Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Abdur Rashid Versus The State1983 PLD 204 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-21Read full judgment →
• Fatim Versus Abdul Hamid1983 PLD 158 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  settlement schemeearmarking schemeC.H. FormE Formdivisibility of propertyevacuee propertydisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a constitutional petition in which the High Court set aside orders of the Settlement Authorities transferring a portion of a residential property to Mst. Fatima, the appellant. The core legal issues concerned whether the appellant could claim transfer of the property under a belated 'C.H.' Form after having subsequently submitted an 'E' Form to participate in the earmarking scheme, and whether the Settlement Commissioner could validly transfer property in lieu of an cancelled earmarking allotment. The Supreme Court held that the declaration attached to Form 'E' operates as an irrevocable condition precedent, and participating in the earmarking scheme amounts to an effective withdrawal or abandonment of any previously filed 'C.H.' Form. Furthermore, a delayed application cannot be entertained as of right after the property has already been validly transferred to another eligible party. The Court affirmed that transferring property on grounds extraneous to the statutory settlement scheme is illegal, upholding the High Court's judgment and dismissing the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the filing of an 'E' Form under an earmarking scheme amount to an irrevocable withdrawal of a previously submitted 'C.H.' Form?
  • Can a belated 'C.H.' Form for transfer of evacuee property be entertained as of right after the property has already been transferred to another party?
  • Can the Settlement Authorities transfer a residential property to an applicant in lieu of a cancelled earmarking lottery drawn in their favour outside statutory scheme instructions?
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• Abdul Hameed Versus The State1983 PLD 130 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-12
  limitation periodleave to appealShariat Appellate BenchFederal Shariat Courtcondonation of delaySupreme Court Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose as a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan against a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court. The core legal questions concerned whether a petition for leave to appeal under Article 203-F(2-B) of the Constitution of Pakistan is subject to the limitation period prescribed by the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, and whether the Shariat Appellate Bench constitutes a distinct forum separate from the Supreme Court. The Court held that the Shariat Appellate Bench remains a bench of the Supreme Court and consequently, the rules applicable to the Supreme Court apply mutatis mutandis to petitions filed under Article 203-F(2-B). The Court further held that the delay in filing the petition was not condonable. The petition was accordingly dismissed as time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Shariat Appellate Bench is a forum separate and distinct from the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
  • Do the Supreme Court Rules apply to petitions for leave to appeal filed under Article 203-F(2-B) of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Does the detention of a petitioner in custody and the advanced age of their father constitute sufficient grounds for the condonation of delay in filing an appeal?
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• Maqbool Begum Versus Gullam1982 PLD 46 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-02Read full judgment →
• Z. Kaikaus Versus Federal Govt. of Pakistan1982 PLD 409 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-13
  Shariat appealabandonment of appealwithdrawal of appealFederal Shariat Courtjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from Shariat Appeals Nos. 11 and 12 of 1981, directed against judgments of the Federal Shariat Court concerning political parties, elections, and the compulsory acquisition of property under the Punjab Acquisition of Land (Housing) Act, 1973. During the hearings, the appellant submitted applications claiming that the judges of the Federal Shariat Court were not Muslims rendering their judgments null and void, and further conditioned his continued participation on the Supreme Court judges making a specific declaration of faith to his satisfaction, independent of the Constitution or law. The core legal question was whether the appellant's conditional refusal to proceed with the appeals amounted to an abandonment and withdrawal of the same. The Supreme Court held that the appellant's unilateral imposition of unwarranted conditions and refusal to pursue the appeals constituted an abandonment and withdrawal under the applicable procedural rules. The key principle laid down is that an appellant who refuses to prosecute appeals except upon extra-legal conditions of their own making is deemed to have abandoned and withdrawn the appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appellant's refusal to pursue an appeal except upon extra-legal conditions amount to abandonment and withdrawal?
  • Can an appellant impose conditions regarding the religious faith or declaration of court judges as a prerequisite for prosecuting an appeal?
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• Begum Darab Sultana Versus Custodian1982 PLD 330 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-13
  evacuee propertyrestoration of propertycustodianpast and closed transactioncompensation poolwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves appeals against a Lahore High Court judgment quashing orders of the Custodian that had declared certain properties to be evacuee, as well as an order declining to review those earlier decisions. The core legal question concerned whether properties restored to their original owners under statutory provisions retained or lost their evacuee status, and whether past Custodian orders could be overridden by subsequent judicial pronouncements and government notifications. The Supreme Court held that the restoration of the properties in 1948 constituted a completed, past and closed transaction that erased all taint of evacuee status, rendering subsequent contrary orders by the Custodian without legal effect. The Court laid down that the statutory restoration of property to a returned evacuee owner removes its evacuee character, which cannot be revived by analogy or erroneous interpretation, though factual inquiries regarding subsequent re-acquisition of evacuee status remain within the domain of the competent authority.

  Questions settled

  • Does an evacuee property retain its evacuee status after it has been legally restored to its original owner?
  • Whether the restoration of property under section 17 of the West Punjab Protection of Evacuee Property Act 1948 erases the evacuee taint from the property?
  • Can a property that is not evacuee legally form part of the Compensation Pool under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Does the Custodian retain suo motu review powers after the amendment of section 43(6) of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957 by Ordinance LXIII of 1962?
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• Qabool Versus The State1982 PLD 24 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  murdereye-witness testimonydeath sentenceFIRrecovery of weaponcriminal appealmedical evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellants for the murder of the deceased. The core legal questions were whether the testimony of the eye-witnesses was reliable despite allegations that the injuries were caused by blunt weapons rather than the alleged hatchets, and whether the First Information Report (FIR) was lodged promptly or fabricated after deliberation. The Supreme Court held that the eye-witnesses, including independent witnesses, were credible and their testimony was corroborated by the recovery of blood-stained hatchets. The Court clarified that the nature of the injuries (blunt) did not necessarily falsify the prosecution's case, as witnesses may not observe the specific side of a weapon used during a violent attack, and the complainant did not explicitly state the hatchets were used from the sharp side. Finding no material inconsistencies or evidence of deliberation in the FIR, the Court upheld the convictions and dismissed the appeal, affirming the principle that eye-witness testimony remains reliable when corroborated by forensic evidence, even if minor discrepancies in medical descriptions exist.

  Questions settled

  • Does the fact that injuries were caused by a blunt weapon necessarily falsify eye-witness testimony that a hatchet was used?
  • Can eye-witnesses be considered reliable if they are related to the deceased but have no proven enmity against the accused?
  • Is the recovery of blood-stained weapons sufficient to corroborate eye-witness testimony in a murder case?
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• Muhammad Hussain Versus Chaudhry Umar Bakhsh1982 PLD 212 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-22
  rent restrictionejectment applicationtransferee landlordpersonal usedefault in rentnotice requirement
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a rent matter wherein the petitioner (tenant) challenged an ejectment order passed by the Rent Controller, which was subsequently upheld by the District Judge and the Peshawar High Court. The core legal question was whether a transferee-landlord is required to serve a notice under Section 13-B of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 upon the tenant before filing an ejectment application on the ground of personal use. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the ejectment application was maintainable despite the absence of such notice. The Court clarified that the requirement of notice under Section 13-B is strictly limited to protecting a tenant against allegations of default in rent payment. The key principle laid down is that the provisions of Section 13-B do not apply to ejectment applications based on grounds other than default in the payment of rent, such as personal use, and therefore, the failure to serve notice does not render an application on other grounds non-maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to serve a notice under Section 13-B of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 render an ejectment application based on personal use non-maintainable?
  • Is the notice requirement under Section 13-B of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 applicable to grounds for ejectment other than default in the payment of rent?
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• Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Letd. Versus National Industrial Relations Commission1982 PLD 113 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-01
  essential servicesreinstatementspecified authorityjurisdictiontermination of serviceindustrial relations
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals by special leave arose from a judgment of the High Court of Sind, which had dismissed constitutional petitions challenging the reinstatement of several employees of the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation by the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) acting as the 'specified authority' under the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act 1952. The core legal question was whether the power to 'regulate' wages and other conditions of service under Section 6 of the Act and Rule 3 of the Rules of 1962 includes the power to adjudicate individual disputes and order reinstatement. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the word 'regulate' means to control, govern, or prescribe rules, and does not encompass the power to adjudicate individual disputes. The Court observed that the Act is emergency legislation with its own penal mechanism under Section 7 for violations. Consequently, the specified authority had no jurisdiction to entertain petitions for reinstatement or to adjudicate individual grievances. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and recalled the writs.

