Pakistan Case LawLatest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.
- Mubarik Ahmad Sani vs The State and another2024 SCP 60, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 111, 2024 SCMR 1303 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-02-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a criminal petition seeking the deletion of charges and a separate petition for post-arrest bail arising from FIR No. 661/22. The petitioner was charged under the Punjab Holy Quran (Printing and Recording) Act, 2011, and sections 298-C and 295-B of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, for allegedly distributing a proscribed book in 2019. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner could be charged for an act that was not an offence at the time of commission and whether the evidence supported the framed charges. The Supreme Court held that the distribution of the book was not an offence in 2019, as the relevant amendment was enacted in 2021, rendering the charge violative of Article 12 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Court found the FIR and police report lacked evidence to sustain the charges under sections 298-C and 295-B of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The Court emphasized that religious compulsion violates fundamental rights and constitutional mandates. Consequently, the Court deleted the charges and granted bail, noting the petitioner had already served double the maximum potential sentence.
Questions settled- Can a person be prosecuted for an act that was not an offence at the time of its commission?
- Does the continued incarceration of an accused beyond the maximum potential sentence for an offence violate fundamental rights?
- Can a court delete charges from a case if the FIR and police report fail to disclose the necessary ingredients of the alleged offences?
- Does the principle of no compulsion in religion constitute a fundamental right under the Constitution of Pakistan?
- Mst. Uzma Mukhtar vs The State thr. Deputy Attorney General and another2024 SCP 214, 2024 SCMR 1520 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-06-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal petition for leave to appeal arose from a cybercrime case where the complainant (petitioner) alleged that the accused (respondent No. 2) harassed, blackmailed, and threatened her using her personal pictures. The FIR was registered under Sections 36 and 37 of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance 2002 (ETO) along with Sections 500, 506, and 509 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (PPC). During trial, the trial court deleted the ETO charges as inapplicable and transferred the case. The petitioner sought to alter the charge to include Sections 20, 21, and 24 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016 (PECA). The trial court and High Court rejected this, noting PECA was enacted after the alleged offences. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld these findings, holding that PECA 2016 could not be applied retrospectively under Article 12 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Furthermore, the Court ruled that Sections 36 and 37 of the ETO 2002 were not attracted as the accused did not unauthorizedly access, alter, or impair any information system.
Questions settled- Can the provisions of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016 be applied retrospectively to offences committed prior to its enactment?
- Does Article 12 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 bar the prosecution of an accused under a penal statute that was not in field at the time of the alleged commission of the offence?
- What constitutes unauthorized access or damage to an information system under Sections 36 and 37 of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance 2002?
- Mst. Tahira Samina and others vs Javed Saeed Tariq and others2024 SCMR 24 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-10-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a property dispute between brothers regarding the validity of a registered gift deed executed in 1991. The predecessor of the petitioners (plaintiff) challenged the gift deed twenty years later, after the respondent (defendant) attempted to mutate the property in his name in the cantonment records. The core legal question was whether the gift deed was validly executed under Islamic law, specifically regarding the essential ingredients of offer, acceptance, and delivery of possession, and whether the suit was barred by limitation. The Supreme Court held that the gift deed was invalid because the essential ingredients of a valid gift under Islamic law were not fulfilled, as the defendant was not present in Pakistan at the time of registration, and no evidence of acceptance or delivery of possession existed. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the limitation period for challenging the deed commenced when the defendant first asserted his rights through the mutation attempt. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower courts' judgments, decreed the plaintiff's suit for cancellation of the gift deed, and dismissed the defendant's suit for possession.
Questions settled- What are the essential ingredients for the completion of a valid gift under Islamic law?
- Does the registration of a gift deed alone satisfy the requirements for a valid gift if the essential ingredients of offer, acceptance, and delivery of possession are missing?
- When does the limitation period commence for a suit challenging a registered gift deed?
- Can a gift deed be upheld if the donor remains in possession of the property and the donee fails to prove acceptance and delivery of possession?
- Mst. Sehat Bibi d/o late Daulat Khan vs Bahar Khan s/o late Daulat Khan &2024 SCP 124, 2024 SCMR 938 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-12-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arises from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Balochistan which decreed the appellant's suit for a share in sale proceeds rather than land. The core legal question was whether a female legal heir, wrongfully deprived of her inheritance through a fraudulent oral gift mutation, is entitled to a physical share in the estate's property or merely a portion of the sale proceeds where third-party rights have been created. The Supreme Court held that legal heirs inherit property immediately upon the predecessor's death, and an illegal mutation procured by fraud cannot divest an heir of their absolute statutory share. The Court ruled that the appellant is entitled to her full one-third share out of the entire property left by her late father, rather than the sale price, and that the fraudulent mutation and subsequent transfers based upon it stand cancelled, with adjustments made from the brother's share for any land already sold to third parties.
Questions settled- Whether a legal heir is entitled to receive their actual share from the legacy of their predecessor instead of receiving a share in the sale proceeds when an illegal mutation has been set aside?
- Can an oral gift mutation executed to the total exclusion of a female legal heir be sustained without the production of best evidence?
- Does a legal heir inherit property the very moment their predecessor passes away?
- What is the effect of an illegal and fraudulent inheritance mutation on subsequent property transactions?
- Mst. Samrana Nawaz, etc. vs MCB Bank Ltd., etc2024 SCP 166, 2024 CLD 1186, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 873, 2025 PLJ SC 77 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-05-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter came before a larger Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan to resolve a conflict regarding the interpretation of the second proviso to Rule 90 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal questions were whether an applicant challenging an auction sale must deposit up to twenty percent of the sale amount at the time of filing the application, and how this provision interacts with Section 19(7) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001. The Court held that the deposit or security is not required at the time of filing; rather, it is a condition precedent that the court must first determine the specific amount or security and direct the applicant to deposit it. The word "entertain" means to adjudicate or consider on merits, not the mere receipt of the application. Furthermore, the Court determined that Section 19(7) of the Ordinance of 2001 is complementary to, and does not exclude, Rule 90 of Order XXI of the Code. The Court overruled contrary precedents, establishing that executing courts must first direct the deposit before dismissing applications for non-compliance.
Questions settled- Whether the second proviso to Rule 90 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 requires an applicant to deposit the sale amount at the time of filing the objection petition or only upon the direction of the court?
- What is the legal meaning of the word 'entertained' in the context of the second proviso to Rule 90 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Does Section 19(7) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 exclude the application of Rule 90 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in banking execution proceedings?
- Mst. Saima Noreen and others vs The State2024 SCP 171, 2024 SCMR 1310, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 319 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-05-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arose from the conviction and death sentences awarded to Mst. Saima Noreen and Muhammad Shafique under Section 302(b)/34 PPC for the strangulation murder of Muhammad Akmal. The High Court had previously converted their death sentences to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court, upon reappraisal of the evidence, identified significant material contradictions between the testimonies of the alleged eyewitnesses (PW-3 and PW-4) and the medical evidence. Key discrepancies included the unexplained presence of tranquilizers in the deceased's system, the failure to produce natural witnesses like the deceased's daughter, and the lack of explanation regarding how a computer-typed FIR application was prepared in the middle of the night. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt, noting that the occurrence appeared unwitnessed and the eyewitnesses' conduct was unnatural. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions, drawing an adverse inference under Article 129(g) of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, for the non-production of material witnesses.
- Mst. Rehmat Begum vs Mehfooz Ahmed and others2024 SCP 376, 2024 CLD 1254, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 1108 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-08-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil petition challenged a High Court judgment that set aside the rejection of a plaint in a suit for specific performance of a contract regarding the sale of a 50% partnership share. The petitioner argued that the suit was barred by the Companies Act, 2017, and that the proper remedy was a suit for dissolution of partnership. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, in a piecemeal fashion or based on the defendant's contentions. The Court affirmed that the Companies Act, 2017, does not apply to non-corporate partnership firms. Furthermore, the Court established that a suit for specific performance is not limited to immovable property and is maintainable for movable property, including partnership shares. Where a suit involves mixed questions of law and fact, the proper approach is to proceed to trial rather than summarily rejecting the plaint. The Court emphasized that the plaint must be read as a whole to determine if a cause of action exists.
Questions settled- Can a plaint be rejected in part or piecemeal under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Does the Companies Act 2017 apply to a partnership firm that is not a corporate entity?
- Is a suit for specific performance of a contract to sell a partnership share maintainable without seeking dissolution of the partnership?
- Should a court reject a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the case involves mixed questions of law and fact?
- Mst. Qurat-ul-Ain vs Station House Officer, Police Station Saddar Jalalpur2024 SCMR 486 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-12-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a challenge to a High Court order that, in its constitutional jurisdiction, granted interim custody of a minor to the paternal grandmother based solely on the mother's remarriage. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and set aside the High Court's order. The Court held that the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 is barred where an adequate alternative remedy exists, such as the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. The Court emphasized that a writ of habeas corpus in custody matters is an extraordinary remedy, not to be used as a routine mechanism to bypass the Guardian Court. Furthermore, the Court clarified that a mother's remarriage does not automatically disqualify her from custody; the paramount consideration remains the welfare of the minor. The Court established that High Courts should exercise extreme caution in family matters, avoiding the involvement of law enforcement agencies unless there is evidence of criminality or abduction, and affirmed that custody disputes must be resolved by the competent Guardian Court.
Questions settled- Can a High Court exercise constitutional jurisdiction to determine child custody when an alternative remedy under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 is available?
- Does a mother's remarriage automatically disqualify her from the right to custody of her minor child under Islamic law?
- Under what circumstances may a High Court issue a writ of habeas corpus for the production of a minor?
- Is the text of D.F. Mulla's 'Principles of Mahomedan Law' a binding statutory authority in Pakistan?
- Mst. Nazeeran and others vs Ali Bux and others2024 SCP 18, 2024 SCMR 1271 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-12-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute over the validity of registered sale deeds and subsequent mutations. The respondents (original plaintiffs) alleged that the appellants, who were initially lessees of the suit land, had fraudulently fabricated sale deeds and tampered with revenue records while the land was mortgaged to a bank. The core legal questions involved the burden of proof when challenging registered documents, the validity of a contract executed by a minor, and the court's power to visually compare signatures. The Supreme Court held that while a presumption of correctness attaches to registered documents under Articles 85 and 129 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, such presumption is rebuttable. Once the respondents produced evidence of fraud—specifically that one executant was a minor—the burden shifted to the beneficiaries to prove the transaction's genuineness. The Court affirmed that a minor's contract is void ab initio and that courts possess plenary power under Article 84 of the Q.S.O. to compare signatures. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the High Court's reversal of the first appellate court's judgment.
Questions settled- Whether a mere denial by an executant is sufficient to shift the burden of proof onto the beneficiary of a registered sale deed?
- What is the legal status of a contract or sale deed executed by a minor under Pakistani law?
- Can a trial court exercise powers under Article 84 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order to compare signatures without referring the matter to a handwriting expert?
- Does the failure to mention a prior mortgage in a sale deed affect the credibility and validity of that document?
- Is a de facto guardian of a minor legally empowered to transfer the minor's interest in immovable property?
- Mst. Mussarrat Shaheen vs Mst. Verbeena Khan Afroz and others2024 SCMR 1796 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-08-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition challenged a High Court order that affirmed an eviction decree against the petitioner/tenant in favor of the respondent/landlady. The core legal question was whether a tenant, by asserting ownership of the rented premises and initiating a separate civil suit for declaration, can resist eviction proceedings initiated under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly restored the Rent Controller's order, which was based on established evidence of a landlord-tenant relationship, willful default in rent payment, and the landlady's personal bona fide need. The Court affirmed the principle that a tenant cannot maintain occupancy of rented premises merely by asserting ownership or filing a separate civil suit. The established legal procedure requires the tenant to first vacate the premises and then pursue the civil suit for title; if successful, the tenant may then seek to regain possession. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, as the petitioner failed to demonstrate any illegality or infirmity in the High Court's well-reasoned judgment.
Questions settled- Can a tenant resist eviction proceedings by asserting ownership of the premises and filing a separate civil suit for declaration?
- Is a tenant required to vacate the premises before contesting the landlord's title in a separate civil suit?
- Does the initiation of a civil suit for specific performance of a sale agreement provide a legal basis for a tenant to remain in possession of rented premises?
- Mst. Johan Bano and others vs Mehraban Shah & others2024 SCP 137, 2024 SCMR 1096, 2024 PLJ SC 498, 2024 PLJ SC 586 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil petition arises from a long-standing property dispute concerning an oral exchange of land made in 1945 between the predecessors of the parties, which was later affirmed through an exchange deed in 1980 and reflected in the revenue records (jamabandis and khasra girdawaris) in the column of cultivators. After the death of their predecessor, the petitioners managed to enter an inheritance mutation of the suit land in their own names based solely on ownership entries in the revenue record, prompting the respondents to file a civil suit for a declaration of ownership. The Trial Court decreed the petitioners' suit and dismissed the respondents' suit, but the Appellate Court reversed this decision and decreed the respondents' suit, which was subsequently upheld by the High Court in revision. The Supreme Court evaluated the concurrent findings of fact, the statutory presumption of truth attached to revenue records under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act 1967, and the legal nature of inheritance mutations. The Court held that mutations do not confer title, that long-standing revenue entries carry a presumption of truth which the petitioners failed to rebut, and that concurrent findings of fact based on proper appraisal of evidence do not warrant interference. Leave to appeal was refused and the petition was dismissed.
Questions settled- Does an inheritance mutation by itself create title to immovable property?
- What is the evidentiary value of entries in periodical records of rights such as jamabandis and khasra girdawaris?
- Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by lower courts in the absence of a substantial question of law or grave miscarriage of justice?
- Mst. Ishrat Bibi vs The State through Prosecutor General, Punjab and another2024 SCP 200, 2024 SCMR 1528, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 279 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-05-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal petition arose from a request for post-arrest bail by the petitioner, Mst. Ishrat Bibi, who was implicated in an FIR involving murder and conspiracy charges. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, a woman, was entitled to bail under the first proviso to Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), particularly given the rule of consistency, as other co-accused had already been granted bail. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail. The Court emphasized that the first proviso to Section 497(1) Cr.P.C. acts as beneficial legislation, mandating that for women, minors, and the sick or infirm, bail should be granted as a rule and refused as an exception, regardless of the offence category. Furthermore, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine of parity, holding that where co-accused have been granted bail and the prosecution's case relies on supplementary statements implicating the petitioner without direct evidence of a specific role, the petitioner is entitled to the same relief. The Court concluded that the petitioner's case warranted further inquiry, justifying her release on bail.
Questions settled- Does the first proviso to Section 497(1) Cr.P.C. mandate the grant of bail to a woman accused of an offence falling within the prohibitory clause?
- Can the rule of consistency be applied to grant bail to an accused when co-accused persons have already been enlarged on bail?
- Does the doctrine of 'further inquiry' at the bail stage require a tentative assessment of the prosecution's evidence?
- Is the principle of vicarious liability under Section 34 PPC applicable for consideration at the bail stage?
