Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muhammad Bashir and another vs The State and others2023 PSC (Crl.) 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-10-31
  ocular testimonymedical evidence contradictioncapital punishmentunproven motivecriminal petitionbenefit of doubtacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses cross-petitions arising from a murder case wherein the petitioner was convicted under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, with his death sentence altered to imprisonment for life by the High Court, while a co-accused was acquitted. The core legal questions involved the reliability of ocular testimony in the face of minor medical discrepancies, the evidentiary value of an initial police investigation favouring the accused, the impact of unproven motive and inconclusive weapon recovery, and the justification for acquitting a co-accused named belatedly. The Supreme Court held that trustworthy and consistent ocular testimony alone is sufficient to sustain a capital conviction, overriding minor discrepancies with medical evidence or the absence of motive and positive forensic recovery. The Court further upheld the acquittal of the co-accused due to delayed naming and lack of initial corroboration. The key principle laid down is that reliable ocular evidence, having a ring of truth, takes precedence over medical discrepancies and can independently sustain a conviction even when motive and recovery are discarded.

  Questions settled

  • Whether trustworthy ocular evidence can prevail over medical discrepancies regarding the distance of firing?
  • Does an initial police investigation declaring an accused innocent vitiate a subsequent valid investigation and trial court conviction?
  • Can a murder conviction be sustained under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the motive and forensic recovery of the weapon are discarded?
  • Whether the High Court was justified in acquitting a co-accused whose name was introduced belatedly through a private complaint?
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• Muhammad Bashir and another vs State etc.PLJ 2023 SC (Cr.C.) 55 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-03-11
  criminal appealocular evidencemedical evidencecapital chargeappreciation of evidencebenefit of doubtmurdersentence enhancement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals against a conviction for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner challenged his conviction, while the complainant sought the enhancement of the petitioner's sentence and the reversal of a co-accused's acquittal. The core legal questions involved the reliability of ocular evidence in the presence of alleged medical discrepancies, the impact of unproven motive and negative forensic reports on a capital conviction, and the validity of an acquittal based on delayed implication. The Supreme Court held that reliable, confidence-inspiring ocular evidence suffices for conviction even if motive is unproven or forensic reports are negative. The Court affirmed that minor discrepancies in evidence do not invalidate a prosecution case if the material aspects ring true. Furthermore, the Court upheld the acquittal of the co-accused due to his delayed implication in the complaint. The key principles laid down are that ocular evidence takes precedence over medical evidence regarding distance estimations, and that the relationship of witnesses to the deceased is not a ground to discard their testimony.

  Questions settled

  • Does the relationship of prosecution witnesses to the deceased constitute a valid ground to discard their testimony?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained in the absence of a proven motive or positive forensic evidence?
  • Should ocular evidence be preferred over medical evidence when discrepancies exist regarding the distance of a gunshot?
  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused based on delayed implication in a private complaint warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
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• Muhammad Aziz @ Mana vs The State etc2023 SCP 247, 2023 SCMR 1773 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-08-23
  pre-arrest bailrule of consistencyprohibitory clausestolen propertycriminal breach of trustdelay in FIR
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, assailing an order of the Lahore High Court which denied pre-arrest bail to the petitioner in a case registered under Sections 381 and 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for allegedly purchasing stolen goods from factory employees. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail considering the rule of consistency with co-accused who had already been granted post-arrest bail, the delay in lodging the FIR, and the fact that the offense did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, granting pre-arrest bail to the petitioner. The holding establishes that where co-accused have been granted bail and the offense does not fall within the prohibitory clause, and where liberty is at stake, pre-arrest bail may be granted based on the rule of consistency and the principle that grant of bail in non-prohibitory clause offenses is a rule while refusal is an exception.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be granted based on the rule of consistency when co-accused have already been granted bail?
  • Does an offense under Section 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the merits of a case be touched upon while considering an application for pre-arrest bail?
  • Is the grant of bail the rule and refusal the exception for offenses not falling within the prohibitory clause?
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• Muhammad Atif vs The State and another2023 SCP 345, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 1, 2024 SCMR 1071 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-10-31
  post-arrest bailrule of consistencycriminal procedureright to equalitytentative assessmentprohibitory clausefurther inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's refusal to grant post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a murder case. The core legal question addressed is the benchmark for applying the "rule of consistency" when seeking bail: specifically, whether courts should compare only the roles attributed in the FIR or consider the totality of the evidence, including investigation material. The Supreme Court held that the rule of consistency is premised on the constitutional right to equality, requiring that similarly placed individuals be treated alike. However, the Court clarified that the benchmark is not merely the role attributed in the FIR but a composite assessment of the FIR and the material collected during the police investigation. Because the co-accused granted bail were found absent from the crime scene, while the petitioner was placed at the scene with incriminating evidence, the cases were not at par. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, establishing that the rule of consistency applies only when the prosecution case against the accused and the co-accused is indistinguishable in substantial aspects.

  Questions settled

  • What is the correct benchmark for applying the rule of consistency when granting bail to an accused?
  • Does the rule of consistency in bail matters require comparing only the role attributed in the FIR or the entire material collected during the investigation?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail on the rule of consistency if the material collected during the investigation distinguishes their case from that of a co-accused who was granted bail?
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• Muhammad Aslam vs The State and others2023 SCMR 397 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-12-20
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryzina-bil-jabrforensic evidencecriminal justicepersonal libertydelay in FIR
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenged the Lahore High Court's order denying post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a case involving allegations of rape and extortion. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, given the evidentiary gaps in the prosecution's case. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail, setting aside the High Court's order. The Court observed significant discrepancies, including an unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, the absence of physical injury marks on the complainant, the lack of DNA or semen grouping tests, and a forensic report indicating the alleged video evidence was created months prior to the incident, contradicting the prosecution's timeline. The Court affirmed the principle that personal liberty is a precious constitutional right that cannot be curtailed based on vague allegations, and where the prosecution's case requires further inquiry, the accused is entitled to the concession of bail pending trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay in lodging an FIR and the absence of corroborative medical evidence justify the grant of bail under the principle of further inquiry?
  • Can an accused be granted bail when forensic evidence regarding the date of creation of alleged video material contradicts the prosecution's timeline?
  • Is the statement of a victim in a rape case sufficient for conviction without independent corroboration when the prosecution's case contains material contradictions?
  • Does the failure to conduct DNA or semen grouping tests in a rape case entitle an accused to the concession of bail?
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• Muhammad Aslam etc vs Muhammad Anwar2023 SCP 182, 2024 PLJ SC 105, 2023 SCMR 1371 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-05-04
  specific performanceagreement to selltime is of the essencepleadings and proofdiscretionary relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arose from a civil suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell, wherein the plaintiff-respondent alleged that the vendor had passed away before the stipulated date of performance and that the defendants failed to complete the transaction. The core legal questions involved whether time was of the essence of the contract given the specific forfeiture clause, and whether a plaintiff could succeed by leading evidence that materially contradicted the pleadings. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff failed to prove readiness and willingness on the target date, admitted inability to pay, and dishonestly pleaded facts regarding the vendor's death, while leading oral evidence in direct contradiction to the plaint. The Court established that where an agreement stipulates a date for performance along with the specific consequence of forfeiture for non-payment, time is of the essence, and a party cannot lead evidence beyond or contradictory to its pleadings to secure the discretionary relief of specific performance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether time can be considered of the essence of a contract when a specific date for performance and consequences of non-performance are stipulated in the agreement?
  • Can a plaintiff be granted a decree for specific performance when their oral evidence stands in direct contradiction to their pleadings?
  • Is a party entitled to lead evidence beyond what has been pleaded in the plaint?
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• Muhammad Aqil vs Muhammad Amir and others2023 SCMR 1032 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-10-20
  specific performancede facto guardianminor's propertyvoid ab initioalienation of propertyIslamic Lawcontractual capacity
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute over the specific performance of a sale agreement concerning a house inherited by the Respondents, one of whom was a minor at the time of the transaction. The Appellant sought to enforce the sale agreement, claiming the minor's brother acted as a de jure guardian. The core legal question was whether a sale agreement regarding a minor's immovable property, executed by a de facto guardian, is enforceable and whether such a transaction requires formal cancellation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision. The Court held that under Islamic Law, a de facto guardian lacks the authority to alienate a minor's immovable property, rendering such a transfer void ab initio. Consequently, the transaction creates no legal effect, and the minor is under no obligation to formally challenge or set aside the void agreement upon attaining majority. The principle established is that unauthorized alienation of a minor's immovable property by a de facto guardian is void, not voidable, and requires no ratification or formal cancellation to be rendered ineffective.

  Questions settled

  • Can a de facto guardian legally alienate the immovable property of a minor?
  • Is a sale agreement of a minor's immovable property executed by a de facto guardian void or voidable?
  • Does a void transaction involving a minor's property require formal cancellation by the minor upon attaining majority?
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• Muhammad Aqil vs Muhammad Amir 86 others2023 SCP 143 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-10-20
  specific performanceminor propertyde facto guardiande jure guardianvoid transactionMuslim law
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which partially dismissed a suit for specific performance regarding a house sold when one of the co-owners, Mst. Maria Siddique, was a minor. The core legal question was whether a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property could be decreed to the extent of a minor's share sold by a de facto guardian without court permission or legal guardianship appointment. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under Islamic law, a de facto guardian has no power to transfer any right or interest in the immovable property of a minor, and such an unauthorized transfer is not merely voidable, but void ab initio. Consequently, no ratification or formal setting aside is required for a void transaction as it produces no legal effects. The Court affirmed that in the absence of proof that the brother was a de jure guardian appointed under the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 or by a court, the agreement to sell the minor's share was legally void.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit for specific performance of a sale agreement can be decreed to the extent of a minor's share sold by a de facto guardian?
  • Does a de facto guardian possess the legal authority to alienate the immovable property of a minor under Islamic law?
  • Is an agreement to sell immovable property belonging to a minor executed by a de facto guardian voidable or void ab initio?
  • Whether a void transaction regarding a minor's property requires formal cancellation or setting aside upon the minor attaining majority?
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• Muhammad Anwar vs Chairman Wapda and others2023 PSC 161 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-19
  pensionary benefitsspecial additional allowancecivil service regulationsemolumentsservice lawconditional grantsuperannuation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a civil petition for leave to appeal against a Federal Service Tribunal judgment denying the petitioner’s request to include a Special Additional Allowance in his pension calculation. The petitioner, a retired WAPDA employee, argued that this allowance, granted via a 1999 Finance Division Office Memorandum, should be reckoned as part of his emoluments. The core legal question was whether a conditional allowance, explicitly excluded from pensionable emoluments by the granting instrument, could be claimed as pensionable. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner could not selectively accept the benefits of the Office Memorandum while rejecting the restrictive condition in Clause (c) that expressly barred the allowance from being treated as emoluments for pension purposes. Relying on CSR-486 and the specific terms of the Office Memorandum, the Court affirmed that the allowance was not reckonable. The principle laid down is that government employees cannot pick and choose conditions of a grant; where an allowance is conditional, those conditions apply in their entirety, and no vested right exists to claim benefits contrary to the express terms of the governing notification.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government employee selectively accept the benefits of an Office Memorandum while rejecting the conditions attached to it?
  • Does the definition of emoluments under CSR-486 include allowances explicitly excluded by the granting authority?
  • Is a Special Additional Allowance granted under the Finance Division's O.M. No. 1(7)-Imp/99 reckonable for the purpose of calculating pension?
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• Muhammad Aslam vs The State2023 SCP 251, 2023 SCMR 2056 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-08-23
  post-arrest bailnarcotics recoveryControl of Narcotic Substances Actprohibitory clausejoint venturesupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 was filed to assail an order of the Peshawar High Court denying post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a case registered under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, involving the recovery of a huge quantity of charas, heroin, and methamphetamine from a vehicle in which the petitioner was traveling on the front seat. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail given his plea of lack of conscious knowledge and absence of personal recovery. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that a huge quantity of narcotics was recovered from a vehicle occupied jointly by the petitioner and a co-accused, both belonging to the disciplined forces, prima facie pointing towards a joint venture. The Court ruled that the offense falls within the prohibitory clause, the recovered quantity is enormous, and the petitioner is connected to the crime. Consequently, the petition was dismissed and leave to appeal refused, reinforcing the principle that bail in heinous narcotic offenses involving prohibitory clauses and huge recoveries is ordinarily declined.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused found sitting in a vehicle containing a huge quantity of narcotics can claim lack of conscious knowledge for the grant of post-arrest bail?
  • Does the recovery of massive quantities of narcotics falling within the prohibitory clause bar the grant of bail in the absence of extraordinary circumstances?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a well-reasoned High Court order denying bail in heinous narcotics cases?
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• Muhammad Ali vs The State and another2023 SCP 138 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-04-18
  post-arrest bailstatutory grounddelay in trialconduct of accusedmurderous attackSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking post-arrest bail on statutory grounds under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, assailing an order of the Lahore High Court which declined bail to the petitioner in a case registered under Sections 324, 148, 149, 337-L(i), 337-D, 337-F(v), 337-F(iii), and 336 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question is whether an accused is entitled to post-arrest bail on statutory grounds when the trial is delayed due to the conduct of the accused. The Supreme Court held that while considering bail on statutory grounds, courts must examine whether the delay is attributable to the accused or persons acting on their behalf, and bail may be lawfully declined if the accused intentionally delays the trial. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that statutory delay cannot be exploited by an accused who actively avoids the recording of evidence and obstructs the expeditious conclusion of the trial. Consequently, the petition was dismissed and leave to appeal refused.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail on statutory grounds when the delay in the conclusion of the trial is occasioned by the accused or his side?
  • Can bail on statutory delay be declined if the accused seeks repeated adjournments and avoids the recording of prosecution evidence?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court order refusing bail when the High Court has properly appreciated the material aspects and conduct of the accused?
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• Muhammad Ali vs Samina Qasim Tarar and others2023 PLJ SC 286 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-09-29
  criminal breach of trustquashing of FIRcivil liabilityconstitutional jurisdictionagreement to sellentrustmentmisappropriation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 challenged an Islamabad High Court judgment that quashed an FIR registered under Sections 406 and 448 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The dispute arose from an agreement to sell a house where the petitioner, having paid partial consideration and taken possession of part of the property, alleged that the respondents committed criminal breach of trust by selling the property to a third party. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly quashed the FIR on the ground that the dispute was purely civil in nature. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in quashing the FIR without allowing the trial to proceed, as the FIR prima facie disclosed allegations of entrustment and misappropriation. The Court established that an act does not lose its criminal nature merely because it involves civil liability. Furthermore, it held that questions regarding the existence of entrustment and misappropriation are matters of evidence to be determined by the Trial Court, not through a Constitutional petition at the pre-trial stage.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of a civil liability automatically preclude criminal prosecution for the same act?
  • Can a High Court quash an FIR in its Constitutional jurisdiction without recording evidence when the FIR prima facie discloses a criminal offence?
  • What are the essential ingredients required to constitute the offence of criminal breach of trust under Section 405 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Muhammad Akhtar Ali vs Additional Sessions Judge, Kot Addu, District2023 SCMR 711 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-01-16
  superdaritemporary custody of vehicleregistered ownercriminal breach of trustcar registration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking superdari (temporary custody) of a car involved in a criminal case registered under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns the entitlement to the temporary custody of a vehicle between the registered owner and an alleged subsequent purchaser through a car dealer where consideration was allegedly not paid. The Supreme Court held that the registered owner of the vehicle is prima facie entitled to its temporary custody unless a court of competent jurisdiction decides the title dispute, noting that a sale without a valid transfer deed from the registered owner is of no consequence for transferring ownership. The key principle laid down is that the official record of the motor vehicle registration authority establishing registered ownership creates a prima facie right to superdari in favor of the registered owner.