  Questions settled

  • Does the power to 'regulate' wages and conditions of service under Section 6 of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act 1952 include the power to adjudicate individual employment disputes?
  • Can the 'specified authority' under the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act 1952 order the reinstatement of a dismissed or terminated employee?
  • What is the proper legal remedy for an employee aggrieved by termination or dismissal under the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act 1952?
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• Bostan Versus Sahib Shah Ali1982 PLD 102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-11-15Read full judgment →
• Sakhawat Ali Versus Shui Khelay1981 PLD 627 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Federal Shariat CourtMuslim Personal LawjurisdictionArticle 203BHaj policyMahramFiqa-e-Ja'afriaShariat AppealCouncil of Islamic Ideology
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of six Shariat Appeals (S.A. K-10 to K-12, K-14, K-15, and K-17 of 1980) filed by appellant Saeedullah Kazmi against orders of the Federal Shariat Court. In S.A. K-10 of 1980, the appellant challenged a Government circular permitting women of the 'Fiqa-e-Ja'afria' to perform Haj without a Mahram. The Supreme Court held that even if the circular were treated as having the force of law, it falls within the scope of 'Muslim Personal Law' under Article 203B of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, which applies to Muslims as a special class and is expressly excluded from the jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court and the Shariat Appellate Bench. The court affirmed that matters of Muslim Personal Law fall within the purview of the Council of Islamic Ideology. The remaining appeals (K-11, K-12, K-14, K-15, and K-17), challenging various social practices, customs, and constitutional expressions, were dismissed as not pressed due to the appellant's refusal to prosecute them after his request to summon witnesses was rejected.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Government circular or policy granting specific exemptions to a particular Muslim sect falls within the definition of 'Muslim Personal Law' under Article 203B of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Whether the Federal Shariat Court has jurisdiction to examine laws, usages, or customs that fall within the scope of 'Muslim Personal Law'?
  • Does the Federal Shariat Court have jurisdiction over general practices, usages, or customs that do not carry the force of law?
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• Saeedullah Kazmi Versus Government of Pakistan1981 PLD 42 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-09-29Read full judgment →
• Fateh Muhammad Versus Abdul Ghani1981 PLD 371 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-14Read full judgment →
• H.I. Sheikh Versus Mahmood A. Haroon, Federal Minister, Religious Affairs1981 PLD 334 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-17
  Shariat petitionHaj PolicyMuslim Personal Lawjurisdiction of Shariat Benchballot system for Hajconstitutional appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant filed a Shariat Application in the Shariat Bench of the Sind High Court under Article 203-B of the Constitution of 1973, challenging the Haj Policy (1980) of the Government of Pakistan, specifically objecting to the selection of pilgrims through a ballot system and the requirement of a non-refundable deposit for handling charges. The High Court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court under Article 203-C of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the matters in issue pertain to Muslim Personal Law, and following its precedent in Federation of Pakistan v. Mst. Farishta, the scrutiny of Muslim Personal Law falls beyond the jurisdiction of Shariat Benches, Shariat Courts, and the Appellate Bench. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the original petition before the High Court was incompetent and properly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the scrutiny of Muslim Personal Law fall within the jurisdiction of Shariat Benches and Courts?
  • Whether the Haj Policy of the Government relating to the selection of pilgrims through ballot pertains to Muslim Personal Law?
  • Is a Shariat application challenging the Haj Policy competent before the Shariat Bench of the High Court?
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• Mansoor Ali Versus Federation of Pakistan1981 PLD 331 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-16Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan Versus Muhammad Siddiq1981 PLD 249 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-26
  service tribunalsabatement of suitsterms and conditions of serviceretrospective operationvested right of appealcivil servantsconstitutional amendment
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses a batch of service appeals arising under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan, concerning the interpretation of provisions of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 relating to the jurisdiction of Service Tribunals, the abatement of pending proceedings, and the right of appeal by government departments and statutory bodies like WAPDA. The core legal questions involved the determination of the exact date of abatement of suits and proceedings upon the establishment of tribunals under Article 212, and whether proviso (c) to section 4(1) of the Service Tribunals Act (excluding matters prior to 1st July 1969) retrospectively barred appeals where a right had already accrued upon abatement. The Supreme Court held that proceedings abated on the actual establishment of the Service Tribunal on 22nd February 1974 pursuant to the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1974, and that the right of appeal accruing to a party upon such abatement was a vested right not taken away retrospectively by subsequent amendments. The Court laid down that statutory abatements synchronise with the date of establishment of tribunals or the extension of laws to new bodies, and subsequent non-retrospective bars cannot defeat accrued rights of appeal.

