Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Ameeruddin vs The State2025 SCP 78, 2025 PLD Supreme Court 383 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-03-04
  criminal appealmurdereyewitness testimonybenefit of the doubtacquittalocular accountindependent corroborationlimitation of human vision
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which dismissed the appellant's appeal and upheld his conviction and sentence of life imprisonment on four counts under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, along with a conviction under Section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, for a daylight shooting incident resulting in four deaths. The core legal question concerns the reliability and credibility of eyewitness testimony claiming to have observed the incident from a distance of half a kilometer, and the legal effect of the acquittal of co-accused attributed similar roles without independent corroboration. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant, holding that human vision limitations render observations from 500 meters unreliable, and that eyewitnesses disbelieved regarding acquitted co-accused cannot be relied upon against remaining accused without independent corroboration. The key principles established are that prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, physical impossibilities regarding eyewitness vantage points create fatal flaws in the prosecution's case, and tainted eyewitness testimony requires independent corroboration.

  Questions settled

  • Can eyewitness testimony claiming to observe an incident from a distance of half a kilometer be considered reliable by a prudent mind?
  • What is the legal effect on remaining accused persons when eyewitnesses are disbelieved regarding co-accused attributed similar roles?
  • Is independent corroboration required when eyewitness testimony against an accused has been found untrustworthy as to co-accused?
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• Ameenullah s/o Saadullah and others vs The State & another2025 SCP 247 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-04-18
  narcoticschain of custodysafe custodychemical examiner reportburden of proofSection 540 CrPCcriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellants under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997, following the recovery of a substantial quantity of narcotics. The core legal question was whether the prosecution established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, specifically concerning the integrity of the chain of custody of the recovered substance, and whether the trial court failed in its duty to ensure a just decision. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove an unbroken chain of safe custody and transmission of the narcotic samples from the point of recovery to the chemical examiner. Consequently, the chemical examiner's report lost its evidentiary value. The Court further held that the trial court failed to exercise its mandatory duty under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to summon essential witnesses to reach the truth. The principle laid down is that the prosecution bears the onerous burden of proving the chain of custody through unimpeachable evidence in narcotics cases, and trial courts must actively exercise their powers under Section 540 CrPC to ensure a just decision when the prosecution's case suffers from reckless omissions.

  Questions settled

  • Does a break in the chain of custody of narcotic samples render the chemical examiner's report unreliable?
  • Is the prosecution required to produce witnesses responsible for the safe custody and transmission of narcotic samples to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt?
  • Can a trial court exercise its powers under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to summon witnesses even if they were given up by the prosecution?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove the chain of custody entitle the accused to an acquittal as a matter of right?
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• Altaf Hussain vs The State2025 SCP 181 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-05-07
  murderocular evidencerelated witnessinjured witnessmedical corroborationacquittal of co-accusedsifting grain from chafffalsus in uno falsus in omnibus
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction and sentence of life imprisonment under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, as well as five years' rigorous imprisonment under Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, against the appellant for the murder of Muhammad Ashfaq and causing firearm injuries. The core legal questions pertained to whether related eyewitness testimony could sustain a conviction absent proof of animus, whether the acquittal of a co-accused on the same ocular evidence invalidated the appellant's conviction, and whether the appellant was liable for injuries specifically caused by an absconding co-accused. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, maintaining the conviction and sentence under Section 302(b) PPC while setting aside the conviction under Section 324 PPC. The Court held that relationship alone does not discredit credible eyewitnesses and that the acquittal of a co-accused does not automatically vitiate the prosecution case against another accused whose specific fatal role is independently established, reiterating the judicial duty to sift grain from chaff.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of eyewitnesses be discarded solely on the basis of their close relationship with the deceased in the absence of established animus or motive for false implication?
  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused automatically render the conviction of the principal accused unsustainable when based on the same ocular evidence?
  • Can an accused be convicted for attempted murder under Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 where the specific act of firing at an injured person is exclusively attributed to a co-accused?
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• All Public Universities BPS Teachers Association (Apubta) through its President vs The Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Federal Education and Professional Training, Islamabad and others2024 SCP 177, 2024 SCP 366, 2025 SCMR 322 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-10-24
  public sector universitiestenured positionsvice-chancellor appointmentstatutory compliancepublic interest litigationhigher education commissionstudent unionsfinancial accountability
  Summary & questions settled

  This public interest litigation was filed by the All Public Universities BPS Teachers Association, challenging the systemic non-compliance with governing laws by public sector universities across Pakistan. The core legal questions concerned whether these institutions were operating in accordance with their respective statutes, specifically regarding the appointment of tenured officials, the holding of mandatory statutory meetings, and financial management. The Supreme Court held that the prevailing state of affairs was unsatisfactory, characterized by widespread violations of governing laws and unauthorized acting-charge appointments. Consequently, the Court directed that all vacant tenured positions, including Vice-Chancellors, be filled transparently and on merit. It mandated strict compliance with HEC-prescribed staff ratios, ordered the revival of inclusive student unions, and directed financial audits for universities exhibiting mismanagement. The Court laid down the principle that public sector universities must operate strictly according to their governing statutes, affirming that taxpayers are entitled to accountability and that the right to education, as a fundamental right under the Constitution, necessitates efficient and lawful university governance.

  Questions settled

  • Can a public sector university continue to function with tenured positions held on an acting-charge basis indefinitely?
  • Does the failure of public sector universities to comply with their governing laws violate the fundamental rights of citizens?
  • Is the appointment of a university official by a Rector valid if the governing statute does not grant the Rector such authority?
  • Are public sector universities required to adhere to staff ratios prescribed by the Higher Education Commission?
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• Ali Madad Jattak vs Mir Muhammad Usman Pirkani and others2025 SCP 1, 2025 SCMR 466 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-11-20
  Election PetitionForm-45Returned CandidateDe-notificationRe-pollingSubstantial ComplianceExhibition of DocumentsAdmissibility of EvidenceCorrupt PracticesConsolidation of Results
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal under Section 155 of the Elections Act 2017 was filed against an Election Tribunal judgment which declared election results (Forms 45 to 49) in respect of 15 disputed polling stations null and void, de-notified the appellant as the returned candidate, and ordered re-polling. The appellant contended that the election petition was procedurally defective, that evidence and documents produced were merely marked rather than formally exhibited under civil procedural rules, and that allegations of corrupt practices and tampering were unproven. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Tribunal’s judgment. The Court held that strict procedural requirements for formal exhibition of documents under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 can be relaxed under the doctrine of substantial compliance where documents are tendered, admitted without objection, and subjected to cross-examination. Furthermore, unrefuted primary evidence, comparative vote discrepancies, visible alterations on Form-45, and unlawful antedating of consolidation proceedings proved fraud and manipulation by election officials in connivance with the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the absence of formal exhibit marking precludes an Election Tribunal from admitting and relying on documentary evidence that was tendered without objection and subjected to cross-examination?
  • Can an objection regarding the mode of proof or formal marking of a document be raised for the first time in an election appeal before the Supreme Court?
  • Does the doctrine of substantial compliance apply to procedural requirements governing evidence and pleadings before an Election Tribunal under the Elections Act 2017?
  • Is an Election Tribunal justified in voiding election results and ordering a re-poll in selected polling stations upon proving fraudulent tampering of Form-45 results and unlawful antedating of consolidation proceedings?
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• Al-Haaj Malik Muhammad Ashraf vs Javed Akhtar and another2025 SCP 67, 2025 SCMR 787 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-02-19
  Illegal Dispossession Actco-ownershipconstructive possessionacquittalpartition proceedingsleave to appealjoint property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which acquitted the respondents of charges under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The petitioner alleged that the respondents had unlawfully occupied a plot of land he had purchased. The core legal question was whether the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 could be invoked by one co-owner against another in the absence of a formal partition of the property. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the acquittal. The Court held that the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 is inapplicable to disputes between co-owners regarding joint property where no formal partition has occurred. The Court affirmed the principle that a co-owner is deemed to be in constructive possession of the entire joint holding, and therefore, one co-owner cannot claim illegal dispossession by another without first establishing exclusive possession through concluded partition proceedings. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that an appellate court should not interfere with an acquittal unless the judgment is perverse or suffers from a glaring misreading of evidence, which was not established in this case.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 be invoked by one co-owner against another in the absence of a formal partition?
  • Is a co-owner considered to be in constructive possession of the entire joint holding?
  • Under what circumstances should an appellate court interfere with an acquittal judgment?
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• Akhtar Waheed vs Muhammad Hussain and others2025 SCMR 551 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-01-02
  suit for specific performanceagreement to sellcancellation of documentsignatures and thumb impressionscivil revisionevidentiary value
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from cross-suits regarding an agreement to sell: the appellant filed a suit for specific performance, while respondent No. 1 filed a suit for cancellation of the document. The Trial Court initially directed the return of earnest money with an equal additional sum, while dismissing the cancellation suit. The Appellate Court subsequently decreed the appellant's suit for specific performance in full. However, on civil revision, the High Court overturned the lower appellate decree, dismissing the suit for specific performance and decreeing the suit for cancellation. The core legal issue pertained to the enforceability of a two-page agreement to sell where the first page lacked signatures or thumb impressions of the parties and witnesses. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's judgment, holding that without signatures or thumb impressions on the first page, the document could not be relied upon to grant a decree for specific performance. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a suit for specific performance be decreed on the basis of a multi-page agreement to sell if the first page lacks signatures or thumb impressions of the parties and witnesses?
  • Whether an agreement to sell is legally enforceable when its material terms appear on an unsigned page?
  • Does the absence of signatures or thumb impressions on a page of an agreement justify decreeing a cross-suit for cancellation of the document?
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• Akbar Saeed vs The State and another2025 SCP 92, 2025 SCMR 935 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-03-05
  Qatl-e-AmdMurder convictionOcular evidenceMedical evidenceRelated witnessesDiscrepancies in evidenceLeave to appealCriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard a criminal petition for leave to appeal filed by Akbar Saeed, who had been convicted under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code for Qatl-e-Amd and sentenced to life imprisonment. The appellant challenged the concurrent findings of the trial court and the Lahore High Court. The core legal questions revolved around the reliability of ocular evidence provided by close relatives of the deceased and the impact of alleged contradictions between ocular and medical evidence. The Court dismissed the petition, affirming the conviction. It held that confidence-inspiring ocular testimony from related witnesses cannot be discarded merely due to their relationship, especially in the absence of ulterior motives for false implication. Furthermore, minor discrepancies of a trivial nature do not shatter the prosecution's case, and trustworthy ocular evidence can be given preference over medical evidence, being sufficient to sustain a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of related eyewitnesses be relied upon for conviction in a murder case?
  • Do minor discrepancies in prosecution evidence warrant acquittal?
  • Does a conflict between ocular and medical evidence automatically lead to the acquittal of an accused?
  • Can trustworthy ocular evidence alone be sufficient to sustain a conviction?
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• Ahsin Ali, Muhammad Ramzan alias Jani vs The State2025 SCP 190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-05-07
  Jail petitionMurder convictionDeath sentenceLife imprisonmentMotiveBenefit of doubtQatl-i-AmdAttempted robberyHouse trespassInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court heard jail petitions challenging a High Court judgment that confirmed convictions for murder, attempted robbery, and house trespass. The core legal questions revolved around the sufficiency of the 'Jappah' role for a murder conviction and the appropriateness of a death sentence when the prosecution fails to establish motive. The Court acquitted Muhammad Ramzan alias Jani, finding that his attributed role of merely holding the deceased ('Jappah') was insufficient to prove his involvement beyond reasonable doubt, especially as no injury was attributed to him and no looted items were recovered. For Ahsin Ali, while his conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, for Qatl-i-Amd was upheld, his death sentence was converted to life imprisonment. This modification was based on the prosecution's failure to prove motive, a crucial mitigating factor in capital punishment cases. The Court emphasized that the death penalty should be reserved for the 'most serious crimes' and that an unproven motive typically warrants a reduction from death to life imprisonment. Ahsin Ali's convictions under Sections 393 and 449 PPC were also set aside due to the unproven motive for dacoity and trespass.

  Questions settled

  • Is the role of merely holding the deceased ('Jappah') sufficient for a murder conviction without direct attribution of injury?
  • Can a death sentence be awarded or confirmed when the prosecution fails to prove the motive for the crime?
  • What is the significance of motive in determining the quantum of sentence in capital punishment cases?
  • When is a death sentence typically converted to life imprisonment in Pakistan?
  • Is the 'right to life' under Article 9 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, in conformity with Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights regarding capital punishment?
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• Ahsan Ali Dawach vs The State through Chairman NAB & others2025 SCP 248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-03-18
  interim custodysuperdarifreezing of propertyNational Accountability Ordinancespecial law vs general lawseizure of vehiclefundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal, converted into an appeal and allowed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, addresses the interplay between Section 12 and 13 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 and Section 516-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 regarding the interim custody (superdari) of a seized vehicle subject to a freezing order. The core legal question was whether an application under Section 516-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 for the release of a vehicle on superdari is maintainable when a freezing order has been passed under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 and no objection was filed under Section 13 thereof. The Court held that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 apply mutatis mutandis to proceedings under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 where not inconsistent, and that failure to file objections under Section 13 does not permanently bar an owner from seeking interim custody under Section 516-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 if the freezing order merely prohibits transfer. The key principles laid down include that special laws do not automatically oust general provisions unless inconsistent, and that discretionary powers to withhold property custody must be exercised reasonably and fairly under Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897 while safeguarding fundamental property rights under the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application under Section 516-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 is maintainable for the interim custody of a vehicle frozen under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Does the failure to file an objection against a freezing order under Section 13 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 permanently disentitle an owner from seeking interim custody of a seized vehicle?
  • Are the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 applicable to proceedings under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • What principles govern the exercise of discretion by courts when deciding applications for interim custody of property under Section 516-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
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• Ahmed Owais Peerzada, Chief Commissioner (Rtd) Federal Land2025 SCP 204, 2025 SCMR 819 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-01-14
  proforma promotionBS-22Federal Service Tribunalexecution of judgmentsuperannuationHigh-Power Selection Boardcivil servants
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arising from an order of the Federal Service Tribunal (FST) disposing of a miscellaneous petition seeking execution and implementation of its earlier final judgment. The petitioner sought consideration for proforma promotion to BS-22 following retirement, in terms of an unappealed FST judgment that had attained finality. The core legal questions centered on whether retirement bars consideration for promotion where eligibility existed prior to superannuation, whether the FST possesses the execution powers of a civil court to enforce its judgments, and whether executive inaction can deprive a civil servant of proforma promotion. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the FST's impugned order, and remanded the matter to the High-Power Selection Board (HPSB). It held that the FST is deemed to be a civil court under Section 5 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 with full execution powers under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and must ensure its final judgments are implemented in letter and spirit rather than mechanically disposing of execution petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the retirement of a civil servant act as a bar to considering them for proforma promotion if they were fully eligible prior to superannuation?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal possess the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to execute and enforce its own judgments?
  • Can the Federal Service Tribunal dispose of an implementation petition without verifying whether its final directions have been substantially complied with by the relevant department?
  • Is a government department obligated to implement an unappealed final judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal granting relief to a civil servant?
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• Ahmed Ali Talpur vs Sub-Registrar Latifabad, Hyderabad and others2025 SCP 109, 2025 PLD Supreme Court 302 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-12-24
  Rejection of plaintOrder VII Rule 11 CPCOral giftDeclaration of ownershipTriable issuesFraudulent transferConcurrent findingsRemand
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal challenged the concurrent dismissal of a second appeal, affirming the rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The petitioner sought a declaration of ownership based on an oral gift from his father and cancellation of a subsequent lease deed in the father's favour, alleging fraudulent cancellation of his prior allotment. The core legal question was whether the plaint, which raised triable issues concerning the authenticity of the gift deed and subsequent property transfers, could be summarily rejected. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts erred in rejecting the plaint, emphasizing that Order VII Rule 11 is a drastic power to be exercised cautiously, requiring a meaningful reading of the plaint and not allowing for summary dismissal where mixed questions of law and fact or triable issues exist. The Court set aside the concurrent findings, converted the petition into an appeal, and remanded the case for trial on merits, specifically directing the framing and adjudication of a preliminary issue regarding the authenticity and execution of the gift deed.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can a plaint be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
  • Can a plaint be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, if it raises substantial questions of fact or law requiring evidence?
  • Is it permissible for a court to consider pleas raised by the defendant when deciding an application for rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
  • Can concurrent findings of lower courts be set aside if they are found to be in violation of the law or based on a flagrant defect?
  • What is the scope of the expression "legal character" or "right as to any property" under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877?
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• Adil Khan Bazai vs Election Commission of Pakistan and another2025 SCP 14, 2025 SCP 15, 2025 SCP 17, 2025 SCP 19, 2025 SCP 20 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  defectionjurisdictional factElection Commission of PakistanArticle 63Ajudicial reviewparliamentary partycontempt of courtbench constitution
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals under Article 63A(5) of the Constitution against the Election Commission of Pakistan's (ECP) orders confirming the appellant's defection from the Pakistan Muslim League (N). The core legal question was whether the ECP possesses the jurisdiction to conclusively determine jurisdictional facts, such as the genuineness of a disputed consent affidavit, in defection proceedings. The Court held that the ECP lacks the power to conclusively determine jurisdictional facts; it may only objectively ascertain them before exercising its jurisdiction. The Court found that the ECP's conclusion regarding the appellant's defection was contrary to the weight of evidence, as the appellant had consistently acted as an independent member and not as a member of the PML-N Parliamentary Party. Consequently, the Court set aside the ECP's orders and restored the appellant's membership. The key principle laid down is the doctrine of jurisdictional fact: a tribunal with limited jurisdiction cannot confer jurisdiction upon itself by erroneously deciding preliminary facts; such findings are subject to judicial review and final determination by civil courts of plenary jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Election Commission of Pakistan have the jurisdiction to conclusively determine jurisdictional facts in defection proceedings under Article 63A of the Constitution?
  • Can an administrative order of a Committee constituted under the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023, withdraw a part-heard case from a regular Bench?
  • Can an administrative order undo the effect of a judicial order fixing a case for hearing?
  • Is the finding of the Election Commission of Pakistan on a jurisdictional fact conclusive or subject to judicial review?
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• Additional Collector of Customs, Faisalabad through Collector of Customs2025 SCP 200 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-05-26
  customs adjudicationorder-in-originalmandatory time limitextension of timeexceptional circumstancesFederal Board of Revenuelimitation periodcondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  The Customs Department petitioned for leave to appeal against the High Court's judgment affirming the Appellate Tribunal's decision, which invalidated an order-in-original for being passed beyond the mandatory statutory limitation under Section 179(3) of the Customs Act, 1969. The core legal questions pertained to whether the timelines under Section 179(3) are mandatory, whether the Federal Board of Revenue's (FBR) extension power under Section 179(4) is circumscribed, and whether the mere involvement of a large revenue amount constitutes 'exceptional circumstances'. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, holding that the statutory time limits under Section 179(3) are mandatory. The Court ruled that the Board’s power to extend time under Section 179(4) is narrowly restricted to 'exceptional circumstances', requiring an objective demonstration rather than subjective satisfaction. Concluding that the Board failed to demonstrate any exceptional circumstances and that the high value of evaded duties did not justify statutory delay, the Court held the extension unlawful and the order-in-original invalid.