  Questions settled

  • Is the registered owner of a vehicle prima facie entitled to its temporary custody (superdari)?
  • Does a sale of a vehicle by an agent without a valid transfer executed by the registered owner effectively transfer ownership for superdari purposes?
  • Can temporary custody of a vehicle be granted to an alleged purchaser when the registered ownership remains with the petitioner according to the vehicle registration authority?
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• Muhammad Abbas, and Muhammad Ramzan vs The State2023 SCP 13 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-01-02
  murderprivate complaintrelated witnessesocular testimonyspur of the momentpremeditationSection 302(c) PPCsentence reduction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a private complaint case under Sections 302/148/149 PPC involving the murder of Muhammad Sarfraz. The petitioners were convicted by the Trial Court under Section 302(b) PPC and sentenced to life imprisonment, which conviction and sentence were subsequently affirmed by the High Court. The primary legal questions concerned the evaluation of ocular testimony by related witnesses, the effect of minor discrepancies, the impact of delayed weapon recovery, and whether the offense fell under Section 302(b) PPC or Section 302(c) PPC due to a sudden flare-up. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding the eyewitness account reliable and corroborated by medical evidence, while establishing that mere relationship of witnesses does not invalidate testimony. However, noting the occurrence transpired at the spur of the moment during a jirga without premeditation or repeated blows, the Court converted the conviction to Section 302(c) PPC and reduced the sentence to 14 years' rigorous imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere relationship of prosecution witnesses to a deceased person render their testimony unreliable?
  • Can minor discrepancies in witness statements due to the lapse of time shatter the prosecution's case?
  • Whether an un-premeditated attack taking place at the spur of the moment alters an offense from Section 302(b) PPC to Section 302(c) PPC?
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• Mubarik Ali Babar vs Punjab Public Service Commission through Secretary2023 PLJ SC 372, 2023 PLC (C.S.) 1049, 2023 PSC 29 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-18
  employment quotaminority rightspersons with disabilitiesaffirmative actioncarry forward quotafundamental rightsdignity
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arose from a challenge to the allocation and reservation of employment quotas for religious minorities and persons with disabilities (PWDs) in the Combined Competitive Examination conducted by the Punjab Public Service Commission. The petitioner sought a direction that any unfilled seats within these special quotas should be made available to general merit candidates. The core legal question was whether unfilled quota seats reserved for marginalized classes can be transferred to the open merit category. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that seats earmarked for minorities and PWDs must be retained and carried forward. The Court ruled that transferring these seats to the general quota would violate constitutional values, fundamental rights, and the Principles of Policy. The Court emphasized that the constitutional scheme guarantees equality of status, opportunity, and inviolable dignity to all citizens, mandating affirmative action and reasonable accommodation for PWDs and minorities. Additionally, the Court directed public authorities to discontinue the use of the word "disabled" in favor of "persons with disabilities" or "persons with different abilities."

  Questions settled

  • Whether vacancies reserved for minorities and persons with disabilities can be transferred to the general open merit quota if they remain unfilled in a recruitment cycle?
  • Does the constitutional guarantee of equality and dignity protect the reservation and carrying forward of employment quotas for marginalized classes?
  • What is the legal status of the term 'disabled' in official correspondence and public advertisements under Pakistani law?
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• Mubarik Ali Babar vs Punjab Public Service Commission through its2023 SCMR 518 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-18
  minority quotapersons with disabilitiesconstitutional valuespublic service recruitmentequality of opportunityfundamental rightscarry forward ruleinclusive governance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a constitutional petition challenging the reservation of seats for minorities and persons with disabilities (PWDs) in the Combined Competitive Examination (CCE) conducted by the Punjab Public Service Commission. The petitioner questioned the legality of these quotas and sought a declaration that if such seats remain unfilled in a given year, they should be converted to open merit. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the reservation of seats for minorities and PWDs is a constitutional mandate rooted in the principles of equality of status, opportunity, and social justice. The Court held that these quotas are non-negotiable and cannot be converted to open merit; rather, they must be carried forward to ensure the legitimate interests of these groups are protected. The Court emphasized that constitutional values of inclusion and dignity require the State to provide reasonable accommodation to bridge systemic barriers. Furthermore, the Court directed that the term 'disabled' be discontinued in official correspondence and replaced with 'persons with disabilities' or 'persons with different abilities' to uphold the dignity of such individuals.

  Questions settled

  • Can seats reserved for minorities and persons with disabilities in public service be converted to open merit if they remain unfilled in a particular year?
  • Does the Constitution of Pakistan mandate the reservation of quotas for minorities and persons with disabilities in government employment?
  • Is the use of the term 'disabled' in official government notifications and advertisements legally permissible?
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• Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen and another vs Shafqat Ali Kiyani and another2023 SCMR 246 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-03
  dissolution of marriagemental crueltyKhuladowerrestitution of conjugal rightsappreciation of evidenceconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a matrimonial dispute where the petitioner (wife) sought dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty. While the Family Court decreed the suit as prayed, the Appellate Court modified the decree, converting the dissolution to Khula and directing the return of dower (gold), a decision subsequently upheld by the High Court. The core legal question concerned the definition and proof of mental cruelty and the scope of appellate interference in findings of fact. The Supreme Court held that mental cruelty encompasses a course of conduct causing such anguish that it renders the matrimonial tie unendurable, including false accusations of infidelity and financial coercion. The Court observed that the Appellate Court erred by substituting its own presumptions for the Trial Court's evidence-based findings. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court and Appellate Court judgments, restoring the Family Court's decree. The ruling establishes that proved cruelty precludes the conversion of a decree to Khula and protects the wife's right to retain dower in such circumstances.

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• Mst. Shahida Siddiqa, Allied Bank Limited through its President, etc vs Allied Bank Limited through its President, etc, Mst. Shahida Siddiqa2023 SCP 359, 2024 SCMR 92, 2024 PLC 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-14
  service lawproportionality of punishmentcompulsory retirementback benefitsmisconductnegligencebank employeedisciplinary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This service matter appeal concerns the proportionality of a disciplinary penalty imposed on a bank employee dismissed for negligence. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in modifying the Labour Court’s decision—which had reinstated the employee in a lower grade—to one of compulsory retirement. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s imposition of compulsory retirement was disproportionate and harsh, particularly given the appellant’s twenty-eight-year unblemished service record and the absence of proven embezzlement. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s judgment, restored the Labour Court’s decision of reinstatement in a lower grade, and further modified the order to grant the appellant back benefits. The key principle laid down is that disciplinary penalties must be proportionate to the degree of moral culpability associated with the offence. The Court emphasized that extreme penalties for acts of negligence, especially for long-serving employees, are contrary to the reformatory concept of punishment in the administration of justice and fail to balance the gravity of the wrong with the individual's service history.

  Questions settled

  • Is a penalty of compulsory retirement proportionate for a bank employee found guilty of negligence but not embezzlement?
  • Does the principle of proportionality require that disciplinary punishment reflect the degree of moral culpability?
  • Can a court modify a disciplinary penalty to be more severe than that imposed by the Labour Court and Appellate Tribunal?
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• Mst. Rabia Gula and others vs Muhammad Janan and others2023 PLJ SC 185 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-25
  limitation periodfraud and limitationgift mutationsale mutationactual denial of rightrevenue record entriesburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the judgment of the Peshawar High Court setting aside concurrent judgments of the trial and appellate courts and decreeing the respondent's suit. The core legal questions involved whether a challenge to a 32-year-old gift mutation was barred by limitation under the Limitation Act 1908, and whether a subsequent sale mutation was validly proved. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the challenge to the gift mutation was barred by time, as the original donor had lived for 23 years after taking possession of the gifted property, constituting an actual denial of rights, and the respondent as legal heir could not claim a fresh period of limitation without proving the predecessor's ignorance of fraud under Section 18 of the Limitation Act 1908. However, the Court upheld the High Court's finding invalidating the sale mutation due to the beneficiary's failure to prove the essential ingredients of the sale transaction and payment of consideration. The appeal was partially allowed, dismissing the suit regarding the gift mutation and decreeing it regarding the sale mutation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for challenging a fraudulent transaction restart from the date of knowledge of the legal heir when the original predecessor had knowledge or lived during the period?
  • Does taking over possession of property on the basis of a gift or sale mutation constitute an actual denial of proprietary rights for the purpose of limitation?
  • Can the benefit of Section 18 of the Limitation Act 1908 be invoked without specific assertions and particulars of fraud pleaded in the plaint?
  • What is the evidential burden required to prove a sale transaction and sale mutation when the purported seller denies the transaction in court?
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• Mst. Musarat Parveen vs Muhammad Yousaf and others2023 SCP 252, 2024 PLJ SC 322, 2023 SCMR 1665, 2023 PLJ SC 586 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-05
  civil petitionlimitationcondonation of delaydue diligencegood faithspecific performancedeclaration
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a suit for declaration, specific performance, permanent injunction, and consequential relief. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondents. Instead of filing an appeal, the petitioner, who was an active party to the suit, filed an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which was dismissed. The petitioner's subsequent appeal was dismissed as time-barred, and the High Court dismissed the civil revision. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the concurrent findings, holding that Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is inapplicable to a party who actively participated in and had knowledge of the suit. The Court reiterated that the law of limitation is not a mere technicality but a foundational legal principle designed to bar stale claims. Condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 is discretionary and requires a diligent, day-by-day explanation of the delay, which the petitioner failed to provide.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who actively participated in and had knowledge of a suit challenge the decree under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 instead of filing a regular appeal?
  • Whether time spent pursuing an incorrect remedy before a wrong forum can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 without proving good faith and due diligence?
  • Is the law of limitation a mere technicality, or does it serve as a foundational legal impediment to stale claims?
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• Mst. Jameela Bibi (Deceased) through LRs vs Mst. Fatima Bibi (Deceased)2023 SCMR 485 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-01-19
  civil revisionlimitation periodrestoration of petitionnon-prosecutionresiduary articledismissal in default
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the limitation period applicable to an application for the restoration of a civil revision petition dismissed for non-prosecution. The High Court had dismissed the petitioner's restoration application, incorrectly applying the thirty-day limitation period prescribed for appeals under Article 168 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the thirty-day limitation period for appeals or suits applies to civil revisions, or if a different period governs. The Supreme Court held that the Limitation Act, 1908 does not contain a specific article governing the restoration of civil revisions dismissed in default. Consequently, the Court ruled that the residuary provision, Article 181 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908, applies, which provides a limitation period of three years from the date the right to apply accrues. The Court set aside the impugned order, noting that the petitioner's application was filed well within this three-year period. The Court also highlighted the legislative anomaly regarding the disparate limitation periods for restoring suits and appeals versus civil revisions.

  Questions settled

  • What is the limitation period for filing an application for the restoration of a civil revision dismissed for non-prosecution?
  • Does Article 168 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to the restoration of civil revisions?
  • Which article of the Limitation Act 1908 governs applications for which no specific period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Schedule?
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• Mst. Jameela Bibi (decd) through LRs vs Mst. Fatima Bibi (decd) through LRs2023 SCP 29 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-01-19
  civil revisionrestoration applicationlimitation perioddismissal for non-prosecutionresiduary articleprocedural law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which dismissed an application for the restoration of a civil revision on the ground of limitation. The civil revision had been dismissed for non-prosecution, and the subsequent restoration application was filed after a delay. The High Court had erroneously applied Article 168 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908, which governs appeals, to the civil revision. The Supreme Court examined the statutory framework and held that since the Limitation Act, 1908 does not provide a specific article for the restoration of a civil revision dismissed in default, the residuary provision, Article 181 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908, applies. Consequently, the period of limitation for such an application is three years, not thirty days. The Court set aside the impugned order, allowed the appeal, and noted the legislative anomaly regarding the disparate limitation periods for restoring suits, appeals, and civil revisions, suggesting this distinction warrants future consideration.

  Questions settled

  • What is the limitation period for filing an application for the restoration of a civil revision dismissed for non-prosecution?
  • Does Article 168 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to the restoration of a civil revision?
  • Which article of the Limitation Act 1908 governs applications for which no specific period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Schedule?
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• Mst. Hajira Bibi alias Seema and others vs Abdul Qaseem and another2023 SCMR 870 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-02-06
  abetmentconspiracybenefit of the doubtcriminal appealmurderWhatsApp voice messagesre-appraisal of evidenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction of the appellants for abetment in the murder of the deceased under sections 302(b)/34 read with section 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial court convicted the appellants and sentenced them to death, which was subsequently altered to imprisonment for life by the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution had successfully established the essential ingredients of abetment and conspiracy against the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly in the absence of evidence regarding the time, date, and place of the conspiracy, and whether the WhatsApp voice messages relied upon constituted sufficient proof of the offence. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the convictions, holding that the prosecution failed to prove the foundational ingredients of abetment under section 107 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, such as instigation, engagement in conspiracy, or intentional aid. The court reaffirmed the principle that any reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case must be resolved in favor of the accused as a matter of right, granting the appellants the benefit of the doubt and directing their immediate release.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential ingredients required to establish the offence of abetment under Section 107 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does mere communication or conversation through electronic messages without proof of active complicity constitute the offence of criminal conspiracy and abetment?
  • Whether the failure of the prosecution to prove the exact time, date, and place of an alleged conspiracy entitles the accused to the benefit of the doubt?
  • What is the extent of proof required to sustain a conviction for abetment under Section 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the principal crime is committed by another?
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• Mst. Hajira Bibi @ Seema and others vs Abdul Qaseem and anotherPLJ 2023 SC (Cr.C.) 93 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  abetment of murdercriminal conspiracybenefit of doubtburden of proofcriminal appealacquittalsufficiency of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellants for the abetment of murder under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution provided sufficient evidence to establish the essential ingredients of abetment, specifically conspiracy and intentional aid, to sustain the conviction. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the necessary elements of abetment, as the evidence—primarily WhatsApp voice messages—did not demonstrate active complicity or criminal intent. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants, granting them the benefit of the doubt. The Court reaffirmed that abetment requires active participation and specific intent; mere concurrence or negligence is insufficient for culpability. Furthermore, it established that the burden of proof rests entirely on the prosecution, and if a single circumstance creates a reasonable doubt in a prudent mind regarding the accused's guilt, the benefit of that doubt must be extended to the accused as a matter of right, not grace.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential ingredients required to establish the offence of abetment under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does mere concurrence in the criminal acts of another without active participation constitute the offence of abetment?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of the doubt if only a single circumstance creates reasonable uncertainty regarding their guilt?
  • Can a conviction for abetment be sustained based solely on speculative evidence regarding the existence of a conspiracy?
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• Mst. Hajira Bibi @ Seema and Mst. Shaina Hameed, Abdul Qaseem vs Abdul Qaseem and another, The State2023 SCP 47 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  abetmentconspiracybenefit of the doubtcriminal appealmurderwhatsapp messagesacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction of the appellants for the abetment of murder under Section 302(b)/34 read with Section 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which was modified on appeal by the High Court from death to imprisonment for life. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution had successfully established the essential ingredients of abetment—namely instigation, engagement in a conspiracy, or intentional aid—beyond a reasonable doubt based on the circumstantial evidence and WhatsApp audio transcripts presented. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the convictions, holding that the prosecution failed to prove any overt act or conclusive evidence satisfying the requirements of abetment under Section 107 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, thereby entitling the accused to the benefit of the doubt. The key principle laid down is that the liability of an abettor requires active complicity and fulfillment of specific statutory ingredients, and any reasonable doubt arising from insufficient or speculative evidence must be resolved in favor of the accused as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential ingredients required to establish the offense of abetment under Section 107 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Whether the liability of an abettor is co-extensive with that of the principal offender in the absence of conclusive proof of conspiracy?
  • Does the mere existence of voice messages on a social media application constitute sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for abetment to murder?
  • When is an accused entitled to the benefit of the doubt in a criminal trial?
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• Mst. Ghazala vs The State and another2023 SCMR 887 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-02-22
  post-arrest bailwomen accusedprohibitory clausefirst provisoQatl-i-amddiscretionary bailcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a woman accused of murdering her husband in connivance with a co-accused, sought leave to appeal against the Peshawar High Court's refusal to grant post-arrest bail. The Supreme Court examined whether the petitioner was entitled to bail under the first proviso to Section 497(1) of the Cr.P.C. The Court held that while the offence of Qatl-i-amd falls within the prohibitory clause, the first proviso places women, children under sixteen, and sick or infirm persons in a category where bail is the rule and refusal is an exception. The Court clarified that for such protected categories, bail can only be refused if there is a likelihood of the accused absconding, tampering with evidence, or repeating the offence. Finding that the prosecution failed to establish any of these exceptions, and noting that the strength of incriminating evidence is not a relevant consideration for discretionary bail under the proviso, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and granted bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a woman accused of an offence falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) Cr.P.C. is entitled to bail as a matter of rule?
  • What are the specific exceptions that justify the refusal of bail to a woman accused under the first proviso to Section 497(1) Cr.P.C.?
  • Is the availability of incriminating material a relevant consideration when exercising discretionary power to grant bail under the first proviso to Section 497(1) Cr.P.C.?
  • Does the first proviso to Section 497(1) Cr.P.C. equate the power of the court to grant bail in prohibitory cases with its power in non-prohibitory cases for specific classes of persons?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghazala vs The State & another2023 SCP 66 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-02-22
  post-arrest bailwomen accusedprohibitory clausemurderstatutory provisobail exceptions
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a Peshawar High Court order that denied her post-arrest bail in a murder case registered under Sections 302, 325, 200, 201, 182, 109, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and Section 15 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act 2013. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether a female accused is entitled to bail under the first proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that the first proviso places female, minor, and sick or infirm accused persons on equal footing with those accused of non-prohibitory offences, making the grant of bail the rule and its refusal the exception. The Court reiterated that bail for such accused persons can only be refused under three established exceptions: likelihood of absconding, tampering with evidence, or repeating the offence. Finding no such exceptions applicable, and clarifying that the presence of incriminating material is irrelevant to this discretionary analysis, the Court allowed the appeal and granted bail.

