Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Getz Pharma (Pvt.) Limited, Karachi vs Muhammad Nafees and others2021 SCMR 1785, 2021 SCP 334, 2022 PCTLR 368, 2022 PLC 33 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-03-24
  payment of wagesgratuityprovident fundworkman definitionsalesmanindustrial and commercial employmentmaster and servant
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner company filed three civil petitions assailing a common judgment of the Islamabad High Court, which had dismissed its writ petitions against the orders of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The respondent employees had filed applications under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 claiming dues including gratuity and provident fund. The core legal question was whether the respondents, who were employed in managerial and sales positions, qualified as "workmen" under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 to claim gratuity and provident fund as dues "payable under any law". The Supreme Court held that salesmen and managers do not fall within the definition of "workman" under the Ordinance of 1968, and since the respondents neither pleaded nor led evidence to establish they were workmen performing manual or clerical work, and contractual dues do not constitute dues payable under any "law" under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, their claims for gratuity and provident fund were not maintainable. The Supreme Court converted the petitions into appeals and set aside the orders granting gratuity and provident fund.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a sales or managerial employee qualifies as a workman under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Can contractual claims for gratuity and provident fund be enforced through an application under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 as dues payable under any law?
  • Upon whom lies the burden of proof to establish that an applicant is a workman when such status is disputed before the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936?
  • Are non-workmen entitled to claim gratuity and provident fund under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
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• Getz Pharma (Pvt) Limited, Karachi vs Muhammad Nafees and another2021 SCP 334 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-03-24
  Payment of Wages Actworkman definitiongratuity claimprovident fundStanding Orders OrdinanceTerritory ManagerSales Managerburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court considered three civil appeals filed by an employer challenging a High Court judgment that upheld orders of the Payment of Wages Authority granting gratuity and provident fund claims to three former sales managers under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act 1936. The employer contended that the respondents were not workmen and had failed to prove their entitlement under any law. The Supreme Court held that Section 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act 1936 requires gratuity and provident fund claims to be payable under a statutory 'law', which does not include mere contractual terms. Where claims are asserted under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968, the applicant must explicitly plead and prove that they fall within the definition of a 'workman' under Section 2(i). Reaffirming established precedent that sales managers are not workmen, the Court held that the burden of proof rested on the respondents, who led no evidence. The appeals were allowed, setting aside the grant of gratuity and provident fund.

  Questions settled

  • Does a claim for gratuity and provident fund under Section 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act 1936 require the amount to be payable under a statutory law rather than a private employment contract?
  • Does a Sales Manager or Territory Manager qualify as a 'workman' under Section 2(i) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
  • Upon whom does the burden of proof lie to establish that an employee is a 'workman' when claiming benefits under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
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• General Manager, Sngpl, Peshawar vs Qamar Zaman and others2021 SCMR 2094, 2022 PLJ SC 52, 2022 PSC 379 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-07-07
  civil court jurisdictionimplied barexclusive jurisdictionoil and gas regulatory authorityspecial lawmaintainability of suitcoram non judice
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing its civil revision and upholding concurrent findings of the lower courts that decreed the respondent's declaration suit. The core legal question was whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit in light of the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002. The Supreme Court held that although the Ordinance does not contain an express bar on the jurisdiction of Civil Courts, the conferment of exclusive jurisdiction on the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority creates an implied bar, rendering civil suits non-maintainable. Consequently, the Court set aside the judgments and decrees of the lower courts as coram non judice and without jurisdiction, converting the petition into an appeal and allowing it with directions to transfer the civil suit to the Authority to be treated as a complaint under section 11 of the Ordinance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 ousts the jurisdiction of Civil Courts by implication?
  • Does a Civil Court have jurisdiction to entertain a dispute when a special statute confers exclusive jurisdiction on a regulatory authority?
  • What is the legal effect of a judgment or decree passed by a court lacking jurisdiction?
  • How should a civil suit be handled when it is found to have been filed before a forum lacking jurisdiction under a special law?
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• Fida Muhammad vs Government Of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Education, Peshawar and others2021 SCMR 1895, 2021 SCP 370, 2022 PSC 351, 2022 PLJ SC 253, 2022 PLC · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-09-28
  up-gradationpromotionservice lawBPS-16 to BPS-17stagnationcut-off datecivil servantspolicy decision
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from the dismissal of a writ petition by the Peshawar High Court regarding the denial of service up-gradation. The appellant, a Senior English Teacher (SET) in BPS-16, sought up-gradation to BPS-17 based on a Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Notification dated 26.01.2008. The core legal question was whether the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the up-gradation scheme upon completing ten years of service in BPS-16, even if he did not meet this threshold on the notification's effective date. The Supreme Court held that up-gradation is a policy-driven benefit distinct from promotion, intended to address stagnation for incumbents of isolated posts. The Court observed that the notification was not open-ended but had a specific effective date of 01.10.2007. Since the appellant had not completed the requisite ten years of service in BPS-16 by that cut-off date, he did not qualify for the benefit. The Court affirmed that up-gradation cannot be claimed as a matter of right and dismissed the appeal.

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• Fida Muhammad vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Secretary of Education, Peshawar & others2021 SCP 370 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  service lawup-gradationpromotionstagnationcivil servantpay scalepolicy decision
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that dismissed a petition regarding the denial of service up-gradation. The appellant, a retired SET/SST (BPS-16), sought up-gradation to BPS-17, claiming entitlement under a 2008 government notification. The core legal question was whether the appellant, having been promoted to BPS-16 in 2003, satisfied the notification's requirement of ten years of service in that grade to qualify for up-gradation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant failed to meet the mandatory ten-year service threshold at the time the up-gradation scheme became effective. The Court clarified that up-gradation is not a vested right but a policy-driven mechanism designed to address stagnation in isolated posts. It is distinct from promotion, as it confers monetary benefits without changing duties, and must be implemented strictly according to the specific criteria defined in the governing scheme. Consequently, as the appellant did not fulfill the stipulated service conditions, he was ineligible for the benefit, and the departmental decision was upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Is up-gradation of a civil servant a vested right or a policy-based benefit?
  • What is the legal distinction between promotion and up-gradation in service matters?
  • Can a civil servant claim up-gradation without fulfilling the specific length of service criteria stipulated in the relevant notification?
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• Federation Of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice2021 PLJ SC 13, 2020 SCMR 1154, 2020 PLC (C.S.) 915 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-05-11
  probationertermination of serviceunauthorized absenceFederal Service Tribunalextra ordinary leaveregular inquiryservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had reinstated a probationer terminated for unauthorized absence. The respondent, an Assistant (BPS-14) on probation, was terminated following a prolonged absence from duty. The respondent alleged he filed a departmental appeal, but the Court found the evidence of this filing to be fraudulent, noting the courier receipt provided was fake and unrelated to the appeal. The Tribunal had set aside the termination, reasoning that the absence period was treated as Extra Ordinary Leave (EOL) and that no regular inquiry was conducted. The Supreme Court rejected these findings, holding that the treatment of absence as EOL does not preclude termination of a probationer. Furthermore, the Court ruled that a regular inquiry is unnecessary when the fact of absence is admitted and undisputed. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment, allowed the appeal, and restored the original termination order, emphasizing that the respondent's conduct involved deception.

  Questions settled

  • Is a regular inquiry required before terminating a probationer for unauthorized absence when the fact of absence is admitted?
  • Does the treatment of a period of absence as Extra Ordinary Leave (EOL) prevent the termination of a probationer's service?
  • Can a service tribunal reinstate a probationer solely on the ground that no regular inquiry was conducted for an admitted absence?
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• Federation Of Pakistan through Secretary Establishment, Islamabad vs M.2021 SCMR 1554, 2021 P SC 1370 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-07-09
  antedated promotionproforma promotionArticle 212 barconstitutional jurisdictionsupersessionCentral Selection Boardterms and conditions of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, arises from a High Court judgment directing the appellant to grant the respondent antedated promotion to BS-21 and proforma promotion to BS-22, alongside imposing special costs on the appellant. The core legal questions pertained to whether the High Court possessed constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 in service matters barred under Article 212 of the Constitution, and whether a civil servant consciously superseded by the Central Selection Board is entitled to antedated or proforma promotion. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment. It held that Article 212 explicitly ousts the jurisdiction of the High Courts regarding terms and conditions of service, placing exclusive jurisdiction in administrative tribunals even where ultra vires or mala fides are alleged. The Court further ruled that the High Court cannot substitute its judgment for the Central Selection Board, that conscious supersession disentitles an officer to regain seniority or antedated promotion, and that statutory minimum length of service must be met for proforma promotion.