  Questions settled

  • When does the abatement of pending suits and proceedings take place under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan and the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
  • Does the bar introduced by proviso (c) to Section 4(1) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 regarding orders passed before 1st July 1969 operate retrospectively to take away the right of appeal accrued upon abatement?
  • Is an appeal filed by a government department or employer competent under Section 6 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
  • What is the relevant date for the abatement of proceedings and application of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 to employees of statutory bodies when the statute is extended to them subsequently?
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• Dawood Cotton Mills Ltd. Versus Guftar Shah1981 PLD 225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-04-04Read full judgment →
• Abdul Shahid Versus Azim Bakhsh1981 PLD 200 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-19
  dismissal for non-prosecutionrestoration of appealcounsel negligencediscretionary orderrent evictionprocedural diligence
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants, tenants of a shop, sought to challenge an eviction order issued by the Rent Controller. After their appeal was dismissed by the District Court, they filed a second appeal in the Lahore High Court. During the proceedings, the appellants and their counsel failed to appear on the scheduled hearing date, leading the High Court to dismiss the appeal for non-prosecution. A subsequent application for restoration was also dismissed by the High Court, as the appellants failed to provide a sufficient explanation for their absence or demonstrate diligence, particularly given the history of previous defaults and the existence of a stay order protecting their possession. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the High Court's discretionary dismissal of the restoration application was illegal or unreasonable. The Supreme Court held that the High Court exercised its discretion properly, noting that litigants cannot rely on the negligence of their counsel as a blanket excuse, especially when the party itself failed to show vigilance. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that discretionary orders based on a history of negligence are valid.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution when both the appellant and their counsel fail to appear?
  • Is a litigant entitled to the restoration of an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution based solely on the negligence of their counsel?
  • Under what circumstances can a court refuse to restore an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution?
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• Habib-Ur-Rehman Siddiqui Versus Govt. of Pakistan1981 PLD 17 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-08-26
  Shariat petitionjurisdiction of Shariat Benchrepugnancy to Islamcustom having force of lawwomen sportssports regulation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the judgment of the Shariat Bench of the Sind High Court, which dismissed a Shariat petition concerning the arrangements of hockey and cricket games played by women. The core legal question was whether the Shariat Bench had the jurisdiction under the Constitution to examine administrative actions, customs, or games in the absence of a specific law, rule, or regulation having the force of law, and whether the general practice of women playing sports constituted a custom having the force of law. The Supreme Court held that the Shariat Bench rightly dismissed the petition as incompetent, because the appellants failed to point out any specific law, rule, regulation, or custom having the force of law that could be examined for repugnancy to the Injunctions of Islam. The Court laid down the principle that the jurisdiction of the Shariat Bench is strictly confined to examining laws or provisions of law, including customs or usages having the force of law, and cannot be invoked against general actions, practices, or non-statutory arrangements of sports without identifying an enforceable law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Shariat Bench of a High Court has jurisdiction to examine administrative actions or general practices of playing sports that do not constitute a law, rule, regulation, or custom having the force of law?
  • What constitutes a custom or usage having the force of law capable of being examined for repugnancy to the Injunctions of Islam under the Constitution?
  • Can an appeal before the Supreme Court be dismissed as infructuous when the grievance raised in the petition has been substantially addressed by governmental and presidential directives?
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• Ahmad Khan Versus Sattar Din1981 PLD 148 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-02-11Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan Versus Mst. Farishta1981 PLD 120 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-01-20Read full judgment →
• S.M. Junaid Versus President of Pakistan1981 PLD 12 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-09-28Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain Patel Versus Habib Wali Muhammad1981 PLD 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-30
  ejectmentrent dueconservancy chargesdefault in paymentlandlord and tenantstatutory interpretationWest Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil appeals against the dismissal of ejectment applications filed by a landlord against tenants for non-payment of conservancy charges. The core legal question was whether "conservancy charges," which the tenants had contractually agreed to pay to the landlord, fell within the ambit of "rent due" under Section 13(2)(i) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, thereby rendering the tenants liable for ejectment upon default. The Supreme Court held that the term "rent due" is not restricted to the specific sum labeled as "rent" in the agreement but encompasses all payments, including taxes and charges, that a tenant contractually agrees to render to the landlord in consideration for the enjoyment of the property. The Court established that the definition of "rent" in the Ordinance is not exhaustive and that the statutory "Explanation" serves as an illustrative guide rather than a limiting provision. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, ruling that the failure to pay agreed-upon conservancy charges constituted a default in "rent due," justifying the tenants' ejectment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'rent due' under Section 13(2)(i) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, include conservancy charges agreed to be paid by a tenant?
  • Is the definition of 'rent' in the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, exhaustive?
  • Does Section 9(2) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, prohibit a landlord from recovering taxes that were agreed upon by the tenant at the time of the lease?
  • Can the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, be used to interpret the term 'rent' in the absence of a definition in the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
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• Ghulam Mustafa Versus Waqar Ahmad1980 PLD 9 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-07-17Read full judgment →
• Hamdard Dawakhana Versus Commissioner of Income-Tax, Karachi1980 PLD 84 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-10Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain Versus Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd.1980 PLD 80 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-08Read full judgment →
• Zafarullah Versus Muhammad Siddiq1980 PLD 76 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-27Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Matin Mirza Versus Jahangir R. Rustomji1980 PLD 64 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-17
  evacuee propertytransfer of excess landplinth areasettlement schemeprovisional transfer orderdisplaced personssuo motu notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from a long-standing dispute over the transfer of an evacuee property, specifically a bungalow in Karachi measuring 4227 square yards, under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal questions involved the legality of transferring excess land attached to the house to a local non-transferee occupant pursuant to government press notes and notifications, the validity of earlier departmental orders, and the extent of land transferable to the primary transferee. The Supreme Court held that the initial transfer order in favor of the first respondent (a local) was void for lack of hearing and that subsequent policy changes by the Central Government via the Press Note of April 16, 1964, disqualified locals and non-claimant displaced persons from obtaining building sites out of excess area unless payments were finalized prior to the revised orders. The court ruled that the appellant transferee was entitled only to the main house and outhouses measuring 655 square yards plus three times that plinth area (1965 square yards), totaling 2620 square yards, while the remaining excess land of 1607 square yards was to be disposed of in accordance with the relevant law. The key principle laid down is that subsequent supersession of administrative policy and press notes regarding the disposal of excess evacuee land terminates pending incomplete claims of non-claimant locals unless saved by prior finalized transfers.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a local non-transferee occupant remains eligible for the transfer of excess land attached to an evacuee property after the supersession of the Press Note of October 22, 1962 by the Press Note of April 16, 1964?
  • Does the Chief Settlement Commissioner have the authority under the second proviso to Section 2(4) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, to issue instructions regarding the calculation and disposal of garden and ground areas attached to houses?
  • Whether an administrative order of transfer passed in favor of a party without affording a hearing to the affected rival claimant is legally valid?
  • Can subsequent structures illegally raised by occupants after partition be considered accretions to an evacuee property for calculating the original plinth area?
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• Muhammad Khan Versus Shobra Hotel Ltd.1980 PLD 62 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-10Read full judgment →
• Nazir Ahmad Versus Muhammad Shafi1980 PLD 6 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-10-30
  transfer of criminal casedouble punishmentpolice investigationcross complaintquashment of proceedingsspecial leave to appealbail
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of three criminal petitions for special leave to appeal arising from connected proceedings involving a murder occurrence and a cross-complaint. The first petition sought the transfer of a complaint case pending before the Sessions Judge, Kasur, which the Supreme Court dismissed as lacking bona fides, noting that the petitioners faced no such grievance in a cross-challan case pending in the same court and that the petition was aimed at prolonging the confinement of the opposing party. The second petition, relating to a bail cancellation order, was treated merely as an item of reference and was likewise dismissed. The third petition challenged ongoing police investigation and the issuance of arrest warrants, contending that it violated the protection against double prosecution under Article 13 of the Constitution, and sought quashment under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that the police power of investigation in cross-version cases remains unfettered, that Section 561-A cannot be invoked to halt police investigation, and that Article 13 is not attracted at the pre-trial investigation stage where no second prosecution exists. Consequently, all three petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be invoked to halt or quash ongoing police investigation?
  • Does police investigation into a cross-version case violate the protection against double prosecution under Article 13 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is the issuance of warrants of arrest by a magistrate in aid of further police investigation considered a second prosecution?
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• Muhammad Sharif Puri Versus Additional District Judge1980 PLD 49 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-16Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam Versus Mimber, Board of Revenue (Settlement & Rehabilitation Wing/Chief Sattlement Commissioner)1980 PLD 45 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-11Read full judgment →
• Waqar Ali Sheikh Versus Islamic Republic of Pakistan1980 PLD 42 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-22
  Service Tribunal jurisdictionMartial Law RegulationLeave preparatory to retirementSuperannuationMala fidesDisputed questions of factService law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal for lack of jurisdiction regarding his dismissal from government service under Martial Law Regulation No. 58. The petitioner contended that he had already retired before the extension of his service and that the subsequent disciplinary action was mala fide. The core legal questions were whether the Service Tribunal possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter despite the validation provisions of Article 270(4) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 and whether the Supreme Court should resolve disputed questions of fact regarding the petitioner's employment status. The Court held that the Service Tribunal erred in declining jurisdiction, affirming that such appeals are competent. However, the Court declined to resolve the underlying disputed questions of fact, such as the effective date of retirement and allegations of mala fides, holding that these matters fall within the purview of the Service Tribunal's appellate jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's order and remanded the case for a decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to hear appeals against dismissal orders passed under Martial Law Regulation No. 58?
  • Can the Supreme Court determine disputed questions of fact regarding the effective date of a government servant's retirement under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the validation provision in Article 270(4) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 oust the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal?
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• S.A. Rizvi Versus Islamic Republic of Pakistan1980 PLD 40 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-22
  service tribunal jurisdictionmartial law regulationdismissal from servicecivil servantappeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the order of the Service Tribunal dismissing the appellant's appeal against his dismissal under Martial Law Regulation No. 58 for want of jurisdiction. The core legal question concerns the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal to entertain an appeal against an order of dismissal passed under Martial Law Regulation No. 58 of 1969 in respect of a civil servant. Following the reasoning in M. Yamin Qureshi v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal has jurisdiction in the matter, set aside the impugned order of the Tribunal, and remanded the case for expeditious disposal on merits. The key principle laid down is that Service Tribunals possess jurisdiction to hear appeals relating to departmental actions and dismissals falling within the scope of relevant constitutional and statutory provisions as interpreted in precedent.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to hear an appeal against the dismissal of a civil servant under Martial Law Regulation No. 58 of 1969?
  • Can a central employee be removed from service by a Provincial Government?
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• Amanullah Khan Versus Service Tribunal (Federal)1980 PLD 38 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-22
  Service Tribunalabatement of proceedingsconstitutional amendmentretrospective applicationscope of appellate jurisdictiondismissal from serviceMartial Law Regulation
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a former Deputy Director in the Customs Department, challenged his dismissal under Martial Law Regulation No. 58. Initially, he approached the High Court and subsequently the Supreme Court, but withdrew his petition to pursue a remedy before the Service Tribunal, believing his case had abated under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Service Tribunal later dismissed his appeal, ruling it incompetent because the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1976, had retroactively saved such proceedings from abatement. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine if the Tribunal erred in applying the Fifth Amendment retrospectively to a case where the appellant had already withdrawn his petition before the amendment's promulgation. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal erred, as the amendment was not in force when the appellant approached the Tribunal. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal’s order and remanded the case for a decision on merits. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the Service Tribunal’s appellate jurisdiction encompasses all questions of law and fact, rejecting arguments that review is limited to jurisdictional or mala fide grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1976, apply retrospectively to proceedings withdrawn before its promulgation?
  • Is an appeal before the Service Tribunal competent if the appellant withdrew a pending Supreme Court petition prior to the enactment of the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1976?
  • Does the appellate jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal extend to all questions of law and fact, or is it limited to jurisdictional errors and mala fides?
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• M.H. Shamim Versus Pakistan1980 PLD 37 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-22
  Service Tribunalmartial law regulationdismissal from servicejurisdictionimmunity from judicial reviewconstitutional petitionpolice service
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former member of the Police Service of Pakistan dismissed from service under Martial Law Regulation No. 58, challenged the Service Tribunal's decision dismissing his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether actions taken under Martial Law Regulation No. 58 enjoy immunity from judicial review under Article 270 of the Constitution and whether the Service Tribunal has jurisdiction to examine appeals against such dismissal orders. The Supreme Court held that while proceedings under Martial Law Regulation No. 58 fall within the validity and immunity granted by clause (4) of Article 270 of the Constitution, they remain open to appeal and revision before the Service Tribunal. The Court laid down the principle that the Service Tribunal has the legal duty to examine on merits all questions of law and fact raised by appellants challenging dismissal orders passed under Martial Law Regulation No. 58, setting aside the Tribunal's order and remanding the matter for a decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to entertain appeals against dismissal orders passed under Martial Law Regulation No. 58?
  • Are proceedings and orders taken under Martial Law Regulation No. 58 protected under clause (4) of Article 270 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is it the duty of the Service Tribunal to examine on merits all questions of law and fact raised to challenge an order of dismissal made under Martial Law Regulation No. 58?
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• Pakistan International Airlines Versus Sindh Labour Coutr No.51980 PLD 323 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-20
  permanent workmantemporary workmanindustrial employmentstanding orderslabour lawcontract of employmentstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the classification of employees engaged by Pakistan International Airlines to supervise a construction project. The respondents, initially hired on a temporary basis, claimed they had become permanent workmen under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, having served for more than nine months. The Labour Court and the High Court ruled in favor of the respondents. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, however, allowed the appeal, holding that the respondents were not permanent workmen. The Court clarified that the definition of a "permanent workman" requires the work itself to be of a "permanent nature," in addition to the duration of employment. The Court emphasized that the mere duration of service exceeding nine months does not automatically convert temporary employment into permanent status if the underlying work is of a temporary nature. The judgment established that courts must adhere to the plain language of statutory definitions and cannot disregard the requirement of the "permanent nature" of work to achieve a perceived beneficial outcome for employees.

  Questions settled

  • Does a workman become a 'permanent workman' solely by being employed for more than nine months?
  • What is the essential distinction between a 'permanent workman' and a 'temporary workman' under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
  • Can a court ignore the statutory requirement that work must be of a 'permanent nature' to qualify a worker as a 'permanent workman'?
  • Does the right to file a grievance under Standing Order 12(3) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968 extend to all workmen?
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• Ali Sher Versus The State1980 PLD 317 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-08-27
  appeal against acquittalmurdercorroborationinjured witnessesplea of self-defencemedical evidencerecovery of blood-stained weapons
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan examines the legality of the acquittal of respondents Muhammad Hussain, Talib Hussain, and Abdul Hameed for the murder of Suleman, which had been set aside by the High Court from a conviction by the trial court. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in reversing the convictions in the presence of natural eye-witnesses, injured witnesses, corroborative medical evidence, injuries on the accused, and recoveries of blood-stained weapons. The Supreme Court held that the High Court fell into serious error by ignoring vital corroborative evidence, including injuries sustained by two of the accused, medical evidence consistent with weapons used (including sua punctures), and genuine recoveries of blood-stained hatchets. The ratio decidendi is that where eye-witness testimony—particularly of injured witnesses—is corroborated by the accused's own injuries and compatible medical evidence, an acquittal based on minor discrepancies or the rejection of site plan details is unsustainable. The Court restored the conviction and sentences originally passed by the trial court, granting credit for the period spent in custody during the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the conviction of the respondents for murder on the ground that eye-witnesses were related and inimical?
  • Does the presence of injuries on the person of the accused provide sufficient corroboration of their participation in a crime?
  • Can the omission of the exact position of prosecution witnesses in a site plan by itself lead to the inference that the witnesses were not present?
  • Whether the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be extended when an appellate court restores a trial court's conviction upon setting aside an acquittal?
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• Zarar Khan Versus Government of Sindh1980 PLD 310 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-12Read full judgment →
• Islamabad Club Versus Punjab Labour Court No.21980 PLD 307 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-30Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Yousuf Versus Abdullah1980 PLD 298 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-08-30
  default in payment of rentsecurity deposit adjustmentexpiry of leaseholding overstatutory tenancyeviction applicationexercise of judicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an eviction application filed by the respondent-landlord against the appellant-tenant on the ground of default in rent payments under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal questions involved whether the terms of an expired lease agreement—including provisions for advance rent and security deposits—continued to govern the parties, and whether a security deposit lying with the landlord should have been adjusted against the arrears, thereby negating the default. The Supreme Court held that upon the expiry of the lease, the rights and liabilities of the parties were governed exclusively by the Ordinance rather than the expired lease agreement, and that a tenant's technical failure to tender rent when a larger security deposit remained with the landlord warranted the exercise of judicial discretion in the tenant's favor. The court laid down that statutory rent restriction laws override inconsistent contractual covenants of expired leases, and that holding over under such rent laws does not automatically import all terms of the old lease.