  Questions settled

  • How does the first proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 affect the court's discretion to grant bail to a female accused in offences falling under the prohibitory clause?
  • What are the established legal exceptions that justify the refusal of bail to an accused covered by the first proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the availability of sufficient incriminating material connecting the accused to the offence a relevant consideration when exercising discretionary power to grant bail under Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Mst. Ghazala vs State and anotherPLJ 2023 SC (Cr.C.) 238 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-02-22
  post-arrest bailwomen accusedprohibitory clausediscretionary powerbail exceptionscriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court order denying post-arrest bail to a female petitioner accused of murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, as a woman, was entitled to bail despite the offence falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Supreme Court held that under the first proviso to Section 497(1), Cr.P.C., bail for women, minors, and infirm persons is the rule, and refusal is the exception, regardless of the offence's category. The Court clarified that the existence of incriminating material is not a relevant consideration for bail under this proviso. The Court established that bail may only be refused if there is a likelihood of the accused absconding, tampering with evidence, or repeating the offence. Finding no such risks in the petitioner's case, the Court allowed the appeal, granted bail, and set aside the High Court's order, emphasizing that the trial court retains the power to cancel bail if the concession is misused.

  Questions settled

  • Is the existence of incriminating material a relevant consideration for granting bail to a woman accused under the first proviso to Section 497(1), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the first proviso to Section 497(1), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, make the grant of bail to a woman accused a rule rather than an exception?
  • What are the specific exceptions that justify the refusal of bail for a woman accused under the first proviso to Section 497(1), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Mst. Faheeman Begum (deceased) through L.Rs and others vs Islam-ud-2023 SCP 241, 2024 PLJ SC 75, 2024 PLJ SC 326, 2023 SCMR 1402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-05-03
  TamleekRevisional jurisdictionLocus standiMutationFraud and forgeryLimitationMisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside concurrent findings of lower courts regarding a disputed Tamleek (gift) mutation. The appellants (plaintiffs) sought to invalidate a 1981 mutation, alleging fraud and forgery, asserting the donor had not appeared before revenue authorities. The core legal questions concerned whether the High Court correctly exercised its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and whether the plaintiffs had locus standi to challenge the mutation long after the donor's death. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court properly exercised its revisional power to correct the lower courts' misreading of evidence. The Court affirmed that where a donor does not challenge a mutation during their lifetime, heirs lack locus standi to challenge it on vague allegations of fraud. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that allegations of fraud require specific pleadings under Order VI, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and that a suit filed fifteen years after the mutation was clearly time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the authority to reverse concurrent findings of lower courts in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Do legal heirs have locus standi to challenge a mutation on allegations of fraud if the donor did not challenge it during their lifetime?
  • Is a specific description of fraud required in the plaint under Order VI Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Asiya vs The State and another2023 SCMR 383 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-18
  Post-arrest bailAbetmentMurderCall Data RecordSuckling babyWelfare of minorRule of consistencyFurther inquiryConstitutional petitionWoman accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition, filed under Article 185(3) of the Constitution, challenged a Peshawar High Court order denying post-arrest bail to the petitioner, accused of abetment in a murder case under sections 302/34/297/201/203 PPC. The core legal questions involved the sufficiency of evidence for abetment, the inconclusive nature of Call Data Records, the entitlement to bail due to a suckling infant, and the application of the rule of consistency given a co-accused's bail. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and granted post-arrest bail. The Court held that Call Data Record is not conclusive evidence without concrete material, the welfare of a suckling child is incompatible with jail life, and the rule of consistency dictates similar treatment for co-accused on similar footing. The petitioner's case fell within Section 497(2) Cr.P.C. for further inquiry and also under the first proviso to Section 497(1) Cr.P.C. as a woman.

  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Asiya vs State and anotherPLJ 2023 SC (Cr.C.) 83 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-18
  post-arrest bailabetmentrule of consistencysuckling babyfurther inquirycall data recordwomen bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition arising out of an order passed by the Peshawar High Court whereby post-arrest bail was denied to the petitioner, a woman accused of abetment in a murder case registered under Sections 302, 34, 297, 201, and 203 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions involved whether the ingredients of abetment were prima facie satisfied, the evidentiary value of Call Data Records without concrete supporting material, the applicability of the rule of consistency given that a co-accused had been granted bail, and the entitlement of a female accused with a suckling child to post-arrest bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and set aside the High Court's order, granting bail to the petitioner. The court held that where essential ingredients of abetment are missing, Call Data Records are inconclusive, a co-accused has already been released, and the accused is a woman having an infant child in jail, her case falls within the scope of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, warranting the grant of post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Call Data Records alone serve as conclusive evidence to establish the guilt of an accused for the purpose of bail in the absence of concrete corroborative material?
  • Does the detention of a suckling infant in jail with an accused mother justify the grant of post-arrest bail?
  • Whether an accused woman whose case falls under the first proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is entitled to bail when the essential ingredients of abetment are prima facie missing?
  • Can a petitioner claim the benefit of the rule of consistency when a principal co-accused has already been granted post-arrest bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Mr. Moeez Ahmed Khan vs Application in respect of Property Dispute2023 SCP 347, 2024 PLD 251 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-14
  Human Rights Cellsuo motu jurisdictionchamber proceedingsSupreme Court Rulesfundamental rightsfair trialadministrative orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from an application regarding a property dispute and a complaint addressed to the Human Rights Cell of the Supreme Court, involving allegations examined by a former Chief Justice in chambers. The core legal question was whether the Chief Justice or a judge in chambers could summon private parties, activate law enforcement agencies, or exercise judicial powers outside open court and without statutory or constitutional backing. The Supreme Court held that neither the Chief Justice nor any judge in chambers can pass orders beyond what is provided for in the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, and that proceedings conducted outside judicial forums, including those by the Human Rights Cell, possess no legal effect and are ultra vires the Constitution. The key principles laid down are that the Human Rights Cell has no independent judicial or coercive powers and merely serves to process complaints for consideration in accordance with law, and that administrative or chamber proceedings cannot infringe upon fundamental rights to due process and a fair trial.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Chief Justice or a Judge of the Supreme Court in chambers summon parties and direct investigations outside of open court proceedings?
  • Does the Human Rights Cell of the Supreme Court possess the legal jurisdiction to perform judicial functions or issue binding orders and summons?
  • How are matters received by the Human Rights Cell required to be processed under the Constitution and the Supreme Court Rules, 1980?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Sibtain Khan and others vs Election Commission of Pakistan2023 SCP 211, 2023 SCMR 2165 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-04-04
  election commission of pakistanconstitutional petitiongeneral electionjudicial reviewelectoral timelinearticle 224article 218(3)fundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an order by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) postponing the general election for the Punjab Assembly beyond the 90-day period mandated by Article 224(2) of the Constitution. The core legal question was whether the ECP possesses the constitutional power to unilaterally extend election dates based on claims of financial or security constraints. The Supreme Court held that the ECP’s order was unconstitutional, void ab initio, and without lawful authority. The Court ruled that the ECP’s constitutional duty under Article 218(3) to conduct elections fairly does not confer a power to override the mandatory timelines set by Article 224. The Court emphasized that constitutional duties cannot be conflated with powers to negate other constitutional provisions. Furthermore, the Court clarified that while the ECP may seek assistance from executive authorities under Article 220, it cannot use perceived lack of support as a justification to abandon its constitutional mandate. The judgment established that the ECP is not immune from judicial review and must adhere strictly to constitutional timeframes for holding elections.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Election Commission of Pakistan have the power to extend the date of general elections beyond the 90-day period stipulated in the Constitution?
  • Can the Election Commission of Pakistan use its duty under Article 218(3) to override other constitutional provisions regarding election timelines?
  • Is the Election Commission of Pakistan immune from judicial review regarding its decisions to alter election schedules?
  • Does the Election Commission of Pakistan have the authority to unilaterally abandon a notified election program under the Elections Act, 2017?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Sibtain Khan and others vs Election Commission of Pakistan2023 SCP 115 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-04-14
  election fundingFederal Consolidated Fundconstitutional mandateState Bank of Pakistangeneral electionsexpenditure authorizationex post facto approval
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the implementation of a prior court order regarding the provision of funds for general elections to the Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assemblies. The core legal question was whether the Federal Government and the State Bank of Pakistan could immediately release Rs. 21 Billion to the Election Commission of Pakistan for the purpose of holding these elections, and whether such expenditure was constitutionally permissible. Upon reviewing presentations from the State Bank and the Ministry of Finance, the Court determined there were no financial or procedural impediments to the release of these funds. Consequently, the Court directed the State Bank of Pakistan and the Ministry of Finance to ensure the sum of Rs. 21 Billion was made available to the Election Commission by increasing the relevant expenditure ceiling by the specified deadline. The Court affirmed the principle that under Article 84 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, the Federal Government is authorized to make expenditures from the Federal Consolidated Fund for new services not included in the Annual Budget Statement, subject to subsequent ex post facto approval by the National Assembly.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Federal Government authorized to make expenditures from the Federal Consolidated Fund for new services not included in the Annual Budget Statement?
  • Can the Court direct the State Bank of Pakistan and the Ministry of Finance to release funds for the purpose of holding general elections?
  • Does the expenditure of funds for holding general elections require ex post facto approval from the National Assembly under the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Sibtain Khan & others vs Election Commission of Pakistan thr. Chief Election Commissioner, Islamabad and others2023 SCP 88 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-03-27
  Election Commission of Pakistanpolling dateconstitutional interpretationgeneral electionsfundamental rightsdemocratic system
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a constitutional petition challenging an order issued by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) on 22.03.2023, which effectively annulled the polling date previously fixed by the President of Pakistan. The petitioners contend that the ECP lacks the constitutional or legal authority to unilaterally alter a polling date set by the President under Section 57(1) of the Elections Act, 2017 and Article 112 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The ECP purportedly relied on Article 254 of the Constitution to justify the delay. The Court observed that Article 254 provides post facto protection for acts performed beyond prescribed time limits but does not grant prior authorization for delaying constitutional obligations. Emphasizing that timely elections are essential for the democratic system and fundamental rights of the public, the Court issued notice to the respondents to address the legal and factual questions raised regarding the ECP's authority and the validity of the grounds cited for postponing the elections to 08.10.2023. The matter was adjourned for further hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Election Commission of Pakistan have the authority to annul a polling date fixed by the President of Pakistan?
  • Does Article 254 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 provide prior authorization for delaying constitutional obligations?
  • Is the postponement of general elections a matter of public importance affecting fundamental rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Boota (Deceased) through L.Rs., and others vs Mst. Fatima2023 SCMR 1901 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-08-22
  succession to tenancycolonization landsharia lawcustomary lawinheritance of femaleslimitation and co-sharersbahawalpur tenancy
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment resolves two civil appeals concerning succession to tenancy rights under the Abadkari Scheme in Bahawalpur, where female legal heirs claimed their inheritance shares, which had been denied under Section 20 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912. The core legal question was whether succession to the tenancy of the original allottee, who died prior to 1951, is governed under Section 20 of the Colonization Act or by Sharia law. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that even prior to the insertion of Section 19-A into the Colonization Act in 1951, Muslim personal law (Sharia) governed succession to agricultural land and tenancies in the State of Bahawalpur by virtue of the West Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948 and related statutory provisions, overriding customary law and Section 20. The Court laid down that inheritance rights of female heirs cannot be defeated by erroneous revenue mutations or limitation pleas when co-sharers are defrauded or denied their legitimate shares, and that Section 2-A of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act, 1962 ensures Sharia law applies retrospectively to settle succession disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether succession to a tenancy under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, is governed by Section 20 or by Sharia law when the original tenant died prior to 1951?
  • Did the West Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948 apply to the State of Bahawalpur to govern succession to agricultural land and tenancies according to Muslim personal law?
  • Does limitation run against a female co-heir who has been denied her inheritance rights and deprived of her share by family members?
  • What is the legal effect of an erroneous inheritance mutation sanctioned in favour of male heirs contrary to the Sharia law of inheritance?
  Read full judgment →
• Mianland Husnain pakistan Limited, Hassan Naseem, Lt. General (R) Saeed2023 SCP 35 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-01-26
  Pakistan Railwaysland managementpublic interestrevenue generationencroachmentjudicial orderslease policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the management and utilization of vast tracts of land owned by the Pakistan Railways Organization. The core legal question addressed is whether the Railways Organization may utilize its land for revenue generation and public purposes, notwithstanding previous judicial orders restricting such use to operational purposes only. The Court held that while the protection of Railways land from encroachment is paramount, the Organization may lease land for up to five years, provided the nature of the land remains unchanged, consistent with the Court's earlier order dated 04.01.2019. Furthermore, the Court permitted the utilization of such land for public works initiated by Government bodies. The key principle laid down is that while the Railways Organization must seek explicit legislative or regulatory approval from the Federal Government and Parliament for any developmental schemes or changes in land use, it retains the authority to manage and utilize land for revenue generation and public benefit, provided such activities do not alter the fundamental nature of the land or violate public interest.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Pakistan Railways Organization lease its land for revenue generation purposes without changing the nature of the land?
  • Is the Pakistan Railways Organization permitted to utilize its land for public works initiated by Government bodies?
  • What is the required procedure for the Pakistan Railways Organization to implement developmental schemes on its land?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Azam Waheed, Shehzad Waheed, Azam Waheed vs The Collector of Customs through Additional Collector of Customs, Karachi2023 SCP 167, 2023 SCMR 1068, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 11, 2023 PTD 1571, 2023 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  customs valuationtransactional valuevaluation rulingprovisional assessmentexhaustion of alternate remediesinterlocutory ordersmerger of orderscustoms appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This batch of civil petitions for leave to appeal arises from a common judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which had set aside an order of the Customs Appellate Tribunal and restored lower forum decisions upholding the assessment of imported ceramic tiles based on Valuation Ruling No. 216 of 2010. The petitioners imported tiles from China, and the customs authorities rejected their transactional values in favor of the valuation ruling. The petitioners challenged the valuation ruling via writ petitions in the Islamabad High Court, securing provisional release of their goods via interim orders, but the petitions were eventually dismissed for lack of territorial jurisdiction. The core legal questions involved the applicability of transactional value under Section 25 of the Customs Act, the effect of alternate statutory remedies such as Section 25D, and whether the limitation period for finalizing provisional assessments under Section 81 applies when goods are released under court stay orders. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the petitioners failed to exhaust the adequate alternate remedy of review under Section 25D, that interim orders do not survive the final dismissal of proceedings, and that the valuation ruling remained intact.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 can be invoked when an adequate alternate statutory remedy under Section 25D of the Customs Act 1969 is available?
  • Whether calculation sheets issued for the payment of duties can be independently challenged as appealable orders under Section 193 of the Customs Act 1969?
  • Whether the statutory limitation period under Section 81 of the Customs Act 1969 for finalizing provisional assessments applies when proceedings are prolonged due to interim stay orders granted by a court?
  • Whether interlocutory and interim orders survive the final dismissal of the original proceedings in a writ petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Sadiq Poultry (Pvt.) Ltd vs Government Of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa2023 PLD Supreme Court 236 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-09-27
  suo motu jurisdictionArticle 199trichotomy of powersprice fixationexport prohibitionpolicy mattersFederal Legislative List
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a High Court order issuing directions regarding the pricing and export of livestock, dairy, and poultry products. Aggrieved by High Court orders banning exports and establishing a pricing formula, a poultry company sought constitutional remedy before the Supreme Court. The core legal questions addressed were whether a High Court possesses suo motu jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, whether it can intervene in executive policy matters like commodity pricing, and whether it can issue orders regarding export restrictions. The Supreme Court set aside the impugned order, holding that High Courts lack suo motu powers under Article 199, unlike the Supreme Court under Article 184(3). The Court emphasized the constitutional principle of trichotomy of powers, ruling that fixing commodity prices and regulating imports or exports fall strictly within executive domain. Furthermore, import and export regulation is a federal subject under Item No. 27 of the Federal Legislative List and Section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950, which High Courts cannot transgress.

