without express statutory authorization?
  • Does Article 77 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 require a clear legal mechanism and statutory authority for a local body to determine property values that increase an assessee's tax burden?
  • Is a valuation process valid if it lacks a legal mechanism for inviting public objections or entertaining representations from affected assessees?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through Chairman FBR Versus Saleem Raza2020 PLD 320 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-04
  customs dutypre-declaration examinationused goodsdoctrine of discriminationconstitutionality of fiscal statutesjudicial deferenceclassification
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the Federation of Pakistan challenges the judgment of the High Court of Sindh which declared an amendment to the proviso of section 79(1) of the Customs Act, 1969 discriminatory under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The core legal question was whether the statutory amendment restricting the option for pre-declaration examination exclusively to importers of used goods was discriminatory and unconstitutional. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment, holding that courts must presume the constitutionality of fiscal statutes and exercise judicial restraint unless a provision is glaringly blatant in its unconstitutionality. The Court laid down that classifying used goods differently is founded on a rational and intelligible differentia, given the practical difficulties importers face in accurately declaring used goods, thereby fulfilling the valid public policy objectives of the Act without offending fundamental rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the amendment introduced in the proviso to section 79(1) of the Customs Act, 1969 is discriminatory?
  • Does a constitutional court presume the constitutionality of a law enacted by the legislature?
  • Can a fiscal statute be struck down merely because no reasons were mentioned in the Budget Instructions for its introduction?
  Read full judgment →
• Fawad Ishaq Versus Mst. Mehreen Mansoor2020 PLD 269 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-07Read full judgment →
• Administrator Municipal Corporation, Peshawar Versus Taimoor Hussain Amin2020 PLD 249 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-11Read full judgment →
• Jurists Foundation through Chairman Versus Federal Government through Secretary, Ministry of Defence2020 PLD 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-11-28
  public interest litigationCOAS appointmentjudicial restraintrule of lawconstitutional interpretationexcessive delegationtenure of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This public interest litigation challenged the extension of the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), questioning the legal framework governing his tenure, appointment, and retirement. The core legal questions concerned whether the COAS is regulated by the Constitution and law, and whether the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, and Army Regulations (Rules) provide a valid basis for such extensions. The Court held that the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, is deficient in meeting the structural requirements mandated by Article 243(3) of the Constitution, as it fails to prescribe terms of service, tenure, or retirement for a General. Consequently, the Court found a legal vacuum regarding the COAS's tenure. Exercising judicial restraint, the Court allowed the incumbent COAS to continue for six months, directing the Federal Government to initiate parliamentary legislation to codify these terms. The judgment establishes that constitutional posts must be regulated by law rather than unwritten institutional practice, and that essential legislative functions cannot be delegated to the executive without clear policy guidelines.

  Questions settled

  • Can a public interest litigation be withdrawn by the petitioner at will?
  • Does the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, satisfy the constitutional requirement to provide for the terms of service of the Chief of the Army Staff?
  • Is the post of Chief of the Army Staff regulated by law under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Can the legislature delegate essential legislative functions to the executive without providing policy guidelines?
  Read full judgment →
• Sikandar Hayat Khan Jogazai Versus Muhammad Hashim2019 PLD 730 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-09-16
  waqf propertyChief Administrator Auqafcommercial leasescheme for administration and developmentstatutory lease periodauqaf fundjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil petitions for leave to appeal were brought before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging a High Court decision which invalidated a 30-year lease of 4 kanals of waqf property granted by the Chief Administrator Auqaf for establishing a petrol pump. The core legal questions pertained to whether waqf property could be leased out for commercial purposes and the prerequisites and procedures governing the sanction of such leases under the Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1979 and the Punjab Waqf Properties (Administration) Rules, 2002. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, affirming that waqf property may only be leased for commercial purposes as an exception where no viable alternative aligned with religious, pious, or charitable purposes exists. The Court held that any valid lease must strictly emanate from a formally settled and well-reasoned statutory scheme under Section 15 of the Ordinance and Rule 7 of the Rules, 2002, fully justifying departures from standard lease durations and detailing how it serves the waqf's best interests.

