Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Zulfiqar Ahmed Bhutta, Syed Tariq Badar, Naeem ul Hassan, Advocate v_c62821782023 SCP 65 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-02-22Read full judgment →
• Zeeshan Shaikh vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Interior2023 PSC 133 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-10
  Federal Investigation Agencyseniority listservice tribunalcadre bifurcationImmigration wingInvestigation groupleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition assails the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal which dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding the seniority list of the Federal Investigation Agency. The core legal question was whether the Immigration wing and the Investigation group of the Federal Investigation Agency constitute separate distinct cadres or a single combined group under the relevant rules, and whether a combined seniority list is lawful. The Supreme Court held that under rule 12 of the Federal Investigation Agency (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1975, only the Federal Government has the power to add to or modify the specified groups, and since no separate Immigration group has been validly created by the Federal Government, the Immigration officers form part of the Investigation group. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, holding that the combined seniority list was in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Immigration wing and the Investigation group of the Federal Investigation Agency constitute a single combined group or separate cadres under the Federal Investigation Agency (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1975?
  • Does the Director General or the Additional Director General's Committee of the Federal Investigation Agency have the power to create a separate distinct group under the Federal Investigation Agency (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1975?
  • Whether a combined seniority list including both Immigration and Investigation personnel accords with rule 12 of the Federal Investigation Agency (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1975?
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• Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited through President and others vs Sarfraz Khan Jadoon and others2023 PLC (C.S) 724 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-06-10
  service lawprospective operation of judgmentsfinancial benefitspromotions withdrawncondonation of delaycivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which partly allowed a writ petition challenging an Office Memorandum issued by the appellant bank. The High Court restrained the bank from recovering or adjusting financial benefits already paid to respondents pursuant to promotions that were subsequently withdrawn by the Supreme Court in an earlier judgment. Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether the High Court erred in allowing the retention of such benefits. The Supreme Court examined the import of the term 'hereby' in the previous judgment and reiterated that judicial pronouncements operate prospectively unless expressly stated otherwise. The Court held that since the withdrawal of promotions was made effective from the date of the judgment itself, the employees were entitled to retain the financial benefits received prior thereto. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and a companion time-barred civil petition was also dismissed due to an unexplained delay.

  Questions settled

  • Whether judgments of courts operate prospectively regarding the withdrawal of promotional benefits?
  • Can financial benefits received pursuant to promotions be recovered after the promotions are set aside?
  • What constitutes sufficient cause for the condonation of a substantial delay of over 500 days in filing a civil petition?
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• Zakir Mehmood vs Secretary, Ministry of Defence (D.P), Pakistan2023 SCP 117 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-04-12
  Federal Service Tribunalimposition of costsspecial costsSection 12(2) CPCfrivolous litigationappellate civil court powersCosts of Litigation Act 2017
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a petition for leave to appeal challenging an order of the Federal Service Tribunal that dismissed the petitioner's application under Order Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 with costs of Rs. 50,000. The petitioner had engaged in prolonged, repeated litigation following his compulsory retirement for misconduct. The core legal question was whether the Federal Service Tribunal, while deciding an appeal or an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, possesses the power to award costs. The Supreme Court held that under Section 5(2) of the Service Tribunals Act 1973, the Tribunal is deemed to be an appellate civil court with all corresponding powers under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. In Islamabad, under the Costs of Litigation Act 2017, Section 35B allows civil courts and the Tribunal to impose special costs without an upper limit to deter frivolous proceedings. Finding the imposition of costs justified, the Court dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the power to award costs when deciding an appeal or an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does Section 5(2) of the Service Tribunals Act 1973 confer upon the Federal Service Tribunal the powers of a first appellate civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can special costs be imposed without an upper financial limit under Section 35B of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 as amended by the Costs of Litigation Act 2017?
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• Zakir Mehmood vs Secretary, Ministry of Defence (D.P), Pakistan2023 PLC (C.S.) 1030 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-04-12
  Federal Service Tribunalcosts of litigationfrivolous litigationvexatious applicationspecial costscivil court powersservice appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which imposed costs of Rs. 50,000 on the petitioner for filing a vexatious application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question addressed is whether the Federal Service Tribunal, while deciding an appeal or application under the Service Tribunals Act 1973, possesses the authority to award costs. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal, being deemed a civil court under Section 5(2) of the Service Tribunals Act 1973, exercises the powers of a first appellate civil court. Consequently, it is empowered to award actual, compensatory, and special costs under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and the Costs of Litigation Act 2017. The Court established the principle that tribunals must regularly exercise their power to impose reasonable costs to curb frivolous and vexatious litigation. This practice is essential to promote fairness, deter baseless claims, encourage settlements, and ensure the efficient use of judicial resources by preventing the abuse of court processes.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the power to award costs when deciding an appeal or application?
  • Can the Federal Service Tribunal exercise the powers of a first appellate civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is the Federal Service Tribunal empowered to impose special costs under the Costs of Litigation Act 2017?
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• Zain Ali vs The State2023 SCP 222, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 103, 2023 SCMR 1669 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-07-24
  narcotic possessionchain of custodypolice witness testimonyControl of Narcotic Substances Actburden of proofcriminal appealchemical examiner report
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged his conviction under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for transporting 563 kilograms of charas and 1500 grams of opium. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of police official witnesses in the absence of independent public witnesses and whether the chain of custody for narcotics samples was compromised. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the conviction was sound. The Court affirmed that police testimony is inherently credible and does not require independent corroboration unless specific grounds for distrust exist. Furthermore, the Court held that minor contradictions do not vitiate the prosecution's case. Regarding the chain of custody, the Court clarified that the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001 are directory rather than mandatory, and that the prosecution successfully established the safe transmission of samples to the Chemical Examiner. The Court emphasized that under Section 29 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, the burden of proof shifts to the accused once the prosecution establishes the recovery of narcotics.

  Questions settled

  • Is the testimony of police officials insufficient to sustain a conviction without independent public witnesses?
  • Are the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, mandatory or directory in nature?
  • Does the burden of proof shift to the accused under Section 29 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, once the prosecution establishes the recovery of narcotics?
  • Do minor contradictions in prosecution evidence automatically invalidate a conviction?
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• Zahid Sarfaraz Gill vs The State2023 SCP 369, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 8, 2024 SCMR 934 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-22
  post-arrest bailnarcotics controlfurther inquirymodern devices and techniquesvideo recording of arrestcharas recoverypolice investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal seeking pre-arrest or post-arrest bail in a narcotics case involving the recovery of 1833 grams of charas under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal question concerned whether the circumstances of the case, including allegations of mala fide and the absence of independent witnesses or modern recording techniques during a daylight public arrest, warranted the grant of bail. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, granting bail to the petitioner on the ground that the case constituted one of further inquiry. The Court laid down the key principle that while section 25 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act excludes the strict requirement of local inhabitants under section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, investigating agencies like the police and the Anti-Narcotics Force ought to utilize modern devices and techniques, such as mobile phone cameras to photograph and video record searches, seizures, and arrests pursuant to Articles 164 and 165 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, to ensure credible evidence, prevent false implication, and curb delays in trials.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the recovery of a commercial quantity of narcotics precludes the grant of bail when the circumstances of the arrest present a case of further inquiry?
  • Can the police and Anti-Narcotics Force utilize mobile phone cameras to record searches and seizures under the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984?
  • Does section 25 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 exclude the application of section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 regarding local witnesses?
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• Zagham Hassan Khan vs The State, etc2023 SCP 352, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 75, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 61 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-07
  unsound mindschizophreniaSection 466 CrPCbailmental disabilitytrial postponementjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a 60-year-old accused suffering from schizophrenia who was declared unfit to stand trial. The core legal question was whether the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion under Section 466 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 by detaining the accused in a mental health facility rather than releasing him on sufficient security after postponing trial proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the trial court’s discretion was exercised unreasonably and capriciously, as there were no exceptional circumstances justifying detention over release. The Court set aside the lower court orders and directed the accused's release on bail, subject to strict conditions regarding his care, prevention of harm, and periodic medical evaluation. The key principle laid down is that under Section 466, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the primary course for an accused of unsound mind is release on sufficient security, while detention in safe custody is an exceptional measure. This discretion must be exercised based on whether the accused can be properly cared for and prevented from harming himself or others.

  Questions settled

  • What is the primary course of action for an accused found to be of unsound mind and incapable of making his defence under Section 466 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Under what circumstances may a court order the detention of an accused of unsound mind in safe custody instead of releasing them on bail?
  • Does the discretion conferred on a court under Section 466 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 allow for the detention of an accused without justifying reasons?
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• Zaffar Afzal and others vs Ashiq Hussain2023 PLD Supreme Court 456 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-04-12
  oral sale agreementmutationpersons with disabilitiesburden of prooffraudproperty transfercivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal concerns the validity of an oral sale agreement executed by a deceased person who was hard of hearing and non-verbal. The appellants, legal heirs of the deceased, challenged the sale mutation in favor of the respondent, alleging fraud and lack of consent. The core legal question was whether the respondent sufficiently proved the deceased's capacity to understand the transaction and the payment of consideration. The Supreme Court held that the transaction was not proved, noting the respondent failed to establish that the deceased understood the terms or that the sale price was paid. The Court emphasized that transactions involving persons with disabilities require strict safeguards, including the presence of interpreters and independent witnesses to ensure the transaction is free from fraud or undue influence. Furthermore, the Court clarified that mutation does not confer title and that the respondent failed to prove the appellants had knowledge of prior partition proceedings to establish a limitation bar. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Trial Court's decree in favor of the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • What safeguards are required for a valid property transaction involving a person who is hard of hearing and non-verbal?
  • Does a mutation entry in revenue records confer title to property?
  • Can a party rely on an ex parte partition order to establish a limitation bar without proving the opposing party's knowledge of the proceedings?
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• Zaffar Afzal & others vs Ashiq Hussain2023 SCP 129 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-04-12
  oral saledeaf and dumb personmutationcivil appealproperty disputeburden of proofpersons with disabilities
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute over property transferred through an oral sale mutation by a deceased owner who was deaf, dumb, and uneducated, in favor of the respondent, who was his nephew and the brother of the appellants. The appellants challenged the mutation through a suit for declaration and cancellation on the ground of fraud, which was initially decreed by the Trial Court, but subsequently dismissed by the Appellate Court and the Lahore High Court. The core legal question concerned the validity and proof of an oral sale transaction and subsequent revenue mutation involving a person with hearing and speech disabilities, and whether such a transaction was backed by free consent and valid consideration. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgments of the High Court and Appellate Court while restoring the Trial Court's decree. The Court held that transactions involving persons who are hard of hearing and non-verbal must be established through clear evidence demonstrating that the person fully understood the transaction, and that revenue authorities must strictly satisfy themselves regarding the absence of fraud, the adequacy of consideration, and proper interpretation through qualified persons or close relatives.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a transaction involving the property of a person who is hard of hearing and non-verbal requires independent safeguards to prove free consent and comprehension?
  • Does a revenue mutation confer independent title to property in the absence of a proven underlying valid sale transaction?
  • Can a court rely on an oral sale agreement where the payment of consideration and delivery of possession are not proved by cogent evidence?
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• Zafaran Khan and others vs Nizam Ullah and others2023 PLC (C.S) 972 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-01-24
  public appointmentnewspaper advertisementprocedural irregularityconstitutional jurisdictionright to workbackdoor appointmentcontract serviceinsurgency
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal arising from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court annulling the appointment of the appellants to public office due to the non-publication of job advertisements in newspapers. The core legal question was whether the High Court should have exercised its discretionary constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 to set aside appointments made via local advertisement pasted at conspicuous places rather than in newspapers, during a period of acute insurgency. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that in the atypical circumstances of insurgency, the procedural irregularity of failing to publish the advertisement in a newspaper was a bona fide lapse by the department, which could not be used to penalize the appellants or invalidate appointments obtained without backdoor means. The Court laid down the principle that employees cannot be deprived of their livelihood and right to work for a departmental procedural default when they met the eligibility criteria, were selected on merit through a local recruitment process, and served satisfactorily for over a decade.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court annul public appointments on the ground of non-publication of advertisements in newspapers when vacancies were otherwise locally advertised during a period of insurgency?
  • Whether employees can be penalized and deprived of their livelihood due to a procedural lapse committed by the government department during recruitment?
  • Does an appointment made without newspaper advertisement invariably constitute a backdoor appointment if all other codal formalities and merit criteria were fulfilled?
  • Should the High Court exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to set aside long-standing public appointments affected by a mere procedural irregularity?
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• Zafar Nawaz vs The State and another2023 SCP 250, 2023 SCMR 1977, PLJ 2023 SC (Cr.C.) 281 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-08-22
  post-arrest baildishonoured chequeprohibitory clausefurther inquirycriminal breachrent dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan via a petition for leave to appeal seeking post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for dishonouring a cheque allegedly given for unpaid rent. The core legal questions involve whether the issuance of a cheque for rent falls within the mischief of Section 489-F PPC and whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail when the offense does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and set aside the High Court's order denying bail. The Court held that since the offense carries a maximum punishment of three years and falls outside the prohibitory clause, the grant of bail is the general rule. The Court laid down the principle that liberty is a precious right, bail in non-prohibitory offenses is the norm, and the mere registration of other criminal cases does not disentitle an accused to bail if a prima facie case for further inquiry under Section 497(2) CrPC is made out.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the issuance of a cheque for unpaid rent attracts the provisions of Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does an offense carrying a maximum punishment of three years fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the mere registration of other criminal cases against an accused disentitle him to post-arrest bail on merits?
  • When is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail on the ground of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Zafar Iqbal vs The State, etc2023 SCP 210, 2023 PLD Supreme Court 617, PLJ 2023 SC (Cr.C.) 318 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-07-31
  pre-arrest baillimitation periodcondonation of delayincarcerationcriminal petitionsupreme court rules
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his pre-arrest bail by the High Court in a criminal case involving theft. The petition was filed after a delay of 74 days beyond the prescribed limitation period, and no application for condonation of delay was filed. The core legal question was whether the law of limitation applies with full rigour to petitions for leave to appeal in pre-arrest bail matters, and whether the lenient standard applied for condoning delay in cases of incarcerated petitioners is available to a petitioner seeking pre-arrest bail. The Supreme Court held that the law of limitation applies strictly to pre-arrest bail petitions, and the lenient view taken toward incarcerated persons is not available to petitioners seeking pre-arrest bail who are not behind bars, as failure to surrender or approach the court promptly may indicate an intent to remain a fugitive. The petition was ultimately dismissed as withdrawn.

  Questions settled

  • Is the law of limitation fully applicable to petitions for leave to appeal in pre-arrest bail matters?
  • Does the incarceration of a petitioner constitute sufficient cause to condone delay in filing a criminal petition?
  • Can the lenient view taken for condoning delay in cases of incarcerated petitioners be extended to a petitioner seeking pre-arrest bail?
  • What is the effect of failing to file a pre-arrest bail petition within the limitation period without an application for condonation of delay?
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• Zafar Iqbal vs The State and others2023 PLD Supreme Court 617 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-07-31
  pre-arrest baillaw of limitationcondonation of delayaccess to justiceleave to appealfundamental rightscriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order denying pre-arrest bail. The core legal question was whether the law of limitation applies to petitions for leave to appeal in pre-arrest bail matters and whether the lenient standard for condoning delay, typically applied to incarcerated persons, extends to those seeking pre-arrest bail. The Court held that the law of limitation applies with full rigour to pre-arrest bail petitions. It distinguished between incarcerated petitioners, who face disabilities justifying a lenient approach to limitation to ensure access to justice, and pre-arrest bail petitioners, who are at liberty and suffer no such constraints. The Court ruled that failing to file a pre-arrest bail petition within the prescribed limitation period, without a valid application for condonation of delay, may indicate an attempt to evade the law or negligence. Consequently, the Court affirmed that there is no relaxation of the limitation period for pre-arrest bail matters unless sufficient cause is demonstrated. As no application for condonation was filed, the petition was dismissed as withdrawn.