  Questions settled

  • Does Article 212 of the Constitution bar the High Court from exercising jurisdiction under Article 199 regarding terms and conditions of civil service?
  • Can a civil servant who was consciously superseded by a departmental promotion board claim antedated promotion upon subsequent promotion?
  • Is a civil servant eligible for proforma promotion if they do not meet the statutory minimum tenure required in the feeder grade?
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• Federation Of Pakistan through Secretary Establishment Division, Islamabad vs Shafqat-Ur-Rehman Ranjha and others2021 KLR Labour & Service Cases 102, 2021 PLC (C.S.) 405, 2021 P SC 728, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-10-28
  de novo inquirycivil servantsdouble jeopardyservice mattersconstitutional jurisdictionArticle 212 barrevisionary powerE&D Rules 1973
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from an intra-court appeal order of the Islamabad High Court upholding a Single Bench judgment that set aside a de novo inquiry ordered by the Prime Minister against a civil servant in BPS-21. The respondent civil servant had been exonerated by the Inquiry Officer and Authorized Officer under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules 1973. However, the Prime Minister, as the competent Authority under Rule 6 of the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules 1973, ordered a de novo inquiry after recording reasons. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and dismissing the writ petition. The Court held that recommendations of the Authorized Officer are not final orders. Under Rule 6A of the E&D Rules, the Prime Minister holds revisionary powers and can order a de novo inquiry for recorded reasons without violating Article 13 of the Constitution. The Court further held that constitutional petitions under Article 199 are barred in service matters under Article 212 of the Constitution, especially where statutory remedies remained unexhausted.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Prime Minister order a de novo inquiry under Rule 6A of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules 1973 after an exoneration recommendation by an Authorized Officer?
  • Does ordering a de novo departmental inquiry constitute double jeopardy under Article 13 of the Constitution when no final order was passed?
  • Is a constitutional petition under Article 199 maintainable in service matters governed by Article 212 of the Constitution when statutory appeal remedies exist?
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• Federation of Pakistan through General Manager_Operations Pakistan Railways, Headquarters Office, Lahore and others vs Shah Mohammad2021 PLJ SC 313, 2021 SCP 244, 2021 PSC 1561, 2021 P SC (Crl.) 890 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  pensionwithholding of pensionconviction of serious crimefuture good conductdepartmental proceedings and criminal trialrailways accidentcivil servant retirement benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondent, a retired employee of Pakistan Railways, was convicted in a criminal case arising from a train derailment accident that caused loss of life and property. Following his conviction, the appellant authorities stopped his pension pursuant to Rule 2307 of the General Conditions Governing Pension (C.S.R. 351). The Federal Service Tribunal allowed the respondent's appeal and directed the payment of pension and arrears, holding that the rule applied only to offences committed after retirement and that no separate notice was given. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan set aside the Tribunal's judgment. The Court held that maintenance of good conduct is an inflexible obligation throughout a civil servant's life, and conviction for a serious crime—defined as an offence carrying a sentence of more than six months—justifies the withholding or withdrawal of pension regardless of whether the criminal conduct occurred during service or retirement, as criminal prosecution and departmental proceedings are distinct and concurrent remedies. Furthermore, the Court found that the respondent's admitted knowledge of his conviction rendered any formal notice requirement non-prejudicial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the withholding or withdrawal of pension under Rule 2307 of the General Conditions Governing Pension (C.S.R. 351) applies exclusively to crimes committed after an employee's retirement?
  • Does a criminal conviction and sentence for a serious crime constitute a valid ground for withholding pension benefits of a retired civil servant notwithstanding prior departmental penalties for the same incident?
  • Whether simultaneous departmental proceedings and criminal prosecution for the same incident violate the principles of double jeopardy?
  • What constitutes a 'serious crime' for the purpose of withholding pension under pension rules when the term is not statutorily defined?
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• Federation Of Pakistan through General Manager_ Operations Pakistan Railways, Headquarters Office, Lahore and others vs Shah Mohammad2021 SCMR 1249 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-06-06
  pensionwithholding of pensionserious crimecriminal convictioncivil servantdepartmental proceedingsfuture good conduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had directed Pakistan Railways to resume pension payments to the respondent, a retired Permanent Way Inspector. The respondent was involved in a train derailment accident in 2002 resulting in fatalities, leading to departmental penalties and criminal prosecution. Following retirement, his pension was stopped upon his conviction by a criminal court. The core legal question was whether the authorities were justified under Rule 2307 of the General Conditions Governing Pension (C.S.R. 351) to withhold pension due to a criminal conviction arising from an incident that occurred during service. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Tribunal's judgment, holding that the obligation of good conduct applies throughout a civil servant's life—before, during, and after service—and that conviction for a serious crime provides an independent, valid ground for withholding pension under the rules, regardless of prior departmental disciplinary proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the requirement of future good conduct under pension rules applies only to the period after a civil servant's retirement?
  • Can a civil servant be subjected to departmental proceedings as well as criminal prosecution for the same incident?
  • Does a criminal conviction for an offense resulting in a sentence of more than six months constitute a 'serious crime' under Rule 2307 of the General Conditions Governing Pension (C.S.R. 351)?
  • Is a separate show-cause notice mandatory prior to withholding pension when the pensioner is already aware of his criminal conviction?
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• Federation Of Pakistan and others vs Province Of Sindh through. Secretary2022 PLD Supreme Court 298 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-26Read full judgment →
• Federation Of Pakistan and others vs Muhammad Farhan2022 SCMR 682 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-12-28
  departmental inquirymisconductburden of proofstandard of proofservice appealdue processprinciples of natural justiceFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This Civil Appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan was directed against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had set aside the departmental penalty of reduction to a lower stage in time scale and recovery of alleged government loss imposed on a Pension Clerk. The department alleged inefficiency, misconduct, and involvement in pension embezzlement, whereas the respondent maintained his innocence. The core legal question was whether the departmental inquiry established the respondent's guilt with confidence-inspiring evidence to justify the imposition of penalties. The Supreme Court observed that none of the witnesses examined during the inquiry deposed against or implicated the respondent, and another employee had already confessed to the fraud and deposited the embezzled funds. Dismissing the appeal, the Court held that judicial and tribunal decisions must be founded on truth and solid evidence. In departmental inquiries, the burden of proof must be satisfied through trustworthy evidence and due process, rather than slipshod inquiries, before penalizing an employee.

  Questions settled

  • Can a penalty be imposed on a civil servant in a departmental inquiry when no witness implicates them in the alleged misconduct?
  • Does the mere determination of financial loss by a verification committee substantiate guilt in the absence of evidence linking the delinquent employee to the embezzlement?
  • What is the standard of evidence required in departmental inquiry proceedings to sustain disciplinary penalties against an employee?
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• Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation (Fgehf) Islamabad2020 SCP 186, 2021 SCMR 201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-10-08
  land acquisitionpublic purposeIslamabad Capital TerritoryCapital Development AuthorityFederal Government Employees Housing Foundationstatutory interpretationspecial law vs general lawconstitutional rightsproperty rightseminent domainregulatory captureState largessehousing schemejudicial ethicselite capture
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court allowed appeals against Islamabad High Court judgments that declared land acquisition for a housing scheme by the Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation (FGEHF) illegal. The core legal questions involved the exclusive jurisdiction of the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960 (CDAO, 1960) over the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (LAA, 1894) in Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT), and whether providing housing for government employees and lawyers constituted a 'public purpose'. The Court held that both the LAA, 1894 and CDAO, 1960 can co-exist and operate in their respective domains, as neither contains an overriding clause to exclude the other. It affirmed that providing housing for a specified class of citizens is a valid 'public purpose' under Article 24(3)(e)(ii) of the Constitution. The Court also strongly deprecated the practice of granting multiple plots and agricultural lands to judges and armed forces personnel, deeming it unconstitutional and contrary to Islamic injunctions and social justice. The impugned judgments were set aside, and the acquisition proceedings were upheld.

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• Federal Board of Revenue through its Chairman, Islamabad and others vs Abdul Ghani and another2021 SCMR 1154, PTCL 2021 CL. 254 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-04
  sales taxstatutory limitationshow cause noticecondonation of delayvested rightstax fraudIntra-Court Appealadministrative discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a challenge to a show-cause notice issued by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) alleging sales tax default from 2001 to 2005. The notice was issued in 2016, nearly 15 years after the alleged default, despite the five-year limitation period prescribed under Section 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The FBR had purportedly condoned this delay under Section 74 of the Act. The Lahore High Court set aside the notice, holding that Section 74 does not authorize the supersession of statutory limitation periods that create vested rights for taxpayers. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, ruling that Section 74 lacks specific criteria or parameters for overriding limitation periods and that the FBR's order failed to provide reasons, rendering it opaque and unreasonable. The Court further clarified that since the Act provides no remedy against a show-cause notice, an Intra-Court Appeal under the Law Reforms Ordinance was maintainable. The petition was dismissed and leave refused.

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• Fayyaz Ullah Khan vs Peshawar High Court, Peshawar through Registrar2021 SCP 172, 2021 PLC (C.S.) 1140, 2021 SCMR 1051, 2022 PSC 317 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-04-15
  compulsory retirementsubordinate judiciaryburden of proofshow cause noticeregular inquiryservice tribunalliving beyond means
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from the dismissal of the petitioner's service appeal by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Subordinate Judicial Service Tribunal, which upheld his compulsory retirement from the position of District & Sessions Judge on allegations of corruption, persistent adverse entries in his PERs, and living beyond ostensible legal means. The core legal question was whether a regular inquiry was mandatory even when the civil servant admitted to the factual premise of living a lavish lifestyle and attempted to justify it through external sources of income. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that once the petitioner admitted to maintaining a lifestyle beyond his direct salary and offered justifications, the burden shifted to him to substantiate those claims with tangible evidence. Failing to provide substantial proof beyond a short bank statement of his spouse, the authorities were justified in proceeding without a full regular inquiry. The Court affirmed that failure to discharge this evidentiary burden renders grievances against the omission of a regular inquiry untenable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a regular departmental inquiry is mandatory when a civil servant admits to the factual basis of an allegation in a show cause notice?
  • Does the burden of proof shift to the employee to substantiate justifications offered for living beyond ostensible means once those means are admitted?
  • Can a major penalty of compulsory retirement be sustained without a regular inquiry if the accused fails to produce material to support his defense during personal hearings?
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• Fayyaz Hussain vs Executive District Officer (Education), City District2021 SCMR 1358, 2021 PLJ SC 370, 2022 PSC 322 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-03-10
  service lawmisconductwilful absencemajor penaltyremoval from servicedepartmental inquiryservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, arises from a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which upheld the removal of an EST Teacher from service due to misconduct and prolonged unauthorized absence. The core legal questions were whether a regular inquiry is mandatory when absence is admitted, and whether the competent authority is bound by the inquiry officer's findings. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the removal. The Court held that the petitioner's absence was admitted and established, and he had been afforded sufficient opportunity for personal hearing. The Court laid down the principle that where an employee's absence from duty is admitted, there is no legal requirement to hold a regular inquiry, as there are no disputed facts to adjudicate. Furthermore, the findings of an inquiry officer are not binding on the competent authority. Finally, the Court reiterated that leave to appeal under Article 212(3) is only granted if a substantial question of law of public importance is raised.

