Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Irshad Hussain Versus Province of Punjab2003 PLD 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-11-28Read full judgment →
• Khadim Hussain Versus The State2003 PLD 243 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-10-24
  extra-judicial confessionlast-seen evidencecircumstantial evidenceminority pleacapital punishmentZina-bil-Jabrcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the High Court’s judgment upholding the appellant’s conviction and death sentence for the kidnapping, rape, and murder of a minor girl. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of last-seen evidence, the voluntariness of an extra-judicial confession, the validity of weapon recoveries, and whether the appellant was a minor entitled to sentencing mitigation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the conviction was sound. The Court established that last-seen evidence from independent witnesses is credible absent evidence of bias or animosity. Furthermore, an extra-judicial confession made before respectable community members without duress is admissible and voluntary. Regarding the appellant's age, the Court ruled that a school certificate produced as an afterthought, lacking corroboration, is insufficient to establish minority status. Ultimately, the Court affirmed that a chain of circumstantial evidence—comprising last-seen testimony, a voluntary confession, and forensic recovery of the crime weapon—is sufficient to sustain a conviction in unwitnessed cases, provided the evidence is corroborated by medical reports and forensic findings.

  Questions settled

  • Can an extra-judicial confession be considered voluntary if made in the presence of local notables without evidence of duress?
  • Is a school leaving certificate sufficient to establish the minority of an accused if it was not raised during the investigation?
  • Does the absence of eyewitnesses preclude a conviction when there is a strong chain of circumstantial evidence?
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• Muhammad Yousaf Versus Haji Murad Muhammad2003 PLD 184 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-10-21Read full judgment →
• Siraj Din Versus Ghulam Nabi2003 PLD 159 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-11-14
  general power of attorneyland mutationconsolidation proceedingsfraudulent transferlimitationbona fide purchasercompulsory registration
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that maintained concurrent findings of the lower courts, which had declared certain land mutations and subsequent alienations illegal. The dispute arose when the heirs of Mst. Sardaran Bibi challenged the sale of her land, claiming the underlying general power of attorney used to effect the transfers was forged and fictitious. The core legal questions concerned the validity of the alleged power of attorney, the necessity of its registration, and the legality of land transfers made during consolidation proceedings without requisite permission. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to produce the alleged power of attorney or prove its execution through witnesses, rendering the foundation of their title baseless. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that transfers made during consolidation proceedings without the Consolidation Officer's permission were illegal. The Court upheld the lower courts' decision to condone the delay in filing the suit, noting the original owner had no knowledge of the fraudulent transactions. The petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does a general power of attorney creating rights in immovable property require compulsory registration under the Registration Act 1908?
  • Can a land transfer made during pending consolidation proceedings be valid without the permission of the Consolidation Officer?
  • Is a mutation of land valid if the underlying power of attorney is neither produced nor proven in evidence?
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• Mukhtar Ahmad Versus The State2003 PLD 126 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-11-18
  review petitionsupreme court rulesappearance of advocatespecial leavecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a review petition filed against the judgment in criminal appeal No. 591 of 2000. The core legal question addressed is whether an Advocate who did not appear at the original hearing of the case can argue a review petition without special leave of the court under the relevant rules. The Supreme Court held that pursuant to Order XXVI, rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, no application for review shall be entertained unless drawn and argued by the Advocate who appeared at the original hearing, except with special leave of the Court or if the requirement is dispensed with. The key principle laid down is that an Advocate who did not appear at the original hearing has no right to argue a review petition unless the Court grants special leave or exercises its discretion to dispense with the requirement.

  Questions settled

  • Can an Advocate who did not appear at the hearing of the original case argue a review petition as of right?
  • What are the requirements under the Supreme Court Rules for filing and arguing a review petition?
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• Qazi Hussain Ahmad, Ameer Jamaat-E-Islami Pakistan Versus General Pervez Musharraf, Chief Executive2002 PLD 853 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-04-27
  referendumconstitutional deviationdoctrine of state necessitychief executivequo warrantopresidential electiontransitional period
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitions challenged the legality of the Referendum Order 2002 and Chief Executive's Orders Nos. 2 and 3 of 2001 issued by General Pervez Musharraf. The core legal questions involved whether the Chief Executive had the authority to hold a referendum for election to the office of the President, whether such a referendum violated the 1973 Constitution and the parameters laid down in Syed Zafar Ali Shah's case, and whether the removal of President Muhammad Rafiq Tarar and assumption of the presidency by the Chief Executive were lawful. The Supreme Court held that the impugned orders were validly promulgated pursuant to the Proclamation of Emergency and the Provisional Constitution Order No. 1 of 1999 as validated by Syed Zafar Ali Shah's case. The Court ruled that challenges to the future consequences of the referendum were premature and academic. The key principle laid down is that during a period of constitutional deviation validated by state necessity, the Chief Executive possesses the authority to issue legislative measures and orders for the orderly running of the State and the transition to democracy, which cannot be tested solely against suspended constitutional provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Chief Executive is empowered to promulgate a Referendum Order for election to the office of the President during a period of constitutional deviation?
  • Can the validity of extra-constitutional legislative measures such as the Referendum Order be tested on the touchstone of suspended provisions of the 1973 Constitution?
  • Whether the removal of the sitting President and the assumption of the presidential office by the Chief Executive via Chief Executive's Orders Nos. 2 and 3 of 2001 are valid under the doctrine of state necessity?
  • Are challenges to the future legal and political consequences flowing from the holding of a referendum premature and academic in nature?
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• Muhammad Naseem Khan Versus United Bank Limited, a Banking Company, Registered under the Companies2002 PLD 753 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-05-29
  personal bona fide requirementrent evictionfixed-term leasepremature ejectment applicationsubsequent events in litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh dismissing the appellants' rent appeal concerning the eviction of the respondent bank from commercial premises on the ground of personal bona fide requirement. The core legal question was whether an ejectment application filed before the expiry of a fixed-term lease is premature and whether the subsequent expiry of the lease during appellate proceedings cures any initial defect regarding the cause of action. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that a landlord is not restricted by statute from initiating ejectment proceedings prior to the expiry of a lease period provided personal bona fide need is established, and that lease extensions cannot be forced unilaterally without the landlord's consent. The Court laid down that subsequent events such as the expiration of a lease during the pendensibility of litigation can be considered, and that a tenant's status as a government-controlled entity does not override the landlord's established right to seek eviction for personal bona fide use.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application for ejectment on the ground of personal bona fide requirement is premature if filed before the expiry of a fixed-term lease?
  • Can a lease agreement be extended unilaterally by a tenant without the consent and agreement of the landlord?
  • Whether the expiration of a lease during the pendency of appellate proceedings cures any defect regarding the maintainability of an eviction petition?
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• Ibrahim Versus Rehmat Ali2002 PLD 741 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2001-11-07Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yasin Versus Dost Muhammad2002 PLD 71 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2001-09-17Read full judgment →
• Shamas-Ul-Bahadur Versus Nisar Ahmed2002 PLD 68 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2001-07-12Read full judgment →
• Noor Salam Versus Gul Badshah2002 PLD 622 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-04-25Read full judgment →
• Government of N.W.F.P. Versus Said Akbar Shah & Company2002 PLD 394 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2002-02-11Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan Versus Syed Mumtaz Ahmed Burney2002 PLD 353 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2001-09-25Read full judgment →
• Mubasher Ahmad Versus Mian Tahir Raza2002 PLD 270 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2001-11-22
  leave to appealSection 12(2) CPCforged power of attorneyfraud and misrepresentationrevisional jurisdictionremand of casecivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment that allowed an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, thereby recalling a previous order passed in civil revision proceedings. The underlying dispute concerns a suit for declaration filed by the petitioner, alleging that a Power of Attorney used to sell his property was a forged document. The trial court, appellate court, and the High Court in its initial revisional jurisdiction had all ruled in favor of the petitioner, finding the document fraudulent. The respondent subsequently invoked Section 12(2), C.P.C., alleging fraud, which led the High Court to set aside the previous decrees and remand the matter for fresh decision. The petitioner contends that the High Court misapplied Section 12(2), C.P.C., by allowing the respondent to re-litigate issues already settled by evidence, effectively enlarging the scope of the provision. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the record and the impugned orders, found that the contentions raised by the petitioner required in-depth examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal and ordered the continuation of the status quo.

  Questions settled

  • Can a respondent invoke Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to challenge a judgment on the grounds of fraud when the issue of fraud was already adjudicated by the trial and appellate courts?
  • Does the scope of Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 permit the reopening of settled matters without new evidence of fraud?
  • Is it permissible for a High Court to set aside a decree and remand a case under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without conducting a full inquiry into the alleged fraud?
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• Haji Ghulam Sarwar Versus Habibullah2002 PLD 263 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2001-10-30Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Idrees Versus Tajammal Hussain2002 PLD 261 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2001-11-01Read full judgment →
• Capital Development Authority Versus Sub. Faqir Shah2002 PLD 243 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2001-11-19Read full judgment →
• Hakeem Shah Versus Sawab Khan2002 PLD 200 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2001-11-21Read full judgment →
• DR. Anwar Ali Sahto Versus Federation of Pakistan2002 PLD 101 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  contract employeestemporary assignmentSection 2-AService Tribunals Act 1973master and servanttrainee engineersabsorption and reinstatementcondonation of delaytermination simpliciter
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan resolved multiple appeals and petitions arising from judgments of the Federal Service Tribunal concerning the termination of contract employees, temporary project workers, and trainee engineers/management trainees of Sui Southern Gas Company Limited. The primary legal questions concerned whether contractual or temporary project assignments automatically transform into regular or permanent employment by efflux of time, the scope and effect of Section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act 1973, the applicability of the master and servant rule in statutory corporation employments, and the strictness of limitation in service appeals. The Supreme Court held that contractual and temporary appointments do not confer regular status merely by the passage of time or project extension, and in the absence of statutory rules, service conditions are governed by the contract of service. Section 2-A provides a forum of appeal but does not automatically extend civil service laws to corporation employees. Consequently, appeals of contract and temporary employees were dismissed, while trainee engineers were reinstated subject to an IBA suitability test, and certain matters were remanded due to procedural defects or misreading of record on limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contractual or temporary appointment in a statutory corporation transform into regular or permanent service merely by efflux of time or continuation of a project?
  • Does the insertion of Section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act 1973 automatically make all civil servant statutory rules applicable to employees of government-controlled corporations?
  • Can an employer terminate the services of an employee governed by contract or temporary terms without issuing a show-cause notice in a case of termination simpliciter?
  • Does a plea of poverty constitute a valid legal ground for condoning delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 in service appeals?
  • Are the terms 'reinstatement' and 'absorption' synonymous when granted to trainees by the Service Tribunal in service matters?
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• In Re: to Revisit "the State V. Zubair" [PLD 1986 SC 173] Versus In Re: to Revisit "the State V. Zubair" [PLD 1986 SC 173]2002 PLD 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2001-09-24
  bail applicationsjudicial proprietyadministrative convenienceHigh Courtcase assignmentjudicial consistencysuo motu jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a suo motu notice taken by the Supreme Court of Pakistan to address administrative difficulties caused by the strict application of the rule established in The State v. Zubair (PLD 1986 SC 173). The core legal question concerned whether the requirement that subsequent bail applications be heard by the same judge who decided the initial application must be followed inflexibly, even when that judge is unavailable due to leave, exigencies of service, or posting at a different bench. The Court held that while the rule of propriety and consistency is salutary, it should not be applied as a rigid technicality that causes avoidable inconvenience or injustice. The Court clarified that if the original judge is unavailable, the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court, or the Senior Judge at a bench, possesses the authority to assign the matter to another judge, provided that reasons for such departure are recorded in writing. This arrangement serves as an interim measure to ensure the efficient administration of justice while maintaining the spirit of judicial consistency.