  Questions settled

  • Can a waqf property be leased out for commercial purposes under the Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1979?
  • Is a formally settled scheme under Section 15 of the Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1979 a mandatory prerequisite for leasing out waqf property?
  • Under what circumstances can the statutory lease period prescribed under Rule 7 of the Punjab Waqf Properties (Administration) Rules, 2002 be extended beyond three years?
  • Are the administrative and developmental schemes settled by the Chief Administrator Auqaf subject to judicial review by courts?
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• Mst. Kubra Amjad Versus Mst. Yasmeen Tariq2019 PLD 677 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-08-07
  specific performanceagreement to selllimitation periodreasonable timeOrder VII Rule 11civil proceduretenancyejectment proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit for specific performance of an alleged oral agreement to sell property, filed by a tenant against the heirs of a deceased landlord. The core legal question was whether the suit was maintainable given the significant delay in filing, despite the appellant's contention that time was not of the essence. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the lower courts' decision to dismiss the suit under Order VII, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Court held that the appellant’s delay of over eight years in seeking enforcement was unreasonable and constituted an abuse of process, particularly as the suit was filed only after the respondents initiated ejectment proceedings. The Court established that the contractual term "very soon" implies dispatch and cannot be interpreted as an indefinite period. Even where time is not of the essence, a party seeking specific performance must act within a reasonable time. A plaintiff cannot remain indolent regarding their rights and subsequently seek equitable relief after an inordinate lapse of time.

  Questions settled

  • Does the phrase "very soon" in an agreement to sell allow for an indefinite period for the performance of contractual obligations?
  • Can a plaintiff maintain a suit for specific performance filed after an inordinate delay, even if time was not originally of the essence?
  • Is a suit for specific performance maintainable when filed solely as a counter-blast to pending rent or ejectment proceedings after years of inaction?
  • Does the limitation period for specific performance commence only upon the refusal of the vendor, or must the purchaser also act within a reasonable time?
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• Human Rights Case No.18877 of 2018 Versus2019 PLD 645 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-24Read full judgment →
• Mst. Asia Bibi Versus State2019 PLD 64 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-08
  blasphemycriminal appealbenefit of doubtextra-judicial confessionstandard of proofcapital punishmentfair trialSection 295-C PPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction and death sentence of the appellant, Mst. Asia Bibi, under Section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for alleged blasphemy. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven the charge beyond reasonable doubt, given the evidence presented. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the appellant, citing significant contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, an inordinate delay in lodging the FIR, and the unreliable nature of the alleged extra-judicial confession. The Court emphasized that the burden of proof rests entirely on the prosecution and that suspicion, however strong, cannot substitute for proof beyond reasonable doubt. The judgment reaffirmed the principle that in criminal cases, the benefit of any doubt must be extended to the accused as a matter of right. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and sentences imposed by the trial and high courts, acquitting the appellant and ordering her immediate release, while stressing that false allegations of such heinous crimes are equally detestable and must be prevented by the State.