- Mst. Iqbal Bibi & others vs Kareem Hussain Shah & others2024 SCP 152, 2024 SCMR 1233 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-02-01Read full judgment →
- Mst. Haseena Bibi vs Abdul Haleem, etc2024 SCP 20, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 291 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that set aside concurrent findings of the Family Court and District Judge, which had decreed the recovery of dower and maintenance in favor of the appellant. The core legal question was whether an agreement (Iqrarnama) executed without the wife's participation, which purported to waive her right to dower and the custody of her minor child in exchange for divorce, was legally valid and enforceable. The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to appreciate the evidence and the law. The Court ruled that dower is a fundamental right under Islamic law, protected by statute, and cannot be waived through agreements to which the wife is not a party. Furthermore, any agreement where a mother purports to waive her statutory right of Hizanat (custody) is void, against public policy, and unenforceable. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the decree for the recovery of dower, affirming that statutory rights regarding dower and child custody cannot be compromised by such agreements.
Questions settled- Can a wife's right to dower be waived through an agreement to which she is not a party?
- Is an agreement by a mother to waive her right to the custody of a minor child legally enforceable?
- Does the principle of estoppel apply against a statutory right like the right to dower?
- Are agreements that contravene public policy regarding child custody void under the Contract Act?
- Mst. Farzana Zia and others vs Mst. Saadia Andaleeb and others2024 SCP 118, 2024 SCMR 916 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-03-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Islamabad High Court setting aside concurrent findings of the lower courts which had declared a release deed executed by female legal heirs in favour of their brother to be void ab initio. The dispute concerned inheritance of an immovable property in Islamabad left by the deceased father of the parties. The female appellants challenged the release deed, contending it was secured through fraud and misrepresentation under the guise of transferring the property jointly to all legal heirs. The Supreme Court evaluated the evidence, noting the lack of consideration, absence of family settlement, and contradictions in the testimonies of marginal witnesses. The Court held that a release or relinquishment deed and a gift deed possess distinct legal characteristics and cannot be used interchangeably, and that transactions depriving female heirs of inheritance without valid consideration or conscious relinquishment violate both law and Shariah. The Court reaffirmed that a revisional court cannot lightly interfere with well-reasoned concurrent findings of fact unless they are perverse or suffer from misreading or non-reading of evidence. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the concurrent judgments of the trial and appellate courts.
Questions settled- Whether a release deed executed by female heirs relinquishing their inheritance shares without consideration can be treated as a valid gift?
- Under what circumstances can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
- Does a release or relinquishment deed require valid consideration or a demonstrable family settlement to be legally enforceable against female co-sharers?
- What is the evidentiary significance of marginal witnesses contradicting the due execution and reading over of a release deed allegedly signed by female family members?
- Mst. AksarJan and others vs Mst. Shamim Akhtar and others2024 SCP 336, 2025 SCMR 88 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-09-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a long-standing inheritance dispute involving the estate of a deceased Muslim man, where the widows were allegedly deprived of their shares through fraudulent gift mutations and an unsubstantiated, undated agreement (Razi Nama). The core legal questions were whether the purported agreement, which lacked consideration and proper execution, could legally divest a widow of her inheritance rights, and whether the High Court erred in remanding the case on peripheral technicalities rather than addressing the merits of the inheritance claim. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision to remand was unjustified, as it overlooked the fraudulent nature of the documents and the clear denial of inheritance rights. The Court restored the original appellate decree in favor of the widow, emphasizing that inheritance rights under Islamic Shariah are absolute upon death. The key principle laid down is that courts must be vigilant in protecting inheritance rights, particularly of females, and must not allow procedural technicalities or fraudulent documentation to facilitate the deprivation of such rights, with the imposition of substantial costs on those employing such tactics.
Questions settled- Can an agreement (Razi Nama) lacking consideration and proper execution be used to divest a legal heir of their inheritance?
- Is a remand order by the High Court justified when the underlying dispute involves clear fraudulent attempts to deprive heirs of their rights?
- Does the court have the authority to impose costs on parties who employ fraudulent tactics to delay the distribution of an estate?
- Mrs. Faryal Arif Latif vs Mr. Arif Latif2024 SCP 417, 2025 SCMR 395, 2025 PLJ SC 120 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-10-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from two civil petitions for leave to appeal directed against orders of the Lahore High Court upholding the restoration of a civil suit. The respondent had filed a civil suit for declaration and possession, which was dismissed for non-prosecution under Order IX Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the plaintiff failed to produce documentary evidence due to unarranged records following an administrative transfer of the case file. The Trial Court subsequently restored the suit upon an application filed under Order IX Rule 9, a decision affirmed by the High Court in revision and review. The core legal question addressed is whether sufficient cause was shown for non-appearance to warrant the restoration of a suit dismissed in default, and whether past conduct can override a valid cause shown for a specific default. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the plaintiff established sufficient cause for non-appearance on the date of dismissal, and that past conduct alone cannot defeat a restoration application if valid cause is otherwise made out. The Court also emphasized the need for comprehensive case management systems and stage-wise timelines in civil and criminal proceedings to prevent systemic delays.
Questions settled- Whether past defaults and conduct of a party can be used as a sole ground to dismiss a restoration application under Order IX Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when sufficient cause for non-appearance on the specific date of dismissal is shown?
- Does an administrative transfer of a case file from one court to another dispense with the requirement of notice to the parties by the transferee court?
- Whether a court is mandated to consider past failures before restoring a suit dismissed for non-prosecution under Order IX Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Mr. Muhammad Hassanullah (Omg/B-18), Acting Additional Secretary,2024 SCP 303, 2025 SCMR 134, 2025 PLC (C.S.) 287 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-09-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from separate petitions for leave to appeal filed by an Acting Additional Secretary and the Government of Balochistan against a High Court judgment. The respondents, civil servants belonging to the Balochistan Secretariat Service, had successfully challenged the petitioner's posting as Acting Additional Secretary under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, despite having already filed an appeal on the same matter before the Balochistan Service Tribunal. The core legal question was whether the High Court could exercise its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 in matters relating to the terms and conditions of civil servants, given the express bar under Article 212 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court converted the petitions into appeals and set aside the High Court's judgment. The Court held that Article 212 contains a non obstante clause that overrides Article 199, vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the Service Tribunal over terms and conditions of service, including transfers and postings, even where questions of mala fide, coram non judice, or violations of fundamental rights are raised.
Questions settled- Does the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 oust the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 in matters concerning the transfer and posting of civil servants?
- Can a civil servant bypass the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal by raising grounds of fundamental rights violations or mala fide in a High Court petition?
- Is a High Court competent to entertain a writ petition regarding terms and conditions of service when an appeal on the same matter is pending before the Service Tribunal?
- Moulvi Abdul Fateh vs Yar Muhammad and others2024 SCP 343, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 1223 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-09-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a High Court judgment granting succession certificates to the respondents regarding the estate of the deceased, Moulvi Abdul Sattar. The petitioner, the deceased's brother, challenged the respondents' status as legitimate children, alleging they were adopted, and argued that the summary nature of proceedings under the Succession Act, 1925, was inappropriate for resolving such disputes. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, noting that the respondents had produced substantial oral and documentary evidence, including official records, to establish their parentage. The Court held that the petitioner failed to provide any evidence to support his claims. Crucially, the Court affirmed that succession proceedings are summary in nature and not the appropriate forum for challenging paternity. Furthermore, the Court laid down the principle that a third party, such as a brother, lacks the legal character to challenge the paternity or legitimacy of children in succession proceedings without first obtaining a declaration through a competent civil court. Additionally, only a putative father may challenge paternity within the time limits prescribed by law.
Questions settled- Can a third party challenge the paternity or legitimacy of children during summary succession proceedings?
- Is a succession application under the Succession Act 1925 the appropriate forum for determining disputed questions of title or parentage?
- Does a brother have the legal character to challenge the paternity of his deceased brother's children without a substantive civil suit?
- Mohsin Raza Gondal and others vs Sardar Mahmood and others2024 SCP 308, 2025 SCMR 104, 2025 PLC (C.S.) 154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-09-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
Civil petitions under Article 185(3) of the Constitution were filed challenging a High Court judgment that set aside the regularization of contractual employees (BS-16 to BS-18) in the Bureau of Emigration & Overseas Employment and referred their cases to the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC). The core legal questions were whether a Cabinet Sub-Committee has lawful authority to regularize contractual employees in BS-16 and above bypassing FPSC examinations and statutory recruitment rules, and whether an illegal regularization can be shielded under the doctrine of past and closed transactions. The Supreme Court held that initial appointments to BS-16 and above must strictly follow competitive examinations by the FPSC pursuant to Article 242 of the Constitution, the Civil Servants Act 1973, and the APT Rules 1973. The Cabinet Sub-Committee lacked jurisdiction over posts in BS-16 and above, rendering its recommendations void ab initio. The Court affirmed that void actions cannot be protected as past and closed transactions, dismissed the petitions, and upheld the reference to the FPSC.
Questions settled- Does a Cabinet Sub-Committee have the lawful authority to regularize contractual employees in Basic Pay Scales 16 and above bypassing the Federal Public Service Commission?
- Does the regularization of a contractual employee constitute a fresh appointment into the civil service stream?
- Can an appointment or regularization that is void ab initio be protected under the doctrine of past and closed transactions?
- Are posts in Basic Pay Scale 16 and above required to be filled through tests and examinations conducted by the Federal Public Service Commission unless expressly excluded?
- Misree Khan & others vs Abdul Ghafoor & others2024 SCP 384, 2025 PLD Supreme Court 24, 2025 PLJ SC 207 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-11-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment upholding the rejection of a plaint on the grounds of limitation. The petitioners challenged the rejection of their suit, which sought a declaration regarding the illegality of certain mutations sanctioned in 1975. The core legal questions addressed were whether the plaint was barred by limitation and whether a first appeal is maintainable against an order rejecting a plaint passed by a court exercising revisional jurisdiction. The Court held that the plaint was indeed time-barred, as the cause of action had accrued well before the suit was instituted. Regarding the second question, the Court clarified that an order rejecting a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, while classified as a decree under Section 2(2), is not appealable under Section 96 when passed by a court exercising revisional jurisdiction, as that jurisdiction is not original. The key principle laid down is that while a revisional court's rejection of a plaint constitutes a decree, it is not subject to first appeal; the appropriate remedy for an aggrieved party in such instances is a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973.
Questions settled- Is a plaint liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if the suit is instituted beyond the limitation period?
- Does an order rejecting a plaint passed by a court exercising revisional jurisdiction constitute a decree appealable under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Is a second revision application permissible under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- What is the appropriate legal remedy for an aggrieved party against an order of rejection of plaint passed by a court in its revisional jurisdiction?
- Mir Muhammad s/o Mir Hassan vs The State through Prosecutor General2024 SCP 62, 2024 SCMR 805 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal petition for leave to appeal challenged the High Court's order declining pre-arrest bail to the petitioner, who was nominated in an FIR for attempted murder and other offences. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail given the contradictions between the FIR allegations, the medico-legal report, and the findings of a Special Medical Board. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail, confirming the ad-interim bail previously granted. The Court reasoned that the significant discrepancies—specifically the divergence between the firearm injury alleged in the FIR and the medical evidence, coupled with the Special Medical Board's conclusion that the injuries were fabricated—warranted further inquiry. The Court emphasized that pre-arrest bail is intended to protect innocent individuals from mala fide prosecution. It established that while the gravity of an accusation is relevant, it does not preclude bail when reasonable grounds exist to suggest false implication or ulterior motives, and that the investigative role of the police should not be interfered with unless mala fide or abuse of power is evident.
Questions settled- Does a significant discrepancy between the FIR allegations and the medical evidence constitute grounds for further inquiry in a pre-arrest bail application?
- What is the scope of judicial intervention in the investigation process conducted by the police?
- Is the gravity of an accusation the sole determinant for refusing pre-arrest bail when reasonable grounds for false implication exist?
- Can the findings of a Special Medical Board regarding the fabrication of injuries be considered during the tentative assessment for bail?
- Mir Hammal Khan vs Election Commission of Pakistan, thr. Secretary, Islamabad and others2024 SCP 403, 2025 SCMR 584 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-11-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard a civil appeal arising from the dismissal of an election petition by the Election Tribunal Balochistan under Section 139 of the Elections Act, 2017. The appellant challenged the election of the returned candidate from constituency PB-28 Kech-IV, alleging illegal and corrupt practices, bogus voting with polling staff connivance at three polling stations, and disproportionately high voter turnout. The Supreme Court addressed whether corrupt and illegal practices were established and the effect of failing to submit original, duly sworn affidavits of witnesses under Section 144(2)(a) of the Elections Act, 2017. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that allegations of corrupt and illegal practices constitute quasi-criminal charges requiring strict, cogent proof beyond reasonable doubt, which the appellant failed to provide. Furthermore, producing only photocopies or marked notarized documents rather than original sworn affidavits failed the mandatory statutory requirements, rendering the evidence inadmissible. Conduct prescribed to be performed in a specific manner must be performed in that manner or treated as non-est.
Questions settled- What is the standard of proof required to establish a charge of corrupt and illegal practices in an election petition?
- Whether the failure to submit original affidavits sworn before an Oath Commissioner under Section 144(2)(a) of the Elections Act, 2017 renders the evidence inadmissible?
- Can a document merely marked or identified as a photocopy during cross-examination be relied upon as valid substantive evidence without meeting the requirements of secondary evidence?
- Mian Dawood Advocate High Court, Lahore and others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, M/o Law and Justice, Islamabad and another2024 SCP 162 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the ongoing proceedings initiated by petitions filed by legal practitioners regarding the independence of the judiciary and allegations of interference. Following a previous order, the Court reviewed proposals submitted by the five High Courts concerning the issues at hand. The Court also acknowledged the involvement of the Pakistan Bar Council and the Supreme Court Bar Association, noting that while the former has submitted proposals, the latter requires further time. The Court addressed numerous applications from various bar councils and associations seeking to be joined as parties, ruling that it would only entertain such applications to the extent of considering the proposals contained therein. To streamline the process, the Court encouraged these bodies to consolidate their submissions into a single document, though separate filings remain permissible. Furthermore, the Court directed the Attorney-General for Pakistan to submit proposals on behalf of the Federation and specifically mandated a formal response to the allegations raised in the letter of the six judges of the Islamabad High Court against the Federation or its agencies before the next hearing date.
Questions settled- To what extent will the Court entertain applications from bar councils and associations seeking to be joined as parties in proceedings concerning judicial independence?
- Is the Federation required to submit a formal response to allegations raised by High Court judges against government agencies in the context of ongoing judicial proceedings?
- What is the procedural expectation for bar councils and associations regarding the submission of proposals to the Supreme Court?