  Questions settled

  • Does the rule in The State v. Zubair require subsequent bail applications to be heard by the same judge under all circumstances?
  • Can the Chief Justice of a High Court assign a subsequent bail application to a different judge if the original judge is unavailable?
  • What is the proper procedure to follow when the judge who heard the first bail application is unavailable for a subsequent application?
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• Collector of Sales Tax Versus Superior Textile Mills Ltd2001 PLD 600 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2001-01-29
  sales taxginning industry rulesvires of rulestax liabilitysubstantive provisionsubordinate legislation
  Summary & questions settled

  The present appeals, by leave of the Court, challenge identical judgments rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court in twenty-two writ petitions, whereby rules 5 and 6 of the Special Procedure for Ginning Industry Rules, 1996 were held to be ultra vires of section 3(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether rules 5 and 6 of the said Rules, which shifted the sales tax liability from the supplier to the recipient of the supply, were ultra vires of the parent Act. The Supreme Court held that rule 6 is substantive in nature and in conflict with the substantive provisions of section 3(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which places the liability to pay tax on the person making the supply. Furthermore, subsection (3-A) of section 3 authorizing such a shift came into force subsequent to the notification of the rules, and the requisite notification under it was issued much later. Consequently, the Supreme Court modified the High Court's finding by declaring that rules 5 and 6 were 'inapplicable' rather than 'ultra vires' for the relevant period, and dismissed the appeals accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether rules 5 and 6 of the Special Procedure for Ginning Industry Rules, 1996 are ultra vires of section 3(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Can a rule framed under section 71 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 override the substantive provisions of the parent Act regarding tax liability?
  • Whether the liability to pay sales tax under section 3(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 can be shifted to the recipient of a supply without a valid notification under subsection (3-A)?
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• Yukong Ltd. South Korean Company, Seoul South Korea Versus M.T. Eastern Navigator2001 PLD 57 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2000-06-23Read full judgment →
• Asif Islam Versus Muhammad Asif2001 PLD 499 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2000-11-23Read full judgment →
• Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Forest Department, Punjab Lahore Versus Ghulam Nabi2001 PLD 415 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2000-11-22Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal Versus Saeeda Salah-Ud-Din2001 PLD 372 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2000-12-06Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ilyas Versus The State2001 PLD 333 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2000-10-12
  murderdeath sentenceinjured witnessocular accountmotivemedical evidencecompromise
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which maintained the appellant's conviction and death sentence for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and five years' rigorous imprisonment under Section 324/34 of the same Code for causing injuries to an eyewitness. The prosecution's case was that the appellant, along with co-accused, shot and killed the deceased over a land dispute. The appellant contended that the ocular account was unreliable due to the witnesses' relationship, that the motive was unproven, and that medical evidence conflicted with the ocular version. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the prompt lodging of the First Information Report (F.I.R.) and the presence of an injured eyewitness strongly corroborated the prosecution's case. The Court laid down that the credibility of a witness is determined by the worth of their testimony rather than relationship, and that where a premeditated murder is established by unimpeachable evidence, the failure to prove motive does not undermine the prosecution's case.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove a motive for a crime undermine a conviction if the ocular and medical evidence is otherwise unimpeachable?
  • Can the testimony of an eyewitness be discarded solely on the ground of relationship or friendship with the deceased?
  • Does a conflict in the size of entry and exit wounds automatically create a fatal contradiction between medical evidence and ocular testimony?
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• Wasim Sajjad Versus Federation of Pakistan2001 PLD 233 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2001-02-07
  review petitionmilitary takeoverdoctrine of state necessitysalus populi suprema lexconstitutional deviationjudicial reviewoath of office
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition was filed under Article 188 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, seeking review of the Supreme Court's landmark judgment of May 12, 2000. The original judgment had validated the military takeover of October 12, 1999, by General Pervez Musharraf on the touchstone of the doctrine of State necessity and the principle of salus populi suprema lex. The petitioners challenged the validation of the military takeover, the power of amendment conferred on the Chief Executive, and the three-year timeframe granted for holding general elections. The Supreme Court, in its review jurisdiction, dismissed the petitions. The Court held that there was no patent error or glaring omission on the face of the record to warrant a review. It reaffirmed that the military intervention was validated due to an extraordinary situation of constitutional vacuum and systemic collapse for which the Constitution offered no solution. The Court reiterated that the validation is strictly conditional upon and interlinked with the holding of general elections within the specified three-year timeframe.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the doctrine of State necessity can be invoked to validate an extra-constitutional military takeover when the Constitution provides no solution to a systemic crisis?
  • Can the Supreme Court in its review jurisdiction re-examine or re-argue factual controversies and legal findings already consciously decided in the main judgment?
  • Whether the power of the Chief Executive to amend the Constitution during a transitional period is subject to limitations, particularly regarding the salient features of the Constitution?
  • Are the cases of judges who ceased to hold office by declining or not being invited to take a fresh oath under an extra-constitutional order hit by the doctrine of past and closed transactions?
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• Muhammad Iqbal Versus The State2001 PLD 222 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2000-10-04
  murderlife imprisonmentocular evidenceballistic reportVatta Sattainterested witnesstheory of substitution
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave was filed by the appellant against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, which modified his sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 from death to life imprisonment with compensation. The prosecution alleged that the appellant shot and killed his father-in-law following a marital dispute arising from a Vatta Satta marriage. The Supreme Court evaluated whether discrepancies in ocular evidence rendered the prosecution case doubtful and whether the eye-witness testimony of close relatives was reliable. The Court held that prompt lodging of the F.I.R., corroborated by blood-stained earth, medical evidence, and a positive Ballistic Expert report matching the recovered pistol with the crime empty, established the case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court reaffirmed that minor discrepancies do not diminish the intrinsic value of natural eye-witness evidence and noted that false substitution of a single accused among close relatives is extremely rare. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minor discrepancies in eye-witness testimony impair the intrinsic value of ocular evidence in a criminal trial?
  • Can the testimony of eye-witnesses who are close relatives of the deceased be relied upon without independent corroboration?
  • Is false substitution of a single accused likely in cases where the parties are closely related by blood or marriage?
  • Does weakness or failure of proof of motive entitle an accused to an acquittal as a matter of right when eye-witness evidence is overwhelming?
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• Managing Director, Sui Southern Gas Co. Ltd. Versus Saleem Mustafa Sheikh2001 PLD 176 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2000-07-10
  service terminationtrainee engineernon-statutory rulesestoppeldiscrimination in employmentFederal Service Tribunalmaster and servantprobationary period
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which set aside the termination of a trainee engineer's services by the Sui Southern Gas Company Limited. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal could enforce the company's internal, non-statutory Executive Service Rules to grant relief to an employee and whether the Tribunal could order the employee's absorption into the company's service based on allegations of discrimination. The Supreme Court held that the company could not disregard its own internal rules merely because they lacked statutory status. The Court emphasized that the company, being owned and controlled by the Federal Government, could not act arbitrarily or violate its own commitments. Furthermore, the Court applied the principle of estoppel, preventing the company from objecting to the enforcement of rules it had itself framed. Consequently, the Court upheld the Tribunal's decision to reinstate the employee and rejected the company's arguments regarding jurisdiction and the non-statutory nature of its rules, affirming that the Tribunal acted within its authority.