  Questions settled

  • Are the statutory timelines for deciding adjudication cases under Section 179(3) of the Customs Act, 1969 mandatory or directory?
  • Can the Federal Board of Revenue extend the time limit under Section 179(4) of the Customs Act, 1969 based on its subjective satisfaction without objectively demonstrating 'exceptional circumstances'?
  • Does the involvement of a large amount of alleged duty or tax evasion by itself constitute 'exceptional circumstances' under Section 179(4) of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Can a Collector of Customs invoke Section 224 of the Customs Act, 1969 as an 'aggrieved party' to seek an extension of the time limit for making an adjudication order?
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• Adamjee Insurance Company Limited vs Techno International and others2025 SCP 69, 2025 SCMR 756, 2025 CLD 610 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-11-15
  summary procedureleave to defendsurety bondbank guaranteediscretion of courttriable issuerecovery suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil matter arose from two separate recovery suits filed by the petitioner-company under the summary procedure of Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The trial court granted the respondents leave to appear and defend the suits subject to furnishing surety bonds equivalent to the claimed amount, which was subsequently upheld by the High Court in civil revision. The petitioner-company challenged these decisions before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, contending that the trial court exercised its discretion arbitrarily and that the security should have been ordered in the form of a bank guarantee instead of a surety bond. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions and refused leave to appeal, holding that the grant of leave to defend, whether conditional or unconditional, falls within the exclusive discretion of the trial court based on the facts of each case. The Court reiterated that if a defendant's affidavit discloses a plausible, non-illusory defence or raises triable issues, leave should be granted, and no hard-and-fast rule restricts the court's discretion regarding the specific form of security to be ordered.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the trial court's discretion to impose conditions for granting leave to defend under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is restricted to ordering a bank guarantee rather than a surety bond?
  • What is the proper legal standard for a trial court to apply when determining whether to grant a defendant leave to appear and defend a summary suit?
  • Can a court at the stage of deciding an application for leave to defend under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 conclusively determine the merits of the defence raised by the defendant?
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• Abid Hussain, Sabir Hussain vs The State etc. (in both cases)2025 SCP 95 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-03-12
  murder by burningdeath penaltyrarest of rarenatural eyewitnessesdomestic disputeabatementbenefit of doubtquantum of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal appeals arose out of the conviction and sentencing of two brothers, Abid Hussain and Sabir Hussain, under Sections 302(b), 109, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for the brutal murder of Abid Hussain's wife by setting her on fire with kerosene oil following a domestic property dispute. The trial court had sentenced Abid Hussain to death and Sabir Hussain to life imprisonment, which sentences were upheld by the High Court of Sindh. The Supreme Court scrutinized whether the ocular testimony of the deceased's children, supported by medical and forensic evidence, proved the charges beyond reasonable doubt and whether the death penalty was warranted under the doctrine of rarest of rare cases. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and death sentence of Abid Hussain, finding the eyewitness accounts trustworthy, natural, and corroborated by recoveries and medical evidence. However, it acquitted Sabir Hussain on the benefit of doubt, as the prosecution failed to prove his presence, active nexus, or specific role at the time of the occurrence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the testimony of inmates of a house who are close blood relatives of both the accused and deceased possess sufficient evidentiary value to sustain a murder conviction?
  • Under what circumstances does the doctrine of 'rarest of rare' warrant the imposition of the death sentence for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a co-accused charged with instigation be convicted of murder where the prosecution fails to establish his presence or an active role at the scene of the crime?
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• Abdullah alias Muhammad alias Masab.,Muhammad Muavia alias Muaz2025 SCP 103, 2025 SCMR 986 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-03-13
  terrorist attackbenefit of doubtadverse inferenceeyewitness credibilitywithholding best evidenceexpert witness qualificationacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  Criminal petitions for leave to appeal were converted into appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging the judgments of the Trial Court and High Court convicting and sentencing the petitioners to death and life imprisonment under Section 302(b) PPC, Section 7(i)(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, and other offences arising from a terrorist attack on a place of worship. The core legal question was whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt in light of the non-appearance of the complainant and named eyewitnesses, contradictions regarding recoveries, and withholding of material medical evidence. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the convictions, and acquitted the petitioners. The Court held that when the complainant and named eyewitnesses fail to testify, an unlisted witness is disbelieved, and the prosecution withholds a medico-legal report, an adverse inference arises under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984. It reaffirmed that a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt entitles the accused to acquittal as of right.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an adverse inference under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 can be drawn against the prosecution for withholding the medico-legal report of an allegedly injured accused?
  • Can the testimony of an eyewitness be safely relied upon when their name was neither mentioned in the FIR nor reflected in the site plan of the place of occurrence?
  • Can reliance be placed on the evidence and report of an alleged bomb disposal expert who admits to lacking educational qualifications and expertise in chemical analysis of explosive substances?
  • Whether the presence of a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in the prosecution case is sufficient to entitle the accused to acquittal?
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• Abdul Shakoor (deceased) through legal ... heirs vs Muhammad Hanif2025 SCP 68, 2025 SCMR 770 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-02-25
  pendente lite purchaserassignment of interestOrder 22 Rule 10 CPCbona fide purchaserrevision petitionstanding to sueland dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning a multi-decade land dispute involving two rounds of litigation over state land originally auctioned to Fazal, Rustam, and Hanif. The core legal question was whether a purchaser of immovable property during the pendency of a suit qualifies as an 'assignee' under Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 so as to maintain a revision petition, notwithstanding that his predecessor-in-interest was found not to be a bona fide purchaser without notice. The Supreme Court held that the sale of immovable property does not constitute an assignment under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC, and an individual purchasing land pendente lite from a party whose claim has been defeated on the merits (specifically, a finding that the vendor was not a bona fide purchaser) lacks standing to maintain a revision petition. The Court laid down the principle that the transfer of title via sale is distinct from an assignment of interest, and the failure of a predecessor's title coupled with an adverse finding on bona fides operates as an insuperable barrier to subsequent purchasers seeking to intervene as assignees.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a purchaser of immovable property during the pendency of a suit qualifies as an assignee under Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does a pendente lite purchaser have the standing to maintain a revision petition when the vendor's claim has been conclusively defeated?
  • Is a sale of immovable property synonymous with an assignment of interest for the purposes of procedural substitution or continuation of legal proceedings?
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• Abdul Sattar Khan vs Umar Ayar2025 SCP 254 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-06-10
  Pre-emptionTalb-i-MuwathibatKhyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act 1987Revisional jurisdictionCode of Civil Procedure 1908Proof of knowledgeInformer's evidenceConcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This direct appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that dismissed a pre-emption suit. The appellant had filed a suit for possession through pre-emption, which was initially dismissed by the Trial Court but decreed by the Additional District Judge. The High Court, in revision, set aside the appellate court's decision, dismissing the pre-emption suit. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was the validity and proof of 'Talb-i-Muwathibat' under Section 13 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987, particularly regarding the non-production of the informer of the sale. The Supreme Court held that the omission to produce the informer was a significant evidentiary shortcoming, rendering the appellant's claim of immediate knowledge uncorroborated. It affirmed that a revisional court can interfere with concurrent findings if they are based on misreading, non-reading, or misinterpretation of evidence. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the High Court's judgment was maintained.