- Messrs Kanpur Old Boys Association vs Messrs Karachi Metropolitan2024 SCMR 1361 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from an appeal concerning the cancellation of the allocation of an amenity plot by the Karachi Development Authority (KDA) to a charitable institution, the Kanpur Old Boys Association. The core legal questions involved whether the Provincial Ombudsman had jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute concerning the enforcement of contractual rights and whether KDA's actions constituted maladministration under the relevant statute, alongside issues of limitation and delay. The Supreme Court held that the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction as the dispute pertained to contractual rights enforceable through a civil suit, rendering the Ombudsman's decision coram non judice, and noted that the complaint was barred by a significant delay contrary to the limitation period prescribed by law. The Court established the principle that the Provincial Ombudsman cannot assume the powers of a civil court to resolve contractual disputes or bypass statutory limitation periods, thereby upholding the High Court's judgment setting aside the concurrent decisions of the Ombudsman and the Governor, and dismissed the appeal.
Questions settled- Whether the Provincial Ombudsman has jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes involving the enforcement of contractual rights?
- Does the non-fulfillment of a contractual obligation by a public authority constitute maladministration under the Establishment of the Office of Ombudsman for the Province of Sindh Act, 1991?
- Can a complaint be entertained by the Ombudsman after the expiration of the statutory limitation period prescribed under the Act?
- Whether the High Court can set aside the concurrent decisions of the Ombudsman and the Governor when the Ombudsman's decision is coram non judice?
- Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab etc vs Sheraz Khan2024 SCP 341, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 1235 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-07-04Read full judgment →
- Mehran vs Ubaid Ullah, etc.2024 SCP 216, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 843, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 270 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-05-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a juvenile petitioner seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of his post-arrest bail petition by the Peshawar High Court. The petitioner, charged with heinous offences, sought bail on the statutory ground of delay in the conclusion of his trial under the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly denied bail based on the heinous nature of the offence and by attributing the trial delay to the petitioner's application for age determination. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its reasoning. The Court clarified that Section 6(5) of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, mandates bail for a juvenile detained for over six months if the trial is incomplete, provided the delay is not attributable to the juvenile. The Court established that the nature of the offence is irrelevant to the statutory right to bail under Section 6(5), and that time taken for age determination is an act of the court, not the accused. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal and granted bail.
Questions settled- Does the heinous nature of an offence preclude a juvenile from being granted bail under Section 6(5) of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018?
- Can the time taken by a court to determine the age of an accused be attributed to the accused as a delay in the trial?
- Is a juvenile entitled to bail as a matter of right if their trial has not concluded within six months of detention, provided the delay is not caused by them?
- Does the responsibility for determining the age of an accused juvenile lie with the police or the court?
- Mehboob-ur-Rehman and Jawar vs The State through Prosecutor General, Balochistan2024 SCP 135, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 639, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 174 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-03-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellants, convicted and sentenced for offences under the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, challenged the revisional Court's judgment maintaining their conviction. The Supreme Court office refused to entertain their petition for leave to appeal, citing non-compliance with the surrender requirement under the Supreme Court Rules, 1980. The core legal question was whether a convict challenging a conviction and sentence of imprisonment must surrender to the sentence before their petition for leave to appeal can be entertained by the Supreme Court. The Court held that the petition was not maintainable. Relying on the first proviso to Order XXIII, Rule 8 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, the Court affirmed that surrender to an order of imprisonment is a condition precedent for the entertainment of a criminal petition by the Court's office. The principle laid down is that while petitions involving bail before arrest may be entertained without prior surrender, a convict challenging a conviction and sentence of imprisonment must first surrender to the sentence to render their petition maintainable.
Questions settled- Is surrender to a sentence of imprisonment a condition precedent for the entertainment of a criminal petition for leave to appeal by the Supreme Court?
- Does the requirement of surrender to an order of imprisonment apply to criminal petitions seeking bail before arrest?
- Can a criminal petition challenging a conviction and sentence be entertained by the Supreme Court office if the petitioner has not surrendered to the sentence?
- Mehboob Hassan vs Akhtar Islam etc.2024 SCP 59, 2024 SCMR 757 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-10-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the High Court's judgment acquitting the respondents of charges under sections 365-A, 201, 34 PPC and section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The prosecution's case rested primarily on a jail identification parade and alleged recoveries of ransom money after more than two years. The core legal questions involved the evidentiary value of a joint identification parade, the reliability of delayed recoveries, and the locus standi of a complainant to challenge an acquittal in an abduction case. The Supreme Court held that a joint identification parade is a nullity in the eyes of the law, that delayed recoveries without unique identification marks hold no evidentiary value, and that only the aggrieved abductee—not merely the complainant—has locus standi to challenge an acquittal in such matters. The Court laid down that identification parades must strictly adhere to the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, that investigating agencies must preserve the secrecy of suspects' identities prior to parades, and that trial courts must actively exercise powers under the Cr.P.C. to prevent frivolous litigation and delays, upholding the constitutional guarantees of a fair trial and due process.
Questions settled- Whether a joint identification parade conducted under one roof holds any evidentiary value under Article 22 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
- Does a complainant have the locus standi to challenge a judgment of acquittal in an abduction case where the abductee is the aggrieved person?
- Can a delayed recovery of currency notes without distinctive identification marks form the basis of a criminal conviction?
- What are the legal consequences when police fail to take precautionary measures to conceal the identity of suspects prior to an identification parade?
- Mehar Badshah vs Govt. of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Peshawar and others2024 SCP 372, 2025 PLD Supreme Court 36 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-10-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil petition initially pertained to the illegal cutting of 218 Shisham trees, but the Supreme Court expanded the scope to address the broader and critical issue of rampant deforestation and climate change in Pakistan. The core legal question concerned the protection of forest cover, the responsibilities of the Forest Department, and the newly established constitutional status of environmental rights. The Court held that forests must be vigorously preserved to combat climate change, prevent natural disasters such as floods and landslides, and protect the environment. The Court highlighted that the insertion of Article 9A into the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 explicitly guarantees every person the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment, building upon earlier expansive interpretations of the right to life under Article 9. The matter was disposed of with the recording of the Additional Advocate-General's statement that the provincial government will implement best sustainable environmental practices.
Questions settled- Whether the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment is a fundamental right under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- How does deforestation impact climate change and vulnerability to natural disasters in Pakistan?
- What are the legal obligations of the Forest Department regarding the preservation of forest cover?
- Meer Gul vs Raja Zafar Mehmood through legal heirs & others2024 SCP 217, 2024 SCMR 1496 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a suit for specific performance and injunction concerning agricultural land in District Sanghar. The Trial Court dismissed the appellant's suit, but the First Appellate Court decreed it, directing the appellant to deposit the balance sale consideration, which he complied with. In Second Appeal, the Sindh High Court set aside the Appellate Court's decision and dismissed the suit solely because the appellant had failed to deposit or apply to deposit the balance sale consideration at the time of instituting the suit. Reversing the High Court's decision, the Supreme Court held that depositing balance consideration upon suit filing is not a mandatory statutory precondition under the Specific Relief Act, 1877 or the CPC, 1908. It clarified that court orders for deposit require a timeline and specified default consequences to entail dismissal. Finding that the High Court failed to frame substantial questions of law under Section 100 CPC, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the High Court for fresh determination.
Questions settled- Is a plaintiff in a suit for specific performance required by law to deposit the balance sale consideration in court at the time of instituting the suit?
- Can a court dismiss a suit for specific performance for failure to deposit balance sale consideration without an express court order specifying penal consequences?
- What are the jurisdictional limitations of a High Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 regarding findings of fact made by the first appellate court?
- Matloob Ellahi Paracha vs Raja Arshad Mahmood & another2024 SCP 24, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 663 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This direct appeal arises from a civil dispute concerning the maintainability of a second suit for the recovery of earnest money following the withdrawal of a prior suit for specific performance. The core legal questions addressed are whether a plaintiff can subsequently file a suit for the recovery of earnest money after withdrawing a specific performance suit, and what the applicable limitation period is. The Supreme Court held that the second suit is maintainable, as it constitutes a fresh cause of action that does not attract the bar of Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 or Order XXIII Rule 1, and that Sections 19 and 29 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 do not preclude such a claim. The Court laid down that a suit for the recovery of earnest money paid under an agreement to sell upon failure of consideration is governed by Article 97 of the Limitation Act 1908, where limitation begins from the date of failure of consideration rather than the date of the original agreement.
Questions settled- Whether a plaintiff, after withdrawing a suit for specific performance, can institute a fresh suit for the recovery of earnest money paid under the agreement?
- Does Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 bar a subsequent suit for the recovery of earnest money when the earlier suit was solely for specific performance?
- What is the applicable article and starting point of limitation for a suit filed for the recovery of earnest money paid upon an agreement to sell that failed to materialize?
- Do Sections 19 and 29 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 prohibit an independent suit for the recovery of earnest money after the termination of a specific performance claim?
- Malik Mahmood Ahmad Khan vs Malik Moazam Mahmood, etc2024 SCP 416, 2025 PLD Supreme Court 247 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-12-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition challenged the dismissal of an appeal against a trial court decree awarding maintenance to a child against his father. The core legal question concerned whether the lower courts erred in their adjudication and the necessity of applying a child-centered lens to such proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the impugned order contained no jurisdictional error, illegality, or procedural irregularity, and consequently declined leave to appeal, dismissing the petition. The Court emphasized that the judiciary must adopt a dedicated "child justice approach" in all cases involving children, whether in contact or conflict with the law. This approach mandates that the "best interests of the child" remain the primary consideration, recognizing their unique vulnerabilities and developmental needs. This principle is grounded in the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, particularly Articles 25, 25A, 35, and 37, and international obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Judicial processes must prioritize the child's dignity, rehabilitation, and well-being, ensuring that legal proceedings are sensitive, protective, and conducive to the child's growth and reintegration into society.
Questions settled- What is the scope of the child justice approach that courts must adopt in proceedings involving children?
- Does the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 provide a framework for the protection and rehabilitation of children in the justice system?
- Is the best interests of the child a primary consideration in judicial proceedings involving children in contact with the law?
- Malik Arshad Hussain Awan vs M/s United Bank Limited2024 SCP 122, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 595, 2024 CLD 708, 2024 PLJ SC 473 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-02-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil petition arose from a recovery suit filed by the respondent Bank under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The petitioner sought appointment as guardian for the suit of his brother, asserting his brother was of unsound mind. The Banking Court dismissed the application on merits, and the High Court dismissed the subsequent appeal, holding that the brother must first be adjudged mentally disordered by the Court of Protection under the Mental Health Ordinance, 2001 before an application under Order XXXII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 could be entertained. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether a Banking Court can independently appoint a guardian for a suit under Rules 3 and 15 of Order XXXII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Court held that Rule 15 of Order XXXII recognizes two categories of persons of unsound mind: those already adjudged, and those not so adjudged but found by the court on inquiry to be incapable of protecting their interests. The Court ruled that a court is not precluded from appointing a guardian ad litem under Order XXXII merely because no guardian has been appointed under the Mental Health Ordinance, 2001. The petition was converted into an appeal, the impugned judgment was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the High Court.
Questions settled- Can a Banking Court appoint a guardian for a suit under Order XXXII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without the defendant first being adjudged as mentally disordered under the Mental Health Ordinance 2001?
- What is the distinction between a guardian for the suit appointed under Order XXXII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and a guardian appointed under the Mental Health Ordinance 2001?
- Does a Banking Court have the power to conduct an inquiry into a party's unsoundness of mind or mental infirmity for the limited purpose of court representation?
- Malik Amanullah vs Haji Muhammad Essa etc2024 SCP 344, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 1258 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-10-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arose from a property dispute concerning the ownership of land in Quetta. The appellant, a subsequent purchaser, challenged the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which had declared the respondents as the lawful owners. The core legal questions involved the applicability of the doctrine of lis pendens to a property sale executed during the interregnum between the dismissal and subsequent restoration of a suit, and whether a purchaser is bound by the title of their transferor. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the doctrine of lis pendens applies to transfers made during the period between a suit's dismissal and its restoration, as the restoration order relates back to the original proceedings. The Court affirmed that a purchaser for value, even without notice, is bound by the result of the litigation and cannot acquire a title superior to that of their transferor. Additionally, the Court emphasized that administrative cancellation of mutations without notice violates due process and the right to a fair trial under the Constitution.
Questions settled- Does the doctrine of lis pendens apply to a property sale made during the period between the dismissal and the restoration of a suit?
- Is a subsequent purchaser bound by the outcome of a suit if the property was transferred during the pendency of that suit?
- Can revenue authorities cancel mutation entries without providing notice and an opportunity of hearing to the affected parties?
- Malik Ahmed Nawaz and others vs Bahria Town (Pvt) Ltd thr. its G.M.2024 SCP 113 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-03-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerns the legality of the transfer and conversion of land originally belonging to the defunct Revenue Employees Cooperative Housing Society. The land was transferred to Bahria Town (Pvt) Ltd via an agreement in 2005, and subsequently transferred to the Defence Housing Authority (DHA) through a Trade Off Agreement in 2007. The Advocate-General of Punjab raised serious concerns regarding the authority of the Society's Administrator to execute the initial agreement after his term had expired, and questioned the legality of the then Chief Minister's approval to exempt the application of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925. The Court directed the involved parties to file detailed concise statements, site plans, and financial disclosures regarding the transactions. Additionally, the Court issued notices to the federal and provincial governments to address broader policy questions regarding the conversion of agricultural land for residential use, food security, environmental degradation, and the legal framework governing land use conversion.
Questions settled- Can an administrator of a cooperative housing society legally execute a land transfer agreement after the expiration of their official term?
- Does a provincial Chief Minister have the legal authority to exempt the application of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 and approve a merger without statutory backing?
- What are the legal and policy implications of converting agricultural land to residential or commercial use regarding food security and environmental degradation?
- Malik Ahmad Usman Nawaz vs The Appellate Tribunal (Elections Act, 2017)2024 SCP 50, 2024 SCP 158, 2024 SCMR 1202, 2024 PLJ SC 921 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the rejection of the petitioner’s nomination papers for the Punjab Assembly constituency PP-254. The core legal questions were whether the status of a proclaimed offender disqualifies a candidate from contesting general elections and whether an alleged signature mismatch on nomination papers constitutes valid grounds for rejection. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the status of a proclaimed offender does not, in the absence of specific statutory prohibition, disentitle a person from exercising their civil right to contest an election. Regarding the signature mismatch, the Court held that the relevant provision, Section 62(9)(d) of the Elections Act 2017, applies only to the signatures of proposers and seconders, not candidates. Furthermore, any signature discrepancy is not a material false declaration under Section 62(9)(c) and is a remediable defect. The Court established that nomination papers cannot be rejected on grounds not strictly supported by the Elections Act 2017, emphasizing that remediable defects do not justify disqualification.
Questions settled- Does the status of being a proclaimed offender in a criminal case automatically disqualify a candidate from contesting a general election?
- Does the provision in the Elections Act 2017 regarding the genuineness of signatures apply to the candidate or only to the proposer and seconder?
- Can a returning officer reject nomination papers based on an alleged signature mismatch that is remediable?
- Is a candidate's signature on a nomination paper considered a declaration or statement under Section 62(9)(c) of the Elections Act 2017?