  Questions settled

  • Can a corporate entity rely on the non-statutory nature of its internal service rules to avoid enforcing them against its employees?
  • Does the principle of estoppel prevent an employer from violating its own internal service rules and commitments?
  • Can the Federal Service Tribunal enforce internal company rules that are not statutory in nature?
  • Is a company justified in terminating a trainee engineer after keeping them on probation significantly beyond the period prescribed in its own service rules?
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• Shafaatullah Qureshi Versus Federation of Pakistan2001 PLD 142 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2000-10-26
  Wafaqi MohtasibOmbudsmanlimitation periodSection 14 Limitation Actexclusion of timedefinition of Courtjudicial tribunalquasi-judicial functionsmaladministration
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a Division Bench judgment of the Sindh High Court affirming the dismissal of his civil suit for recovery of money and damages as time-barred. The petitioner had initially pursued his grievance before the Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman). After the President set aside the Ombudsman's recommendations upon representation under Article 32 of the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983, the petitioner filed a civil suit. He argued that the limitation period should be calculated from the communication of the President's order, claiming exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908. The Supreme Court considered whether the Wafaqi Mohtasib constitutes a 'Court' or 'Judicial Tribunal' for the purposes of Section 14. The Supreme Court held that the Wafaqi Mohtasib makes recommendations rather than binding judgments, possesses delegable powers, and is not a Court under Article 175 of the Constitution. Therefore, Section 14 was inapplicable, and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Office of the Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) a 'Court' or 'Judicial Tribunal' for the purposes of Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can time spent prosecuting proceedings before the Wafaqi Mohtasib be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Does the performance of quasi-judicial functions convert an administrative authority or ombudsman into a Court under Article 175 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Western Brand Tea, Karachi Versus Tapal Tea (Pvt) Limited, Lahore2001 PLD 14 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  trade mark infringementpassing offdeceptive similaritycommercial goodwillconsent decreeconsumer confusion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil petitions challenging a judgment by the Lahore High Court, which upheld a trial court decree restraining the petitioner, Western Brand Tea, from using trade marks, wrappers, and packaging deceptively similar to those of the respondent, Tapal Tea (Pvt) Limited. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's use of packaging and trade marks, which closely resembled the respondent's registered designs, constituted an actionable infringement and whether the trial court correctly decreed the suit based on the petitioner's counsel's undertaking. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts correctly identified the deceptive similarity between the products, noting that the petitioner's packaging could easily mislead consumers. The Court affirmed that the respondent possessed a vested right to protect its registered trade mark and design from infringement. The key principle laid down is that it is a cardinal principle of law and fair commercial trading that deceptive measures cannot be adopted to adversely affect the goodwill and recognition earned by other organizations, and courts will not permit the use of similar trade marks or packaging that creates a likelihood of consumer confusion.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal lie against a consent order or decree under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a party be restrained from using a trade mark or wrapper that is deceptively similar to a registered trade mark?
  • Does a registered trade mark holder have a vested right to prevent others from using similar packaging or design schemes?
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• Abdul Rahim Khan Versus Asif Ali Khan2001 PLD 137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2000-10-23
  pre-emptionHindu vendornon-Muslimsleave to appealrejection of plaintTalab-e-MuwasibatShafi-e-JarShafi-e-Khalit
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the plaint was rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, a decision upheld by both the appellate and revision courts. The lower courts held that a right of pre-emption founded upon Muslim Personal Law could not be enforced against a sale made by a Hindu vendor who is not subject to Muslim Personal Law. The core legal question before the Supreme Court of Pakistan was whether a right of pre-emption can be claimed and enforced when the vendor of the immovable property is a non-Muslim. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, observing that the question was one of first impression lacking an authoritative precedent from the Apex Court. The Court highlighted past judicial observations and classical Islamic jurisprudence indicating that the Islamic law of pre-emption deals with social transactions ('Maamlat') and applies to both Muslims and non-Muslims (Zimmees), thereby requiring a definitive determination by the Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the right of pre-emption can be enforced upon a sale of immovable property executed by a Hindu vendor who is not subject to Muslim Personal Law?
  • Whether the Islamic Law of Pre-emption applies equally to Muslims and non-Muslims in social transactions?
  • Whether a pre-emption suit plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 solely because the vendor is a non-Muslim?
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• Ittehad Cargo Service Versus Syed Tasneem Hussain Naqvi2001 PLD 116 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2000-10-12Read full judgment →
• Zafar Ali Shah Versus Pervez Musharraf Chief Executive of Pakistan2000 PLD 869 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2000-05-12
  military takeoverdoctrine of state necessitysalus populi suprema lexProvisional Constitution Orderjudicial reviewconstitutional deviationindependence of judiciaryOath of Office (Judges) Orderpower to amend constitutionpast and closed transaction
  Summary & questions settled

  Multiple Constitution Petitions were filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 challenging the military takeover on October 12, 1999, led by General Pervez Musharraf, the issuance of the Proclamation of Emergency, the Provisional Constitution Order No. 1 of 1999 (PCO 1 of 1999), and the Oath of Office (Judges) Order 2000.

  The core legal question was whether the extra-constitutional intervention by the Armed Forces, the suspension of the Constitution, and the restriction on judicial review were legally valid.

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the intervention by the Armed Forces was validated under the doctrine of State necessity and the principle of salus populi suprema lex. The Court affirmed that the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 remained the supreme law of the land, though certain parts were held in abeyance. The Court retained its power of judicial review and granted the Chief Executive limited powers to legislate and amend the Constitution, provided the basic features (independence of the judiciary, federalism, and parliamentary form of government blended with Islamic provisions) remained unaltered. A three-year period from October 12, 1999, was granted to the Chief Executive to restore civilian democratic rule.

  Questions settled

  • Can an extra-constitutional takeover by the Armed Forces be validated under the doctrine of State necessity?
  • Does the Supreme Court retain the power of judicial review over legislative and executive acts passed during a military regime?
  • Can a Chief Executive exercising power under a Provisional Constitution Order amend the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Are the basic features of the Constitution of Pakistan, such as independence of the judiciary and parliamentary democracy, subject to amendment by an extra-constitutional authority?
  • Can superior court judges be removed from office without resorting to the procedure laid down in Article 209 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Al-Jehad Trust Versus President of Pakistan2000 PLD 84 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1999-10-26
  original jurisdictionpublic importancefundamental rightscourt martialjudicial reviewconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging the proceedings of a Field-General Court Martial regarding the trial of a former Major-General and others accused of conspiring to wage war against the state. The petitioner sought the enforcement of Fundamental Rights, alleging victimization of religious elements within the Army. The core legal question was whether the petition met the threshold for invoking the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction under Article 184(3), which requires a question of public importance concerning the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. The Court held that the petition was based on vague, bald, and general allegations unsupported by cogent material. Furthermore, the Court noted that the specific grievance regarding the Court Martial proceedings had already been adjudicated and dismissed in previous litigation. Consequently, the Court ruled that the petition did not present a justiciable issue of public importance and dismissed it, affirming that academic or vague pleas are insufficient to warrant the exercise of extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Is a direct petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution maintainable if the allegations are vague and not supported by cogent material?
  • Can a petitioner re-argue a matter under Article 184(3) that has already been adjudicated and dismissed by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the mere allegation of a violation of Fundamental Rights automatically satisfy the requirement of 'public importance' under Article 184(3) of the Constitution?
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• Muhammad Sadiq Versus Bashiran2000 PLD 820 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2000-04-10Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan Versus Mahommod-Ur-Rehman Faisal2000 PLD 770 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1999-02-24Read full judgment →
• House Building Finance Corporation Versus Muhammad Sharif2000 PLD 760 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1999-12-23
  diminishing partnershipIslamic bankingRibainterest-free economyrepugnancy to IslamShariat Appellate Benchrental income assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was directed against a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court which declared certain provisions of the House Building Finance Corporation Act, 1952 (as amended by the Amendment Ordinance of 1979) repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam. The core legal questions centered on whether provisions allowing a fixed rate of return on capital, interest-bearing loans, and partner-guaranteed principal under partnership arrangements violated the Islamic prohibition of Riba, and whether the rental assessment mechanism under the 'diminishing partnership' scheme conformed to Shariah principles. The Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the Federal Shariat Court's findings, holding that a fixed rate of return on capital constitutes interest, and that a partner cannot guarantee the principal of another partner in a Shariah-compliant partnership. The Court further held that under a diminishing partnership, rental payments must decrease proportionally as the client purchases units of the Corporation's share. Consequently, the Court directed that sections 4(2), 21(2), and 24(11), (12), and (20) of the Act be amended by June 30, 2000, to conform to Islamic injunctions.