  Questions settled

  • What is the evidentiary requirement for proving Talb-i-Muwathibat under Section 13 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act 1987?
  • Does the non-production of the person who informed the pre-emptor about a sale affect the validity of Talb-i-Muwathibat?
  • Can a High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, set aside concurrent findings of lower courts?
  • Under what circumstances can a revisional court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Samad vs The State etc2025 SCP 31, 2025 SCMR 639 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-01-24
  criminal appealbenefit of doubtillegal detentionexplosive substancesanti-terrorismprosecution evidenceacquittalappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the petitioner's conviction for the possession of explosive substances under the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, given the accused's claim of illegal detention prior to the alleged arrest. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's case was fraught with significant doubts, primarily because the accused produced documentary evidence—a newspaper report—corroborating his claim that he was arrested two months before the date alleged in the F.I.R. The Court observed that the prosecution failed to associate independent witnesses or explain the suspicious circumstances surrounding the recovery. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower courts' judgments and acquitted the petitioner. The key principle laid down is that the benefit of doubt must be extended to an accused person as a matter of right, not grace, whenever a single circumstance creates a reasonable doubt in a prudent mind regarding the prosecution's case.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt entitle an accused to acquittal as a matter of right?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution fails to associate independent witnesses or explain the timing of an arrest contradicted by documentary evidence?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt if the prosecution fails to prove the date of arrest beyond reasonable doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Majeed and others vs Mst. Khalida Bibi (deceased) through L.Rs. and others2025 SCP 241 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-06-24
  Gift deedOral giftFraudInheritanceDeclaration suitBurden of proofLimitationAdverse presumptionPleadings and proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition, filed under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenged a Lahore High Court judgment affirming the concurrent findings of the trial and appellate courts. The original suit sought a declaration with perpetual and mandatory injunction regarding inherited agricultural land, alleging that gift deeds were fraudulent and intended to deprive female heirs of their shares. The core legal questions revolved around the validity of the alleged oral and registered gift deeds, the burden of proof on the donees, and the limitation period for challenging such transactions. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, refusing leave, and upheld the lower courts' decisions. The Court reiterated that the essential ingredients of a valid gift (offer, acceptance, and delivery of possession) must be pleaded and proved, and evidence cannot extend beyond pleadings. It emphasized the heavy burden on donees to prove a valid gift, especially when excluding legal heirs, and affirmed that a declaratory suit based on fraud, seeking to establish title, represents a continuing right under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential ingredients for a valid gift that must be pleaded and proved?
  • Can a party lead evidence beyond its pleadings?
  • What is the burden of proof on a donee asserting a gift, especially when excluding other legal heirs?
  • Does the withholding of best available evidence raise an adverse presumption?
  • What is the limitation period for a declaratory suit seeking to establish title based on allegations of fraud?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Haq vs The State2025 SCMR 751 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2025-03-04
  narcoticsdrug traffickingchain of custodysafe transmissionbenefit of doubtacquittalcriminal appealopium smuggling
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Abdul Haq, was convicted by the Trial Court under Section 9(d) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Control of Narcotic Substances Act 2019 for smuggling opium and sentenced to life imprisonment. His appeal to the Peshawar High Court was dismissed. The Supreme Court, hearing a petition for leave to appeal, converted it into an appeal. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established an unbroken chain of custody for the seized narcotics. The Court found significant contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses regarding the transmission of the seized opium samples from the spot to the police station and then to the Forensic Science Laboratory. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish a safe and secure chain of custody, rendering the chemical examiner's report unreliable. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the petitioner, emphasizing that any rupture in the chain of custody in narcotics cases necessitates the benefit of doubt for the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Must the prosecution establish an unbroken chain of custody for seized narcotics from recovery to forensic analysis?
  • What is the consequence of a rupture or inconsistency in the chain of custody for seized narcotic samples?
  • Can a conviction be sustained in a narcotics case if the safe transmission of samples to the chemical examiner is not proven?
  • Does the benefit of doubt extend to an accused when the prosecution fails to establish a safe and continuous handling of narcotic samples?
  Read full judgment →
• Aatika Hina Mushtaq vs Secretary Special Education Government of the Punjab, Special Education Department Lahore, etc2025 SCP 158, 2025 PLJ SC 353 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  promotionservice rulesDepartmental Promotion Committeecivil servantright to be considered for promotionconstitutional rightright to livelihoodarbitrary defermentcivil bureaucracymeritocracy
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court heard a petition for leave to appeal concerning a Physical Education Teacher's deferred promotion to Lecturer Physical Education (BS-17) by the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC). The DPC deferred the promotion, citing a need to amend the Special Education Department (Directorate of Special Education) Service Rules, 2006, and questioning the rules' provisions regarding seniority and qualifications. The Court held that the DPC acted without lawful authority by questioning the legality and enforceability of existing service rules and deferring promotions based on contemplated amendments. The DPC is bound to enforce the law as it exists and lacks the mandate to sit in judgment over the rules. The Court emphasized that while a civil servant has no vested right to promotion, they possess an enforceable right to be considered for promotion in accordance with law, rooted in Article 9 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, which guarantees the right to life and dignified livelihood. Arbitrary obstruction or delay in career progression erodes the civil bureaucracy's independence and morale. The Court set aside the impugned order and directed the DPC to consider the petitioner's case on merits within one month.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Departmental Promotion Committee defer promotions by questioning the legality or enforceability of existing service rules?
  • Does a civil servant have an enforceable right to be considered for promotion in accordance with law?
  • Can a Departmental Promotion Committee defer promotions based on proposed or contemplated amendments to service rules?
  • What is the scope of the right to livelihood under Article 9 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, concerning career progression?
  • Are service laws required to be transparent, predictable, and uniformly applied to ensure equal treatment in promotions?
  Read full judgment →
• Aamir Akbar vs Additional Superintendent of Police, Bahawalpur, and others2025 SCP 65, 2025 SCMR 632, 2025 PLC (C.S.) 675, 2025 PLJ SC 272 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-12-04
  Departmental inquiryDismissal from serviceCivil servantEfficiency and Discipline RulesNatural justiceFair trialDe novo inquiryProcedural irregularityService appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal challenged the dismissal of a junior clerk from service by departmental authorities and the subsequent upholding of that decision by the Punjab Service Tribunal. The petitioner, dismissed on charges of inefficiency and corruption, contended that no regular departmental inquiry was conducted, and he was denied the opportunity to present witnesses or evidence in his defense, being dismissed merely on a fact-finding inquiry. The core legal question was whether the departmental inquiry adhered to the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1999, and the principles of natural justice, including the right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, setting aside the impugned judgment of the Service Tribunal and the departmental dismissal order. The Court held that a regular inquiry requires a fair opportunity to defend charges, including the right to cross-examine witnesses, and that the inquiry conducted was defective and not commensurate with the prescribed procedure. The matter was remanded for a de novo regular inquiry, emphasizing that procedural lapses vitiate departmental proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant be dismissed from service without a regular departmental inquiry that provides a fair opportunity to defend charges?
  • What constitutes a 'regular inquiry' under the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1999, regarding the examination and cross-examination of evidence?
  • Do procedural lapses in a departmental inquiry, such as failure to record evidence or allow defense, amount to a violation of the right to a fair trial?
  • Is a 'discreet inquiry' a valid substitute for a regular inquiry when imposing major penalties like dismissal from service on a civil servant?
  Read full judgment →
• Zulfiqar Ali vs The State thr. Dag Islamabad2024 SCP 350, 2025 SCMR 100 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-09-30
  criminal breach of trustembezzlementreduction of sentencemitigating circumstancesanti-corruptionsupreme court discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises out of an impugned judgment of the High Court dismissing the petitioner's appeal against his conviction under section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 for embezzlement as an employee of the Utility Stores Corporation. The core legal question concerned the quantum of sentence and whether leniency could be granted given that the petitioner deposited the embezzled amount, did not contest the merits of the conviction, and pleaded mitigating personal circumstances involving his ailing wife. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction but exercised its discretion to take a lenient view, reducing the substantive sentences to the period already undergone by extending the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and substantially reducing the fines. The key principle laid down is that while a convict cannot claim sentence reduction as a matter of right, the apex court may exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to grant a lighter sentence in appropriate circumstances—such as full restitution of the embezzled amount and compelling humanitarian grounds—where the offense does not affect the public at large.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court can reduce the quantum of sentence to the period already undergone upon restitution of the embezzled amount and a plea of no contest?
  • Can the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be extended while reducing a sentence to the period already undergone?
  • Whether courts may take a lenient view in sentencing when the offense of corruption and embezzlement does not affect the public at large and mitigating personal circumstances are present?
  Read full judgment →
• Zulfiqar Ali Bhatti vs Election Commission of Pakistan and others2023 SCP 278, 2024 SCMR 997 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-02
  re-pollElection Commission of Pakistanconsolidation of resulttampering with election recordElection Tribunalplenary powerssummary enquiryElections Act 2017
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under Section 9(5) of the Elections Act 2017 arose from an Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) order directing a re-poll in 20 polling stations due to alleged post-consolidation tampering of election records. The core legal question was whether the ECP possesses the power under Article 218(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, read with Sections 8(c) or 9(1) of the Elections Act 2017, to order a re-poll after the Returning Officer has consolidated the final results under Section 95. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the ECP's order. The Court held that general or inherent powers under Article 218(3) and Section 8(c) supplement statutory law and cannot be exercised to supplant express provisions or after the election process has culminated. Furthermore, Section 9(1) re-poll powers apply only to grave illegalities affecting the poll result prior to or during final consolidation; disputes involving post-consolidation tampering require full trial evidence falling exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Election Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Election Commission of Pakistan have the power under Article 218(3) of the Constitution to order a re-poll after the final consolidation of results by the Returning Officer?
  • Can the Election Commission exercise general powers under Section 8(c) of the Elections Act 2017 in matters expressly covered by statutory provisions?
  • Does post-consolidation record tampering fall within the scope of Section 9(1) of the Elections Act 2017 to justify ordering a re-poll?
  • Is an enquiry conducted by the Election Commission under Section 9(1) of the Elections Act 2017 limited to a summary nature?
  Read full judgment →
• Zubair Saeed Sabri/Sain Zubair Shah vs The State thr. A.G. Islamabad and2024 SCP 70, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 681 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-02-14
  post-arrest bailblasphemy lawssearch warrantprivacy of homepolice investigationdue processIslamic injunctions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail in a criminal case involving allegations of offences relating to religion under the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The petitioner challenged the legality of the FIR, citing the lack of evidence for the charged offences, the failure to adhere to mandatory investigation procedures by a Superintendent of Police as required by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and the illegal entry into his residence by police without a search warrant. The Supreme Court held that the police's failure to obtain a search warrant violated the constitutional right to the privacy of the home and that the investigation was procedurally flawed due to the absence of a Superintendent of Police. Emphasizing the necessity of strict adherence to both statutory law and Islamic injunctions regarding justice, mercy, and due process, the Court granted the bail. The judgment establishes that police must strictly comply with procedural safeguards, including obtaining search warrants, and that investigations into sensitive religious offences must be conducted by authorized officers to prevent misuse of the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the police to obtain a search warrant before entering a private home violate the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is an investigation into an offence under Section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 conducted by an officer below the rank of Superintendent of Police legally valid?
  • Does the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 mandate that all actions detrimental to a citizen's liberty must be taken in accordance with law?
  Read full judgment →
• Zeeshan S/o Gul Hussain vs The State & another2024 SCP 253, 2024 SCMR 1716 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-07-26
  post-arrest bailrule of consistencyabsconsionfurther inquirymurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for post-arrest bail filed by Zeeshan against the State, involving offences under sections 302, 324, 427, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, registered vide FIR No. 1039/23 at Police Station Faqirabad, Peshawar. The core legal question is whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail in a murder and attempt to murder case, notwithstanding his prolonged absconsion and the role attributed to him, particularly in light of the rule of consistency given that a co-accused had already been granted bail. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that upon a tentative assessment of the material, the case against the petitioner falls within the ambit of further inquiry, and the rule of consistency applies due to the bail granted to the co-accused. The Court laid down the key principle that mere absconsion of an accused for a considerable period cannot, by itself, serve as a sole basis to refuse post-arrest bail when the case otherwise falls within the scope of further inquiry and the principle of consistency is attracted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether mere absconsion of an accused for several months is sufficient to refuse post-arrest bail when the case otherwise falls within the ambit of further inquiry?
  • Does the grant of bail to a co-accused entitle another accused to post-arrest bail under the rule of consistency?
  • Can post-arrest bail be granted on a tentative assessment of the record when prosecution witnesses have not yet been examined at trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Zeeshan Pervez (Late) through his legal heirs vs Muhammad Nasir2024 SCP 409, 2025 SCMR 495, 2025 PLJ SC 188 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-05-21
  specific performanceagreement to sellimmovable propertytime of the essencecontra proferentemconditional contractbreach of contractreadiness and willingness
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against a High Court judgment upholding the specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property in favor of the vendee and dismissing the vendor's suit for contract cancellation. The core legal questions concerned whether the vendee committed breaches of the payment schedule, making time of the essence, and whether the vendor's revocation of the contract was legally justified when the vendor himself failed to clear the property's mortgage and obtain a bank NOC as stipulated. The Supreme Court held that the erroneous payment date in the contract was an obvious misprint and that the vendee had discharged his obligations, whereas the vendor committed a breach by failing to clear the property's encumbrances. The court reaffirmed that in transactions of immovable property, time is not ordinarily of the essence unless expressly made so, and a party in default cannot benefit from its own wrongdoing to cancel a contract.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an obvious misprint regarding a payment date in an agreement to sell can be construed against the party relying on it?
  • Does a vendor's failure to clear a property's mortgage and obtain a bank NOC constitute a breach of a conditional contract?
  • Is time ordinarily of the essence in contracts for the sale of immovable property?
  • Can a party that fails to fulfill its contractual obligations validly rescind the agreement and seek its cancellation?
  Read full judgment →
• Zakirullah and others vs Muhammad Rehman and others2024 SCP 407, 2025 SCMR 430 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-11-21
  res judicatapartition suitrejection of plaintdeclaratory suitjoint propertyindependent rightcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that upheld the rejection of the petitioners' plaint in a suit for partition. The lower courts had rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, citing the principle of res judicata based on a previously dismissed declaratory suit concerning the same property. The core legal question was whether the dismissal of an earlier declaratory suit bars a subsequent suit for partition of joint property. The Supreme Court held that the right to partition is an independent right and cannot be barred by the principle of res judicata simply because a previous declaratory suit regarding the same property was dismissed. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that the suit was barred by Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, clarifying that the right to partition is distinct and not contingent upon previous litigation. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the lower courts' judgments, and remanded the suit for trial on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dismissal of an earlier declaratory suit bar a subsequent suit for partition of the same property?
  • Is a suit for partition of joint property barred by the principle of res judicata due to a prior unsuccessful declaratory suit?
  • Can a suit for partition be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on the ground of Order II Rule 2?
  Read full judgment →
• Zain Shahid vs The State and another2024 SCP 88, 2024 SCMR 843, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 135 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-12-29
  Anti-Terrorism Actfund raisingdefective chargecriminal intentstandard of proofacquittalpolice investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction and sentencing of the petitioner under sections 11-F(i) and 11-H(i)(ii) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, which was upheld by the High Court. The core legal questions involved the legality and precision of the charge framed against the accused, the essential legal ingredients required to constitute an offence of fund raising under section 11-H of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and the standard of evidence necessary for sustaining a conviction in terrorism-related cases. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgments of the lower courts, and acquitted the petitioner. The Court held that the provisions of section 11-H require conjunctively proving both the act of raising or receiving funds and the specific intent or reasonable cause to suspect that such funds would be used for terrorism, which the prosecution failed to establish. The key legal principles laid down are that a defective or vague charge that misleads the accused constitutes a failure of justice, that criminal intent or reasonable cause for suspicion cannot be presumed without tangible evidence, and that convictions under anti-terrorism laws cannot be sustained on weak or speculative police evidence.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential legal ingredients required to constitute an offence of fund raising under section 11-H of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Does the framing of a vague or incomplete charge by a Trial Court vitiate the trial and cause a failure of justice under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Can a conviction for terrorism-related offences be sustained solely on weak, unverified police evidence and uncorroborated spy information?
  • What is the legal scope of 'reasonable cause to suspect' under section 11-H of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  Read full judgment →
• Zafar Iqbal and others vs Muhammad Rafiq and others2024 SCP 265, 2024 SCMR 1791 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-07-02
  Shamlat Dehjoint holdingdeclaratory suitexclusive ownershipco-sharerrevenue recordpartition proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the defendants challenged the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had accepted a civil revision and decreed the respondents' declaratory suit regarding a portion of Shamlat Deh (joint holding). The respondents had filed a suit claiming exclusive ownership of 332 Kanals of joint land based on long-standing possession and historical statements of four shareholders made during 1938-1940 partition proceedings, which never materialized into a formal mutation. The Trial Court and Appellate Court had dismissed the suit, finding no legal basis for exclusive ownership in a joint holding. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the maintainability of a declaratory suit claiming exclusive ownership in joint property without proof of proper partition or valid transfer. The Court held that a co-sharer or claimant cannot claim exclusive ownership of a specific piece of joint land merely on the basis of vague entries and unverified historical statements without formal partition or proof of valid acquisition of rights. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the concurrent dismissals by the lower courts, while granting liberty to the respondents to approach the appropriate revenue forum in accordance with law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaintiff claim exclusive ownership of a specific piece of land in a joint holding merely on the basis of long-standing possession without formal partition?
  • Whether a declaratory suit for exclusive ownership of Shamlat Deh land is maintainable on the basis of unverified historical statements of certain shareholders?
  • Does a revisional court have the authority to reverse concurrent findings of fact of lower courts without establishing any misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Zafar Ali Abbasi, Shakeel Ahmed Abbasi vs Zafar Ali Abbasi, and others2024 SCP 267, 2024 SCMR 1773, PLJ 2025 SC (Cr.C.) 64 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-05-13
  murderbenefit of the doubtunnatural conduct of eyewitnessesdefective investigationrecovery of crime weaponpost-mortem reportdelayed FIRcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from a criminal appeal against the conviction and sentence of death under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder. The core legal questions involved the appreciation of ocular testimony, the unnatural conduct of alleged eyewitnesses, doubtful recovery of the weapon under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, defective investigation, and delayed FIR registration. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the lower courts' judgments, holding that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt due to unreliable eyewitness accounts, contradictory medical evidence regarding the time of death and rigor mortis, and flawed police investigation. The key legal principles laid down include that the testimonies of related witnesses must be scrutinized with greater care when their conduct is unnatural, that the absence of a written disclosure statement invalidates a recovery under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, and that the benefit of a doubt arising from a defective investigation must be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of eyewitnesses can be relied upon when their conduct at the time of the occurrence is unnatural?
  • Does the absence of a written disclosure statement by an accused in police custody vitiate the recovery under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the medical evidence and post-mortem report directly contradict the ocular account of the incident?
  • What is the legal effect of a flawed and biased police investigation on the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Yar Muhammad Khan vs The State & another2024 SCP 251, 2024 SCMR 1738 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-07-25
  post-arrest bailmurderfirearm expert reportcounter-versionheinous offencescriminal investigationtentative assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a case involving murder and murderous assault, registered under FIR No. 470/23. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner and his brother opened fire on the complainant's family, resulting in two deaths and multiple injuries, with the motive being a dispute over a joint guest room. The petitioner claimed a counter-version, alleging he was attacked while constructing a wall. The investigation revealed that crime empties recovered from the scene matched the Kalashnikov recovered at the petitioner's pointation. The Supreme Court observed that the firearm expert's report provided strong incriminating evidence linking the petitioner to the crime. The Court held that the existence of a counter-version does not automatically entitle an accused to bail when there is sufficient incriminating material on record. Consequently, the Court determined that the petitioner was prima facie involved in heinous, non-bailable offenses and dismissed the bail petition, emphasizing that the findings were tentative and should not prejudice the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere registration of a counter-version of an occurrence entitle an accused to the concession of post-arrest bail?
  • Can a positive firearm expert report linking a recovered weapon to crime empties constitute sufficient incriminating material to deny bail in a murder case?
  Read full judgment →
• Waqas Shahzad vs Inspector General Police Punjab Lahore and others2024 SCP 75, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 587, 2024 SCMR 605 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-23
  service lawdismissal from servicedepartmental inquiryrevision petitionsuo motulimitation periodservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of the petitioner's service appeal by the Punjab Service Tribunal. The petitioner, a former Security Constable, was dismissed from service following a departmental inquiry under the Punjab Police Efficiency and Discipline Rules, 1975, which found him guilty of misconduct and negligence. The petitioner challenged the dismissal through a departmental appeal, which was rejected, and subsequently filed a revision petition before the Inspector General of Police, Punjab, which was also dismissed. He then appealed to the Service Tribunal against the revisional order. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether a civil servant has a vested right to file a revision petition under Rule 12 of the Punjab Police (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975, or Section 17 of the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006, and whether doing so extends the limitation period for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal. The Court held that revisional powers under these provisions are suo motu in nature and do not confer a vested right of appeal or revision on the employee. Consequently, filing an unauthorized revision petition does not condone delay or extend the limitation period for approaching the Service Tribunal against the final departmental appeal order. The petition was dismissed and leave was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant have a vested right to file a revision petition under Rule 12 of the Punjab Police (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975, or Section 17 of the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006?
  • Does the filing of an unauthorized departmental revision petition extend the limitation period for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
  • Can an aggrieved civil servant bypass the direct remedy of an appeal before the Service Tribunal by waiting for the outcome of a non-statutory or suo motu revision petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Waqar Ahmed & others, Aaqib Ali and others vs The Federation of Pakistan2024 SCP 329, 2024 SCMR 1877, 2024 PLC 338 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-08-02
  regularization of servicewrit jurisdictionArticle 199contractual employeesoutsourcinglabor lawsindustrial relationsdisputed questions of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed constitutional petitions seeking the regularization of services for employees engaged by the Karachi Port Trust (KPT) through an outsourcing contractor. The core legal question was whether these contractual employees could claim regularization in the principal organization via writ jurisdiction, and whether such claims, involving disputed factual issues, were maintainable under Article 199 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, ruling that constitutional jurisdiction is not the appropriate forum for resolving complex factual controversies, such as whether an outsourcing arrangement was a sham or whether employees attained permanent status under labor laws. The Court established that where no statutory rules of service exist, or where disputed facts require evidence, the High Court cannot embark on such inquiries. Instead, the Court emphasized that aggrieved workers must pursue their remedies under applicable labor laws, such as the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, before the appropriate Labour Court or the National Industrial Relations Commission, rather than invoking the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199, adjudicate upon disputed questions of fact regarding the regularization of contractual employees?
  • Does a contractual employee have an automatic vested right to regularization in the absence of specific statutory rules of service?
  • Is the writ jurisdiction of the High Court the appropriate forum for an employee to seek redressal for grievances governed by the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  Read full judgment →
• Waheed Gul Khan, Mumtaz Ali vs Province of Sindh and others2024 SCP 258, 2024 SCMR 1701, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 1228 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-07-26
  service lawconstitutional jurisdictioninterview processvested rightjudicial reviewpublic appointmentsubjective evaluation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing constitutional petitions filed by candidates who, despite passing a written examination for positions in the Food Department, Government of Sindh, were not selected following the interview process. The core legal questions were whether qualifying for an interview creates a vested right to appointment and whether the interview process is subject to judicial review under the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the petitions were devoid of merit and dismissed them. The Court affirmed that merely passing a written test does not confer a vested right to appointment. Furthermore, the Court held that an interview is a subjective evaluation process; therefore, a court of law cannot substitute its own opinion for that of an Interview Board unless there is clear evidence of mala fides, bias, or significant error apparent on the record. The principle laid down is that the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to challenge the subjective assessment of an Interview Board or to enforce appointment based on written test performance alone.

  Questions settled

  • Does passing a written examination for a public post create a vested right to appointment?
  • Can a court of law substitute its opinion for that of an Interview Board in the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Is the interview process for public employment subject to judicial review in the absence of mala fides or bias?
  Read full judgment →
• Vice Chancellor Agriculture University, Peshawar, etc. (In all cases) vs Muhammad Shafiq, etc. and others2024 SCP 44, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 323, 2024 SCMR 527 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-17
  regularizationcontractual employmentante-date regularizationinstitutional autonomyvested righteducational institutionsservice lawpolicy matter
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment addresses the regularization of contractual employees at the University of Agriculture, Peshawar. The respondents, initially hired as Class IV employees on a contract basis, sought regularization and back benefits through the High Court, which directed the University to consider their cases based on the principle of parity with already regularized staff. The Supreme Court identified two primary legal questions: whether contractual employees can be regularized without specific legal or policy backing, and whether regularization can be granted retrospectively (ante-date). The Court held that regularization is a fresh appointment process requiring a statutory basis, policy framework, and objective assessment of merit and financial implications. It ruled that there is no vested right to regularization for contract employees and that Article 25 of the Constitution cannot be invoked to perpetuate illegalities or bypass statutory requirements. Furthermore, the Court established that regularization takes effect prospectively from the date of the order. Consequently, the High Court's judgments were set aside, emphasizing judicial deference to the institutional autonomy and policy decisions of educational institutions.