- Lutfullah Virk vs Muhammad Aslam Sheikh2024 SCP 235, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 887, 2024 PLJ SC 905 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-07-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld a trial court’s order closing the defendant’s right to cross-examine the plaintiff’s witnesses due to non-appearance. The core legal question was whether the trial court acted lawfully in closing this right after the petitioner failed to appear at the scheduled time despite prior adjournments. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the trial court correctly exercised its discretion under Order XVII, Rules 1, 2, and 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Court affirmed that adjournments are not a right and cannot be used as delaying tactics; they require 'sufficient cause' supported by written applications. It clarified that when a party fails to appear or perform necessary acts, the court may proceed to decide the suit forthwith, meaning the case must proceed without further delay. The Court emphasized that curbing the 'adjournment culture' is essential to address judicial backlog and ensure the fundamental right to a fair trial and speedy justice.
Questions settled- Can a court close a party's right to cross-examine witnesses if that party fails to appear on the date fixed for evidence?
- Does the phrase 'decide the suit forthwith' under Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 require the court to pronounce judgment immediately?
- Are adjournments a matter of right for litigants in civil proceedings?
- What is the procedure for a court when a party fails to appear on an adjourned date of hearing?
- Liaquat Ali Khan vs Muhammad Akram & another2023 SCP 191, 2024 SCMR 1883 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-05-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arises from a dispute over the specific performance of two agreements for the sale of a house. The plaintiff sought specific performance, alleging the defendant failed to obtain necessary clearances from the Capital Development Authority (CDA). The trial court decreed the suit, but the High Court set it aside, finding the plaintiff failed to prove readiness and willingness to perform his financial obligations. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the availability of funds to pay the second installment by the agreed date. Furthermore, the Court observed that the agreements contained no clause obligating the defendant to obtain an NOC before the transfer, and the plaintiff failed to provide evidence of dispatch for his alleged legal notice. Emphasizing that specific performance is an equitable remedy under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, the Court ruled that the plaintiff's failure to establish readiness and willingness barred the relief, and the equities favored the defendant.
Questions settled- Is a plaintiff entitled to specific performance if they fail to prove the availability of funds to meet their contractual payment obligations?
- Does the failure to produce postal receipts for a legal notice undermine a party's claim of having issued such notice?
- Is the grant of specific performance a mandatory right or a discretionary equitable remedy?
- Can a court grant specific performance if the plaintiff fails to establish readiness and willingness to perform their part of the agreement?
- Liaqat Hussain vs The state2024 SCP 229, 2024 SCMR 1600 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-05-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arose from the conviction and death sentence of the petitioner for the double murder of his nephew and sister, and the attempted murder of his niece-in-law. The core legal question concerned the validity of the conviction and the appropriateness of the death penalty in light of the evidence and the reported pardon by the legal heirs. The Supreme Court maintained the convictions, finding the prosecution's case—supported by consistent eyewitness testimony, forensic reports, and recovery of the weapon—proved beyond reasonable doubt. However, the Court exercised its discretion regarding the quantum of sentence. Applying the principle that a single mitigating circumstance is sufficient to avoid the death penalty, the Court held that the reported pardon by the legal heirs and the nature of the prior altercation between the parties constituted sufficient mitigating factors. Consequently, the Court converted the death sentences into imprisonment for life, while maintaining the other convictions and sentences, directing them to run concurrently with the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.
Questions settled- Can a death sentence be converted to life imprisonment based on a reported pardon by legal heirs even if formal compromise documents are not filed?
- Does a single mitigating circumstance suffice to justify the imposition of life imprisonment instead of the death penalty?
- Are sentences for multiple offenses under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 required to run concurrently?
- Late Sher Ayaz Khan @ Sheraz Khana through His L.Rs. & others vs Gul2024 SCP 401, 2025 SCMR 380 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-12-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal by leave of the Court arose from a pre-emption suit regarding the sale of agricultural land. The core legal question centered on whether the pre-emptor had validly and immediately performed Talb-i-Muwathibat (the jumping demand) in accordance with the statutory requirements of the pre-emption law. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the pre-emptor failed to prove the immediate making of Talb-i-Muwathibat, noting that consultations among the pre-emptor and witnesses prior to the demand negated its immediacy, and that the complete chain of the source of information was not established through the withholding of key witnesses. The Court reiterated that Talb-i-Muwathibat forms the mandatory foundation of a pre-emption claim; if it fails, the entire superstructure collapses and subsequent demands cannot cure the defect. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the judgments of the High Court and the appellate court were set aside, and the trial court's dismissal of the pre-emption suit was restored.
Questions settled- Does prior consultation among a pre-emptor and witnesses before making a demand invalidate the requirement of an immediate Talb-i-Muwathibat?
- Is proof of a complete and unbroken chain of the source of information regarding a sale transaction essential for establishing a valid Talb-i-Muwathibat?
- What is the legal consequence on a pre-emption suit if the primary demand of Talb-i-Muwathibat is not proved in accordance with the law?
- Does the failure to produce a primary witness or informer give rise to an adverse presumption under the law of evidence?
- Khurshid Ali & others vs Miangul Adnan Aurangzeb (decd.) through LRs2024 SCP 375, 2025 SCMR 34 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-10-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns two direct appeals arising from a suit for possession of immovable property and recovery of mesne profits. The core legal question is whether a plaintiff, having instituted a suit for possession based on title, is entitled to a decree when they fail to establish that title, regardless of the defendant's possession status. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove their ownership, as the alleged gift deed did not include the disputed property and other vital links in the chain of title were missing. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court and Appellate Court decrees, restoring the Trial Court's judgment dismissing the suit. The Court affirmed the principle that in a suit for possession based on title, the burden of proof rests entirely on the plaintiff to establish their own ownership. A plaintiff cannot succeed by relying on the weaknesses of the defendant's case; they must succeed on the strength of their own title. Furthermore, where a plaintiff’s title is clouded or disputed, a simple suit for possession is not maintainable without seeking a declaration of title.
Questions settled- In a suit for possession based on title, can a plaintiff succeed by merely highlighting the weaknesses in the defendant's title?
- Is a simple suit for possession maintainable when the plaintiff's title to the property is clouded or disputed?
- Does the burden of proof lie on the plaintiff to establish their title in a suit for possession under Section 8 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877?
- Khuda Bakhsh vs State and anotherPLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 21 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-09-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner-complainant filed petitions for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging the Lahore High Court's acquittal of two respondents accused of qatl-e-amd under Sections 302, 337-A(i), 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court evaluated the prosecution's evidence and affirmed the High Court's findings. The Court noted that the eye-witness testimonies were highly unreliable: one injured witness's medical timeline was physically impossible and lacked proof of injury during the incident; the complainant made dishonest improvements during trial to align his testimony with medical evidence regarding the trajectory of the gunshot wounds; and a third eye-witness, despite being sworn in, was withheld from testifying about the occurrence, triggering an adverse inference. Additionally, the forensic report was negative. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that an acquittal carries a double presumption of innocence and cannot be interfered with unless it is blatantly perverse, illegal, arbitrary, or shocking, which was not the case here.
Questions settled- What is the standard of review for the Supreme Court when dealing with an appeal against an acquittal?
- Can an adverse inference be drawn under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 if a sworn witness is withheld from testifying about the occurrence?
- How do dishonest improvements made by a prosecution witness to align their testimony with medical evidence affect the credibility of their statement?
- Khizar Hayat vs The State etc2024 SCP 233, 2024 SCMR 1605, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 267 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-05-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court declining pre-arrest bail to the petitioner in a case registered under Sections 448, 440, 511, 427, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail given the existence of a cross-version of the incident and family disputes regarding the property in question. The Supreme Court observed that the parties were involved in a long-standing family dispute over the management of a housing society, creating a strong possibility of false implication and mala fide intent. Furthermore, the Court noted the existence of a cross-version of the incident, which necessitates further inquiry to determine the aggressor. The Court held that in cases of counter-versions, bail is granted as a rule to allow for the recording of evidence at trial. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order and granted pre-arrest bail, establishing the principle that where cross-versions exist, the case falls within the ambit of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.
Questions settled- Is bail generally granted in cases involving cross-versions of the same incident?
- Does the existence of a cross-version of an incident entitle an accused to bail on the grounds of further inquiry?
- Can a court grant pre-arrest bail when there is a plausible claim of false implication due to family disputes?
- Khizar Hayat vs Malik Akhtar Mehmood2024 SCP 156, 2024 SCMR 1191, 2024 SCMR 1208, 2024 PLJ SC 530 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 was filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's Regular First Appeal. The matter arose from a suit for recovery under Order XXXVII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 based on a pro-note and cheque. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in upholding the trial court's decree despite allegations of misreading and non-reading of evidence. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner admitted the execution of the pro-note, the agreement appointing arbitrators, and the issuing of the cheque. Moreover, the petitioner did not challenge the arbitrators' decision confirming his financial liability and admitted his liability in his testimony. Holding that concurrent findings of fact should not be interfered with unless perverse, arbitrary, or capricious, the Supreme Court found no illegality or infirmity in the High Court judgment, dismissed the petition, and refused leave to appeal.
Questions settled- Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower courts?
- Can a summary suit for recovery based on a pro-note be decreed when the defendant admits execution of the instrument and financial liability?
- Does an unproven assertion of non-reading or misreading of evidence justify setting aside concurrent judgments of lower courts?
- Khial Muhammad vs The State2024 SCP 204, 2024 SCMR 1490, PLJ 2025 SC (Cr.C.) 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-05-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arises from the conviction and sentence of death awarded to the appellant under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased. The appellant's conviction and murder reference were confirmed by the High Court. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined the record and noted multiple critical flaws in the prosecution's case, including an unexplained and substantial delay in lodging the First Information Report, the omission of eyewitnesses' names from the FIR coupled with a delayed recording of their statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and an unexplained delay in sending the crime weapon and forensic samples for analysis. The Court held that these cumulative circumstances and evidentiary gaps created profound reasonable doubts regarding the guilt of the appellant. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that the prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and any reasonable doubt arising from the evidence must be resolved in favor of the accused as a matter of right. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the judgments of the lower courts were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.
Questions settled- Does an unexplained delay in lodging the First Information Report cast doubt on the veracity of the prosecution case?
- Whether the belated recording of statements of eyewitnesses under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 affects their credibility?
- Is an accused entitled to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right when a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case?
- What is the legal effect of an unexplained delay in sending crime weapons and forensic samples for chemical analysis?
- Khawaja Adnan Zafar vs Hina Bashir and others2024 SCP 142, 2024 SCMR 1295 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-03-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves multiple Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeal (CPLAs) filed by a father challenging various interim orders passed by the Lahore High Court regarding the custody and visitation of his minor children. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to interfere with interlocutory orders passed by the High Court in ongoing guardianship proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the petitions were not maintainable. The Court reaffirmed the established principle that it ordinarily does not interfere with interim orders passed by the High Court unless there is a flagrant violation of law, wrongful exercise of jurisdiction, or manifest grave injustice. Finding that the impugned orders were legally sound and did not prejudice the pending guardianship application, the Court dismissed the petitions. It further directed the Guardian Judge to expedite the final adjudication of the pending guardianship petition to resolve the custody dispute in accordance with the law.
Questions settled- Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with interim orders passed by the High Court?
- Is an interim order regarding the custody of minors subject to appeal before the Supreme Court under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Does the filing of multiple interim applications in guardianship proceedings justify Supreme Court intervention?
- Khalid vs The State thr. PG Sindh2024 SCP 201, 2024 SCMR 1474, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-05-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner filed a criminal petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which had dismissed his jail appeal and maintained his death sentence under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Abdul Basit. The Supreme Court examined the record, noting that eyewitness testimonies were consistent, corroborated by medical evidence, recovery of crime empties, and weapon matching. The core legal question revolved around whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and whether mitigating circumstances existed for commutation of the death sentence. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully proved the charge through trustworthy eyewitnesses and circumstantial evidence, maintaining the conviction. However, considering mitigating circumstances—specifically the failure of the prosecution to prove the alleged motive and the inordinate delay of 16 years spent by the petitioner in the death cell awaiting judicial remedies—the Court partly allowed the appeal, converting the death sentence into imprisonment for life while enhancing the compensation amount and extending the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that the non-proof of motive and the prolonged incarceration/delay in disposal not attributable to the accused serve as mitigating circumstances justifying the reduction of a death sentence to imprisonment for life.
Questions settled- Can the non-proving of the motive alleged by the prosecution be considered as a mitigating circumstance for reducing the quantum of sentence?
- Whether prolonged incarceration in the death cell awaiting judicial remedies can form the basis for applying the principle of expectancy of life to commute a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
- Does the relationship of an eyewitness with the deceased render their testimony discardable in the absence of an ulterior motive for false implication?
- Khalid alias Muhammad Khalid and others vs Collector of Customs2024 SCP 285, PTCL 2024 CL. 658, 2024 SCMR 1806, PTCL 2025 CL. 20 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-08-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the power of the Customs Appellate Tribunal to execute its own appellate orders passed under the Customs Act 1969. The core legal question was whether the Customs Appellate Tribunal possesses the implied power to execute orders passed in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, or whether parties must invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court for execution. The Supreme Court held that the Customs Appellate Tribunal possesses the implied, incidental, and ancillary power to execute and enforce orders passed under Sections 194-A and 194-B of the Customs Act 1969, as the power to make an order necessarily carries the implicit power to implement it. The Court laid down the principle of statutory construction that where a statute confers substantive jurisdiction upon a court or tribunal, it also grants by necessary implication all incidental and ancillary powers required to make that jurisdiction effective, including the power to execute its own orders. Consequently, the High Court's writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked for the execution of such orders since an adequate remedy exists before the Tribunal.
Questions settled- Whether the Customs Appellate Tribunal has the power to execute orders passed in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under the Customs Act 1969?
- Can the writ jurisdiction of the High Court be invoked for the execution of orders passed by the Customs Appellate Tribunal when an adequate remedy is available?
- Does a statutory tribunal possess implied and ancillary powers to execute its own adjudicatory orders?
- Khaleelullah & others vs Muhaim Khan & others2024 SCP 31, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 600 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-12-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal challenged three concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding a long-standing inheritance dispute over the legacy of Qaim Khan. The petitioners, claiming as great-grandchildren of Qaim Khan through a female line, instituted a suit for inheritance in 2007, decades after the death of their mother and maternal grandfather, both of whom never claimed their shares during their lifetimes. The respondents resisted the claim on the grounds of limitation, estoppel, and the creation of third-party rights. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while inheritance is normally governed by constructive possession and lacks a strict limitation period in simple co-sharer disputes, claims involving long-standing third-party interests are subject to strict limitation periods and require the claimant to prove lack of knowledge or fraud under Section 18 of the Limitation Act 1908. The Court ruled that actual denial of rights occurs when property is transferred to third parties (such as via sale or gift), which starts the period of limitation, and failure by the predecessor to challenge such acts within time binds subsequent legal heirs.
Questions settled- Does the law of limitation bar an inheritance claim when third-party interests have already been created in the disputed property?
- What constitutes an actual denial of proprietary rights as opposed to a threatened denial in co-sharer property disputes?
- Does a fresh period of limitation become available to legal heirs if their predecessor failed to challenge an actual denial of rights within the prescribed time?