  Questions settled

  • Does a statutory provision requiring a fixed rate of return on subscribed capital violate the Islamic injunctions against Riba?
  • Can a partner in a Shariah-compliant partnership arrangement guarantee the principal investment of another partner?
  • Is a rental assessment mechanism under a diminishing partnership scheme Shariah-compliant if it does not proportionally reduce the rent as the client purchases units of the financier's share?
  Read full judgment →
• Jamat-I-Islami Pakistan Versus Federation of Pakistan2000 PLD 111 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1999-12-13
  anti-terrorism lawconstitutional petitionvires of ordinanceextra-judicial killingscivil commotionright to privacy and lifeindependence of judiciaryprivate defense
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 challenged the constitutional validity of Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance (IV of 1999) and Anti-Terrorism (Second Amendment) Ordinance (XIII of 1999) amending the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, particularly concerning provisions on extra-judicial police powers, civil commotion, and judicial tenure. The core legal questions involved whether these amending ordinances were repugnant to Fundamental Rights and contrary to the guidelines established by the Supreme Court in Mehram Ali v. Federation of Pakistan. The Supreme Court held that section 5(2)(i) of the Act, which authorized law enforcement to open fire without being fired upon, and section 7-A, defining civil commotion to include vague terms like illegal strikes and internal disturbances, were unconstitutional and invalid as they infringed upon Fundamental Rights and lacked nexus with terrorism. However, amendments concerning judicial tenure under section 14 were upheld. The key principle laid down is that penal statutes, especially those touching upon life and liberty, must be precise and certain, and executive powers to use lethal force or penalize ordinary labor disputes as terrorist acts without clear nexus are void.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the power granted to law enforcement officers under section 5(2)(i) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 to open fire without being fired upon violates Article 9 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the inclusion of illegal strikes, lock-outs, and internal disturbances under the definition of 'civil commotion' in section 7-A of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 bear sufficient nexus with terrorism?
  • Whether the amendments to section 14 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 regarding the tenure and appointment of judges of Special Courts conform to the principles of judicial independence?
  • Are penal provisions that lack clear and definite standards unconstitutional for vagueness under Pakistani jurisprudence?
  Read full judgment →
• Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari Versus Federation of Pakistan1999 PLD 57 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-07-28Read full judgment →
• Maqbool Ahmed Qureshi Versus Islamic Republic of Pakistan1999 PLD 484 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1999-03-08
  Lambardarprimogeniturehereditary claimrepugnancy to IslamShariat Appellate Benchpublic officemerit-based appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants challenged several provisions of the Punjab Land Revenue Rules, 1968, specifically Rules 17, 19, 25, and 26, before the Federal Shariat Court on the grounds of repugnancy to the Injunctions of Islam. The challenged rules governed the appointment of Lambardars (village headmen), prioritizing hereditary claims, the rule of primogeniture, and allowing the appointment of minors or substitutes (Sarbrahs). The Supreme Court of Pakistan (Shariat Appellate Bench) examined the nature of the office of Lambardar, noting it serves as an unofficial intermediary between the State and landowners. The Court held that under Islamic injunctions, public offices and employments are sacred trusts that must be conferred strictly on the basis of merit, capability, and trustworthiness, as derived from the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah. Consequently, the Court declared sub-rule (2) of Rule 19 repugnant to Islam to the extent that it mandates the rule of primogeniture. Rules 25 and 26 were also declared repugnant to the extent that they permit the appointment of minors or physically/mentally incapable persons as headmen.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the rule of primogeniture in the appointment of a successor Lambardar under the Punjab Land Revenue Rules, 1968 is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam?
  • Does the consideration of hereditary claims as one of several non-mandatory factors in the first appointment of a Lambardar violate Islamic principles?
  • Are provisions allowing the appointment of minors or physically/mentally incapable persons as village headmen repugnant to the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahid Orakzai Versus Nawaz Sharif1999 PLD 46 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-11-13
  fundamental rightspublic importancejurisdictionaccomplice testimonysecurity coverarmed forcescriminal prosecution
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a journalist, approached the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, seeking directions for security cover by the Pakistan Army and the initiation of proceedings regarding alleged political 'horse-trading' and the subsequent assassination of his brother. The petitioner had previously sought the suspension of the Chairman of the Ehtesab Cell from the Chief Ehtesab Commissioner, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and because the petitioner was a self-confessed accomplice. The Supreme Court held that the Chief Ehtesab Commissioner lacked the jurisdiction to suspend the Chairman. Furthermore, the Court ruled that allegations of misconduct against public officials do not automatically warrant direct recourse under Article 184(3) unless there is a clear violation of fundamental rights of public importance. Criminal matters, such as murder, must be pursued through the ordinary courts of criminal jurisdiction. Finally, regarding security, the Court clarified that while the Armed Forces must act in aid of the Supreme Court under Article 190, no such occasion arose here, and the petitioner could seek ordinary security from the trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution solely because a high state functionary is accused of misconduct?
  • Does the Chief Ehtesab Commissioner possess the statutory power to suspend the Chairman or members of the Ehtesab Cell?
  • Under what circumstances can the Supreme Court direct the Armed Forces of Pakistan to provide personal security cover to a citizen under Article 190 of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Jumma Khan Versus Zarin Khan1999 PLD 1101 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1999-07-20
  rent ejectmentlandlord and tenantspecific performancesale agreementestoppelbona fide requirementleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a High Court judgment affirming an ejectment order against a tenant. The core legal question is whether a tenant can resist rent ejectment proceedings by setting up a pending civil suit for specific performance based on an alleged sale agreement, which the landlord vehemently denies. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the ejectment proceedings remain maintainable despite the tenant's claim of a sale agreement. The Court affirmed that the relationship of landlord and tenant continues to exist until the civil court of competent jurisdiction finally determines the validity of the disputed sale agreement. Relying on established precedents, the Court held that a tenant cannot be permitted to retain possession and resist eviction by merely asserting a hostile title that is bona fide disputed by the landlord. The tenant must vacate the premises while pursuing their civil claim, as the doctrine of estoppel prevents them from denying the landlord's title while remaining in possession.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant resist ejectment proceedings by claiming a pending civil suit for specific performance based on a disputed sale agreement?
  • Does the relationship of landlord and tenant continue to exist while a civil suit regarding the validity of a sale agreement is pending?
  • Is a tenant permitted to retain possession of rented premises while denying the landlord's title based on an unproven sale agreement?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sharif Versus The State1999 PLD 1063 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1999-03-26Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan Versus Shaukat Ali Mian1999 PLD 1026 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1999-06-23
  foreign currency accountseconomic reformsproclamation of emergencyfundamental rightsbanking circularsconfiscatory legislationexcessive delegationcolourable legislation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal and connected petitions arose from the Lahore High Court's judgment declaring Section 2 of the Foreign Exchange (Temporary Restrictions) Act 1998 and certain State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) circulars unconstitutional. Following nuclear tests on May 28, 1998, the President declared an emergency, and the SBP suspended withdrawals from foreign currency accounts, offering conversion into Pakistani Rupees at a fixed rate. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the validity of these restrictions against the statutory protections guaranteed under the Protection of Economic Reforms Act 1992. The Court held that Section 2 of the Foreign Exchange (Temporary Restrictions) Act 1998 is intra vires, provided it does not compel account holders to convert their foreign holdings or liquidate accounts held as security. However, the Court declared SBP's B.P.R.D. Circular No. 23 of 1998 illegal and confiscatory as it interfered with concluded contracts. The Court ruled that account holders are entitled to interest/profits in foreign exchange and directed the Federation to evolve a scheme for the gradual removal of these restrictions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 2 of the Foreign Exchange (Temporary Restrictions) Act 1998 is ultra vires the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can the State Bank of Pakistan issue circulars that retrospectively alter the terms of concluded loan and security agreements?
  • Does the existence of a Proclamation of Emergency under Article 232 justify executive actions that are not supported by subsequent legislative enactments?
  • Whether the temporary suspension of foreign currency withdrawals constitutes a 'taking' of property without compensation under the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Platinum Insurance Comp. Ltd Versus Daewoo Corporatio1999 PLD 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-11-03
  winding-upcompanies ordinancemobilisation advance guaranteeinability to pay debtscommercial insolvencybona fide disputesurety liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This direct appeal challenges the judgment of the Sindh High Court's Company Judge allowing a winding-up petition against the appellant insurance company for failing to pay a guaranteed mobilization advance under an unconditional guarantee. The core legal questions involved whether an unconditional mobilization advance guarantee can be read in conjunction with other contract documents, whether a bona fide dispute existed regarding the debt, and whether clauses (a) and (c) of section 306 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, operate independently or in conjunction to establish a company's inability to pay its debts. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the guarantee was absolute and unconditional, that no bona fide dispute regarding the liability existed, and that service of a statutory demand notice under section 306(1)(a) raises a rebuttable presumption of commercial insolvency which the appellant failed to displace. The court laid down the principle that while winding-up proceedings are not a substitute for recovery suits and require proof of commercial insolvency, a statutory demand notice shifts the burden to the debtor company to prove solvency and capacity to meet its debts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unconditional mobilization advance guarantee can be read in isolation from other contract documents?
  • Does the non-payment of a debt following a statutory demand under section 306 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, raise a rebuttable presumption of commercial insolvency?
  • Can a winding-up petition be sustained when the debtor company raises a bona fide dispute regarding its liability?
  • Is the liability of a surety co-extensive with that of the principal debtor under section 128 of the Contract Act 1872?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afza Versus Govt. of Pakistan1998 PLD 92 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-12-05Read full judgment →
• Benazir Bhutto Versus President of Pakistan1998 PLD 388 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-09-13
  dissolution of National Assemblyextra-judicial killingsindependence of judiciaryphone-tappingsystemic corruptionconstitutional petitionjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  These constitutional petitions, filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, challenged the President's proclamation of November 5, 1996, which dissolved the National Assembly and dismissed the Prime Minister and Cabinet under Article 58(2)(b). The core legal question was whether the President's dissolution was validly based on objective, relevant material demonstrating that the Government of the Federation could not be carried on in accordance with the Constitution. The Supreme Court, in a majority decision, dismissed the petitions and upheld the dissolution. The Court held that the President possessed sufficient and relevant objective material to justify his opinion. The ratio decidendi established that the persistent non-implementation and public ridicule of the Supreme Court's judgments (specifically the Judges' Appointment Case), widespread extra-judicial and custodial killings in Karachi, illegal phone-tapping of judges and political leaders, and systemic corruption collectively proved a total breakdown of the constitutional machinery. The Court laid down the principle that while the President's power under Article 58(2)(b) is discretionary, it must be exercised objectively based on material showing that alternative constitutional remedies have been exhausted or rendered futile.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the President's power to dissolve the National Assembly under Article 58(2)(b) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 requires the existence of objective material showing a breakdown of the constitutional machinery?
  • Can the persistent non-implementation and public ridicule of Supreme Court judgments by the executive constitute a valid ground for the dissolution of the National Assembly?
  • Whether widespread extra-judicial killings and the failure of the federal and provincial governments to control them can justify the invocation of Article 58(2)(b) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the illegal tapping of telephones of superior court judges and political leaders violate the fundamental right to privacy under Article 14 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Asad Ali Versus Federation of Pakistan1998 PLD 161 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-12-23
  constitutional conventionjudicial independenceappointment of judgesquo warrantoseniority rulelocus standifundamental rightsaccess to justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns constitutional petitions filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan challenging the appointment of Mr. Justice Sajjad Ali Shah as the Chief Justice of Pakistan. The core legal question was whether the appointment of the Chief Justice of Pakistan is governed by a binding constitutional convention of seniority and whether the appointment of Mr. Justice Sajjad Ali Shah, who was junior to other Supreme Court judges, was constitutional. The Court held that the appointment was unconstitutional, illegal, and of no legal consequence. It declared that the appointment of the Chief Justice of Pakistan must follow the well-established constitutional convention of appointing the senior-most judge, absent concrete and valid reasons for departure. The Court further held that the independence of the judiciary is inextricably linked to the constitutional process of appointing judges, and that access to an independent and impartial court is a fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 9 and 25 of the Constitution. Consequently, the Court directed the Federal Government to denotify the appointment of Mr. Justice Sajjad Ali Shah and appoint the senior-most judge, Mr. Justice Ajmal Mian, as Chief Justice of Pakistan.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the appointment of the Chief Justice of Pakistan is governed by a binding constitutional convention of seniority?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the jurisdiction under Article 184(3) to determine the validity of the appointment of the Chief Justice of Pakistan?
  • Can a petition seeking information in the nature of quo warranto be maintained against a judge of the superior court?
  • Does the restraint of a Chief Justice from performing judicial functions create a vacancy or inability requiring the appointment of an Acting Chief Justice under Article 180?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Murtz Versus The State1998 PLD 152 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-01-15
  pre-sentence detentionSection 382-B Cr.P.C.life imprisonmentsentencing discretionjudicial discretionmitigating circumstancescriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the entitlement of a convict to the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, specifically regarding the set-off of pre-sentence detention against a sentence of life imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the sentencing court is mandated to consider the pre-sentence period spent in custody and whether the denial of this benefit requires specific justification. The Supreme Court held that Section 382-B is a mandatory provision requiring the sentencing court to take into account the period of detention during trial. The Court emphasized that this discretion must be exercised judiciously; while the court may deny the benefit in exceptional circumstances—such as where the accused purposely obstructed the trial—it must provide reasons for such denial. The judgment establishes that the benefit of Section 382-B is not automatically precluded by the nature of the offence or the fact that a death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. Consequently, absent extraordinary circumstances, the pre-sentence detention period should be counted towards the sentence of imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Is the application of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandatory for the sentencing court?
  • Can an appellate court grant the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the trial court failed to consider it?
  • Does the commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment preclude the convict from receiving the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Must a court provide reasons if it decides to deny the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Sartaj Khan Versus Jan Muhammad1998 PLD 1502 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  suit for possessionprior sale deedsubsequent sale deedlandlord and tenantdenial of titlemisreading of evidenceconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit for possession filed by the appellants against the respondent in respect of a residential house. The appellants claimed ownership based on a prior sale-deed dated 17-2-1961, asserting that the respondent was their tenant who subsequently denied their title. The respondent claimed ownership based on a subsequent sale-deed dated 28-1-1967 executed by the same vendor. The trial, appellate, and revisional courts dismissed the suit, relying on the vendor's testimony that the prior sale was for a different plot. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the evidence, found that the lower courts had misread and ignored critical admissions. The vendor had admitted in cross-examination that the prior sale-deed was indeed for the disputed house and that the respondent was a tenant prior to the subsequent sale. The respondent also admitted entering the house as a tenant. The Court held that the alleged repurchase of the house by the vendor from the appellants' father was unsupported by any documentary evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the concurrent findings, accepted the appeal, and decreed the suit in favor of the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a subsequent purchaser can claim valid title over a property that was already sold to a prior purchaser by the same vendor?
  • Whether concurrent findings of lower courts can be set aside by the Supreme Court if they are based on a gross misreading or non-reading of material evidence?
  • Can an oral assertion of repurchase of property by a vendor be accepted without any supporting documentary evidence of such transaction?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehram Ali Versus Federation of Pakistan1998 PLD 1445 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-15Read full judgment →
• Wukala Mahaz Barai Thafaz Dastoor Versus Federation of Pakistan1998 PLD 1263 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-05-20
  anti-defection lawFourteenth Amendmentbasic structure doctrinefloor crossingparliamentary privilegesfreedom of speechconstituent powerjudicial reviewparty discipline
  Summary & questions settled