  Read full judgment →
• Umar Farooq vs Sajjad Ahmad Qamar and others2024 SCP 49 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-30
  election lawnomination papersGeneral Elections 2024candidate eligibilityelection symbolballot papers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a challenge to the rejection of nomination papers for the General Elections of 2024 for constituency NA-99 (Faisalabad). The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the High Court's judgments that had upheld the rejection of his nomination papers. The Supreme Court, upon hearing the parties, converted the leave petitions into appeals and allowed them. The Court set aside the impugned judgments of the High Court, thereby declaring that the petitioner's nomination papers are deemed accepted and his name must be included in the final list of candidates for the constituency. Furthermore, the Court mandated that the Election Commission of Pakistan must immediately allocate an election symbol to the candidate and ensure his name and symbol appear on the ballot papers for the scheduled election on 08.02.2024. The decision effectively restores the candidate's eligibility to contest the election, emphasizing the necessity of timely inclusion in the electoral process for the specified constituency.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment rejecting nomination papers and order the inclusion of a candidate in the final list?
  • Is the Election Commission of Pakistan obligated to allocate an election symbol to a candidate whose nomination papers have been accepted by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the acceptance of nomination papers by the Supreme Court require the inclusion of the candidate's name and symbol on the ballot papers for the scheduled election?
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• Umar Farooq vs Ali Imran Aslam and others2024 SCP 51 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-30
  nomination papersgeneral electionselection symbolcandidate eligibilitysupreme court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal converted into appeals, challenging the judgments of the High Court that had allowed writ petitions against the acceptance of the petitioner's nomination papers. The core legal question concerns the validity of the rejection or challenge to nomination papers for provincial assembly candidacy for the General Elections of 2024. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeals, set aside the impugned judgments of the High Court, and declared that the nomination papers of the appellant for PP-107 (Faisalabad) are deemed accepted. The Court directed the Election Commission to immediately include his name in the final list of candidates and allocate him an election symbol to ensure the election proceeds as scheduled.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court set aside High Court judgments regarding nomination papers and order the inclusion of a candidate's name on the ballot?
  • Is the Election Commission duty-bound to allocate an election symbol upon the acceptance of nomination papers by the Court?
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• Umar Aslam Khan vs Election Commission of Pakistan, etc2024 SCP 40, 2024 SCMR 553 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-26
  nomination papersproclaimed offenderelection disqualificationelectoral processprotective bailjudicial restraint
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that rejected the petitioner's nomination papers for a National Assembly seat (NA-87) on the grounds that he was a proclaimed offender. The core legal question was whether a proclaimed offender is disqualified from contesting elections under the Constitution or the Elections Act, 2017. The Supreme Court observed that neither the Constitution nor the Elections Act provides for such disqualification. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioner had obtained protective bail, effectively nullifying his status as a proclaimed offender. The Court held that courts cannot create additional disqualifications not prescribed by law. It further clarified that Article 62(1) of the Constitution is not self-executory and does not automatically disqualify a candidate based on such status. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and directed the Election Commission of Pakistan to facilitate the petitioner's participation in the electoral process, establishing the principle that disqualification must be explicitly grounded in statutory law.

  Questions settled

  • Is a proclaimed offender disqualified from contesting elections under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 or the Elections Act, 2017?
  • Can courts create additional grounds for election disqualification not provided by statute?
  • Does the status of being a proclaimed offender automatically trigger disqualification under Article 62(1) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Ufaid Gul vs Mst. Farkhanda Ayub Khan and others2024 SCP 345, 2025 SCMR 64 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-09-23
  specific performanceagreement to sellpecuniary jurisdictioncontributory negligencediscretionary reliefactus curiae neminem gravabitappellate forum
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that set aside a trial court's decree for specific performance of an agreement to sell. The core legal questions were whether a decree for specific performance is maintainable against a property owner when the agreement was executed by a third party lacking title, and whether procedural delays resulting from filing an appeal in a forum lacking pecuniary jurisdiction can be condoned. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that specific performance is a discretionary relief which cannot be granted against an owner when the agreement was entered into with a person having no legal concern with the suit property. The Court further ruled that where both a party and the court contribute to procedural delays regarding jurisdictional defects, the doctrine of contributory negligence applies. Affirming the principle that "an act of the court shall prejudice no one," the Court held that a litigant should not be deprived of legal rights due to procedural lapses induced by the court’s own failure to identify jurisdictional limits promptly.

  Questions settled

  • Can a decree for specific performance be granted against a property owner when the agreement to sell was executed by a third party having no title to the property?
  • Does the doctrine of contributory negligence apply when both a litigant and the court contribute to procedural delays regarding jurisdictional defects?
  • Is the grant of a decree for specific performance a discretionary relief that can be refused even if the agreement is proven?
  • Does the principle that an act of the court shall prejudice no one apply to procedural delays caused by filing an appeal in a court lacking pecuniary jurisdiction?
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• Ubaidullah vs Haji Atta Mihammad Bangulzai & others2024 SCP 402, 2025 SCMR 422 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-11-20
  election petitionmandatory requirementoriginal affidavitssummary rejectionelection tribunalre-pollingtechnical lapse
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Election Tribunal-1 Baluchistan, Quetta, which allowed an election petition and ordered re-polling in sixteen disputed polling stations. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether an election petition is maintainable when it is filed and supported by photocopies of witness affidavits rather than the original affidavits verified on oath as mandated by statute. The Supreme Court held that the requirement to furnish original statements of witnesses on affidavits along with the election petition is mandatory under Section 144(2)(a) of the Election Act, 2017, and non-compliance entails summary rejection of the petition under Section 145. The Court established that filing photocopies or unverified notarized copies instead of original affidavits is a fatal defect that cannot be dismissed as a mere technical lapse, rendering the election petition non-maintainable. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the Tribunal's judgment was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the requirement to furnish original witness affidavits with an election petition under the Election Act, 2017 is mandatory?
  • Does the failure to file original affidavits, and relying instead on photocopies, render an election petition liable to summary rejection?
  • Can the non-submission of original affidavits verified on oath be condoned as a mere technical lapse in election proceedings?
  • What are the legal consequences under the Election Act, 2017 for non-compliance with the procedural mandates governing the filing of election petitions?
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• The State through Prosecutor-General, Punjab. vs Mubarik Ahmad Sani2024 SCP 77 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-02-26
  review petitionInjunctions of Islamconstitutional interpretationamicus curiaereligious institutionsSupreme Court procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a review petition against the order dated 6 February 2024 passed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in a criminal case involving Mubarik Ahmad Sani. During the proceedings, applications were filed by third parties, including a political party, seeking to be arrayed as parties to the review. The core legal question concerned the mechanism for entertaining objections and seeking expert opinions regarding the interpretation of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Injunctions of Islam. The Court decided to entertain all intervention applications, allowed parties to the case to raise objections to the order under review, and permitted other interested entities and individuals to submit written opinions limited to constitutional and Islamic law interpretations. Furthermore, the Court formally issued notices to several prominent religious and academic institutions—including the Council of Islamic Ideology and various Islamic seminaries and research bodies—to assist the Court on the Injunctions of Islam within a stipulated timeframe of three weeks.

  Questions settled

  • Whether third parties and political organizations can be permitted to submit written opinions or be arrayed as parties in a review petition involving questions of Islamic law?
  • Can the Supreme Court issue notices to religious and academic institutions to seek assistance regarding the Injunctions of Islam during review proceedings?
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• The State through Prosecutor General Punjab, Lahore vs Chaudhry2024 SCP 368, 2025 PLD Supreme Court 254 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-09-27
  quashment of FIRconstitutional jurisdictioncivil and criminal proceedingsfraudulent transfer of state landcognizable offenceanti-corruptionprobability of conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition calling in question an order of the Lahore High Court whereby an FIR registered against the respondents under various provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 relating to the fraudulent transfer of state land was quashed. The core legal questions involved whether an FIR can be quashed prematurely by the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution on grounds of a pending civil dispute, lack of probability of conviction, or alleged mala fides. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in quashing the FIR, reiterating that the extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction to quash an FIR must be exercised sparingly only in exceptional cases where no cognizable offence is disclosed, and that criminal and civil proceedings can proceed simultaneously. Furthermore, the evaluation of evidence and probability of conviction are matters for the trial court, not for determination in writ jurisdiction. The appeals were consequently allowed and the impugned order of the High Court setting aside the FIR was reversed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court quash an FIR under Article 199 of the Constitution on the ground that a civil dispute is pending between the parties?
  • Whether criminal proceedings and civil proceedings relating to the same transaction can proceed simultaneously?
  • Is the High Court justified in evaluating the probability of conviction to quash an FIR at the investigative stage?
  • What are the exceptional circumstances under which a High Court may exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to quash a first information report?
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• The State through A.N.F., Rawalpindi vs Obaid Khan (decd) through LRs &2024 SCP 181, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 810, 2024 PLJ SC 607 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-23
  person aggrievedright of appealproperty forfeituresmugglingstatutory interpretationAnti-Narcotic Forcemaintainability of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns whether the Anti-Narcotic Force, as a complainant, qualifies as a "person aggrieved" under Section 43 of the Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1977, to challenge an order of a Special Judge regarding the forfeiture of property. The Supreme Court examined the statutory scheme, noting that the right of appeal is a creature of statute and must be strictly construed. The Court held that the role of the complainant ends upon providing information to the Special Judge, as the subsequent proceedings involve only the Special Judge and the accused, with the burden of proof resting on the latter. Consequently, the Anti-Narcotic Force, having suffered no infringement of a legal right or direct injury, cannot be considered a "person aggrieved" but merely a "person annoyed" by the adverse finding. The Court affirmed that the appeal was not maintainable, dismissed the petition, and observed that the current legislative framework lacks a mechanism for the State to appeal such orders, recommending parliamentary intervention to amend the Act.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Anti-Narcotic Force qualify as a "person aggrieved" under Section 43 of the Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1977?
  • Is the right of appeal under the Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1977, available to a complainant who has suffered no direct legal injury?
  • Does the Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1977, provide the State or Government an express right of appeal against an order of a Special Judge?
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• The Secretary School Education, Government of the Punjab, Lahore etc. vs Riaz Ahmed and others2024 SCP 114, 2024 SCMR 809, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 821 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-12-19
  selection graderegularization of servicescivil servantsservice tribunal jurisdictioncontract employeesexecutive policypay revision
  Summary & questions settled

  The Secretary Schools Education, Government of Punjab, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had allowed the respondents' appeals regarding the grant of selection grade. The respondents were initially appointed on contract as Graduate Primary Teachers in BS-14 in 1995 and their services were subsequently regularized in 2004 with retrospective effect from their date of joining. They claimed a selection grade based on Rule 8(3) of the Punjab Civil Servants Pay Revision Rules, 1977 and a 1983 notification. The Supreme Court examined the legal position and held that the grant of a selection grade is an executive function requiring a specific government policy and is not an inherent right under the civil servants law unless expressly formulated for a specific post. The Court found that no such policy or higher pay scale sanctioned existed for the post of Graduate Primary Teacher, and the Service Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to create or assume such a right in the absence of a government policy. Consequently, the Supreme Court converted the petitions into appeals and set aside the impugned judgment of the Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant has a vested right to claim a selection grade in the absence of a specific government policy formulated for their post?
  • Does a court or service tribunal have the jurisdiction to compel the Government to formulate a policy for the grant of a selection grade?
  • Can retrospective regularization of contract employees create a right to a financial benefit such as a selection grade that did not exist during the relevant period?
  • Is the grant of a selection grade an appointment by promotion or an executive function governed by policy under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974?
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• The Monal Group of Companies, Islamabad and others vs Capital2024 SCP 120 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-03-21
  Margalla Hills National Parkenvironmental degradationlease agreementCapital Development AuthorityIslamabad Wildlife Management BoardFundamental Right to lifecommercial activities
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the commercial activities, lease agreements, and environmental degradation within the Margalla Hills National Park. The core legal questions involve the legality of lease agreements executed by the Remount, Veterinary and Farms Directorate, the statutory prohibitions against running restaurants and commercial projects in the National Park under wildlife and zoning laws, and the respective management authorities of the Capital Development Authority and the Islamabad Wildlife Management Board. The court observed that the Directorate is not a legal entity, rendering its lease agreement void, and noted that commercial activities violate environmental laws and the Fundamental Right to life under Article 9 of the Constitution. The court directed parties to submit comprehensive records, lease lists, and proposals for systematically restoring the integrity and ecological balance of the National Park. The key principle laid down is that the Margalla Hills National Park must be strictly preserved, conserved, and managed solely for permissible recreational, educational, and research purposes, with zero tolerance for unauthorized commercial exploitation or deforestation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a component of the Pakistan Army such as the Remount, Veterinary and Farms Directorate lawfully execute a lease agreement regarding land in the Margalla Hills National Park?
  • Does the setting up and running of restaurants within the Margalla Hills National Park violate section 21 of the Islamabad Wildlife (Protection, Preservation, Conservation and Management) Ordinance, 1979?
  • Whether the Capital Development Authority or the Islamabad Wildlife Management Board holds the primary statutory management powers over the Margalla Hills National Park?
  • Does the right to a meaningful life under Article 9 of the Constitution of Pakistan encompass the protection and preservation of national parks and natural environments?
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• The Monal Group of Companies, Islamabad and others vs Capital2024 SCP 206, 2024 SCMR 1563 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-06-11
  Margalla Hills National Parkenvironmental protectioncommercial leasesCapital Development AuthorityIslamabad Wildlife Management Boardpublic interest litigationconservation law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the preservation and conservation of the Margalla Hills National Park in Islamabad. The core legal question addressed was the legality of commercial activities, specifically restaurants, operating within the protected precincts of the National Park under leases or licenses granted by the Capital Development Authority (CDA) and the Remount, Veterinary and Farms Directorate. The Supreme Court held that all such leases, licenses, or permissions granted by the CDA or the Directorate were contrary to the provisions of the Islamabad Wildlife (Protection, Preservation, Conservation and Management) Ordinance, 1979, and were consequently declared to be of no legal effect. The Court ordered all restaurants situated on or around Pir Sohawa Road to vacate the premises within three months, though it permitted small, licensed kiosks to continue operations under strict regulatory conditions. The judgment establishes the principle that commercial exploitation of protected national park land is prohibited by law, and that administrative authorities lack the legal competence to authorize such activities in violation of statutory conservation mandates. The Court further directed that all rent or fees deposited in court be transferred to the Islamabad Wildlife Management Board.