  Questions settled

  • Do the terms of a written lease agreement continue to govern the parties after the expiry of the lease when a statutory rent restriction law is in force?
  • Can a security deposit lying with the landlord be adjusted against arrears of rent to determine whether a tenant has committed a default under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Does the acceptance of rent by a landlord after the determination of a lease amount to an implied renewal of all terms of the original lease agreement?
  • When can a court exercise its discretion in favor of a tenant who has committed a technical default in the payment of rent?
  Read full judgment →
• Akbar Ali Versus Muhammad Hanif1980 PLD 295 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-14Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Israr Nabi Versus Province of Punjab1980 PLD 292 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  premature retirementservice tribunalmala fidesadministrative appealservice recordcompulsory retirementjurisdiction of service tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had upheld the petitioner's premature retirement under Martial Law Regulation 114. The petitioner argued that the retirement was mala fide, stemming from a personal dispute with a Chief Engineer, and contended that the Tribunal failed to exercise its jurisdiction by focusing solely on the issue of mala fides without examining the merits of the retirement decision. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and addressed whether the Tribunal, as an appellate body, was obligated to review the merits of the retirement order beyond the allegation of mala fides. The Court held that while the petitioner failed to establish mala fides against the President of Pakistan, the Tribunal erred by failing to perform its duty to examine the petitioner's service record and the justification for the retirement. The Court established that a Service Tribunal, acting as an appellate authority, is obligated to review the merits of an administrative order, not merely the question of mala fides, to ensure the petitioner is not deprived of a valuable right.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Service Tribunal, when hearing an appeal against a retirement order, obligated to examine the merits of the case beyond the issue of mala fides?
  • Does a Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to review the service record of a civil servant to determine the justification for compulsory retirement?
  • Can a Service Tribunal dismiss an appeal against a retirement order without specifically examining the merits of the service record?
  Read full judgment →
• Qureshi Brothers Versus Khairpur Textle Mills Ltd.1980 PLD 286 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-30
  mutual open and current accountlimitationprincipal and agentrecovery suitreciprocity of accountsspecial leave appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which had dismissed the appellant's first civil appeal and upheld the trial court's preliminary decree for accounts in a recovery suit. The core legal question was whether the business dealings between the parties constituted a 'mutual, open and current account' under Article 85 of the Limitation Act, thereby bringing the respondent's recovery suit within limitation. The Supreme Court held that the parties dealt in two distinct capacities—as principal and agent, and as seller and purchaser—giving rise to reciprocal demands and obligations capable of creating a shifting balance. Affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts, the Court held that the account was indeed a mutual, open and current account, and the suit filed within limitation from the last credit entry of December 1957 was maintainable. The key principle laid down is that mutuality of accounts requires transactions creating mutual obligations and independent demands on both sides, but absolute shifting of balances is not a mandatory conclusive test as long as the nature of the transactions is capable of giving rise to it.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an account consisting of transactions arising from dual business relationships of principal-agent and seller-purchaser constitutes a mutual, open and current account?
  • Does the absence of a balance actually shifting in favour of both parties disprove the mutuality of an account?
  • Is a recovery suit governed by Article 85 of the Limitation Act when continuous mutual dealings exist between the parties?
  • Whether the appropriation of sale proceeds towards a running account establishes valid credit entries for the purpose of computing limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• N.J. Silk Industries Versus Presiding Officer, Ivth Sindh Labour Court1980 PLD 283 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  industrial establishmentstanding ordersmisconducttermination of servicestatutory interpretationprovisoback benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind allowing a constitutional petition. The core legal question was whether Standing Order No. 15 of the West Pakistan (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, applies to an industrial establishment employing not more than 49 persons, in view of the second proviso to section 1(4) of the said Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the second proviso explicitly excludes the application of Standing Order No. 15 to establishments employing 49 or fewer workers unless extended by government notification, and Standing Order No. 12(5) cannot be invoked to override this explicit statutory exclusion. The Court laid down the principle that a proviso concerning the extent and application of an enactment carves out an exception that must be given full effect, and specific exclusionary provisions regarding establishment size override general protections against termination for misconduct where the statute provides otherwise.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Standing Order No. 15 of the West Pakistan (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 is applicable to an industrial establishment employing forty-nine or fewer persons?
  • Does the second proviso to section 1(4) of the West Pakistan (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 override other inconsistent provisions regarding the applicability of Standing Orders?
  • Can Standing Order No. 12(5) operate to enforce the procedure of Standing Order No. 15 when the application of Standing Order No. 15 has been explicitly excluded by statute?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohrab Khan Kalwar Versus Secretary to the Government of Sindh,Department of Food1980 PLD 279 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-08-31
  civil servicedisciplinary proceedingsremoval from servicelocus poenitentiaepersonal hearingnatural justiceremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal was filed against a judgment of the Sind Service Tribunal upholding the appellant's removal from service as Rationing Controller, Karachi, under the Sind Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973. The core legal questions pertained to whether an Authorised Officer can recall an order initiating a formal inquiry under rule 5(2) to instead proceed under the summary show-cause procedure of rule 5(3), and whether denying a civil servant an explicit personal hearing requested pursuant to a show-cause notice invalidates the ultimate penalty. The Supreme Court held that under general administrative principles of locus poenitentiae and Section 20 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act 1956, an authority retains the power to recall an unexecuted order and adopt an alternative statutory procedure when circumstances justify it. However, because the appellant was explicitly offered the option of a personal hearing in the show-cause notice and requested it, denying that hearing without sufficient cause deprived him of a fair opportunity to defend himself. The removal order was declared without lawful authority and the matter was remanded for fresh proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Authorised Officer retain the power under administrative law to recall an order for formal departmental inquiry and instead proceed via summary show-cause notice?
  • Can an authority deny a civil servant a personal hearing after explicitly offering the option in a disciplinary show-cause notice and receiving an affirmative request?
  • Does the failure to afford a requested personal hearing render a subsequent order of removal from service illegal and without lawful authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Afzal Versus Shamim Firdaus1980 PLD 228 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-09-02
  declaration of marriagelegitimacy of childsecond appealconcurrent findings of factpresumption of marriageIslamic Lawacknowledgement of paternity
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit for a declaration of marriage and the legitimacy of a child, filed by the respondents against the appellant. The trial court, affirmed by the appellate court and the High Court, decreed the suit, holding that the marriage was proved via direct evidence (Nikahnama) and corroborated by extensive circumstantial evidence, including correspondence and the appellant's conduct. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its second appeal jurisdiction by upholding concurrent findings of fact regarding the marriage and legitimacy. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court correctly applied the law by refusing to re-evaluate factual findings absent a material error or misreading of evidence. The Court affirmed that under Islamic Law, long-term cohabitation and the acknowledgement of paternity create a strong presumption of a valid marriage, which the appellant failed to rebut. The judgment reinforces the principle that courts must presume in favor of marriage and against concubinage, and that concurrent findings of fact are generally immune from interference in second appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does long-term cohabitation between a man and a woman create a legal presumption of marriage under Islamic Law?
  • Does an acknowledgement of paternity by a man confer the status of a legitimate son upon a child under Islamic Law?
  • Is secondary evidence admissible to prove a fact when the original document is available?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Bakhsh Versus Shammi1980 PLD 225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-02Read full judgment →
• Sadiq Ali Versus Imtiaz Ahmad Khan1980 PLD 222 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-07-14Read full judgment →
• M. Yamin Qureshi Versus Islamic Republic of Pakistsan1980 PLD 22 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-01-22
  Service Tribunal jurisdictionMartial Law Regulation 58Article 270 Constitution of PakistanService appealOuster of jurisdictionDisciplinary proceedingsCivil servant dismissal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an order of the Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the appellant's appeal against his dismissal under Martial Law Regulation 58 of 1969 for lack of jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the immunity granted by Article 270 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to acts done under Martial Law precluded the Service Tribunal from exercising its appellate jurisdiction under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal possessed exclusive jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Court reasoned that the constitutional immunity from judicial scrutiny in "courts" did not extend to preventing an appeal before a specialized tribunal established under Article 212 of the Constitution. The Court affirmed that the Service Tribunal is obligated to examine the merits of such disciplinary orders, including allegations of procedural illegality, lack of jurisdiction, or mala fides. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's order and remanded the matter for a decision on merits, emphasizing that the Tribunal acts as an appellate forum with full powers to review the legality of the impugned dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the immunity granted by Article 270 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 bar the Service Tribunal from hearing appeals against dismissal orders passed under Martial Law Regulations?
  • Does the Service Tribunal have the power to examine the merits of a dismissal order passed under Martial Law Regulation 58 of 1969?
  • Can the Service Tribunal review disciplinary actions to determine if they were taken without jurisdiction, mala fide, or were coram non judice?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hafiz Versus Secretary, Communication & Works Department1980 PLD 211 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Ghulam Nabi Versus Mushtaq Ahmad1980 PLD 206 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-29Read full judgment →
• Farman Ali Versus The State1980 PLD 201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-28
  dying declarationbenefit of the doubtculpable homicidemurdermedical evidenceabscondenceballistic report
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a conflict between the trial court's judgment convicting the appellants under section 304 Part I/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the High Court's judgment altering the conviction to section 302/34 of the same code and sentencing them to imprisonment for life. The Supreme Court examined the evidence, including the ocular testimony, the alleged dying declaration, medical evidence, and ballistic reports. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the genuineness and reliability of the dying declaration, particularly given the severe injuries sustained by the deceased and material contradictions among the medical and police witnesses. Furthermore, the medical and ballistic evidence indicated injuries consistent with the act of a single assailant using a single weapon, creating grave doubt regarding the participation of all appellants. The key principle laid down is that where the dying declaration is rendered doubtful by severe physical trauma and conflicting testimony, and where corroborative ocular and medical evidence suffers from serious infirmities and contradictions, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused, and mere abscondence alone is insufficient to sustain a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a dying declaration recorded under contradictory circumstances by medical and police witnesses can be relied upon without corroboration?
  • Does abscondence by itself suffice to sustain a conviction in the absence of reliable primary evidence?
  • Whether medical and ballistic inconsistencies regarding the nature of injuries and weapons used warrant the acquittal of multiple accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain Versus Kanwar Ashiq Ali Khan1980 PLD 198 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Fazal-I-Raziq Versus Zaman Shah1980 PLD 193 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-28Read full judgment →
• Barkat Ali Versus Bashir Ahmad1980 PLD 189 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-09Read full judgment →
• Gul Mir Versus The State1980 PLD 185 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-26
  murdersentence enhancementdying declarationocular evidencehired assassinmotivesuo motu jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a High Court judgment that exercised suo motu jurisdiction to enhance the appellant's sentence from life imprisonment to death for the murder of Janat Gul. The core legal question concerned the propriety of the High Court's enhancement of the sentence based on the assumption that the appellant was a hired assassin acting under the instigation of a third party, despite the trial court's finding that the motive remained shrouded in mystery. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding the ocular evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the dying declaration reliable. However, the Court held that the High Court's enhancement of the sentence was based on mere conjecture rather than evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed that judicial decisions regarding sentencing must be grounded in established evidence rather than speculation about motive or external instigation. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal regarding the conviction but allowed it regarding the sentence, setting aside the death penalty and restoring the original sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court enhance a sentence based on conjectures regarding motive that are not supported by evidence on the record?
  • Is a site plan prepared by a police officer considered evidence in a criminal trial?
  • Does the absence of a proven motive preclude a conviction for murder when ocular evidence is reliable?
  Read full judgment →
• Barkat Khan Versus Fazal-E-Akbar1980 PLD 183 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-27
  pre-emptionFrontier Crimes Regulationsecond revisionjurisdictionCouncil-of-EldersCommissioner