  Questions settled

  • Does the law of limitation apply to petitions for leave to appeal in pre-arrest bail matters?
  • Is the lenient standard for condoning delay applicable to petitioners seeking pre-arrest bail?
  • Does the incarceration of a petitioner constitute sufficient cause for condoning delay in filing an appeal?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be entertained if filed beyond the limitation period without an application for condonation of delay?
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• Zafar Iqbal vs Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ferozewala and others2023 SCMR 613 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-02-17
  specific performanceamendment of plaintrevisional jurisdictionabuse of processlegal heircivil proceduredelay in litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that allowed an amendment to a plaint in a long-pending suit for specific performance of an oral agreement. The core legal question was whether the plaintiffs (respondents) could amend their plaint to challenge the status of a defendant (petitioner) as a legal heir of the deceased seller, after evidence had already been concluded. The Supreme Court held that the amendment was unnecessary and irrelevant to the merits of the specific performance suit. The Court observed that the plaintiffs' attempt to challenge the petitioner's paternity/maternity had no connection to the underlying claim and appeared to be a tactic to delay the suit, as the plaintiffs were already in possession of the property. The Court ruled that the revisional court erred in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to allow such an amendment. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned orders, allowed the appeal, and imposed costs on the respondents for abusing the court process.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaintiff in a specific performance suit amend their plaint to challenge the status of a defendant as a legal heir after evidence has been concluded?
  • Does the exercise of revisional powers under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, justify setting aside a trial court's order when the proposed amendment is irrelevant to the suit's merits?
  • What are the consequences of abusing the court process through unnecessary litigation and delaying tactics?
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• Zafar Iqbal vs Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ferozewala & others2023 SCP 63 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-02-17
  specific performanceamendment of plaintrevisional jurisdictionabuse of processlegal heirscivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a suit for specific performance of an oral agreement filed in 2002. The petitioner, claiming to be the son of the deceased defendant, was impleaded as a legal heir. Subsequently, the plaintiffs (respondents) sought to amend their plaint to challenge the petitioner's paternity, a request initially dismissed by the Trial Court but later allowed by the Revisional Court and upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether such an amendment, irrelevant to the merits of the specific performance suit, was permissible. The Supreme Court held that the amendment was unnecessary and that the respondents were abusing the court process to delay the suit, likely because they were in possession of the property. The Court set aside the High Court and Revisional Court orders, restoring the Trial Court's decision. The principle laid down is that amendments to pleadings must be relevant to the core issues of the suit, and courts should not exercise revisional powers to allow irrelevant amendments that delay proceedings or abuse the judicial process.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaintiff amend a plaint to challenge the paternity of a defendant in a suit for specific performance?
  • Does the exercise of revisional powers under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 justify allowing an irrelevant amendment to a plaint?
  • Is a party entitled to seek the setting aside of a decree under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if they were a necessary party not arrayed in the suit?
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• Yasir Aftab vs Irfan Gull and others2023 SCMR 206 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-30
  local government electionsnomination papersasset declarationReturning Officersubstantial defectelectoral processSindh Local Government Act 2013
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a High Court order rejecting the appellant’s nomination papers for a local government seat in Sindh due to alleged non-disclosure of assets. The core legal questions concerned whether a pre-election asset declaration is mandatory under the Sindh Local Government Act, 2013, and the scope of the Returning Officer's authority to reject nominations for defects in such declarations. The Supreme Court held that while a pre-election asset declaration is mandatory, the rejection of nomination papers is governed by the proviso to Rule 18(3) of the Sindh Local Councils (Election) Rules, 2015. The Court established a two-step mandatory procedure: first, the Returning Officer must determine if a defect is of a 'substantial nature.' If not, the nomination cannot be rejected. If the defect is substantial, the Returning Officer retains the discretion to allow the candidate to remedy the defect 'forthwith.' The Court emphasized that local government election laws should be interpreted to encourage maximal participation, and that the Returning Officer must exercise discretion based on the context of the entire nomination.

  Questions settled

  • Is a candidate for a local government election in Sindh required to declare assets in their nomination papers?
  • Does the Returning Officer have the discretion to allow a candidate to remedy a substantial defect in their nomination papers?
  • What is the two-step procedure a Returning Officer must follow when evaluating a defect in nomination papers under the Sindh Local Councils (Election) Rules, 2015?
  • Does the failure to disclose assets in local government nomination papers automatically result in rejection?
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• Waqas Aslam and others vs Lahore Electric Supply Company Limited and others2023 SCMR 549 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-12-07
  Recruitment policyEligibility criteriaJudicial reviewOverqualificationInstitutional autonomyEmployment lawService matters
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought appointment as Line Superintendent Grade-I at LESCO, which was denied due to their overqualification (BS Electrical Engineering) relative to the advertised requirement (Diploma in Associate Engineering). The core legal question concerned the extent of judicial review regarding an employer's right to set specific eligibility criteria and exclude overqualified candidates. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the employer possesses the autonomy to design recruitment policies and define necessary qualifications based on institutional needs. The Court affirmed that it is not the judiciary's function to determine the equivalence of academic degrees or to act as a human resource department. Furthermore, the Court established that restricting recruitment to specific qualifications is a valid policy decision that promotes social justice by preserving opportunities for targeted tiers of society. Consequently, the Court ruled that judicial review must tread warily regarding internal governance and policy decisions, and that recruitment must strictly adhere to the advertised criteria. The Court upheld the impugned judgment while allowing the petitioners' continued employment as a one-time concession.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court interfere with an employer's decision to set specific eligibility criteria for a post?
  • Does the possession of a higher qualification automatically make a candidate eligible for a post requiring a lower, specific qualification?
  • Is it within the jurisdiction of the court to determine the equivalence of academic qualifications for a job vacancy?
  • Does an employer's policy of excluding overqualified candidates constitute discriminatory practice?
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• Wapda through Chairman and others vs Alam Sher and others2023 SCP 103 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-03-28
  land acquisitioncompensation enhancementmarket valuelocal commission reportcompulsory acquisitionKhyber Pakhtunkhwa amendment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, challenged a judgment of the Peshawar High Court upholding the enhancement of compensation for land acquired by Wapda for the construction of a drain. The core legal questions involved the legality of determining market value through a local commission relying on oral and documentary evidence, and the consideration of provincial amendments regarding the relevant date for assessing land value. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the concurrent findings of the lower forums regarding the market value and the report of the Local Commission were well-reasoned and based on proper appreciation of evidence, including mutations, two-year averages, and direct oral testimony consistent with the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The Court reaffirmed that under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as amended by the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the market value is determined on the date of taking possession, and new factual grounds not raised before lower forums cannot be urged for the first time in the apex court. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the market value of acquired land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is to be determined from the date of the Section 4 notification or the date of taking possession?
  • Can a new ground or question of fact not raised before the lower courts be agitated for the first time before the Supreme Court in appellate jurisdiction?
  • Whether a local commission report based on both documentary evidence and direct oral testimony of local landowners is legally sustainable for assessing land compensation?
  • What relevant factors must be considered under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 when determining the compensation and fair market value for compulsory land acquisition?
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• United Bank Limited (UBL) through its President and others vs Jamil Ahmed2023 SCP 350, 2024 SCMR 164, 2024 PLC 50, PLJ 2023 SC (Cr.C.) 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-10-06
  employment statusworkmanmanagerial dutiesburden of proofIndustrial Relations Actconcurrent findingsremand of matterappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arises from the dismissal of a writ petition by the Islamabad High Court, which had affirmed the orders of the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission and the Labour Court reinstating the respondent employee into service. The core legal question pertained to the employment status of the respondent—specifically whether he was a 'workman' or 'worker' under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, or whether he was performing managerial or supervisory duties, given that he served as a Branch Manager and faced allegations of unauthorized withdrawals. The Supreme Court held that the determination of an employee's status depends on the pith and substance of their actual duties rather than the mere nomenclature of their post, and that the burden of proof lies upon the employee to substantiate their status. The Court found that the lower fora and the High Court had failed to properly advert to crucial oral and documentary evidence regarding admissions made by the respondent. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the impugned judgments were set aside, and the matter was remanded to the NIRC for a fresh decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the determination of an employee's status as a workman depends on the nomenclature of the post or the actual nature of duties performed?
  • Upon whom does the burden of proof lie to establish that an employee is a workman when such status is disputed by the management?
  • Can concurrent findings of lower fora be interfered with by the High Court under constitutional jurisdiction if they suffer from non-reading or misreading of evidence?
  • What is the scope of powers of the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission under Section 59 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012?
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• The State vs Chaudhry Muhammad Usman2023 SCP 205, 2023 SCMR 1676 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-06-15
  production of documentsSection 94 CrPCSection 265-C CrPCSection 265-F(7) CrPCcriminal trialcross-examinationremand for fresh decision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a criminal prosecution under the Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Act 2012 and the Drugs Act 1976. The respondent sought an order under Section 265-C read with Section 94 Cr.P.C. directing the complainant authority to produce 23 specified documents before the framing of charges. The trial court dismissed the application, holding that document supply was governed strictly by Section 265-C Cr.P.C. and defence evidence occurs later. The High Court reversed this order in revision, allowing the document production application directly. The Supreme Court held that under Section 94 Cr.P.C., an accused may apply for document production at any stage, including before trial or entering upon defence, provided the documents are shown to be necessary or desirable for the trial. It ruled that Section 265-F(7) Cr.P.C. does not limit or override Section 94 Cr.P.C. However, the High Court erred by allowing the application directly without examining whether each requested document was necessary or desirable. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, remanding the application to the trial court for a fresh decision on document necessity.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused apply under Section 94 Cr.P.C. for the production of documents before the commencement of trial?
  • Does Section 265-F(7) Cr.P.C. restrict or override the trial court's power under Section 94 Cr.P.C. to order production of documents before the defence stage?
  • Must a court determine whether each requested document is necessary or desirable for the trial before granting an application under Section 94 Cr.P.C.?
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• The State through Deputy Director Law, Regional Directorate AntiNarcotics2023 SCP 232, 2023 SCMR 1709 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-03-24
  Review PetitionForfeiture of PropertyForeign ConvictionNarcoticsRetrospective ApplicationMisleading the CourtImposition of Costs
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, representing the State through the Anti-Narcotics Force, filed a review petition against the Supreme Court's judgment dated 15.01.2020 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 01-L of 2015. The underlying judgment had declared the forfeiture of the respondent's properties unlawful under Section 37 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Ordinance, 1995. The petitioner primarily contended that the matter stood previously dismissed on 24.08.2009 and could not have been decided through the judgment under review, and alternatively argued that the assets could have been forfeited under the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that the earlier dismissal had already been reviewed and the criminal petition revived, making the counsel's assertion an attempt to mislead the Court. Furthermore, the Court held that Section 35-C of the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930 did not contemplate foreign convictions, a concept only introduced in 1995 via Section 37 of the Ordinance, which could not apply retrospectively to a 1993 foreign conviction. The Court imposed costs of Rs. 10,000/- on petitioner's counsel for misleading the Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can property be forfeited under Section 37 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Ordinance 1995 on the basis of a foreign conviction handed down prior to the promulgation of the Ordinance?
  • Does Section 35-C of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1930 envisage forfeiture of property on the basis of a foreign conviction?
  • Can a party re-argue merits and raise previously addressed legal arguments within the review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court?
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• The State through Advocate General KPK, Peshawar vs Saadat Khan and another2023 SCP 306, 2023 SCMR 2109 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-09-26
  criminal petitionacquittaldesecration of Holy Quranmental statecontradictions in evidencebenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition for leave to appeal filed by the State under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging the acquittal of the respondent by the Peshawar High Court. The respondent was initially convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment by the trial court under Section 295-B of the Pakistan Penal Code for allegedly desecrating the Holy Quran. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through cogent and confidence-inspiring evidence, considering material contradictions, abandonment of independent witnesses, non-production of case property, and the mental state of the accused. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the prosecution failed to establish the charge due to material contradictions, suppression of material evidence, and the uncontroverted abnormal mental state of the respondent at the time of the incident. The key principle laid down is that in sensitive criminal cases, the prosecution must prove its case through unimpeachable evidence, and failure to do so, alongside reasonable doubt regarding the mental sanity of the accused at the time of the offense, warrants acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the prosecution's failure to produce vital case property and independent witnesses is fatal to a criminal case?
  • Can an accused benefit from an abnormal mental state established at the time of the incident?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an acquittal judgment of the High Court based on a proper appreciation of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• The State thr. Director A.N.F. Peshawar, The State thr. Director A.N.F.2023 SCP 263, 2023 PLD Supreme Court 907 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-05-10
  constitutional jurisdictionwrit petitionpersona designataAnti-Narcotics ForceSpecial Appellate Courtbar against writsstatutory tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had dismissed constitutional petitions filed by the Anti-Narcotics Force on the ground that a writ under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 was barred by Article 199(5) because the Special Appellate Court under the Prevention of Smuggling Act 1977 is presided over by a sitting Judge of the High Court. The core legal question was whether a High Court can issue a writ under Article 199 against a judgment or order of the Special Appellate Court whose presiding judge is a sitting High Court judge. The Supreme Court converted the petitions into appeals and held that while the Special Appellate Court is presided over by a High Court judge, that judge acts as a persona designata and not as a member of the High Court, meaning its acts and orders are fully amenable to constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199. The High Court's impugned judgment was accordingly set aside and the matters remanded for fresh decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court can issue a writ under Article 199 of the Constitution against an order passed by a Special Appellate Court established under the Prevention of Smuggling Act 1977?
  • Does a sitting Judge of a High Court presiding over a Special Appellate Court act as a member of the High Court or as a persona designata?
  • Is the bar contained in Article 199(5) of the Constitution applicable to actions of a High Court Judge performing functions as a persona designata in a statutory tribunal?
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• The Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary & others vs Ghulam Shabbir, Asadullah Khoso, Zulfiqar Ali Nizamani and others2023 SCP 86 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  civil serviceacting chargeregular promotionretrospective promotionlegitimate expectationad-hoc appointmentservice tribunalpromotion quota
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals were filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan against a Sindh Service Tribunal judgment directing the appellants to consider the respondents for promotion to BPS-17 from the date when the posts fell vacant in their quota. The respondents, originally appointed as Mukhtiarkars (BPS-16), were promoted to BPS-17 on an acting charge basis in 2017 and subsequently regularized in 2020. The appellants argued that acting charge appointments do not confer a vested right to regular promotion or retrospective regularization. The Supreme Court observed that the respondents' acting charge continued for three years without reversion or complaint, despite the availability of vacant posts in the promotion quota. The Court emphasized that keeping civil servants on acting charge or ad-hoc arrangements indefinitely violates the spirit of service rules and creates legitimate expectations. Relying on local and foreign precedents, the Court held that the promotion of acting charge holders may be considered from the date vacancies arose in their quota. Consequently, the Court found no illegality in the Tribunal's directions and dismissed the appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant's regular promotion be considered from the date a vacancy occurred in the promotion quota rather than the date of formal regularization?
  • Does the prolonged continuation of an acting charge appointment beyond the statutory period violate the spirit of civil service rules?
  • Whether the doctrine of legitimate expectation applies to civil servants kept on acting charge or ad-hoc arrangements for an extensive period?
  • Does an acting charge appointment confer a vested right to regular promotion or seniority from the date of such appointment?
  Read full judgment →
• The President of Pakistan and others, The President of Pakistan thro_ba33edc92023 SCP 195 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-04-10Read full judgment →
• The President of Pakistan and others vs Justice Qazi Faez Isa and others2023 PLD Supreme Court 621 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-04-10Read full judgment →
• The Officer Incharge Army Housing Directorate, Karachi vs The Federation2023 SCP 330, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 576 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-10-25
  maintainabilitylegal entityexecutive authorityprivate counselgovernment litigationlocus standi
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal was filed by 'The Officer Incharge, Army Housing Directorate' through an advocate engaged via an authority letter issued by an Assistant Director of Askari Housing. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the petitioner constituted a legal entity under the Constitution or the Rules of Business, 1973, and whether it could independently initiate litigation and engage private counsel. The Court observed that under Article 90 and Article 99(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, read with the Rules of Business, 1973 and the Secretariat Instructions 2005, no civil suit or legal proceedings may be initiated on behalf of the Federal Government by any division or department without prior consultation with, and nomination of counsel by, the Law and Justice Division. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that government components cannot engage private counsel unless the relevant constitutional law officer certifies a lack of internal expertise. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as incompetent and not maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a component or directorate of the Federal Government has an independent legal status to initiate or defend legal proceedings without complying with the Rules of Business and Secretariat Instructions?
  • Can a government department or division engage private counsel to conduct litigation without obtaining the requisite certification and permission from the Law and Justice Division?
  • Does an authority letter issued by an Assistant Director of a housing directorate satisfy the constitutional and statutory requirements for exercising the executive authority of the Federation in legal proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• The Competition Commission of Pakistan and others vs Dalda Foods2023 SCP 284, 2023 CLD 1298, 2023 SCMR 1991 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-03-29
  Competition Commission of Pakistanenquirycalling for informationregulatory proceedingsanti-competitive practicesdisclosure of reasonssuo moto enquiryplausibility testfreedom of trade and business
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the Islamabad High Court setting aside information-seeking letters and an enquiry initiated by the Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP) against an undertaking under the Competition Act, 2010. The core legal questions involved distinguishing the powers and requirements under Sections 30, 33, 36, and 37 of the Act, and determining whether the CCP is required to furnish detailed reasons and supporting evidence to an undertaking before calling for information or initiating an enquiry. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that calling for information under Section 36 or initiating an enquiry under Section 37 constitutes a regulatory, fact-finding process rather than an adverse 'proceeding' under Section 30. The Court ruled that for Section 37 enquiries, the CCP is not required to provide detailed explanations or internal files, but must deliberately record reasons in writing and communicate the gist of those reasons to the undertaking.