  Questions settled

  • Are leases or licenses granted by the Capital Development Authority for commercial activities within the Margalla Hills National Park legally valid?
  • Does the Remount, Veterinary and Farms Directorate possess the legal authority to lease land within the National Park for commercial restaurant operations?
  • Can small kiosks continue to operate within the National Park if they are not licensed by the Islamabad Wildlife Management Board?
  • To which entity should rent or fees deposited in court for commercial activities in the National Park be paid?
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• The Inspector General of Police, Punjab & Others vs Waris Ali (deceased)2024 SCP 133, 2024 SCMR 1109, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 883, 2024 PLJ SC 482 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-17
  police promotionmandatory trainingseniority disputeservice tribunalupper subordinatescapacity buildingPolice Rules 1934
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal which allowed Respondent No.1's claim for proforma promotion to the ranks of Assistant Sub-Inspector and Sub-Inspector by alleging supersession by juniors. The core legal question was whether a police officer can claim retrospective or proforma promotion without completing the mandatory training courses stipulated under the statutory rules and whether the named officers were indeed junior to Respondent No.1. The Supreme Court held that the service record clearly established that the contesting officers were senior in service and had completed their mandatory training courses prior to Respondent No.1, rendering the claim factually incorrect. Furthermore, the Court held that promotion in the police force is strictly contingent upon fulfilling mandatory training requirements under Rule 19.25 of the Police Rules, 1934, and antedated promotions that bypass training cannot be sustained. The key principles laid down are that institutional capacity building and strict adherence to statutory training frameworks take precedence over promotion litigation, and the police force must be allowed to regulate its internal governance autonomously in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a police officer claim proforma promotion to the rank of Assistant Sub-Inspector or Sub-Inspector without completing the mandatory training courses prescribed under Rule 19.25 of the Police Rules, 1934?
  • Whether antedated promotions are permissible when they upset the statutory training requirements of a disciplined force?
  • To what extent should courts interfere in the internal governance and service matters of the police force regulated by the Police Order, 2002 and the Police Rules, 1934?
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• The Government of Balochistan, through its Secretary Energy Department, Quetta and another vs Muhammad Yasir2024 SCP 400, 2025 SCMR 367, 2025 PLJ SC 113 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-10-04
  service appealappointment cancellationdue processprinciples of natural justicereview jurisdictionservice tribunalfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil petitions arose from a service dispute where the respondent was appointed as a Junior Clerk by the Energy Department, Government of Balochistan, after successfully qualifying through an advertisement, test, and interview. Weeks later, the department withdrew his appointment order without a show-cause notice, claiming that only one post was vacant and two had been mistakenly advertised due to a lack of coordination. The Balochistan Service Tribunal allowed the respondent's service appeal and set aside the cancellation, prompting the department to approach the Supreme Court. The core legal questions involved whether a department can arbitrarily withdraw a regular appointment order without due process due to its own internal mistakes, and the parameters of review jurisdiction under service tribunal laws. The Supreme Court held that an innocent candidate cannot be made a scapegoat for departmental errors and that withdrawing an appointment without a hearing violates fundamental rights to due process and natural justice. The Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision, ruling that public functionaries must act fairly and that review jurisdiction cannot be used as a rehearing of the matter.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government department arbitrarily withdraw an appointment order issued after a proper selection process without affording a right of hearing?
  • Whether an innocent candidate can be made to suffer or be terminated from service due to administrative errors or a lack of coordination within a government department?
  • What are the permissible parameters and grounds for exercising review jurisdiction by a Service Tribunal?
  • Does the withdrawal of an appointment letter without a show-cause notice violate the fundamental right to due process under the Constitution?
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• The General Manager, Punjab Provincial Cooperative Bank, Ltd, etc vs Ghulam Mustafa and others2024 SCP 212, 2024 SCMR 1458, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 1028, 2024 PLJ SC 638 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-15
  master and servantstatutory rules of servicewrit petition maintainabilitycooperative bankdepartmental appealconstitutional jurisdictioncivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan addresses civil appeals and a civil petition concerning the maintainability of constitutional petitions under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, filed by employees of the Punjab Provincial Cooperative Bank, Limited against adverse departmental actions. The core legal question was whether the Bank's service rules are statutory in nature, and whether writ petitions are maintainable in the absence of statutory service rules. The Court held that the Bank's Staff Service Rules, 2010, framed by the Board of Directors, are non-statutory and govern the employment relationship purely under the common law concept of master and servant. Consequently, writ petitions against the Bank are not maintainable, and the aggrieved employees must seek their remedy through a civil suit in a civil court. The Court laid down that in the absence of statutory rules of service, constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked, and reiterated the binding nature of judicial precedents under Articles 189 and the doctrine of stare decisis. However, enforcing the doctrine of indoor management, the Court directed the Bank to decide the pending departmental appeals of the employees in accordance with its internal rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether writ petitions under Article 199 of the Constitution are maintainable against a corporate body or bank in the absence of statutory rules of service?
  • Does the relationship between the Punjab Provincial Cooperative Bank, Limited and its employees fall strictly under the domain of master and servant?
  • Can the Board of Directors' internal staff service rules be equated with statutory rules of service?
  • What is the appropriate remedy for an employee governed by non-statutory service rules who challenges a termination or adverse departmental action?
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• The Executive Director (P&GS) State Life, Principal Office Karachi and others2024 SCP 382, 2025 SCMR 249 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-09-16
  date of birth correctionwrit jurisdictiondisputed questions of factnecessary partysuperannuationservice recordlachesjuristic person
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a service dispute where an employee sought to correct his date of birth in official records near the age of superannuation, relying on a matriculation certificate despite having consistently declared an earlier date of birth in his CNIC, passport, and initial service documents. The Peshawar High Court allowed the employee's writ petition, prompting this appeal by the employer. The Supreme Court held that the employee failed to implead the State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan as a necessary party, instead suing only individual officials, which is legally improper for a corporate entity. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 is not the appropriate forum to resolve disputed questions of fact, such as conflicting evidence regarding a date of birth, which requires plenary civil proceedings. Additionally, the Court emphasized that requests for date of birth correction must be made within the prescribed limitation period and cannot be entertained at the verge of retirement. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the writ petition dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court resolve disputed questions of fact, such as conflicting evidence regarding an employee's date of birth, under its writ jurisdiction?
  • Is it legally permissible for an employee to sue individual officials instead of the corporate employer in a service matter?
  • Can an employee seek correction of their date of birth in service records at the verge of retirement after years of service?
  • Does the non-joinder of a necessary party in a writ petition warrant the dismissal of the petition?
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• The Election Commission of Pakistan through its Secretary and others vs Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf through its authorized person and others2024 SCP 32, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 267, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 295, · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  intra-party electionselection symbolElection Commission of Pakistanpolitical partiesArticle 17Section 215 Elections Actlis pendensforum shopping
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose out of a judgment of the Peshawar High Court which set aside the Election Commission of Pakistan's (ECP) order declaring Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) ineligible to obtain an election symbol due to its failure to hold valid intra-party elections. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court concerned whether the ECP has jurisdiction to examine the validity of intra-party elections, whether withholding an election symbol under Section 215(5) of the Elections Act 2017 violates Article 17 of the Constitution, and whether a political party can simultaneously agitate the same legal grievance before two different High Courts. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Peshawar High Court's judgment and upholding the ECP's order. The Court held that holding periodic, democratic intra-party elections is mandatory under the Elections Act 2017 and integral to Article 17(2) rights. When a political party fails to demonstrate that genuine intra-party elections took place, the ECP is fully empowered under Section 215 to withhold an election symbol.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Election Commission of Pakistan have the authority to examine whether intra-party elections were held in accordance with a political party's constitution and the law?
  • Does the failure of a political party to hold valid intra-party elections justify the Election Commission declaring it ineligible to obtain an election symbol under Section 215 of the Elections Act 2017?
  • Can a party file constitutional petitions agitating the same subject matter simultaneously in two different High Courts?
  • Does the Election Commission of Pakistan have locus standi to appeal a High Court judgment that overturns its administrative order?
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• The Director General, Intelligence Bureau Government of Pakistan & others2024 SCP 415, 2025 SCMR 353 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-10-15
  departmental inquiryex parte proceedingsdue processnatural justiceincarcerated employeedisciplinary proceedingsright to fair defense
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition challenges a Federal Service Tribunal judgment reinstating an Intelligence Bureau employee who was removed from service following a criminal conviction, later overturned via compromise. The core legal question concerns whether a departmental inquiry conducted ex parte while the employee was incarcerated violates due process and natural justice. The Supreme Court held that while disciplinary proceedings and criminal trials are distinct and may proceed concurrently, conducting an ex parte inquiry while the employee is incarcerated—thereby denying him the opportunity to defend himself—constitutes a violation of due process and natural justice. The Court set aside the reinstatement order and directed a de novo inquiry to be conducted, affording the respondent a fair opportunity to defend himself. The key principle laid down is that while an employer may conduct disciplinary proceedings regardless of criminal acquittal, the right to a fair defense is a vested right under Article 10-A of the Constitution; thus, an inquiry officer must ensure the accused can personally participate, cross-examine witnesses, and adduce evidence, which is impossible during incarceration.

  Questions settled

  • Does conducting an ex parte departmental inquiry against an incarcerated employee violate the principles of natural justice?
  • Can disciplinary proceedings and criminal trials proceed concurrently against a civil servant?
  • Is an acquittal based on a compromise in a criminal case conclusive regarding an employee's suitability for service in a disciplined force?
  • Does the right to a fair defense under Article 10-A of the Constitution require the personal appearance of an accused civil servant in a departmental inquiry?
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• The Commissioner of Income Tax vs M/s. Inter Quest Informatics ServicesPTCL 2024 CL. 201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-09-08
  income taxdouble taxation conventionroyaltiesbusiness profitssoftware leasetax treaty interpretationappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns fourteen income tax references regarding whether payments received by a non-resident Dutch company for the lease of software programs (FLIC tapes) to a Pakistani entity constitute 'royalties' under Article 12 of the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation between Pakistan and the Netherlands, or 'business profits' under Article 7. The Income Tax Officer, Commissioner (Appeals), and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal concurrently held the receipts were royalties, while the High Court held they were not. The Supreme Court, by a majority, allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's judgments. The Court held that the High Court erred in its jurisdiction by re-evaluating factual findings and misapplying the OECD Model Convention instead of the UN Model Convention, upon which the bilateral treaty was based. The Court emphasized that the respondent failed to establish the nature of the receipts to qualify for exemption and that the High Court should not have ventured into technical factual determinations without adequate evidence. The holding restores the assessment orders, affirming that the receipts were taxable as royalties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether payments received for the lease of software programs constitute 'royalties' or 'business profits' under the Pakistan-Netherlands Double Taxation Convention?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to re-evaluate factual findings in income tax references under Section 136(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 and Section 133(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001?
  • Is the definition of 'royalties' in the Pakistan-Netherlands Double Taxation Convention based on the UN Model Convention or the OECD Model Convention?
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• The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Legal Zone, Large Taxpayers Office, Lahore. and others vs M_s Mayfair Spinning Mills Ltd. etc2024 SCP 380, 2025 SCMR 1, 2025 PTD 180 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-11-12
  sales taxinput tax adjustmenttax refundtaxable suppliespast and closed transactionsvested rightssubordinate legislationretrospective exemption
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan resolves a set of appeals and a petition concerning the interpretation of input tax adjustment and refund provisions under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The core legal question revolves around whether a registered person is entitled to deduct input tax under Section 7 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 in respect of raw materials destroyed by fire before being consumed in manufacturing, and whether retrospective exemption notifications can nullify past input tax adjustments. The Court held that Section 7 is a beneficial provision allowing input tax adjustment correlated to the tax period and the purpose of purchase for taxable supplies made or to be made, and that loss of raw materials through fire does not disqualify a taxpayer from claiming adjustments or refunds under Section 10. Furthermore, the Court held that vested rights accrued from completed monthly sales tax returns prior to retrospective subordinate legislation constitute past and closed transactions which cannot be undone by executive SROs. The appeal and petitions were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether input tax deduction can be made under section 7 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 in respect of goods which got destroyed by fire and do not remain available for making taxable supplies?
  • Does the loss of input or raw materials through fire fall within the scope of goods used or to be used for any purpose other than taxable supplies under section 8 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Can a retrospective exemption notification issued via subordinate legislation nullify input tax adjustments already availed and crystallized as past and closed transactions?
  • Whether a registered person must wait for raw materials to be actually consumed in the manufacturing process before availing input tax adjustment against output tax under section 7 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
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• The Commissioner Inland Revenue and others vs Mekotex (Pvt) Limited &2024 SCP 316, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 1168 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-09-18
  tax creditvested rightsretrospective legislationpast and closed transactionsincome taxfundamental rightsequality before the lawfiscal legislationconstitutional interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the constitutionality of amendments made to Section 65B of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ("ITO") by the Finance Act, 2019, which curtailed a 10% tax credit on plant and machinery investments and reverted the eligibility deadline. The core legal questions involved whether the legislature could retrospectively affect vested rights, whether taxpayers who had purchased but not installed machinery acquired vested rights, and whether the 2019 amendments violated fundamental rights under Articles 8, 18, 23, 24, and 25 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the competent legislature has plenary powers to legislate retrospectively and take away vested rights. The Court determined that fulfilling both purchase and installation conditions was necessary to accrue a vested right, and that the proviso reducing the tax credit rate for tax year 2019 violated the equality guarantee under Article 25. Consequently, the Court partly allowed the appeals, upholding the amendment altering the expiration date while striking down the discriminatory proviso reducing the tax credit rate.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the legislature is competent to enact laws with retrospective effect that take away or impair vested rights?
  • Whether the purchase of plant and machinery alone is sufficient to acquire a vested right for a tax credit under Section 65B of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, without its prior installation?
  • At what point does a vested right to claim an income tax credit mature into a past and closed transaction?
  • Whether the reduction of the tax credit rate from 10% to 5% for the tax year 2019 via the Finance Act, 2019 infringes the fundamental right to equality under Article 25 of the Constitution?
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• Taufiq Asif. vs General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf and others_2024 SCP 87, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 610 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-10
  high treasonterritorial jurisdictionwrit jurisdictionalternate remedySpecial Courtjudicial reviewMustafa Impextrial in absentiabinding precedent
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves the Supreme Court of Pakistan's review of a Lahore High Court judgment that had set aside the high treason trial and conviction of General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf. The core legal questions concerned the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution, the maintainability of a writ petition when an alternate statutory remedy of appeal exists, and the retrospective application of the 'Mustafa Impex' principle regarding federal government actions. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that the Lahore High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction over proceedings conducted by a Special Court in Islamabad. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the High Court could not exercise writ jurisdiction when Section 12(3) of the Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Act, 1976, provided an exclusive right of appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court emphasized that judicial review cannot be used to usurp appellate jurisdiction or bypass binding Supreme Court precedents. Key principles established include the 'dominant object' test for territorial jurisdiction and the rule that High Courts must not interfere in matters where a specific statutory forum and appellate route to the Supreme Court are prescribed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court possesses territorial jurisdiction under Article 199 to review acts of a Special Court sitting outside its territorial limits based on the 'dominant object' of the petition?
  • Can a High Court exercise writ jurisdiction when a special statute provides an exclusive right of appeal directly to the Supreme Court?
  • Does the principle laid down in the Mustafa Impex case regarding the definition of 'Federal Government' have retrospective application to actions taken prior to June 18, 2016?
  • Is it permissible for a High Court to declare a statutory provision ultra vires when the petitioner did not specifically challenge the entire provision or show they were an 'aggrieved person' in that regard?
  • What is the legal effect of a High Court judgment passed in derogation of express directions and binding precedents of the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Tassawar Hussain vs The Regional Police Officer, Multan and another2024 SCP 393, 2025 SCMR 235 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-09-24
  service tribunaldismissal from servicelimitation periodcondonation of delayincarcerated civil servantdepartmental appealmixed question of law and fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arises from a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal which dismissed the petitioner police constable's appeal against his dismissal from service as time-barred. The core legal question concerns whether the period of limitation for filing a departmental appeal runs against an employee who was incarcerated during the relevant period and was never served with the show cause notice or the dismissal order. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, set aside the Tribunal's judgment, and remanded the matter for decision on merits. The Court held that a civil servant who is behind bars and has not been served with adverse departmental orders cannot be held solely responsible for delay, and the department cannot take refuge in limitation. The key principle laid down is that limitation questions involving incarcerated employees are mixed questions of law and fact requiring judicious evaluation of the starting point of limitation, and courts or tribunals must adopt a lenient and sympathetic view to advance the cause of justice rather than nonsuiting a litigant on technicalities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the period of limitation for a departmental appeal runs against a civil servant who was incarcerated and never served with the dismissal order?
  • Can a service tribunal dismiss a service appeal on the ground of limitation without evaluating the factual controversies surrounding the service of show cause notices and orders?
  • Does the failure of an incarcerated employee to file a departmental appeal from jail constitute culpable negligence when the foundational orders were not communicated to him?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Zubair Khan vs Mst. Tabassum Khan and others2024 SCP 157, 2024 SCMR 1218 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-19
  court auctionexecution of decreesetting aside saleOrder XXI Rule 84Order XXI Rule 90deposit of 20 percentmaterial irregularitypreliminary decree
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against an order of the High Court, which upheld the dismissal of his objections to a court auction report in execution proceedings. The petitioner had filed objections under Order XXI Rule 84 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 against an auction report alleging fraud and mala fides, but failed to deposit 20% of the sale proceeds as directed by the execution court under the second proviso to Order XXI Rule 90 CPC. The core legal question was whether an owner/legal heir can challenge an auction sale under Order XXI Rule 84 CPC or if such objections fall under Order XXI Rule 90 CPC requiring a mandatory deposit. The Supreme Court held that Order XXI Rule 84 CPC applies to the duties of a purchaser and does not grant owners/legal heirs a right to file objections against auction sales. The Court ruled that objections alleging irregularity or fraud fall under Order XXI Rule 90 CPC, which mandatorily requires the applicant to deposit the amount directed by the court (up to 20%). Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can an owner or legal heir challenge a public auction sale under Order XXI Rule 84 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Whether objections alleging fraud or irregularity in conducting a court auction must be treated under Order XXI Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 rather than Rule 84?
  • Is compliance with the court direction to deposit up to twenty percent of the sum realized at an auction sale mandatory under the second proviso to Order XXI Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Tanvir Sarfraz Khan vs Federation of Pakistan through Director Legal, Islamabad and others2024 SCP 349, 2025 SCMR 98 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-10-02
  inheritanceshariahconsent statementfemale heirsfrivolous litigationmesne profitsvesting of estate
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arose from a dispute over the estate of a deceased Muslim, Sarfraz Ahmad Khan, who passed away in 2010 leaving behind a widow, five sons, and five daughters. The petitioner, one of the sons, had initially signed a 'Consent/Joint Statement' agreeing to evaluate the deceased's house in Rawalpindi and pay the other legal heirs their respective Shariah shares. However, the petitioner subsequently resiled from this commitment and challenged the consent statement, claiming he did not understand what he was signing despite his counsel being present. He also filed a partition suit eleven years after the father's death, shortly after his sisters demanded their inheritance. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the property of a deceased Muslim vests in the legal heirs immediately upon death. The Court condemned the practice of using frivolous pending litigation to deprive vulnerable heirs, particularly females, of their inheritance, and dismissed the petition with costs of three hundred thousand rupees, while also declaring the respondents' right to claim mesne profits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the property of a deceased Muslim vest in his legal heirs immediately upon his death?
  • Can a party resile from a signed consent statement on the ground of not understanding it if they are literate and their counsel was present?
  • Does the subsequent filing of a partition suit by one heir exclude other legal heirs from receiving their inheritance shares?
  Read full judgment →
• Taisei Corporation Tokyo Japan thr. its Attorney vs A.M. Construction2024 SCP 85, 2024 CLD 531, 2024 SCMR 640 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-02-28
  foreign arbitral awardarbitration agreementretrospective applicationRecognition and Enforcement of Arbitration Agreement and Foreign Award Act 2011Arbitration Act 1940New York Conventionpro-enforcement biasseat of arbitrationsubject matter jurisdictionres judicata18th Amendmentinternational arbitrationdomestic arbitrationpublic policy
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether an arbitral award made in a Contracting State, pursuant to an arbitration agreement governed by Pakistani law, constitutes a "foreign arbitral award" under the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitration Agreement and Foreign Award Act 2011, and if the Act applies retrospectively to awards from proceedings commenced before its enactment. The Court held that an award made in a Contracting State is a "foreign arbitral award" under the 2011 Act, adopting a pure "territorial approach" where the seat of arbitration is the sole criterion, rendering the governing law of the contract or arbitration agreement irrelevant. Furthermore, the 2011 Act applies retrospectively to foreign arbitral awards made on or after July 14, 2005, thereby extinguishing any vested right to challenge such awards under the Arbitration Act 1940. The Court emphasized the "pro-enforcement bias" of the New York Convention, which the 2011 Act implements, limiting grounds for refusing enforcement and precluding examination of an award's merits or alleged misapplication of law.