  Questions settled

  • Does an inordinate, unexplained delay in lodging an FIR render the prosecution's case doubtful?
  • Can an extra-judicial confession made in a coercive or intimidating environment form the basis of a capital conviction?
  • Is the principle that un-rebutted statements amount to admission applicable in criminal trials?
  • Does the investigation of a case by an officer below the rank prescribed by law vitiate the proceedings?
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• Muhammad Pervaiz Versus State2019 PLD 592 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-06
  qatl-e-amdbenefit of doubtocular testimonyacquittal of co-accusedburden of proofcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court affirming the appellant's conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the qatl-e-amd of his wife, sentenced to imprisonment for life. The core legal question concerns the safety of maintaining a conviction based on circumstantial inferences, implausible defence explanations, and eyewitness testimony whose presence was deemed suspicious by the High Court and which had already been disbelieved regarding a co-accused. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that silence or an implausible explanation by an accused does not absolve the prosecution from proving its case through positive, unquestionable proof, nor can suspicions substitute for legal proof. The Court laid down the principle that a conviction cannot be sustained on presumptions or moral satisfaction in the absence of evidentiary certainty, and that where eyewitness testimony is disbelieved regarding an identically placed co-accused whose role is intertwined with the appellant, it is unsafe to maintain the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused's silence or implausible explanation substitute for the positive proof required by the prosecution to establish guilt?
  • Whether a conviction can be sustained on the basis of presumptions and moral satisfaction in the absence of evidentiary certainty?
  • Does the rejection of prosecution testimony against an identically placed co-accused undermine the conviction of the remaining accused whose role is intertwined?
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• Muhammad Yaqoob Versus State2019 PLD 580 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-30
  homicidedeath penalty commutationmitigating circumstancesanti-terrorism actcourt-room murdercriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for homicide committed within the precincts of a court-room. The core legal question concerns the propriety of the conviction and the quantum of sentence given the totality of the circumstances, background enmity, sudden flare-up, and the presence of mitigating factors such as injuries sustained by the appellant and the exoneration or absence of co-accused. The Supreme Court held that while the appellant's guilt for homicide is established, the death penalty warrants commutation to imprisonment for life due to mitigating circumstances clouding the moments preceding the occurrence. Furthermore, the Court held that the incident lacked the nexus required under the Anti Terrorism Act, 1997, thereby setting aside the conviction under Section 7(a) thereof. The key principle laid down is that where pre-occurrence events are shrouded in mystery and mitigating circumstances exist, capital punishment may be commuted to life imprisonment, and ordinary crimes committed within court premises do not ipso facto attract anti-terrorism laws without the requisite statutory nexus.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the death penalty can be commuted to imprisonment for life when the moments preceding the occurrence are shrouded in mystery and mitigating circumstances exist?
  • Does an offense committed within the precincts of a court-room automatically attract the provisions of the Anti Terrorism Act, 1997 without establishing the requisite statutory nexus?
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• Notice to Police Constble Khizar Hayat Son of Hadait Ullah Versus2019 PLD 527 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-04
  falsus in uno falsus in omnibusperjurycriminal evidencewitness credibilitysifting grain from chaffIslamic jurisprudencefalse testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from the perjury of a prosecution witness who provided false testimony in a murder trial, leading to the wrongful conviction of an accused. The core legal question was whether the long-standing judicial practice in Pakistan of discarding the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything) should continue, given its inconsistency with Islamic principles and the prevalence of perjury. The Court held that the previous judicial view, which permitted courts to 'sift the grain from the chaff' rather than rejecting the entire testimony of a perjured witness, was based on subjective, extraneous considerations rather than legal jurisprudence. Consequently, the Supreme Court declared that the rule falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus shall henceforth be an integral part of Pakistani criminal jurisprudence and must be applied by all courts. The key principle laid down is that a witness found to have committed deliberate falsehood on a material aspect must be disbelieved in their entirety and invariably prosecuted for perjury.

  Questions settled

  • Is the legal maxim 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus' applicable in criminal cases in Pakistan?
  • What are the consequences for a witness who provides deliberate false testimony in a judicial proceeding?
  • Does the practice of 'sifting the grain from the chaff' in criminal evidence align with Islamic principles and the rule of law?
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• Maqbool Ahmad Qureshi Versus Government of Pakistan through Secretary Law and Justice2019 PLD 37 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  civil servantsback benefitsrepugnancy to Quran and Sunnahreinstatementstatutory interpretationShariat appealdisciplinary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the constitutionality of Proviso (II) of Section 17 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, and corresponding provisions in provincial civil service legislation, alleging they were repugnant to the injunctions of the Quran and Sunnah. The appellant contended that these provisions, which grant authorities discretion to determine arrears of pay for civil servants reinstated after dismissal or removal, were being misused to award back benefits to those who performed no service. The core legal question was whether these statutory provisions violated Islamic injunctions. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant failed to provide any specific Nass from the Quran or Sunnah to support the claim of repugnancy. The Court clarified that the impugned provisions vest discretion in the competent authority to determine back benefits based on the facts and circumstances of each case. It established the principle that the alleged misapplication of a law by authorities or judicial forums does not constitute a valid ground to declare the statute itself repugnant to the Quran and Sunnah.

  Questions settled

  • Does the misapplication of a statutory provision by authorities constitute a valid ground to declare the law repugnant to the Quran and Sunnah?
  • Is the discretion granted to authorities to determine back benefits for reinstated civil servants unconstitutional?
  • What is the requirement for challenging a law on the touchstone of the Quran and Sunnah?
  Read full judgment →
• Human Rights Case No.32642-P of 2018 Versus2019 PLD 280 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-16Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ibrahim Shaikh Versus Government of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence2019 PLD 133 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-12-15
  dual nationalityservice of PakistanPakistan Origin Cardcivil servantssuo motufiduciary dutynational securityforeigners
  Summary & questions settled