  Direct Constitutional Petitions were brought before the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging the vires of Article 63A, which was inserted by the Constitution (Fourteenth Amendment) Act, 1997 to disqualify members of Parliament for defection. The petitioners contended that Article 63A destroyed the basic structure of the Constitution and violated fundamental rights including freedom of speech (Article 19) and parliamentary privileges (Article 66). The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Article 63A by a majority of 6 to 1, ruling that the basic structure doctrine does not apply to invalidate constitutional amendments passed by Parliament in exercise of its constituent powers, and that a constitutional provision cannot be struck down under Article 8. However, the Court clarified by a 4 to 2 majority that paragraph (a) of the Explanation to clause (1) of Article 63A must be read in conjunction with paragraphs (b) and (c), restricting disqualifying misconduct to breaches of discipline committed inside the House, while preserving freedom of speech subject to reasonable restrictions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the basic structure doctrine is applicable in Pakistan to strike down an amendment to the Constitution enacted by Parliament?
  • Does the expression 'law' in Article 8 of the Constitution of Pakistan include a constitutional amendment passed in the exercise of constituent power?
  • Whether Article 63A of the Constitution of Pakistan can be applied to disqualify a parliamentarian for conduct or breaches of party discipline occurring outside the precinct of Parliament?
  • Does the ouster clause in Article 63A(6) preclude superior courts from reviewing disqualification orders that are without jurisdiction, coram non judice, or mala fide?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ikram Chaudhry Versus Federation of Pakistan1998 PLD 103 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-01-07
  Constitutional petitionwrit jurisdictionSupreme Judicial Counciljudicial misconductCircuit Benchesmaintainabilityquo warranto
  Summary & questions settled

  These four Constitution petitions, filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, challenged the judicial orders passed by separate Benches of the Supreme Court at Quetta and Peshawar. The petitioners, mostly practicing lawyers, also sought a direction to initiate misconduct proceedings under Article 209 of the Constitution against certain Judges, and prayed for the abolition of Supreme Court Benches outside Islamabad. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that a Bench of the Supreme Court cannot sit in appeal over, or issue a writ against, an order of another Bench of the same Court. The Court clarified that the exclusion of the Supreme Court and High Courts from the definition of a "person" under Article 199(5) of the Constitution applies to Article 184(3) proceedings. Furthermore, the Court ruled that Article 209 does not permit citizens or lawyers to file Constitutional petitions to direct the President or the Supreme Judicial Council to initiate misconduct proceedings against a Judge. Lastly, the Court upheld the constitutionality of holding Circuit Benches under Article 183(2) of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Bench of the Supreme Court entertain a Constitution petition under Article 184(3) to challenge or set aside a judicial order passed by another Bench of the same Court?
  • Does the exclusion of the Supreme Court and High Courts from the definition of a 'person' under Article 199(5) of the Constitution apply to the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 184(3)?
  • Can a citizen or practicing lawyer maintain a Constitutional petition seeking a direction to initiate misconduct proceedings against a Judge under Article 209 of the Constitution?
  • Is the holding of Circuit Benches of the Supreme Court at locations other than Islamabad constitutionally valid under Article 183 of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Qadir Dad Versus Muhammad Afzal1997 PLD 859 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-27
  remand orderleave to appealdecreeMajlis-e-Shooraright of hearingappellate discretionjudicial procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order remanding a case to the Majlis-e-Shoora for re-hearing. The primary legal question was whether a remand order constitutes a 'decree' or 'judgment' under Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, thereby enabling a direct appeal under Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Additionally, the court addressed whether a judgment rendered by a Majlis-e-Shoora is legally valid when the Chairman signing the judgment had not heard the parties. The Supreme Court held that a remand order does not conclusively determine the rights of parties and thus does not qualify as a 'decree' or 'judgment' for the purposes of a direct appeal. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that a judicial body cannot validly decide a case without hearing the parties, rendering the Majlis-e-Shoora's decision unsustainable. The Court established that the appellate court's power under Order XLI Rule 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is discretionary, not mandatory, and upheld the remand order.

  Questions settled

  • Does a remand order constitute a 'decree' or 'judgment' under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to allow a direct appeal under Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is a judgment rendered by a Majlis-e-Shoora valid if the Chairman who signed it did not hear the parties?
  • Is the power of an appellate court to decide a case on merits under Order XLI Rule 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 mandatory or discretionary?
  Read full judgment →
• Al-Jehad Trust Versus Federation of Pakistan1997 PLD 84 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-12-04
  appointment of judgesPresidential Referenceindependence of judiciarybinding adviceEighth Amendmentconsultation processcontempt of courtConstitutional machinery breakdown
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from Constitutional petitions and a Presidential Reference seeking to determine whether the President's power to appoint Judges to the Supreme Court and High Courts under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 is subject to the compulsory advice of the Prime Minister under Article 48(1). The core legal question centered on the distribution of executive powers between the President and the Prime Minister following the Constitution (Eighth Amendment) Act 1985. The Supreme Court held that the appointment of superior court judges is an executive action to which Article 48(1) applies, meaning the President must act on the Prime Minister's advice. However, this advice is strictly circumscribed by the judicial independence principles established in the 1996 Al-Jehad Trust case; the advice must align with the recommendations of the Chief Justices. If the Prime Minister fails to tender advice within the prescribed time-frame, consent is deemed granted. Furthermore, deliberate non-implementation of the Court's judgments constitutes contempt under Article 204 and may signal a breakdown of Constitutional machinery under Article 58(2)(b).

  Questions settled

  • Whether the President's power to appoint judges to the Supreme Court and High Courts is subject to the binding advice of the Prime Minister under Article 48(1) of the Constitution?
  • What is the legal consequence if the Prime Minister fails to tender advice regarding judicial appointments within the constitutionally prescribed time-frame?
  • Does the Constitution (Eighth Amendment) Act 1985 alter the basic parliamentary character of the government of Pakistan to a presidential system?
  • Can the deliberate non-implementation of a Supreme Court judgment by the executive be construed as a failure of Constitutional machinery under Article 58(2)(b)?
  Read full judgment →
• Mahmood Ali Butt Versus Inspector General of Police1997 PLD 823 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-23
  constitutional petitionspecial oathcompromisemonetary liabilityresile from agreementtechnicalities of procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, where the petitioner sought a direction for the registration of a criminal case. During the proceedings, a private dispute regarding a monetary debt emerged. The petitioner offered to pay the disputed sum if the respondent and her brother took an oath on the Holy Qur'an confirming the debt. Upon their taking the oath, the petitioner signed a written statement admitting the liability and requested to pay in instalments, which the High Court recorded as a compromise. The petitioner subsequently challenged this arrangement, arguing that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to settle a money dispute or decree a claim in its constitutional jurisdiction, and that the oath violated Article 163 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984. The Supreme Court, by majority, dismissed the petition, holding that the special oath procedure was governed by the Oaths Act 1873 rather than Article 163 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984. The Court ruled that a party who voluntarily offers to resolve a dispute via a special oath and undertakes to be bound by it cannot resile from the resulting liability, and that technicalities of procedure should not thwart substantive justice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who offers to resolve a dispute via a special oath under the Oaths Act 1873 resile from the resulting liability after the oath is taken?
  • Is a decision based on a special oath governed by Article 163 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984?
  • Can the High Court, in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, record and enforce a monetary compromise voluntarily entered into by the parties?
  Read full judgment →
• M.A.No.657 of 1996 in References Nos 1 and 2 of 1996 : in Re Versus M.A.No.657 of 1996 in References Nos 1 and 2 of 1996 : in Re1997 PLD 80 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-10-23Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hameed Versus Muhammad Mohiyuddin1997 PLD 730 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-16
  HibaAriatUmragift of usufructlimited estateIslamic jurisprudencemutation of inheritance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a suit for declaration and permanent injunction filed by the legal heirs of a deceased landowner, Jamal Din. In 1948, Jamal Din mutated one square of land in favor of his issueless wife, Mst. Karam Noor, for her life or till remarriage. Following her death in 1985, the revenue authorities mutated the land in favor of her heirs as exclusive owner, which the plaintiffs challenged, arguing she was only a limited owner and the land should revert to the donor's heirs. The core legal questions were whether Islamic law permits the gift of usufruct of immovable property, and whether a life-grant (Umra) to a wife constitutes a gift of the corpus with a void condition. The Supreme Court held that Islamic law fully recognizes and permits the gift of usufruct (Ariat). However, where the donor's intention is to transfer the corpus of the property itself, any life-limiting condition attached to the gift (Umra) is void under Shariah, rendering the gift absolute. Finding that the transaction gifted the land itself, the Court affirmed the lower courts' judgments dismissing the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether under Islamic law a gift of the usufruct of immovable property is permissible?
  • Whether a life-grant (Umra) of the corpus of property under Islamic law is construed as an absolute gift with the life-limiting condition being void?
  • How is the intention of a donor to be determined in distinguishing between a gift of the corpus (Hiba) and a gift of the usufruct (Ariat)?
  Read full judgment →
• Zahida Begum Versus Muhammad Shafiq1997 PLD 73 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-07-30Read full judgment →
• Secretary to Govt. of Punjab Versus Kishwar Alam1997 PLD 578 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-11Read full judgment →
• Mahmood Khan Achakzai Versus Federation of Pakistan1997 PLD 426 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-01-12Read full judgment →
• Zeshan Kazmi Versus The State1997 PLD 406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-12
  surety bondforfeiture of bondabscondence of accusedjudicial discretionbail bond
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a case concerning the forfeiture of a surety bond following the abscondence of an accused person. The core legal question before the Supreme Court of Pakistan was whether the full amount of a surety bond could be forfeited, or whether courts were bound by precedent to forfeit only a fraction of the bond amount. The Supreme Court held that there is no statutory or legal prohibition against forfeiting the full amount of a surety bond if the circumstances of the case so warrant. The Court clarified that the determination of what portion of a surety bond should be forfeited depends entirely on the specific facts and circumstances of each case, within the discretion of the court. Furthermore, the Court reaffirmed the principle established in Dildar v. The State (PLD 1963 SC 47), which balances leniency to encourage sureties with severity to prevent the abuse of justice, noting that this principle remains valid and does not prescribe a rigid mathematical yardstick for forfeiture.