  Questions settled

  • Does a High Court possess suo motu jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Can a High Court fix product pricing formulas or intervene in executive policy matters under Article 199?
  • Does a Provincial High Court have jurisdiction to order restrictions or bans on the import and export of goods?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan Wapda Foundation vs The Collector Of Customs,/Sales2023 PTD 111 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-12-08
  central excise dutysales taxmanufacturereclamation of transformer oiltaxable supplybailmentstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment upholding tax authorities' decisions to levy excise duty and sales tax on the appellant for reclaiming used transformer oil for WAPDA. The core legal questions were whether this reclamation process constituted 'manufacture' under the Central Excises Act, 1944, and the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and whether the appellant was liable for such taxes. The Supreme Court held that while the reclamation process qualifies as 'manufacture' under the expansive definition in the Central Excises Act, the appellant, acting as a service provider under a contract of bailment, was not the 'manufacturer' liable for excise duty. Regarding the Sales Tax Act, the Court held that the definition of 'manufacture' is narrower and excludes mere repair or reconditioning; thus, the activity did not constitute a taxable supply. The Court established that tax liability under these statutes requires the entity to meet the specific statutory definition of a 'manufacturer' or 'taxable supplier,' which the appellant did not satisfy. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the concurrent findings of the lower forums.

  Questions settled

  • Does the reclamation of used transformer oil constitute 'manufacture' under the Central Excises Act, 1944?
  • Is a service provider who reclaims goods under a contract of bailment liable as a 'manufacturer' under the Central Excises Act, 1944?
  • Does the process of reclaiming used transformer oil constitute 'manufacture' within the meaning of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Can a person be charged with sales tax on a supply if they do not fall within the statutory definition of a manufacturer or taxable supplier?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan Wapda Foundation vs The Collector of Customs, Sales Tax, Lahore and others2023 SCMR 79 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-12-08
  excise dutysales taxreclamation of transformer oilmanufacturetaxable supplycontractual servicesbailment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment upholding concurrent orders of tax authorities that subjected the appellant, Messrs Pakistan WAPDA Foundation, to excise duty and sales tax for the reclamation of used transformer oil. The core legal questions were whether the reclamation process constituted 'manufacture' under the Central Excises Act, 1944, and the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and whether the appellant was liable as a 'manufacturer' for these taxes. The Supreme Court held that while the definition of 'manufacture' in the Central Excises Act is expansive enough to include 'reconditioning' or 'repair', the appellant was merely a service provider performing work on goods owned by WAPDA, which remained the owner throughout. Consequently, WAPDA, not the appellant, held the capacity of the manufacturer. Furthermore, under the Sales Tax Act, the definition of 'manufacture' is narrower and does not encompass the mere reclamation/repair of transformer oil. The Court established that tax liability under these statutes attaches to the manufacturer, not the service provider, and set aside the lower forums' orders, ruling that the appellant was not liable for the assessed taxes.

  Questions settled

  • Does the reclamation of used transformer oil constitute 'manufacture' under the Central Excises Act, 1944?
  • Does the reclamation of used transformer oil constitute 'manufacture' under the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Is a service provider who performs work on goods owned by another party liable for excise duty or sales tax as a 'manufacturer'?
  • Can the Parliament legislate on 'services' under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 prior to the 18th Constitutional Amendment?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan Wapda Foundation vs Collector of Customs, Sales Tax, Lahore and others2023 PLJ SC 226 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  reclamation of transformer oilmanufacturetaxable supplyexcise dutysales taxbailmentservice providerstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the taxability of transformer oil reclamation services performed by the appellant for WAPDA. The core legal question was whether the reclamation process constituted 'manufacture' under the Central Excises Act, 1944, and a 'taxable supply' under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The Supreme Court held that the appellant, acting under a contract of bailment, was merely a service provider and not a 'manufacturer' within the meaning of either statute. The Court distinguished the expansive definition of 'manufacture' in the Central Excises Act, 1944, from the Sales Tax Act, 1990, noting that while the former includes 'repair' or 'reconditioning,' the appellant’s role remained that of a service provider rather than a manufacturer of excisable goods. Furthermore, the Court determined that the reclamation process did not transform the oil into a new, distinct product, thus failing to meet the criteria for a 'taxable supply' under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Consequently, the Court set aside the concurrent findings of the lower forums, ruling that the appellant was not liable for the assessed excise duty or sales tax.

  Questions settled

  • Does the reclamation of used transformer oil constitute 'manufacture' under the Central Excises Act, 1944?
  • Is the reclamation of used transformer oil a 'taxable supply' under the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Does a service provider performing reclamation work under a contract of bailment qualify as a 'manufacturer' for the purposes of excise duty?
  • Can the Parliament levy sales tax on services under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 prior to the 18th Amendment?
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• Messrs Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. vs Collector of Customs, Karachi2023 PTD 241 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-04
  customs dutyrefund claimunjust enrichmentrebuttable presumptionfiscal statutetelecommunication equipmentretrospective application
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd., challenged the judgment of the High Court of Sindh which upheld the rejection of its refund claims for over-paid customs duty on imported telecommunication equipment. The customs authorities had rejected the claims on the grounds that the appellant failed to produce the required concessionary certificates under SRO 457(1)/2004 at the time of import, and failed to rebut the presumption under Section 19A of the Customs Act, 1969, that the tax burden was passed on to consumers. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal. It held that the appellant had factually fulfilled the conditions of SRO 457(1)/2004 by producing the certificates during the adjudicatory proceedings. Furthermore, the Court ruled that Section 19A of the Customs Act, 1969, establishes a rebuttable presumption of procedural nature, which applies retrospectively. However, the substantive doctrine of unjust enrichment and the presumption of passing on the duty under Section 19A only apply to 'such goods' sold directly or indirectly, and cannot be extended to capital equipment installed for providing services, as fiscal statutes must be interpreted strictly without reading in additional words.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a rebuttable presumption under Section 19A of the Customs Act, 1969, is procedural or substantive in nature, and whether it applies retrospectively to pending refund proceedings?
  • Whether the presumption of passing on the incidence of customs duty to buyers under Section 19A of the Customs Act, 1969, applies to imported capital equipment installed and used by an importer for providing services rather than being sold as goods?
  • Can additional words or implications, such as extending 'price of such goods' to include 'services provided by using such goods', be read into a fiscal statute?
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• Messrs Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd vs Collector Of Customs, Karachi2023 SCMR 261 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-04
  customs dutyrefund claimunjust enrichmentrebuttable presumptionfiscal statutetelecommunication equipment
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which had upheld the rejection of the appellant's refund claims for over-paid customs duty on imported telecommunication equipment. The customs authorities had rejected the claims on the grounds that the appellant failed to produce concessionary certificates at the time of filing Goods Declarations under SRO 457(I)/2004, and failed to rebut the presumption under Section 19A of the Customs Act, 1969, that the tax burden was passed on to consumers. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, holding that the appellant had factually fulfilled the conditions of the SRO by producing the required certificates during the adjudicatory proceedings. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the statutory presumption under Section 19A and the common-law doctrine of unjust enrichment apply only where the imported goods are sold to third parties. Since the appellant installed and utilized the equipment in its own telecommunication infrastructure, the presumption of passing on the tax incidence did not apply, and the language of the fiscal statute could not be stretched to include services.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a rebuttable presumption under Section 19A of the Customs Act 1969 is procedural or substantive in nature, and whether it applies retrospectively?
  • Does the presumption of passing on the incidence of customs duty under Section 19A of the Customs Act 1969 apply to capital goods and equipment installed for the importer's own service project rather than sold to third parties?
  • Can the words 'or of services provided by using such goods' be read into Section 19A of the Customs Act 1969 under the principles of interpreting fiscal statutes?
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• Messrs Pak Suzuki Motors Company Limited through Manager vs Faisal2023 PLD Supreme Court 482 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-05-23
  consumer protectionmanufacturing defectexpert evidencelimitation periodcause of actionpleadings and evidenceadmission of co-defendant
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged the concurrent findings of the Consumer Court and the High Court, which had allowed the respondent's claim for a refund and compensation due to alleged defects in a purchased vehicle. The Supreme Court examined whether the claim was barred by limitation and whether the alleged defects were legally proven. The Court held that parties are bound by their pleadings, and evidence concerning specific defects not mentioned in the consumer claim or legal notice could not be considered. Furthermore, the Court ruled that where technical manufacturing defects are alleged, the onus of proof lies on the consumer to produce expert evidence under Section 30(1)(c) of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005, rather than relying solely on a non-expert's statement. Additionally, the admission of a co-defendant is not binding on another defendant. On limitation, the Court resolved conflicting jurisprudence, declaring that the thirty-day limitation period under Section 28(4) of the Act commences the moment the consumer obtains knowledge of the defect, and the statutory pre-suit notice must be served within this timeframe. The appeal was allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party can lead or rely on evidence regarding facts that were not specifically pleaded in their consumer claim?
  • On whom does the onus of proof lie to establish technical manufacturing defects under the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005?
  • Is the admission of a co-defendant binding upon another defendant in a consumer protection dispute?
  • When does the thirty-day limitation period for filing a consumer claim under Section 28(4) of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 commence?
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• Messrs Middle East Construction Company, Karachi vs The Collector of Customs, Karachi2023 SCMR 838 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-02-16
  customs dutyappellate jurisdictionquestion of lawimport policyfact-findingCustoms Appellate Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the import of four prime movers by the appellant, which were detained by Customs authorities on the grounds that they were classified as trucks and violated the age limit under the Import Policy Order, 2016. The Customs Appellate Tribunal ruled in favor of the appellant, but the High Court reversed this decision, having conducted its own independent investigation into the nature of the vehicles by accessing a manufacturer's website. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its appellate jurisdiction under the Customs Act, 1969, could re-determine factual findings made by the Tribunal and introduce new evidence not presented before the lower forums. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, holding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by acting as a fact-finding body. The Court affirmed that the Tribunal is the final forum for factual determination and that the High Court's jurisdiction is strictly limited to questions of law. Consequently, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the Tribunal's decision was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the jurisdiction to re-determine factual findings made by the Customs Appellate Tribunal?
  • Can the High Court introduce new evidence, such as website data, not presented before the adjudicating officer or the Tribunal?
  • Is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969 limited to questions of law?
  • What is the effect of a pre-shipment inspection certificate on the burden of proof in customs classification disputes?
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• Messrs DW Pakistan (Private) Limited, Lahore vs Begum Anisa Fazl-i-Mahmood and others2023 SCMR 555 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-12-08
  specific performanceagreement to sellbalance sale considerationreadiness and willingnesscheque encashmentprofit bearing accountstale chequediscretionary reliefrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This Civil Petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property. The Trial Court ordered status quo subject to the deposit of the balance sale consideration. The petitioner tendered a cheque with a bank statement, but the Trial Court merely directed its safe custody without encashment. The High Court, in revision, directed the Trial Court to deposit the cheque in a profit-bearing account. The Supreme Court evaluated whether submitting a cheque without encashment constitutes valid tender or proves the vendee's continuous readiness, willingness, and capacity to perform their obligation. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the remedy of specific performance is discretionary and requires persistent readiness and willingness under Section 24 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. The Court laid down that merely holding an unencashed cheque is insufficient as it risks becoming stale under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and fails to demonstrate financial capacity or good faith. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does submitting a negotiable instrument without encashment constitute a valid tender demonstrating readiness and willingness in a suit for specific performance?
  • Is a Trial Court required to direct the encashment and investment of a deposited cheque for balance sale consideration in a profit-bearing account during the pendency of a specific performance suit?
  • Does non-encashment of a cheque tendered in court risk rendering it a stale instrument under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, thereby defeating the purpose of demonstrating financial capacity?
  • Must the Court provide reasonable time and specify the consequences of non-compliance when ordering the deposit of balance sale consideration in a specific performance suit?
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• Mehtab Publication (Pvt.) Ltd vs Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory2023 SCP 147, 2023 PLJ SC 475, 2023 SCMR 1174 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-05-26
  restoration of petitionnon-prosecutioncase fixationAdvocate-on-Recordprocedural complianceSupreme Court Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for the restoration of a civil petition that was previously dismissed for non-prosecution. The petitioner sought restoration on the grounds that neither the petitioner nor their counsel received notification regarding the case's fixation date. The Supreme Court examined the procedural requirements for notifying parties of case fixation, noting that under the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, the official method involves supplying the cause list to the Advocate-on-Record (AOR), while notices are served to petitioners-in-person. The Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that this established procedure was breached or that the cause list was absent. Furthermore, the application lacked an affidavit from the AOR to substantiate the claim of non-notification, and failed to explain why the AOR, who is responsible for the case, did not appear. Consequently, the Court found no sufficient grounds to restore the petition and dismissed the application, emphasizing that the burden lies on the applicant to prove procedural failure when seeking restoration of a dismissed matter.

  Questions settled

  • What is the official procedure for notifying counsel regarding the fixation of a case in the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
  • Is an application for restoration of a petition dismissed for non-prosecution maintainable without an affidavit from the Advocate-on-Record?
  • Does the failure of an Advocate-on-Record to inform a client of a hearing date constitute sufficient ground for restoration of a dismissed petition?
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• Mehr Noor Muhammad vs Nazir Ahmed2023 SCP 365, 2024 CLD 193, 2024 PLD SC 45 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-06
  promissory noteadmissibility of evidenceStamp Actnon est factumburden of proofnegotiable instrumentcircumstantial evidenceforgery
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit based on a promissory note, where the plaintiff claimed recovery of money, while the defendant alleged forgery, asserting that blank thumb-marked papers were misused. The trial and appellate courts dismissed the suit, citing issues with the promissory note's admissibility regarding witness production and stamp cancellation. The Supreme Court addressed whether the promissory note was admissible and whether it was validly executed. The Court held that promissory notes do not require attestation, and once a document is admitted into evidence, Section 36 of the Stamp Act, 1899, precludes any subsequent challenge to its admissibility based on stamping. However, the Court affirmed the dismissal on merits, finding that the defendant successfully rebutted the presumption of consideration. By examining the physical evidence—specifically the ink overlap—the Court concluded the document was a forgery created from blank papers. The judgment establishes that while procedural admissibility cannot be challenged post-admission, the substantive validity of a negotiable instrument remains subject to proof when challenged by a plea of non est factum.

  Questions settled

  • Does the non-production of an attesting witness render a promissory note inadmissible in evidence?
  • Can the admissibility of a document be challenged on the ground of improper stamping after it has been admitted into evidence?
  • Does the presumption of consideration under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, apply when a defendant pleads non est factum?
  • Is a promissory note required to be attested by witnesses to be valid?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehmood Khan and others vs Sara Akhtar2023 SCP 333, 2024 SCMR 178, 2024 PLJ SC 319 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-10-26
  sale mutationsburden of prooffraudadverse presumptionconstructive possessioncivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal challenged concurrent judgments of the lower courts regarding the declaration and cancellation of six sale mutations. The core legal questions concerned the burden of proof regarding the validity of sale mutations and the consequences of failing to testify regarding the sale consideration. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the concurrent findings against the petitioners. The Court held that the burden of proving the validity of sale mutations rests squarely upon the beneficiaries, and their failure to discharge this burden, coupled with the failure to testify, constitutes fraud. The Court affirmed that under the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, the burden of proof lies on the party asserting the transaction (Article 115), and an adverse presumption (Article 129(g)) arises against a party who fails to produce material evidence or testify regarding the consideration of a disputed sale. Furthermore, the Court recognized the principle of constructive possession in cases where the owner was unaware of fraudulent mutations.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proving the validity of a sale mutation lie upon the beneficiary of the transaction?
  • Can an adverse presumption be drawn against a party who fails to testify regarding the payment of sale consideration?
  • Is constructive possession sufficient to maintain a suit for declaration and cancellation of sale mutations?
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• Meeru Khan vs Mst. Naheed Aziz Siddiqui & others2023 SCP 304, 2024 PLJ SC 331, 2023 PLD Supreme Court 912 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-09-13
  court fee deficiencySection 149 CPClimitationprocedural justicesecond appealsubstantial justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a civil petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order that dismissed a Second Appeal as time-barred, despite the petitioner having previously paid the requisite court fee pursuant to the court's own order. The core legal question was whether an appeal can be dismissed as time-barred after the court has exercised its discretion under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to allow the payment of deficient court fees, and such payment has been duly made. The Supreme Court held that Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is a beneficial provision intended to facilitate justice rather than obstruct it. Once a court grants time to make up a deficiency in court fees and the litigant complies within the stipulated period, the document is deemed to have been filed with the correct fee from the outset. Consequently, the High Court’s dismissal was erroneous. The Court reaffirmed that procedural technicalities should not be used to defeat substantive rights, and that courts must ensure substantial justice is served rather than penalizing litigants for procedural deficiencies that have been rectified.