- Is a court or appellate tribunal obligated to consider the question of limitation under Section 3 of the Limitation Act 1908 even if it was not specifically raised in the written statement?
- Kashif vs Imran and another2024 SCP 23, 2024 SCMR 589 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a criminal bail matter arising from an FIR registered for dacoity involving unknown persons. The petitioner sought post-arrest bail, contending misidentification and false implication stemming from alleged illegal police detention. The Supreme Court noted that the petitioner was not named in the initial report, no identification parade was conducted, and no stolen property was recovered from his possession, thus making his case one of further inquiry under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, set aside the impugned order, and granted bail to the petitioner. Furthermore, upon discovering a questionable weapon license for a prohibited bore sub-machine gun issued by a police officer, the Court raised vital constitutional and legal questions regarding the issuance of prohibited bore licenses, private possession of automatic weapons, and their consistency with fundamental rights to life and equality under Articles 9 and 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Court directed the office to register a separate constitution petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution for public importance.
Questions settled- Under what legal authority had the Deputy Inspector General of Police issued a document purporting to be a license to carry a sub-machine gun, which is a prohibited bore weapon?
- Whether exempting certain categories of persons or granting them the right to obtain licenses for sub-machine guns and other prohibited bore weapons accords with Article 25 of the Constitution?
- Whether enabling the easy availability of sub-machine guns and other prohibited bore weapons accords with Article 9, the Fundamental Right to life guaranteed by the Constitution?
- Karachi Properties Investment Company (Pvt) Ltd vs Habib Carpets (Pvt)2024 SCP 198, 2024 SCMR 1354 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal challenged a High Court judgment that dismissed an ejectment application filed by a landlord against a tenant. The core legal question was whether 'maintenance charges,' which were not explicitly mentioned in the lease agreement, fall within the definition of 'rent' under Section 2(i) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, such that their non-payment constitutes a ground for eviction. The Supreme Court held that the residuary clause in the definition of 'rent'—'and such other charges which are payable by the tenant but are unpaid'—cannot be invoked to impose liability for maintenance charges absent an express or implied agreement between the parties. The Court emphasized the principle of consensus ad idem, noting that tenancy terms must be clearly defined in writing to be enforceable. Because the lease agreement lacked any provision for maintenance charges, the landlord could not unilaterally claim default. The Court affirmed the High Court's exercise of writ jurisdiction, ruling that concurrent findings of lower forums can be set aside when they suffer from misreading of evidence or patent errors of law.
Questions settled- Do 'maintenance charges' not specified in a lease agreement fall within the definition of 'rent' under Section 2(i) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
- Can a landlord seek eviction for non-payment of maintenance charges if the tenancy agreement contains no express clause requiring the tenant to pay such charges?
- Under what circumstances can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by rent tribunals in its constitutional jurisdiction?
- Kamran vs The State through A.G. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and others2024 SCMR 1419 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought post-arrest bail after the Peshawar High Court dismissed his petition in connection with FIR No. 1894 registered under Section 392, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which was subsequently converted or related to a murder charge involving dagger blows. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, alleged to have committed a heinous offence involving capital punishment and falling within the prohibitory clause, was entitled to post-arrest bail, particularly given his status as a juvenile. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was not entitled to bail, reasoning that the supplementary statement, statements under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, unchallenged forensic video analysis of CCTV footage, medical evidence, and weapon recovery robustly connected the petitioner to the crime. The court laid down the principle that the mere status of being a juvenile does not automatically entitle an accused to the concession of bail when charged with a heinous offence falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.
Questions settled- Does the status of being a juvenile automatically entitle an accused to post-arrest bail for a heinous offence?
- Whether positive forensic video analysis and recovery of the crime weapon connect the accused to the crime to bar bail under the prohibitory clause?
- Is an accused charged with an offence carrying capital punishment entitled to bail when supported by medical and circumstantial evidence?
- Justice Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, Judge Supreme Court of Pakistan2024 SCP 16, 2024 SCMR 599 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves constitutional petitions filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging the proceedings and show cause notices issued by the Supreme Judicial Council against a judge. The core legal question addressed is whether the complainants or informers who filed complaints before the Supreme Judicial Council are necessary or proper parties to be impleaded as respondents in these constitutional petitions. The Court held that while a suit cannot be dismissed for non-joinder of necessary parties, the informers and complainants are proper parties whose impleadment is necessary in the interest of justice, particularly where the pleadings heavily rely on allegations that their complaints are mala fide, frivolous, and politically motivated, to ensure they are not condemned unheard. The key principle laid down is that persons whose complaints form the foundational basis of impugned proceedings and whose integrity or actions are directly challenged as mala fide in constitutional petitions must be impleaded as proper parties to satisfy the principles of natural justice.
Questions settled- Whether the complainants and informers who initiated proceedings before the Supreme Judicial Council are necessary or proper parties in constitutional petitions challenging those proceedings?
- Can proceedings before the Supreme Judicial Council be stayed through an injunctive order when the petitioner refuses to implead the original complainants as respondents?
- Whether non-joinder of necessary parties warrants the outright dismissal of a suit or petition?
- Does the disclosure of income tax returns to complainants violate fundamental rights to liberty and privacy under the Constitution?
- Javed Iqbal and others vs The State2024 SCP 195, 2024 SCMR 1437, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-03-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This consolidated judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from jail petitions filed against the judgments of the Lahore High Court upholding the petitioners' convictions for abduction for ransom and the subsequent murder of police officials during a rescue raid. The core legal questions involved whether every kidnapping for ransom constitutes terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, and whether resistance and firing upon a police raiding party to avoid arrest falls within the definition of terrorism. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of an intent, object, design, or purpose to create terror or overawe the government or public as defined under section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, an ordinary abduction for ransom for personal vendetta or firing at police to avoid arrest does not constitute an act of terrorism. Consequently, while the convictions for kidnapping and murder were maintained, the convictions under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 were set aside or altered to the substantive provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, establishing that heinous offenses included in the Third Schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 are triable by Anti-Terrorism Courts for speedy trial alone unless core terrorist intent is proven.
Questions settled- Does every act of abduction or kidnapping for ransom constitute terrorism under section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
- Can an accused be convicted under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 for firing at police officials during a rescue raid without proof of terrorist intent?
- What is the legal distinction between a heinous offence included in the Third Schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 and an act of terrorism per se?
- Does firing at a raiding police party to avoid arrest attract anti-terrorism provisions in the absence of intent to overawe the public or government?
- Javed Ali, Sabir Ali vs Inspector General of Police, Sindh & others2024 SCP 339, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 1397, 2024 SCMR 1896 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-08-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These civil petitions for leave to appeal arose from a consolidated order of the Sindh Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioners' appeals maintaining their dismissal from service as Police Constables on the ground of being overage at the time of appointment. The core legal questions involved whether a civil servant could be dismissed after serving for a considerable period without an inquiry and personal hearing, and whether recruitment lapses attributable to departmental authorities could be used to penalize employees. The Supreme Court held that the department failed to conduct a proper departmental inquiry, did not afford the right of personal hearing, and ignored the plea of discrimination regarding the reinstatement of similarly placed employees. The Court laid down that recruitment screening must be performed diligently at the initial stage, that employees cannot be penalized years later for departmental oversights without due process, and that the Service Tribunal must meticulously evaluate factual contentions and claims of discriminatory treatment on merits rather than dismissing them summarily.
Questions settled- Whether an employee can be dismissed from service on the ground of being overage without being afforded a right of personal hearing and a regular departmental inquiry?
- What is the legal effect of departmental delays and lapses in screening job applications during the recruitment process upon subsequent termination of employees?
- Whether the Sindh Service Tribunal is required to meticulously examine factual contentions and claims of discrimination regarding reinstated colleagues rather than disposing of appeals in a summary manner?
- Itbar Muhammad vs The State & Others2024 SCP 222, 2024 SCMR 1576 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-06-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition seeks leave to appeal against the order of the Peshawar High Court declining post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a case involving murder and attempted murder. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail despite being directly nominated in the FIR with a specific role of firing at the deceased and injured, supported by ocular, medical, and recovery evidence. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner is prima facie connected to the offense, which falls within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and that deeper scrutiny of evidence is unwarranted at the bail stage. The petition was consequently dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. The key principles laid down include that tentative assessment of material is sufficient at the bail stage, specific attribution of a fatal role coupled with corroborative medical and recovery evidence constitutes reasonable grounds to deny bail for offenses within the prohibitory clause, and a deeper appreciation of evidence must be avoided to prevent prejudice to the trial.
Questions settled- Whether post-arrest bail can be granted when the accused is specifically nominated in the FIR with a fatal role supported by medical and recovery evidence?
- Does a case fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when reasonable grounds exist to believe the accused committed an offense punishable with death or imprisonment for life?
- To what extent can a court conduct a scrutiny of evidence at the bail stage without affecting the merits of the trial?
- Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence and another vs M_s Rashid Builders (Pvt) Limited2024 SCP 257, 2024 SCMR 1816 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-07-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal arose from a construction contract dispute where the Respondent (contractor) sued the Appellants (Government) for recovery of funds following a project delayed by 40 months. The trial and appellate courts decreed the suit in the Respondent's favor. The Supreme Court, upon review, determined that the delays were concurrent, caused by both parties, and that the contractor had received necessary extensions of time. The Court held that concurrent delays do not inherently entitle a contractor to compensation, particularly where the contractor fails the but-for test of causation. The Court further observed that the Respondent’s suit appeared to be a mala fide attempt to circumvent an audit-based recovery of overpayments owed to the Government under the contract. Finding the lower courts' concurrent findings of fact to be patently improbable and perverse, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgments. The Court established that where delays are concurrent, compensation is not recoverable unless the contractor can isolate costs specifically attributable to the employer's delay, which was not demonstrated here.
Questions settled- When can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts?
- Does the existence of concurrent delays automatically entitle a contractor to compensation?
- How is the but-for test applied to determine causation in construction contract delays?
- Can a contractor recover compensation for delays where both parties contributed to the project overrun?
- Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary M_o Law and Justice, Govt. of Pakistan, Islamabad and others vs Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi and another2024 SCP 296 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves appeals against the majority judgment of the Supreme Court which had partially struck down amendments made to the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The core legal questions concerned whether the constitutional petition challenging the amendments met the prerequisites of Article 184(3) regarding public importance and the enforcement of Fundamental Rights, and whether the legislation violated the Constitution. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the impugned judgment, dismissing the original petition. The Court held that the impugned judgment failed to demonstrate or establish any clear nexus between the challenged legislative amendments and the alleged violation of Fundamental Rights such as Articles 9, 14, 23, 24, and 25 of the Constitution. The key principles laid down are that courts must respect the separation of powers and the legislature's primacy in making laws, must strive to uphold legislation unless it is clearly proven to be unconstitutional, and cannot strike down statutes based on cursory assertions or personal judicial preferences without proper constitutional testing.
Questions settled- Does a constitutional petition challenging legislative amendments under Article 184(3) of the Constitution require a clear demonstrated nexus with the violation of Fundamental Rights?
- Can a court strike down parliamentary legislation without establishing its conflict with express constitutional provisions?
- Whether the Supreme Court should adopt an interpretation that upholds legislation whenever possible?
- Does the exercise of original jurisdiction under Article 184(3) permit courts to substitute parliamentary enactments with their own subjective criteria?
- In the matter of letter dated 25th March 2024 of the Six Judges of the Islamabad High Court vs Not2024 SCP 149 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-03Read full judgment →
- Imtiaz Latif and others vs The State through Prosecutor General, Punjab, Lahore and another2024 SCP 155, 2024 SCMR 1169, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 299 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-03-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal against a consolidated judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing criminal appeals and upholding the conviction and sentence of the petitioners under Sections 148, 365-A, and 392 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal questions examined by the Supreme Court were whether the provisions of Section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 were attracted in the circumstances of the case, and whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held that the offences were driven by personal enmity or private financial motives without the requisite 'design' or 'purpose' to terrorize the public or destabilize the State, thereby rendering the Anti-Terrorism Act inapplicable. Furthermore, the Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt due to major contradictions, delayed nominations, uncorroborated evidence, and flawed recovery proceedings. The Court laid down the principle that mere gravity, severity, or brutality of an ordinary crime does not constitute terrorism unless accompanied by the specific twofold mens rea and nexus required under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997.
Questions settled- Whether the provisions of Section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 are attracted to a short-term kidnapping for ransom motivated by private financial gain or personal enmity?
- Does the mere severity, brutality, or heinous nature of an ordinary crime classify it as an act of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
- What is the standard of proof required by the prosecution regarding the presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal trials?
- Are belated nominations through supplementary statements and material contradictions in the testimonies of key witnesses fatal to the prosecution's case?
- Imran alias Mani vs The State2024 SCP 282, 2024 SCMR 1811, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 341 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-08-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal, filed with leave of the Court, challenges the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court which upheld the convictions and sentences of the appellant for murder and zina. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven the charges against the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically concerning the plausibility of the motive and the reliability of eyewitness testimony. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the convictions, holding that the prosecution's version of events was fraught with contradictions, improbable timelines, physical impossibilities regarding the crime scene, and severe investigative flaws. The Court laid down the principle that faulty investigations and uncorroborated, improbable eyewitness accounts fail to meet the rigorous standard of proof required in criminal cases, necessitating the acquittal of the accused.
Questions settled- Whether convictions for murder and zina can be sustained when the prosecution's narrative of motive and events is inherently improbable and contradicted by the physical layout of the crime scene?
- Does the failure to produce crucial eyewitnesses undermine the prosecution's case beyond reasonable doubt?
- Can a criminal conviction stand in the absence of material forensic corroboration and when investigative flaws pervade the case?
- Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Law2024 PLD Supreme Court 102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-10-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This Constitution Petition challenged the 2022 amendments to the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 ("NAB Ordinance"), which restricted the National Accountability Bureau's (NAB) jurisdiction, raised the pecuniary threshold for corruption cases to Rs. 500 million, and altered evidentiary standards. The petitioner contended these amendments effectively decriminalized corruption for holders of public office, violating Fundamental Rights under Articles 9, 14, 24, and 25 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court, by a majority, held the petition maintainable under Article 184(3), ruling that the amendments created a legislative vacuum by removing accountability for elected officials without providing an alternative forum. The Court struck down provisions setting the Rs. 500 million threshold for elected officials, the requirement to prove "corrupt and dishonest means," and the plea bargain revocation proviso, declaring them unconstitutional. It held that while Parliament may legislate, it cannot enact laws that render accountability mechanisms ineffective or grant blanket immunity, as this violates the principle of equality and Fundamental Rights. The Court restored the original provisions, directing the revival of pending references returned due to the amendments.
Questions settled- Can the legislature enact laws that effectively grant blanket immunity to elected holders of public office from accountability for corruption?
- Does the Supreme Court have the jurisdiction under Article 184(3) to strike down legislative amendments that violate Fundamental Rights?
- Are elected holders of public office triable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860?
- Can a legislative amendment nullify the independence of the judiciary by allowing accused persons to revoke plea bargains without court approval?