  This suo motu case addressed the legal status of dual nationals and foreigners of Pakistani origin employed in the service of Pakistan and autonomous bodies. The Court examined whether dual nationality or foreign origin constitutes a disqualification for government service. The Court held that while the Constitution imposes specific disqualifications on elected representatives regarding dual nationality, no such general constitutional bar exists for civil servants. Consequently, dual nationals remain citizens and are eligible for government service, subject to specific statutory restrictions. Regarding Pakistan Origin Card (POC) holders, the Court resolved an anomaly, holding that they are entitled to work in Pakistan, and directed authorities to facilitate work permits. The Court also declared the Ministry of Interior's imposition of a five-year marriage condition for POC eligibility ultra vires. The judgment emphasized that while divided loyalty is a valid concern, the government must formulate clear, balanced policies and negative lists for sensitive posts rather than imposing blanket bans, ensuring that the expertise of the overseas Pakistani diaspora is utilized effectively while safeguarding national security.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Constitution of Pakistan impose a general disqualification on dual nationals from holding positions in the service of Pakistan?
  • Are holders of Pakistan Origin Cards (POC) legally entitled to work in Pakistan?
  • Can the Ministry of Interior unilaterally impose a five-year marriage condition for Pakistan Origin Card eligibility?
  • Does the acquisition of foreign citizenship by a civil servant automatically result in disqualification from service?
  Read full judgment →
• 2019 PLD 12019 PLD 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-12Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Qasim Versus State2018 PLD 840 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-27
  grave and sudden provocationhonor killingmurderreduction of sentenceloss of self-controlcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction of the appellant on two counts of murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which the High Court had subsequently commuted from death sentences to life imprisonment. The prosecution alleged that the appellant murdered his sister-in-law and another man on the suspicion of illicit relations. The appellant admitted the killings but maintained he acted under the impulse of grave and sudden provocation upon finding the deceased in a compromising position. The Supreme Court examined the distinction between premeditated honor killings and actions taken under grave and sudden provocation. The Court held that the phrase 'in the name or on the pretext of honour' in the first proviso to Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 refers to calculated, premeditated murders, whereas grave and sudden provocation involves a sudden loss of self-control. Finding the latter applicable, the Court partly allowed the appeal, converting the convictions to Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and reducing the sentences to twenty years of rigorous imprisonment on each count.