  Questions settled

  • Is there any legal prohibition against the forfeiture of the full amount of a surety bond when an accused person absconds?
  • How should a court determine what portion of a surety bond is to be forfeited in a particular case?
  • Does the precedent in Dildar v. The State establish a fixed mathematical yardstick or percentage for the forfeiture of surety bonds?
  Read full judgment →
• Saleem Akhtar Versus Muhammad Ashraf1997 PLD 308 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-01-13Read full judgment →
• Zeeshan Kazmi Versus The State1997 PLD 267 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-02-12
  surety bond forfeiturebail bondabsconding accusedpre-arrest bailcriminal jurisprudence
  Summary & questions settled

  This case arises from criminal proceedings where the petitioner, a former Station House Officer accused of murder and other offences, absconded after being granted interim pre-arrest bail by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the Court issued a show-cause notice to his surety—who was also his father-in-law—regarding the forfeiture of the Rs. 2,00,000 surety bond. The core legal question concerned the principles and quantum for forfeiting a surety bond when an accused jumps bail. The Supreme Court held that once an accused absconds, the entire surety amount is liable to be forfeited in the absence of mitigating circumstances, and courts should not show undue leniency, particularly in heinous offences or where the surety has a close relationship with the accused. The Court laid down that determining the forfeited amount depends on the facts of each case, balancing undue leniency against undue severity, while factoring in modern socio-legal conditions, rising crime rates, the severity of the alleged offence, and the relationship between the surety and the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the entire amount of a surety bond is liable to be forfeited when an accused absconds?
  • What factors should courts consider when determining the extent of forfeiture of a bail bond?
  • Does a familial relationship between the surety and the accused affect the liability or leniency in forfeiting a surety bond?
  Read full judgment →
• Zulfiqar Ali Babu Versus Government of Punjab1997 PLD 11 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-10-23
  local governmentlegislative competencejudicial reviewnullification of judgmentcolourable legislationstatutory interpretationconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  These Constitution Petitions challenged the Punjab Local Government (Repeal) Act, 1996, which repealed the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, and terminated the tenure of elected local council members, thereby nullifying a previous Supreme Court judgment ordering their restoration. The core legal questions concerned whether the legislature could enact laws that nullify judicial decisions, whether the Act constituted a colourable exercise of legislative power, and whether the Court could examine legislative intent through external debates. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the legislature is sovereign within its constitutional domain. The Court ruled that it cannot inquire into the motives or alleged mala fides of the legislature. Furthermore, because the language of the Repeal Act was clear and unambiguous, the Court held that it was not permissible to resort to external materials like assembly debates for interpretation. The ratio established that if a statute is competently enacted, the judiciary cannot refuse to enforce it, even if the result is the nullification of a prior judicial decision.

  Questions settled

  • Can the judiciary inquire into the motives or mala fides behind a statute enacted by a competent legislature?
  • Does the legislature have the power to enact a law that effectively nullifies a previous judgment of the Supreme Court?
  • When is it permissible for a court to refer to external materials, such as legislative debates, to interpret a statute?
  • Can a violation of the Principles of Policy under the Constitution be challenged through a petition under Article 184(3)?
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• Sabur Rehman Versus Govt. of Sindh1996 PLD 801 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-06-11
  constitutional petitionjudicial reviewno evidenceSpecial Military Courtnarcotics smugglingjurisdictional defectreappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from three constitutional petitions filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, challenging the convictions and sentences awarded to the appellants by a Special Military Court for smuggling and abetting the smuggling of narcotics. The High Court of Sindh dismissed the petitions, holding that it could not interfere with the findings of the military tribunal. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the convictions were based on 'no evidence' and whether the High Court could intervene in such circumstances. The majority of the Supreme Court held that while a finding of fact based on absolutely no evidence is a jurisdictional defect that can be corrected under Article 199, the burden of proving a complete absence of evidence lies heavily on the petitioner. Because the complete trial record, including material documentary evidence, was not placed before the Court, the appellants failed to discharge this burden. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals, affirming that the High Court cannot act as a regular appellate court to reappraise evidence under its constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 reappraise evidence to overturn a finding of fact by a tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction?
  • Does a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction that is based on no legal evidence constitute a jurisdictional defect remediable under Article 199?
  • Who bears the initial burden of proving that a conviction by a Special Military Court was based on no evidence in a constitutional petition?
  • Are confessional statements made to a police officer during investigation admissible before a Special Military Court in light of the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984?
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• Muhammad Azam Versus The State1996 PLD 67 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Punjab Provincial Cooperative Bank Ltd. Versus Muhammad Salim Butt1996 PLD 596 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-21
  fresh inquirydefective inquiryembezzlementreinstatementback benefitsdisciplinary proceedingslabour law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two appeals arising from the dismissal of writ petitions by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal's decision to reinstate employees while barring the employer from conducting fresh disciplinary inquiries. The employees, bank officers, were dismissed following allegations of embezzlement, fraud, and forgery. The Labour Court and the Appellate Tribunal found the initial departmental inquiries defective due to procedural lapses. The core legal question was whether an employer, after an initial inquiry is declared defective, is entitled to hold a fresh inquiry into serious charges such as embezzlement. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts erred in denying the bank the opportunity to conduct a fresh inquiry. The Court established the principle that when an employee is reinstated solely due to a defective inquiry, the employer must be permitted to hold a fresh, lawful departmental inquiry to establish the charges. This is deemed essential for public interest, maintaining financial integrity, and ensuring that employees are either held accountable or cleared of stigma through a proper, fair process.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employer hold a fresh departmental inquiry if the initial inquiry against an employee is found to be defective?
  • Does the reinstatement of an employee due to a defective inquiry automatically preclude the employer from initiating a new disciplinary proceeding?
  • Is the denial of back benefits a valid legal justification for barring an employer from conducting a fresh inquiry into allegations of embezzlement?
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• Riaz Ahmed Versus The State1996 PLD 589 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-04-08Read full judgment →
• The State Versus Khalid Masood1996 PLD 42 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-12
  contempt of courtscandalizing the courteditor liabilityprinter and publisher liabilityreporter liabilitysui generis proceedingsunconditional apologydrug mafia speech
  Summary & questions settled

  Suo motu proceedings for contempt of court were initiated by the Supreme Court of Pakistan against a speaker who delivered a speech at a public event alleging that judges were on the payroll of a drug mafia, as well as against the editor, printer, and reporter of the newspaper that published the report. The speaker claimed his remarks pertained to foreign jurisdictions, while the editor and publisher raised defenses of oversight and absence. The core legal questions pertained to whether oral scandalization of superior courts in a public gathering and its subsequent publication constitute contempt, the standard of liability for editors and publishers, and whether standard criminal principles apply to contempt proceedings. The Supreme Court held that scandalizing superior judiciary undermines public confidence in the administration of justice and constitutes contempt under Article 204 of the Constitution and the Contempt of Court Act 1976. The speaker, editor, and printer were found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment till the rising of the court and a fine, while the reporter was discharged. The Court affirmed that editors and publishers bear strict responsibility for published material and that contempt proceedings are sui generis rather than strictly criminal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether oral utterances scandalizing the superior judiciary in a public gathering constitute contempt of court?
  • Does the printing and publication of a defamatory or scandalizing report in a newspaper render the editor, printer, and publisher liable for contempt regardless of absence or lack of intent?
  • Are contempt of court proceedings strictly criminal proceedings or are they sui generis in nature?
  • Can a news reporter be held liable for contempt of court if their report was submitted solely for internal editorial review and policy scrutiny?
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• Al-Jehad Trust Versus Federation of Pakistan1996 PLD 324 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-03-24
  independence of judiciaryjudicial appointmentsmeaningful consultationActing Chief JusticeAdditional Judgeslegitimate expectationFederal Shariat Court transferconstitutional conventionsad hoc judges
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional matter arose under Article 184(3) and appellate jurisdiction, challenging various appointments, transfers, non-confirmations, and acting assignments in the superior judiciary. The core legal questions pertained to the constitutional scope of 'consultation' under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, the legitimacy of appointing Acting Chief Justices and ad hoc Judges against permanent vacancies, the legitimate expectation of Additional Judges for permanent appointment, and the transfer of High Court Judges to the Federal Shariat Court under Article 203-C without consent. The Supreme Court held that 'consultation' is mandatory, consensus-oriented, and effective, giving primacy to the opinion of the Chief Justice of Pakistan and Chief Justices of High Courts, which can only be rejected for sound, recorded, and justiciable reasons. The Court declared that permanent vacancies must generally be filled within 30 to 90 days; Acting Chief Justices are not valid consultees; ad hoc appointments cannot be made against permanent vacancies; senior-most High Court Judges have a legitimate expectation to be appointed Chief Justice; and transferring High Court Judges to the Federal Shariat Court without consent violates tenure protections under Article 209.