- Ikramuddin Rajput vs The Inspector General of Police, Sindh and others2024 SCP 94, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 493, 2024 SCMR 510 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-12-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition challenged the Sindh Service Tribunal's dismissal of the petitioner’s appeal against his removal from service as a Sub-Inspector. The petitioner, acting as an Investigation Officer, had registered a rape case under Section 511 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, despite overwhelming medical and ocular evidence supporting a charge of rape under Section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The core legal question was whether the disciplinary dismissal for misconduct due to this flawed investigation was legally sustainable. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, affirming that the petitioner’s actions constituted gross misconduct and inefficiency. The Court held that an Investigating Officer has a sacrosanct duty to conduct impartial investigations to discover the truth. It emphasized that disciplinary proceedings operate on the "balance of probabilities" standard, which is distinct from the "proof beyond reasonable doubt" standard required in criminal trials. Consequently, the Court found no illegality in the Tribunal’s decision, ruling that the petitioner’s conduct undermined the criminal justice system and justified his removal from the disciplined force.
Questions settled- Does the standard of proof in a departmental inquiry differ from that in a criminal trial?
- Can an Investigating Officer be held liable for misconduct for failing to properly investigate a crime?
- Is a Service Tribunal's decision upholding a dismissal for misconduct subject to interference if the disciplinary process was lawful?
- Does the insertion of a lesser charge by an Investigating Officer in the face of overwhelming evidence constitute misconduct?
- Iftikhar Hussain alias Kharoo vs The State2024 SCP 197, 2024 SCMR 1449, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 286 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-05-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard a jail petition against the Lahore High Court's judgment, which had commuted the petitioner's death sentence to life imprisonment for murder under Section 302(b) PPC. The prosecution's case rested on ocular testimony from the deceased's father and brother, motive, and the petitioner's abscondence. Upon review, the Court found the motive disproved and the recovery of the weapon inconsequential due to a four-year delay. Crucially, the Court identified material contradictions in the eye-witnesses' testimonies, noting they were not present at the spot as they failed to accompany the deceased to the hospital or identify the body during the post-mortem. The Court held that medical evidence is merely confirmatory and cannot identify a culprit in an unwitnessed incident. Furthermore, abscondence alone cannot substitute for deficient substantive evidence. Applying the principle of 'proof beyond reasonable doubt,' the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to meet its burden. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the petitioner was acquitted.
- Iftikhar Ahmed Chaudhry vs Saeed Ahmed Khan, etc2024 SCP 261, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 896 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-08-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the implementation of a Supreme Court judgment dated 25.09.2017 regarding the payment of pension to over 11,000 pensioners by the National Bank of Pakistan (NBP). While the NBP President acknowledged the obligation and reported partial compliance, the Court noted that factual verification of certain pensioners remained pending. The core legal question addressed is the imperative nature of judicial compliance and the role of the judiciary in ensuring its orders are executed. The Court held that its orders are binding legal mandates, not mere recommendations, and that non-compliance undermines the rule of law, democratic governance, and public trust in the judicial system. The Court directed the NBP President to appoint a senior officer as a focal person to streamline the verification and payment process, emphasizing that the law of contempt serves as a necessary tool to ensure institutional adherence to judicial directives. The Court underscored that compliance with its judgments is a constitutional requirement essential for maintaining the balance of power and the efficacy of the administration of justice.
Questions settled- Are orders of the Supreme Court of Pakistan merely advisory or binding legal mandates?
- Does the failure to implement judicial decisions undermine the rule of law and public trust in the judiciary?
- Is the power of contempt essential for the judiciary to effectively enforce its decisions?
- Iffco Pakistan (Private) Limited vs Ghulam Murtaza & others2024 SCP 263, 2024 SCMR 1548, 2024 PLC 226 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns civil petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that affirmed concurrent findings of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC). The core legal question was whether workers engaged through contractors in a manufacturing facility were employees of the principal company, IFFCO, or the contractors, and whether the outsourcing arrangement constituted a sham to circumvent labour laws. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the workers were indeed employees of IFFCO. The Court determined that the outsourcing agreements were mere pretenses, as the workers operated under IFFCO’s direct supervision, used its machinery, and performed permanent duties. The Court established that while businesses may outsource, such arrangements cannot be used as a weapon to exploit labour or deprive workers of fundamental rights, such as forming trade unions. The control and supervision test, alongside an integration test, remains the primary barometer for determining the true employer-employee relationship. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the concurrent findings of the lower fora were based on a proper appreciation of evidence and did not warrant interference.
Questions settled- Can an employer use outsourcing agreements to circumvent labour laws and deny workers their rights?
- What criteria determine whether a worker is an employee of the principal company versus an independent contractor?
- Are concurrent findings of fact by the NIRC and the High Court subject to interference by the Supreme Court?
- Does the existence of a contractor agreement automatically absolve a principal company of employer responsibilities?
- Ibrahim Khan vs Mst. Saima Khan and others2024 SCP 108, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 645, 2024 PLJ SC 505, PLJ 2024 SC · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-02-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil petition before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court concerning suits for dissolution of marriage, dower, maintenance, and dowry articles. The core legal question was whether a court can of its own motion convert a wife's prayer for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty into a decree for dissolution by way of khula when she did not seek khula and did not consent to waiving her dower. The Supreme Court held that khula is an exclusive and absolute right of a woman that must be explicitly sought with an unequivocal offer to waive her dower; a court cannot unilaterally grant khula without her consent. The Court laid down that dissolution of marriage under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939 on grounds like cruelty and dissolution by way of khula exist in distinct legal domains with separate procedural requirements and legal consequences, particularly regarding the wife's right to dower, which remains protected under Section 5 of the Act and is not affected unless she voluntarily seeks khula and waives it.
Questions settled- Whether a court can convert a prayer for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty into a decree of khula without the wife's explicit request and consent?
- Does a decree of dissolution of marriage on grounds other than khula affect a Muslim woman's right to her dower?
- What are the procedural distinctions between dissolving a marriage under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939 versus dissolution by way of khula?
- Hazaray Khan and others, Muhammad Ayub vs The State & another2024 SCP 323, 2024 SCMR 2042 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-05-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning convictions for murder, attempted murder, house trespass, and anti-terrorism offences. The core legal question involved the appreciation of evidence, the credibility of eyewitness testimony suffering from material contradictions and improvements, the failure to send crime empties for forensic analysis, and the withholding of material witnesses. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the uncorroborated and doubtful testimony of eyewitnesses who suffered no injuries despite close-range indiscriminate firing, coupled with material discrepancies and unproved recoveries, created a reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the appellants. The Court reiterated the established legal principle that the benefit of any reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case must be extended to the accused. Consequently, the appeal filed by the convicts was accepted, their convictions and sentences were set aside, and they were acquitted of the charge, while the state and complainant appeals seeking enhancement of sentences and challenging acquittals were dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether contradictions and dishonest improvements in the testimony of eyewitnesses can be a ground for extending the benefit of doubt to the accused?
- Does the failure to send crime empties to the firearm expert for analysis weaken the prosecution's case?
- What is the legal effect under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 of withholding material eyewitnesses during trial?
- Whether an accused is entitled to acquittal when prosecution evidence lacks independent corroboration in cases involving previous enmity?
- Hasrat Khan vs The State2024 SCP 273, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 911, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 336 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-08-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner challenged his conviction under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the possession of 320 kilograms of charas. The core legal question concerned the validity of the conviction when the prosecution failed to obtain separate samples from each packet for chemical analysis, instead relying on a single consolidated sample. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction but found the investigation method procedurally flawed, noting a clear violation of the principle established in Ameer Zeb v. The State (PLD 2012 SC 380), which mandates that samples must be separated from each packet of narcotics and tested individually. Consequently, the Court held that only the weight of the single tested sample (3.200 kilograms) could be legally attributed to the petitioner for sentencing purposes. The Court dismissed the petition regarding the conviction but converted it into an appeal and partly allowed it, significantly reducing the petitioner's sentence to six years and six months rigorous imprisonment, while emphasizing the necessity for proper training and capacity building for narcotics investigation and prosecution agencies in Balochistan.
Questions settled- Is a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 sustainable if only a consolidated sample is tested instead of samples from each individual packet?
- Does the failure to test each packet of recovered narcotics individually invalidate the entire conviction or merely affect the quantum of sentence?
- What is the legal consequence of failing to follow the procedure for sample collection in narcotics cases as established in Ameer Zeb v. The State?
- Hamza Rasheed Khan vs Election Appellate Tribunal, Lahore High Court, Lahore and others_2024 SCP 65, 2024 PLJ SC 379, 2024 SCP 66, 2024 SCP 6, PLD 2024 Supreme · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the constitutional interpretation of Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, specifically whether disqualification thereunder constitutes a permanent bar to contesting elections. The Supreme Court addressed whether the precedent in Sami Ullah Baloch v. Abdul Karim Nousherwani, which established a lifelong disqualification, correctly interpreted the Constitution. The Court held that Article 62(1)(f) is not a self-executory provision, as it fails to identify a competent court of law, prescribe a procedure, or specify the duration of disqualification. Consequently, the Court overruled Sami Ullah Baloch, determining that lifetime disqualification amounts to an unwarranted reading into the Constitution. The Court emphasized that provisions curtailing fundamental rights, such as the right to contest elections, must be construed restrictively and narrowly. It affirmed that in the absence of specific legislation, Article 62(1)(f) serves merely as a guideline for voters. Furthermore, the Court recognized that Section 232(2) of the Elections Act, 2017, which limits disqualification to five years, renders the issue of duration moot, ensuring consistency with due process and fundamental rights.
Questions settled- Is Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 a self-executory provision?
- Does the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 impose a permanent or lifelong disqualification for candidates under Article 62(1)(f)?
- Do the Supreme Court or High Courts have the jurisdiction to make a declaration of disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) in the absence of specific enabling legislation?
- Can a court of law create or enlarge its own jurisdiction to issue declarations under Article 62(1)(f) without statutory authorization?
- Hamza Rasheed Khan and another vs Election Appellate Tribunal, Lahore High Court, Lahore and others2024 PLD Supreme Court 256 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The Supreme Court of Pakistan, by a majority of 6 to 1, addressed whether Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution is self-executory and whether it imposes a lifetime disqualification. The core legal questions concerned the procedural requirements, identification of the competent court, and duration of disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) in light of the fundamental right to a fair trial. The court held by majority that Article 62(1)(f) is not a self-executory provision as it lacks specified procedures, forums, and periods for disqualification, and that imposing a lifetime disqualification through civil court declarations violates fundamental rights to due process and political participation. The previous precedent in Sami Ullah Baloch v. Abdul Karim Nausherwani was overruled to the extent of imposing lifelong disqualification. The court established that until a specific law makes it fully executory, Article 62(1)(f) serves as a guideline for voters, while noting that Section 232(2) of the Elections Act, 2017 now prescribes a five-year disqualification period.
Questions settled- Is Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of Pakistan a self-executory provision?
- Does Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution impose a lifetime disqualification upon a person based on a declaration by a court of civil jurisdiction?
- Whether the interpretation of Article 62(1)(f) given in Sami Ullah Baloch v. Abdul Karim Nausherwani holding disqualification to be lifelong is correct?
- What is the effect of Section 232(2) added to the Elections Act, 2017 regarding the period of disqualification under Article 62(1)(f)?
- Haji Musharraf Mahmood Khan (deceased) through his legal heirs vs Sardarzada Zafar Abbas (deceased) through his L.Rs., etc2024 SCP 145, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 588, 2025 PLJ SC 23 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-03-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil petition challenged a High Court order that refused to restore a Civil Revision dismissed for non-prosecution, primarily because the application for restoration was filed after the 60-day deadline set by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court had the authority to curtail the statutory limitation period for restoring a dismissed revision petition by imposing a 60-day limit, and what the correct limitation period is for such applications. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by restricting the limitation period to 60 days, as the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 contains no specific provision for restoring a revision dismissed for non-prosecution. Consequently, the Court must invoke its inherent powers under Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and the residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 applies, providing a three-year limitation period. The Court affirmed that technicalities should not defeat the ends of justice and that courts cannot override statutory limitation periods.
Questions settled- What is the limitation period for filing an application to restore a civil revision dismissed for non-prosecution?
- Can a High Court restrict the statutory limitation period for filing a restoration application by imposing a shorter deadline in its dismissal order?
- Under which provision of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 can a court restore a civil revision dismissed for non-prosecution?
- Does Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to applications for the restoration of a civil revision?
- Haji Ghulam Rasool and another vs Shah Nawaz and others2024 PLJ SC 61 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil petition for leave to appeal challenged the judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell. The core legal question concerned whether the suit, filed on 11.11.2007 based on an agreement dated 24.05.2003, was barred by limitation under Article 113 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908. The petitioners argued that since no specific date for performance was fixed in the agreement, the limitation period commenced only upon the respondents' refusal to perform. The Supreme Court observed that while Article 113 provides a three-year limitation period—commencing from the date fixed for performance or, if none is fixed, from the date the plaintiff has notice of refusal—the burden of proof lay on the petitioners to establish the date of such refusal. Finding that the petitioners failed to lead credible evidence to prove the date of refusal, the Court held that the suit was time-barred. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, affirming the lower courts' findings on the limitation issue.
Questions settled- When does the limitation period for a suit for specific performance commence if no date for performance is fixed in the agreement?
- Does the burden of proving the date of refusal to perform a contract lie on the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance?
- Is a suit for specific performance maintainable if the plaintiff fails to prove the date of refusal to perform within the statutory limitation period?
- Haider Mehar vs The State2024 SCP 188, 2024 SCMR 1471 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-05-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner filed a criminal petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed his appeal and upheld his conviction and sentence under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The petitioner was arrested during a raid based on spy information, leading to the alleged recovery of 2300 grams of charas, 700 grams of heroin, and sale proceeds from his possession. The core legal questions revolved around whether the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and whether the courts below misread or ignored material evidence. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution witnesses remained consistent regarding the raid, arrest, search, recovery, sample preparation, and safe custody of the contraband, which was further confirmed by the Punjab Forensic Science Agency report. Finding no misreading, non-reading, or illegality in the judgments of the lower courts, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and declined leave to appeal, affirming the conviction.
Questions settled- Whether the uncorroborated testimony of police officials regarding search and recovery of narcotics is sufficient to sustain a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
- Does a consistent and unblemished chain of custody regarding recovered contraband samples satisfy the legal requirements of proof in narcotics cases?
- Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial court and the High Court in the absence of misreading or non-reading of evidence?
- Hafiz Qari Abdul Fateh through L.Rs vs Ms. Urooj Fatima and others2024 SCP 259, 2024 SCMR 1709 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-07-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that dismissed a civil revision regarding the specific performance of an alleged oral agreement for the sale of agricultural land. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had sufficiently proven the existence of the oral agreement in accordance with established legal requirements. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to establish the agreement. The Court affirmed that while oral agreements are enforceable, they require the clearest and most satisfactory evidence. Crucially, the Court laid down the principle that a party claiming an oral agreement must explicitly plead the date, time, place, and names of witnesses in the plaint. Failure to include these particulars constitutes a fatal defect, and parties cannot improve their case through evidence at trial that contradicts or supplements the original pleadings. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that evidence cannot be considered on a plea of fact not raised in the pleadings, and the petitioner failed to prove the authority of the agent who purportedly entered the agreement.