  Questions settled

  • Is a regular inquiry necessary when the fact of absence from duty is admitted by the employee?
  • Are the findings of an inquiry officer binding upon the competent authority?
  • Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 in the absence of a substantial question of law of public importance?
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• Fawad Khan vs The State2021 SCMR 162, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 807 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-11-09
  abduction for ransomkidnappingcriminal petitionillegal arms possessionconcurrent findingsappreciation of evidenceanti-terrorism
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by Fawad Khan impugning the dismissal of his appeal against conviction and sentence under Section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, along with connected matters under Section 15 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act 2013 and Section 7(2)(i) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The core legal questions involve the evaluation of concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the abduction for ransom, the evidentiary value of recovery from exclusive possession, and the proof of unlawful arms possession. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions and refused leave to appeal, holding that the concurrent findings showed no misreading or non-reading of evidence, that the abductee was validly recovered from the petitioner's custody while chained, and that the prosecution successfully proved both the kidnapping and the illegal possession of a weapon without a license. The key principles established relate to the sufficiency of direct eyewitness and recovery evidence in kidnapping-for-ransom cases and the immateriality of non-payment of ransom where the intent and overt acts of abduction and captivity are proven.

  Questions settled

  • Whether non-payment of the demanded ransom affects the conviction under Section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the purpose of abduction is established?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts be interfered with in the absence of misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  • Is the recovery of an unlicenced weapon from the exclusive possession of the accused sufficient to sustain a conviction under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act 2013?
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• Fawad Ahmad Mukhtar and others vs Commissioner Inland Revenue2022 PTD 454, 2022 SCMR 426, 2022 PTCL 327, 2022 PSC 434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-09
  dividend in speciewithholding taxretrospective effectdeduction at sourcetaxable incomeSecond Schedule exemptioncharging provision
  Summary & questions settled

  These cross-appeals arose under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, relating to the tax year 2008 concerning the taxability and withholding of a dividend in specie distributed in the form of shares. The core legal questions were whether a dividend in specie constituted taxable income, whether a distributing company had an obligation to deduct withholding tax under Section 150, and whether Clause (103B) of Part I of the Second Schedule had retrospective application as beneficial, remedial, or clarificatory legislation. The Supreme Court held that 'income' is an inclusive concept covering money or money's worth, including dividends in specie under Section 5. However, Section 150 did not apply to dividends in specie because withholding deductions contemplate monetary amounts payable to the Treasury, not deductions in kind. Furthermore, Clause (103B) was a deferred exemption without express or implied retrospective operation. The Court laid down that each tax year constitutes a distinct unit of assessment, substantive chargeability under Section 5 is independent of withholding machinery provisions under Section 150, and beneficial exemptions do not automatically operate retrospectively.

  Questions settled

  • Does a dividend distributed in specie constitute taxable income within the meaning of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Was a distributing company obligated under Section 150 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to deduct withholding tax on a dividend paid in specie?
  • Does Clause (103B) of Part I of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 apply retrospectively to prior tax years?
  • Does the failure of a specific withholding or collection mechanism invalidate the substantive chargeability of income under Section 5 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
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• Faqir Ali and others vs Samna Bibi and others2022 PLD Supreme Court 85, 2022 PSC 1498 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-12-29
  Oral giftGift validityFraudCollusionLimitationRevisional jurisdictionInheritanceFemale heirsMutation cancellationProof of gift
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside concurrent findings of the trial and appellate courts, decreeing a suit for declaration and cancellation of gift mutations. The suit was filed by daughters against their brothers, alleging fraud and collusion to deprive them of their inheritance. The core legal questions concerned the High Court's revisional jurisdiction to upset concurrent findings, the strict requirements for proving a valid oral gift, and the applicability of limitation when fraud and collusion are established. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's decision. It held that the High Court was justified in exercising revisional jurisdiction where lower courts misread evidence and misapplied the law. The Court affirmed that beneficiaries must strictly prove the three ingredients of a valid oral gift (declaration, acceptance, delivery of possession). It further ruled that fraud vitiates even solemn transactions, making the question of limitation irrelevant when fraud and collusion are proven, especially when gifts are a device to deprive female heirs of their Sharia-mandated inheritance.

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• Fakhar Zaman vs The State through D.A.G. and another2021 SCMR 1815, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 97 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-09-17
  post-arrest bailPrevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016cyber crimesexual harassmentprohibitory clausepersonal liberty
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 arose from the refusal of post-arrest bail to the petitioner by the Peshawar High Court in a case registered under Sections 20, 21, and 24 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016 and Section 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The allegations concerned causing sexual harassment by posting photographs of the complainant on social media. The Supreme Court examined the material collected during investigation and observed that while certain photographs were close to nudity, they were not recognizable, and other photographs showed full attire with no element of immorality. Noting that the petitioner had been incarcerated for over three months, the alleged offences did not fall within the prohibitory clause, and personal liberty is a precious right, the Supreme Court held that the case warranted post-arrest bail so that the trial court could determine the allegations after recording evidence. The petition was converted into an appeal and allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail may be granted where the social media photographs alleged to constitute sexual harassment under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016 are unidentifiable or lack explicit immorality?
  • Whether incarceration exceeding three months for offences outside the prohibitory clause justifies the grant of post-arrest bail pending trial?
  • Whether the Supreme Court may convert a leave to appeal petition into an appeal and grant bail to safeguard fundamental personal liberty?
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• Faisalabad Electric Supply Company Limited vs The Federation Of Pakistan2021 SCMR 1463 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-05-27
  sales taxlimitation periodshow cause noticejudicial reviewFBRstatutory interpretationtime-barred proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a power distribution company, challenged the Federal Board of Revenue's (FBR) decision to extend the limitation period for tax proceedings under Section 74 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Previously, the Appellate Tribunal had determined that certain tax periods were time-barred under Section 36(2) of the Act. Instead of challenging this judicial finding, the tax authorities sought and obtained an extension from the FBR to reopen these time-barred periods. The core legal question was whether the FBR could lawfully use its powers under Section 74 to circumvent a judicial determination regarding limitation. The Supreme Court held that the FBR’s resort to executive remedies to bypass a judicial finding of time-bar is impermissible. The Court ruled that once a judicial forum has determined a matter is time-barred, the tax authorities cannot use Section 74 to frustrate that outcome. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, declaring the FBR's order and the subsequent show cause notice legally invalid and striking them down.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Federal Board of Revenue use Section 74 of the Sales Tax Act 1990 to extend limitation periods for proceedings already declared time-barred by a judicial forum?
  • Is it permissible for tax authorities to circumvent a judicial finding of a time-bar by seeking an executive extension of time?
  • Can a show cause notice issued pursuant to an unlawful order of the Federal Board of Revenue be challenged via a writ petition?
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• Faheemullah vs The State2021 SCMR 1795 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-09-06
  narcotic possessionconcurrent findingsproof beyond reasonable doubtchemical examiner reportcriminal appealpolice misconduct allegations
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges the concurrent findings of the Court of Session and the High Court of Sindh, which convicted the petitioner under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the possession of 5080 grams of cannabis. The petitioner contended that the prosecution case was fabricated, alleging that the police conducted an unauthorized raid on his house, stole valuables, and subsequently planted the narcotics to justify the incident. The core legal question was whether the prosecution evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt despite the petitioner's allegations of police misconduct. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's case was consistent, supported by contemporaneous records such as the daily diary entry, site plan, and chemical examiner's report. Finding no evidence to support the petitioner's claims of a planted case or police abuse, the Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts, ruling that the evidence established guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was declined.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of a consistent prosecution account, supported by contemporaneous records and a positive chemical examiner report, satisfy the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt in narcotics cases?
  • Can a conviction be overturned based on allegations of police misconduct when there is no material evidence on the record to support such claims?
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• Fahad Hussain and another vs State through Prosecutor General Sindh2022 SCP 424, 2023 SCMR 364 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-12-28
  pre-arrest bailfurther inquirytentative assessmentbenefit of doubtcriminal jurisprudencemurder trialpost-mortem report
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition challenged the High Court's order dismissing the petitioners' application for pre-arrest bail in a murder case registered under sections 302 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to pre-arrest bail given the conflicting evidence regarding the cause of death—alleged murder versus suicide—and the significant delay in lodging the FIR. The Supreme Court held that the case required further inquiry, as the medical evidence was inconclusive, the FIR was lodged with an unexplained nine-day delay, and the prosecution's account of the incident contained inconsistencies regarding the complainant's inaction at the scene. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal and confirmed the petitioners' pre-arrest bail. The key principles laid down are that bail decisions require only a tentative assessment of the material on record, avoiding deeper appreciation of evidence; that the benefit of doubt can be extended to an accused at the bail stage; and that 'further inquiry' is warranted when the prosecution's case is not free from reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does a case require further inquiry when the cause of death remains undetermined by a medical board?
  • Can the benefit of doubt be extended to an accused at the pre-arrest bail stage?
  • Is a deeper appreciation of evidence permissible when deciding a bail petition?
  • What is the standard for determining if reasonable grounds exist for denying bail?
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• Ex-Pa 43620 Lt. Asim Bashir vs Federation Of Pakistan and 3 others2021 SCMR 1176 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-05-06
  Field General Court Martialhomicideconcurrent jurisdictionrevision of findingcoram non judicejudicial reviewmilitary law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which dismissed a constitutional petition challenging the petitioner's conviction and life sentence for homicide by a Field General Court Martial. The petitioner, a lieutenant in the Pakistan Army, was initially convicted of fornication but acquitted of homicide. However, upon reconsideration directed by the Convening Authority, he was subsequently convicted of homicide as well. The petitioner contended that he was not subject to the Pakistan Army Act 1952, that the venue of the trial was improper, and that the revision of the finding was mala fide and coram non judice. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that under Section 549 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and Sections 94 and 95 of the Pakistan Army Act 1952, the military authorities had concurrent jurisdiction to try the officer. The Court further ruled that the statutory scheme of the Act permits the revision of findings before final confirmation under Section 119, and that judicial review of court-martial proceedings is restricted to cases of coram non judice, lack of jurisdiction, or clear mala fides, none of which were established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether military authorities have jurisdiction to try an Army officer for a civil offence under the Pakistan Army Act 1952 read with Section 549 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a Field General Court Martial be convened at any place under Section 93 of the Pakistan Army Act 1952 without vitiating the trial?
  • Does the Pakistan Army Act 1952 permit a Convening Authority to return a finding to the Court Martial for reconsideration and revision prior to confirmation?
  • What are the parameters of judicial review by civil courts over the findings and sentences passed by a Court Martial?
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• English Biscuits, Manufacturers Private Limited (Ebm), Korangi Industrial2021 P SC 1451 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  company petitionoppression and mismanagementright sharesshare valuationfiduciary powerssubsidiary company
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh, which modified the Single Judge's order in a company petition filed under Section 290 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 concerning allegations of oppression and mismanagement regarding share valuations and right share issues. The core legal questions involved the competency of the board of directors to issue right shares for acquiring subsidiary shares, the fairness of share valuation, and whether minority shareholders were oppressed. The Supreme Court held that the directors of a company exercise fiduciary powers and must act bona fide without self-enrichment or oppression. Since the appellants conceded to the revaluation of the subsidiary shares, the initial valuation and subsequent right share disposition were flawed and linked to the unfair valuation. The Court affirmed the High Court's judgment directing fresh valuation and dismissed the appeal, ruling that the appellants could not rely on the forfeiture of right shares when the underlying valuation itself was disputed and conceded as unverified.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the board of directors exercises fiduciary powers when fixing share valuations and issuing right shares to acquire a subsidiary?
  • Can a company's board of directors enforce the forfeiture of right shares against a minority shareholder when the foundational valuation of the subsidiary shares is contested and subjected to revaluation?
  • Whether an appellate court is justified in upholding a revaluation order and modifying the deposit conditions for right shares in a petition under Section 290 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984?
  Read full judgment →
• English Biscuits Manufacturers Private Limited (Ebm), Korangi Industrial2021 SCMR 1182 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-11-11
  company petitionoppression and mismanagementfiduciary powers of directorsright sharesshare valuationconflict of interest
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the judgment of the High Court of Sindh arising from a company petition filed under Section 290 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 regarding alleged oppression and mismanagement by the majority directors of English Biscuits Manufacturers Private Limited (EBM). The core legal question concerned whether the board of directors acted bona fide in valuing shares of its subsidiary (CFL) and issuing right shares to dilute minority shareholding, particularly when self-dealing and conflict of interest were alleged by the respondent (ABIL). The Supreme Court held that directors exercise fiduciary powers and must act bona fide without causing oppression; since the appellants conceded to a revaluation of the CFL shares during proceedings, the initial valuation and subsequent right share disposal were tainted. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's modifications requiring fair revaluation and safeguarding the minority shareholder's rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether directors of a company can fix share values of a subsidiary in a manner that results in self-enrichment and dilution of minority shareholding without a fair and transparent valuation?
  • Does a failure by a minority shareholder to subscribe to right shares forfeit their remedy under Section 290 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 when the underlying share valuation is flawed and disputed?
  • Are directors bound by fiduciary duties to act bona fide in the interest of the company and its members when issuing right shares and acquiring subsidiary assets?
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• English Biscuits Manufacturers Private Limited (Ebm), Korangi Industrial2021 SCP 246 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  company lawoppression and mismanagementfiduciary duties of directorsright sharesshare valuationsubsidiary company
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh concerning a corporate dispute over share valuation, right issues, and allegations of oppression under company law. The core legal question involved whether the board of directors of a parent company acted bona fide in issuing right shares to finance the acquisition of shares in its subsidiary from individual directors, thereby diluting a minority shareholder's interest, and whether the initial valuation of the subsidiary's shares was fair and transparent. The Supreme Court held that directors stand in a fiduciary capacity and must exercise their powers bona fide in the interest of the company and all members without causing oppression. The Court ruled that because the appellants tacitly conceded the unfairness of the original share valuation by submitting to revaluation proceedings, their subsequent actions regarding the disposal of un-subscribed right shares were vitiated. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the High Court's modifications requiring revaluation and permitting the minority shareholder to subscribe to the right issue.