  Read full judgment →
• Tahir Sadiq vs Faisal Ali, etc.2024 SCP 48, 2024 SCMR 775 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-29
  electionsnomination papersproclaimed offenderdisqualificationfundamental rightsright to contest electionsenfranchisementElections Act 2017
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan addresses the legality of rejecting a candidate's nomination papers for the National Assembly on the ground of being a 'proclaimed offender'. The core legal questions involved whether a returning officer or court can disqualify a candidate without express statutory backing and what constitutes a proclaimed offender under the law. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of formal proceedings and an order under Section 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, an individual cannot be treated as a proclaimed offender. Furthermore, neither the Constitution nor the Elections Act 2017 provides for the disqualification of a proclaimed offender from contesting elections, and authorities cannot create additional disqualifications without express legislative provision. The Court laid down the key principle that electoral laws must be interpreted in favour of enfranchisement rather than disenfranchisement, upholding the constitutional rights of citizens to vote and contest elections freely.

  Questions settled

  • Can a candidate's nomination paper be rejected on the ground of being a proclaimed offender without formal proceedings under Section 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Do Returning Officers or courts have the power to create additional disqualifications for candidates without express backing in the Constitution or statute?
  • Does the status of being a proclaimed offender in a criminal case affect a person's civil right to contest an election under the Elections Act 2017?
  • How must electoral laws be interpreted regarding the enfranchisement versus disenfranchisement of voters and candidates?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Sakhawat Hussain vs The State and another2024 SCP 136, 2024 SCMR 1103, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 187 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-03-21
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirybank fraudbeneficiary liabilitypersonal libertycheating and forgerycriminal breach of trust
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 arose from the Lahore High Court's dismissal of the petitioner's post-arrest bail application in a bank scam case registered under Sections 34, 109, 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The central legal question was whether an alleged beneficiary receiving funds in a separate bank account is entitled to bail when the account holder who transferred the embezzled funds was not nominated as an accused in the FIR. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and granted post-arrest bail. The Court held that mere receipt of funds in a bank account without substantive material linking the petitioner to the scam does not establish guilt at the pre-trial stage. The failure to nominate the transferring account holder rendered the petitioner's criminal liability a matter of further inquiry. The Court reaffirmed that personal liberty cannot be curtailed on bald allegations without progress in trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere receipt of alleged proceeds of a fraud in a bank account justify pre-trial detention without substantive material establishing a conspiracy?
  • Is a case made out for further inquiry when an alleged beneficiary is nominated in an FIR but the primary account holder who transferred the funds is not implicated?
  • Can personal liberty be curtailed during trial solely on the basis of bald allegations in a financial fraud prosecution?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Raheel Ahmed vs Mst. Syeda Zona Naqvi and others2024 SCP 256, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 902 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-07-26
  family litigationconstitutional jurisdictionArticle 199right of appealfactual findingsFamily Courts Act 1964judicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenges a High Court order that dismissed a constitutional petition regarding a family dispute involving the dissolution of marriage, maintenance, and recovery of dowry articles. The core legal question concerns the scope of the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 in reviewing factual findings of Family Courts and Appellate Courts where no further statutory right of appeal exists. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court cannot act as a court of appeal to re-evaluate factual controversies. The Court affirmed that the legislature intentionally limited family litigation to two tiers to ensure definitive closure. It established that constitutional jurisdiction is not a substitute for appeal or revision and is limited to correcting jurisdictional errors or glaring, patent legal violations. High Courts must refrain from interfering with factual findings of lower fora, as the right of appeal is a creature of statute and cannot be assumed where the law provides none.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise constitutional jurisdiction to re-evaluate factual findings of Family Courts in the absence of a statutory right of appeal?
  • Is the decision of an appellate court in a family matter final and conclusive regarding factual determinations?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to act as a court of appeal against decisions of Family Courts under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Qamber Ali Shah vs Province of Sindh and others2024 SCP 140, 2024 SCMR 1123, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-02
  FIR registrationJustice of PeaceSection 22-A Cr.P.C.Cognizable offencePolice dutyHigh Court jurisdictionSection 561-A Cr.P.C.InvestigationFalse FIRAbduction
  Summary & questions settled

  This Criminal Petition challenged a High Court order that set aside a Justice of Peace's direction for FIR registration concerning an alleged abduction. The core legal questions revolved around the scope of a Justice of Peace's powers under Section 22-A Cr.P.C. in directing FIR registration, the police's duty under Section 154 Cr.P.C., and the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. to interfere with such orders. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order. The Court held that a Justice of Peace's function under Section 22-A Cr.P.C. is limited to ensuring a cognizable offense is disclosed for FIR registration, not to conduct a meticulous scrutiny or render findings on merits. The police are statutorily obligated to register an FIR for a cognizable offense under Section 154 Cr.P.C. without holding a prior inquiry into its correctness or falsity. The High Court erred by assuming the role of an investigator and making observations on the merits, which is beyond its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. The Court emphasized that the check against false FIRs lies in punishment under Section 182 PPC, not in refusing registration.

  Read full judgment →
• Syed Pervaiz Hussain and another vs Zikr-ur-Rehman and others2024 SCP 241, 2024 SCMR 1683 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-07-15
  unregistered power of attorneypresumption of authenticitynotary publicattesting witnessesburden of proofcancellation of conveyance deedconcurrent findingsbona fide purchaser
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from concurrent findings of three courts decreeing a suit for cancellation of a registered conveyance deed and restoration of title. The predecessor-in-interest of the respondents was the original allottee and registered lessee of a residential plot. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners claimed title through a registered conveyance deed executed pursuant to an unregistered general power-of-attorney and a subsequent sub-power-of-attorney. The core legal questions pertained to the proof and validity of an unregistered power-of-attorney, the applicability of the presumption under Article 95 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, the burden of proof, and the validity of transfers executed on the basis of a fraudulent instrument. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the concurrent judgments. The Court held that where the execution of an unregistered power-of-attorney is denied, the burden lies on the beneficiary to prove it under Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984. Without examining the attesting witnesses, the notary public, or the attorneys, no presumption of authenticity arises, and any subsequent conveyance deeds derived from a forged foundational document are legally void.

  Questions settled

  • Does the legal presumption under Article 95 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 apply to an unregistered power-of-attorney when its execution is expressly denied and the notary public or attesting witnesses are not examined?
  • Upon whom does the burden of proof lie to establish the validity and execution of an unregistered power-of-attorney when it is challenged as forged?
  • Can a valid right, title, or interest in immovable property be conveyed under a sale deed executed on the basis of a forged or legally invalid power-of-attorney?
  Read full judgment →
• Town Administration and another vs Mohammad Khalid and others2024 SCP 295, 2024 PLC 314, 2024 SCMR 1852, 2024 PLJ SC 894 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-06-28
  oral terminationpermanent workmanlabour lawscondonation of delaylimitationindustrial disputereinstatementstanding orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court order upholding the reinstatement of two employees. The core legal questions addressed whether oral termination of service is lawful, whether employees engaged for long periods against permanent posts attain permanent status, and whether government departments are entitled to preferential treatment regarding the condonation of delay. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that oral termination is illegal and contrary to labour laws. It affirmed that employees who serve beyond nine months against permanent posts attain the status of permanent workmen. The Court established that employers must issue written termination orders providing explicit reasons. Furthermore, it laid down the principle that government departments are not entitled to special clemency or preferential treatment regarding the law of limitation; they are subject to the same standards of vigilance as ordinary litigants. The Court emphasized that the nature of the work, rather than the mere duration of employment, is the primary factor in determining the classification of a workman under the applicable Standing Orders.

  Questions settled

  • Is an oral termination of an employee's service valid under labour laws?
  • Does an employee engaged for more than nine months against a permanent post automatically attain the status of a permanent workman?
  • Are government departments entitled to preferential treatment or special clemency regarding the condonation of delay in filing appeals?
  • What is the primary factor for determining whether a workman is a permanent workman under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Ibn-e-Hussain and others. vs Federation of Pakistan through its2024 SCP 52 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-30
  freedom of pressjournalistsFIA noticesconstitutional petitionSupreme Court Practice and Procedure Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves proceedings before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning journalists, freedom of the press, and related notices issued by the Federal Investigation Agency. During the hearing, oral submissions were made regarding the inclusion of an attacked journalist in previous orders, requests by representative bodies such as the Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists and the Press Association of the Supreme Court to file petitions, and an undertaking by the Attorney General for Pakistan that notices issued to journalists by the FIA would be deferred until after the general elections scheduled for February 8, 2024. The core legal questions revolved around the procedure for entertaining fresh constitutional petitions and addressing concerns regarding journalists. The Court ordered the inclusion of the journalist's name, granted time for counsel to submit a concise statement, adjourned the proceedings to a date post-elections, and directed that any new petitions filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution be placed before the Committee constituted under the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023. The key principle laid down is the procedural handling of public interest petitions and the protection of fundamental rights of journalists during electoral periods.

  Questions settled

  • Whether notices issued to journalists by the Federal Investigation Agency can be deferred until after general elections upon an undertaking by the Attorney General?
  • How should petitions filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution be processed and placed before the appropriate authority under the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023?
  • Can representative bodies of journalists become a party in ongoing proceedings concerning freedom of the press?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Ibn-e-Hussain and others vs Federation of Pakistan through its2024 SCP 97 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-03-11
  freedom of the pressfundamental rightsFIA investigationcyber crimesJoint Investigation Teamultra viresjudicial reputation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the investigation into crimes against journalists and the subsequent actions taken by the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA). The Supreme Court examined reports submitted by the police and the FIA regarding attacks on journalists, finding them unsatisfactory. The Court emphasized that the intimidation of the press is intolerable, affirming that freedom of the press is a fundamental right under Article 19 of the Constitution, essential for protecting other rights. The Court scrutinized notices issued by the FIA under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and an FIR registered under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016, noting that these actions, which referenced the judiciary without its involvement or complaint, misled the public and damaged the reputation of the Court. The Court held that investigations must be thorough to avoid the implication of facilitating perpetrators. Furthermore, the Court questioned the legality of including intelligence agency members in Joint Investigation Teams under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Investigation Rules, 2018, suggesting potential conflict with the parent statute, the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016.

  Questions settled

  • Does the freedom of the press constitute a fundamental right under the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Can rules framed under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016, be declared ultra vires if they contradict the parent statute?
  • Does the registration of an FIR referencing the judiciary without its involvement or complaint constitute an abuse of process?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Ibn-e-Hussain and others vs Federation of Pakistan through its2024 SCP 47 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-29
  journalists' rightsfreedom of expressionpolice investigationsuo motu jurisdictionFIA noticesjudicial criticismfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a complaint filed by several journalists regarding the abduction and attacks on media personnel and the alleged failure of law enforcement to properly investigate these incidents. The core legal questions concerned the adequacy of police investigations into crimes against journalists and the potential intimidation of media professionals through notices issued by the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) regarding alleged maligning of the judiciary. The Court directed the Attorney-General to submit comprehensive reports on the status of police investigations for each specific case, emphasizing that investigating officers must be granted full access and remain unhampered. Regarding the FIA notices, the Attorney-General provided an undertaking on behalf of the Federal Government that honest criticism of judicial orders or judgments does not constitute a crime and that no coercive action or criminal registration would occur against journalists for such expression. The Court reaffirmed the principle that the power of the press is a public trust, necessitating fearless, responsible, and independent journalism, while simultaneously welcoming honest criticism of state policies and institutions.

  Questions settled

  • Does honest criticism of a judicial order or judgment constitute a criminal offense?
  • Can the Federal Government take coercive action against journalists for criticizing the judiciary?
  • Are investigating officers required to be granted unhampered access to investigate crimes against journalists?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Fida Hussain Shah vs The State and another2024 SCP 238, 2024 SCMR 1622 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-07-03
  rash and negligent drivingroad accidentstatement of accusedbenefit of doubtdelayed FIRinculpatory statementexculpatory statementcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, arose from a road accident resulting in two fatalities, leading to the petitioner's conviction under Sections 279, 427, and 320 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC). The core legal questions centered on whether the prosecution established the identity of the driver and proved 'rash and negligent driving' beyond reasonable doubt, and whether an accused's statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) can be parsed to accept only the inculpatory portion. By a 2:1 majority, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the petitioner. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the driver's identity, as the eye-witnesses did not name the petitioner, and there was a five-day unexplained delay in lodging the FIR. Crucially, the Court reiterated that an accused's statement under Section 342 Cr.P.C. must be accepted or rejected in toto; it is legally impermissible to accept only the inculpatory part while rejecting the exculpatory portion.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a statement of an accused recorded under Section 342 of the Cr.P.C. must be accepted or rejected in its entirety when prosecution evidence is disbelieved?
  • Can a conviction for rash and negligent driving under Sections 279 and 320 of the PPC be sustained solely on the basis of high speed on a highway without proving the driving was above the prescribed limit and negligent?
  • Does an unexplained delay of five days in lodging an FIR affect the credibility and sanctity of the prosecution's case?
  • Can a piece of prosecution evidence be used against an accused if it was not specifically put to them during their examination under Section 342 of the Cr.P.C.?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Faizan-e-Rasool vs The Lahore High Court, Lahore through Registrar2024 SCMR 1871 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-08-29
  judicial officersstudy leaveforeign scholarshipadministrative discretionservice appealmaster of lawssubordinate judiciary
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 by a civil judge challenging the refusal of the Lahore High Court administration and the Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal to grant him permission and study leave to pursue a Master of Laws (LLM) degree on a scholarship at a foreign university. The core legal question was whether a judicial officer's request to avail of a foreign scholarship for higher legal education could be declined without providing valid, rational reasons and whether such refusal was sustainable in the absence of a clear policy or financial outlay by the state. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that administrative discretion must be exercised fairly and reasonably, and that decisions withholding permission for study leave without citing specific valid grounds are unsustainable. The Court laid down the principle that judicial officers fulfilling prescribed criteria should generally be permitted to pursue higher education abroad on scholarships where no financial burden is placed on the state, and directed the High Court to formulate a clear, transparent policy regarding study leave.

  Questions settled

  • Whether refusal of permission for study leave to a judicial officer requires valid and communicated reasons?
  • Can a judicial officer be denied permission to avail of a foreign scholarship for an LLM degree when it involves no financial outlay by the state?
  • Whether the High Court's constitutional power to supervise subordinate courts includes the arbitrary withholding of study leave without a formulated policy?
  • Are judicial officers governed by applicable government servant leave rules when specific rules for the judicial service are silent on study leave?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Faizan e Rasool vs The Lahore High Court, Lahore through Registrar2024 PLC (C.S.) 1373 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-08-29
  study leavejudicial officerscivil judgeLLM scholarshipadministrative discretionreasoned decisionsubordinate judiciary
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Civil Judge serving in Punjab, challenged the decision of the Lahore High Court Administration Judge and the subsequent judgment of the Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal, which denied him permission to pursue an LLM degree in the United Kingdom on a scholarship. The respondents had advised the petitioner to obtain the degree from a local university instead, but provided no reasons for denying permission to study abroad. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the petitioner met the general criteria for study leave under the applicable civil service rules, as he had served for over ten years, sought a relevant degree, and incurred no financial cost to the government. The Court held that while the High Court has constitutional authority to supervise subordinate courts, its decisions must be fair, transparent, and reasoned. Finding no justification for the denial, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned decisions, and directed the Lahore High Court to formulate a clear, equitable, and uniform policy regarding study leave for judicial officers.