  Questions settled

  • What is the legal distinction between a murder committed 'in the name or on the pretext of honour' and one committed under 'grave and sudden provocation' under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does a murder committed under the sudden loss of self-control upon witnessing an compromising situation fall under Section 302(b) or Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can the first proviso to Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be applied to cases where there was no premeditation or calculation in the killing?
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• State Versus Haji Nabi Bux2018 PLD 837 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-26
  narcotics controlcriminal appealacquittal appealmaintainability of appealspecial courtstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the maintainability of a criminal appeal filed by the State against an acquittal in a narcotics case. The respondents were acquitted by a Special Court (CNS), and the State's subsequent appeal to the High Court was dismissed on grounds of maintainability, with the High Court relying on provisions from the Customs Act, 1969 and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Supreme Court examined whether these statutes governed the right of appeal in narcotics cases. The Court held that the right of appeal in cases involving the recovery of narcotic substances is exclusively governed by Section 48 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The Court clarified that Section 48 imposes no restrictions on the State or the complainant regarding the filing of an appeal, rendering the High Court's reliance on the Customs Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure unnecessary. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the matter for a decision on the merits, affirming that the appeal was competently filed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 or the Customs Act 1969 govern the right of appeal in cases arising under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997?
  • Does Section 48 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 place restrictions on the State or the complainant regarding the filing of an appeal against an acquittal?
  • Is an appeal filed by the State against an acquittal in a narcotics case maintainable under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997?
  Read full judgment →
• Trading Corporation of Pakistan Versus Devan Sugar Mills Limited2018 PLD 828 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-05
  doctrine of electionconstructive res judicataejectment proceedingsexecution applicationstriking off defencemultiplicity of proceedingsconcurrent remedies
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from an appeal against a High Court judgment that remanded an execution application to the executing court. The respondent-tenant, facing an ejectment order after their defence was struck off under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, initially challenged the order via an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which was dismissed and upheld by the High Court. Subsequently, the respondent filed a new application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on substantially similar grounds. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in remanding the matter. The Court affirmed that while multiple concurrent remedies may exist to challenge an ex-parte order, the doctrine of election prohibits a party from hopping between remedies once an election is made and exhausted. Applying the principles of constructive res judicata and the doctrine of election, the Court ruled that a party cannot pursue successive remedies for the same relief on grounds that were or could have been raised in the initial proceeding. The appeal was allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party, after exhausting one remedy against an ejectment order, subsequently invoke another concurrent remedy on substantially the same grounds?
  • Does the doctrine of election prohibit a judgment debtor from pursuing successive remedies for the same relief?
  • Are grounds for objection that were available but not raised in an initial proceeding deemed to have been decided against the party under the principle of constructive res judicata?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Asim Versus Mst. Samro Begum2018 PLD 819 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-08-15Read full judgment →
• Habib Bank Ltd. Versus WRSM Trading Company, LLC2018 PLD 795 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-07-02
  Banking Court jurisdictionterritorial jurisdictionforeign branch transactionsforum non conveniensinterest-based loansState Bank of Pakistan circularscreditor follows debtorFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment upholding a Banking Court's order that returned a recovery suit plaint for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant bank had extended finance to the respondents via its Dubai branch, and later filed a recovery suit before the Banking Court in Lahore upon default, since the respondents resided in Pakistan. The core questions were whether the Banking Court possessed territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 and Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for foreign banking transactions, and whether interest-based loans granted abroad were void under Section 23 of the Contract Act 1872 pursuant to State Bank of Pakistan BCD circulars. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned orders, holding that Pakistani-incorporated financial institutions operating abroad fall under the 2001 Ordinance, Banking Courts exercise jurisdiction where debtors reside under Section 20 CPC, and SBP circulars are regulatory instructions that do not render interest-based loan contracts void under Section 23.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applies to Banking Courts when determining territorial jurisdiction over defendants residing in Pakistan?
  • Whether branches abroad of financial institutions incorporated in Pakistan fall within the definition of a financial institution under Section 2(a) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001?
  • Whether the principle that creditors follow debtors empowers Banking Courts in Pakistan to adjudicate recovery claims where the loan was disbursed abroad but the defaulting debtor resides in Pakistan?
  • Whether State Bank of Pakistan Banking Control Department circulars prohibiting interest-based transactions have the force of law so as to render foreign interest-based loan agreements void under Section 23 of the Contract Act 1872?
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• Dr. Farhat Javed Siddique Versus Government of Pakistan2018 PLD 788 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  overseas votingright to voteinternet votingElections Act 2017pilot projectElection Commission of Pakistanconstitutional rights
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant petitions were filed by Overseas Pakistanis seeking the right to vote in General and Local Bodies Elections. The core legal question concerned whether Overseas Pakistanis possess a constitutional right to vote and whether the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) is legally mandated to facilitate this through internet voting (I-voting) under the Elections Act, 2017. The Court held that the right to vote is a sacrosanct constitutional right under Article 17 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, applicable equally to citizens residing abroad. Interpreting Section 94 of the Elections Act, 2017, the Court held that the word 'may' must be read as 'shall,' mandating the ECP to conduct pilot projects for overseas voting. The Court approved the proposed rules (84-A to 84-C) for I-voting but established a safety mechanism allowing the ECP to exclude overseas votes if technical efficacy, secrecy, or security is compromised. The principle laid down is that the ECP must implement an effective mechanism for overseas voting, with pilot results kept separate and secret until the ECP verifies the system's integrity.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right to vote under Article 17 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 extend to Overseas Pakistanis?
  • Does Section 94 of the Elections Act, 2017 mandate the Election Commission of Pakistan to conduct pilot projects for overseas voting?
  • Can the Election Commission of Pakistan exclude overseas votes from the final count if technical efficacy or security is compromised?
  • Is the word 'may' in Section 94 of the Elections Act, 2017 to be interpreted as 'shall'?
  Read full judgment →
• Suo Motu Contempt Proceedings Versus2018 PLD 773 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-07-11
  suo motu contempt proceedingscriminal contemptfreedom of speechscandalizing the courtcontempt of courtjudicial restraintfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involved suo motu contempt proceedings initiated against Talal Chaudhry, a State Minister, following press clippings, statements, and telecast transcripts of public speeches made on 24.01.2018 and 27.01.2018. The core legal question centered on whether the statements made by the alleged contemnor scandalized the Supreme Court of Pakistan and its judges, thus constituting criminal contempt under Article 204 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 and Section 3 of the Contempt of Court Ordinance 2003, or whether they were protected under the right to freedom of speech enshrined in Article 19 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the speeches substantially brought the Court and its judges into hatred, ridicule, and contempt, and fell outside the scope of permissible speech under reasonable restrictions relating to contempt. The Court convicted and sentenced the contemnor under Sections 3 and 5 of the Contempt of Court Ordinance 2003. The key principle laid down is that while freedom of speech is a fundamental right, it is expressly subject to reasonable restrictions including contempt of court, and public criticism that scandalizes the judiciary or impairs public confidence in the administration of justice is actionable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Chief Justice of Pakistan can competently initiate suo motu contempt proceedings upon a note put up by the Registrar of the Court?
  • Does the fundamental right to freedom of speech under Article 19 of the Constitution protect public speeches that scandalize the judiciary and bring it into ridicule?
  • Where a contemnor raises the defense that speeches were quoted out of context, upon whom does the burden of proof lie to establish that fact?
  • Whether failure by regulatory authorities like PEMRA to issue show-vause notices to satellite channels affords a valid legal defense in contempt proceedings against the maker of the speech?
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• Khawaja Saad Rafique Versus Hamid Khan2018 PLD 749 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-07-12
  election petitioncorrupt practicesmaterial effectelection tribunalburden of proofelectoral irregularitiesreturned candidate
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged the Election Tribunal's decision declaring the election for NA-125 void due to alleged corrupt practices and procedural irregularities. The core legal question was whether the identified lapses by election staff and alleged irregularities were sufficient to materially affect the election result under the Representation of the People Act, 1976. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Tribunal's judgment and dismissing the election petition. The Court held that the petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving that the alleged irregularities, including administrative lapses and discrepancies in vote counts, materially affected the outcome, particularly given the appellant's significant margin of victory. The Court emphasized that allegations of corrupt practices in election petitions must be proven to the standard of criminal cases, which is beyond reasonable doubt. Furthermore, it established that mere administrative negligence or procedural deviations by election staff do not warrant the annulment of an election unless cogent evidence demonstrates that such lapses fundamentally altered the election's result.