  Questions settled

  • What is the true constitutional import and legal effect of the words 'after consultation' in Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 regarding the appointment of superior court judges?
  • Can an Acting Chief Justice of a High Court or the Supreme Court serve as a valid consultee under Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution?
  • Does the senior-most Judge of a High Court have a legitimate expectancy to be appointed as the permanent Chief Justice in the absence of recorded valid reasons?
  • Can ad hoc Judges be appointed to the Supreme Court under Article 182 when permanent vacancies exist within the sanctioned strength?
  • Is the transfer of a sitting High Court Judge or Chief Justice to the Federal Shariat Court without their consent under Article 203-C violative of the tenure protections guaranteed under Article 209 of the Constitution?
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• Ali Muhammad Versus Ali Muhammad1996 PLD 274 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Qatl-i-Amdgrave and sudden provocationright of private defencedefence of honouradulterySection 302(c) PPCexceeding right of self-defenceTazirQisas
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a Lahore High Court judgment acquitting an accused convicted under the repealed Section 304, Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for killing a man found in his home at midnight on the same bed as his wife in an objectionable position. The trial court had relied on the defence of grave and sudden provocation under Exception 1 to the former Section 300, which had since been repealed and replaced under Islamic penal laws. The High Court acquitted the accused, holding that he had an absolute right under Islamic injunctions to defend the privacy and honour of his home and wife without incurring Qisas, Tazir, or Diyat. The Supreme Court reviewed the legal status of grave and sudden provocation and self-defence under the amended Section 302(c), Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Court held that while an individual possesses a right to defend honour and privacy under Islamic jurisprudence, exceeding that right by strangulating an overpowered intruder constitutes Qatl-i-Amd under Section 302(c), P.P.C. The High Court's absolute acquittal was set aside, the accused was convicted under Section 302(c), and his sentence was reduced to the period already served.

  Questions settled

  • Does the repeal of Exception 1 to former Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 eliminate grave and sudden provocation as a mitigating factor in Qatl-i-Amd cases?
  • Whether an offender who kills an intruder caught committing an illicit act with his wife is completely immune from criminal liability including Tazir or Diyat under Islamic law?
  • Is Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 exclusively restricted to the specific categories enumerated in Section 306 of the same Code?
  • What offence is committed under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when a husband exceeds his right of self-defence while protecting the honour of his wife against an intruder?
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• Muhammad Amir Versus Khan Bahadur1996 PLD 267 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-12-20Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram Versus The State1996 PLD 263 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-01-16Read full judgment →
• Amanullah Shah Versus The State1996 PLD 241 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-12-06Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafique Versus Sakhi Muhammad1996 PLD 237 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-10-31Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Mansha Versus The State1996 PLD 229 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-27Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Siddique Versus Secretary Govt. of Pakistan1996 PLD 197 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-12-19Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Asghar Versus Federal Service Tribunal1996 PLD 195 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-12-13Read full judgment →
• Iftikhar Ahmed Versus Secretary, Health Division1996 PLD 193 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1905-12-12Read full judgment →
• Abdul Latif Versus Bagga Khan1996 PLD 152 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-06Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arshad Versus The State1996 PLD 122 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-19Read full judgment →
• Joint Venture KG/Rist Versus Federation of Pakistan1996 PLD 108 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-09-17Read full judgment →
• Abdul Haque Versus The State1996 PLD 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-04Read full judgment →
• Pir Sabir Shah Versus Shad Muhammad Khan, Member Provincial Assembly, N.W.F.P and Another1995 PLD 66 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-11-16
  defectionfloor-crossingdisqualification of memberultra viresconstitutional jurisdictionforum of adjudicationappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from direct appeals filed under Section 8-B of the Political Parties Act, 1962, challenging the Election Commission of Pakistan's dismissal of references seeking the disqualification of two provincial assembly members on the ground of party defection. The core legal question was whether the adjudicatory forums prescribed under Section 8-B of the Act—namely, the Election Commission for initial determination and the Supreme Court for appeal—were ultra vires the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, in light of Article 63(2), which designates the Chief Election Commissioner as the forum for deciding member disqualifications. The Supreme Court, by a majority decision, dismissed the appeals as incompetent. The Court held that Section 8-B of the Act is ultra vires the Constitution to the extent of the forums it establishes, as Article 63(2) exclusively vests the jurisdiction to determine member disqualifications in the Chief Election Commissioner, whose decision is final. The key principle laid down is that sub-constitutional legislation cannot alter, bypass, or duplicate a constitutionally mandated forum, and where a conflict exists between the Constitution and subordinate law, the Constitution must prevail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 8-B of the Political Parties Act, 1962, is ultra vires the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to the extent of the forums it prescribes?
  • Whether Article 63(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Chief Election Commissioner to determine all questions of member disqualification?
  • Can a sub-constitutional statute create an appellate forum in the Supreme Court against a disqualification decision if no such appeal is provided in the Constitution?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the power to declare a statutory provision ultra vires while hearing an appeal brought under that very statutory provision?
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• Nek Muhammad Versus The State1995 PLD 516 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-24
  conscious possessioncontraband heroinProhibition Ordercriminal appealbenefit of doubtvehicle search
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction and life imprisonment of the appellants under Articles 3 and 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 1979. The prosecution alleged that heroin was recovered from a bolted cavity under the main gate of a bus in which the appellants were present. The core legal question was whether the mere presence of the appellants in the vehicle, without proof of ownership, driving capacity, or knowledge of the hidden compartment, was sufficient to establish 'conscious possession' of the contraband. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the convictions. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish any connection between the appellants and the vehicle or the concealed heroin. The Court laid down the principle that where contraband is hidden in a vehicle in a manner not discoverable by mere inspection, the prosecution must prove the accused had actual knowledge of its presence or a connection to the vehicle that establishes conscious possession.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere presence of a person in a vehicle from which concealed contraband is recovered automatically establish conscious possession?
  • Is the prosecution required to prove an accused's connection to a vehicle, as owner, driver, or cleaner, to attribute possession of contraband hidden in a secret cavity of that vehicle?
  • Can a conviction for possession of contraband be sustained when the recovery is made from a bolted cavity requiring special knowledge to access, without proof of the accused's knowledge of its existence?
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• Liaqat Ali Versus The State1995 PLD 485 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-19
  post-conviction reliefbenefit of detention periodsentencinglife imprisonmentstatutory concession
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, filed with the leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenged the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court which maintained the appellant's conviction and sentences under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Article 22 of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979. At the hearing, the appellant's counsel did not contest the conviction on merits but confined the arguments to the trial court and the Federal Shariat Court's failure to grant the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the evidence, found the conviction to be established beyond reasonable doubt. However, noting that neither of the lower courts had addressed the statutory concession under Section 382-B, and finding no circumstances justifying its denial, the Court held that the provision is mandatory and also applies to cases of life imprisonment. Consequently, the Supreme Court maintained the conviction but directed that the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, be extended to the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Is a court bound to take into consideration the period of pre-trial detention under Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when passing a sentence of imprisonment?
  • Does the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to cases where the accused is sentenced to imprisonment for life?
  • Can the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be extended by an appellate court if the trial court omitted to do so without justifying circumstances?
  Read full judgment →
• Salima Begum Versus Mst. Sardaran Bibi1995 PLD 406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-14Read full judgment →
• Govt. of the Punjab Versus Muhammad Saleem1995 PLD 396 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  specific performanceagreement to sellhandwriting expertconcurrent findings of factforgeryburden of proofthird judge reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a regular second appeal dismissed by the Lahore High Court, which had affirmed concurrent judgments of the lower courts decreeing a suit for possession through specific performance of an agreement to sell. The core legal question concerned the genuineness and valid execution of the disputed agreement to sell and receipt, particularly whether the signatures thereon belonged to the deceased predecessor-in-interest of the appellants or were forged, and the weight to be attached to conflicting handwriting experts' evidence and the medical condition of the executant. Following a difference of opinion between two judges of the Supreme Court, the matter was referred to a third judge for an opinion. The court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the due execution of the documents and the genuineness of the signatures were well-supported by direct and corroborative evidence, and that visual dissimilarities without microscopic or general characteristic comparison did not outweigh established expert and direct testimony. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that a court will not disturb concurrent findings of fact absent perversity or misreading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the execution of a disputed agreement to sell can be interfered with by the Supreme Court without proof of misreading or perversity?
  • How is the handwriting or signature of a deceased executant to be legally proved under the Qanun-e-Shahadat and Evidence Act?
  • Whether the opinion of a handwriting expert who fails to provide reasons for his conclusions carries more weight than an expert who gives detailed reasons supported by direct evidence?
  • Does a general medical condition of an executant at an advanced age necessarily negate his physical capability to execute a sale agreement in the absence of specific evidence proving immobility on the exact date of execution?
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• Iqbal Mahmood Banday Versus Muhammad Sadiq1995 PLD 351 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-22
  suit for damageslandlord and tenantdestruction by fireburden of proofnegligenceres ipsa loquiturtransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This direct appeal under Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 arose from a suit for damages filed by a landlord (the appellant) against his tenant (the respondent) following a fire that damaged a leased flour mill. The appellant alleged that the respondent maliciously or negligently caused the fire, while the respondent contended the fire was an act of God. The trial court decreed the suit, but the High Court reversed this decision. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that under Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882, a lessee is not liable for damages caused by fire unless the fire was occasioned by the lessee's wrongful act, default, or negligence. The Court ruled that the initial burden of proving negligence or breach of contract rests on the plaintiff-landlord, which the appellant failed to discharge. Furthermore, the maxim 'res ipsa loquitur' was held inapplicable as the fire occurred at night in the respondent's absence, and the statutory provisions of the Act governed the parties' liabilities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant is liable for damages caused by a fire on leased premises in the absence of proof of negligence or a specific covenant to the contrary?
  • Does the failure of a defendant to prove that a fire was an 'act of God' relieve the plaintiff of the initial burden of proving the defendant's negligence?
  • Is the maxim 'res ipsa loquitur' applicable to a fire accident on leased premises when the tenant was not present and had no exclusive knowledge of the cause?
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• Inam Naqshband Versus Haji Shaikh Ijaz Ahmad1995 PLD 314 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-22
  specific performancelimitation periodcause of actioninchoate cause of actionregistration of sale deedclouded titlecontractual performance
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment regarding a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale of property. The core legal question was whether the suit was barred by limitation under Article 113 of the Limitation Act 1908, given that the vendor's title was subject to a pending third-party claim by his father shortly after the agreement. The Supreme Court held that the suit was within time, affirming the High Court's decision. The Court reasoned that the 'date fixed' for performance in Article 113 requires an express date, which was absent here. Furthermore, the Court established that the cause of action for specific performance remains inchoate and suspended while the vendor's title is under a cloud of litigation initiated by a third party, as the vendee cannot effectively perform their part of the contract until that title is cleared. Consequently, the limitation period does not commence until the vendee is in a position to enforce the contract effectively, and the defendant must prove an unequivocal refusal to perform to invoke the bar of limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contractual stipulation to perform an agreement within a week constitute a 'date fixed' for the purposes of Article 113 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Is a suit for specific performance barred by limitation if the vendor's title to the property is subject to a pending third-party claim?
  • Does the limitation period for a suit for specific performance commence when the vendor's title is under a cloud of litigation?
  • Can a defendant successfully invoke the bar of limitation under Article 113 of the Limitation Act 1908 without proving an unequivocal refusal to perform the contract?
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• Government of N.W.F.P through Chief Secretary and Another Versus Muhammad Irshad and Three Others1995 PLD 282 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Tribal AreasJirga systemFundamental RightsEquality before lawJudicial independenceConstitutional interpretationPATA RegulationsPeace and good government
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the validity of the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) Regulations (Nos. 1 and 2 of 1975), which established a parallel judicial system (Jirgas) in Swat and Dir, effectively replacing the ordinary courts. The core legal question was whether these Regulations, promulgated by the Governor under Article 247 of the Constitution, were ultra vires for violating Fundamental Rights—specifically the right to equality before the law—and for failing the constitutional mandate of 'peace and good Government.' The Court held that the Regulations were void. It reasoned that while Article 247 grants special legislative powers for Tribal Areas, this authority is not absolute and must be exercised to facilitate the introduction of representative administration and the rule of law, rather than creating arbitrary, retrograde judicial forums. The key principle laid down is that legislative measures for Tribal Areas must be reasonable and justifiable; legislation that unnecessarily curtails judicial access and ignores the constitutional mandate to separate the judiciary from the executive, without valid cause, constitutes an invalid exercise of power.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Regulation made under Article 247 of the Constitution be challenged on the touchstone of Fundamental Rights?
  • Does the term 'State' in Article 7 of the Constitution include the President and the Governor when exercising powers under Article 247?
  • Are the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) Regulations of 1975 ultra vires for failing the constitutional requirement of 'peace and good Government'?
  • Does the establishment of a parallel judicial system excluding ordinary courts in Tribal Areas violate the constitutional mandate for the separation of the judiciary from the executive?
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• Fozail Merchant Versus The State1994 PLD 842 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-15
  criminal review petitiondismissal for non-prosecutionabsence of counselcriminal appealleave to appealSupreme Court Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal review petition arises from an order dismissing a criminal appeal for non-prosecution due to the absence of the appellant's counsel and Advocate-on-Record on the date of hearing, followed by the dismissal of a restoration application. The core legal question was whether a criminal appeal before the Supreme Court, in which leave to appeal had been granted, could be dismissed for non-prosecution solely on account of the counsel's absence, and whether sufficient grounds existed to recall the dismissal order. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal order should be recalled and the appeal re-admitted to its original number, noting both that the counsel's absence was due to circumstances beyond his control and that the Supreme Court Rules do not contain any provision for dismissing a criminal appeal for non-prosecution for default of appearance. The key principle laid down is that criminal appeals in which leave has been granted by the Supreme Court must be heard on merits and cannot be dismissed merely for non-prosecution due to the absence of the appellant or counsel.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal appeal in which leave to appeal has been granted by the Supreme Court be dismissed for non-prosecution due to the absence of the appellant or counsel?
  • Do the Supreme Court Rules provide for the dismissal of a criminal appeal for non-prosecution on account of the absence of a counsel on the date of hearing?
  • Whether an order dismissing a criminal appeal for non-prosecution can be recalled on a review application when the counsel's absence was due to circumstances beyond his control?
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• Government of N.W.F.P Versus I.A.Sherwani1994 PLD 72 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-06-30
  suspensionsubsistence grantrepugnancy to IslamGhararTatfifcivil serviceFundamental Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  These two appeals were directed against a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court which declared Rule 53 of the Fundamental Rules (and parallel provincial rules) repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam. The core legal question was whether a Government servant suspended during an inquiry can be deprived of their full salary and benefits, receiving only a 'subsistence grant' instead. The Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that a suspended employee remains a full-fledged Government servant who is prohibited from leaving the station, taking leave, or seeking alternative employment. The Court ruled that a contract of service allowing unilateral and arbitrary reduction of salary without any fault being proved is exploitative and constitutes 'Gharar' (uncertainty/exploitation) and 'Tatfif' (giving short measure), both of which are prohibited under Islamic law. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals, declaring Rule 53 and related rules repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam to the extent that they deprive suspended servants of full salary and benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Government servant under suspension is entitled to receive full salary and benefits during the period of suspension?
  • Does a contract of service allowing unilateral reduction of salary during suspension without proven guilt violate the Islamic principles of contract?
  • Whether the restriction on a suspended employee from leaving the station or taking other employment makes the deprivation of full salary a form of prohibited 'Tatfif'?
  Read full judgment →
• Shehla Zia Versus WAPDA1994 PLD 693 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-12
  public interest litigationright to lifeenvironmental protectionelectromagnetic fieldssustainable developmentprecautionary principlegrid station construction
  Summary & questions settled