  Questions settled

  • Does the payment of deficient court fees within the time granted by the court under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 relate back to the date of the initial filing?
  • Can an appellate court dismiss an appeal as time-barred after it has already granted time to make up a court fee deficiency and the appellant has complied with that order?
  • What is the scope of the court's discretion under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding the payment of deficient court fees?
  • Is a court required to provide an opportunity to make up a deficiency in court fees before rejecting a plaint or appeal?
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• Meera Shafi vs Ali Zafar2023 PLD Supreme Court 211 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-21
  Video conferencingRecording evidenceCivil procedureCross-examinationUpdating construction of statutesInherent powers of courtQanun-e-Shahadat OrderCode of Civil ProcedureVirtual attendanceAccess to justice
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court considered whether the evidence of a witness not physically present in court can be recorded in a civil case via video conferencing within the existing legal framework. The case arose from a defamation suit where the petitioner, residing in Canada, sought to complete her cross-examination virtually. The Court held that the word "attendance" in Rule 4 of Order XVIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, includes "virtual attendance" through video conferencing, applying the principle of "updating construction" of statutes to adapt law to technological advancements. It further ruled that courts can exercise inherent powers under Section 151 of the C.P.C. and Article 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, to allow such evidence when necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process, particularly to avoid unreasonable delay, expense, or inconvenience. The Court allowed the petitioner's application, setting aside the lower courts' orders, and clarified that guidelines for video conferencing are discretionary.

  Questions settled

  • Can evidence of a witness who is not physically present in court be recorded in a civil case by using video conferencing within the existing legal framework?
  • Does the word "attendance" used in Order XVIII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 include "virtual attendance" through video conferencing?
  • Can a court make an order for the virtual attendance of a witness in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the term "evidence" in Article 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, include oral evidence of a witness that may become available because of modern techniques like video conferencing?
  • What conditions must courts consider when exercising discretion to allow recording of evidence through video conferencing?
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• Masood Ahmad Bhatti and another vs Khan Badshah and another2023 SCP 378, 2024 SCMR 168, 2024 PLJ SC 292 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-16
  specific performanceagreement to sellreadiness and willingnesssale considerationcontractual obligationsdiscretionary reliefvendor and vendee
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment upholding a decree for specific performance of an agreement to sell commercial property. The core legal question was whether the vendors were justified in refusing the balance sale consideration on the grounds that the pay orders were issued by third parties rather than the vendee's personal account, and whether the vendee demonstrated sufficient readiness and willingness to perform. The Supreme Court held that the agreements contained no stipulation requiring payment exclusively from the vendee's personal account. The Court found that the vendee had consistently demonstrated readiness and willingness by arranging the necessary funds and depositing them in court upon the vendors' refusal to accept payment. Consequently, the Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts, ruling that the vendors' refusal was unjustified and the vendee was entitled to specific performance. The principle laid down is that a vendee seeking specific performance must demonstrate readiness and capability to fulfill contractual obligations, and where a vendor refuses to accept payment, the vendee must deposit the consideration in court to satisfy the requirement of readiness.

  Questions settled

  • Does an agreement to sell require the vendee to pay the sale consideration exclusively from their personal bank account in the absence of an express contractual clause?
  • What is the legal consequence when a vendor refuses to accept the balance sale consideration offered by the vendee?
  • Is the deposit of the balance sale consideration in court sufficient to establish the vendee's readiness and willingness for the purpose of specific performance?
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• Maskeen Ullah and another vs The State and another2023 SCMR 1568, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 54 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-06-14
  qatl-i-amddeath sentencemitigating circumstancesabscondenceocular accountmedical evidenceacquittal of co-accuseddelay in FIR
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal matter arises from a jail petition and a connected petition for enhancement of sentence concerning a conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for qatl-i-amd. The core legal questions involve the reliability of related ocular witnesses, the effect of delay in lodging the FIR and conducting the post-mortem, the corroborative value of abscondence, and whether the acquittal of a co-accused warrants identical relief for the principal offender, alongside the validity of mitigating circumstances for reducing a death sentence to imprisonment for life. The Supreme Court held that prompt lodging of the FIR explained any initial delay, that related eyewitnesses were consistent and reliable when corroborated by medical evidence and unexplained abscondence, and that the acquittal of a co-accused attributed with no overt acts does not benefit the active assailant. Furthermore, unestablished motive and lack of crime empty recoveries are recognized mitigating circumstances justifying the commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of close relatives as eye-witnesses can be relied upon in the absence of previous enmity or motive to falsely implicate the accused?
  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused who caused no injury entitle the principal offender to claim the same benefit of acquittal?
  • Can unestablished motive and absence of crime empty recoveries serve as valid mitigating circumstances for reducing a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Does unexplained and willful abscondence of an accused corroborate the ocular account of the prosecution?
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• Market Committee, Multan through its Chairman and another vs Additional Commissioner (Consolidation), (In all cases) Multan and others2023 SCP 266, 2023 SCMR 1683 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-06-13
  market committeeallotment cancellationdefault in paymentremandestoppelacquiescenceapprobate and reprobateconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comprises twenty-nine civil petitions for leave to appeal directed against a common judgment of the Lahore High Court, which disposed of writ petitions filed by the Market Committee regarding the cancellation of plots and shops in the New Fruit & Vegetable Market, Multan. The core legal question involved the legality of the cancellation of plot allotments due to prolonged defaults in payment by allottees, alongside the effect of the Market Committee subsequently accepting payments without demur during the litigation. The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed no irregularity or perversity in setting aside the cancellation orders and remanding the matter to the Chairman of the Market Committee to determine outstanding dues, surcharges, and penalties after affording a right of audience. The Court laid down the principle that public bodies cannot approbate and reprobate by accepting payments during proceedings while simultaneously pursuing cancellation, and their delayed, cavalier actions coupled with the acceptance of payments without objection attract the doctrines of estoppel and acquiescence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Market Committee cancel plot allotments for non-payment after delaying action for years and accepting payments from defaulters without objection?
  • Whether the High Court can properly resolve disputed facts and reconcile accounts in constitutional jurisdiction or if remanding the matter to the competent authority is appropriate?
  • Does the acceptance of outstanding dues by a public body during pending litigation amount to a waiver of the right to cancel an allotment?
  • How do the doctrines of estoppel and acquiescence apply to the conduct of public bodies in commercial allotment disputes?
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• Maqsood Alam, Mukhtar Ahmed, complainant vs The State etc.,Maqsood Alam etc2023 SCP 332, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 72, 2024 SCMR 154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  criminal appealbenefit of the doubtocular accountmedical evidencecorroborationprivate complaintmurderacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition challenged a High Court judgment that maintained the petitioner's conviction for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner's conviction could be sustained based solely on the testimony of eye-witnesses when that same evidence had been rejected by the trial court regarding a co-accused, and when medical and documentary evidence contradicted the prosecution's narrative. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court observed that the ocular account was inconsistent with medical evidence regarding the firing distance and contradicted by the complainant's attendance records. Furthermore, since the eye-witnesses were disbelieved regarding the acquitted co-accused, their testimony required independent corroboration to convict the petitioner, which was absent. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the petitioner, reiterating the principle that any doubt in the prosecution's case must be resolved in favor of the accused, and that conviction must rest on unimpeachable, trustworthy evidence rather than speculative accounts.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained on the testimony of eye-witnesses if that same testimony has been rejected by the trial court regarding a co-accused?
  • Does a contradiction between medical evidence and the ocular account regarding the firing distance cast sufficient doubt to warrant acquittal?
  • Is independent corroboration required to convict an accused when the primary eye-witnesses are deemed unreliable regarding other co-accused?
  • Does the benefit of the doubt apply to an accused when the prosecution's case lacks unimpeachable and trustworthy evidence?
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• Manzar Abbas, Farhan Nazar vs District Police Officer, Sargodha, etc.2023 SCP 301, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 45, 2023 SCMR 2111 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-06-15
  disciplinary proceedingsservice appealmisconductcriminal acquittaldue processpolice servicedepartmental inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a service appeal filed by two police officers challenging their dismissal from service following disciplinary proceedings. The core legal questions were whether an acquittal in a criminal case precludes departmental proceedings on the same charges, and whether the departmental inquiry against the petitioners was conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court, by a majority, held that an acquittal in a criminal trial does not serve as an absolute bar against disciplinary proceedings, as departmental and criminal proceedings may proceed concurrently, and the result of one does not necessarily impinge upon the other. The Court affirmed that while an acquittal may be considered during disciplinary proceedings, it cannot be the sole determining factor. The majority found that the petitioners' unauthorized use of a private vehicle while in uniform and the subsequent abuse of their official position constituted gross misconduct, justifying their dismissal. The principle laid down is that disciplinary action for misconduct is independent of the outcome of criminal proceedings, provided the departmental inquiry is based on sufficient material and evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does an acquittal in a criminal trial preclude departmental disciplinary proceedings on the same charges?
  • Can departmental and criminal proceedings proceed concurrently against a civil servant?
  • Is an acquittal in a criminal case the sole determining factor in deciding the outcome of disciplinary proceedings?
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• Malik Tariq Mahmood and others vs Province of Punjab and others2023 PLJ SC 121 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  land acquisitioncompensation enhancementmarket value determinationpotential valuecommercial landlocal commission reportfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding the assessment of adequate compensation for land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act 1894. The appellants' land had been categorized as agricultural/Ghair Mumkin Chapper and awarded minimal compensation by the Land Acquisition Collector and the Reference Court. The High Court enhanced the rate to Rs. 20,000 per marla but rejected the claim that the land itself was commercial. The Supreme Court held that in determining market value under Section 23(1) of the Act, courts must evaluate potential future beneficial uses and surrounding local developments, rather than strictly relying on present use or revenue entries. Recognizing fundamental rights under Article 24 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, the Court emphasized that local commission reports under Order XXVI Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 provide vital evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court partially allowed the appeal, declaring the land commercial based on its surroundings and enhancing compensation to Rs. 40,000 per marla pursuant to official rates and statutory caps under Section 25.

  Questions settled

  • How should the market value of acquired land be determined under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 when evaluating its potential non-agricultural use?
  • Can land be classified as commercial for compensation purposes based on surrounding developments even if not used commercially at the time of acquisition notification?
  • What weight and evidentiary status must courts attach to a local commissioner's report prepared pursuant to Order XXVI Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in land acquisition cases?
  • Does Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 prevent a court from awarding land acquisition compensation higher than the amount claimed by the landowner?
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• Malik Muhammad Tahir vs State and anotherPLJ 2023 SC (Cr.C.) 18 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-09-22
  post-arrest bailagreement to sellprohibitory clausefrauddishonoured chequefurther inquiryoverseas Pakistani
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, seeking post-arrest bail in a criminal case registered under Sections 420, 468, 471, 406, and 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, relating to an allegedly fraudulent agreement to sell agricultural land. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail given that some of the offences did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and whether his case warranted further inquiry under Section 497(2). The Supreme Court held that the non-application of the prohibitory clause is not an absolute rule for granting bail and depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Finding sufficient oral and documentary evidence connecting the petitioner to the deprivation of the overseas Pakistani complainant's wealth and noting the petitioner's subsequent refusal to return the owed money, the Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal. The key principle established is that exemption from the prohibitory clause is not absolute for the grant of bail, and courts must evaluate the specific facts and conduct of the accused, particularly when vulnerable overseas citizens are defrauded.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the rule that offences falling outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.P.C. entitle an accused to bail is absolute?
  • Does an unfulfilled promise to refund misappropriated amounts justify withholding post-arrest bail?
  • Whether a case involving allegations of fraud and deprivation of property of an overseas Pakistani warrants further inquiry under Section 497(2) Cr.P.C.?
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• M. Hamad Hassan vs Mst. Isma Bukhari and 2 others2023 SCP 197, 2023 SCMR 1434, 2023 PLJ SC 593 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-07-17
  Civil Petition for Leave to AppealConstitutional jurisdictionArticle 199 of the ConstitutionFamily lawDowerMaintenance allowanceDowry articlesFactual findingsScope of judicial reviewMisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition concerning a family court's decree for dower, maintenance, and dowry articles. The core legal question addressed was the permissible scope of the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, specifically regarding its power to interfere with factual findings of lower courts. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court erred by adjudicating on facts in its constitutional jurisdiction, which is not meant to be a substitute for an appeal or revision. The Court reiterated that the High Court's role under Article 199 is limited to correcting jurisdictional errors and procedural improprieties, ensuring proper administration of justice, and not to re-examine or reconsider facts already decided by lower courts. Interference is permissible only on limited grounds such as misreading or non-reading of evidence, arbitrary orders, or patent errors of law/fact leading to a miscarriage of justice, but not to re-evaluate facts or substitute the appellate court's opinion. The legislature's intent for finality in family litigation after appellate court decisions was emphasized.

  Read full judgment →
• M Taimoor Ali vs The State through P.G. Punjab and another2023 SCP 371, 2024 SCMR 209, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 87 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-28
  criminal petitionwithdrawal of petitionfresh ground for bailalternate remedynomenclature of the court
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order where the petitioner's counsel did not press the petition to approach the Supreme Court, mistakenly believing a fresh ground for bail required a withdrawal. The core legal question concerned the propriety of withdrawing a petition when a fresh ground for relief allegedly arises. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition as withdrawn as the counsel opted to avail an alternate remedy, while reiterating the established legal position that if a fresh ground becomes available, counsel should insist on a decision on merits rather than withdrawing. Additionally, the Court observed that the use of the prefix 'august' before the Supreme Court is incorrect, emphasizing that the institution should be referred to strictly as the Supreme Court of Pakistan as designated in the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Should a petition be withdrawn when a fresh ground becomes available prior to the passing of an order?
  • Can a counsel insist on a decision on merits when a new ground for relief arises?
  • What is the correct constitutional designation of the Supreme Court of Pakistan without prefixes?
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• Liaquat Ali Khan vs Muhammad Akram & another2023 PLJ SC 641 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-07-07
  specific performancereadiness and willingnessagreement to sellequitable remedyburden of proofcontractual breachimmovable property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that dismissed the appellant’s suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell property. The core legal question was whether the plaintiff had established readiness and willingness to perform their contractual obligations, particularly the payment of the second installment. The Supreme Court, by a majority, affirmed the High Court’s decision, holding that the plaintiff failed to discharge the burden of proving the availability of funds to meet the payment obligation. The Court reasoned that specific performance is an equitable remedy under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, and is not granted automatically. Furthermore, the Court noted that the agreements contained no clause obliging the defendant to obtain a No Objection Certificate (NOC) before transfer, and the plaintiff failed to prove the defendant’s breach. The key principle laid down is that a plaintiff in a specific performance suit must affirmatively prove their financial readiness and willingness to perform essential terms, and equitable relief may be denied where the plaintiff fails to demonstrate such capacity or where equities favor the defendant.