  Questions settled

  • Whether directors of a company can exercise fiduciary powers to issue right shares for acquiring shares from themselves without a fair and transparent valuation?
  • Does a minority shareholder forfeit the right to subscribe to right shares when the underlying valuation of the company's shares is flawed and subjected to revaluation?
  • Whether the High Court was justified in modifying the Company Judge's order to allow a fresh valuation of shares and adjusting the deposit for right issues?
  • Did the conduct of the directors in failing to support their initial share valuation amount to a breach of fiduciary duty and oppression under the law?
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• English Biscuits Manufacturers Private Limited (Ebm) & 6 others vs Associated Biscuits International Limited (Abil) through its Attorney, Farrukh H. Junaidy2021 PCTLR 1357 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  minority oppressionfiduciary duty of directorsright sharesvaluation of sharessubsidiary companyCompanies Ordinance 1984dilution of shareholding
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a company dispute under Section 290 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, involving allegations of minority shareholder oppression. English Biscuits Manufacturers (EBM) sought to acquire the remaining 49% shares of its subsidiary, Coronet Foods (Pvt.) Limited (CFL), owned by EBM’s majority directors and their family, financed through a right issue that threatened to dilute Associated Biscuits International Limited’s (ABIL) 40% stake to 13%. ABIL challenged the Board's decision and the valuation of CFL shares. The High Court ordered a fresh independent valuation of CFL shares, set aside the Board's price determination, and permitted ABIL to subscribe to the right issue. EBM appealed to the Supreme Court.

  The Supreme Court affirmed the Division Bench judgment, dismissing the appeal. The Court held that company directors hold a fiduciary duty to act bona fide and transparently in the interest of the company and all its shareholders. Attempting to force an unfair valuation for self-enrichment constitutes oppression, invalidating subsequent actions taken against affected shareholders.

  Questions settled

  • Whether company directors breach their fiduciary duties by approving an unfair share valuation for self-enrichment at the expense of minority shareholders?
  • Can a company declare a minority shareholder's entitlement to right shares forfeited when the underlying share valuation financing the transaction is challenged for lack of transparency and bona fides?
  • Does an oppression petition under Section 290 of the Companies Ordinance 1984 empower the court to set aside illegal board decisions and order a fresh independent valuation of shares?
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• Enforcement of Fundamental Rights with regard to independence of Press_Media vs N_a2021 SCP 322 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-08-20
  freedom of the pressfundamental rightsArticle 184(3)journalist safetyjudicial independencepublic interest litigationmedia regulation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application filed by journalists alleging widespread violations of Fundamental Rights, including harassment, intimidation, and attacks on media personnel, alongside claims that state agencies and media houses are suppressing independent reporting. The core legal question is whether the alleged actions by state authorities and the suppression of media freedom constitute a violation of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The Court held that the application raises matters of public importance regarding the enforcement of Fundamental Rights, thereby invoking its jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. The Court observed that the Federal Investigation Agency’s actions, specifically a press release implicating the judiciary, potentially undermined public confidence in the judiciary and overstepped legal mandates. Consequently, the Court issued notices to various government ministries, regulatory bodies, and press associations to provide detailed responses regarding the allegations, the status of investigations into attacks on journalists, and the criteria for government advertising disbursements. The Court emphasized the judiciary's constitutional duty to protect Fundamental Rights, including freedom of the press and the right to a lawful profession.