Questions settled- Is an oral agreement for the sale of immovable property enforceable if the specific particulars of the agreement are not pleaded in the plaint?
- Can a party improve their case by introducing evidence of details regarding an oral agreement that were not mentioned in the original pleadings?
- What is the legal consequence of failing to plead the date, time, place, and names of witnesses in a suit for specific performance based on an oral agreement?
- Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a civil revision under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
- Hafiz Malik Kamran Akbar, etc. vs Muhammad Shafi (deceased) through LRs, etc2024 SCP 81, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 262 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court order dismissing an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioners, legal heirs of a defendant in a specific performance suit, alleged fraud and lack of service of summons regarding a decree that had attained finality through concurrent findings up to the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the court is mandatorily required to frame issues and record evidence in every Section 12(2) application, and whether the petitioners’ claims of non-service justified reopening the litigation. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioners failed to substantiate allegations of fraud or lack of jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that it is not incumbent upon a court to frame issues and record evidence in every Section 12(2) application; rather, the court has discretion to determine the procedure based on the nature of the allegations. Furthermore, the Court clarified that Section 12(2) applies to any person adversely affected by a judgment, not just the original parties.
Questions settled- Is a court mandatorily required to frame issues and record evidence in every application filed under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Does the term 'person' in Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 restrict the remedy exclusively to the judgment-debtor?
- Can an ex-parte decree be set aside solely on the ground of irregularity in the service of summons if the defendant had knowledge of the hearing?
- What is the appropriate forum for filing an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the final judgment was passed by an appellate court?
- Gul Sadem Khan vs Mst. Halima and others2024 SCP 395, 2025 PLD Supreme Court 47 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-11-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition arose from a guardianship dispute where the petitioner-father sought custody of his minor sons, challenging concurrent findings of lower courts that favored the respondent-mother. The core legal question concerned whether the father's status as a natural guardian under Muhammadan Law and the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, confers an absolute right to custody, or if such rights are subordinate to other considerations. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the welfare and betterment of the minor is the paramount and overriding consideration in all custody matters, superseding the father's preferential right as a natural guardian. The Court emphasized that custody arrangements are not absolute and must be determined based on the specific facts and circumstances of each case, including the child's age, the proposed guardian's capacity, and the minor's own preference. The Court reaffirmed that rigid technicalities should not obstruct the minor's welfare and that factors such as the father's absence or lack of care can disentitle him from custody, regardless of his status as a natural guardian.
Questions settled- Is the father's right to custody of a minor child under Muhammadan Law an absolute right?
- Does the welfare of the minor override the natural guardianship of the father in custody disputes?
- Can a mother retain custody of a minor child after remarriage?
- Is poverty a valid ground for disentitling a mother from the custody of her minor children?
- Govt. of Punjab through Secretary Irrigation and Power & another vs M/s.2024 SCP 348, 2025 SCMR 239 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-10-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These appeals challenged a High Court judgment regarding the liability of industrial entities to pay electricity duty on self-generated power. The core legal question was whether the 2001 amendment to the Punjab Finance Act, 1964, which expanded the definition of 'licensee' to include entities generating electricity for self-use exceeding 500 KW, effectively imposed a tax on such self-consumption. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the respondents were not liable for the duty. The Court determined that the taxing event under Section 13 of the Act requires both the consumption of energy and a 'supply' of that energy to a consumer. The Court emphasized that fiscal statutes must be interpreted strictly; where two reasonable interpretations exist, the one more favorable to the taxpayer must be adopted. Since the respondents consumed the energy themselves rather than supplying it to another, the taxing event was not triggered, regardless of their status as 'licensees' under the amended definition.
Questions settled- Does the definition of 'licensee' under the Punjab Finance Act 1964, as amended by the Punjab Finance Ordinance 2001, automatically trigger electricity duty liability for self-generated power?
- What constitutes the 'taxing event' for electricity duty under Section 13 of the Punjab Finance Act 1964?
- Is the self-consumption of electricity generated by a private generator exceeding 500 KW subject to electricity duty under the Punjab Finance Act 1964?
- How should a court interpret a fiscal statute when two reasonable interpretations of the charging provision exist?
- Govt. of Balochistan thr. its secy. Forest and Wildlife Dept., Quetta & Another2024 SCP 146, 2024 SCMR 1155, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 938, 2024 PLJ SC 526 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns civil petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Balochistan Service Tribunal, which reinstated employees whose appointments were summarily withdrawn by the Forest and Wildlife Department. The core legal questions were whether the department could terminate the employees without a show-cause notice or opportunity for hearing, and whether the recruitment process, conducted by a Departmental Recruitment Committee, was legally flawed. The Supreme Court held that the summary withdrawal of appointment letters, after the respondents had joined duties and had their service books prepared, violated the principles of natural justice. The Court emphasized that a right of audience is mandatory before detrimental action is taken. Furthermore, the Court found no evidence of fraud or misrepresentation by the respondents, noting that they had participated in a competitive process initiated by the government. The ratio established is that once a recruitment process is completed and vested rights are created, appointments cannot be withdrawn in a perfunctory manner without due process, even if the department later alleges procedural irregularities in the initial recruitment phase.
Questions settled- Can a government department summarily withdraw appointment orders without issuing a show-cause notice or providing an opportunity for a hearing?
- Does the doctrine of locus poenitentiae allow for the revocation of appointment orders once a candidate has joined duty and vested rights have been created?
- Is it legally permissible for a department to terminate employees based on alleged procedural irregularities in the recruitment process without proving fraud or misrepresentation by the employees themselves?
- Government of the Punjab through Secretary Primary & Secondary2024 SCP 335, 2024 SCMR 2061, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 1483 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-09-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Government of the Punjab against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal. The core legal question concerned whether the petition was filed within the prescribed limitation period, specifically whether the time taken by the Tribunal to administratively dispatch a copy of the judgment to the department could be excluded from the computation of the limitation period under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Supreme Court held that the petition was time-barred. The Court ruled that the limitation period for filing a petition for leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution commences from the date of the judgment's announcement in the presence of the parties, not from the date of receipt of a copy sent by the Tribunal. The principle laid down is that administrative actions, such as the Tribunal's duty to provide copies under Rule 21 of the Punjab Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1975, do not extend the statutory limitation period, as doing so would create uncertainty and violate the fair trial rights of civil servants.
Questions settled- Does the administrative dispatch of a judgment copy by a Service Tribunal extend the limitation period for filing a petition for leave to appeal?
- From what date is the limitation period for a petition for leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution computed?
- Can the time taken by a Tribunal to provide a copy of an order to a department be excluded under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
- Is a petition for leave to appeal filed after the expiry of the 60-day limitation period, without sufficient cause for delay, liable to be dismissed?
- Government of the Punjab through Chief Secretary, Punjab, Lahore and another vs Zaka Ullah and others2024 SCP 410, 2025 SCMR 443, 2025 PLC (C.S.) 483, 2025 PLJ SC 158 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-12-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This Civil Petition challenged a Lahore High Court order that directed the Chief Secretary, Punjab, to secure a supplementary grant for the regularization of 236 contract employees of the Zakat and Ushr Department. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court could issue such a directive without explicit cabinet approval and finance department sanction for the posts and budget. The Court held that cabinet approval is mandatory for regularization, and the finance department's concurrence is essential for decisions affecting provincial finances or creating new posts. It found no such approvals in the record and reiterated that regularization is a policy matter falling within the executive's domain, which courts cannot usurp. Contractual employees have no vested right to regularization, and courts cannot direct it in the absence of statutory or legal backing. Consequently, the Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and set aside the High Court's order.
Questions settled- Is cabinet approval mandatory for the regularization of government employees?
- Can a High Court direct the regularization of contractual employees without statutory or legal backing?
- Do contractual employees have a vested right to regularization merely by efflux of time?
- Is consultation with and concurrence of the finance department required for decisions affecting provincial finances or creating new government posts?
- Can courts interfere with the executive's policy decisions regarding employee regularization?
- Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad2024 SCP 5 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from multiple constitutional petitions concerning the issue of enforced disappearances and the perceived ineffectiveness of the Commission of Enquiry on Enforced Disappearances. The petitioners expressed deep reservations regarding the Commission's performance, while the Commission's Registrar asserted that its efforts had successfully recovered numerous individuals. The Court appointed an amicus curiae to assist with the matter, particularly regarding the non-compliance with production orders issued by the Commission. The Court overruled office objections on the maintainability of certain petitions, limiting their scope strictly to missing persons. To ensure transparency and progress, the Court directed the Commission to compile and submit comprehensive data on missing persons, production orders, and its budget. Crucially, the Court directed the Federal Government to submit a written undertaking that no individual would be detained except in accordance with the law, and reaffirmed that the right to peaceful protest is a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right.
Questions settled- Does the right to information under Article 19A of the Constitution of Pakistan require the disclosure of the budget, staff, and resources of a public commission?
- Can individuals who have already returned home be categorized as missing persons for the purpose of issuing writs of habeas corpus?
- What is the scope of the constitutional right to peaceful protest and assembly, and what are its permissible limitations?
- Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence Rawalpindi2024 SCP 173, 2024 SCMR 1323, 2024 PLJ SC 878 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The Government of Pakistan appealed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had dismissed its appeals and maintained the Referee Court's determination of enhanced compensation for land acquired for the Pakistan Military Academy, Kakul. The primary legal questions concerned whether compensation could exceed the amount claimed in reference applications under Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and whether the quantum of compensation warranted interference. The Supreme Court held that the restrictive provisions of Section 25 cannot be invoked unless the mandatory statutory notices under Section 9 of the Act are strictly complied with by the Collector. Since the appellant failed to prove proper service of notice under Section 9, the Referee Court was not barred from awarding compensation exceeding the landowners' initial claims. Furthermore, the Court held that fair market value and potential land value must be determined based on reliable evidence such as contemporary sale mutations. The appeals were consequently dismissed, upholding the enhanced compensation.
Questions settled- Whether the Court could enhance the rate of compensation beyond the amount claimed by the respondents in the reference applications?
- Whether the compensation awarded by the Courts below requires any interference by this Court?
- Does the failure to comply with the mandatory notice requirements under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act prevent the application of the restrictive limits on compensation under Section 25?
- Can the potential future value of acquired land be taken into account alongside its current market value when determining compensation?
- Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Elementary &2024 SCP 396, 2025 SCMR 40, 2025 PLC (C.S.) 353, 2025 PLJ SC 109 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-10-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal, which set aside the compulsory retirement of a school teacher and directed his posthumous reinstatement. The core legal question concerned whether the competent authority could lawfully impose a major penalty of compulsory retirement based merely on a show-cause notice without conducting a regular inquiry or recording valid reasons for dispensing with it under the applicable service rules. The Supreme Court held that allegations involving disputed facts, such as verbal abuse and misconduct, cannot be proved without a proper inquiry providing opportunities for evidence and cross-examination, and that dispensing with an inquiry requires cogent reasons and overwhelming documentary evidence. The Court laid down the principle that competent authorities must adopt a judicious approach in departmental proceedings, ensuring due process and natural justice, and that leave to appeal under Article 212 of the Constitution requires a substantial question of law of public importance.
Questions settled- Can a competent authority impose a major penalty on a government servant based solely on a show-cause notice without holding a regular inquiry?
- What are the legal prerequisites and conditions under which a regular departmental inquiry can be legally dispensed with?
- Whether the Supreme Court can grant leave to appeal against a service tribunal judgment in the absence of a substantial question of law of public importance?
- Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Agriculture, Peshawar and others vs Tahir Mushtaq and others2024 SCP 318, 2024 SCMR 2069, 2025 PLC (C.S.) 34 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-09-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa against a High Court judgment that had directed the appointment of a respondent to a government post based on an 'employee son's quota' policy. The core legal question was whether the policy reserving government jobs for children of retiring civil servants is constitutionally permissible. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment. The Court held that such quota policies are unconstitutional, as they violate the principles of non-discrimination and merit-based employment enshrined in the Constitution. The Court emphasized that public employment must be based on merit to ensure the best candidates are selected, rather than appointments being secured through filial relationships, which undermines transparency and good governance. Furthermore, the Court noted that the instructions relied upon by the respondent lacked a clear statutory basis and failed to identify the competent authority, rendering them legally ineffective. The Court advised the provincial government to withdraw all such notifications and instructions that reserve seats for children of government servants.
Questions settled- Is a policy reserving government posts for the children of retiring civil servants constitutionally valid?
- Does the reservation of government jobs based on filial relationships violate the principle of merit-based employment?
- Can instructions issued by a government department without a clear statutory basis and identification of the competent authority be enforced?
- Government of Balochistan through Secretary Mines And Minerals2024 SCP 96, 2024 SCMR 876 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-03-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter originated from petitions challenging a High Court judgment regarding the retrospective application of a notification issued by the Secretary of the Mines and Minerals Department, Government of Balochistan. The notification, issued in 2017, revised rates for mineral titles, annual rentals, and royalties under the Balochistan Mineral Rules, 2002. The core legal question was whether a notification lacking initial Cabinet approval, but subsequently receiving ex-post facto Cabinet approval, could be applied retrospectively. The Supreme Court, relying on the principles established in the Mustafa Impex case, held that executive authority, particularly regarding fiscal matters, must be exercised by the Cabinet collectively. The Court affirmed that ex-post facto approval by the Cabinet does not validate a notification retrospectively; rather, it renders the notification effective only from the date of such approval. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, upholding the High Court's decision that the notification could only have prospective effect from the date of the Cabinet's authentication, thereby rejecting the government's attempt to enforce the revised rates from the date of the original, unauthorized notification.
Questions settled- Can a notification issued by a government department without prior Cabinet approval be given retrospective effect through subsequent ex-post facto Cabinet approval?
- Does the principle of collective responsibility of the Cabinet apply to the exercise of executive authority by a Provincial Government?
- From what date does a notification become effective if it receives ex-post facto approval from the Cabinet?
- Gohar Ali Khan vs Aftab Durrani and others2024 SCP 7 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan pursuant to an earlier order dated 3 January 2024, involving the Election Commission of Pakistan and the Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab, who filed criminal miscellaneous applications. The core procedural question concerned whether the petitioner required time to respond to the voluminous applications filed by the respondents. The court decided to grant the petitioner three days time to file a written response to the contents of the said applications. The key principle established is the provision of adequate opportunity of hearing and response in procedural compliance with court directions prior to further adjudication.
Questions settled- Whether a party is entitled to seek time to file a written response to miscellaneous applications filed pursuant to court orders?
- Can the court grant adjournment for submitting replies to CMAs in pending matters?