  Questions settled

  • Does calling for information under Section 36 or initiating an enquiry under Section 37 of the Competition Act, 2010 constitute a 'proceeding' under Section 30 of the Act?
  • Can the powers of a civil court under Section 33 of the Competition Act, 2010 be exercised by the Commission when merely seeking information under Section 36 or conducting studies under Section 28(1)(b)?
  • Is the Competition Commission of Pakistan required to communicate its complete internal working documents or only the gist of its reasons to an undertaking when initiating an enquiry under Section 37 of the Competition Act, 2010?
  • What legal requirements must the Competition Commission of Pakistan satisfy before initiating an enquiry upon receiving a third-party complaint under Section 37(2) of the Competition Act, 2010?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner, Inland Revenue, Karachi vs M/s. Attack CementPTCL 2023 CL. 305 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  sales taxinput tax adjustmentrefund of taxtax periodoverpaid taxinadvertencelimitation period
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal addressed whether a registered person could claim a refund or adjustment of input sales tax paid on imported machinery and spare parts beyond the standard monthly return period, and whether such claims fell within Section 66 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The respondent-company had imported new cement grinding mill machinery and spare parts and paid input tax but failed to adjust the same in its monthly returns prior to cement being exempted from sales tax under the Finance Act, 1997. The Supreme Court held that while input tax adjustment is a statutory concession, at the relevant time there was no express time-limit in Section 7(1) restricting adjustment strictly to the tax period of payment. The Court further held that where input tax was not adjusted against output tax due to inadvertence or oversight, the taxpayer's remedy for the resulting overpaid tax lay under Section 66 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, subject to the prescribed one-year limitation period. Consequently, the appeal was partly allowed, restricting the refund entitlement to claims made within one year of payment under Section 66.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the adjustment of input tax from output tax provided under Section 7(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 could be availed without any limitation of time during the relevant period?
  • Whether Section 66 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 applies to refund claims arising from unadjusted input tax resulting from inadvertence or error?
  • Does the subsequent amendment to Section 66 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 by the Finance Act, 1998 operate as a clarificatory provision?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner, Inland Revenue, Karachi vs M/s Attock Cement2023 SCP 10 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  sales taxinput tax adjustmentrefund claimtax periodinadvertencestatutory interpretationoverpayment of tax
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal by the Commissioner, Inland Revenue, against a High Court judgment upholding a refund claim by M/s Attock Cement for input tax paid on imported machinery and spare parts. The core legal questions were whether input tax adjustment under Section 7(1) of the Sales Tax Act 1990 was subject to time limitations and whether Section 66 of the same Act applied to claims for input tax not adjusted in the relevant tax period. The Supreme Court held that while the respondent-company failed to adjust the input tax in the relevant monthly returns, the claim was maintainable under Section 66 of the Sales Tax Act 1990 as an overpayment due to 'inadvertence.' The Court determined that the respondent-company was entitled to a refund for claims filed within one year of the payment date. The Court established that Section 66 provides a remedy for unadjusted input tax, and subsequent legislative amendments clarifying this were declaratory in nature, confirming that the right to seek such refunds existed even prior to the explicit statutory inclusion.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the adjustment of input tax from output tax under Section 7(1) of the Sales Tax Act 1990 is subject to a time limitation?
  • Does Section 66 of the Sales Tax Act 1990 apply to claims for input tax that were not adjusted in the relevant tax period?
  • Can a claim for refund of overpaid output tax due to failure to adjust input tax be considered a claim based on 'inadvertence' under Section 66 of the Sales Tax Act 1990?
  • Are legislative amendments that clarify existing statutory provisions considered retrospective in their application?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner, Inland Revenue, Karachi vs Messrs Attock Cement2023 SCMR 279 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-01-12
  sales taxinput tax adjustmentrefund claimlimitation periodtax regimeinadvertencetax credit
  Summary & questions settled

  The Commissioner, Inland Revenue, Karachi appealed against a High Court judgment upholding a Tribunal order that directed a refund of input tax to the respondent-company. The core legal questions concerned whether the adjustment of input tax under Section 7(1) of the Sales Tax Act 1990 was subject to time limitations and whether Section 66 of the Act governed refund claims for unadjusted input tax. The Supreme Court held that the respondent-company was entitled to a refund, but clarified that such claims fall under Section 66 of the Sales Tax Act 1990, rather than general adjustment provisions. The Court established that the 1998 amendment to Section 66 was clarificatory, confirming that where a taxpayer fails to adjust input tax due to inadvertence or error, they may claim a refund under Section 66, provided the claim is filed within one year of the date of payment. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal in part, restricting the refund to claims made within the one-year limitation period preceding the application date.

  Questions settled

  • Is the adjustment of input tax from output tax under Section 7(1) of the Sales Tax Act 1990 subject to a time limitation?
  • Does Section 66 of the Sales Tax Act 1990 apply to refund claims where a taxpayer failed to adjust input tax within the relevant tax period?
  • Is the amendment to Section 66 of the Sales Tax Act 1990 introduced by the Finance Act 1998 considered clarificatory in nature?
  • What is the limitation period for claiming a refund of overpaid tax under Section 66 of the Sales Tax Act 1990?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax, Companies Zone-II, New Income Tax2023 SCP 209, 2023 SCMR 1595, 2023 PTD 1550, 2023 PTCL 839, PLJ 2023 SC · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-03-13
  presumptive tax regimeprincipal and agentoutright saleIncome Tax Ordinancelifting of veiladvance income taxcontract of agency
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals arose from judgments of the High Court of Sindh and the Lahore High Court concerning whether fertilizer manufacturing companies selling their products through a marketing company were subject to the normal tax regime or eligible for the presumptive tax regime under Section 80-C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the agreement between the manufacturer and the marketing company constituted an outright sale of goods or created a principal-agent relationship. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the terms of the agreement, including provisions on risk, pricing, and indemnification, established an outright vendor-purchaser relationship rather than an agency. The Court affirmed that essential elements of a contract of agency were missing and that the tax deducted under Section 50(4) of the Ordinance entitled the assessees to the benefits of the presumptive tax regime. The key principle laid down is that the true legal nature of a commercial relationship must be determined from the substantive terms of the contract rather than its nomenclature, and where a transaction is an outright sale, the supplier is entitled to the final tax discharge benefits under the presumptive tax regime.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an agreement between a manufacturing company and a marketing company constitutes a contract of agency or an outright sale for the purposes of income tax assessment?
  • Does the deduction of advance tax under Section 50(4) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, automatically qualify the assessee for the benefits of the presumptive tax regime under Section 80-C?
  • Can the nomenclature used in a commercial agreement override the substantive terms and conditions when determining the true legal relationship between the parties?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income Tax vs M/s. Inter Quest Informatics Services2023 SCP 276, 2023 PTD 1718, 2023 SCMR 1803 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-09-08
  income taxdouble taxation conventionroyaltybusiness profitstax referencesoftware leasestatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns income tax references filed by a non-resident Dutch company regarding the taxability of receipts from software leases in Pakistan. The core legal question was whether these payments constituted "royalties" under Article 12 of the Pakistan-Netherlands Double Taxation Convention, or "business profits" exempt under Article 7. The High Court had ruled in favor of the respondent, classifying the receipts as business profits. The Supreme Court, in a majority judgment, allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court’s decision and restoring the assessment orders. The Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by engaging in factual determinations, which were the province of the tax authorities. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the Convention’s Article 12 aligns with the United Nations Model Convention rather than the OECD Model, and that the respondent failed to provide sufficient evidence to substantiate its claim for exemption. The judgment establishes that parties claiming tax exemptions bear the burden of proof and that courts must respect the limited scope of review in tax references, avoiding factual re-evaluation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to engage in factual determination when exercising powers under Section 136(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 or Section 133(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001?
  • Does the burden of proof lie with the taxpayer to establish that receipts are not royalties when claiming a tax exemption under a double taxation convention?
  • Is the definition of 'royalties' in the Pakistan-Netherlands Double Taxation Convention based on the UN Model Convention or the OECD Model Convention?
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• The Commissioner of Income Tax vs M/s. Dye Chemical Industries (Pvt.)2023 PTCL CL. 200 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  minimum taxfiscal incentivestax exemptioneconomic reformsindustrial undertakingsnon-obstante clause
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether respondent taxpayers enjoyed exemption from minimum tax under section 80D of the repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, by virtue of section 6 of the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992, read with clause 122C of Part-I of the Second Schedule to the Ordinance. The tax authorities had assessed the respondents for minimum tax, but the appellate tribunal and High Court ruled in favor of the taxpayers, holding that their industrial undertakings were set up after the relevant date and thus entitled to relief. The Supreme Court held that the protection afforded by section 6 of the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992, applies exclusively to fiscal incentives announced, promulgated, or implemented on or after 7 November 1990. Because the fiscal incentive under clause 122C of the Second Schedule was promulgated in 1987, it did not qualify for protection under the 1992 Act against the non-obstante minimum tax provisions of section 80D. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned High Court orders and allowed the appeals of the tax department, establishing that the critical date for protection is the promulgation of the fiscal incentive, not the setup date of the industrial undertaking.