  Questions settled

  • Does the suppression of independent journalism by state agencies constitute a violation of the right to enter upon any lawful profession under Article 18 of the Constitution?
  • Can the Supreme Court exercise jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution in matters concerning the safety and independence of the press?
  • Does a government agency's press release that implicates the judiciary without basis constitute an overstepping of legal mandate and an undermining of public confidence in the courts?
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• Dr. Sikandar Ali Mohi-Ud-Din vs Station House Officer and othersPLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 333 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-07-23
  quashing of FIRconstitutional jurisdictionforgeryconcurrent proceedingscivil and criminal litigationtrial courtdue process
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that quashed an FIR registered under Sections 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 regarding a forged land document. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly exercised its constitutional jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings while civil litigation concerning the same property was pending. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in law by summarily quashing the FIR, thereby bypassing the ordinary course of trial. The Court emphasized that criminal and civil proceedings can proceed simultaneously when founded on cogent grounds. The holding established that where a prima facie offence is disclosed, the High Court should not defeat the ordinary trial process through constitutional jurisdiction. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and directed the trial court to proceed with the matter and decide the case on the basis of evidence brought on record within a specified timeframe. This decision reinforces the principle that criminal trials should not be prematurely terminated by constitutional petitions when factual controversies require judicial determination.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court quash an FIR in its constitutional jurisdiction when a prima facie case of forgery exists?
  • Can criminal and civil proceedings regarding the same subject matter proceed simultaneously?
  • Is it legally permissible for the High Court to summarily quash an FIR without allowing the trial court to conclude proceedings based on evidence?
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• Dr. Sikandar Ali Mohi Ud Din vs Station House Officer and others2021 SCMR 1486 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-07-23
  quashing of FIRconstitutional jurisdictionforgeryfard malkiatcivil and criminal proceedingsrevenue recordsadjudication on merits
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a High Court judgment that quashed an FIR registered under Sections 420, 468, and 471 of the PPC regarding the alleged forgery of land revenue records (fard malkiat). The appellant contended that the FIR was based on a formal inquiry by the Revenue Department which confirmed the forgery, and that the High Court erred by summarily quashing the proceedings while factual controversies were pending. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court could exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to stifle a criminal prosecution when a prima facie offence was made out. The Court held that criminal and civil proceedings can coexist if they arise from a cogent foundation. It further ruled that the High Court should not bypass the ordinary course of trial by resorting to constitutional jurisdiction where evidence requires adjudication. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, restored the FIR, and directed the trial court to conclude the proceedings on merits within three months.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can quash an FIR under constitutional jurisdiction when a prima facie offence is established through a departmental inquiry?
  • Can criminal proceedings and civil litigation regarding the same property coexist simultaneously?
  • Is it legally sustainable for a High Court to summarily decide factual controversies regarding forged documents instead of allowing a trial court to record evidence?
  • Whether the pendency of civil litigation is a valid ground to quash criminal proceedings involving allegations of fraud and forgery?
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• Fareed and others vs The State and others2021 PLJ SC (Cr.C. ) 209, 2021 P SC (Crl.) 596, 2021 SCMR 621 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-09-29
  Qatl-Shibhi-i-amdcriminal petitionsentence reductiondying declarationblunt weapon injuryculpable homicideappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal petitions filed by the convicts and the complainant challenging the High Court's judgment, which maintained the convictions of four brothers for the Qatl-i-amd of their father but reduced their sentences from ten years to five years of rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the trial court and High Court correctly classified the offense under section 316 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, as Qatl-Shibhi-i-amd, or whether the circumstances warranted a conviction under section 302(b) of the same Code, as argued by the complainant. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' findings, noting that while the deceased died from injuries sustained during the assault, the prosecution failed to prove the use of specific weapons or the intent required for a more severe charge. The Court held that the conviction under section 316 was legally sound, as the evidence did not support the doctrine of novus actus interveniens or a higher degree of culpability. The petitions were dismissed, affirming that the lower courts' assessment of the evidence and sentencing was within the proper remit of the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to recover weapons used in an assault preclude a conviction under section 316 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a court sustain a conviction for Qatl-Shibhi-i-amd when the medical evidence suggests injuries were not sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature?
  • Under what circumstances does the doctrine of novus actus interveniens apply to homicide cases involving blunt force trauma?
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• Dr. Iqrar Ahmad Khan vs Dr. Muhammad Ashraf and others2021 PLC (C.S.) 1259, 2021 P SC 1480, 2021 SCMR 1509 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-07-13
  Vice-Chancellor appointmentJudicial reviewDiscretionary powersMerit principleSearch Committee recommendationsAudit parasConstitutional lawBinding precedentUniversity governancePublic appointments
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses civil appeals concerning the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor for the University of Agriculture Faisalabad. The core legal questions revolved around the applicability of the Supreme Court's HRC Order (Human Rights Case No. 13865-P of 2018) to all Vice-Chancellor appointments and the validity and justiciability of reasons provided by the Chief Minister for bypassing the highest-merit candidate. The Supreme Court held that its HRC Order laid down a rule of universal application, structuring the exercise of discretion in such appointments to prevent arbitrary decisions and uphold the principle of merit. It ruled that reasons for not appointing the highest-merit candidate must be cogent, recorded in writing, and subject to judicial review. The Court found the Chief Minister's reasons (unsettled audit paras and failure to hold syndicate meetings) to be arbitrary, contrived, and inconsistently applied, especially given the Search Committee's high evaluation of the appellant. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the Lahore High Court's Division Bench judgment.

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• Farhad Ali vs The State through A.A.G. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa2022 SCMR 685, PLJ 2022 SC (Cr.C.) 95 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-10-01
  post-arrest bailnarcoticsfurther inquiryjuvenile offendercriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition, converted into an appeal, arises from an order of the Peshawar High Court refusing post-arrest bail to the petitioner, Farhad Ali, who was implicated in case FIR No.261 under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Control of Narcotic Substances Act. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail where no recovery was made from his direct possession or pointation and he appeared to be a juvenile at the time of the incident. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the case against the petitioner called for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, given the absence of recovery and his apparent juvenility, leaving the applicability of relevant statutory provisions to be determined by the trial court after recording evidence. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the petitioner granted bail subject to surety bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Does a case call for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 where no recovery is made from the accused?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail when his juvenility is apparent and no incriminating material is recovered from his possession or pointation?
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• Dost Muhammad vs Mian Riaz Hussain and others2022 SCMR 616 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-10
  Specific performanceAgreement to sellBona fide purchaserSection 41 Transfer of Property ActPart performanceDelivery of possessionRegular Second Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had partially decreed Respondent No. 1's suit for specific performance regarding an agreement to sell land. The Trial Court and first Appellate Court had previously dismissed the suit, but the High Court decreed it to the extent of 80 kanals upon payment of the remaining sale consideration, while protecting a 20-kanal transfer to proforma respondents under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The main questions concerned whether the agreement to sell was duly proved, whether delivery of possession was voluntary in part performance, and whether the High Court properly protected the subsequent bona fide purchasers. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's findings, holding that Respondent No. 1 reliably proved the agreement through marginal witnesses, scribe, and stamp vendor, while the appellant's uncorroborated plea of forcible dispossession lacked credibility given his failure to seek legal remedy. The Court maintained that subsequent purchasers without notice were rightly protected, dismissing the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an agreement to sell can be held as proved when supported by consistent testimonies of marginal witnesses, scribe, and the stamp vendor against an uncorroborated denial by the vendor?
  • Whether an unexplained failure by an educated vendor to seek legal remedy after alleged forcible dispossession supports the buyer's claim of voluntary handover of possession in part performance of an agreement to sell?
  • Whether a subsequent purchaser without notice of an earlier unregistered agreement to sell is entitled to protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
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• Divisional Superintendent, Quetta Postal Division and others vs Muhammad Ibrahim and others2021 SCP 402, 2022 SCMR 292, 2022 KLR Supreme Court Cases 349, 2022 PLC · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-12-07
  postman statuscivil servant vs workmantrans-provincial entityIndustrial Relations Act 2012federal legislative competencegrievance petitionNational Industrial Relations Commissionrepugnancy
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the legal status of a postman employed by the Pakistan Post Office Department and the appropriate forum for adjudicating his grievance petition. The core legal questions were whether a postman qualifies as a "civil servant" or a "workman," and which labor law governs his employment—the federal Industrial Relations Act, 2012 or the provincial Balochistan Industrial Relations Act, 2010. The Supreme Court held that a postman, performing duties involving outdoor work, falls within the definition of a "workman" under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, and is excluded from the definition of a "civil servant" under the Civil Servants Act, 1973. Consequently, the Court ruled that the federal Industrial Relations Act, 2012, being a federal enactment governing trans-provincial entities, overrides the provincial Balochistan Industrial Relations Act, 2010. The Court declared Section 1(4)(b) of the provincial Act repugnant to the Constitution and void to the extent it purports to regulate Pakistan Post employees. The principle established is that employees of trans-provincial federal departments are governed by federal labor laws, and their grievances must be addressed before the National Industrial Relations Commission.

  Questions settled

  • Is a postman employed by the Pakistan Post Office Department a civil servant or a workman?
  • Does the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 override the Balochistan Industrial Relations Act, 2010 regarding employees of trans-provincial entities?
  • Is Section 1(4)(b) of the Balochistan Industrial Relations Act, 2010 ultra vires the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Which forum has the exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate grievance petitions filed by workmen of the Pakistan Post Office Department?
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• Divisional Superintendent, Postal Services, Gujranwala and another vs Muhammad Arif Butt2021 SCP 178, 2021 SCMR 1033, 2021 PLC (C.S.) 955, 2022 PSC 362 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-03-31
  misappropriationmisconductpublic fundsservice lawdismissal from servicequantum of punishmentFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a Federal Service Tribunal judgment which modified a major penalty of dismissal from service to a minor penalty of stoppage of increments. The respondent, a postman, was dismissed after an inquiry confirmed he had misappropriated public funds (Rs. 36,400/-), a fact he admitted by citing personal financial needs. The Tribunal took a lenient view because the amount was recovered and the respondent had 27 years of service. The Supreme Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment, holding that misappropriation of public money, regardless of the amount or subsequent recovery, constitutes a fundamental breach of trust and misconduct that renders an employee unfit for government service. The Court clarified that while the Tribunal has discretion under Section 5 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 to modify penalties, such discretion must be exercised cautiously, in a structured manner, and supported by cogent, legally sustainable reasons. Arbitrary reduction of penalties for proven financial dishonesty was deemed unsustainable in law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the recovery of misappropriated public funds justifies a lenient view or the reduction of a major penalty of dismissal?
  • Does the admission of temporary misappropriation for personal needs mitigate the charge of misconduct for a government servant?
  • What are the legal limits and requirements for the Service Tribunal to exercise its discretionary power under Section 5 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 to modify a penalty?
  • Can a government servant who has admittedly breached the trust reposed in them regarding public money be retained in service based on length of past service?
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• Divisional Superintendent, Postal Services, Faisalabad and others vs Muhammad Zafarullah2021 PLC (C.S.) 611, 2021 P SC 736, 2021 SCMR 400, 2021 SCP 12 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-11-10
  service lawmisappropriationdismissal from servicecompulsory retirementmodification of penaltydepartmental inquiryjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a Federal Service Tribunal judgment that converted a penalty of dismissal from service into compulsory retirement. The respondent, a postman, was dismissed following a departmental inquiry that proved allegations of misappropriating money orders. While the Tribunal upheld the findings of guilt and confirmed that all procedural formalities were followed, it modified the penalty without providing specific reasons. The Supreme Court examined whether the Tribunal's exercise of power under Section 5 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1974, was lawful. The Court held that while the Tribunal possesses the power to modify departmental orders, such power must be exercised judiciously, carefully, and based on cogent reasons supported by the facts of the case. Finding the Tribunal's decision to be arbitrary, unstructured, and whimsical, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and restored the original penalty of dismissal, emphasizing that no court or tribunal has jurisdiction to grant relief without legal or constitutional support.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Service Tribunal can modify a departmental penalty under Section 5 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1974, without recording cogent reasons?
  • Can a court or tribunal grant relief in an arbitrary or whimsical manner without the support of power granted by the Constitution or law?
  • Is the exercise of jurisdiction by a tribunal considered lawful if it modifies a penalty despite upholding the findings of guilt and procedural regularity?
  • Does the failure to challenge a tribunal's finding of guilt preclude a respondent from reopening the merits of the case during an appeal against the modification of penalty?
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• Divisional Superintendent Postal Services Jhang and another vs Siddique2021 P SC 1411, 2021 SCMR 1398, 2021 SCP 274 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-07-08
  misappropriationmisconductbreach of trustservice appealgovernment servantpenalty of dismissalpublic money
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals by leave of the Court against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had converted the dismissal of two Postmen into a lesser penalty of withholding increments. The respondents were found guilty of misappropriating money orders by forging payee signatures and utilizing the funds for personal use. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal erred in taking a lenient view and reducing the penalty despite the respondents' admitted misappropriation and breach of trust. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the Tribunal's judgment. The Court held that misappropriation of public funds, regardless of the amount or whether the act was temporary or permanent, constitutes serious misconduct and a fundamental breach of trust. The Court reaffirmed that a government servant found guilty of such dishonesty is unworthy of the confidence reposed by the State and has no place in government service. Consequently, the original penalty of dismissal from service was restored, emphasizing that strict adherence to rules and regulations is mandatory for those handling public money.