  Questions settled

  • Can the competent authority deny a judicial officer's request for study leave without providing any reasons?
  • What rules govern the study leave of judicial officers in Punjab when the Punjab Judicial Service Rules 1994 are silent on the matter?
  • Does the constitutional power of supervision and control under Article 203 of the Constitution permit arbitrary denial of study leave to subordinate judicial officers?
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• Syed Asghar Ali Shah, Muhammad Younas Khan vs Kaleem Arshad and others2024 SCP 33, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 463, 2024 SCMR 563 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-15
  service tribunalseniority disputeappellate jurisdictionconstitutional interpretationouster clauseleave to appealadministrative tribunals
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the maintainability of petitions for leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 against judgments of Provincial Administrative Tribunals where the proviso to Article 212(2) has not been activated. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction under Article 212(3) is contingent upon the activation of the proviso to Article 212(2) through federal legislation, as previously held in the Gomal case. The Court held that Article 212(3) is a standalone constitutional provision that independently confers appellate jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court against decisions of Administrative Tribunals established under Article 212(1), regardless of whether the ouster clause in Article 212(2) has been extended to such provincial tribunals. Consequently, the Court overruled Gomal, declaring that the absence of federal legislation extending the proviso does not bar an appeal to the Supreme Court. On the merits, the Court upheld the Tribunal’s decision, confirming that seniority is determined by the date of the selection process, thereby affirming the respondent's seniority based on his 2001 batch.

  Questions settled

  • Is the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 212(3) of the Constitution contingent upon the activation of the proviso to Article 212(2)?
  • Does the absence of federal legislation extending the proviso to Article 212(2) preclude an appeal to the Supreme Court from a decision of a Provincial Administrative Tribunal?
  • Is seniority for judicial officers determined by the date of appointment or the date of the selection process under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Judicial Service Rules 2001?
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• Syed Ali Ahmed Shah vs Syed Shoukat Hussain Shah & Others2024 SCP 413, 2025 SCMR 361 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-12-16
  consent orderreview applicationpresumption of correctnessjudicial proceedingslimitation periodcivil revisionpartition of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal against a Sindh High Court order that dismissed a review application regarding a previous consent order. The core legal question was whether a party can challenge a judicial order recorded as a consent order through a review application without providing an affidavit or evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness attached to court proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly dismissed the review application. The Court reasoned that judicial proceedings and orders recorded in open court carry a presumption of sanctity and correctness. A party cannot simply recoil from a consent order by filing a review application without demonstrating an error apparent on the face of the record or providing formal evidence, such as an affidavit from the counsel, to substantiate the claim that consent was never given. Furthermore, the review application was time-barred. The key principle laid down is that consent orders are binding, and a party seeking to challenge them must provide concrete evidence to overcome the presumption of judicial correctness, rather than making unsubstantiated allegations.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge a consent order through a review application without providing an affidavit to rebut the presumption of correctness?
  • Does a judicial order recorded in open court carry a presumption of sanctity that requires formal evidence to challenge?
  • Is a review application filed after the limitation period without an application for condonation of delay maintainable?
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• Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan through its President vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and others2024 SCP 340, 2024 SCP 342, 2024 SCP 347, 2024 SCP 355, PLD 2024 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-10-10
  civil review petitiondefectionvote countpresidential referenceconstitutional interpretationparliamentary partydisqualification
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil review petition was filed by the Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan against the majority judgment of a five-member Bench of the Supreme Court in Presidential Reference No. 1 of 2022 and connected matters. The core legal question was whether a member of Parliament who votes or abstains from voting contrary to the directions of their parliamentary party can have their vote discarded, and whether such an act results in automatic de-seating or lifelong disqualification under Article 63A of the Constitution of Pakistan. The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the review petition, setting aside the majority's short order and detailed judgment. The Court held that Article 63A is a self-executory provision with clear, unambiguous steps that cannot be bypassed. The Court ruled that the judiciary cannot read words into the Constitution, create new jurisdictions, or divest constitutional authorities (such as the Party Head and the Election Commission) of their designated roles. Consequently, votes cast contrary to party directions must be counted, and any subsequent defection proceedings must strictly follow the procedure prescribed in Article 63A.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a vote cast by a member of Parliament contrary to the directions of their parliamentary party can be excluded from the vote count under Article 63A of the Constitution?
  • Can the Supreme Court read words into the Constitution or create a disqualification not expressly provided by the text of the Constitution?
  • Whether the opinion of the Supreme Court rendered under its advisory jurisdiction under Article 186 of the Constitution has a binding and executable nature?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the jurisdiction to bypass the adjudicatory role of the Election Commission in matters of defection under Article 63A?
  Read full judgment →
• Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan through its President vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary M/o Interior, Islamabad and others2024 SCP 332, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 1228 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-09-30
  civil review petitionbench constitutionrecusal of judgeSupreme Court Practice and Procedure Act 2023re-constitution of bench
  Summary & questions settled

  This procedural order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises out of Civil Review Petition No. 197 of 2022 filed by the Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan against the majority judgment previously authored by Munib Akhtar, J. During the hearing, it was noted that Munib Akhtar, J addressed a letter to the Registrar expressing his inability to participate in the bench hearing the review petition at the present time, while explicitly clarifying that his stance did not constitute a formal recusal. Addressing this issue, the Supreme Court directed the Registrar to place the order before Munib Akhtar, J requesting him to join the bench. The Court held that in the event his lordship declines or does not join, the Committee constituted under Section 2 of the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 shall nominate and appoint another Judge to replace him on the bench to hear the review petition.

  Questions settled

  • What procedure must be followed when a judge expresses inability to sit on a review bench without formally recusing?
  • Whether the Committee under the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act 2023 can appoint a replacement judge if a member of the original bench expresses inability to join the hearing?
  Read full judgment →
• Superintendent of Police Headquarters, Lahore etc vs Ijaz Aslam, Sana2024 SCP 290, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 1310, 2024 SCMR 1831 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-08-07
  service lawfraudulent appointmentinstitutional autonomymisconductdoctrine of unclean handsservice tribunaldisciplinary proceedingsfake documents
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged the Punjab Service Tribunal's decision to reinstate driver constables dismissed for securing employment using fake driving licenses. The respondents had admitted during departmental inquiries that their licenses were obtained through agents without physical tests. The Tribunal had reinstated them citing long service and alleged vague disciplinary proceedings. The Supreme Court set aside the Tribunal’s judgment, holding that the Tribunal acted arbitrarily by granting relief based on subjective standards of leniency rather than law. The Court affirmed that appointments obtained through fraud are void ab initio, as the doctrine of unclean hands precludes those who act dishonestly from benefiting from their misconduct. Furthermore, the Court emphasized the principle of institutional autonomy, noting that competent authorities are best suited to determine penalties for misconduct. Finally, the Court clarified that Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 cannot be invoked to claim benefits derived from illegal acts, as equality does not apply to perpetuating illegality. The dismissal orders were upheld, reinforcing that integrity is foundational to public service.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Service Tribunal reinstate an employee whose appointment was obtained through fraudulent documents?
  • Does the doctrine of unclean hands prevent an employee from seeking relief against dismissal for fraudulent recruitment?
  • Can Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 be invoked to claim benefits derived from illegal acts?
  • To what extent should courts defer to the institutional autonomy of public sector departments in disciplinary matters?
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• Sunni Ittehad Council, Faisalabad, etc. vs Election Commission of Pakistan2024 SCP 153, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 642, 2024 PLJ SC 534 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-05-06
  reserved seatsproportional representationpolitical partiesgeneral electionsparliamentary democracyleave to appealconstitutional interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions challenging the allocation of reserved seats for women and non-Muslims in the National and Provincial Assemblies to political parties other than the petitioner, Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC). The core legal question involves whether a political party that did not contest general elections or win a general seat can be allocated reserved seats under the proportional representation system pursuant to the Constitution. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider these constitutional questions concerning parliamentary democracy and electoral integrity, suspended the operation of the impugned judgment and the Election Commission of Pakistan's order regarding the disputed reserved seats, and referred the matter for the constitution of a larger bench. The Court held that the case involves significant questions of constitutional interpretation requiring consideration by a larger bench, maintaining interim relief regarding the disputed seats prospectively.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a political party that did not contest general elections and secure general seats is entitled to the allocation of reserved seats for women and non-Muslims?
  • How does the proportional representation system apply to the allocation of reserved seats under Articles 51 and 106 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • What constitutes a political party for the purpose of allocating reserved seats in the National and Provincial Assemblies?
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• Sunni Ittehad Council through its Chairman, Faisalabad and another, _0c86d1c62024 SCP 237, 2024 SCP 220, 2024 SCP 236, 2024 SCP 319, 2024 SCP 320, · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  reserved seatselectoral integritypolitical partiesfundamental rightsproportional representationElection Commission of Pakistanconstitutional interpretationelection symbol
  Summary & questions settled

  This case concerns appeals regarding the allocation of reserved seats for women and non-Muslims in the National and Provincial Assemblies following the 2024 General Elections. The core legal questions addressed include the consequences of declaring a political party ineligible for an election symbol under Section 215(5) of the Elections Act 2017, whether candidates of such parties can be treated as independents, and the interpretation of Articles 51(6)(d) & (e) and 106(3)(c) of the Constitution regarding reserved seat entitlement. The Court held that the denial of an election symbol does not strip a political party of its constitutional rights to participate in elections or claim reserved seats. It declared the Explanation to Rule 94 of the Election Rules 2017 ultra vires. The Court ruled that PTI is a political party entitled to reserved seats, and the Commission's actions treating its candidates as independents were unlawful. The judgment establishes that election disputes are collective litigation involving the constituency's rights, emphasizing constitutional fidelity, the judiciary's role in electoral justice, and the principle of strict construction for statutes curtailing fundamental rights.

  Questions settled

  • What is the consequence of declaring a political party ineligible to obtain an election symbol under Section 215(5) of the Elections Act 2017?
  • Can a candidate nominated by a political party ineligible to obtain an election symbol be mentioned as an independent candidate in the list of contesting candidates?
  • Do Articles 51(6)(d) & (e) and 106(3)(c) of the Constitution refer to all enlisted political parties or only those that have won general seats?
  • How is the proportional representation of a political party to be calculated for the allocation of reserved seats under the Constitution?
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• SubMachine Guns and other Prohibited Bore Weapons vs N/A2024 SCP 100 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-03-06
  prohibited bore weaponsfirearms licensingpublic safetyrule of lawconstitutional equalityright to lifePakistan Arms Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter addresses the widespread proliferation of sub-machine guns (SMGs) and prohibited bore weapons in Pakistan, focusing on the lack of legal authority for weapon permits and the failure of law enforcement to ensure public safety. The Court examined whether the issuance of such licenses complies with the Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965, and the Pakistan Arms Rules, 2023, while questioning if current licensing practices and exemptions for specific categories of persons violate Articles 9 and 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Court observed a dereliction of duty by authorities, noting the absence of verification mechanisms for weapon licenses and significant discrepancies in reported weapon statistics. Holding that the current state of affairs fosters lawlessness and undermines the rule of law, the Court directed the Federal Government to provide a detailed, signed response addressing the legality of the Rules vis-à-vis the Ordinance and the Constitution. The Court emphasized that state authorities must ensure public safety and that any licensing regime must strictly conform to statutory mandates and constitutional guarantees of equality and the right to life.