  Questions settled

  • What is the standard of proof required to establish allegations of corrupt practices in an election petition?
  • Does administrative negligence or procedural lapse by election staff automatically invalidate an election result?
  • What constitutes 'materially affecting' an election result under the Representation of the People Act, 1976?
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• Suo Motu Contempt Proceeding Versus2018 PLD 738 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-06-28
  suo motu contemptcontempt of courtscandalizing the courtfreedom of speechjudicial independencepolitical statementscriminal original petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a suo motu criminal contempt proceeding initiated against Mr. Daniyal Aziz, a Federal Minister and member of the ruling party, for making contemptuous statements and speeches that maligned, ridiculed, and scandalized the Supreme Court of Pakistan and its judges following the Panama Papers judgment. The core legal question was whether the statements and media clips attributed to the alleged contemnor constituted contempt of court under the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions, or whether they were protected under freedom of speech or constituted misreporting. The Supreme Court held that the first charge relating to a press conference was not proven due to misreporting, but the second and third charges involving televised statements made in an agitated political environment were fully established, as they undermined the authority of the court and scandalized a judge. The court laid down the principle that political leaders with large public followings must exercise restraint and cannot invoke freedom of speech or the heat of political rivalry to justify scandalous attacks on the judiciary, and that contempt proceedings are aimed at vindicating public confidence in the judicial system rather than satisfying judicial ego. The contemnor was convicted and sentenced till the rising of the court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether statements made against judges in the heat of political rivalry amount to contempt of court?
  • Can a reporter's personal impression of a press conference be attributed to a speaker as a contemptuous charge?
  • Does criticism of a judicial judgment in a politically charged environment fall within the protection of freedom of speech?
  • What constitutes sufficient proof of televised contemptuous statements in contempt proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Bilal Hussain Shah Versus Dilawar Shah2018 PLD 698 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-02Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadiq Versus Muhammad Mansha2018 PLD 692 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-24
  specific performancelimitationequity of redemptionmortgageagreement to sellimmovable property
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell executed on May 2, 1983, which fixed the date of performance as May 28, 1983. The plaintiff filed the suit on December 6, 1988, contending that because the subject property was mortgaged and only redeemed on November 28, 1988, limitation should run from the date of redemption. The trial court decreed the suit, the appellate court reversed it as time-barred, and the High Court restored the decree, holding that the mortgage deferred the limitation period. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, holding that a mortgage does not prevent the mortgagor from selling their remaining interest, known as the equity of redemption, which is itself immovable property. Consequently, the existence of a mortgage has no bearing on the limitation period for specific performance. Under Article 113 of the Limitation Act 1908, when a date is fixed for performance, limitation runs from that date, rendering the suit hopelessly time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of a mortgage on immovable property prevent the mortgagor from entering into a valid agreement to sell their remaining interest?
  • Whether the limitation period for a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell is deferred or suspended until the mortgage on the subject property is redeemed?
  • Does the equity of redemption constitute immovable property that can be transferred or sold subject to the mortgagee's rights?
  Read full judgment →