  Questions settled

  • Does the temporary misappropriation of public money by a government servant constitute grounds for dismissal?
  • Can a service tribunal reduce a penalty of dismissal for a government servant found guilty of misappropriation?
  • Is the return of misappropriated funds by a government servant sufficient to absolve them of liability for misconduct?
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• Divisional Superintendent Pakistan Railways, Rawalpindi and others vs Syed Usman Ali and others2021 PLC (C.S.) 898, 2021 SCMR 1008, 2022 PSC 303 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-08
  regularizationdaily wagerstemporary labour appointmentpakistan railwaysservice lawregularization policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter addresses appeals concerning the date of regularization of daily-wagers and Temporary Labour Appointment (TLA) workers employed by Pakistan Railways. The core legal question is whether the respondent employees, appointed in 2006/2007, are entitled to be regularized from the date of their initial appointment or from the date specified in the applicable regularization policy. The Supreme Court reviewed the chronological sequence of Regularization Policies from 1985, 2000, 2008, and 2012, holding that the 1985 policy was restricted to ad-hoc employees and substitutes appointed up to 26.12.1992 and did not apply to the respondents. Similarly, the 2008 policy required three years of service by a specific cut-off date which the respondents had not met. The Court held that the respondents were validly and properly regularized under the Regularization Policy of 2012 with immediate effect, and could not claim regularization from their initial appointment. The impugned judgments were set aside and the appeals were allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether daily-wagers and Temporary Labour Appointment workers of Pakistan Railways can claim regularization from the date of their initial appointment under the Regularization Policy of 1985?
  • Does the Regularization Policy of 2008 apply to employees who had not completed three years of service by the cut-off date of 08.09.2007?
  • Whether regularization under the Regularization Policy of 2012 takes effect from the date of initial appointment or with immediate effect?
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• Divisional Accounts Officer, Pakistan Railways, Rawalpindi and another vs Muhammad Yaseen (Deceased) through LRs and others2022 SCMR 815, 2022 PSC 1443, 2022 PLC (C.S.) 765 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-12-23
  pensionmedical allowancemove-overcivil servicepension drawnFederal Service Tribunallimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal and review petition arose from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal allowing a retired civil servant's service appeal regarding medical allowance rates. The deceased respondent, a Pakistan Railways employee who opted for move-over to BS-16 and retired drawing pension accordingly, claimed a higher 25% medical allowance applicable to BS-15 pensioners rather than the 20% allowed for BS-16 pensioners under the Office Memorandum dated 05.07.2010. The core legal question was whether entitlement to medical allowance under the said Office Memorandum depended on the employee's substantive pay scale or on the actual pension drawn based on last drawn pay. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the clear terms of the Office Memorandum made "pension drawn" the determining factor. Having drawn pension based on his last drawn pay in BS-16, the employee was properly paid medical allowance at 20%. The Court affirmed that an employee cannot claim pension benefits in BS-16 while simultaneously claiming allowances meant for BS-15, as law does not permit claiming double benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether medical allowance payable under the Office Memorandum dated 05.07.2010 is calculated on the basis of actual pension drawn or the substantive grade of the civil servant?
  • Can a retired civil servant who opted for move-over to a higher pay scale claim pension in that higher scale while simultaneously claiming medical allowance at the higher percentage reserved for lower pay scales?
  • Whether a service appeal filed before the Federal Service Tribunal seeking interpretation of an Office Memorandum regarding allowance rates is subject to the law of limitation?
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• District Education Officer (Female), Charsadda & others, Secretary S_f58e1b072022 SCP 404, 2023 SCMR 217, 2023 PLC (C.S.) 392 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-09-29
  Primary School Teacher appointmentdomicile certificateCNIC addresspermanent residencelegitimate expectationrecruitment rulesstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns five civil petitions challenging Peshawar High Court judgments regarding the appointment of Primary School Teachers (PSTs). The core legal question was whether a candidate’s permanent residence for recruitment purposes should be determined by the address on their Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC) or their Domicile Certificate, specifically under Section 3 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Appointment, Deputation, Posting and Transfer of Teachers, Lecturers, Instructors and Doctors) Regulatory Act, 2011. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that a Domicile Certificate serves as the primary, authoritative document for establishing a candidate's permanent residence. The Court reasoned that CNIC addresses may reflect temporary dwelling, whereas domicile represents a fixed, permanent legal status. It ruled that interpreting the 2011 Act to prioritize CNIC addresses over domicile certificates would render the latter redundant. Furthermore, the Court applied the doctrine of legitimate expectation, noting that the department allowed candidates to compete and qualify based on their submitted credentials, making their exclusion at the final stage unfair. The judgment establishes that domicile certificates hold superior evidentiary weight for determining permanent residence in public recruitment.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Domicile Certificate take precedence over a CNIC address for determining permanent residence in public sector recruitment?
  • Can a public authority exclude a candidate from recruitment based on a discrepancy between CNIC and domicile addresses after the candidate has qualified through the merit process?
  • Does Section 3 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Appointment, Deputation, Posting and Transfer of Teachers, Lecturers, Instructors and Doctors) Regulatory Act, 2011, mandate that CNIC addresses supersede domicile certificates for determining permanent residence?
  • Does the doctrine of legitimate expectation apply to candidates who have qualified in a recruitment process but are subsequently excluded due to administrative discrepancies?
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• Director Postal Life Insurance, Lahore vs Shakeel Ahmad2021 SCP 192, 2021 PLC (C.S.) 1559, 2021 SCMR 1162, 2022 PSC 1227 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-03-05
  service appealdepartmental inquirymajor penaltydue processshow cause noticeproportionality of punishmentappellate authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had modified a penalty imposed on a civil servant from a reduction in pay scale to a minor penalty of 'Censure'. The Respondent, a Clerk, faced departmental proceedings for alleged negligence and double payments. While an Inquiry Officer recommended only a severe warning, the competent authority imposed a major penalty, which the Appellate Authority subsequently enhanced. The core legal question was whether the authorities acted lawfully in imposing and enhancing these penalties without sufficient evidence or procedural fairness. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the authorities failed to provide cogent reasons for disagreeing with the Inquiry Officer's findings and lacked documentary evidence to substantiate the charges. Furthermore, the Court held that the Appellate Authority committed a material procedural error by enhancing the penalty without issuing a show-cause notice or providing the Respondent an opportunity to be heard. The Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision, emphasizing that disciplinary actions must be based on established evidence and comply with due process requirements.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate authority enhance a penalty imposed on a civil servant without issuing a show-cause notice?
  • Is a competent authority required to provide cogent reasons when disagreeing with the findings of an Inquiry Officer?
  • Does the lack of documentary evidence to support charges of misconduct justify the setting aside of a major penalty?
  Read full judgment →
• Director General, National Savings Central Directorate of National Saving, Islamabad and others vs Muhammad Sultan and others2021 P SC 134 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-17
  civil servantabsorption in service18th Constitutional Amendmentpromotion channelservice tribunal jurisdictiondevolution of ministriescareer progression
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the service rights of employees absorbed into the Central Directorate of National Savings following the devolution of their original ministry under the 18th Constitutional Amendment. The core legal question was whether these absorbed employees, having attained civil servant status, were entitled to automatic promotion channels and re-designation, and whether the Federal Service Tribunal acted within its jurisdiction in directing the department to frame rules for such promotion. The Supreme Court held that while the absorption letter conferred civil servant status, it did not guarantee an automatic right to promotion. The Court affirmed the Federal Service Tribunal's direction, ruling that the department must establish a regulatory framework for promotion. The ratio established is that absorption into government service provides job security, but career progression remains contingent upon the employee meeting prescribed legal qualifications and criteria. Consequently, the Court directed the department to frame appropriate rules to allow these civil servants to be considered for promotion, ensuring compliance with the law while addressing the unique circumstances of their induction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absorption of contract employees into government service due to the 18th Constitutional Amendment automatically confer a right to promotion?
  • Can a Federal Service Tribunal direct a department to frame recruitment rules for the promotion of civil servants?
  • Does the status of a civil servant under the Civil Servants Act 1973 guarantee a right to career progression without meeting prescribed qualifications?
  Read full judgment →
• Director General, Directorate General Of Training And Research (Inland2021 SCMR 710 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-03-02
  service matterunauthorized absencedepartmental proceedingspenalty reductionService Tribunals Actdisciplinary actiondismissal from servicecompulsory retirement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal which reduced a major penalty of dismissal from service to compulsory retirement for a government employee absent without leave. The respondent, a UDC, remained absent for over eight months and failed to participate in departmental proceedings despite receiving multiple notices. While the Tribunal acknowledged the respondent’s absence was deliberate and contumacious, it nonetheless reduced the penalty, citing domestic circumstances. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider whether the Tribunal’s exercise of discretion was lawful. The Court held that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under Section 5 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 to modify penalties must be exercised judiciously, with circumspection, and supported by cogent, record-based reasons. Finding that the Tribunal’s decision lacked such justification and that the respondent’s conduct was obstructive, the Court ruled the reduction arbitrary. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the Tribunal’s judgment and restored the original penalty of dismissal, emphasizing that leniency without valid grounds undermines consistent standards in the administration of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the authority to reduce a penalty imposed by a departmental authority?
  • Can the Federal Service Tribunal reduce a disciplinary penalty without recording cogent and record-supported reasons?
  • Is an employee's deliberate and contumacious absence from duty a valid ground for the imposition of a major penalty?
  • Must the exercise of the Tribunal's jurisdiction to modify penalties be based on evidence rather than arbitrary compassion?
  Read full judgment →
• Director General Federal Directorate and another vs Tanveer Muhammad2021 PLC (C.S.) 602, 2021 PLJ SC 187, 2021 SCMR 345, 2021 SCP 22 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-12-18
  service tribunalmisconductdismissal from serviceharassment at workplacemodification of penaltydepartmental proceedingscriminal acquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a civil petition for leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which partly allowed a service appeal by converting the respondent employee's penalty of dismissal from service into the withholding of increments for five years. The respondent, a Chowkidar at an educational institution, had been dismissed following an internal inquiry that found him guilty of physical assault, use of abusive language, and harassment against a female school employee within the school premises. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Service Tribunal was justified in modifying the major penalty imposed by the department without recording legally sustainable reasons. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal acted arbitrarily and without lawful justification in reducing the penalty, noting that the charges of gross misconduct were fully established through eye-witness accounts, a medical report, and a fair internal inquiry, and that the acquittal in criminal proceedings had no bearing on independent departmental proceedings. The Court laid down the principle that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 5 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1974, the Tribunal must record legally sustainable reasons and exercise its discretion in a structured and regulated manner rather than casually observing that a penalty is disproportionate.