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing a writ petition. The appellants had purchased land, which was subsequently made the subject of a pre-emption suit referred to the Council-of-Elders under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901. After prolonged proceedings, revisions, remands, and a final dismissal of the first respondent's revision by the Commissioner, the first respondent filed a second revision before the Officer on Special Duty, Government of N.-W. F. P., which was allowed. The appellants' writ petition against that order failed before the High Court. The core legal question was whether a second revision lay to the Officer on Special Duty under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901. The Supreme Court held that Section 49 of the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901 provides for only one revision, and since the first respondent's revision had already been heard and rejected by the Commissioner, the second revision before the Officer on Special Duty was entirely incompetent. The appeal was accordingly allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Does section 49 of the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901 permit more than one revision against an order passed under the Regulation?
  • Was the second revision filed before the Officer on Special Duty competent under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901?
  Read full judgment →
• B.Z. Kaikaus Versus President of Pakistan1980 PLD 160 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-06-07
  constitutional petitionIslamic lawShariaIslamisation of lawslegislative powersjudicial functionsupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, members of an organization, filed a constitutional petition in the Lahore High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, seeking extensive declarations and injunctions to the effect that Pakistan must be governed exclusively by the Divine Law (Sharia) derived from the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah, and that existing laws and provisions of the Constitution inconsistent therewith should be declared null and void. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the judiciary lacks jurisdiction to strike down the Constitution or issue mandates to the legislature to enact or alter laws. Upon a petition for special leave to appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the Islamisation of laws and the formulation of legal codes are legislative and political functions entrusted to the State organs, not the courts. The judiciary's role is to interpret and apply existing laws rather than act as a legislature or supplant the legal system overnight. Consequently, the petition for special leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the superior courts have the jurisdiction to issue declarations and injunctions directing the legislature or state organs to enforce Islamic Sharia law or overhaul the existing legal system?
  • Can the judiciary declare the Constitution of Pakistan or its provisions to be null and void as being contrary to the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah?
  • Whether the process of Islamising laws and adapting legal systems to Islamic principles is a judicial function or a legislative and political responsibility?
  • Whether a writ of mandamus or prohibition can lie against the legislature to compel or prevent the enactment of specific laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Iqan Ahmad Khurram Versus Govt. of Pakistan1980 PLD 153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-09
  Service Tribunal jurisdictionvires of rulesterms and conditions of serviceconstitutional petitionpromotion quotarecruitment rulesArticle 212
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil petitions for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed constitutional petitions as incompetent. The petitioners, employees of the Telegraph and Telephone Department, challenged the validity of notifications that revised recruitment and promotion rules, arguing these changes adversely affected their terms and conditions of service. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal possessed exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the vires of such rules, or if the High Court retained jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal is competent to examine the validity of rules governing service terms and conditions. The Court distinguished between challenges regarding an individual's fitness for promotion—where the Tribunal's jurisdiction might be restricted—and challenges to the rules themselves, which alter the method of recruitment and promotion. Consequently, because the impugned rules affected terms and conditions of service, the matter fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution, rendering the constitutional petitions before the High Court barred. The petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to determine the vires of rules governing the terms and conditions of service?
  • Does a challenge to the validity of recruitment and promotion rules fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution?
  • Is there a distinction between challenging the fitness of an individual for promotion and challenging the rules that govern the method of recruitment and promotion?
  • Does the Government possess the plenary power to frame and amend service rules, thereby superseding previous rules regarding promotion?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain Versus Zahoor Din1980 PLD 146 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-25
  inherent jurisdictionundertaking to courtstatus quocivil procedurereview petitionpossession of landequitable relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a Lahore High Court order dismissing a review petition as time-barred and directing the appellant to surrender possession of land. The core legal question was whether the High Court could lawfully order the appellant to deliver possession based on an undertaking provided by the appellant to secure an adjournment and maintain status quo, given the appellant's argument that the land was not the original subject matter of the suit. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant had voluntarily provided a solemn undertaking to vacate the land to obtain an adjournment. The Court determined that the property had become a central issue during the review proceedings, and the High Court acted within its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, to enforce this undertaking. The judgment establishes that a party cannot benefit from a court order obtained through an undertaking and subsequently seek to withdraw from that commitment. Furthermore, inherent powers may be invoked to enforce undertakings given to the court to maintain status quo, particularly when the party seeking relief has themselves introduced the subject matter into the proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court enforce an undertaking given by a party to vacate property in exchange for an adjournment?
  • Does the High Court have inherent jurisdiction under Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to enforce a status quo order?
  • Can a party who has obtained a benefit from an undertaking given to the court later withdraw from that undertaking?
  • Is a party permitted to challenge the jurisdiction of the court regarding the subject matter of a suit when they have themselves introduced that subject matter into the proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Asghari Khanum Versus The State1980 PLD 14 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-05Read full judgment →
• M.A. Haseeb Khan Versus Sikandar Shaheen1980 PLD 139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-10
  Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958evacuee propertywrit jurisdictionres judicatacompensation bookauction purchaserlaches
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions for leave to appeal challenge a Lahore High Court judgment concerning the disposal of property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal questions involved whether the cancellation of property transfers and subsequent auction were lawful, and whether the High Court properly exercised writ jurisdiction to re-open the matter despite the repeal of settlement laws and the dismissal of prior writ petitions. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, upholding the High Court’s ruling. It held that the property units in question were never legally resumed or auctioned, meaning the auction purchaser acquired no valid title. The Court established that payment of the evaluated price for transferred evacuee property is inextricably linked to the issuance of a compensation book; consequently, no default could be attributed to a transferee until such book was issued. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the dismissal of a writ petition for non-prosecution does not constitute a decision on merits, does not bar a subsequent petition on the same cause of action, and does not create res judicata.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dismissal of a writ petition for non-prosecution bar a subsequent petition on the same cause of action?
  • Can a transferee of evacuee property be held in default for non-payment of the transfer price before the issuance of a compensation book?
  • Does the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, divest the High Court of its constitutional writ jurisdiction to review settlement proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Barkat Shah Versus Azizullah Khan1980 PLD 138 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-06Read full judgment →
• Saeeda Khatoon Versus Amir Begum1980 PLD 133 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-30
  displaced personssettlement schemeallotment of propertyundisputed occupationtransfer of propertyletters patent appealsub judicepossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from a property dispute concerning the western portion of property No. 3/18 Temple Road, Lahore, under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal questions involved the legality of dividing a disputed property into separate units by settlement authorities, the restriction against a claimant obtaining multiple houses, and the interpretation of 'undisputed occupation' under a Central Government notification regarding possession. The Court held that the Settlement Commissioner acted within his lawful authority in dividing the property into two units, and that the appellants, having already been transferred one housing unit, were not entitled to a second unit. Furthermore, the Court held that the appellants' occupation of the ground floor was heavily contested in ongoing litigation and therefore did not qualify as 'undisputed occupation' under the relevant notification. The appeal was dismissed with costs, upholding the decision of the High Court's Letters Patent Bench which restored the Settlement Commissioner's fair and just allocation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Settlement Commissioner has the jurisdiction in revision to divide a disputed property into separate units for transfer to different claimants?
  • Can a claimant who has already been transferred one housing unit under settlement laws claim the transfer of a second unit or house?
  • What constitutes 'undisputed occupation' under the Central Government Notification dated October 13, 1959, issued pursuant to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Does an occupation that is the subject of pending litigation and active challenge before a competent authority qualify as undisputed?
  Read full judgment →
• Mansukhdas Bodaram Versus Hussain Brothers Ltd.1980 PLD 122 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-28
  frustration of contractforward contractprice controlmartial law regulationimpossibility of performancebreach of contractdamages
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a suit for damages filed by the appellant vendors against the respondent purchasers for the alleged breach of forward contracts for the supply of rapeseed. The contracts were entered into in July 1958, but before their implementation, Martial Law Regulation 42 of 1958 was promulgated, and a notification dated November 1958 fixed the maximum price of rapeseed at a significantly reduced rate. The trial court and the High Court in a Letters Patent Appeal both dismissed the suit, holding that the contracts had frustrated due to the price-fixing regulation which rendered performance at the original contractual rates unlawful and impossible. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Central Government was empowered under the regulation to control the prices of rapeseed as a "selected foodgrain" and that the subsequent price fixation directly frustrated the contracts under Section 56 of the Contract Act 1872. The Court laid down that the doctrine of frustration operates automatically to discharge parties from performance when supervening legislation renders a contract unlawful, and a party refusing to take the real risk of penal prosecution for violating a statutory price control cannot be deemed in breach.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Central Government was empowered to fix the price of rapeseed under Martial Law Regulation 42 of 1958?
  • Does the fixation of a statutory price lower than the contractual rate render a forward contract void due to frustration under Section 56 of the Contract Act 1872?
  • Whether a party refusing to perform a contract to avoid the risk of penal prosecution under a price-control regulation is guilty of a deliberate breach?
  • What is the legal effect and operation of the doctrine of frustration on an executory contract?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income-Tax, Lahore Versus Ferozedin Allah Rakha M. Ramzan1980 PLD 115 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-13Read full judgment →
• Ali Khan Versus The State1980 PLD 109 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-11-26
  leave to appealmurderinterested witnesscorroborationnon-production of witnessprivate revengecapital sentencearms ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment arises from three petitions for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan: two filed by the convict Ali Khan challenging his conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 13 of the Arms Ordinance, and one by the complainant challenging the acquittal of co-accused. The deceased was shot dead while walking to court, allegedly due to long-standing family enmity. The trial court convicted three accused, but the High Court maintained only the petitioner's conviction while acquitting the others for lack of independent corroboration. The core legal questions involved whether the prosecution is required to produce every witness named in the FIR or examined during investigation, whether interested eyewitness testimony requires independent corroboration, and whether private revenge constitutes a mitigating factor for sentence reduction. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution is not bound to produce witnesses who lack awareness of relevant facts. It further held that corroboration of interested witnesses is a rule of prudence, and private revenge does not constitute a mitigating circumstance for capital punishment. All petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is the prosecution legally required to produce every person named in the FIR or examined by the police as a witness at trial?
  • Whether private revenge constitutes a mitigating circumstance for awarding a lesser sentence in murder cases under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can the testimony of interested eyewitnesses be relied upon to convict an accused without independent corroboration?
  Read full judgment →
• Siraz Din Versus Amanullah Qureshi1980 PLD 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  land allotmentsettlement authoritywrit petitionnon-application of mindremandevacuee propertyadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment involving a dispute over the allotment of urban agricultural land. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly quashed an allotment order made by an Additional Settlement Commissioner and remanded the case for fresh adjudication, given that the petitioner had not explicitly used the word 'fraud' in the writ petition, despite alleging collusion and concealment. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the Settlement Authority's order was passed without application of mind because it failed to consider the respondent's prior pending claim and other relevant facts. The Court affirmed that pleadings should be interpreted based on their pith and substance rather than requiring artistic legal drafting. The key principle laid down is that administrative orders may be quashed for non-application of mind when authorities fail to consider relevant facts or adjudicate the comparative merits of competing claimants, and courts possess the discretion to remand such matters to ensure a fair determination of entitlement.