  This public interest litigation arose from a challenge by residents against the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) regarding the construction of a grid station in a residential area of Islamabad. The petitioners alleged that electromagnetic fields from high-voltage transmission lines posed serious health hazards, violating their fundamental rights. The core legal questions concerned whether government agencies could endanger citizens' lives without consent and whether the constitutional right to "life" encompassed the right to a clean, healthy environment. The Court held that the constitutional right to "life" is broad, extending beyond mere existence to include the quality of life, dignity, and a healthy environment. Applying the "precautionary principle," the Court ruled that in the face of scientific uncertainty regarding potential health hazards, authorities must prioritize public safety and sustainable development. Consequently, the Court appointed an expert commission to evaluate the project's risks and mandated that WAPDA implement a public notice and hearing procedure for all future infrastructure projects to ensure transparency and citizen participation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the constitutional right to life include the right to a clean and healthy environment?
  • Can the Supreme Court intervene under Article 184(3) in cases involving potential environmental health hazards?
  • Is a government agency required to provide public notice and a hearing before constructing infrastructure that may affect the health of residents?
  • Should the precautionary principle be applied when scientific evidence regarding health risks is inconclusive?
  Read full judgment →
• Israr Ali Chisti Versus Federation of Pakistan1994 PLD 567 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  service lawseniority disputepromotioncadre changeService TribunalDepartmental Promotion Committeecivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal concerns a service dispute regarding seniority and promotion rights within the Directorate-General of Immigration and Passport. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, an Assistant who voluntarily opted for the post of Examiner (BPS-12), was entitled to promotion as Superintendent (BPS-16) based on his original seniority as an Assistant, despite declining subsequent promotion to Assistant Incharge (BPS-15) and moving to a different cadre. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the Service Tribunal's decision. The Court held that the petitioner, by opting for the Examiner cadre, had effectively changed his career path and could not claim seniority or promotion rights based on his former cadre. The Court affirmed that promotion is not an automatic right but requires consideration of comparative suitability by the competent authority. The judgment establishes that an employee who voluntarily opts for a different cadre cannot maintain seniority claims based on their previous cadre, and that promotion to higher grades involves a selection process based on merit and suitability rather than automatic entitlement.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee who voluntarily opts for a different cadre claim seniority based on their previous cadre?
  • Is promotion to a higher grade an automatic right or a selection process based on suitability?
  • Does an employee who declines a promotion to a higher post lose the right to claim seniority for future promotions in that department?
  Read full judgment →
• Liaqat Ali Versus The State1994 PLD 172 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-21Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab Versus Amin Jan Naseem1994 PLD 141 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-03-18
  requisition of propertyIslamic injunctionscompulsory acquisitionjudicial reviewRibamarket rentprivate property rightsouster of jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves appeals under Article 203-F(1) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging a Federal Shariat Court judgment that declared specific provisions of the West Pakistan Requisitioning of Immovable Property (Temporary Powers) Act, 1956, repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam. The core legal questions concerned the State's authority to compulsorily requisition private property for government officers, the adequacy of compensation mechanisms, and the validity of statutory clauses ousting judicial review. The Supreme Court held that the power to requisition property for government officers is not a necessity and thus violates Islamic principles. The Court affirmed that compensation must be based on current market rates, prohibited the imposition of interest (Riba) on delayed payments, and ruled that statutory provisions barring judicial intervention are unconstitutional. The key principles established are that private property ownership is protected under Shariah, compulsory requisition is restricted to cases of extreme necessity, and the judiciary cannot be deprived of its jurisdiction to provide remedies to aggrieved citizens against state actions.

  Questions settled

  • Can the government compulsorily requisition private property for the use of its officers?
  • Is the payment of interest on delayed compensation for requisitioned property permissible under Islamic law?
  • Can a statute validly oust the jurisdiction of the courts to review actions taken under the West Pakistan Requisitioning of Immovable Property (Temporary Powers) Act, 1956?
  • Must compensation for requisitioned property be based on current market rates?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hani Versus The State1993 PLD 895 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-06-22Read full judgment →