  Questions settled

  • Whether industrial undertakings are exempt from minimum tax under section 80D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 by virtue of section 6 of the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992?
  • Does the protection of fiscal incentives under section 6 of the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992 apply to incentives promulgated prior to 7 November 1990?
  • Is the date of setting up of an industrial undertaking or the date of promulgation of the fiscal incentive relevant for claiming protection under the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992?
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• The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore vs M_s. Atta Cables (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore, etc2023 SCP 338, PTCL 2024 CL. 1, 2024 PTD 321, 2024 SCMR 468, PLJ 2023 SC · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-02
  automatic audit selectionextension of timetax return filingstrict construction of fiscal statutesincome tax audit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, concerning the tax year 2015 and the application of Section 214D regarding automatic audit selection. The department contended that the respondent taxpayer fell within Section 214D because it failed to file its return by the due date, despite having properly filed an extension application under Section 119 upon which the Commissioner took no action. The Lahore High Court's single Bench dismissed the taxpayer's writ petition, but the Division Bench allowed the intra-court appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the department's appeal, holding that Section 214D is a penal and coercive provision requiring strict construction. The Court ruled that until an application for extension under Section 119 is explicitly disposed of by an order in writing, Section 214D does not become applicable, and refusal or denial of an extension cannot be assumed by implication or inaction. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the conflicting single Bench decision in Muhammad Mujahid Qureshi was declared incorrectly decided.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 214D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 apply automatically when an application for extension of time filed under Section 119 remains undecided by the Commissioner?
  • Can a refusal or denial of an extension of time under Section 119 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 be inferred by implication or inaction of the Commissioner for the purposes of automatic audit selection?
  • What is the standard of construction applicable to coercive and penal provisions such as Section 214D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
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• The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Karachi vs Messrs Attock Cement2023 PTD 320 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-01-12
  sales taxinput tax adjustmentrefund of taxtax periodlimitation periodinadvertence
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Balochistan maintaining orders of the Appellate Tribunal that directed a sales tax refund on imported machinery and spare parts. The core legal question concerned the time and manner of claiming adjustment of input tax under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, particularly whether such adjustment could be availed without time limitation and whether an unadjusted input tax claim falls within the ambit of refund provisions. The Supreme Court held that while input tax adjustment was a beneficial concession, the respondent-company had inadvertently failed to adjust the input tax in its monthly returns prior to cement becoming exempt from sales tax. Consequently, the Court held that the unadjusted input tax claim was maintainable as a refund application under section 66 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, subject to the prescribed one-year limitation period from the date of overpayment. The appeal was partly allowed, restricting the refund entitlement to the period of one year preceding the applications.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the adjustment of input tax from output tax provided under section 7(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 could be availed without any limitation of time?
  • Whether section 66 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 was applicable to claims for unadjusted input tax paid through inadvertence or error?
  • Whether a refund claim can be maintained under section 66 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 when no specific reference to the section was made in the initial application?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-I, Regional Tax Office, Quetta vs M_s. Hajvairy Steel Industries (Pvt.) Limited, Quetta, M_s. Ghazi Steel Industries (Pvt.) Limited, Quetta2023 PTCL 298 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-01-30
  sales taxsteel re-rolling millsspecial procedurecharging provisionnon-obstante clausefinal discharge of tax liabilitytax precedent
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal filed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue against three concurrent decisions of lower forums in favor of steel manufacturing respondents concerning sales tax liability for tax periods between 2013 and 2016. The core legal question is whether steel re-rolling mills governed by a special procedure under section 71 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 remain liable to additional sales tax under section 3(1A) of the said Act despite paying tax at a fixed rate through electricity bills which constitutes a final discharge of liability. The Supreme Court held that the overriding non-obstante provisions of the special procedure prevail over general charging sections, meaning payment at the prescribed fixed rate constitutes full and final discharge of sales tax liability. The key principle laid down is that special procedures enacted pursuant to section 71 with overriding clauses must be given full effect, and taxpayers complying therewith cannot be subjected to additional general charging provisions unless explicitly provided, and precedents cannot apply unless identical statutory provisions and factual periods are established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the special procedure prescribed under section 71 of the Sales Tax Act 1990 overrides the general charging provisions under section 3(1A) of the Act?
  • Does the payment of sales tax at fixed rates through electricity bills under the Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules 2007 constitute a final discharge of sales tax liability for steel re-rolling mills?
  • When does a previous decision of the Supreme Court constitute a binding precedent under Article 189 of the Constitution regarding tax laws?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-I, Regional Tax Office, Quetta vs M_s. Hajvairy Steel Industries (Pvt.) Limited, Quetta and another2023 PCTLR 70 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-01-30
  sales taxspecial proceduresteel re-rolling millsnon-obstante clausetax liabilitystatutory interpretationconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  The Commissioner Inland Revenue filed petitions for leave to appeal against concurrent decisions of the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals), the Appellate Tribunal, and the High Court. The core legal question was whether steel re-rolling mills, having discharged their sales tax liability under the Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules, 2007, remained liable for additional sales tax under Section 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The petitioner argued that subsequent amendments to Section 3(1A) prevailed over the pre-existing Section 71 of the Act. The Supreme Court held that Section 71 empowers the government to prescribe special procedures for tax payment, and the resulting Special Procedure contains an overriding non-obstante clause. Consequently, where a taxpayer has discharged their liability under the specific mechanism prescribed by the Special Procedure, they are not subject to the general charging provisions of Section 3(1A). The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower forums, noting that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any legal error, and dismissed the petitions for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules, 2007, prevail over the general charging provisions of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Are steel re-rolling mills liable for sales tax under Section 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, after discharging their liability under the Special Procedure?
  • What is the legal effect of an overriding non-obstante clause in tax legislation?
  • Does a decision of the Supreme Court constitute a binding precedent if it does not decide a question of law or enunciate a principle of law?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Inland Revenue vs M/s. Habib Insurance Company Ltd2023 PTCL CL. 25 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-03
  insurance businessmanagement expensestax deductionburden of proofcondonation of excess expensesController of InsuranceIncome Tax Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two tax appeals filed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue against an insurance company regarding the tax treatment of management expenses that exceeded statutory limits. The core legal question was whether the respondent insurance company could claim deductions for management expenses exceeding the limits prescribed under the Insurance Act, 1938, without providing evidence that the Controller of Insurance had condoned such excess under the proviso to Section 40-C(1). The Supreme Court held that while the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, and the Insurance Act, 1938, provide a mechanism for insurance companies to potentially exceed management expense limits upon condonation by the Controller, the burden of proof lies squarely on the insurer to demonstrate that such condonation was granted. The Court found that the respondent failed to produce the necessary certificate or order from the Controller of Insurance to substantiate the condonation of the excess expenses. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal's decision, emphasizing that the mere allegation of condonation without supporting documentation is insufficient to justify the deduction of excess management expenses.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proof lie on an insurance company to demonstrate that the Controller of Insurance has condoned management expenses exceeding the prescribed statutory limits?
  • Can an insurance company claim deductions for management expenses exceeding the limits set by the Insurance Act, 1938, without producing an order of condonation from the Controller of Insurance?
  • Is the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal's decision regarding the disallowance of excess management expenses sustainable when the taxpayer fails to provide evidence of condonation by the Controller of Insurance?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Messrs Habib Insurance Company2023 PTD 417 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-03
  insurance businessmanagement expensesIncome Tax OrdinanceInsurance Actcondonation of excess expensesController of Insurancetax assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals filed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue challenged a common order of the High Court of Sindh setting aside the decision of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal regarding income tax cases of an insurance company for the tax years 1999-2000 and 2000-2001. The core legal question concerned the computation of profits and gains for general insurance business under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 and the Fourth Schedule thereto, specifically regarding the limitation of management expenses under the Insurance Act, 1938 and whether excess expenses could be deducted or required condonation by the Controller of Insurance. The Supreme Court held that while the statute and binding precedent permit general insurance management expenses to be governed by the Insurance Act and allow the Controller of Insurance to condone excesses, the burden lies squarely on the insurance company to provide concrete proof, such as the official order or certificate of condonation. Since the respondent failed to produce any official order or proper certificate establishing condonation by the Controller of Insurance, the High Court erred in setting aside the Tribunal's order. The Supreme Court laid down that an insurance company exceeding statutory management expense limits must produce definitive proof of condonation by the Controller of Insurance to claim the benefit thereof.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an insurance company exceeding the prescribed statutory limit for management expenses must prove condonation by the Controller of Insurance?
  • Does the Income Tax Officer have the power to reintroduce or exclude expenses not authorized by the Fourth Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • What is the burden of proof required when an insurance company claims condonation of excess management expenses under the Insurance Act, 1938?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Messrs Habib Insurance Company2023 SCMR 387 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-03
  income taxinsurance businessmanagement expensesController of Insuranceburden of prooftax appealstatutory limits
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals filed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue challenged a common order of the High Court of Sindh setting aside the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal's decision regarding accounts and management expenses of an insurance company for the tax years 1999-2000 and 2000-2001. The core legal question was whether the respondent insurance company could exceed the prescribed statutory limits on management expenses under the Insurance Act, 1938, and claim the benefit of condonation by the Controller of Insurance without producing substantive proof or the formal order of condonation. The Supreme Court held that while the Controller of Insurance possesses supervisory powers to condone excess expenses under the proviso to Section 40-C(1) of the Insurance Act, 1938, the burden of proof lies heavily on the insurer to establish such condonation through concrete documentation, which the respondent failed to do across all forums. The Court laid down the principle that an insurance company exceeding statutory management expense limits cannot claim the benefit of condonation without producing the formal order, certificate, or contemporaneous documents evidencing the valid exercise of power by the Controller of Insurance, and consequently restored the Tribunal's order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an insurance company exceeding the prescribed limits of management expenses under the Insurance Act, 1938 must provide proof of formal condonation by the Controller of Insurance?
  • Does the Income Tax Officer have the power to exclude or reintroduce expenses not authorized by the special procedure contained in the applicable schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • Where an insurer asserts that excess management expenses were condoned, upon whom does the burden lie to establish such condonation?
  • Can a High Court set aside an appellate tribunal's findings of fact in the absence of primary documentary evidence supporting the respondent's claim?
  Read full judgment →
• The Collector of Sales Tax and Central Excise, Lahore vs M/s. QadbrosPTCL 2023 CL. 512 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  sales taxinput tax adjustmentpresumptive tax regimefixed production basissubsidiary companysister concerntax invoiceappellate tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the Department's sales tax appeal regarding input tax adjustment. The core legal questions involved whether a registered buyer could claim input tax adjustment on purchases from a supplier paying sales tax under a presumptive fixed tax regime, and whether the buyer and supplier were sister or subsidiary companies. The Supreme Court held that the tax department failed to establish any sister concern or subsidiary relationship between the buyer and supplier based on evidence from the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan. Furthermore, the Court held that while the supplier was paying sales tax under a presumptive production regime and was barred from claiming rebates or adjustments itself, it was not prohibited under the law from issuing tax invoices to independent buyers, and any fault of the supplier did not penalize or disqualify the independent buyer from claiming input tax adjustment under Section 7 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The key principles laid down relate to the finality of factual findings by the Appellate Tribunal, the strict limitation of the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 to substantial questions of law, and the distinct legal identity of separate corporate entities unless a subsidiary or sister concern relationship is legally proven.

  Questions settled

  • Can a registered buyer claim input tax adjustment on purchases made from a supplier who is paying sales tax under a presumptive production regime?
  • Is the Appellate Tribunal considered the final fact-finding body whose factual determinations are conclusive in tax matters?
  • What is the scope of the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 when hearing an appeal or reference from the Appellate Tribunal?
  • Does a supplier paying fixed sales tax under a presumptive tax regime lack the legal capacity to issue sales tax invoices to an independent buyer?
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• The Collector of Sales Tax and Central Excise, Lahore vs M/s Qadbros2023 SCP 80 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-03-10
  sales taxinput tax adjustmentpresumptive tax regimefixed sales taxsubsidiary companysister concerntax invoiceappellate tribunal findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the sales tax appeal filed by the petitioner Department. The core dispute involved an allegation that the respondent company had wrongfully claimed input sales tax adjustment on purchases made from its sister or subsidiary concern, which was paying fixed sales tax under a presumptive production regime pursuant to S.R.O.630(I)/1995. The central legal questions were whether the respondent was a sister concern or subsidiary of the supplier company, whether a taxpayer under the fixed tax regime is prohibited from issuing sales invoices, and whether a buyer can be penalized for errors committed by the supplier in issuing invoices. The Supreme Court held that the Department failed to establish any sister concern or subsidiary relationship through tangible evidence, that the Appellate Tribunal is the final fact-finding forum whose findings cannot be disturbed absent perversity, and that an independent registered supplier is not proscribed from issuing tax invoices. The Court ruled that a buyer holding valid tax invoices cannot be disqualified from claiming input tax adjustment due to a fault committed by the supplier. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a taxpayer paying sales tax under the presumptive or fixed production regime is prohibited from issuing tax invoices to buyers?
  • Can a buyer be denied input tax adjustment solely because of an irregularity or fault committed by the supplier in issuing invoices?
  • What is the scope and extent of the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act 1990 regarding findings of fact recorded by the Appellate Tribunal?
  • How is the relationship of a subsidiary company or sister concern established for the purposes of tax proceedings?
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• The Collector of Sales Tax and Central Excise, Lahore vs Messrs Qadbros2023 CLD 559, 2023 SCMR 939 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-03-10
  sales taxinput tax adjustmentpresumptive tax regimecorporate veilsubsidiary companyAppellate Tribunalquestion of lawtax invoice
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arose from a challenge to an order denying input tax adjustment to the respondent, Messrs Qadbros Engineering (Pvt.) Ltd., on purchases from Messrs Qadri Brothers (Pvt.) Ltd. The Department alleged the entities were sister concerns and that the supplier, operating under a presumptive tax regime (SRO 630(I)/1995), could not issue valid tax invoices for input adjustment. The Supreme Court held that the Department failed to establish the "sister concern" relationship or any fraudulent intent. It affirmed that the Appellate Tribunal is the final fact-finding forum and that the High Court’s jurisdiction is limited to questions of law. The Court further clarified that a buyer is not precluded from claiming input tax adjustment merely because the supplier operates under a presumptive tax regime, provided the invoices are otherwise valid. Any irregularity by the supplier in issuing invoices should be pursued against the supplier, not the buyer. The petition was dismissed as the High Court judgment contained no legal infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Can a buyer claim input tax adjustment on purchases from a supplier operating under a presumptive tax regime?
  • Is the Appellate Tribunal the final forum for the determination of factual aspects in tax matters?
  • Under what circumstances can the corporate veil of a company be pierced?
  • Is the jurisdiction of the High Court under the Sales Tax Act 1990 limited to questions of law?
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• The Chairman Agriculture Policy Institute, Ministry of National Food Security2023 PLC (C.S) 780 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-12-13
  verbal terminationnatural justiceservice lawreinstatementback benefitsgood governancedue process
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition challenged a judgment by the Federal Service Tribunal which set aside a verbal termination order of a daily-wage employee and directed his reinstatement with back benefits. The core legal question was whether an employer can terminate the services of an employee through a verbal order without written reasons or due process. The Supreme Court held that verbal termination is alien to both labour and service laws and violates the principles of natural justice and good governance. The Court affirmed that even for contractual or temporary engagements, any adverse action affecting an employee's service requires a fair opportunity to respond and must be communicated in writing with explicit reasons. The Court emphasized that administrative actions must be transparent and lawful. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, upholding the Tribunal's decision to reinstate the respondent, noting that the petitioners failed to justify the verbal termination or provide valid grounds for the dismissal in their departmental proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employer terminate the services of an employee through a verbal order?
  • Does the principle of natural justice require that an employee be given a fair opportunity to respond before termination?
  • Is a verbal termination order legally sustainable under Pakistani service and labour laws?
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• Telenor Microfinance Bank Limited vs Shamim Bano & others, Rehana Sabir2023 SCP 234, 2023 SCMR 1560, 2023 CLD 1148 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-04-28
  summary suitpromissory notenegotiable instrumentmicrofinance institutionfinance agreementplenary jurisdictioncivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil petitions for leave to appeal arose from consolidated judgments of the Sindh High Court maintaining lower court orders which had returned plaints filed by a microfinance institution under the summary procedure chapter, holding that recovery suits should be filed in the ordinary plenary jurisdiction rather than under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The core legal question was whether a microfinance institution could institute summary suits under Order XXXVII of the CPC on the strength of promissory notes incorporated or executed alongside finance agreements, or if such suits were barred or restricted to plenary civil jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts erred in ignoring the promissory notes, which contained unconditional undertakings and satisfied the requirements of Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and were validly executed as an integral part of the finance agreements. The Court ruled that summary suits under Order XXXVII, CPC are maintainable on such instruments by microfinance institutions, allowed the appeals, set aside the impugned judgments, and remanded the matters to the trial courts for proceedings under the summary chapter.

  Questions settled

  • Can a microfinance institution institute a summary suit under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 on the basis of a promissory note executed alongside a finance agreement?
  • Does a promissory note incorporated into or executed in support of a finance agreement lose its independent character as a negotiable instrument under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881?
  • Are microfinance institutions barred from utilizing summary procedure under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the recovery of loans?
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• Taufiq Asif vs General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf and others2023 SCP 341, 2024 SCMR 63, 2024 PLJ SC 317 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-10
  territorial jurisdictionwrit jurisdictioncoram non judiceSpecial CourtHigh Court jurisdictionjudicial hierarchymaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from several civil miscellaneous applications filed by bar associations and legal practitioners challenging a judgment of the Lahore High Court in a case involving General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf. The core legal question concerns whether the Lahore High Court possessed the territorial or constitutional jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition regarding proceedings of a Special Court that had already been taken cognizance of by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The petitioners contend that the High Court's judgment was void ab initio, coram non judice, and in direct violation of the Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Act, 1976, which vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Supreme Court under specific circumstances. The Supreme Court, finding these to be substantial legal points requiring consideration, allowed the applications, directed the office to register the petitions, and issued notices to the respondents. The Court further ordered the requisition of the record of the impugned writ petition from the Lahore High Court to facilitate a formal hearing, thereby setting the stage for a judicial determination on the limits of High Court jurisdiction in matters already seized by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a High Court have the jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition regarding proceedings of a Special Court when the Supreme Court has already taken cognizance of the matter?
  • Is a judgment rendered by a High Court in derogation of the exclusive jurisdiction vested in the Supreme Court by the Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Act, 1976, considered void ab initio?
  • Can a High Court exercise writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to interfere with a trial being conducted by a Special Court that is already under the supervision of the Supreme Court?
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• Tassaduq Hussain Shah 86 others vs Allah Ditta Shah 8s others2023 SCP 218, 2023 SCMR 1635 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-03-10
  Adna MalikAla MalikMartial Law Regulation No. 64 of 1959Jamabandipresumption of correctnessland revenueNowtordocumentary evidencedeclaratory suit
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the decree of the first Appellate Court, which declared the Respondents as Adna Maliks of the suit land measuring 111 Kanals. The Appellants contended that the Respondents were mere tenants paying a share of produce, whereas the Respondents claimed ownership as Adna Maliks under Martial Law Regulation No. 64 of 1959. The Supreme Court examined the legal requirements for establishing Adna Malkiat and the evidentiary weight of historical revenue records. The Court held that the two essential conditions for Adna Malkiat are cultivating possession and payment of land revenue. Following the abolition of Ala Malkiat under Paragraph 22 of MLR No. 64 of 1959 and the West Pakistan Land Commission Notification dated 03.03.1960, Adna Maliks in cultivating possession became full proprietors. Finding that the Jamabandi of 1943-44 and prior judicial determination established the Respondents' cultivating possession and status, which attached a statutory presumption of correctness unrebutted by documentary evidence, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential legal conditions required to establish the status of an Adna Malik?
  • What is the legal effect of Paragraph 22 of Martial Law Regulation No. 64 of 1959 and the West Pakistan Land Commission Notification dated 03.03.1960 on the rights of Adna Maliks?
  • Can a statutory presumption of correctness attached to long-standing revenue entries in a Jamabandi be rebutted solely by oral assertions?
  • Does uncontroverted documentary revenue evidence establishing cultivating possession take precedence over contradictory oral claims of tenancy?
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• Tasawar Hussain vs Deputy Commissioner District Jhelum and others2023 PLC (C.S.) 69 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-06-08
  service lawunauthorized absencedisciplinary proceedingscompetent authoritypenalty enhancementnatural justicedismissal from serviceremoval from service
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a service matter involving the dismissal of a public servant for unauthorized absence from duty. The core legal questions were whether a regular inquiry is necessary when absence is admitted, and whether the competent authority is required to provide reasons when enhancing a penalty recommended by an Inquiry Officer. The Supreme Court held that where absence from duty is admitted, there is no requirement to hold a regular inquiry as no disputed facts exist. However, the Court ruled that while the competent authority is not bound by the recommendations of an Inquiry Officer, it is under a legal obligation to assign justiciable reasons when enhancing a penalty to a more severe degree, particularly because dismissal from service carries a permanent stigma and bars future employment, unlike removal from service. Consequently, the Court maintained the finding of guilt but modified the penalty from dismissal to removal from service, emphasizing that fairness and equity necessitate reasoned decisions when increasing the severity of punishment.