  Questions settled

  • Whether acquittal in criminal proceedings constitutes a basis for interfering in independent departmental proceedings?
  • Can the Federal Service Tribunal modify a major penalty imposed by a department without recording legally sustainable reasons?
  • Does physical assault of a female colleague within an educational institution constitute gross misconduct justifying dismissal from service?
  Read full judgment →
• Dinshaw Hoshang Anklesaria vs National Accountability Bureau (NAB) through Chairman and others2021 PLJ SC 269, 2021 SCMR 699 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-01-06
  post-arrest bailNAB referenceundue incarcerationExit Control Listamenity landpolitical influencetrial commencement
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the Islamabad High Court's refusal to grant post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a National Accountability Bureau (NAB) reference. The petitioner, a director of a construction firm, was accused of utilizing political influence to illegally acquire and amalgamate state land with amenity land, causing significant loss to the public exchequer. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail given the circumstances of the case, the duration of his incarceration, and the status of the trial. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner had been incarcerated for twenty months without the trial commencing, that the prosecution's evidence was primarily documentary, and that other co-accused were at liberty. Furthermore, the Prosecutor General, NAB, did not oppose the bail. The Court held that the petitioner had established a case for bail, emphasizing the right to liberty pending trial when the conclusion of proceedings is not in sight. Consequently, the Court granted bail, subject to the petitioner furnishing bail bonds and placing his name on the Exit Control List.

  Questions settled

  • Is a petitioner entitled to post-arrest bail when the trial has not commenced after a significant period of incarceration and the prosecution's evidence is primarily documentary?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant bail in a NAB reference if the Prosecutor General, NAB, does not oppose the petition?
  • Does the fact that co-accused are enjoying liberty constitute a valid ground for granting bail to a petitioner in a corruption reference?
  Read full judgment →
• Dildar Ahmad vs The State etc2021 SCP 390, PLJ 2022 SC (Cr.C.) 48, PLJ 2022 SC (Cr.C.) 19, 2022 PSC (Crl.) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-04
  pre-arrest bailfurther inquirybenefit of doubtsuppression of injuriesmedical board reportprohibitory clause
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court, which had declined the petitioner's request for pre-arrest bail in a case registered under Sections 337-F(v) and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail given the conflicting medical reports and the suppression of injuries sustained by the petitioner during the same incident. The Supreme Court observed that the initial medical board report suggested the possibility of fabrication regarding the complainant's injury, and noted that the complainant failed to appear before the subsequent Provincial Standing Medical Board. Furthermore, the Court found that the petitioner had sustained five injuries which were suppressed by the prosecution, creating a prima facie doubt regarding the authenticity of the case. Consequently, the Court held that the case warranted further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court established that where a prima facie doubt exists regarding the prosecution's version, the benefit of such doubt can be extended to the accused at the bail stage, particularly when the offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause.

  Questions settled

  • Can the benefit of doubt be extended to an accused at the bail stage if the prosecution's case appears doubtful?
  • Does the suppression of injuries sustained by the accused during an occurrence entitle them to the concession of bail?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail when the offence charged does not fall within the prohibitory clause of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Deputy Postmaster General, Central Punjab, Lahore and another vs Habib2021 KLR Supreme Court Cases 407, 2021 P SC 630, 2021 SCMR 584, 2021 PLC (C.S.) 531 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-01-27
  misappropriation of public fundsdismissal from servicecompulsory retirementFederal Service Tribunalquantum of punishmentmodification of penaltybreach of trust
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a Federal Service Tribunal decision modifying a public postmaster's dismissal penalty to compulsory retirement. The respondent faced allegations of serious temporary and permanent financial misappropriation of public funds. A departmental inquiry proved the charges, supported by the respondent's voluntary confession and repayment made through his relative. Despite affirming the departmental finding of guilt, the Tribunal converted the dismissal into compulsory retirement citing length of service and absence of net financial loss to the national exchequer. The Supreme Court of Pakistan reversed the Tribunal's decision and restored the dismissal penalty. The Court held that while Section 5 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 confers jurisdiction to modify penalties, such discretion must be exercised judiciously, cautiously, and with cogent, legally sustainable reasons. Where financial embezzlement and breach of trust are fully established by evidence and admission, modifying a dismissal order to grant pensionary benefits without valid justification represents an arbitrary exercise of discretion exceeding lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Under what parameters can the Service Tribunal modify a departmental penalty under Section 5 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
  • Can the Service Tribunal convert a penalty of dismissal to compulsory retirement when financial misappropriation is established and confessed?
  • Is repayment of misappropriated funds a sufficient ground to reduce a punishment of dismissal from service to compulsory retirement?
  Read full judgment →
• Deputy Inspector General of Police, Lahore etc vs Sarfraz Ahmed2021 SCP 366 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-10-04
  service appealdismissal from servicewilful absencemisconductdisciplinary proceedingsservice tribunalmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a service matter concerning the dismissal of a police constable for wilful absence and maintaining illicit associations with criminal gangs. The Punjab Service Tribunal had set aside the dismissal, primarily reasoning that the respondent had been acquitted in related criminal cases and that his period of absence had been condoned by the department as leave without pay. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to determine whether the Tribunal's decision was legally sustainable. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Service Tribunal failed to consider the critical evidence regarding the respondent's established links with criminal elements, which was a primary ground for his dismissal. The Court further held that treating unauthorized absence as leave without pay does not preclude the imposition of a major penalty like dismissal, as such administrative categorization is not a punishment. The principle laid down is that service tribunals must not exercise their modification powers arbitrarily or based on misreading of evidence, and that an employer's administrative decision to treat absence as leave without pay does not invalidate a concurrent major penalty for misconduct.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employer impose a major penalty of dismissal for unauthorized absence even if that period is treated as leave without pay?
  • Does the acquittal of a public servant in criminal proceedings automatically invalidate departmental disciplinary action based on the same conduct?
  • Is a service tribunal's power to modify punishment subject to judicial review for arbitrariness or misreading of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Deputy Inspector General Of Police, Lahore and others vs Sarfraz Ahmed2021 SCMR 1886, 2021 SCP 366, 2021 PLJ SC 505, 2022 PLC (C.S.) 278 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-10-04
  service appealdismissal from servicepolice constablewilful absencecriminal associationmisreading of evidencedisciplined force
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenges the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal whereby the respondent police constable's dismissal from service was set aside. The core legal question involved whether the Service Tribunal was justified in setting aside the dismissal order which was based on wilful absence from duty and close association with criminal gangs, notwithstanding his acquittal in connected criminal cases. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal committed misreading and non-reading of evidence by ignoring the established finding of the departmental inquiry regarding the respondent's close ties with hardened criminals, and that the treatment of the unauthorized absence period as leave without pay does not vitiate the major penalty of dismissal. The Court laid down the principle that members of a disciplined force maintaining unauthorized absence and associating with criminal elements deserve no leniency, and that administrative authorities are competent to impose major penalties despite formal accounting adjustments of absence periods.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Punjab Service Tribunal can set aside a departmental dismissal based on criminal acquittal while ignoring established charges of association with criminal gangs?
  • Does treating a period of unauthorized absence as leave without pay preclude the imposition of a major penalty such as dismissal from service?
  • What is the standard of discipline required from members of a disciplined force regarding unauthorized absence from duty?
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• Deputy Director Food Faisalabad Division, Faisalabad, etc vs Muhammad2021 KLR Supreme Court Cases 131, 2021 PLJ SC 214, 2021 P SC 659, 2021 SCMR 760, 2021 SCP 114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-03-10
  regularization of servicecontract employeesdate of regularizationpensionary benefitssenioritycivil servants
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a challenge to the Punjab Service Tribunal's order directing that the regularization of the respondents' services should take effect from the date of their initial contract appointments. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether regularization under the relevant statutory framework takes effect from the date of initial contract appointment or from the date of regularization itself. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the Tribunal's order, and held that regularization under the Punjab Regularization of Service Act, 2018 takes effect with immediate effect from the date of regularization, and prior contract service is not counted for pensionary benefits or other purposes. The key principle laid down is that statutory regularization schemes must be interpreted strictly in accordance with their express provisions, which provide for prospective regularization from the date of regular appointment rather than retrospective reckoning from initial contract employment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the regularization of contract employees under the Punjab Regularization of Service Act, 2018 takes effect from the date of initial contract appointment or from the date of regularization?
  • Does service rendered on a contract basis count for pensionary benefits or other purposes upon regularization under the Punjab Regularization of Service Act, 2018?
  • Where should a regularized contract employee be placed on the seniority list of the respective cadre?
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• Deputy Commissioner Upper Dir and others vs Mst. Nusrat Begum2022 SCMR 964 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-01
  regularization of servicescontract employeeproject employeecivil servantpublic service commissionconstitutional petitionlaches
  Summary & questions settled