  Questions settled

  • Does a plaintiff in a suit for specific performance bear the burden of proving the availability of funds to pay the sale consideration?
  • Is a court obligated to grant specific performance merely because the contract is lawful?
  • Does the failure of a seller to obtain a No Objection Certificate constitute a breach of contract where the agreement contains no such express obligation?
  Read full judgment →
• Liaqat University of Medical and Health Sciences (Lumhs) Jamshoro2023 SCP 387, 2024 PLJ SC 347, 2024 SCMR 443 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-12-06
  medical admissionforged documentsprovisional admissionjudicial interferenceeducational institutionsclean hands doctrineacademic discipline
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court order that set aside the cancellation of a student's admission to a medical university. The core legal question was whether a university is justified in cancelling a student's provisional admission upon discovering that the academic credentials submitted for admission were forged or fabricated. The Supreme Court held that the university acted lawfully in cancelling the admission, as the student had submitted a fake mark sheet, and the university's disciplinary actions were within its regulatory authority. The Court emphasized that educational institutions must maintain high standards and possess the autonomy to regulate admissions and discipline without judicial interference, provided no fundamental rights are violated. Furthermore, the Court invoked the principle that those seeking equitable relief must come with clean hands, noting that the student could not benefit from his own illegal act of submitting forged documentation. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and upheld the university's decision to cancel the admission.

  Questions settled

  • Can a university cancel a student's provisional admission upon discovering the submission of forged academic credentials?
  • To what extent should courts interfere in the internal disciplinary and administrative affairs of educational institutions?
  • Does the doctrine of clean hands preclude a student from seeking judicial relief when admission was secured through forged documents?
  Read full judgment →
• Lal Jan vs The State2023 SCMR 1009 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-12-01
  narcotics recoverychain of custodyforensic science laboratorybenefit of doubtcriminal appealsafe transmission
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner Lal Jan impugned the judgment of the Peshawar High Court which dismissed his appeal against conviction under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, resulting in a sentence of 25 years simple imprisonment and a fine. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the case and noted a fatal flaw in the prosecution's evidence: the police constable responsible for transmitting the sample parcels to the Forensic Science Laboratory was never produced at trial to establish safe transmission, leaving an unexplained gap in the chain of custody. Relying on established precedents, the Court held that failure to prove safe custody and transmission of narcotics samples creates a serious doubt in the prosecution's case. Consequently, the Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, set aside the impugned judgment, and acquitted the appellant on the benefit of doubt. The key principle laid down is that non-production of the official who transmitted narcotics samples to the laboratory breaks the chain of safe custody, entitling the accused to the benefit of doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to produce the official who transported narcotics samples to the forensic laboratory break the chain of custody?
  • Can an accused be acquitted of a narcotics offense when the safe transmission of the recovered substance is not established?
  • Does the non-production of the courier constable entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• Lakson Tobacco Company Limited and others vs NWFP through Secretary2023 PLJ SC 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  tobacco development cessfiscal statute interpretationlegislative competenceprovincial taxationultra virestobacco quotaregulatory fee
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a Peshawar High Court judgment upholding the validity of the Tobacco Development Cess levied under the North West Frontier Province Finance Act, 1999. The appellants challenged the levy on grounds of legislative competence, arguing that the Province lacked authority to tax tobacco, and contended that the term 'tobacco quota' used in the Act was vague, rendering the tax unenforceable. The Supreme Court addressed whether the levy was unconstitutional, whether the legislative field was occupied by Federal law, and whether the fiscal statute suffered from fatal ambiguity. The Court held that the levy was constitutional, reaffirming that the Provincial Assembly has the prerogative to impose such a cess for development purposes within the province. It further held that the term 'tobacco quota' was sufficiently clear when read in the context of the regulatory framework governing tobacco purchases. The Court affirmed the principle that fiscal statutes should be saved rather than destroyed where possible, and that the cess, being in the nature of a fee, was validly imposed for the benefit of the industry and growers.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Tobacco Development Cess levied under the North West Frontier Province Finance Act, 1999, unconstitutional?
  • Does the term 'tobacco quota' in the North West Frontier Province Finance Act, 1999, provide a sufficiently certain basis for the levy of a cess?
  • Can a provincial legislature impose a development cess on tobacco production without encroaching on federal legislative domains?
  • Is a levy that is collected for a specific development purpose in the nature of a fee rather than a tax?
  Read full judgment →
• Lakson Tobacco Company Limited and others vs NWFP through Secretary2023 SCMR 33 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-09-13
  tobacco development cessprovincial fiscal powerfee versus taxstrict construction of fiscal statutesconstitutional petitiontobacco quota
  Summary & questions settled

  These four appeals assail a judgment of the Peshawar High Court upholding the levy of the tobacco development cess introduced under the North West Frontier Province Finance Act, 1999. The core legal questions involved the constitutionality of the cess, whether it encroached upon the Federal legislative domain, whether fiscal statutes were void for vagueness regarding the taxable event and taxpayer, and whether the reference to a tobacco quota fixed by the Pakistan Tobacco Board was unceasingly enforceable. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the tobacco development cess is in the nature of a fee rather than a tax, as the proceeds are specifically utilized for the development of tobacco-growing areas and the benefit of stakeholders, and that its imposition by the Provincial Assembly is constitutionally valid. The key principle laid down is that fiscal levies exacted for a specific regulatory or developmental purpose conferring a direct advantage to the payers constitute a fee within the Provincial legislative competence, and fiscal statutes must be construed fairly to give effect to the legislative intent without defeating operational provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the levy of a tobacco development cess by a Provincial Assembly is ultra vires the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Does a development cess levied for specific developmental services in a particular sector qualify as a fee rather than a tax?
  • Can a fiscal statute be declared void for vagueness when it references targeted requirements or quotas established under regulatory rules?
  • Does the imposition of a provincial tobacco development cess conflict with federal legislative domains under the Federal Legislative List?
  Read full judgment →
• Kiramat Khan vs Ig, Frontier Corps and others2023 SCMR 866 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-08-18
  condonation of delaylimitationSection 14 Limitation Actvoid orderFederal Service TribunalFrontier Corpsdue diligencegood faith
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan was directed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, which dismissed the petitioner's service appeal in limine as time-barred. The core legal questions pertained to whether the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908 for pursuing a remedy before a wrong forum, whether delay in filing a departmental appeal could be condoned without a formal application, and whether the law of limitation applies to an allegedly void order. The Supreme Court held that since the law regarding the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal for Frontier Corps employees was settled in 2004, the petitioner failed to show due diligence or good faith in approaching the High Court. Furthermore, limitation runs even against a void order, and every day of delay must be explained with a valid application for condonation. Finding no question of law of public importance under Article 212(3) of the Constitution, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Is a litigant entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908 when pursuing a remedy before a wrong forum despite settled law regarding jurisdiction?
  • Does the law of limitation apply to an order that is alleged or claimed to be void?
  • Can delay in filing a time-barred departmental or service appeal be condoned without a formal application explaining each day's delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan Afsar vs Mst. Qudrat Jan widow and others2023 PLJ SC 456 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-03-10
  redemption of mortgagelimitation periodmortgagor and mortgageeconcurrent findingssupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from concurrent findings of three courts below and revenue authorities regarding a property dispute involving the redemption of a mortgaged property. The core legal question centered on the commencement of the sixty-year period of limitation for a mortgagor to redeem a mortgaged property under Article 148 of the Limitation Act, 1908, specifically whether limitation begins from the date of the mortgage creation or from the expiry of the fixed term of the mortgage. The Supreme Court held that where a mortgage is for a fixed term, the right of redemption and the consequent sixty-year limitation period accrue only upon the expiry of that fixed term, rather than from the date of creation. The Court laid down the principle that the commencement of the limitation period for redemption depends strictly on the terms of the mortgage agreement regarding fixed dates or periods, and where a twenty-year term was fixed, limitation commenced upon the expiration of that twenty-year period. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • When does the period of limitation for a mortgagor to redeem a mortgaged property commence under Article 148 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • Does the limitation period for redeeming a mortgage start from the date of the mortgage creation or from the expiry of the fixed term of the mortgage?
  • What is the starting point of limitation for redemption when a specific date is fixed for payment of the mortgage debt?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan Afsar vs Mst. Qudrat Jan widow and others, Abdul Latif and others2023 SCP 101 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-03-10
  mortgage redemptionlimitation periodaccrual of cause of actionfixed term mortgageconcurrent findingsproperty law
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged concurrent findings of lower courts regarding the limitation period for a redemption suit of mortgaged property. The core legal question was whether the sixty-year limitation period under Article 148 of the Limitation Act, 1908, commences from the date of the mortgage's creation or from the expiry of the fixed term of the mortgage. The Supreme Court held that the cause of action for redemption accrues only when the right to redeem becomes exercisable under the terms of the mortgage agreement. The Court clarified that where a mortgage has a fixed term, the limitation period begins upon the expiry of that term, not the date of the mortgage's creation. Applying this principle, the Court found that since the twenty-year mortgage term expired in 1955, the respondents' suit filed in 2010 was well within the sixty-year limitation period. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, finding no illegality in the lower courts' concurrent findings, and affirmed that the commencement of limitation depends strictly on the specific terms of the mortgage agreement.

  Questions settled

  • When does the limitation period for a suit for redemption of mortgaged property commence under Article 148 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Does the limitation period for redeeming a mortgage with a fixed term begin from the date of the mortgage's creation or the expiry of the term?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by lower courts in a property dispute?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan Afsar vs Mst. Qudrat Jan (widow) and others2023 PLD Supreme Court 359 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-03-10
  mortgage redemptionlimitation periodfixed-term mortgageaccrual of cause of actionimmovable property
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged concurrent findings of lower courts regarding the limitation period for a suit for redemption of mortgaged property. The core legal question was when the sixty-year limitation period under Article 148 of the Limitation Act, 1908, commences for a mortgage with a fixed term. The petitioner argued limitation began from the date of the mortgage creation, while the respondents contended it began upon the expiry of the mortgage term. The Supreme Court held that the cause of action for redemption accrues only when the right to redeem arises under the terms of the mortgage agreement. Consequently, where a mortgage has a fixed term, the limitation period commences upon the expiry of that term, not the date of the mortgage's creation. Applying this principle, the Court found the respondents' suit was filed within the sixty-year limitation period following the expiry of the twenty-year mortgage term. The Court affirmed the lower courts' findings, dismissing the petition and refusing leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • When does the limitation period commence for a suit for redemption of a mortgage with a fixed term?
  • Does the limitation period for redeeming a mortgage run from the date of the mortgage's creation or the expiry of the mortgage term?
  • Is a suit for redemption of mortgaged property maintainable if filed within sixty years of the expiry of the fixed mortgage term?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Pervaiz vs Samina, etc2023 SCP 375, 2024 SCMR 142, 2024 PLJ SC 301 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-20
  mehrdowerfrivolous litigationmaintenancefamily lawcompensatory costssubsistence of marriage
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged a High Court judgment that upheld a decree for the recovery of mehr (dower) and maintenance in favour of his wife, the respondent. The core legal question was whether a husband is obligated to pay the mehr during the subsistence of the marriage, particularly when the nikahnama does not specify a mode of payment. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the husband is legally obligated to pay the mehr upon the wife's demand, regardless of the subsistence of the marriage. The Court affirmed that the impugned judgment was in accordance with the law, noting that the petitioner's refusal to pay was untenable and constituted frivolous litigation. The Court laid down the principle that the mere filing of an appeal or challenge against a judicial decision does not render that decision ineffective or excuse non-compliance. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that courts should not hesitate to impose costs, including compensatory costs, to discourage unnecessary litigation and ensure that judicial orders are respected and complied with promptly.

  Questions settled

  • Is a husband obligated to pay mehr to his wife during the subsistence of the marriage?
  • Does the filing of an appeal against a judgment automatically stay or render the judgment ineffective?
  • What is the legal consequence when a nikahnama does not specify the mode of payment for dower?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Mehmood vs Chaklala Cantonment Board through its CEO and others2023 SCP 213, 2023 SCMR 1843 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-09-21
  second review petitionreview jurisdictionSupreme Court Rulesmaintainabilitycomplete justiceinherent jurisdictionstare decisisfinality of judgments
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against the order of the Institution Officer of the Supreme Court returning an application filed as a second review petition. The core legal question was whether a second or subsequent review petition, or an application seeking similar relief under Articles 187 or 184(3) of the Constitution or under the guise of a curative review, is maintainable before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Court held that a second review petition is completely barred and not maintainable under Article 188 of the Constitution read with Order XXVI Rule 9 of the Supreme Court Rules 1980. The key principles laid down are that review jurisdiction is strictly circumscribed by statute and rules, can only be exercised once in respect of any judgment or order passed in original or appellate jurisdiction, cannot be extended through inherent powers under Article 187 or Article 175(2) of the Constitution, and that foreign jurisprudence allowing curative reviews is inapplicable due to differing constitutional texts.

  Questions settled

  • Is a second or subsequent review petition maintainable before the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
  • Does Article 187 of the Constitution confer independent jurisdiction to initiate proceedings or entertain a second review?
  • Can the Supreme Court exercise suo motu review jurisdiction a second time under Article 188 of the Constitution?
  • Does the Supreme Court possess inherent jurisdiction under English common law or equity to entertain a curative review beyond constitutional and statutory limits?
  Read full judgment →
• Kh. Muhammad Fazil vs Mumtaz Munnawar Khan Niazi (decd.) thr. L.Rs. & another2023 SCP 368, 2024 SCMR 1059 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-10
  rejection of plaintcourt feefunctus officioconditional orderenlargement of timefresh suitcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a suit for declaration where the Trial Court directed the plaintiff to pay deficient court fees by a specified date, with a rider that non-compliance would result in the automatic rejection of the plaint. On the specified date, the plaintiff failed to pay, but the Trial Court, on its own motion and without any application, granted an extension. The Revisional Court and the High Court set aside this extension, holding that the Trial Court had become functus officio. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, affirming that once a conditional order is passed with a deeming clause for rejection, non-compliance results in automatic rejection, rendering the court functus officio and stripping it of jurisdiction to extend time under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Court deprecated the practice of passing conditional orders, noting they strip courts of their statutory discretion, and clarified that under Order VII Rule 13, the rejection of a plaint for non-payment of court fees does not preclude the filing of a fresh suit within the limitation period.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Trial Court become functus officio after the expiry of a deadline set in a conditional order that deems a plaint rejected upon non-compliance?
  • Can a court on its own motion enlarge the time for depositing court fees under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without any application or sufficient cause shown by the defaulting party?
  • Does the rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for non-payment of court fees preclude the plaintiff from filing a fresh suit on the same cause of action?
  Read full judgment →
• Kauser Parveen and another vs Kasb Bank and others2023 CLD 589 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-22
  Banking Court auctionexecution of decreeproprietary rightsauction purchaserFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001sale certificateco-ownership
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order dismissing the appellants' challenge to a Banking Court's auction of a mortgaged property. The appellants, claiming to be co-owners of the property, argued that they were not judgment-debtors and that the auction was procedurally flawed, specifically regarding the timing of payment by the auction purchaser. The Supreme Court addressed whether the appellants could be deprived of proprietary rights through such an auction and whether the auction was vitiated by procedural irregularities. The Court held that the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, provides a special summary procedure, meaning the Banking Court is not strictly bound by the procedural requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in execution proceedings. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that once an auction sale is confirmed and a sale certificate is issued, the rights of the auction purchaser are vested and protected, particularly when the appellants failed to timely challenge the proceedings or prove fraud under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The appeals were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Banking Court is strictly bound by the procedural requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 during execution proceedings?
  • Can an auction sale of a mortgaged property be set aside after the sale certificate has been issued and the sale has become absolute?
  • Does a person challenging a judgment or decree on the grounds of fraud or misrepresentation have to seek remedy under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Kashmali Khan & others vs Mst. Malala2023 SCP 152, 2023 PLJ SC 520 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-05-18
  pre-emptionTalb-i-MuwathibatTalb-i-Ishhadstrictissimi jurisplaint requirementsagency in pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of a suit for pre-emption under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987. While the lower courts concurrently found in favour of the plaintiffs regarding the initial demand of Talb-i-Muwathibat, the High Court reversed the decree. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court concerned whether the formal requirements of Talb-i-Ishhad—specifically the disclosure of witnesses' names in the plaint, confirmation of the intention to exercise the right of pre-emption in the notice, and the validity of a notice sent through an agent without proof of personal disability or express authorization—were duly fulfilled. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the right of pre-emption is strictissimi juris and any slight departure from mandatory statutory formalities is fatal. The Court established that omission to name witnesses of Talb-i-Ishhad in the plaint, failure to expressly confirm the intention to pre-empt in the notice, and unauthorized agency without proving personal disability defeat the pre-emption claim.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the omission to mention the names of the witnesses of Talb-i-Ishhad in the plaint is fatal to a pre-emption suit?
  • Is a notice of Talb-i-Ishhad valid if it fails to expressly confirm the pre-emptor's intention to exercise the right of pre-emption?
  • Can a pre-emptor make Talb-i-Ishhad through an agent without proving personal disability and prior explicit authorization?
  Read full judgment →
• Kashif Aftab Ahmed Abbasi vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary2023 PLJ SC 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  antedated seniorityPolice Service of PakistanCommon Training Programprobationer seniorityservice lawdefermentinter-se seniority
  Summary & questions settled