  Questions settled

  • Can an administrative order be quashed for non-application of mind if the authority failed to consider relevant pending claims?
  • Does the absence of the specific word 'fraud' in a writ petition preclude a court from examining allegations of collusion and surreptitious conduct?
  • Is a court justified in remanding a case to an administrative authority when the authority failed to adjudicate the comparative merits of competing claimants?
  Read full judgment →
• Atta Hussain Khan Versus Muhammad Siddique Khan1979 PLD 965 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-05-20Read full judgment →
• Billu Alias Inayatullah Versus The State1979 PLD 934 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-27
  appeal against acquittalappreciation of evidencebenefit of doubtocular evidencemotiverecovery of weaponmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which reversed the acquittal of the petitioner by the Sessions Judge, Lahore, and convicted him under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing him to imprisonment for life. The petitioner challenged the High Court's reversal of his acquittal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan under Article 185(2)(a) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The core legal question involved the scope of interference by an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and the proper appreciation of ocular evidence, motive, and recovery evidence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court misread the evidence, disregarded well-established principles governing acquittal appeals, and ignored material discrepancies and unnatural conduct of the prosecution witnesses. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's view—granting the benefit of the doubt to the accused—was fully warranted by the record. Consequently, the appeal was accepted, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the original acquittal by the Sessions Judge was restored.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a statement made by an accused person in the committing Court, which is subsequently rescinded in the trial Court, be used as the sole basis for conviction?
  • Whether the testimony of eyewitnesses whose presence at the scene of the crime is unnatural and uncorroborated can sustain a murder conviction?
  • How should an appellate court treat findings of fact and the assessment of witness credibility arrived at by a trial judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses?
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• Abdul Ahad Versus Roshan Din1979 PLD 890 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-06-12Read full judgment →
• Nawab Din Versus Member Board of Revenue(Settlement and Rehabilitation) Punjab1979 PLD 846 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-12-13Read full judgment →
• MRS. Gool Versus MRS. Nasim a Rahman1979 PLD 843 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-04-30
  leave to appealeviction applicationpersonal bona fide needresidential buildingnon-residential buildingdual use premisesurban rent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an eviction application filed under Section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959 by the respondent-landlady against the petitioner-tenant regarding a ground floor property. The landlady sought eviction on the ground of personal residential need, whereas the lease agreement permitted using the premises for residence or running a school. Lower courts, including the High Court of Sind, ordered the eviction of the tenant. Before the Supreme Court, the core legal question raised was whether premises let for dual or non-residential purposes could be retrieved by a landlord for personal residential use under Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Ordinance, or whether the 'use' contemplated under the law must strictly match the non-residential character for which the property was let. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the interpretation of the terms 'building' and 'own use' under the Ordinance raised substantial legal questions of public importance affecting numerous similar tenancies. Status quo was ordered pending the hearing of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a landlord can seek eviction of a tenant for personal residential use under Section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959 where the premises were let for non-residential or dual purposes?
  • How is the nature of a building determined under Section 2 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959 when the lease agreement allows both residential and commercial use?
  • Does the phrase 'for his own use' in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959 restrict a landlord to using the property strictly in accordance with its prior non-residential mode of occupation?
  Read full judgment →
• Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Versus The State1979 PLD 741 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-03-24Read full judgment →
• Province of Punjab Versus Abdul Rehman Khan Durrani1979 PLD 711 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-12-06Read full judgment →
• Shamroz Khan Versus Muhammad Amin1978 PLD 89 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-06
  Civil Procedure CodeStriking off defenseJudicial discretionEx parte decreeStatutory interpretationAddress for serviceLaw Reforms Ordinance 1972
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the interpretation of Rule 12, Order VIII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, specifically whether the phrase "shall be liable to have his defence... struck out" imposes a mandatory obligation on the court or confers judicial discretion. The petitioners challenged a High Court order that set aside a trial court's decision to strike off the respondents' defense and decree the suit ex parte due to the respondents' failure to provide an address for service. The Supreme Court held that the word "liable" in the statute confers discretion upon the court rather than imposing a mandatory duty. Consequently, the trial court is not compelled to strike off a defense, nor is it required to decree a suit automatically without recording evidence upon such a failure. The Court emphasized that statutory provisions must be construed according to their ordinary and natural meaning, and judicial discretion must be exercised in light of the facts and circumstances of each case. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision to remand the case for trial on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the phrase 'shall be liable to have his defence struck out' in Order VIII, Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 impose a mandatory duty on the court?
  • Is a court required to pass an ex parte decree without recording evidence when a defendant's defense is struck off under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the word 'liable' in a statute generally confer discretion upon the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Crescent Jute Products Ltd., Jaranwala Versus Muhammad Yaqub1978 PLD 295 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-06-28Read full judgment →
• Manzar Bashir Versus M. A. Asghar & Co.1978 PLD 231 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-05-28
  ejectment proceedingsex parte orderright of appealinterlocutory orderRent ControllerWest Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinancestatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing an appeal regarding an ejectment proceeding. The core legal question was whether an order passed by a Rent Controller setting aside an ex parte order of ejectment is appealable under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. The Supreme Court held that the order setting aside the ex parte ejectment was interlocutory in nature, as it merely reopened proceedings to allow the respondent an opportunity to be heard, and did not finally decide the controversy. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the order was not appealable under Section 15(1) of the Ordinance. The Court established that the right of appeal is a creature of statute and cannot be assumed. It clarified that only orders which embrace the whole gamut of the dispute are appealable under the Ordinance, while interlocutory or incidental orders are excluded from the scope of appellate review. The Court further rejected the argument that Section 15(4) provided a residuary right of direct appeal to the High Court in this context.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order by a Rent Controller setting aside an ex parte order of ejectment appealable under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Does the right of appeal exist for interlocutory orders under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Can a direct appeal be filed to the High Court under Section 15(4) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 against an order of the Rent Controller?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Suleman Versus Abdul Ghani1978 PLD 190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-06-01Read full judgment →
• Mumtazuddin Versus The State1978 PLD 114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-02-21Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Shabbir Versus Nur Begum1977 PLD 75 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-11-23
  Waqf-alal-auladfamily waqffictitious transactiondeclaratory suitmutwallibona fide purchaserTransfer of Property ActMussalman Waqf Validating Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the validity of a Waqf-alal-aulad created by Haji Faiz Bakhsh in 1948. The core legal question was whether the Waqf was a fictitious, colourable transaction intended to defraud creditors, or a genuine dedication of property. The High Court had held the Waqf was fictitious, citing the Waqif's subsequent conduct and lack of possession by the mutwalli. The Supreme Court reversed this, holding that the Waqf was validly created upon the execution and registration of the deed. The Court ruled that the Waqif's primary intention was to protect his property from his profligate son, not to defraud creditors. Furthermore, the Court established that a validly created Waqf cannot be invalidated by the Waqif's subsequent conduct or breaches of trust, nor by the failure of specific charitable objects, as the doctrine of cy-pres applies. Finally, the Court held that a suit for declaration and injunction by a mutwalli is competent even if the mutwalli is not in physical possession, provided the beneficiaries are in possession.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Waqf-alal-aulad be declared invalid solely on the basis of the Waqif's subsequent conduct or breaches of trust?
  • Is a suit for declaration and injunction by a mutwalli competent if the mutwalli is not in physical possession of the waqf property?
  • Does the doctrine of cy-pres apply to a Waqf where the specific charitable objects fail or are non-existent?
  • Can a Waqf created to exclude a profligate heir from inheritance be considered a fictitious transaction intended to defraud creditors?
  Read full judgment →
• Controller of Examination, B. I. S. E. Lahore Versus Muhammad Yaqub1977 PLD 69 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-11-08
  examination malpracticediscipline committeenatural justicewrit jurisdictionleave to appealeducational institutionsaudi alteram partem
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Controller of Examinations against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had allowed a writ petition and directed the declaration of the respondent's intermediate examination result. The respondent had been penalized by the Discipline Committee for allegedly possessing objectionable material and copying during an examination. The Supreme Court, by a majority of two to one (Muhammad Afzal Cheema and Salahuddin Ahmed, JJ.; Dorab Patel, J., dissenting), dismissed the petition. The majority held that the finding of guilt was based on no convincing evidence as the allegation of copying was completely baseless and unsubstantiated by the record, and the failure to examine the Deputy Superintendent or provide a fair opportunity of defense caused serious prejudice to the respondent. The Court concluded that no substantial question of general public importance warranted the grant of leave to appeal, and the High Court had rightly struck down the illegal departmental order rather than remanding the matter.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the finding of a university discipline committee regarding examination malpractice can be set aside in writ jurisdiction when based on no convincing evidence?
  • Does the failure of a discipline committee to examine the reporting official upon request violate the principles of natural justice?
  • Whether a High Court should remand a matter to a departmental authority or strike down an illegal order directly?
  • Whether a charge-sheet issued in university disciplinary proceedings can be challenged on the ground of vagueness?
  Read full judgment →
• Begum Nusrat Bhutto Versus Chief of Army Staff and Federation of Pakistan1977 PLD 657 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  martial lawdoctrine of necessityconstitutional deviationjudicial reviewfundamental rightshabeas corpussupreme court jurisdictionlaws continuance in force order
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 challenged the detention of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and ten others under Martial Law Order No. 12 of 1977. The core legal questions involved the constitutional and legal validity of the imposition of Martial Law by the Chief of the Army Staff on July 5, 1977, the status of the pre-existing legal order, and the availability of judicial review during the period of martial rule. The court held that the extra-constitutional intervention by the Armed Forces was justified and validated by the doctrine of State necessity in light of the severe political crisis, widespread disturbances, and breakdown of constitutional machinery following the disputed elections of March 1977. The court ruled that the 1973 Constitution remained the supreme law of the land, with certain parts held in abeyance, and that the superior courts retained their power of judicial review to test executive and legislative actions against the law of necessity. The petition was dismissed as not maintainable due to the valid suspension of Fundamental Rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the imposition of Martial Law by the Chief of the Army Staff on July 5, 1977, is a valid extra-constitutional step justified by the doctrine of State necessity?
  • Does the Proclamation of Martial Law and the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order 1977 completely destroy the pre-existing legal order or does the 1973 Constitution remain the supreme law in abeyance?
  • Do the superior courts retain the power of judicial review to examine the validity of acts and actions of the Martial Law Authorities under the doctrine of necessity?
  • Are Fundamental Rights validly suspended under the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order 1977 during the period of martial rule?
  • Whether a petition filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution for the enforcement of suspended Fundamental Rights is maintainable?
  Read full judgment →
• Shamim Akhter Versus Najma Baqai1977 PLD 644 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-07-24
  arbitration agreementstamp dutyarbitration awardestoppelwritten agreementinstrumentinheritance dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute over an estate, where parties referred the matter to arbitration through the mediation of Martial Law authorities. The respondents challenged the resulting award under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, alleging the absence of a valid, stamped arbitration agreement. While the High Court invalidated the award due to the lack of stamp duty on the agreement, the Supreme Court reversed this decision. The Court held that an "arbitration agreement" under Section 2(a) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, does not require a formal, signed instrument; rather, it is satisfied by written correspondence evidencing the parties' mutual intent to arbitrate. Furthermore, the Court determined that the specific correspondence in this case did not constitute an "instrument" requiring stamp duty under the Stamp Act, 1899. Additionally, the Court ruled that the respondents were estopped from challenging the award's validity after having accepted financial benefits under it. Consequently, the Court restored the trial court's order making the award a rule of the court.