  Questions settled

  • Does the issuance of licenses for prohibited bore weapons by authorities other than the Federal Government violate the Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965?
  • Are the exemption categories for prohibited bore weapon licenses under the Pakistan Arms Rules, 2023, consistent with the constitutional mandate of equality before the law?
  • Does the failure to implement a verification mechanism for weapon licenses constitute a dereliction of duty by law enforcement agencies?
  Read full judgment →
• Subha Sadiq vs The State2024 SCP 369, 2025 SCMR 50 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-22
  test identification paradecriminal appealbenefit of doubtevidentiary valueappreciation of evidencemurder convictionanti-terrorism
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition challenged a High Court judgment upholding the petitioner's conviction for murder and terrorism-related offenses. The core legal question concerned the reliability of the conviction, which rested primarily on witness testimony and a test identification parade. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the appellant, extending him the benefit of the doubt. The Court held that the prosecution's case suffered from significant evidentiary infirmities, particularly regarding the identification of the accused. The Court laid down that while a test identification parade is not mandatory, it serves as crucial corroborative evidence that must strictly adhere to established procedural guidelines to be admissible. It emphasized the necessity of assessing both 'system variables'—the procedural conduct of the parade—and 'estimator variables'—the witness's capacity and circumstances of observation. Because the identification proceedings were fraught with procedural flaws, including failure to record dummy features and potential witness exposure, the evidence was deemed unsafe for sustaining a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • What are the mandatory requirements for conducting a reliable test identification parade in criminal proceedings?
  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on a test identification parade that fails to follow established judicial guidelines?
  • How should a court distinguish between 'system variables' and 'estimator variables' when evaluating eyewitness identification evidence?
  • Is a test identification parade a mandatory requirement for proving the identity of an accused in a criminal trial?
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• State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan, Karachi vs Nina Industries2024 SCP 418, 2025 SCMR 406, 2025 CLD 402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-12-19
  Scheme of ArrangementCompanies Ordinancesecured creditorsminority shareholderscivil petition for leave to appealcompromise or arrangement
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from an order passed by the Sindh High Court sanctioning a "Scheme of Arrangement" under the Companies Ordinance, 1984. The petitioner, State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan, an unsecured creditor and minority shareholder, challenged the scheme on the grounds that it catered solely to secured creditors, ignored minority interests, and was allegedly oppressive. The core legal question concerned the validity and legality of sanctioning a scheme of arrangement approved by the requisite majority of secured creditors and shareholders under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, despite objections from minority stakeholders. The Supreme Court held that the scheme complied with all statutory requirements, having been approved by the overwhelming majority of secured creditors and 100% of the shareholders present and voting, and that the rights of unsecured creditors and minority shareholders remained unaffected to pursue independent legal remedies. The Court affirmed that a compromise or arrangement sanctioned by the court and approved by the statutory majority is binding on all members and creditors, provided no procedural illegality or lack of bona fides is established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Scheme of Arrangement approved by the requisite majority of creditors and shareholders can be sanctioned under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 despite objections from minority shareholders?
  • Can unsecured creditors and minority shareholders challenge a Scheme of Arrangement formulated primarily between a company and its secured creditors?
  • What are the statutory requirements for sanctioning a compromise or arrangement under Section 284 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984?
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• State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan and another vs Mst. Zubeda2024 SCP 1, 2024 CLD 600, 2024 PLJ SC 257, 2024 SCMR 426 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-12-13
  insurance claimliquidated damagesroad accident deathburden of proofpresumption of truthofficial documentsinsurance appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which allowed the respondent widow's insurance appeal and decreed her suit for recovery of an insurance claim along with liquidated damages under Section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000. The husband of the respondent had purchased an insurance policy and subsequently died in a road accident. Although a police report and newspaper accounts recorded the incident, no post-mortem examination was conducted. The appellant insurance corporation rejected the claim, leading to litigation before the Insurance Tribunal and eventually the High Court. The core legal question concerned the entitlement of the nominee to the insurance claim and the liability of the insurer to pay liquidated damages upon failure to settle the claim within the statutory period despite the fulfillment of requirements. The Supreme Court held that official documents establishing death carry a presumption of truth, that the absence of a post-mortem examination does not invalidate a genuine claim where the insurer failed to establish circumstances beyond its control, and that the High Court's judgment was well-reasoned. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the insurer's liability for the claim and liquidated damages.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an insurance company is liable to pay liquidated damages under Section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 upon failing to make payment within the statutory period?
  • Does the absence of a post-mortem examination disentitle the legal heirs of an insured person from claiming insurance benefits arising from an accidental death?
  • What is the evidentiary value of official documents such as death certificates and police reports regarding a death?
  • Where the insurer disputes the cause of death, on whom does the burden of proof lie under the relevant legal framework?
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• Sohail Ahmed vs Mst. Samreena Rasheed Memon and another2024 SCP 14, 2024 SCMR 634, 2024 PLJ SC 467 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-12-20
  territorial jurisdictiondissolution of marriageKhulareconciliationordinarily residesfamily courtdual citizenship
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves petitions filed under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, challenging a High Court order that dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petitions against orders passed by a Family Court. The core legal questions relate to the territorial jurisdiction of Pakistani Family Courts in suits for dissolution of marriage where the plaintiff wife is a dual citizen residing abroad, and the interpretation of powers under Section 10 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 regarding the immediate dissolution of marriage through Khula upon the failure of reconciliation. The Supreme Court held that the Family Courts possess territorial jurisdiction since the wife 'ordinarily resides' or visits Pakistan, and that the proviso to Section 10 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 empowers Family Courts to pass a decree for dissolution of marriage by way of Khula forthwith once reconciliation fails, without the necessity of recording further evidence on that issue. The petitions were consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Family Courts in Pakistan have jurisdiction to entertain a family suit when the wife is a dual citizen residing abroad at the time of institution?
  • What is the legal scope and meaning of the expression 'ordinarily resides' under Rule 6 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965?
  • Is a Family Court empowered to pass a decree for dissolution of marriage by way of Khula forthwith upon the failure of reconciliation without recording evidence?
  • Can a plaintiff wife withdraw the remaining prayer clauses of a family suit after a preliminary decree for Khula has been passed?
  Read full judgment →
• Siraj Nizam vs Federation of Pakistan and others2024 SCP 165, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 867, 2024 SCMR 1184 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-02
  service lawcivil servantpromotion eligibilityservice tribunalestablishment codestatutory instructionfact-finding forumremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Federal Service Tribunal judgment that dismissed the appellant's claim for promotion from Assistant Executive Engineer (BS-17) to Executive Engineer (BS-18). The core legal question was whether the appellant's prior service in a different government department could be counted towards the minimum length of service required for promotion under Statutory Instruction No. 157 of the Establishment Code, and whether the Tribunal erred in its factual assessment of the appellant's eligibility, specifically regarding the departmental examination. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal, as an exclusive fact-finding forum for civil servants, failed to properly examine the record and misconstrued the relevant provisions of the Establishment Code. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the matter for a fresh decision. The key principle laid down is that the Service Tribunal is obligated to exercise its appellate jurisdiction by thoroughly evaluating both facts and law, ensuring that provisions like Statutory Instruction No. 157 are correctly applied to determine service length for promotion, thereby fulfilling the constitutional mandate to provide substantial justice to civil servants.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Service Tribunal have the authority to examine both questions of fact and law in appeals regarding terms and conditions of service?
  • Can previous government service be counted towards the minimum length of service for promotion eligibility under Statutory Instruction No. 157 of the Establishment Code?
  • Is the Service Tribunal required to consider the total length of service performed by a civil servant across different departments when determining promotion eligibility?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaukat Mahmood vs Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) through its2024 SCP 110, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 653 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-26
  election nominationsubordinate legislationelection expensesfundamental rightslegislative competenceReturning Officerjoint bank account
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the rejection of his nomination papers for the 2024 general elections by the Returning Officer, which was upheld by the Election Appellate Tribunal and the Lahore High Court. The rejection was based on the petitioner's use of a joint bank account for election expenses, purportedly violating a proviso added to Rule 51 of the Election Rules, 2017, via S.R.O. No. 1793(I)/2023, which prohibited joint signatory accounts. The core legal question was whether the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) could, through subordinate legislation, impose restrictions not found in the parent statute, the Election Act, 2017. The Supreme Court held that the ECP exceeded its legislative competence by adding a proviso that contradicted the parent Act, which only mandated an 'exclusive' account without prohibiting joint accounts. The Court ruled that subordinate legislation must remain consistent with the parent statute and cannot restrict fundamental rights, such as the right to contest elections, beyond what the Act prescribes. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower orders, deeming the petitioner's nomination papers accepted and directing the allocation of an election symbol.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Election Commission of Pakistan, through subordinate rules, impose restrictions on election candidates that are not present in the parent Election Act, 2017?
  • Does the requirement for an 'exclusive' bank account for election expenses under the Election Act, 2017, inherently prohibit the use of a joint bank account?
  • What is the legal test for determining whether subordinate legislation is ultra vires the parent statute?
  • Does a Returning Officer have the authority to reject nomination papers based on 'office hours' not explicitly defined in the election schedule?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaukat Hussain vs The State thr. PG Punjab & another2024 SCP 121, 2024 SCMR 929 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-03-14
  criminal appealmurderlife imprisonmentdelay in FIRbenefit of doubtacquittal of co-accusedbest evidence withheld
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC), where the trial court sentenced the appellant to death, and the High Court subsequently modified the sentence to life imprisonment. The prosecution alleged that the appellant and co-accused ambushed the deceased and an injured party over a property dispute. The core legal issues before the Supreme Court were whether an unexplained four-hour delay in lodging the FIR, the withholding of an injured eyewitness, and the acquittal of co-accused on the same set of evidence created reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant. The Court held that an unexplained delay in reporting a crime raises the probability of deliberation and consultation. Furthermore, withholding an injured eyewitness amounts to withholding the best evidence, and where co-accused are acquitted on identical evidence, the benefit of doubt must similarly extend to the remaining accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay in lodging an FIR create reasonable doubt regarding deliberate consultation and fabrication?
  • Can an accused be convicted on the same evidence that was disbelieved to acquit co-accused in the same transaction?
  • What is the effect of the prosecution's failure to produce an injured eyewitness without a valid explanation?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui and others vs Federation of Pakistan, Secretary Ministry of Law and Justice and others2024 SCP 112, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 746, 2025 PLJ SC 40 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-03-22
  judicial misconductSupreme Judicial Councildue processouster clausejudicial independencecoram non judicemala fide
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the removal of Justice Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui from the Islamabad High Court by the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) for alleged misconduct following a public speech. The core legal question was whether the SJC could remove a judge without a formal inquiry and whether such action, despite the ouster clause in Article 211 of the Constitution, was justiciable. The Supreme Court held that the SJC’s failure to conduct an inquiry into the allegations violated the fundamental right to a fair trial and due process under Article 10A. The Court ruled that the SJC’s proceedings were coram non judice and mala fide, rendering the ouster clause inapplicable. It established that the removal of a judge requires a formal inquiry to determine facts, and the SJC cannot rely on vague, unspecified standards of behavior outside the Code of Conduct. Consequently, the Court set aside the SJC’s report and the removal notification. As the petitioner had reached the age of superannuation during the proceedings, he was deemed retired with full benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the ouster clause in Article 211 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 protect acts of the Supreme Judicial Council that are mala fide or coram non judice?
  • Is the Supreme Judicial Council required to conduct a formal inquiry before removing a judge for misconduct under Article 209 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can the Supreme Judicial Council determine a judge's misconduct based on vague standards of behavior outside the prescribed Code of Conduct?
  • Does the removal of a judge without a formal inquiry violate the fundamental right to a fair trial and due process under Article 10A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaukat Ali, Azeem Hassan Mushtaq vs The State2024 SCP 19, 2024 SCMR 594, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 98 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-15
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationperverse orderopinion of investigating officeripse dixitocular accountmedical evidencemurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, assailing the Lahore High Court order granting post-arrest bail to the respondent in a murder case registered under Sections 302, 34, and 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The core legal question concerns whether bail was rightly granted by the High Court based solely on a subsequent investigating officer's opinion favoring the accused while ignoring ocular and medical evidence. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, setting aside the impugned order and recalling the bail. The ratio laid down is that an investigating officer's ipse dixit or opinion lacks persuasive value if unsupported by cogent and concrete material, and an order granting bail by ignoring direct eyewitness accounts and medical evidence while relying on a partisan police opinion is perverse and liable to be cancelled under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted solely on the basis of a subsequent investigating officer's opinion favoring the accused?
  • Does an investigating officer's opinion carry persuasive value in the absence of strong and concrete material?
  • When can a bail-granting order be classified as a perverse order warranting cancellation?
  • Can a bail order be recalled if the High Court ignores material evidence such as ocular and medical accounts?
  Read full judgment →
• Shameem Khan vs The State2024 SCP 283, 2024 SCMR 1802 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-08-08
  reduction of death sentencemitigating circumstancessingle fire shotconfessional statementacceptance of confession in entiretySection 302(b) PPCSection 382-B Cr.P.C.vicarious liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose out of the appellant's conviction under Section 302(b) and Section 392 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and Section 13 of the Arms Ordinance, wherein the Federal Shariat Court had confirmed his death sentence for killing a van driver during an attempted robbery. Counsel for the appellant did not press for acquittal, seeking solely the reduction of the death penalty to life imprisonment on grounds of mitigating circumstances, including parity with the co-convict who received life imprisonment under Section 302(b)/34 PPC. The Supreme Court observed that the appellant fired only a single shot, which serves as a recognized mitigating factor attracting the alternate penalty of life imprisonment. Additionally, the appellant’s judicial confession under Section 164 Cr.P.C. established that the co-convict had persuaded and abetted the offence, and settled law dictates that a confession must be accepted or discarded in its entirety. Consequently, the Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, reducing the death sentence to imprisonment for life, ordering all sentences to run concurrently, and granting the benefit of Section 382-B Cr.P.C.

  Questions settled

  • Whether firing only a single shot from a firearm during the commission of murder constitutes a mitigating circumstance warranting the alternate sentence of imprisonment for life under Section 302(b) PPC?
  • Whether a confessional statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. must be accepted or discarded in its entirety, including portions beneficial to the accused?
  • Can a death sentence be reduced to life imprisonment to maintain parity where a vicariously liable co-convict who abetted and shared common intention was awarded the lesser sentence of life imprisonment?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaista Habib vs Muhammad Arif Habib and others2024 SCP 131, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 629, 2024 PLJ SC 537 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-03-06
  child custodywelfare of the minorhizanatsecond marriage of motherintelligent preferencevisitation rightsguardian and wardschild friendly courts
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard an appeal against a High Court judgment that had affirmed the transfer of a minor child's custody from the mother to the father. The lower courts had primarily based their decisions on the mother's second marriage and the minor reaching the age of seven. The Supreme Court set aside these orders, emphasizing that the 'welfare of the minor' is the paramount and overarching consideration in custody disputes, to which the rights and aspirations of parents are subservient. The Court noted that the minor, who was mature and intelligent, expressed a strong preference to remain with his mother, viewing his father as a stranger due to lack of visitation. The Court held that a mother's second marriage or financial status cannot be stand-alone grounds for disqualification. Furthermore, the Court highlighted the State's constitutional obligation under Articles 35 and 37 to protect the child, directing the establishment of child-friendly courts and specialized training for judges to assess the psychological and emotional needs of children in litigation.

  Read full judgment →
• Shahzad Amir Farid vs Mst. Sobia Amir Farid and others2024 SCP 151, 2024 SCMR 1292, 2024 PLJ SC 532 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-30
  maintenance allowanceinterim maintenancestriking off defencefamily courtconstitutional petitionvexatious litigationminor children
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional writ petition challenging orders passed by the Family Court and the District Court. The core legal question involved the legality of striking off the petitioner's defence and decreeing a maintenance suit due to his contumacious failure to pay interim maintenance for his minor children as ordered under Section 17-A of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964. The Supreme Court held that the Family Court lawfully possessed the authority to strike off the defence and proceed with the suit upon non-compliance with interim maintenance orders after due notice. The ratio decidendi is that persistent failure to comply with interim maintenance orders issued under family laws justifies the striking off of a litigant's defence and the decreeing of claims based on record. The Court affirmed that high courts rightly decline to interfere in such determinations under writ jurisdiction absent substantive illegality or procedural impropriety, dismissing the petition with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Family Court has the lawful authority to strike off the defence of a defendant for failing to pay interim maintenance?
  • Can a High Court interfere with the quantum of maintenance determined by a Family Court in exercise of its constitutional writ jurisdiction?
  • Does persistent non-compliance with court orders regarding interim maintenance constitute vexatious litigation and an abuse of court process?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahtaj Sugar Mills Ltd. and others vs Govt. of Pakistan thr. Secretary2024 SCP 244, 2024 SCMR 1656, PTCL 2024 CL. 785 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-07-25
  special excise dutyexcessive delegationdelegated legislationconstitutional interpretationtax refunddoctrine of binding precedentjudicial reviewFederal Excise Act 2005
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan addresses the vires of section 3A of the Federal Excise Act 2005, inserted via the Finance Act 2007, and the accompanying notification levying special excise duty. The core legal questions involved whether section 3A suffered from excessive and impermissible delegation of legislative power and whether a High Court could take a contrary view on a notification whose validity had already been upheld by the Supreme Court. The Court held that section 3A validly delegated only ancillary and incidental functions, keeping essential legislative policy intact, and thus did not violate the doctrine of excessive delegation. Furthermore, a prior final judgment of the Supreme Court upholding the notification bound all courts, precluding contrary findings by the Sindh High Court, and refunds of indirect taxes could not be ordered without satisfying statutory conditions under section 44 of the Federal Excise Act 2005. The key principles laid down include the presumption of constitutionality of statutes, the narrow grounds for striking down legislation under the delegation doctrine, and the stringent procedural prerequisites for claiming tax refunds.

  Questions settled

  • Whether section 3A of the Federal Excise Act 2005 suffers from impermissible and excessive delegation of legislative power?
  • Does a judgment of the Supreme Court upholding a statutory notification attain finality so as to bar a High Court from taking a contrary view?
  • Can a court order the refund of special excise duty without the claimant fulfilling the conditions prescribed under section 44 of the Federal Excise Act 2005?
  • What are the established grounds and limitations for striking down a legislative enactment on the touchstone of constitutionality?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahbaz Ahmad Khan vs Learned Election Appellate Tribunal and others2024 SCP 54 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-31
  nomination papersgeneral electionselection symbolelection appealballot papers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan via a leave petition filed by Shahbaz Ahmad Khan against the Election Appellate Tribunal and others concerning the rejection of nomination papers. The core legal question involves the validity of the rejection of the appellant's nomination papers for constituency NA-144 (Khanewal) for the General Elections of 2024. The Court held that the petition should be converted into an appeal and allowed, setting aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and the orders of the lower fora. Consequently, the nomination papers of the appellant are deemed accepted, his name is ordered to be included in the final list of candidates, an election symbol must be allocated by the Election Commission, and his name and symbol must appear on the ballot papers for the scheduled election on 08.02.2024. The key principle laid down is that qualified candidates wrongfully excluded from nomination stages must be reinstated expeditiously to ensure participation in the general elections.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court can convert a leave petition into an appeal and set aside the rejection of nomination papers?
  • Does the Election Commission have a duty to allocate an election symbol upon the acceptance of a candidate's nomination papers?
  • Must a candidate's name and election symbol appear on the ballot papers for the scheduled general election once the nomination is restored?
  Read full judgment →
• Shah Madar Khan vs Tariq Daud and others2024 SCP 184, 2024 SCMR 1319, 2024 PLJ SC 654 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-05-09
  power of attorneyregistered documentsuit for declarationcancellation of documentsburden of proofspecific pleadingssignature comparison
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arose from a suit for declaration filed by the respondent-plaintiff, who claimed to be the owner of a suit plot and asserted that he never appointed the defendants as his attorneys or authorized the transfer of his property. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the first appellate court and the High Court in revision decreed it in the plaintiff's favor. The Supreme Court of Pakistan analyzed the evidence and noted that the plaintiff himself summoned the record keeper from the Sub-Registrar's office and exhibited the registered power of attorney as Exh.PW-1/1. The Court held that since the plaintiff himself proved the existence of the registered power of attorney and failed to discharge the initial onus of proving forgery—such as by seeking forensic comparison of his signatures—the presumption of correctness attached to the registered document remained unrebutted. Furthermore, the Court ruled that where a registered document is challenged, the plaintiff must seek its cancellation under Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act 1877, rather than a mere declaration under Section 42. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the appellate and revisional decrees, restoring the trial court's dismissal of the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff challenging a registered power of attorney must specifically plead and prove the grounds of fraud or forgery rather than making general denials?
  • Does the initial burden of proof shift to the defendant when the plaintiff himself summons the registration record and exhibits the registered power of attorney?
  • Is a suit for declaration under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 maintainable when the appropriate remedy is to seek the cancellation of a registered document under Section 39 of the same Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. Bashir Ahmad and others vs Muhammad Asadullah (deceased)2024 SCP 357, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 1262 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-10-17
  Public Account of the FederationDiamer-Bhasha and Mohmand Dams FundImplementation BenchJudicial oversightConstitutional jurisdictionWAPDA
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the management of the 'Supreme Court of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of Pakistan Diamer-Bhasha and Mohmand Dams Fund' and the role of the Supreme Court's Implementation Bench. The Government of Pakistan and the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) sought the transfer of funds held in a specific Supreme Court-named account to the Public Account of the Federation. The core questions addressed were the constitutional propriety of the Court holding such funds and the necessity of continued judicial oversight via an Implementation Bench and periodic progress reports. The Court held that the funds must be transferred to the Public Account of the Federation pursuant to Article 78(2)(b) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and the account should be closed. Furthermore, the Court determined that the Implementation Bench, having lost its members to retirement, was no longer functional, and WAPDA was relieved of the obligation to submit further progress reports. The principle established is that judicial bodies should not hold public funds, which must instead be credited to the Public Account of the Federation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether funds deposited in an account named after the Supreme Court of Pakistan must be transferred to the Public Account of the Federation?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to maintain an Implementation Bench for monitoring construction projects indefinitely?
  • Is WAPDA required to submit periodic progress reports to the Supreme Court in the absence of an active Implementation Bench?
  Read full judgment →
• Senior General Manager, Pakistan Railways, etc. vs Muhammad Pervaiz2024 SCP 21, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 508, 2024 PLJ SC 234, 2024 SCMR 581 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-20
  advance incrementshigher educational qualificationservice appealjudicial review of policyPakistan RailwaysFederal Service TribunalL.L.B. degree
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal with leave of the court challenged the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had allowed the respondent-employee's service appeal and held him entitled to receive advance increments for acquiring a higher qualification of L.L.B. The core legal question was whether an employee of Pakistan Railways who had already received advance increments for attaining a Master of Arts degree was further entitled to advance increments on acquiring an L.L.B. degree under the applicable incentive policies and notifications. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Tribunal's judgment, holding that advance increments for an L.L.B. degree were specifically restricted to employees working in organizations dispensing justice or directly connected with court work, and further subject to the condition that no duplicate increments were admissible if an employee had already received them for an M.A. or M.Sc. degree. The court laid down the principle that government policies providing incentives for higher education must be interpreted in light of their underlying rationale and job-related objectives, and that the judicial review of executive policy is limited to examining arbitrariness, discrimination, or constitutional violations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee who has already received advance increments for acquiring a Master's degree is entitled to additional advance increments upon obtaining an L.L.B. degree?
  • Are advance increments for acquiring an L.L.B. degree admissible to employees of departments not directly connected with the work of dispensing justice?
  • What is the scope and purview of the judicial review of government policies by the superior courts?
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