- Ghulam Shabbir vs The State etc2024 SCP 289, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 951, PLJ 2025 SC (Cr.C.) 29 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-08-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner filed a criminal review petition seeking conversion of his death sentences into imprisonment for life, having already served over 34 years in prison, including 24 years in a death cell, following his conviction under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for double murder. The core legal question was whether an unconscionably delayed execution and prolonged incarceration equaling or exceeding a life term can serve as a mitigating circumstance to commute a death sentence to imprisonment for life under the principle of expectancy of life. The Supreme Court partly allowed the petition, holding that longstanding detention in prison exceeding a life term due to systemic delays in judicial proceedings and execution constitutes an unconscionably delayed punishment and a violation of human dignity. The court laid down the principle that where a death row convict undergoes custody equal to or exceeding a full term of imprisonment for life without fault of their own, the court may exercise its discretion to commute the death sentence to imprisonment for life.
Questions settled- Whether prolonged incarceration exceeding a life term during the pendency of judicial proceedings or awaiting execution can be considered a mitigating circumstance to commute a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
- Does keeping a death row convict in a death cell for an unconscionably long period amount to double punishment or violate constitutional dignity?
- Can the principle of expectancy of life be invoked when the delay in the final conclusion of a criminal case is attributable to systemic failure rather than the fault of the convict?
- Raza Khan vs The State & another2024 SCP 252, 2024 SCMR 1697 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-07-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a petition for post-arrest bail arising out of an FIR registered under Sections 4 and 5 of The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Elimination of Custom of Ghag Act, 2013 read with Section 25 of the Telegraph Act, 1885. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, prima facie involved in non-bailable offences related to the custom of Ghag, was entitled to the discretionary relief of post-arrest bail. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that upon a tentative assessment of the material available on record and considering the peculiar circumstances of the case, including the petitioner's prima facie involvement in making Ghag and obstructing a marriage, the petitioner was not entitled to bail. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Is a person prima facie involved in non-bailable offences under the Ghag Act entitled to post-arrest bail?
- What constitutes the custom of Ghag under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Elimination of Custom of Ghag Act, 2013?
- Ghulam Sarwar through his LRs vs Province of Punjab through District2024 SCP 383, 2025 PLD Supreme Court 60 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-11-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan was filed with a delay of twenty-two days, accompanied by an application for condonation of delay under section 5. The core legal question was whether conflicting or erroneous legal advice received by a party regarding whether to file a leave petition or an appeal as of right constitutes sufficient cause for the condonation of delay under limitation laws. The Court held that wrong legal advice of this nature does not constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay, distinguishing the facts from precedents where litigants pursued remedies in a wrong forum. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay was dismissed, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal as time-barred. The key principle laid down is that mistaken legal counsel regarding procedural remedies does not amount to sufficient cause to excuse a delay in filing an appeal.
Questions settled- Does wrong or conflicting legal advice constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay under limitation laws?
- Can the principles of section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908 be invoked for appeals under section 5?
- Does an appeal filed with a delay caused by mistaken legal counsel warrant condonation?
- Ghulam Rasool vs The State2024 SCP 327, 2024 SCMR 2048 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-09-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from concurrent findings of guilt and a sentence of death under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for double murder. The core legal questions involved the reliability of ocular and medical evidence, the existence of mitigating circumstances, and whether prolonged incarceration during protracted trial and appellate proceedings warrants the commutation of a death sentence to imprisonment for life. By a majority of 2 to 1, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, maintaining the conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but altering the death sentence to imprisonment for life on two counts, with sentences to run concurrently alongside the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that extensive delays in the judicial process resulting in prolonged incarceration in a death cell, coupled with uncertainties regarding individual fatal attribution in multi-assailant sudden occurrences, can constitute mitigating circumstances justifying the commutation of capital punishment to imprisonment for life.
Questions settled- Does prolonged incarceration during protracted trial and appellate proceedings constitute a mitigating circumstance for commuting a death sentence?
- Whether the non-recovery or inconsequential recovery of a crime weapon vitiates an otherwise consistent ocular and medical account in a murder trial?
- Can a death sentence be altered to imprisonment for life when it remains uncertain which specific assailant's firearm shot caused the fatal injury?
- Does a delay in the execution or conclusion of judicial proceedings by itself justify the reduction of capital punishment?
- Ghulam Rasool vs Election Commission of Pakistan through Secretary, Islamabad and others2024 SCP 321, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 981 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-09-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arises from the judgment of the Election Tribunal Balochistan, Quetta, dismissing the appellant's election petition challenging the results of the Provincial Balochistan constituency PB-14 Naseerabad-II. The core legal question concerned whether the appellant established allegations of vote tampering and manipulation of Form-45s by the winning candidate in collusion with presiding officers, and whether the recount and election results were lawfully conducted. The Supreme Court held that the appellant failed to establish any wrongdoing or familial ties between the winning candidate and the presiding officers during extensive cross-examination, and that ballot papers constitute the primary evidence of an election result. The Court affirmed that while a presumption of correctness attaches to statutory forms, the actual ballot papers remain the determinative factor in resolving controversies, and upheld the impugned judgment dismissing the appeal.
Questions settled- What constitutes primary evidence of an election result in the event of a dispute over vote counts?
- Whether the summoning of presiding officers as court witnesses by an Election Tribunal causes any legal disadvantage to an election petitioner who gains the opportunity to cross-examine them?
- Does a presumption of correctness attach to election forms prepared by presiding and returning officers until ballot papers are recounted?
- Whether tampering with election results can be established without proving specific wrongdoing or interference with actual ballot papers?
- Ghulam Mustafa vs Mst. Mah Begum and others2024 SCP 69, 2024 SCMR 795 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal by leave of the Court arose from a judgment of the High Court of Balochistan dismissing a civil revision filed by the appellant regarding a long-standing property dispute. The core legal question concerned whether the appellant's civil suit for declaration, possession, and permanent injunction was barred by limitation. The Supreme Court held that the suit was indeed time-barred, as the main relief of declaration of ownership was filed fourteen years after the impugned mutation, thereby exceeding the six-year limitation period prescribed under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Court laid down that when the primary relief of a declaration of ownership is time-barred, consequential reliefs, even if filed within time, cannot be sustained. Furthermore, the Court clarified that while co-owners of joint property generally enjoy protection from limitation, the creation of third-party interests and transfer of actual possession constitutes an actual denial of rights, triggering the limitation period.
Questions settled- Is a civil suit for declaration of ownership time-barred if filed beyond six years from the date of the impugned mutation?
- Does the time-barring of the primary relief for declaration of ownership render consequential reliefs like possession and injunction legally unavailable?
- When does the creation of third-party interests in joint property constitute an actual denial of rights so as to trigger the limitation period?
- Ghulam Murtaza Sheikh Faheem Anwar Memon vs The Chief Minister, Sindh and others2024 SCP 293, 2024 SCMR 1757, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 1274 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-08-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These civil petitions for leave to appeal were directed against a consolidated judgment of the Sindh Service Tribunal, which had dismissed service appeals of prison officials—a Senior Superintendent and a Deputy Superintendent—regarding major penalties imposed after the escape of hardcore criminals from custody, while modifying and enhancing their punishments. The core legal question centered on whether departmental disciplinary proceedings and inquiries conducted without affording the accused the right to cross-examine witnesses violate due process and principles of natural justice, and whether job descriptions alone can override fatal procedural lapses in an inquiry. The Supreme Court held that the right to cross-examine witnesses is a vested, fundamental right intrinsic to due process under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, and its denial vitiates the entire inquiry, rendering reliance solely on job descriptions legally untenable. The Court established that while acquittal in criminal proceedings does not bar departmental action for misconduct, inquiries must strictly adhere to transparency, natural justice, and due process, and service tribunals must scrutinize inquiry reports thoroughly rather than ignore procedural defects.
Questions settled- Does the denial of the right to cross-examine witnesses during a departmental inquiry vitiate the disciplinary proceedings?
- Can a service tribunal overlook fatal procedural lapses in a departmental inquiry simply on the ground that the employee failed to perform duties specified in a manual?
- Does acquittal in a criminal trial automatically bar or invalidate departmental proceedings for misconduct arising from the same incident?
- Is the right to cross-examination considered a fundamental right under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Ghulam Abbas Soomro vs The Province of Sindh, etc.2024 SCP 79, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 569, 2024 SCMR 673 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-02-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant, an Executive Engineer holding a B-Tech (Hons.) in Civil engineering, challenged a judgment of the Sindh Service Tribunal regarding his frequent transfers and postings, and raised a broader question concerning an alleged conflict between two judgments of the Supreme Court: Fida Hussain v. The Secretary, Kashmir Affairs and Northern Affairs Division (PLD 1995 SC 701) and Maula Buz Shaikh v. Chief Minister Sindh (2018 SCMR 2098 / 2019 PLC (C.S.) 282), regarding the applicability of the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976 to government employees and their eligibility to perform professional engineering works. During the proceedings, the Provincial Government admitted that the appellant's transfers were administratively incorrect and gave assurances of corrective action. However, noting the critical legal conundrum created by allowing promotions of unqualified or unregistered persons to posts requiring professional engineering work while exposing them to penal consequences under Section 27 of the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976 and potential discrimination under Article 25 of the Constitution, the Court held that the matter warranted consideration by a larger bench. The Court accordingly directed that the case be placed before the Committee under the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 for fixation before an appropriate bench.
Questions settled- Whether any governmental policy regarding promotion can be given effect if it leads to the violation of the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976 or exposes the beneficiary to criminal liability?
- Does denying an Executive Engineer (BS-18) the right to perform professional engineering works create disparate classes of employees within the same cadre, thereby violating Article 25 of the Constitution?
- Are the provisions of the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976 applicable only to professional engineers in private practice or do they extend to persons employed in government departments and autonomous bodies performing professional engineering work?
- General Post Office, Islamabad & others vs Muhammad Jalal2024 SCP 358, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 1276 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-10-18Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arose from a Peshawar High Court judgment directing the General Post Office to appoint the respondent on a contract basis under an Establishment Division Office Memorandum ('OM') reserving employment quotas for children of civil servants retired on medical grounds. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether policies, rules, and OMs granting public appointments to spouses or children of civil servants who die in service or retire on medical/invalidation grounds without open advertisement and competitive merit conform with constitutional guarantees. Reversing the High Court's order, the Supreme Court held that public sector employment cannot be made hereditary or allocated through unadvertised quotas. The Court held that such preferential hiring rules—including the Prime Minister's Assistance Package and corresponding provincial civil servant appointment rules—are manifestly discriminatory and ultra vires Articles 3, 4, 5(2), 18, 25, and 27 of the Constitution. The Court struck down these quota mechanisms, directing federal and provincial governments to withdraw them, while saving past closed transactions and special compensation packages for martyrs of law enforcement agencies and victims of terrorist acts.
Questions settled- Are rules and policies providing public sector employment to children or spouses of deceased or incapacitated civil servants without open competition constitutionally valid under Articles 25 and 27?
- Can public sector employment be granted on a hereditary basis or reserved as an exclusive dispensation for civil servants' family members?
- Does an unadvertised appointment policy for specific categories of citizens violate the fundamental right to enter upon a lawful profession under Article 18 of the Constitution?
- Does the Supreme Court's declaration striking down preferential employment quotas for civil servants' family members invalidate appointments already finalized prior to the judgment?
- General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf vs Federation of Pakistan and others2024 SCP 12, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 497, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 162 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal was filed by General (retired) Pervez Musharraf under section 12(3) of the Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1976 against his conviction by the Special Court dated 17 December 2019. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant passed away. The core legal questions involved whether the appeal abated upon the death of the appellant under section 431 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and the consequential effects on his conviction and the rights of his legal heirs. Despite notices issued to the legal heirs through available addresses and publications in leading newspapers, no legal heirs came forward to contest the appeal or instruct counsel. The Supreme Court held that the appeal stood abated upon the death of the appellant pursuant to section 431 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal and the subsistence of the conviction handed down by the Special Court. The key principle laid down is that a criminal appeal abates upon the death of the convict when legal heirs choose not to contest the proceedings.
Questions settled- Whether on the death of the appellant the criminal appeal did not abate in terms of section 431 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
- What are the consequences on the conviction and rights of legal heirs if an appellant dies during the pendency of an appeal?
- Does an appeal abate under section 431 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 when the legal heirs of a deceased appellant fail to contest the proceedings?
- Fozia Mazhar vs Additional District Judge, Jhang and others2024 SCP 139, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 771, 2024 PLJ SC 489 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-04-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil petition arose out of a matrimonial dispute challenging the concurrent findings of three courts below, which set aside an order recalling a decree of dissolution of marriage on the ground of khula under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (C.P.C.) due to misrepresentation. The petitioner had obtained a khula decree and subsequently filed a purported joint application stating the parties had reconciled, leading to the decree's recall. The respondent challenged this recall, asserting he never consented, signed, or authorized any compromise. The Supreme Court considered whether Section 12(2) C.P.C. applies to Family Court proceedings despite Section 17 of the Family Courts Act, 1964, and whether the High Court correctly declined to disturb concurrent factual findings under Article 199. Dismissing the petition, the Supreme Court held that Family Courts may apply the general principles of the C.P.C. to prevent abuse of process and entertain challenges grounded on fraud or misrepresentation. Furthermore, concurrent factual findings cannot be disturbed in writ jurisdiction absent gross misreading, non-reading, or absence of evidence.
Questions settled- Can the general principles of Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 be invoked before a Family Court to challenge an order or decree obtained through fraud or misrepresentation despite the bar contained in Section 17 of the Family Courts Act, 1964?
- Under what circumstances can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by courts below while exercising constitutional writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution?
- Is a petitioner estopped from claiming that an application for recall of a khula decree was a unilateral withdrawal when it was expressly presented as a joint compromise application?
- Federation of Pakistan, The Province of Balochistan through the Chief Secretary Services & Department Quetta vs Karamat Ali and others2024 SCP 288, 2024 SCMR 1952, 2024 PLJ SC 863 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-07-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from civil miscellaneous applications seeking to restrain the Federation of Pakistan and provincial governments from engaging private counsel to plead appeals arising from challenges to provisions of the Pakistan Army Act, 1952. The core legal question was whether the government can engage private counsel when the Attorney General is available, and whether such engagement complies with the Rules of Business, 1973 and previous Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Court held that the applications were misconceived and dismissed them, ruling that the government may engage private counsel for compelling reasons and in the public interest, provided the procedure under Rule 14(1A) of the Rules of Business, 1973 is fulfilled, and that advocates-on-record properly instructed private counsel pursuant to the Supreme Court Rules, 1980. The key principle laid down is that while the Attorney General is the primary law officer, the government is not barred from engaging private counsel in complex matters of exceptional public importance where compelling reasons exist, subject to adherence to prescribed administrative procedures.
Questions settled- Whether the Federal Government and its ministries can engage private counsel to represent them in court proceedings in the presence of the Attorney General for Pakistan?
- What constitutes compelling reasons for engaging private counsel under the Rules of Business, 1973?
- Can an Advocate-on-Record instruct a private counsel to appear and plead in a matter before the Supreme Court of Pakistan under the Supreme Court Rules, 1980?
- Whether the engagement of private counsel by the government violates the principles laid down in Rasheed Ahmad's case?