  Questions settled

  • Does an arbitration agreement under the Arbitration Act 1940 require the signatures of all parties to be valid?
  • Can correspondence between parties and third-party facilitators constitute a valid arbitration agreement under the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • Are letters of appointment of arbitrators considered 'instruments' liable to stamp duty under the Stamp Act 1899?
  • Is a party estopped from challenging an arbitration award after accepting financial benefits under that award?
  Read full judgment →
• Sultan Khan Versus Amir Khan1977 PLD 642 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-09-14
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationmurdercommon intentionsupreme court jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court granting post-arrest bail to the respondent, who along with co-accused was charged under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the petitioner's brother. The High Court had granted bail on the ground that the respondent's role was confined to raising a lalkara and firing an ineffective shot, as all fatal injuries were caused by pistol shots fired by co-accused. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court's reasoning--suggesting an accused who merely instigates and fires ineffectively is likely to be acquitted of murder--was erroneous and against the provisions of the law, noting that the case was not fit for bail on the alleged facts. However, holding that the Supreme Court is primarily a constitutional court and generally does not interfere in bail matters granted by the High Court, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused who raises a lalkara and fires ineffectively is entitled to bail in a murder case under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the Supreme Court of Pakistan interfere with bail orders passed by the High Court in routine matters?
  • What is the scope of the Supreme Court as primarily a constitutional court regarding petitions against bail grants?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ishaq Versus Chief Administrator of Auqaf,Punjab1977 PLD 639 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1917-05-17
  Waqf propertylimitation periodstatutory publicationofficial gazetteadministrative notificationproperty rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the interpretation of the term "publication" regarding a notification issued under the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1961. The appellant challenged a notification declaring his land as Waqf property. Lower courts dismissed his petition as time-barred, calculating the thirty-day limitation period from the date the notification was printed in the official Gazette. The core legal question was whether "publication" under Section 7 of the Ordinance refers to the mere printing date or the date the notification is made available to the public. The Supreme Court held that "publication" necessitates that the notification be made available to the public through normal modes, such as delivery to the book depot. Consequently, the limitation period commences only when the notification is effectively published, not when it is merely printed. The Court established the principle that statutory publication requires providing a reasonable opportunity for the public to access the information. Accordingly, the appellant’s petition was deemed within time, and the case was remanded for trial on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for challenging a notification under the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance 1961 commence from the date of printing or the date of public availability?
  • What constitutes 'publication' of a notification in the official Gazette for the purpose of triggering statutory limitation periods?
  • Is the mere printing of a notification in the official Gazette sufficient to constitute legal publication?
  Read full judgment →
• Illahi Noor Versus Muhammad Din1977 PLD 634 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-07-27
  partition suitpublic auctionsetting aside saleexecution of decreedecree for sale
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses whether the provisions of Order XXI, Rule 89 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 apply to a court auction sale held pursuant to a decree for the sale of property in a partition suit under the Partition Act 1893. The primary legal question is whether such a sale, governed by section 7 of the Partition Act 1893, permits an application to set aside the sale upon depositing five percent of the purchase money despite the absence of a money decree-holder. The Supreme Court held that Order XXI, Rule 89 applies to partition sales as far as practicable, subject to the condition that clause (b) of sub-rule (1) is inapplicable where there is no decree-holder for a debt recovery. The Court laid down that sales under the Partition Act 1893 incorporate the procedure of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 only in so far as it is practicable, allowing courts to disregard inapplicable portions while granting co-owners the right to seek relief under Rule 89.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order for the sale of property in a partition suit constitutes a decree under the Civil Procedure Code 1908?
  • Do the provisions of Order XXI, Rule 89 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 apply to auction sales conducted in partition suits?
  • Can an auction sale in a partition suit be set aside under Order XXI, Rule 89 without complying with clause (b) of sub-rule (1)?
  • Are parties in a partition suit entitled to adjust or settle the suit under Order XXIII of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 after a preliminary decree for sale has been passed?
  Read full judgment →
• General Tractor and Machinery Co. Ltd.Karachi Versus The State1977 PLD 629 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-05-24
  production of propertysection 94 CrPCdeposit of money in courtproceeds of offenceimplied powers doctrinecriminal procedureinterim custody
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by special leave arose from a judgment of the former High Court of Sind and Baluchistan, which had affirmed a Special Judge's order directing the appellant-company to deposit Rs. 5,43,683 of unadjusted Government money into court. The core legal question was whether Section 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 empowers a criminal court to direct the production and deposit of money or property that constitutes the subject matter or proceeds of an offence under investigation or trial. The High Court had held that Section 94 was inapplicable to property subject to an offence and instead relied on the doctrine of implied powers to sustain the order. Reversing the High Court's reasoning while maintaining its ultimate decision, the Supreme Court held that the phrase 'document or other thing' in Section 94 Cr.P.C. includes property directly connected to the subject matter of the proceedings. The Court established that where money in a party's possession is reasonably connected to the criminal charge, Section 94 Cr.P.C. provides statutory authority to order its deposit in court during proceedings, serving as a basis for final disposal under Section 517 Cr.P.C. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 empower a court to order the production and deposit of money directly connected to the subject matter of an offence?
  • Can an order for the production of property be issued under Section 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in anticipation of a final disposal order under Section 517?
  • Is a court required to resort to the doctrine of implied powers when an express statutory provision under Section 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 covers the production of property?
  Read full judgment →
• Zarif Khan Versus The State1977 PLD 612 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-07-09
  dying declarationoral dying declarationcorroborationSection 32 Evidence Actmurder appealappreciation of evidencehostile witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged the appellant's conviction and sentence of transportation for life under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder. The High Court had discarded the sole eyewitness and two written dying declarations as fabricated, but upheld the conviction relying on alleged oral dying declarations spoken to by interested witnesses. The primary legal questions concerned the probative value of dying declarations under Section 32 of the Evidence Act 1872, and whether an uncorroborated oral dying declaration can sustain a murder conviction. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant, holding that the prosecution failed to prove that the deceased was physically capable of identifying the assailant through a closed door, and that the witnesses testifying to the oral dying declarations were dishonest and unreliable. The Court established that while a truthful dying declaration can legally sustain a conviction without corroboration, it must be subjected to close scrutiny regarding observation capacity, integrity, and lack of tutoring before it can be safely acted upon.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal conviction for murder be based solely on an uncorroborated dying declaration?
  • What factors must a court evaluate when assessing the evidentiary value and reliability of a dying declaration?
  • Can evidence of an oral dying declaration be relied upon when the witnesses deposing to it are found to have suppressed facts or given false testimony?
  • Does an adverse inference arise against the prosecution under the Evidence Act for failing to produce a material eyewitness cited in the case?
  Read full judgment →
• Amiruddin Versus The State1977 PLD 602 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-03-31
  bail cancellationinherent powers of High Courtcriminal procedurefinality of judgmentnon-bailable offencejudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order cancelling the petitioner's bail in a case involving charges under sections 148, 302, and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed the jurisdiction to review and cancel its own bail order, particularly given the principle of finality of judgments under section 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted within its jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that bail orders do not constitute 'judgments' under section 369, and thus are not immune to review. Furthermore, the Court established that section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is ancillary to section 497, meaning the power to cancel bail under section 497(5) extends to bail granted by the High Court. Consequently, while courts should exercise judicial discretion and avoid arbitrary interference, they retain the inherent power to cancel bail to prevent the abuse of process or secure the ends of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Does a bail order constitute a 'judgment' within the meaning of section 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a High Court cancel bail granted by itself under section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the power to cancel bail under section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to bail granted by a High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Conforce Ltd. Versus Syed Ali Shah1977 PLD 599 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-04-26
  ex parte proceedingsvoid orderwithout jurisdictiongross negligencecivil revisioninherent powersleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of an order passed by the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's revision against orders of the Civil Judge declining to set aside an ex parte proceeding order and dismissing a subsequent application. The core legal question concerned whether an order passed without proper notice or on a date allegedly not fixed for hearing is void, and whether inherent powers under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 can condone gross negligence. The Supreme Court held that the trial court had competence and seisin over the matter, making its order an illegal or irregular exercise of jurisdiction rather than a nullity, and that inherent powers cannot be invoked to defeat statutory provisions or excuse gross negligence. The Court laid down the principle that the expressions 'void order' and 'without jurisdiction' are overworked and should properly be used in the narrow sense of a court's lack of competence to enter upon an inquiry, and that an illegal order passed by a court with competent seisin creates rights and must be challenged through the proper legal remedies and within the prescribed limitations.