  This Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal arose from a Federal Service Tribunal decision dismissing the petitioner's claim for antedated seniority. The petitioner, inducted into the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP) on an Armed Forces quota, was granted successive deferments from his mandatory Common Training Program (CTP) while serving as Aide-de-Camp to the Governor Sindh. Upon completing training with the 43rd CTP, his inter-se seniority was fixed with that batch, but he claimed antedated seniority with the 35th CTP from his initial appointment date without having passed the training exam. The Supreme Court evaluated whether a probationer deferred from training could claim seniority from the original appointment date without qualifying the mandatory examinations under the applicable rules. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, holding that seniority for probationers is determined after passing the final examination under Rule 7 of the Occupational Groups and Services (Probation, Training and Seniority) Rules, 1990. The Court ruled that no civil servant possesses a vested right to antedated seniority or a specific rank placement prior to completing mandatory training requirements.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant have a vested or fundamental right to claim antedated seniority prior to passing required training examinations?
  • How is inter-se seniority of probationers determined when mandatory Common Training Program deferments are granted?
  • Can a probationer claim seniority with an earlier training batch without qualifying the requisite final passing-out examination with that batch?
  Read full judgment →
• Kanwar Arif Ali Khan and another vs Danish Ali and others2023 SCMR 233 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-12-01
  leave to appeallocus standinon-partyprocedural lawjudicial governanceSupreme Court practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the procedural requirements for filing an appeal or petition before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by a person who was not a party to the original proceedings before the High Court. The core legal question addressed is whether a non-party can directly challenge a High Court judgment without first seeking leave of the Supreme Court. Relying on the precedent established in H.M. Saya & Co. v. Wazir Ali Industries Ltd. (PLD 1969 SC 65), the Court held that a person not party to the original proceedings must first file a separate application seeking leave to appeal or petition. The Court affirmed that this practice ensures the Court is notified of the petitioner's status and allows the petitioner to establish their grievance before the merits are heard. This procedure is deemed consistent with the spirit of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, promoting transparency and judicial governance. Consequently, the Court directed the office to de-number the instant petition and required the petitioner to file the necessary application for leave to appeal before the matter could proceed on its merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person who was not a party to the proceedings before the High Court directly file an appeal or petition before the Supreme Court?
  • What is the procedural requirement for a non-party to challenge a High Court judgment before the Supreme Court?
  • Does the Supreme Court require a separate application for leave to appeal from a non-party petitioner?
  Read full judgment →
• K-Electric Limited through its Chief Executive Officer, Karachi and Others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Energy and Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Pakistan Secretariat, Islamabad and others2023 SCP 106 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-01-19
  electricity tariffNEPRAsubsidyvested rightSchedule of TariffK-Electrictariff determinationregulatory authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a dispute over electricity tariff subsidies for K-Electric consumers. The Federal Government modified the Industrial Support Package (ISP) via SRO 810(I)/2019, subsequently issuing a Corrigendum to adjust the Schedule of Tariff (SOT) without National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) approval. Consumers challenged the Corrigendum, arguing that the subsidy was a vested right and that only NEPRA could adjust tariffs. The Supreme Court held that while the Federal Government possesses the authority to introduce, modify, or withdraw subsidies as a matter of socio-economic policy, it cannot unilaterally issue or adjust an SOT. Tariff determination and adjustments are exclusively within NEPRA’s domain under the Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997. The Court affirmed that consumers hold no vested right to a subsidy, which remains subject to government policy. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s attempt to calculate specific tariff adjustments, directing that the matter be referred to NEPRA for proper determination and issuance of an amended SOT in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Federal Government unilaterally issue or adjust a Schedule of Tariff without the involvement of the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority?
  • Do consumers possess a vested right to an electricity subsidy once it has been incorporated into the tariff?
  • Does the authority to determine and adjust electricity tariffs exclusively reside with the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority?
  • Is the Federal Government empowered to modify or withdraw electricity subsidies as a matter of policy?
  Read full judgment →
• K-Electric Limited through Chief Executive Officer, Karachi vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Energy and Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and others2023 PLD Supreme Court 412 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-01-19
  electricity tariffNEPRAsubsidyindustrial support packagetariff determinationK-Electricuniform tariffregulatory authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the legality of a Corrigendum issued by the Federal Government, which modified the Industrial Support Package (ISP) subsidy for K-Electric consumers without National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) approval. The core legal questions involved the Federal Government's authority to unilaterally adjust electricity tariffs and issue a Schedule of Tariff (SOT), and whether electricity consumers possess a vested right in government-provided subsidies. The Supreme Court held that tariff determination, including adjustments for subsidies, falls exclusively within the domain of NEPRA under the Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997. The Court ruled that while the Federal Government may set socio-economic policies and offer subsidies, it cannot unilaterally determine or adjust tariffs or issue an SOT. Furthermore, the Court clarified that consumers have no vested right in a subsidy, which remains subject to government policy modifications. Consequently, the High Court’s attempt to calculate tariff adjustments was set aside, and the matter was remanded to NEPRA to compute the necessary adjustments to the uniform tariff in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Government have the authority to unilaterally determine or adjust electricity tariffs and issue a Schedule of Tariff without NEPRA's involvement?
  • Do electricity consumers possess a vested right in a government-provided subsidy once it is incorporated into the tariff?
  • Is the calculation and adjustment of electricity tariffs a matter that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of NEPRA?
  • Can the Federal Government modify or withdraw electricity subsidies through policy decisions without NEPRA's prior determination?
  Read full judgment →
• K-Electric Limited through Chief Executive Officer, Karachi and others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Energy and Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Pakistan Secretariat, Islamabad and others2023 PLJ SC 403 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  electricity tariffsubsidyNEPRAK-ElectricIndustrial Support Packageschedule of tariffvested righttariff adjustment
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan addresses appeals arising from a dispute over the modification of an Industrial Support Package (ISP) subsidy for electricity consumers of K-Electric. The core legal question concerned the authority of the Federal Government to issue a corrigendum and schedule of tariff adjusting the subsidy without recourse to the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA), and whether consumers have a vested right in government-provided subsidies. The Court held that while the Federal Government possesses the sole competence to introduce, modify, or withdraw subsidies as part of its socio-economic policy, the determination, adjustment, and issuance of the Schedule of Tariff (SOT) strictly fall within the exclusive domain of NEPRA under the Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997. The High Court's exercise in calculating and restructuring the tariff was set aside as an oversimplification of a complex regulatory process. The key principle laid down is that electricity subsidies do not merge into the tariff to create a vested right for consumers, and any adjustments or SOT issuances necessitated by a change in subsidy must be computed and determined exclusively by NEPRA.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Government have the authority to determine or adjust electricity tariffs and issue a Schedule of Tariff without recourse to NEPRA?
  • Do consumers acquire a vested right in an electricity subsidy simply because the subsidy is built into the notified tariff?
  • Can the High Court calculate and fix electricity tariffs for peak and off-peak hours in place of NEPRA's statutory determination mechanism?
  • Does the adjustment of a government-offered electricity subsidy amount to an illegal retrospective application of a tariff?
  Read full judgment →
• Justice Qazi Faez Isa and others vs President of Pakistan and others2023 PLD Supreme Court 661 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-04-04
  live streaming court proceedingsaccess to informationArticle 19Areview jurisdictionmaintainability of miscellaneous applicationinherent powers of Supreme Courtopen court principlefreedom of speech
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil miscellaneous application was filed by a petitioner in review jurisdiction seeking directions for the state-owned television network (PTV) and private channels to broadcast live, and for live streaming of, the court proceedings of his review petition. The Additional Attorney General raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability, arguing that review jurisdiction under Article 188 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 is restricted to correcting material errors and cannot entertain new prayers seeking enforcement of fundamental rights under Articles 19 and 19A. The majority of the Supreme Court of Pakistan (6:4) sustained the preliminary objection and dismissed the application as incompetent in review jurisdiction. The majority held that while public access to information in matters of public importance under Article 19A is a recognized fundamental right, matters regarding technological infrastructure, live-streaming modalities, and procedural rules fall under the purview of administrative decision-making by the Full Court under Article 191, rather than being determined via an ancillary application in review jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a miscellaneous application seeking enforcement of new fundamental rights be entertained under the review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court?
  • Does Article 19A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 guarantee a fundamental right of public access to live streaming of court proceedings in matters of public importance?
  • Whether the decision to broadcast or live stream judicial proceedings is a matter to be regulated by the Full Court on the administrative side under Article 191 of the Constitution?
  • Can inherent powers under Order XXXIII Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules 1980 be invoked to bypass procedural limitations governing review jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Junaid Wazir vs Superintendent of Police, PRU/Dolphin Police, Lahore2023 SCP 355, 2024 SCMR 181, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 211 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-10-05
  discharge from servicepolice rulesdepartmental representationlimitation periodservice tribunalpith and substancenatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal dismissing the petitioner-constable's service appeal as time-barred. The petitioner was proceeded against under the Punjab Police (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975 for absence from duty and was discharged from service under Rule 12.21 of the Police Rules, 1934. His departmental appeal was rejected as non-maintainable because Rule 12.21 bars an appeal against discharge. The core legal question was whether a departmental remedy or appeal could be pursued against an order of discharge under Rule 12.21, and how limitation applies before the Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that even if an appeal is not provided under Rule 12.21, a civil servant is entitled under Section 21(2) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 to file a representation to the next higher authority, which authorities must examine on merits rather than dismissing it on hyper-technical grounds of nomenclature. The Court established that public functionaries and tribunals must look at the pith and substance of a remedy rather than its title, and procedural hurdles should not defeat substantive rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a departmental appeal or representation is maintainable against an order of discharge passed under Rule 12.21 of the Police Rules, 1934?
  • Does the absence of an express provision for appeal in service rules bar a civil servant from filing a representation under Section 21 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974?
  • Can a departmental authority reject a remedy solely on the basis of incorrect nomenclature without examining the pith and substance of the grievance?
  • When does time begin to run for filing an appeal before the Punjab Service Tribunal in cases where a departmental representation is pursued?
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• Junaid Ali vs The State through Advocate-General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa2023 SCMR 1514, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 58 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-02-15
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirycriminal appealstatement under section 164 Cr.P.C.murderbail granting
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the Peshawar High Court, whereby post-arrest bail was denied to the petitioner in a case registered under sections 302, 324, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 15 of the Arms Act 2013. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail in the absence of direct or tangible incriminating material connecting him to the alleged crime. The Supreme Court held that where the sole material against the accused is a statement under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 pointing an accusing finger without any supporting source or material, and in the absence of direct evidence, the case calls for further inquiry under subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and granted post-arrest bail to the petitioner subject to furnishing appropriate bail bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Does a case call for further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the only material connecting the accused is a bald statement under section 164 without any supporting source?
  • Whether post-arrest bail should be granted when there is no direct evidence linking the petitioner to the crime?
  • Can a criminal petition be converted into an appeal by the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
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• Muhammad Abbas and another vs StatePLJ 2023 SC (Cr.C.) 112 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-01-02
  murder convictionspur of the momentocular evidenceinterested witnessessentence reductionprivate complaintpre-meditation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal appeal against the conviction of the petitioners for the murder of Muhammad Sarfraz, initially tried under a private complaint. The petitioners were convicted under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to life imprisonment, a decision upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt and whether the conviction and sentence were justified given the circumstances. The Supreme Court held that the ocular account provided by the prosecution witnesses was reliable and consistent with medical evidence, despite the witnesses' relationship to the deceased. However, the Court found that the incident occurred at the spur of the moment without pre-meditation, as the parties had gathered to discuss a family dispute. Consequently, the Court modified the conviction from Section 302(b) to Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, reducing the sentence to fourteen years of rigorous imprisonment. The key principle laid down is that while relationship to the deceased does not invalidate witness testimony, the absence of pre-meditation warrants a more lenient sentencing approach.

  Questions settled

  • Does the relationship of prosecution witnesses to the deceased automatically invalidate their testimony in a murder trial?
  • Can a conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be converted to Section 302(c) if the offense occurred at the spur of the moment without pre-meditation?
  • Is the delayed submission of recovered weapons to a chemical examiner a fatal flaw in the prosecution's case?
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• Jind Wadda and others vs General Manager NHA (LM & Is), Islamabad2023 SCP 85 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-03-15
  land acquisitioncompensation enhancementburden of proofmarket value of landcompulsory acquisitionvaluation of agricultural land
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a land acquisition dispute concerning property in D.I. Khan acquired for the N-55 road project. The appellants challenged the Land Acquisition Collector's award, seeking enhancement of compensation. While the Referee Judge initially enhanced the compensation from Rs.33,657/- to Rs.96,830/- per kanal, the appellants further appealed to the High Court, which dismissed their claim. Before the Supreme Court, the appellants contended that the lower courts failed to properly assess the land's potential, location, and future prospects, arguing for a significantly higher valuation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants failed to discharge the burden of proof required to justify further enhancement. The Court emphasized that in land acquisition cases, landowners must produce tangible, independent, and credible evidence regarding the specific value of the subject land, including its fertility, surrounding development, and comparable sales. As the appellants provided no documentary proof to support their claim of a higher market value and failed to demonstrate any misreading of evidence by the lower courts, the Supreme Court upheld the existing compensation award.