  Questions settled

  • Is a regular inquiry mandatory when an employee's absence from duty is admitted?
  • Is the competent authority legally obligated to assign reasons when enhancing a penalty recommended by an Inquiry Officer?
  • Does the penalty of dismissal from service carry a different legal consequence regarding future employment compared to the penalty of removal from service?
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• Syeda Ayesha Subhani vs The State, etc2023 SCP 253, PLJ 2023 SC (Cr.C.) 290, 2023 PLD Supreme Court 648 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-08-28
  post-arrest bailstatutory delayright to fair trialundertrial prisonerfresh groundconstitutional rightscriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged a High Court order granting post-arrest bail to the respondent on the statutory ground of delay in the conclusion of the trial. The core legal question was whether a second post-arrest bail application, based on the statutory ground of delay, is maintainable when the delay in the subsequent period occurred for no fault of the accused, despite an earlier bail application on the same ground having been dismissed. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the High Court’s decision. The Court held that the statutory right to bail due to trial delay is time-based and recurring. If an accused is not at fault for trial delays in a period following the rejection of an earlier bail application, this constitutes a "fresh ground" for a subsequent bail application. The Court emphasized that denying this right would effectively grant the prosecution a license to delay trials indefinitely, violating the constitutional rights to liberty and fair trial. Consequently, the accused is entitled to relief if the prosecution fails to conclude the trial within the statutory timeframe.

  Questions settled

  • Is a second post-arrest bail application on the statutory ground of delay maintainable if the first one was dismissed?
  • Does the statutory right to bail due to trial delay constitute a recurring right for the accused?
  • Can delay in the conclusion of a trial occurring for no fault of the accused in the year following the rejection of a first bail application be considered a 'fresh ground' for bail?
  • Does the denial of bail to an undertrial prisoner despite trial delays for which they are not responsible violate constitutional rights?
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• Syed Nayab Hussain Gardazi vs The President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, President House, Islamabad and others.,Nadia Naz, PTV Home H-9, Islamabad and others2023 SCP 163 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  workplace harassmentgender-based discriminationpurposive interpretationreview jurisdictionstatutory interpretationsexual harassmenterror apparent on the face of the record
  Summary & questions settled

  These review petitions challenged a Supreme Court judgment that interpreted the definition of "harassment" under Section 2(h) of the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010, in a restrictive manner, limiting it to conduct of a sexual nature. The core legal question was whether the statutory definition of "harassment" encompasses gender-based discrimination or is confined to sexual overtures. The Court held that the previous judgment erred by failing to consider the broader dictionary definition of "sexual," which includes "relating to gender." Adopting a purposive approach, the Court determined that the Act aims to eliminate all forms of workplace harassment, including gender-based discrimination, which is often rooted in power dynamics rather than sexual desire. The Court emphasized that the Act protects both men and women, and interpreting "harassment" narrowly renders the legislation ineffective. Consequently, the Court allowed the review petitions, set aside the impugned judgment, and remanded the matter for fresh consideration, establishing that workplace harassment includes discriminatory behavior based on gender, regardless of whether it is sexual in nature.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of 'harassment' under Section 2(h) of the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010, extend to gender-based discrimination that is not sexual in nature?
  • Is the definition of 'harassment' under the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010, limited to female victims?
  • Does the failure to consider a plausible interpretation of a statutory term that would have altered the outcome of a case constitute an error apparent on the face of the record justifying review?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Mansoor Ali Shah vs Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi2023 SCMR 636 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-12-29
  interrogatoriesstriking out defencecontumacious conductprocedural delaycivil procedureexpeditious justicerevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order upholding the trial court's decision to strike out the petitioner's right of defence in a defamation suit. The core legal question was whether the trial court acted within its jurisdiction under Order XI, Rule 21, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, in striking out the defence for the petitioner’s failure to answer interrogatories. The Supreme Court held that the trial court’s action was justified, as the petitioner’s conduct throughout the proceedings was willfully contumacious, marked by inordinate delays and repeated failure to comply with court orders despite warnings. The Court affirmed that procedural timelines are essential for the constitutional goal of expeditious justice. It laid down the principle that courts must be firm in enforcing procedural rules and that penal consequences for non-compliance are appropriate where a party demonstrates a pattern of contumacious conduct. The Court emphasized that a toothless court undermines the rule of law and that trial courts possess the authority to enforce compliance to prevent the abuse of judicial processes.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court strike out a defendant's right of defence under Order XI, Rule 21, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for failing to answer interrogatories?
  • Does the power to strike out a defence under Order XI, Rule 21, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 require a formal written application by the opposing party?
  • Is the seven-day period prescribed under Order XI, Rule 7, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for filing objections to interrogatories mandatory?
  • Does the failure to comply with a court order to answer interrogatories constitute contumacious conduct justifying penal action?
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• Syed Hammad Nabi and others vs Inspector General of Police Punjab, Lahore and others2023 PLC (C.S.) 592 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-02
  seniority determinationPolice Rules 1934organizational justicebinding precedentleave-refusing orderpolice serviceservice lawpromotion structure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the determination of seniority among police officers in the Punjab Police, specifically regarding the rank of Inspector. The core legal question was whether seniority for upper subordinates should be reckoned from the date of initial appointment or the date of confirmation. The Supreme Court held that, under Rule 12.2(3) of the Police Rules, 1934, seniority for upper subordinates is finally settled by the date of confirmation, not the date of appointment. The Court clarified that reliance on Qayyum Nawaz was misplaced, as leave-refusing orders do not constitute binding precedents under Article 189 of the Constitution. The judgment emphasized that the Police department must function as a rule-based organization, ensuring organizational justice in career progression and promotions. The Court set aside the impugned judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal and directed the Inspector General of Police to constitute a committee to re-determine seniority strictly in accordance with the statutory framework of the Police Rules, 1934 and the Police Order, 2002, thereby reinforcing the necessity of internal governance and adherence to established legal procedures.

  Questions settled

  • Does a leave-refusing order of the Supreme Court constitute a binding precedent?
  • Is the seniority of upper subordinates in the Punjab Police reckoned from the date of appointment or the date of confirmation under the Police Rules, 1934?
  • What is the legal status of organizational justice in the governance of the police force?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Ghazanfar Ali Shah vs Hassan Bokhari and others2023 SCP 351, 2024 SCMR 154, 2024 PLJ SC 311 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-13
  partition of landconsent orderland revenuewrit petitionimposition of costssupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' writ petition challenging a consent order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue regarding an application for partition of land under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967. The core legal question concerned the validity of objections raised against partition proceedings and the challenge mounted against a binding consent order. The Supreme Court held that being in possession of land is not a valid ground to oppose a lawful partition, and a consent order cannot be arbitrarily assailed to prolong litigation. The Court dismissed the leave to appeal with substantial costs of one million rupees, holding that unnecessary resistance and delaying tactics undermine the administration of justice. The key principle laid down is that co-owners are entitled to partition under the law, resistance to partition based merely on possession or influence is untenable, and revenue authorities are bound to strictly execute partition orders and recover imposed costs.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge a consent order passed in land partition proceedings?
  • Does being in possession of land constitute a valid ground to oppose partition under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967?
  • Whether unnecessary resistance to partition proceedings warrants the imposition of exemplary costs?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Asad Hussain and others vs Syed Ghulam Khitab2023 SCMR 325 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-24
  pre-emptionTalb-i-Muwathibatsuperior right of pre-emptionconcurrent findings of factknowledge of salesale deed registration
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a suit for pre-emption filed by the respondent, which was decreed in his favor and upheld through successive appeals by the Additional District Judge and the High Court. Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court to examine whether the pre-emptor's first demand, namely Talb-i-Muwathibat, was made belatedly upon acquiring knowledge of the sale through a written statement filed in an earlier suit, allegedly violating Section 13 of the N.W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the question of when the pre-emptor acquired knowledge of the sale is essentially a question of fact to be established through proper pleading and evidence. The Court observed that since the appellants failed to properly plead or lead evidence to establish that the respondent's knowledge stemmed from the date of the written statement, the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the lower courts could not be disturbed by the court of final appeal based on surmises and conjectures. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the question of knowledge of sale for the purpose of making Talb-i-Muwathibat is a question of fact that must be specifically pleaded and proved through evidence?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact recorded by three lower courts regarding the timeliness of pre-emption demands be interfered with by the Supreme Court based on surmises and conjectures?
  • Whether a statement made in a written statement in a separate proceeding automatically imputes knowledge of a sale to a pre-emptor without proper pleading and evidence?
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• Syed Asad Hussain & others vs Syed Ghulam Khitab2023 PLJ SC 110 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  pre-emptionTalb-i-Muwathibatlimitationconcurrent findingsquestion of factknowledge of sale
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a pre-emption suit filed by the respondent under the N.W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987, which had been concurrently decreed in his favor by three lower courts. The appellants, who purchased the property, challenged the concurrent findings on the ground that the respondent's first demand (Talb-i-Muwathibat) was delayed. They argued that the respondent acquired knowledge of the sale prior to the registration of the sale deed, specifically when the vendor disclosed the sale in a written statement in an earlier injunction suit. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the date of a pre-emptor's knowledge of a sale is a question of fact to be determined by evidence. Since the appellants failed to specifically plead or lead evidence to prove that the respondent acquired knowledge on the date of the written statement, the Court refused to disturb the concurrent findings of fact based on surmises or conjectures at the final appellate stage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the date of a pre-emptor's knowledge of a sale for the purpose of making Talb-i-Muwathibat is a question of fact or a question of law?
  • Can a party raise a new plea regarding the date of knowledge of a sale at the Supreme Court stage if it was not specifically pleaded or supported by evidence in the lower courts?
  • Does the disclosure of a sale in a vendor's written statement in a separate suit create a legal presumption of immediate knowledge of sale on the part of the pre-emptor?
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• Syed Arshad Ali vs Secretary Ministry of Housing and Works, Islamabad2023 PLC (C.S) 707 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-12-22
  inter se senioritycivil servants seniorityappointment by transferpromotionservice appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a service dispute concerning the inter se seniority of Assistants in the Ministry of Housing and Works. The core legal question was whether civil servants appointed by transfer in a particular calendar year rank senior to those promoted to the same post in the same calendar year under Rule 6 of the Civil Servants (Seniority) Rules, 1993. The Supreme Court held that under Rule 6, persons appointed by transfer in a particular calendar year rank as a class senior to those appointed by promotion or initial appointment in that same year. The Court dismissed the appeal, ruling that the private respondents, having been appointed by transfer in 2003, were rightly placed senior to the appellant who was promoted in 2003. The key principle laid down is that appointment by transfer takes precedence over promotion and initial appointment for seniority determination when made within the same calendar year pursuant to Rule 6 of the Civil Servants (Seniority) Rules, 1993.

  Questions settled

  • Whether persons appointed by transfer in a particular calendar year rank senior to those appointed by promotion in the same year under Rule 6 of the Civil Servants (Seniority) Rules, 1993?
  • Does past service count towards seniority upon transfer when a civil servant is transferred voluntarily versus compulsorily?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Amir Raza vs Mst. Rohi Mumtaz and others2023 SCMR 1394, 2024 PLJ SC 261 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-05-05
  khuladeferred dowerdissolution of marriagefamily courtdower recoverySupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of concurrent findings of the lower courts in family litigation concerning dissolution of marriage by way of khula, recovery of dower, maintenance, and dowry articles. The core legal question centers on the extent to which a wife obtaining khula is required to surrender her deferred dower, specifically regarding immovable property (a house) settled in the Nikahnama. The Supreme Court of Pakistan converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that upon dissolution of marriage through khula under Section 10(5) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, the wife is bound to surrender fifty percent of her deferred dower. The Court modified the lower courts' orders and ruled that the respondent wife is entitled only to a fifty percent share in the house in question or its alternate market value.

  Questions settled

  • What is the extent of surrender of deferred dower required when a marriage is dissolved on the basis of khula under Section 10(5) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964?
  • Whether a house settled as deferred dower in the Nikahnama is subject to the fifty percent surrender rule upon dissolution of marriage through khula?
  Read full judgment →
• Supreme Court Bar Association, through its Vice-President, Islamabad and others vs Pakistan Bar Council, through its Secretary, Islamabad and another2023 SCP 135 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-05-09
  Supreme Court Bar AssociationPakistan Bar Councilconstitutional petitionamicable settlementde-seatingshow cause noticebar councilsoriginal jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was brought under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 by the Supreme Court Bar Association and others to challenge show cause notices and subsequent de-seating notifications issued by the Pakistan Bar Council against certain office-bearers of the Supreme Court Bar Association. During the preliminary hearing and subsequent proceedings, the representatives of both eminent bar bodies, with the mediation of senior members of the legal fraternity and the Attorney General for Pakistan, engaged in amicable discussions and arrived at a consensual settlement. The parties agreed to withdraw all pending show cause notices, de-seating notifications, suspension resolutions, departmental letters, and related civil suits filed in the High Court, thereby resolving their disputes. The Supreme Court disposed of the constitutional petition in terms of the mutually agreed compromise, commending the leadership of both associations for their prudent resolution and emphasizing the maintenance of cordial relations within the legal fraternity in accordance with the applicable rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution is maintainable against show cause notices and de-seating actions issued by the Pakistan Bar Council?
  • Can disputes between the Supreme Court Bar Association and the Pakistan Bar Council be resolved through a consensual out-of-court settlement adopted by the Court?
  • Does the de-seating of bar association office-bearers without providing an opportunity of hearing violate the right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Supreme Court Bar Association through Vice-President, Islamabad and others vs Pakistan Bar Council through Secretary, Islamabad and another2023 SCMR 1123 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-05-09
  constitutional petitionSupreme Court Bar AssociationPakistan Bar Councilamicable settlementbar councils rulesshow cause noticede-seatingjurisdiction under Article 184(3)
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 by the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) and others to challenge show cause notices and subsequent de-seating notifications issued by the Pakistan Bar Council (PBC) against certain office bearers of the SCBA. During the preliminary hearing, the representatives of both the SCBA and the PBC, along with the Attorney General for Pakistan, engaged in discussions and successfully reached an amicable, consensual settlement to resolve all ongoing disputes between the two premier legal bodies. The terms of the settlement included the withdrawal of the impugned show cause notices and de-seating notifications by the PBC, the withdrawal of various civil suits and resolutions by the SCBA, the cancellation of certain meeting minutes, and the restoration of suspended memberships and bank account operations. The Supreme Court disposed of the constitutional petition in terms of this mutual compromise, recording appreciation for the efforts of the leadership of both bar associations in amicably settling their differences.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution can be disposed of on the basis of a consensual settlement between the Supreme Court Bar Association and the Pakistan Bar Council?
  • Can show cause notices and de-seating notifications issued against bar association office bearers be withdrawn pursuant to an amicable compromise between the disputing bodies?
  • What is the effect of a mutual agreement between representative bodies of lawyers on pending civil suits and resolutions regarding membership suspensions?
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• Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan, through its Secretary, Islamabad and others vs The Federation of Pakistan and others2023 SCP 331 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-02
  general electionsdelimitationelection programmeElection Commission of Pakistanappointment of election date
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a constitutional petition concerning the fixation of a date for general elections in Pakistan. The core legal question addressed by the Court was the determination and finalization of a timeline for holding general elections following the completion of the delimitation process by the Election Commission of Pakistan. The Court held that upon the conclusion of the delimitation process and subsequent announcement of the election programme in accordance with the law, the Election Commission must meet with the President of Pakistan to appoint the specific date for the general elections. The key principle laid down is that the electoral timeline must be adhered to in consultation with the relevant constitutional authorities to ensure general elections are held expeditiously while allowing adequate time for political parties to conduct their campaigns.