  Questions settled

  • Can the provisions of section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be invoked to condone gross negligence or defeat procedural rules?
  • When does an order passed by a court qualify as void or without jurisdiction in the strict legal sense?
  • Does the failure to produce the foundational order of a lower court preclude a party from claiming that a subsequent date was not fixed for hearing?
  • Is an ex parte order passed by a court having seisin of the case considered a complete nullity or merely an illegal order subject to regular challenge?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Sadiq Versus The State1977 PLD 582 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-06-03
  murderarsonocular testimonyfirst information reportmotivebenefit of the doubtcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the judgment of the Lahore High Court which maintained the conviction of the accused for murder and arson under sections 302, 201, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while enhancing their sentences to death. The core legal questions involved the reliability of ocular testimony, the corroborative value of a first information report regarding motive, and the standard of proof required in an unwitnessed double murder case. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the first information report is not substantive evidence, that the prosecution failed to prove the alleged motive and the presence of the eye-witnesses, and that the lower courts based their findings on conjectures and a misreading of the record. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the convictions and sentences, giving the benefit of the doubt to the appellants and acquitting them.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the first information report can be used as substantive piece of evidence?
  • Is delay in lodging the first information report satisfactorily explained by presumed reluctance of relatives?
  • Can the uncorroborated testimony of doubtful eye-witnesses form the basis of a murder conviction?
  • Whether recovery of incriminating articles at the instance of the accused is sufficient to sustain a conviction when ocular testimony is rejected?
  Read full judgment →
• Roshan Versus The State1977 PLD 557 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-05-10Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain Shah Versus The State1977 PLD 548 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-05-20
  criminal appealmurderprivate defenceappreciation of evidencerelated witnessescorroborationtransportation for liferetrospective effect of statute
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal under Article 185(2)(a) of the Constitution of Pakistan arises from convictions and sentences under sections 302/34 and 324/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, passed by the High Court which had set aside an acquittal by the trial court. The core legal questions involved the reliability of related ocular evidence, the adequacy of corroboration, the evaluation of rival versions concerning self-defence, and the retrospective or prospective application of the sentencing amendment substituting transportation for life with imprisonment for life under section 302. The Supreme Court held that the ocular testimony, corroborated by the prompt FIR, injuries sustained by the eyewitnesses, and proven motive stemming from a land dispute, was fully reliable and disproved the defence plea of self-defence. The Court further held that penal amendments affecting substantive sentences are presumed prospective, thereby altering the sentence of imprisonment for life back to transportation for life while directing that the sentences run consecutively.

  Questions settled

  • Whether related eyewitness testimony can be relied upon without independent corroboration in a criminal trial?
  • Does a disproportionately lesser number of injuries on the accused party negate the plea of private defence?
  • Whether the amendment substituting transportation for life with imprisonment for life applies retrospectively to offences committed prior to its promulgation?
  • Whether sentences under sections 302/34 and 324/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code should run concurrently or consecutively in the circumstances of the case?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Ali Versus Zahoor Ahmed1977 PLD 545 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-05-21
  contempt of courtunqualified apologymitigating circumstancepolice torturefundamental rightsdignity of citizencriminal original jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court convicting six police officers of contempt of court for disobeying an interim order prohibiting the arrest of the respondent without the court's prior permission. The contemners tendered an unconditional and unqualified apology before the High Court, which was treated as a mitigating circumstance rather than a complete defense, resulting in convictions, sentences of imprisonment till the rising of the court, and fines. The core legal question was whether an unqualified apology operates as a complete defense to a charge of contempt or merely serves as a mitigating circumstance. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that an apology does not furnish a complete defense to contempt of court but is only considered when determining punishment. The Court further observed that law enforcement officers subjecting a citizen to torture constitutes a grave violation of constitutional guarantees protecting human dignity, and ordered a pending private criminal complaint against the officers to be transferred to the High Court for trial in its extraordinary original jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unqualified apology operate as a complete defense to a charge of contempt of court?
  • Can police officers disobey a court order restraining arrest on the ground of lack of knowledge?
  • What is the effect of an apology on the sentence awarded for contempt of court?
  • How does the Constitution protect citizens against torture by law enforcement agencies?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf Versus The State1977 PLD 538 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-05-12
  double murderocular testimonyconcurrent findingseye witness credibilityrecoveriesmedical evidencenight occurrencemotive
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction and death sentences awarded to two appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for committing a double murder. The prosecution case relied primarily on the ocular evidence of an old witness with defective eyesight who accompanied the deceased, supported by motive, medical evidence, and recoveries of blood-stained weapons and clothes. The defense challenged the credibility of the eye-witnesses, argued delay in investigation, and asserted that the victims were killed by family members while eloping due to an illicit relationship.

  The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts. Re-evaluating the evidence, the Court held that the star eye-witness was truthful, natural, and credible despite his weak eyesight, as the scene was moonlit and the parties were closely related. The Court reaffirmed that it will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless there is a serious question of law or the lower court findings are demonstrably perverse or disregard material evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by lower courts in a criminal trial?
  • Can the testimony of an eye-witness with defective eyesight be relied upon to sustain a conviction for murder?
  • Does the failure of an investigating officer to show immediate arrest of accused persons automatically vitiate prosecution recoveries or render them doubtful?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Ilah Versus Zamurd Khan1977 PLD 535 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-05-16
  leave to appealacquittalocular testimonydying declarationbenefit of doubtmedical evidenceappellate review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which acquitted the respondent of a murder charge under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, overturning a conviction and life sentence previously awarded by the Sessions Judge. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court’s appellate assessment of evidence—specifically regarding the timing of the First Information Report, the visibility conditions, the credibility of the dying declaration, the withholding of a witness, and the alleged conflict between ocular and medical evidence—was legally sound. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the contentions that the High Court ignored the relationship between the parties, disregarded disinterested eyewitness testimony, and misinterpreted the physical dynamics of the crime scene, determined that the entire evidence required a fresh review in the interest of justice. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal and issued non-bailable warrants against the respondent. The judgment emphasizes the necessity of a comprehensive re-evaluation of evidence when appellate findings appear to overlook critical corroborative facts or misinterpret physical evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the appellate court have the authority to review the entire evidence in a criminal case when the High Court's acquittal is challenged on grounds of misappreciation of evidence?
  • Can an appellate court disregard ocular testimony based on alleged conflicts with medical evidence without considering the physical dynamics of the crime scene?
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• Fazlu R Rehma Versus Abdul Ghani1977 PLD 529 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-04-12
  criminal appealacquittalappreciation of evidencemisreading of evidencemurderocular testimonySupreme Court interference
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the High Court's judgment setting aside the conviction of the respondent for the murder of his uncle. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its appreciation of evidence, specifically regarding alleged contradictions in eye-witness testimony, lighting conditions at the crime scene, and the recovery of a light bulb. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s acquittal was based on a misreading of evidence and a failure to consider material facts, such as the corroborative evidence of the bazar's lighting and the established motive arising from long-standing civil litigation. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal, and restored the trial court's conviction and sentence. The judgment reaffirms the principle that while the Supreme Court typically respects findings of fact by lower courts, it will interfere with an acquittal if the High Court's decision is based on a disregard of material evidence, faulty reasoning, or a misreading of the record that results in a miscarriage of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the High Court?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to re-examine evidence in a criminal appeal to prevent a miscarriage of justice?
  • Can a court rely on a portion of a witness's testimony while rejecting the remainder as unreliable?
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• Muhammad Din Versus The State1977 PLD 52 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-09-22Read full judgment →