  Questions settled

  • Upon whom does the burden of proof lie in a land acquisition case seeking enhancement of compensation?
  • Is a landowner entitled to enhanced compensation for acquired land without producing independent and credible evidence of higher market value?
  • What factors must be considered when determining the market value of acquired land for compensation purposes?
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• Jind Wadda and others vs General Manager Nha (Lm & Is), Islamabad and others2023 SCMR 1005 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-03-15
  land acquisitioncompensation enhancementburden of proofmarket value of landagricultural landreference petitionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing the appellants' Regular First Appeal concerning the acquisition of their land for a road project. The core legal question involves the determination of proper compensation and market value for acquired agricultural land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and whether the appellants discharged the burden of proof required for enhancement. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that landowners seeking enhancement of compensation must provide independent, trustworthy, and credible evidence regarding market value, fertility, location, and surrounding development. The Court established that mere assertions without tangible documentary proof or comparable sale instances are insufficient to overturn concurrent findings of lower fora regarding land valuation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether landowners seeking enhancement of compensation for acquired land can succeed without producing independent, trustworthy, and credible evidence?
  • Does the burden of proof lie upon the landowners to establish a higher market value of their acquired property?
  • Can a court rely on a commission's report for land valuation if it is determined without supporting material or proof on the record?
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• Jehanzeb son of Khushal Khan and others vs Government of Khyber2023 SCP 380, 2024 SCMR 199, 2024 PLJ SC 285 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-07
  renaming villagepublic objectionsLand Record ManualKhyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Councils Rulesprocedural fairnesspublic interestlacheswrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal assailed the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench, which declared null and void a provincial government notification changing the name of village Tamba Maira to Maira Swati Abad and the subsequent order renaming the local public school. The core legal question was whether the government could change the official name of a village without following a procedure to invite public objections and suggestions. The Supreme Court observed that although the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Councils Naming and Renaming of Public Places Rules, 1994 specifically cover roads, streets, squares, and parks, the same procedural principles must apply when changing a village name under Para 7.69 of the Land Record Manual. Because official village names affect revenue records, postal addresses, and private documentation, altering a name without newspaper publication to invite public objections violates the rights of the inhabitants. Holding that the unilateral process was discriminatory and illegal, and that laches could not bar public interest claims, the Supreme Court maintained the High Court's judgment and dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is procedural publication for public objections required before the government changes the official name of a village under the Land Record Manual?
  • Can the rules for naming public places be applied to the process of renaming a village?
  • Does laches bar a judicial review challenge brought in the interest of the general public regarding village renaming?
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• Jawwad S.Khawaja vs Fderation of Pakistan, etc2024 SCP 9, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 337, 2023 SCP 190, 2023 SCMR 1732 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2024-01-09
  trial of civilianscourt martialmilitary courtsfundamental rightsfair trialdue processindependence of judiciaryseparation of powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves constitutional petitions challenging the legality and vires of Section 2(1)(d) (in both sub-clauses (i) and (ii)) and Section 59(4) of the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, which permit the trial of civilians by courts martial. The core legal questions concern whether subjecting civilians to military trials violates fundamental rights—specifically the right to a fair trial and due process under Article 10A, the right to life and liberty under Article 9, and the equality clause under Article 25—alongside the principles of judicial independence and separation of powers enshrined in Article 175 of the Constitution. A majority of the court held that the impugned provisions are ultra vires the Constitution and of no legal effect, declaring that civilians cannot be tried by courts martial and must be tried by ordinary or special criminal courts established under the law. The key principle laid down is that the constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights, fair trial, and an independent judiciary cannot be bypassed or suspended to subject civilians to military justice systems during peacetime operation of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the trial of civilians by courts martial under Section 2(1)(d) and Section 59(4) of the Pakistan Army Act, 1952 violates fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Do provisions allowing military trials of civilians contravene the right to a fair trial and due process under Article 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can ordinary citizens be subjected to the military justice system while the Constitution is operating in its normal default mode?
  • Whether Article 8(3)(a) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 exempts laws relating to the Armed Forces from fundamental rights scrutiny in respect of civilians who are not members of the armed forces?
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• Jawad Ahmad Mir vs Prof. Dr. Imtiaz Ali Khan, Vice Chancellor, University of Swabi, District Swabi, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and others2023 PLC (C.S) 813 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-10-18
  stopgap arrangementlook-after chargeacting chargewrit of quo warrantouniversity vice chancellorpublic interest litigationlocus standi
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a Peshawar High Court judgment dismissing a writ petition that challenged a government notification. The notification had authorized the Vice Chancellor of the University of Swabi to look after the affairs of the Women University, Swabi, as a stopgap arrangement following the expiry of the previous Vice Chancellor's tenure. The petitioner contended that under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Universities Act 2012, the Pro Vice Chancellor should have been appointed as Acting Vice Chancellor, and that look-after charge was unauthorized. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that no Pro Vice Chancellor or permanent faculty was available at the Women University to take charge, making the stopgap arrangement necessary to prevent administrative and academic disruption. The Court held that look-after or additional charge given under exceptional circumstances as a stopgap arrangement does not confer substantive rights and is distinct from regular recruitment. It further clarified the scope of a writ of quo warranto, emphasizing that it requires showing that a public office is held by a usurper without legal authority. Finding no illegality in the temporary arrangement, the Court dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an acting or look-after charge assigned as a stopgap arrangement confers any substantive right or claim to the post upon the incumbent?
  • What are the essential grounds and conditions required for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Can a former public office holder claim an extension of tenure as a vested right upon the expiry of their term?
  • Is a petitioner required to meet the strict definition of an 'aggrieved person' to maintain a petition for a writ of quo warranto?
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• Javid Khan vs Arshid Khan and another2023 SCP 356, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 73 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-15
  post-arrest bailfurther enquirycriminal investigationpolice conductbail applicationjudicial administration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by the petitioner, who was nominated in an FIR registered on 8 August 2022 regarding the death of a young boy. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the nature of the evidence and the quality of the police investigation. The Supreme Court observed that the investigation was handled incompetently, noting that the police report relied solely on statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, which the Court found implausible. The Court held that the case constituted a matter of further enquiry, thereby admitting the petitioner to bail subject to furnishing bail bonds. Furthermore, the Court laid down the principle that public servants should avoid honorifics like 'sahib' in their job titles to prevent perceptions of unaccountability and delusions of grandeur. Additionally, the Court criticized the practice of police officers travelling to the Supreme Court to deliver documents that could have been transmitted electronically, emphasizing that such practices waste resources and fail to treat judicial matters with appropriate seriousness.

  Questions settled

  • Does the reliance solely on Section 161 statements in a police report constitute a ground for further enquiry in a bail application?
  • Is the use of honorifics such as 'sahib' by public servants in official proceedings acceptable?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant bail when the investigation of a criminal case is found to be incompetently handled?
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• Javed Iqbal vs The State2023 SCMR 139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-10-25
  narcoticssafe custodysafe transmissionjudicial confessionbenefit of doubtconscious possessionchain of custodyexculpatory statement
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard an appeal against a life sentence for narcotics trafficking under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The prosecution alleged recovery of 25 kilograms of charas from the appellant's vehicle. The core legal questions involved the safe custody and transmission of samples and the evidentiary value of a judicial confession. The Court observed that the prosecution failed to produce the constable who transported the samples or the Moharrar of the Malkhana, thereby breaking the chain of custody. Furthermore, the Court scrutinized the appellant's judicial confession, which was exculpatory as he claimed no knowledge of the narcotics concealed in the luggage. The Court held that when prosecution evidence is doubtful, a confession must be accepted or rejected as a whole and cannot be split into inculpatory and exculpatory parts. Since the confession, taken in toto, did not establish conscious possession, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the appellant by extending the benefit of doubt.

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• Javed Iqbal vs The State through D.A.G., Islamabad and another2023 SCMR 401 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-01
  post-arrest bailbail conditionscash depositsurety bondPrevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016Section 499 CrPCinterlocutory arrangement
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a High Court order granting post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a cybercrime case under Sections 13 and 14 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016, and Sections 420, 468, 471, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but conditioning his release on depositing Rs. 3.5 million in the trial court alongside furnishing bail bonds. The core legal issue was whether a court granting post-arrest bail can impose conditions or riders, such as the deposit of disputed monies or fines, beyond requiring the execution of bail bonds with sureties as provided under Section 499 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the condition requiring the cash deposit. The Court held that bail cannot be subjected to riders or extra-statutory conditions, nor used as a mechanism to enforce monetary recovery or compel compromise, reiterating that Section 499 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 requires only sufficient bail bonds to secure the accused's attendance.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court impose a condition requiring the deposit of cash or disputed money when granting post-arrest bail to an accused?
  • Does Section 499 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 permit incorporating conditions other than surety bonds in a bail order?
  • Can the grant of bail be made dependent on the payment of a fine or the recovery of alleged embezzled funds?
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• Javed Iqbal vs StatePLJ 2023 SC (Cr.C.) 21 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-10-25
  narcotics traffickingchain of custodyjudicial confessionbenefit of doubtexculpatory statementcriminal appealsafe transmission
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that upheld the appellant's conviction under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997. The core legal questions concerned the prosecution's failure to establish a continuous chain of custody for the recovered narcotics and the permissible use of a judicial confession as the sole basis for conviction. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the safe custody and transmission of the sample parcels, creating a fatal gap in the evidence. Furthermore, the Court reaffirmed that where prosecution evidence is rejected, a judicial confession must be accepted or rejected in its entirety. It cannot be split into pieces to selectively use inculpatory parts while discarding exculpatory elements. The principle laid down is that the prosecution must establish every link in the chain of custody in narcotics cases; failure to do so entitles the accused to the benefit of doubt. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to establish the safe custody and transmission of narcotics samples entitle the accused to an acquittal?
  • Can a court selectively accept the inculpatory part of a judicial confession while rejecting the exculpatory part?
  • Is a judicial confession required to be accepted or rejected in its entirety when it serves as the sole basis for conviction?
  • Does the burden of proof shift to the accused before the prosecution has established its case beyond reasonable doubt?
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• Javed Hameed, etc vs Aman Ullah, etc2023 SCP 346, 2024 SCMR 89, 2024 PLJ SC 306 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-10
  frivolous litigationabuse of processproperty rightsfundamental rightspossession of landcostsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against concurrent findings of the trial, appellate, and revisional courts, which dismissed the petitioners' suit. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in dismissing the suit after the petitioners failed to produce evidence over a seven-year period. The Supreme Court found that the petitioners, who were in illegal possession of the respondents' land, had abused the court process to delay litigation and deprive the rightful owners of their property, thereby violating the respondents' fundamental right under Article 23 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Court held that the impugned judgments were legally sound and that the petitioners' conduct constituted frivolous litigation. Consequently, the Court declined leave to appeal, dismissed the petition with costs of one million rupees, and ordered the petitioners to surrender possession of the land. The key principle laid down is that courts must be vigilant against the abuse of judicial process, actively discourage frivolous litigation, and impose costs to prevent parties from perpetuating wrongdoing through protracted legal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court impose costs on petitioners for filing frivolous litigation?
  • Does the abuse of court process to maintain illegal possession of property violate fundamental rights?
  • Are courts empowered to order the surrender of possession as a consequence of dismissing a frivolous suit?
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• Jamshed Ali Shah vs Irshad Hussain Shah and others2023 SCP 317, 2023 SCMR 2162 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-07-19
  specific performanceagreement to sellconcurrent findingscivil revisionleave to appealonus of proofattesting witnesses
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's civil revision upholding the decree in a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell land. The suit was instituted by Respondent No. 1 claiming that the deceased predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner had agreed to sell 56 Kanals and 12 Marlas of land, received full consideration, and delivered possession prior to his death. The legal question before the Court was whether the agreement to sell and payment of consideration were duly established by cogent evidence. The Supreme Court observed that Respondent No. 1 examined the attesting witnesses and the representative of the scribe, who proved the transaction, execution, and delivery of possession without their testimony being shaken in cross-examination, while the petitioner failed to discharge the onus of disproving the transaction. Upholding the concurrent findings of three lower forums, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of any misreading, non-reading, or legal infirmity in the evidence, no interference was warranted. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by lower courts can be set aside in the absence of misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  • Upon whom does the burden of proof lie when challenging an agreement to sell that has been duly proved by attesting witnesses?
  • Whether an agreement to sell executed by a deceased vendor can be specifically enforced against his legal heirs when supported by credible evidence?
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• Jameel Qadir, Muhammad Asif Baloch vs Government of Balochistan, Local Government, Rural Development & Agrovilles Department, Quetta through its Secretary and others2023 SCP 274, 2023 SCMR 1919 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-07-27
  election disputeconstitutional petitionjurisdictionElection Tribunalstatutory barlocal government electionswrit jurisdictiondisputed questions of factcoram non judiceper incuriamexhaustion of remediesfunctus officio
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court heard Civil Petitions for leave to appeal challenging High Court judgments that had set aside orders of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and declared private respondents as returned candidates in local body elections. The core legal question was whether the High Court could exercise its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to decide election disputes after the constitution of an Election Tribunal, given the statutory bar under Section 37 of the Balochistan Local Government Act, 2010. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by entertaining the petitions without first determining its jurisdiction and by adjudicating disputed questions of fact, effectively assuming the role of an appellate court in writ jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that election disputes, particularly those involving factual controversies, must be resolved by the designated Election Tribunal. Consequently, the Supreme Court converted the petitions into appeals, allowed them, set aside the High Court's judgments, and remanded the matter back to the High Court to decide the question of its jurisdiction in accordance with law.

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• Jamaluddin, Rabail vs The State2023 SCP 154, 2023 SCP 244, PLJ 2024 SC (Cr.C.) 50, 2024 PLJ SC 244, 2024 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-05-29
  pre-arrest bailpost-arrest bailrule of consistencyattempted murdernon-vital body partfurther inquirydelay in FIR
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from petitions filed under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, seeking pre-arrest and post-arrest bail in a case registered under Sections 324, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the petitioners launched a murderous assault, causing firearm injuries to the complainant and his cousin. The petitioners argued that there was an unexplained three-day delay in lodging the FIR, and that the injuries were on non-vital parts of the body, meaning Section 324 was not attracted. The Supreme Court observed that the injuries were on non-vital parts and the accused did not repeat the fire. Crucially, the Court addressed the differing standards for pre-arrest and post-arrest bail, holding that where co-accused are ascribed the same role, denying pre-arrest bail to one on technical grounds while granting post-arrest bail to the other would be futile, as the arrested accused would immediately qualify for post-arrest bail under the rule of consistency. The Court confirmed the pre-arrest bail and granted post-arrest bail, emphasizing that the judiciary must protect personal liberty against baseless accusations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unexplained inordinate delay in lodging an FIR can be a ground for granting bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a charge under Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 justify the refusal of bail if the injuries are on non-vital parts of the body and the accused did not repeat the fire?
  • How does the rule of consistency apply when co-accused with identical roles seek pre-arrest and post-arrest bail respectively?
  • Does the protection of personal liberty under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 override technical distinctions between pre-arrest and post-arrest bail when the accusations require further inquiry?
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• Jahanzeb Kalmaty and others vs Province of Sindh through Board of Revenue and others2023 SCP 320 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-10-18
  consent orderland allocationpayment defaultguarantorsallotteesimplementation of decreeMalir Development Authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the implementation of a consent order dated 21 March 2019 regarding land allocation and payment obligations involving Bahria Town (Pvt.) Limited, the Malir Development Authority (MDA), and the Government of Sindh. Bahria Town alleged it received less land than agreed, leading to a cessation of payments, while other parties disputed the extent of land possession and entitlement to the paid funds. The Court addressed issues regarding the non-functioning of a previously constituted Commission, the potential for varying or modifying the consent order, and the status of individual allottees seeking to be arrayed as parties. The Court held that individual allottees would not be arrayed as parties to prevent procedural delays, though their counsel may attend proceedings to protect their interests. The Court directed the Government of Sindh, MDA, and the Sindh Building Control Authority to file concise statements with supporting documentation regarding land ownership, sale, and project approvals. Furthermore, the Court issued notices to the guarantors of the payment obligations and entities involved in foreign remittances to ensure transparency and compliance with the consent order.

  Questions settled

  • Can individual allottees be arrayed as parties in a complex litigation involving thousands of stakeholders to prevent procedural delay?
  • What is the procedure when a Commission constituted by a court order fails to function due to the non-appointment of its Chairman?
  • Can a consent order passed by the Supreme Court be varied, modified, or amended?
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• Muhammad Abbas and another vs The State2023 SCMR 487 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-01-02
  MurderPrivate complaintOcular accountMedical evidencePre-meditationSpur of the momentConvictionSentence modificationWitness testimonyDiscrepancies
  Summary & questions settled

  This case concerned a petition challenging the conviction of two individuals for murder under sections 302/148/149, P.P.C., originating from a private complaint filed due to dissatisfaction with police investigation. The Trial Court had convicted the petitioners under Section 302(b), P.P.C., imposing a life sentence, which the High Court subsequently upheld. The central legal questions addressed included the presence of material contradictions in eye-witness testimonies, the credibility of related witnesses, the consistency between ocular and medical evidence, and whether the offense constituted pre-meditated murder or an act committed at the spur of the moment. The Supreme Court affirmed the reliability of the ocular account and its consistency with medical evidence, rejecting arguments regarding minor discrepancies and related witnesses. However, the Court determined that the incident occurred at the spur of the moment, without pre-meditation, provoked by the complainant party's visit. Consequently, the conviction was modified from Section 302(b) to Section 302(c), P.P.C., and the sentence was reduced to fourteen years rigorous imprisonment for each petitioner.

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• Jahanzaib Kalmaty and others vs Province of Sindh through Board of Revenue and others2023 SCP 367, 2024 PLD Supreme Court 88 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-23
  land shortfallconsent orderBahria Townsurvey reportdefault of installmentsforeign remittancesrecord keeping of allotments
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment arises from multiple civil miscellaneous applications filed by Bahria Town (Private) Limited seeking a declaration of a land shortfall and a moratorium on payment installments under a previous consent order of the Supreme Court dated 21 March 2019. The core legal question concerned whether Bahria Town suffered a genuine land shortfall justifying the suspension of its financial obligations, and the handling of foreign remittances deposited into the Supreme Court's account. The Court held that Bahria Town's allegations of a land shortfall were a false pretext and an abuse of process, as a comprehensive scientific survey conducted by the Survey of Pakistan revealed no shortfall and instead exposed unauthorized land occupation by Bahria Town. The Court dismissed Bahria Town's applications, ordered the remittance of foreign funds linked to UK National Crime Agency freezing orders to the Federal Government, directed the disbursement of land cost installments to the Government of Sindh, and highlighted regulatory gaps in housing scheme allotments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party to a consent order can suspend payment obligations on the unverified pretext of a land shortfall?
  • How should foreign remittances detected and frozen by foreign law enforcement agencies and deposited into court accounts be handled?
  • Whether a land developer in default of structured payment installments under a judicial settlement is liable to pay costs and have its suspension applications dismissed?
  • What measures are necessary to regulate and maintain electronic records of property allotments by developers to protect public interest?
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