  Questions settled

  • What is the statutory timeframe governing the announcement of the election programme under the Elections Act, 2017?
  • Who is responsible for appointing the date for holding general elections after the completion of the delimitation process?
  • When must the Election Commission meet with the President of Pakistan to settle the date for general elections?
  Read full judgment →
• Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan through its Secretary, Isl_de33f3ed2023 SCP 322 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-10-23
  general electionsdelimitation of constituenciesCouncil of Common Interestcensus approvalconstitutional interpretationelection scheduleArticle 254
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns multiple constitution petitions challenging the delay in holding general elections following the approval of the 7th Population and Housing Census, 2023, and the subsequent delimitation process. The petitioners questioned the validity of the census approval by the Council of Common Interest and the resulting inability to hold elections within the ninety-day constitutional period following the dissolution of assemblies. The Court addressed the procedural hurdles, including the immunity of the President under Article 248 and the requirement for a larger bench under the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023, for constitutional interpretation. Upon the petitioners restricting their prayers solely to the holding of general elections, the Court determined that a three-member bench could proceed. The Court noted the unanimous admission by counsel that elections could not be held within the ninety-day limit and acknowledged the application of Article 254 regarding the validity of acts performed outside prescribed periods. Consequently, the Court issued notices to the Election Commission of Pakistan and the Federation of Pakistan to ascertain the election schedule, adjourning the matter for further hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to perform a constitutional act within a prescribed period render the act invalid under Article 254 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does a petition seeking constitutional interpretation require a larger bench under Section 4 of the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023?
  • Can the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan be held liable for failing to announce an election date given the immunity provided by Article 248 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan through its Secretary, Isl_cd88e4232023 SCP 337, 2023 SCP 331, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-03
  general electionsdissolution of assemblieselection datedelimitation of constituenciescensusconstitutional jurisdictionElection Commission of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  Constitutions petitions and civil miscellaneous appeals were filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan seeking the announcement of a date for general elections following the dissolution of the National Assembly and provincial assemblies in August 2023. The core legal questions involved the constitutional obligation to hold general elections within ninety days of dissolution under Article 224(2) of the Constitution, and the respective domains of the President of Pakistan and the Election Commission of Pakistan in fixing an election date amidst delays caused by the conduct of the 7th Population and Housing Census and subsequent delimitation of constituencies. The Court held that while general elections were delayed beyond the stipulated ninety-day period due to census and delimitation processes, the matter was successfully resolved when the President and the Election Commission of Pakistan agreed during court-facilitated proceedings to appoint 8 February 2024 as the poll date. The key principle laid down is that constitutional officeholders must strictly adhere to their respective domains and fulfill their constitutional duties as a sacred trust, and that obedience to the Constitution and law is mandatory rather than optional.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the delay in holding general elections beyond the ninety-day period due to census and delimitation renders the election process invalid under the Constitution?
  • How is the date for general elections to the National Assembly and provincial assemblies to be appointed when an impasse occurs between the President and the Election Commission of Pakistan?
  • Can the Supreme Court encroach upon the constitutional domain of the President or the Election Commission of Pakistan in fixing an election date?
  Read full judgment →
• Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan through its Secretary, Islamabad and others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Cabinet Division, Islamabad and others2023 SCP 364 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-23Read full judgment →
• Syed Jamil Ahmad vs Muhammad Salam and others2023 PSC 131 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-06
  Katchi Abadielimitation periodleasehold rightsspecific reliefmaintainability of suitunauthorized possessionpublic policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a dispute over the lease of a plot of land in a Katchi Abadie, where the appellant challenged a lease granted to the respondent. The core legal questions were whether the appellant's suit, filed in 1995 regarding a 1985 lease, was time-barred, and whether the appellant could claim ownership rights over land not in his possession. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower courts' decisions. The Court held that the suit was clearly time-barred as the appellant failed to justify the delay in filing. Furthermore, the Court determined the suit was not maintainable because the appellant lacked the requisite legal character under the law. The Court established the principle that regularization of Katchi Abadies is intended to benefit the landless, not to facilitate personal enrichment or exploitation by individuals claiming rights over land they neither own nor possess. Consequently, the appellant could not claim leasehold rights based on a purported tenancy for land situated in a declared Katchi Abadie, as such claims are contrary to public policy.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit for declaration and cancellation of a lease filed ten years after the cause of action is time-barred?
  • Can a person claim ownership rights under the regularization of Katchi Abadies for land that is not in their possession?
  • Does a person have the legal character under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 to claim ownership of land they do not possess?
  Read full judgment →
• Suo Motu Regarding Holding of General Elections to the Provincial Assemblies of Punjab and Khyber vs Not2023 SCP 87 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  suo motu jurisdictionjudicial federalismoriginal jurisdictionres judicatajudicial restraintconstitutional interpretationprovincial autonomyArticle 184(3)
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns suo motu proceedings and connected constitutional petitions initiated under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan regarding the appointment of a date for general elections to the Provincial Assemblies of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa following their dissolution. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court should exercise its original jurisdiction while identical matters were pending before provincial High Courts and where a High Court had already rendered a judgment. The Court held that the proceedings were not maintainable, emphasizing that the Supreme Court's extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 184(3) is discretionary and should be exercised with circumspection, particularly when concurrent jurisdiction is already being exercised by High Courts under Article 199. The judgment established that the Supreme Court cannot, directly or indirectly, issue orders of the nature mentioned in Article 199 against a judicial order of a High Court, nor can it bypass the doctrine of res judicata. The Court underscored the principles of judicial federalism, the necessity of judicial restraint, and the requirement for rule-based, transparent procedures for invoking suo motu jurisdiction and constituting benches.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court can exercise its original jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution when the same matter is pending before a High Court under Article 199?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the power to issue an order of the nature mentioned in Article 199 against a judicial order of a High Court?
  • Is the doctrine of res judicata applicable to a decision of a High Court made under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Can the Chief Justice of Pakistan unilaterally reconstitute a bench once it has been constituted and has commenced hearing a case?
  Read full judgment →
• Suo Motu Regarding Holding of General Elections to the Provincial2023 SCP 107 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-04-07Read full judgment →
• Suo Motu Case No. 4 of 2022: in the matter of vs Not2023 PLD Supreme Court 387 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-03-29
  constitution of benchessuo motu jurisdictionfreedom of speechpemra prohibition orderdue processjudicial accountabilityspecial benches
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a civil petition where a regulation granting additional marks for the memorization of the Holy Qur'an for medical admissions was questioned, leading to the initiation of suo motu proceedings regarding bench constitution practices and a media prohibition order issued by PEMRA. The core legal questions pertained to the Chief Justice's administrative powers to constitute special benches under the Supreme Court Rules 1980, the legality of PEMRA's prohibition order barring discussion on the conduct of judges, and the scope of fundamental rights concerning freedom of speech and due process. The majority held that the Supreme Court Rules do not envisage special benches or grant unilateral power to the Chief Justice to constitute them without transparent rules, and that PEMRA's blanket media gag violates constitutional freedoms of speech and information. The court laid down principles emphasizing that judicial transparency, adherence to established rules for bench formation, and freedom of expression are vital to public trust, and that judicial accountability remains integral to the rule of law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Chief Justice of Pakistan have the power under the Supreme Court Rules 1980 to constitute special benches and select judges arbitrarily?
  • Whether PEMRA has the authority under the PEMRA Ordinance 2002 to impose a blanket prohibition on discussing the conduct of judges of the superior courts?
  • Does the prohibition of criticism against judges violate the fundamental rights to freedom of speech and expression under the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Are suo motu proceedings under Article 184(3) of the Constitution subject to transparent procedural rules for case fixation and bench constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Suo Moto Case vs Independent and Transparent Investigation into the Murder of Renowned Journalist, Mr. Arshad Sharif in Kenya2023 SCP 172 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-06-13
  suo motumurder investigationjournalist assassinationSpecial Joint Investigation TeamMutual Legal AssistanceSupreme Court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a suo motu case concerning an independent and transparent investigation into the murder of renowned journalist Mr. Arshad Sharif in Kenya. The learned Attorney General for Pakistan submitted reports from the Special Joint Investigation Team and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, noting ongoing negotiations for Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements with Kenya and the UAE, and requested an adjournment. Counsel for the deceased's second wife suggested approaching United Nations Rapporteurs or Committees if direct governmental communication fails. Meanwhile, counsel for the mother of the deceased filed an application seeking a direction from the Court for the Special Joint Investigation Team to examine certain suspected persons. The core legal question addressed is whether the Supreme Court can direct the course of an ongoing investigation in exercise of its suo motu jurisdiction. The Court held that in its suo motu proceedings, it is merely facilitating the investigation and has no mandate to direct the course of investigation, leaving it open for the counsel to approach the investigating team directly. The application was disposed of accordingly and the matter adjourned.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have the mandate to direct the course of an ongoing criminal investigation in suo motu proceedings?
  • Can the Special Joint Investigation Team be directed by the Court to examine specific persons named by a complainant?
  Read full judgment →
• Sundas, Naila Khan, Mst. Reema Naz vs Khyber Medical University thr. V.C.2023 SCP 319, 2024 SCMR 46 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-10-12
  medical educationeligibility criteriajudicial review in academic mattersconstitutional petitioncompassion and hardshipinterim injunctive ordersprofessional examinations
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment dismissing their constitutional petitions, which challenged the cancellation of their student registrations by Khyber Medical University. The petitioners had failed to clear their first or second professional medical examinations within the permitted four chances, rendering them ineligible to continue their MBBS or BDS studies under the Admissions in MBBS/BDS Courses and Conditions for House Job/Internship/Foundation Year Regulations, 2013, framed pursuant to the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council Ordinance, 1962. Although interim injunctive orders from civil courts had previously allowed them to continue their studies, the Supreme Court held that courts must exercise utmost restraint in academic matters, as formulating educational policies and eligibility criteria falls within the exclusive domain of educational experts and regulators. The Court ruled that relief cannot be granted on the grounds of compassion or hardship in violation of binding statutory regulations, and interim orders cannot create legal rights contrary to law. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions as meritless.

  Questions settled

  • Whether courts can interfere with the academic policies and eligibility criteria formulated by educational regulators?
  • Can relief be granted to students on grounds of compassion and hardship in violation of binding statutory regulations?
  • Do interim injunctive orders passed by civil courts create enforceable legal rights for students to continue their studies contrary to regulatory eligibility standards?
  • Are the standards set by the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council regarding medical education open to judicial review?
  Read full judgment →
• Summit Bank Limited, Lahore vs Messrs M. M. Brothers, Proprietorship2023 CLD 297 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-10-04
  execution proceedingscourt auctionproclamation of salenewspaper publicationsole bidderreserve pricecompetitive biddingBanking Courtfinancial institutions
  Summary & questions settled

  This Civil Petition for leave to appeal arose from execution proceedings under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 and Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. A decree-holder bank purchased the mortgaged property of judgment debtors as the sole bidder at reserve price after execution proclamation was carried out only through beat of drum and local affixture without newspaper publication. The Lahore High Court set aside the sale and remanded the matter to the Executing Court. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision and refused leave to appeal. The Supreme Court held that while executing a decree through auction under Order XXI, C.P.C., the Executing Court must ensure adequate publicity to obtain a fair market value and protect the judgment debtor’s rights. A valid public auction requires competitive bidding, necessitating at least two potential bidders. Failure to publish proclamation notices in daily newspapers to attract public participants constitutes a material irregularity that causes injustice if it leads to a single-bidder walkover at an inadequate price.

  Questions settled

  • Is newspaper publication of an auction proclamation required to ensure proper publicity in execution proceedings under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a court auction sale be sustained where only the decree-holder participates as the sole bidder without competitive bidding?
  • Does the failure to give wide publicity to a court auction sale warrant setting aside the sale if it causes prejudice or injustice to the judgment debtor?
  Read full judgment →
• Sultan Ahmed vs Registrar, Balochistan High Court, Quetta and others2023 SCP 283, PLJ 2023 SC (Cr.C.) 321, 2023 SCMR 1955 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-07-06
  contempt of courtjudicial independencedistrict judiciaryunqualified apologyexecutive interferencedue processsuo motu jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Balochistan High Court order convicting the appellant, an Assistant Commissioner, for contempt of court following his unauthorized arrest and manhandling of a Qazi (a judicial officer). The core legal questions concerned whether the High Court could initiate suo motu contempt proceedings on a report from a District & Sessions Judge, whether the appellant was denied due process under Article 10A of the Constitution, and whether an unqualified apology necessitates acquittal. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding that the High Court possesses inherent jurisdiction to initiate contempt proceedings to protect the district judiciary, which is the backbone of the justice system. The Court affirmed that an unqualified apology does not grant an automatic right to acquittal; rather, it serves as a mitigating factor for sentencing. The judgment emphasizes that judicial independence requires protection from executive intrusion. Consequently, the Court established mandatory precautionary guidelines for the executive when dealing with criminal matters involving district judicial officers, ensuring transparency, fair treatment, and the protection of judicial dignity.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unqualified apology in contempt proceedings entitle the accused to an automatic discharge?
  • Can a High Court initiate suo motu contempt proceedings based on a report from a District & Sessions Judge?
  • Are judicial officers immune from criminal liability for non-judicial acts?
  • What procedural safeguards must the executive follow when arresting a member of the district judiciary?
  Read full judgment →
• Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited, through its General Manager, Rawalpindi vs Muhammad Arshad2023 SCP 325, 2024 SCMR 122 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-09-20
  gas theftmeter tamperingconnected loadburden of proofgas utility courtpilferage chargesOGRA procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing an appeal filed by the petitioner, Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (SNGPL), against a judgment of the Gas Utility Court. The respondent had filed a civil suit challenging a gas utility bill calculated on the basis of alleged meter tampering. The Trial Court decreed the suit, setting aside the bill while permitting recovery of the meter cost, a decision upheld by the High Court both on procedural grounds and on merits. The core legal question revolved around the burden of proof and the mandatory adherence to the procedure prescribed for assessing gas theft and pilferage charges, including the determination of connected load. The Supreme Court held that mere submission of a calculation sheet or proof of meter tampering without assessing the actual connected load through a proper committee and inventory, in accordance with the standard operating procedures approved by the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA), is insufficient to establish liability. The Court affirmed that the burden of proof lies on the utility company to substantiate its assessment through convincing evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a gas utility company can assess and recover gas pilferage charges without determining the connected load through a proper committee and inventory as required by OGRA procedures?
  • Does the mere production of a calculation sheet and a meter inspection report discharge the utility company's burden of proof regarding the quantum of gas theft?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial and high courts regarding the lack of evidence to support assessed gas consumption charges?
  Read full judgment →
• State Life Insurance Corporation and another vs Mst. Razia Ameer and another2023 CLD 517 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-03-06
  liquidated damagesinsurance claimgroup insurancelate settlementrepudiation of claimInsurance Tribunalearly retirement
  Summary & questions settled

  This direct appeal by the insurer challenges the judgment of the first Appellate Court which varied the decision of the Insurance Tribunal, Punjab, and held that the legal heirs of the assured person were entitled to claim liquidated damages under section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000. The core legal question examined by the court was whether the legal heirs of a deceased assured person under a group insurance scheme can claim liquidated damages for late settlement of their claim where the initial repudiation of the insurance claim was found to be unlawful and based on a subsequently signed policy. The Supreme Court held that the first Appellate Court's decision was legally sound, ruling that payment of liquidated damages is an implied term of every insurance contract under section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, and that legal heirs of the assured are entitled to such damages when a claim is unduly delayed without lawful justification or circumstances beyond the insurer's control. The court established that group insurance contracts inherently benefit the family of the assured, and insurers cannot evade statutory liquidated damages for delayed settlements.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the legal heirs of an assured person are entitled to claim liquidated damages under section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 for late settlement of an insurance claim?
  • Does an insurance policy become effective from the date it is signed by the executants?
  • Whether the legal heirs have standing to claim liquidated damages under a group insurance contract even if the assured person was not a direct signatory to it?
  Read full judgment →
• State Life Insurance Corporation & another vs Mst. Razia Ameer & another2023 SCP 79 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-03-06
  liquidated damagesgroup insurancelate settlement of claimsinsurance tribunalrepudiation of claimimplied termearly retirement
  Summary & questions settled

  This direct appeal by the insurer challenges a judgment of the first Appellate Court which favored the legal heirs of an assured person regarding the payment of liquidated damages under the Insurance Ordinance, 2000. The husband of respondent No.1 was covered under a Group Insurance contract, took early retirement on medical grounds, and subsequently passed away. His insurance claim was initially repudiated by the insurer on the ground that revised contracts did not cover early retirees, though the sum assured was eventually paid years later after further policy revisions. The Insurance Tribunal dismissed the claim for liquidated damages, but the first Appellate Court reversed this. The Supreme Court examined the competing judgments and held that the payment of liquidated damages for late settlement of claims is an implied statutory term of every insurance contract under Section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, and that legal heirs are entitled to such damages when a claim is unduly delayed without lawful justification. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Are the legal heirs of an assured person entitled to claim liquidated damages for late settlement under Section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000?
  • Does an insurance policy become effective from the date it is signed by the executants?
  • Can an insurer avoid paying liquidated damages when a group insurance claim is delayed without circumstances beyond its control?
  Read full judgment →
• State Bank of Pakistan vs Mohammad Naeem and others2023 SCMR 737 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-10
  civil review petitionconstitution of benchessupreme court rulesleave to appealdollar bearer certificatemarkup ratejurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil review petition was filed by the State Bank of Pakistan against a consolidated order of a two-member bench of the Supreme Court which had modified a High Court judgment regarding Dollar Bearer Certificates by reducing the markup rate from 10% to 2% without formally granting leave to appeal. The core legal question was whether a two-member bench could modify a High Court judgment and dispose of a matter without granting leave to appeal and without constituting a three-member bench as mandated by rules. The Supreme Court held that under Order XI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, a two-member bench may hear petitions for leave to appeal, but it cannot alter, amend, or modify an appellate judgment of the High Court without granting leave and without the matter being heard by a bench of not less than three judges. Consequently, the review petition was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the civil petition for leave to appeal was restored for hearing before a three-member bench.

  Questions settled

  • Can a two-member bench of the Supreme Court modify or alter a High Court judgment without granting leave to appeal?
  • What is the quorum requirement under Order XI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 for hearing and disposing of causes, appeals, or matters other than petitions for leave to appeal?
  • Whether an order passed by a two-member bench without granting leave and altering a High Court judgment is liable to be reviewed?
  Read full judgment →
• Special Secretary-II (Law and Order), Home and Tribal Affairs Department, Government Of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar and others vs Fayyaz Dawar2023 SCMR 1442 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-06-14
  constitutional jurisdictiondisputed questions of factadequate remedylachescompensation claimretrospective applicationwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a Peshawar High Court judgment allowing a writ petition and directing the petitioners to pay the respondent Rs.26,54,000/- as compensation for alleged housing damages incurred during a 2007 military operation. The petitioners challenged the judgment on grounds of disputed factual controversies, non-retrospective applicability of the 2013 compensation policy, and laches, as the writ petition was filed 12 years after the incident. The Supreme Court of Pakistan set aside the High Court's judgment and dismissed the writ petition. The Court held that extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution cannot be invoked to establish rights or resolve disputed questions of fact requiring evidence. Where a claim is unestablished under existing policy or law, the plenary civil court is the appropriate venue. Furthermore, an unexplained delay of 12 years in filing a constitutional petition renders it barred by laches, which cannot be excused merely by engaging in administrative correspondence.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court resolve disputed questions of fact requiring evidence under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Does engaging in administrative correspondence excuse an undue delay in filing a constitutional petition from being barred by laches?
  • Is a suit in a civil court an adequate alternate remedy precluding writ jurisdiction when a compensation claim involves controverted facts?
  Read full judgment →
• Special Secretary-II (Law & Order), Home & Tribal Affairs Department, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar and others vs Fayyaz Dawar2023 SCP 199, 2023 SCMR 1097, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 16 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  writ jurisdictiondisputed questions of factlachesconstitutional petitioncompensation claimcivil suitadequate remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a civil petition for leave to appeal against a Peshawar High Court judgment that granted compensation to the respondent for property damage allegedly sustained during 2007 military operations. The core legal questions were whether the High Court could adjudicate disputed questions of fact in its constitutional jurisdiction and whether a claim filed after a twelve-year delay was barred by laches. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in exercising writ jurisdiction to resolve complex factual controversies regarding the extent of property damage, which required evidence and plenary adjudication. The Court reaffirmed that constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, is intended for enforcing clear rights rather than establishing disputed ones, and that civil courts provide the appropriate forum for such litigation. Furthermore, the Court found the respondent’s claim significantly delayed, thereby invoking the doctrine of laches. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and dismissed the respondent's writ petition, emphasizing that disputed factual claims must be pursued through ordinary civil procedure.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court resolve disputed questions of fact in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is a writ petition an appropriate remedy for a claim that requires the recording of evidence and the resolution of factual controversies?
  • Does the doctrine of laches apply to a constitutional petition filed twelve years after the cause of action arose?
  • What is the standard for determining whether a remedy is 'adequate' to bar the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohail Akhtar, Rahul Naazir vs The State, Sohail Akhtar, etc2023 SCP 305, 2024 SCMR 67 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-09-25
  murder convictionocular evidenceinterested witnessesforensic reportsentence enhancementcriminal appeallife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal appeal against a conviction for murder and related offences. The petitioner, Sohail Akhtar, was convicted by the trial court for the murder of Adil Javed and causing injuries to his son, receiving a death sentence and other terms. The High Court, while maintaining the convictions, commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment. The petitioner challenged his conviction, while the complainant sought enhancement of the sentence. The core legal questions involved the reliability of ocular evidence, the credibility of interested witnesses, and the evidentiary value of forensic reports regarding weapon recovery. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding that the prosecution successfully established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court affirmed that the ocular account was consistent with medical evidence and that the prosecution witnesses were credible. It further held that the High Court correctly appreciated the evidence and that the sentence of life imprisonment was justified under the circumstances. Consequently, the Court dismissed both the petitioner's appeal and the complainant's petition for enhancement of sentence, refusing leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained based on ocular evidence that is consistent with medical evidence despite minor contradictions?
  • Does the failure to produce a witness mentioned in a medical report automatically render the prosecution's case doubtful?
  • Is a sentence of life imprisonment appropriate where the High Court has already commuted a death sentence based on the appreciation of evidence?
  • Does the delay in sending crime empties to a forensic laboratory necessarily invalidate the forensic evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Snamprogetti Engineering B.V. through Special Attorney vs Commissioner2023 PTD 863, 2023 PTCL 722, 2023 SCMR 1055 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-08-02
  double taxation treatypermanent establishmentincome tax exemptiontreaty interpretationnon-resident companybusiness profitstax reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a tax dispute regarding whether income derived by a non-resident company from engineering services provided to a local entity is exempt from income tax under the Pakistan-Netherlands Double Taxation Convention. The core legal question was whether the petitioner maintained a "permanent establishment" in Pakistan under Article 5 of the Convention, thereby rendering its business profits taxable. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not constitute a permanent establishment. The Court rejected the lower forums' reliance on the total project duration, holding that the "furnishing of services" threshold requires the actual physical presence of employees or personnel in the source country for an aggregate period exceeding four months within a twelve-month period. As the petitioner’s personnel were present for only 97 days, the threshold was not satisfied. The Court established that international tax treaties, governed by customary international law and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, must be interpreted independently of domestic tax statutes. Furthermore, treaty provisions override domestic law, and the burden of proving a permanent establishment lies with the tax department.

  Questions settled

  • Does the duration of a project contract determine the existence of a permanent establishment for service-based activities under the Pakistan-Netherlands Double Taxation Convention?
  • Is the interpretation of international tax treaties governed by domestic tax law or customary international law?
  • Does the 'furnishing of services' clause in a tax treaty require the physical presence of personnel in the source country to constitute a permanent establishment?
  • Can tax authorities rely on the total duration of a project to establish a permanent establishment if the actual physical presence of personnel is less than the treaty-mandated threshold?
  Read full judgment →
• Snamprogetti Engineering B.V. thr. its Special Attorney vs Commissioner of Inland Revenue Zone-II, L.T.U, Islamabad, etc2023 SCP 131 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  permanent establishmentdouble taxation conventionengineering servicesinternational taxationtax exemptionincome taxtreaty interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal by a non-resident foreign company seeking tax exemption on income derived from engineering services provided to a local company under a contract, in light of the double taxation treaty between Pakistan and the Netherlands. The core legal question revolves around whether the income derived from the provision of engineering services is exempt from income tax or liable to be taxed under the normal tax regime of Pakistan due to the existence of a permanent establishment. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not maintain a permanent establishment in Pakistan under Article 5 of the Convention, as the physical presence and rendering of services by its employees within the country did not aggregate beyond the mandatory threshold of four months within any twelve-month period. Consequently, the Court ruled that the income is exempt from income tax in Pakistan, setting aside the judgments of the High Court and the Tribunal while restoring the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals). The key principle laid down is that the determination of a permanent establishment for furnishing services under tax treaties requires actual physical presence and activity extending beyond the specified time threshold, and interpretation of international tax treaties must be governed by international legal standards rather than strict domestic tax rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether income derived from providing engineering services by a non-resident company is taxable in Pakistan without a permanent establishment?
  • How is the time threshold for a permanent establishment relating to the furnishing of services under Article 5 of the double taxation convention to be calculated?
  • Does the mere execution of an engineering contract create a permanent establishment under the Pakistan-Netherlands Double Taxation Convention?
  • What is the extent of the burden of proof required on the tax department to establish the existence of a permanent establishment?
  Read full judgment →
• Sindh Revenue Board through Secretary Government of Sindh, Karachi and others vs Messrs Quick Food Industries (Pvt.) Limited and others2023 SCMR 1776, PTCL 2024 CL. 509 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-10-12
  sales tax on servicesvalue of taxable servicedelegated legislationreimbursable expensesgross amount chargedfiscal statute interpretationconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns constitutional petitions challenging the Sindh Revenue Board's (SRB) practice of including salaries and allowances of security and manpower personnel in the 'gross amount charged' for levying sales tax on services. The core legal question was whether such reimbursable expenses form part of the 'value of taxable service' under the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, and whether the SRB could expand the tax base through delegated legislation. The Supreme Court held that sales tax is leviable only on the consideration paid for the service rendered. Salaries and allowances, being reimbursable expenses borne by the service recipient, do not constitute part of the taxable service or its value. The Court established the principle that delegated legislation cannot override or expand the scope of the parent statute. Taxing provisions must align with the taxable event defined in the Act, and Rules are intended only to effectuate the statute's mandate, not to alter its substantive scope. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, affirming that the tax cannot be levied on amounts beyond the value of the service provided.

  Questions settled

  • Does the 'gross amount charged' for sales tax purposes include reimbursable salaries and allowances paid to personnel?
  • Can delegated legislation (Rules) expand the scope of a charging provision in a fiscal statute?
  • Are salaries and allowances paid to security and manpower personnel part of the 'value of taxable service' under the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011?
  • Does the omission of a clarifying proviso in delegated legislation alter the substantive scope of the parent statute?
  Read full judgment →
• Shujat Hussain vs Provincial Election Commissioner, Balochistan & others2023 SCP 151, 2024 PLJ SC 25, 2023 PLD Supreme Court 500 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-05-29
  local government electionelection petitionElection Tribunaljurisdictionalternative remedyre-pollwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute regarding the election of the Chairman of Union Council-15, Padagai, District Chaghi, held under the Balochistan Local Government Act 2010. After a tie-vote was settled by drawing lots in favor of the appellant, the contesting respondent filed an election petition before the Election Commission of Pakistan, which ordered a re-poll under Sections 8 and 9 of the Elections Act 2017. The appellant's writ petition challenging this order was dismissed by the Balochistan High Court on the ground of an alternative remedy of appeal under Section 9(5) of the Elections Act 2017. The Supreme Court held that since the election was held under the Balochistan Local Government Act 2010, Section 37 of the said Act applied, which mandates that elections can only be called in question via an election petition before an Election Tribunal. The Election Commission's direct assumption of jurisdiction under the Elections Act 2017 was without lawful authority. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment, remanded the writ petition for decision on merits, and directed that the results of the ongoing re-poll remain undeclared pending the High Court's final determination.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of the Elections Act 2017 override the express provisions of the Balochistan Local Government Act 2010 in local government election disputes?
  • Can the Election Commission of Pakistan directly decide a local government election dispute under Section 9 of the Elections Act 2017 when the local government law mandates the constitution of an Election Tribunal?
  • Is a writ petition maintainable against an order of the Election Commission of Pakistan passed without jurisdiction, despite the existence of an appellate remedy under Section 9(5) of the Elections Act 2017?
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• Shuhada Forum, Balochistan through its Patron in Chief, Nawabzada Jamal Raisani, Quetta Cantt. And others vs Justice (R) Jawwad S. Khawaja and others2023 SCP 392 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-12-13
  Intra Court AppealMilitary CourtsTrial of CiviliansUltra ViresConstitutional PetitionStay OrderPakistan Army Act
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard Intra Court Appeals challenging an order that declared Section 2(1)(d)(i) and (ii) and Section 59(4) of the Pakistan Army Act, 1952 as ultra vires the Constitution, thereby prohibiting the trial of civilians by military courts. The appellants contended that the impugned order deviated from established precedents and that the Army Act provisions were protected under the Constitution. While the detailed reasons for the impugned order were pending, the Court addressed the appellants' request for interim relief. By a majority of five to one, the Court suspended the operation of the impugned order, allowing the legal status quo to persist temporarily. However, this suspension was explicitly conditioned upon the stipulation that no final judgment shall be passed against the 103 accused persons by the Military Courts until the next date of hearing. The Court directed that the matter be fixed for further proceedings in January 2024, emphasizing the necessity of reviewing the detailed reasons once released by the bench that initially decided the constitutional petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Can the operation of a court order declaring a statute ultra vires be suspended pending the release of detailed reasons?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to impose conditions, such as prohibiting final judgments, while granting a stay of an order striking down a law?
  • Are the provisions of the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, regarding the trial of civilians, subject to the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution?
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• Sheikh Muhammad Iftikhar Ahmad and others vs Faiz Ahmad and others2023 SCMR 2158 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-14
  Section 12(2) C.P.C.lis pendensspecific performancefraud upon the courtbona fide purchaserappellate proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals challenged the dismissal of applications filed under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, regarding property purchased during the pendency of an appeal. The core legal question was whether the appellants could invoke Section 12(2) to challenge an appellate judgment based on alleged fraud, and whether the doctrine of lis pendens invalidated their claims. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the appellants failed to establish that any fraud or misrepresentation was played upon the Court, a mandatory prerequisite for relief under Section 12(2). The Court clarified that alleged fraud inter se between the seller and the purchasers does not satisfy the statutory requirement of fraud upon the Court. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that transfers of property made during the pendency of litigation are subject to the doctrine of lis pendens, binding the purchasers to the final outcome of the proceedings. Consequently, the appellate judgment remained intact, and the purchasers, having acquired the property during the litigation, could not claim independent rights to the property.

  Questions settled

  • Does fraud committed inter se between parties to a sale transaction constitute fraud upon the court under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
  • Is a purchaser of property who acquires title during the pendency of an appeal bound by the final outcome of that litigation under the doctrine of lis pendens?
  • What are the essential requirements for maintaining an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
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• Sheikh Humayun Nazir vs The State and others2023 SCMR 2058 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-04-14
  intra-court appealnon-cognizable offenceinvestigation permissionrevisional jurisdictionmagisterial discretionlaw reforms ordinancecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged an order of a Judicial Magistrate refusing to grant permission under Section 155(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to investigate a non-cognizable offense. The petitioner's constitutional petition and subsequent Intra-Court Appeal (ICA) against this refusal were dismissed by the Islamabad High Court. The core legal question was whether an ICA is maintainable against an order passed by a Single Judge in a constitutional petition concerning the refusal of a Magistrate to order an investigation into a non-cognizable offense, and whether such an order is amenable to revisional jurisdiction. The Court held that the Magistrate’s order refusing investigation under Section 155(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is a judicial function amenable to revisional jurisdiction under Sections 435-439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, an ICA against the High Court's order in such a matter is not maintainable due to the proviso to Section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972. The principle laid down is that a Magistrate acts as a court when exercising judicial discretion to order or refuse an investigation into non-cognizable offenses.

  Questions settled

  • Is an Intra-Court Appeal maintainable against an order passed by a Single Judge in a constitutional petition regarding the registration of an FIR or investigation of a non-cognizable offence?
  • Does a Magistrate act as a court when exercising the power to grant or refuse permission to investigate a non-cognizable offence under Section 155(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an order of a Magistrate refusing to grant permission to investigate a non-cognizable offence amenable to revisional jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Shehri Citizens for a Better Environment & others vs Murad Ali Shah2023 SCP 395 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-12-21
  rehabilitation schemedispossessed personscompensationrental paymentsencumbrance-free plotpublic notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the implementation of a rehabilitation and compensation scheme for individuals dispossessed during the clearing of Gujjar Nallah, Orangi Nallah, and Mehmoodabad Nallah in Karachi. The Supreme Court of Pakistan reviewed the progress of rental payments and the rehabilitation of 6,932 affectees. Regarding rental payments, the Court noted substantial compliance, with cheques released to 6,471 affectees, leaving 461 uncollected due to untraceable whereabouts, blocked CNICs, or death. To expedite delivery, the Court directed the Commissioner's office to share the list of remaining affectees with the counsel for the affectees and to publish public notices in local Urdu and Sindhi newspapers. On the issue of rehabilitation, the Court considered two proposals: either releasing funds to the affectees for land purchase and construction based on market value and Pakistan Engineering Council standards, or allotting an encumbrance-free 80-square-yard plot in the Malir Development Authority along with construction costs. The Court directed the Chief Secretary, Mayor, and Commissioner of Karachi to decide on the most suitable option and submit a compliance report with a proper timeline within 15 days.

  Questions settled

  • What measures must the state administration take to locate and disburse compensation cheques to untraceable or deceased affectees of a public displacement drive?
  • What are the permissible options for the rehabilitation of dispossessed persons under a court-supervised compensation scheme?
  • How are construction costs calculated for the rehabilitation of dispossessed persons under the standards approved by the Supreme Court?
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• Shehri -Citizens for a Better Environment & others vs Murad Ali Shah2023 SCP 225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-08-17
  contempt proceedingscompensation and rehabilitationGujjar Nallah affecteesrental supportSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose upon an application filed for initiating contempt proceedings against the Chief Minister of Sindh for non-compliance with previous orders of the Supreme Court regarding the compensation and rehabilitation of affectees dispossessed from Gujjar Nallah, Orangi Nallah, and Mehmoodabad Nallah. The core legal question concerned the enforcement of court-ordered directions for rental support and the formulation of a viable rehabilitation scheme for the displaced persons. Upon hearing the Chief Minister, Mayor Karachi, and other officials, the Court recorded a consensual mechanism for the immediate disbursement of pending rental support cheques in two tranches and noted two alternative proposals submitted by the Government of Sindh for permanent rehabilitation and land/construction cost allocation. The Court held that the contempt proceedings would remain pending and intact without prejudice while the agreed timelines and mechanisms for payment and rehabilitation proposals were implemented, dispensing with the personal appearance of the Chief Minister subject to due compliance and filing of an interim compliance report.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contempt proceedings can be kept pending while parties negotiate a consensual mechanism for implementing previous court orders?
  • Can the personal appearance of a Chief Executive be dispensed with upon assurance of compliance and proper allocation of funds for court-ordered compensation?
  • What is the prescribed mechanism and timeline for the disbursement of rental support cheques to affectees dispossessed from urban nallahs?
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• Shaukat Ali vs State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through its2023 SCP 77 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-03-03
  pension enhancementvoluntary retirement schemeFederal Service Tribunalleave to appealjudicial honorificsconstitutional nomenclaturecourt decorumappellate practice
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard a petition seeking leave to appeal against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's miscellaneous application assailing the dismissal of a review petition regarding enhanced pension claims under a Voluntary Retirement/Separation Scheme. The Court declined leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, observing that the issues regarding limitation and pension entitlement had already been settled by precedent. Additionally, the Court addressed the widespread practice among lawyers and judges of applying honorifics and prefixes such as 'Honourable', 'Hon'ble', 'August', or 'Apex' to the Supreme Court and High Courts. The Court held that such prefixes should not be used for inanimate institutions, as the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan designates them simply as 'Supreme Court' and 'High Courts' without honorifics. The Court ruled that constitutional nomenclature should be adhered to, noting that honorifics like 'honourable' or 'learned' appropriately describe judges personally rather than court institutions, and cautioned against excessive or obsequious usage.

  Questions settled

  • Is it linguistically and constitutionally appropriate to attach honorifics such as 'Honourable', 'August Court', or 'Apex Court' to court institutions rather than individual judges?
  • Should legal practitioners and judges adhere strictly to the designations provided in the Constitution of Pakistan when referring to courts?
  • Can enhanced pension benefits be claimed under a voluntary retirement scheme when the underlying limitation and entitlement issues have already been definitively settled by Supreme Court precedent?
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• Shaukat Ali vs State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through Chairman and another2023 PLD Supreme Court 260, 2023 PLJ SC 476 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-03-02
  Voluntary Retirement Schemepension enhancementlimitationhonorificscourt nomenclaturelanguage of ConstitutionFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arose out of an order of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing a miscellaneous application that challenged the dismissal of a review petition regarding pension enhancement under a Voluntary Retirement/Separation Scheme. The petitioner sought an increase in pension corresponding to salary hikes granted to serving employees of the State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan. Finding that the issues regarding limitation and pension entitlement had already been authoritatively settled by prior decisions of the Supreme Court, the Court declined leave to appeal and dismissed the petition. Furthermore, the Court addressed the prevalent practice among lawyers and judges of using honorifics such as 'Honourable', 'August', or 'Apex' when referring to courts. The Court emphasized that constitutional institutions should be referred to using the precise language of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, which does not use such prefixes for courts, noting that 'honourable' applies properly as a courtesy title for individuals rather than inanimate institutions.

  Questions settled

  • Is a retired employee who opted for a voluntary retirement scheme entitled to enhanced pension benefits when serving officers' salaries are subsequently increased?
  • Should honorific prefixes such as 'Honourable', 'August', or 'Apex' be used when referring to constitutional courts in judicial proceedings and pleadings?
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• Shan Muhammad alias Shany vs Said Mashal2023 PSC 126 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-05-15
  pre-emption suitTalb-i-Ishhadnotice of demandmutationplaint omissioncivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a pre-emption suit filed by the respondent against the appellant regarding a sale effected through a mutation. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, but the appellate court set it aside and dismissed the suit. Upon civil revision, the High Court restored the trial court's judgment, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal questions involved whether the failure to mention the exact date of issuance of the notice of Talb-i-Ishhad in the plaint is fatal to the pre-emption suit, and whether physical possession was delivered prior to the attestation of mutation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that mere non-mentioning of the date of the notice in the plaint, where the notice itself was duly tendered in evidence and the objection was never raised in the written statement or earlier proceedings, is not fatal and does not warrant non-suiting the pre-emptor. The Court laid down that a party cannot be permitted to raise a new factual plea not pleaded in the written statement, and that substantial compliance with statutory requirements supported by un-rebutted evidence is sufficient.

  Questions settled

  • Whether failure to mention the date of issuance of the notice of Talb-i-Ishhad in the plaint is fatal to a pre-emption suit?
  • Can a party raise a new factual plea regarding limitation and notice before the Supreme Court without having pleaded it in the written statement or earlier fora?
  • Does mere oral assertion of delivery of physical possession prior to the attestation of mutation suffice to prove limitation in a pre-emption suit?
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• Shamshad Bibi, etc vs Riasat Ali, etc2023 SCP 236, 2023 PLD Supreme Court 643, 2023 PLJ SC 600 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-05-25
  civil revisionadditional evidencerevisional jurisdictionremand of caseconcurrent findingsOrder XLI Rule 27 CPCSection 115 CPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a civil revision petition challenging a High Court order that allowed an application for additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and remanded the case to the trial court, thereby setting aside concurrent findings of the lower courts. The core legal question is whether the High Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, was justified in permitting additional evidence and remanding the matter. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's order was improper. The Court affirmed that while revisional powers may exceptionally allow for additional evidence to rectify jurisdictional errors or material irregularities, such power is not intended to fill lacunas, allow new pleas, or assist indolent litigants. The Court emphasized that the power to admit additional evidence must be exercised cautiously and sparingly, and only when the evidence could not have been produced earlier or is necessary to prevent grave injustice. Finding the respondents' application flimsy and an attempt at a fishing inquiry, the Court set aside the High Court's order, restoring the concurrent findings of the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 allow the production of additional evidence?
  • What are the parameters for the exercise of revisional powers by the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is the power to allow additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 intended to fill lacunas or allow new pleas in a case?
  • Under what exceptional circumstances may a revisional court permit the recording of additional evidence?
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• Shahzad vs The State and another2023 SCMR 679 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-12-06
  post-arrest bailrule of consistencyprohibitory clausecyber crimeelectronic crimes
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition seeking leave to appeal against the order of the Islamabad High Court, which declined post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a case registered under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 and the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The core legal question involves the entitlement of the accused to post-arrest bail on the grounds of consistency, given that a co-accused attributed with the ownership of the SIM used in the alleged crime was already granted bail, and considering that the offences fall outside the prohibitory clause of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that the petitioner is entitled to bail under the rule of consistency and because offences not falling within the prohibitory clause warrant bail as a rule and refusal as an exception. The key principle laid down is that the rule of consistency applies when co-accused assigned similar roles or connected roles are granted bail, and that bail should not be withheld in non-prohibitory offences without exceptional circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to post-arrest bail on the rule of consistency when a co-accused has already been granted bail?
  • Does the grant of bail become a rule and refusal an exception for offences falling outside the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
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• Shahzad vs State and anotherPLJ 2023 SC (Cr.C.) 203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-12-06
  post-arrest bailrule of consistencynon-prohibitory offenceselectronic crimescriminal appealbail concession
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition challenged an order of the Islamabad High Court denying post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a case involving the transmission of objectionable photographs and videos. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the circumstances of the case and the principle of consistency. The Supreme Court observed that while the petitioner was found in possession of the mobile phone, the SIM card used for the alleged transmission belonged to a co-accused who had already been granted bail. Applying the rule of consistency, the Court held that the petitioner was entitled to the same concession. Furthermore, the Court noted that the offences charged did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, making the grant of bail the rule and refusal the exception. Consequently, the petition was converted into an appeal, and the petitioner was admitted to post-arrest bail, emphasizing that bail should generally be granted in non-prohibitory offences absent exceptional circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Does the rule of consistency apply when a co-accused has already been granted bail in the same case?
  • Is the grant of bail the rule and refusal the exception for offences falling outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Does the lack of a previous criminal record influence the grant of post-arrest bail in non-prohibitory offences?
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• Shahray Khan (Deceased) through LRs. and others vs Qadir Bakhsh2023 SCMR 201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-17
  life estatelimited owneralienation of propertyinheritanceconcurrent findingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding concurrent findings of lower courts dismissing the petitioners' civil revision. The core legal question revolved around whether a limited owner widow could validly alienate agricultural land to her relatives to pay off her deceased husband's alleged loan, and the proper distribution of inheritance among legal heirs. The Supreme Court held that the widow, holding a life estate without a right of alienation, failed to prove the specific particulars and amounts of the alleged loan, rendering the purported transfer invalid. The Court affirmed that upon the cessation of limited ownership under the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, the estate rightly devolved upon the primary legal heirs of the deceased, excluding collateral claimants. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts unless they are shown to be perverse, based on misreading or non-reading of evidence, or suffering from a legal defect.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a limited owner widow can validly alienate property to pay off a deceased husband's debt without proving the specific particulars and amounts of the loan?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in the absence of misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  • How does the promulgation of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962 affect a pre-existing limited estate?
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• Shahin Shah vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Irrigation Department, Peshawar and others2023 PLJ SC 155 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  arbitration awardrule of courtarbitrator misconductsubstantial compliancecomposite orderlimitation periodstay of proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that set aside a Trial Court's decree making an arbitration award a Rule of Court. The core legal questions concern the appealability of a composite order making an award a Rule of Court, whether arbitrators committed misconduct by exceeding time limits, the necessity of formal notice under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and the validity of proceedings absent a formal Section 34 stay order. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its jurisdiction and interpretation. It ruled that a composite order dismissing objections and making an award a Rule of Court is not appealable unless the decree is in excess of or contrary to the award, which was not the case here. The Court affirmed that time extensions granted by the Trial Court with party consent are valid, and the doctrine of substantial compliance applies to Section 14 notice requirements when parties are aware of proceedings. The Court emphasized that arbitration agreements must be honored, and procedural technicalities cannot be used to defeat the finality of an award after voluntary participation.

  Questions settled

  • Is a composite order of a Trial Court dismissing objections and making an arbitration award a Rule of Court appealable under the Arbitration Act, 1940?
  • Does the failure of arbitrators to file an award within the initial four-month period constitute legal misconduct if extensions were granted by the Court?
  • Can the requirement of formal notice under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 be satisfied by the doctrine of substantial compliance if the parties were present in Court?
  • Does the absence of a formal stay order under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 render arbitration proceedings illegal if the parties voluntarily participated in them?
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• Shahbaz Akmal vs The State through Prosecutor General Punjab, Lahore2023 SCP 6 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-01-05
  statutory delaybailfair trialdue processlawyers' strikeprofessional conductcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, detained in a murder case since 2018, sought bail on the ground of statutory delay under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, arguing that the trial had not concluded within the statutory period. The Supreme Court examined whether the ground of statutory delay remained available after a previous bail application on the same ground had been withdrawn. Relying on precedents, the Court held that once a bail application based on statutory delay is withdrawn, that specific ground cannot be re-agitated in a subsequent application. Consequently, the petition was found not maintainable and dismissed. However, the Court expressed concern over trial delays caused by lawyers' strikes and the absence of counsel, emphasizing that such delays infringe upon the accused's constitutional right to a fair trial and due process. The Court directed the Trial Court to conclude the trial expeditiously within two months, clarifying that the trial should not be adjourned due to the absence of the complainant's counsel or co-accused, and reiterated the professional duty of advocates to appear in court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a bail application based on statutory delay be re-agitated if a previous application on the same ground was withdrawn?
  • Does a court have the discretion to adjourn a criminal trial due to the absence of the complainant's advocate?
  • What is the duty of an advocate regarding court appearances when representing a detained accused?
  • Can a trial court proceed with a case if a co-accused is absent?
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• Shahbaz Akmal vs State through Prosecutor General Punjab, Lahore and anotherPLJ 2023 SC (Cr.C.) 117, 2023 PSC (Crl.) 98 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-01-09
  statutory delaypost-arrest bailwithdrawal of bail applicationright to fair triallawyer strikesexpeditious trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal filed by the petitioner seeking post-arrest bail in a murder case registered under FIR No. 246/18 at Police Station Gulgasht, Multan. The core legal question revolves around whether the petitioner remains entitled to statutory bail under the third proviso of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, despite having previously withdrawn a bail application after the statutory period had elapsed. The Supreme Court held that once a bail application is withdrawn during the subsistence of a statutory ground, the same ground cannot be re-urged in a subsequent application, rendering the petition not maintainable on that score as per established precedents. The Court further laid down that a detained accused must not suffer prolonged incarceration due to lawyer strikes or the absence of the complainant's advocate, emphasizing that the right to a fair trial and liberty under the Constitution must be safeguarded through expeditious trial proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a bail application on the ground of statutory delay can be repeated after a previous bail application on the same ground has been withdrawn?
  • Does the right to statutory bail subsist if a bail application is withdrawn after the completion of the statutory detention period?
  • Can a criminal trial be adjourned solely due to the absence of the complainant's advocate or co-accused?
  • What is the obligation of the trial court when a detained accused suffers prolonged incarceration due to lawyer strikes?
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• Shah Zameen vs The State2023 PSC (Crl.) 67 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-10-10
  narcoticssafe custodychemical examiner reportbenefit of doubttamperingcriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction of the appellant, Shah Zameen, under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for possession of narcotics. The trial court sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment, which was subsequently upheld by the Peshawar High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution successfully established the safe custody and transmission of the recovered narcotic samples to the Chemical Examiner, thereby proving the case beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon review, the Court observed that the prosecution failed to produce evidence regarding who delivered the sample parcels to the laboratory, and the Chemical Examiner’s report omitted the identity of the person who transported the samples. Consequently, the Court held that the safe transmission of the samples was not proven, leaving room for potential tampering. Applying the principle that the prosecution must prove its case beyond a shadow of doubt, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and acquitted the appellant by extending the benefit of doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove the safe transmission of narcotic samples to the laboratory entitle the accused to an acquittal?
  • Can a conviction be sustained under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 if the chain of custody of the recovered samples is broken?
  • Is the prosecution required to prove the identity of the person who delivered the sample parcels to the Chemical Examiner?
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