  The Appellant challenged a judgment of the Peshawar High Court which had allowed a constitutional petition filed by the Respondent seeking regularization of her services as a Charge Nurse. The core legal questions revolved around whether a contract or project employee can claim automatic regularization under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Regularization of Services Act, 2009 or the Civil Servants (Amendment) Act, 2005, and the effect of the termination of a time-bound project on such employment. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that project employees are expressly excluded from the definition of 'employee' under the 2009 Act, that long service does not confer a right to regularization, and that appointments not made in the 'prescribed manner' through the Public Service Commission cannot benefit from the deeming provisions of the 2005 Act. The key principles laid down are that contract and project employees have no vested right to regularisation, that employment tied to a time-bound project ceases upon its completion, and that relief granted to one party cannot be extended to another without independent scrutiny.

  Questions settled

  • Whether project-based contract employees are entitled to regularisation under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Regularization of Services Act, 2009?
  • Does long continuous service on contract basis create a vested right to automatic regularisation?
  • Whether an employee not appointed through the prescribed manner of the Public Service Commission can claim the benefit of regularisation under section 19(2) of the Civil Servants (Amendment) Act, 2005?
  • What is the effect of the conclusion of a time-bound project on the employment status of a project worker?
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• D.H.A. Quetta vs Quetta Residencia Housing Scheme, Quetta and others2021 KLR Supreme Court Cases 281, 2021 P SC 615 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-03-16
  housing schemeland acquisitionproperty rightsconstitutional petitionleave to appealdevelopment schemesuo motu proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arises from an impugned judgment dated 16.12.2020 which struck down certain provisions of the Defence Housing Authority Quetta Act, 2015 as violative of Articles 23, 24, and 142 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, and misconstrued the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 along with the definition of a Specified Area. The core legal questions involve whether the statutory provisions governing land acquisition and development restrictions encroach upon legislative fields, violate fundamental property rights, or permit conflicts of interest, and whether a High Court can continue proceedings after a writ petitioner seeks withdrawal. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these contentions, holding that pending the appeal, the petitioner may develop its schemes under the Act subject to certain safeguards and a cooperative approach, while keeping the impugned judgment in abeyance to that extent. The key principle laid down is that acquiring agencies must exercise powers within statutory definitions of specified areas and that courts must exercise caution regarding potential conflicts of interest in land acquisition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Defence Housing Authority Quetta Act, 2015 are provincial laws that do not violate Article 142 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Do the restrictions on owning and holding land under Section 6(b)(14) and Section 14(b) of the Defence Housing Authority Quetta Act, 2015 apply exclusively to land in which the authority has a legal interest as owner or lessee?
  • Can a High Court continue proceedings in a writ petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 after the aggrieved party seeks to withdraw the same?
  • Whether an acquiring agency can conduct acquisition proceedings for itself without a conflict of interest?
  Read full judgment →
• D. G. Khan Cement Company Ltd vs Government of Punjab through its2021 SCP 136 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-02-11
  Negative Areazoningsustainable developmentprecautionary principlein dubio pro naturawater justiceclimate democracyfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This case concerns a constitutional petition challenging a notification issued by the Government of the Punjab under sections 3 and 11 of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963, which declared parts of Districts Chakwal and Khushab as a "Negative Area" where the establishment and expansion of cement plants are prohibited. The core legal questions addressed whether the Provincial Government possessed the statutory authority to declare a negative area for zoning purposes, whether the notification was based on sound factual and scientific foundations, and whether it infringed upon fundamental rights relating to trade and equality. The Supreme Court held that the Provincial Government has the requisite statutory police power under the Ordinance to zone land for organized, planned, and sustainable industrial growth, and that the restrictions imposed were justified based on expert studies concerning water scarcity, environmental degradation, and ecological preservation. The Court laid down key principles emphasizing that zoning is not absolute but subject to change based on new circumstances, and incorporated international environmental doctrines including the Precautionary Principle, in dubio pro natura, intergenerational equity, and climate justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Provincial Government has the statutory authority under the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963 to declare a negative area restricting the establishment and expansion of industrial units?
  • Does the zoning of land into positive and negative areas by the Provincial Government violate the right to freedom of trade, business, and profession under Article 18 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  • Whether the prohibition against establishing or enlarging industrial undertakings in a designated negative area is absolute and permanent?
  • How do the precautionary principle and the principle of in dubio pro natura apply to judicial review of environmental and water-related administrative decisions?
  Read full judgment →
• D. G. Khan Cement Company Ltd vs Government Of Punjab through Chief2021 P C T L R 857, 2021 SCMR 834 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Negative Areaenvironmental zoningPrecautionary Principlein dubio pro naturasustainable developmentclimate justicewater justiceintergenerational equitycement plant expansionfreedom of trade
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arose from a notification dated 08.03.2018 issued by the Government of Punjab under sections 3 and 11 of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963, which declared certain areas in Chakwal and Khushab as 'Negative Areas' prohibiting the establishment and expansion of cement plants. The petitioner, owning a cement plant in the Salt Range, challenged the notification on grounds of lack of provincial jurisdiction versus local governments, violation of fundamental rights under Articles 18 and 25 of the Constitution, lack of a hearing, and flawed scientific assessment of groundwater levels. The Supreme Court upheld the notification and dismissed the petition. The Court held that the Provincial Government possesses lawful statutory authority under the Ordinance to regulate land use and implement environmental zoning in public interest. Applying the Precautionary Principle, the doctrine of in dubio pro natura, water justice, and climate democracy, the Court affirmed that commercial rights under Article 18 are subject to lawful regulation aimed at sustainable development and safeguarding fragile ecosystems for present and future generations.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Provincial Government have the statutory authority under the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963 to declare an area a 'Negative Area' prohibiting the establishment and expansion of industrial undertakings?
  • Does the statutory power of local governments regarding land use zoning under the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013 override the executive authority of the Provincial Government under the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963 in trans-district matters?
  • Does an environmental zoning restriction banning the enlargement of industrial undertakings in ecologically fragile areas violate the fundamental right to freedom of trade, business, or profession under Article 18 of the Constitution?
  • How should courts apply the Precautionary Principle and the doctrine of in dubio pro natura when reviewing administrative environmental decisions based on scientific and technical findings?
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• Controller Military Accounts (Pension) Lahore Cantonment and others vs Muhammad Sabir (Deceased) through L.Rs2021 PLC (C.S.) 940, 2021 SCMR 1124, 2022 PSC 207 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-12-03
  military pensionarmy reservistminimum pensionspecial pensionarmed forces pension regulationsstatutory interpretationoffice memorandum
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had allowed a writ petition filed by the respondent, a discharged army reservist, directing the appellants to pay him the minimum pension as sanctioned by the Federal Government through various Office Memorandums. The core legal question was whether army reservists, who receive a fixed-rate special pension under the Pension Regulations of the Armed Forces rather than active service retiring pensions, are entitled to the minimum pension notified by the Federal Government for retired government and defence employees. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment. The Court held that reservists constitute a distinct class governed by separate statutory provisions—specifically the Pakistan (Army and Air Force) Reserves Act, 1950 and the Army Pension Code—and receive fixed or proportionate special pensions rather than retiring pensions based on qualifying service. The Court established the principle that Office Memorandums concerning minimum pensions apply only to regular retired employees and do not automatically alter or supersede the distinct fixed-rate statutory pension scheme applicable to military reservists.

  Questions settled

  • Whether army reservists in receipt of a fixed-rate special pension are entitled to the minimum pension notified by the Federal Government for retired government and defence employees?
  • Does the classification of reservist pensioners as a separate group under the Army Pension Code constitute a valid classification under the law?
  • Are Office Memorandums issued by the Federal Government regarding minimum pensions applicable to fixed-rate special pensioners who are not regular retired employees?
  • Does the Reserve Force of the Pakistan Army constitute a distinct force from the regular Pakistan Army Force for the purpose of pensionary benefits?
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• Controller General of Accounts vs Fazli Ahmad, Dao Ec (C&W Division2021 PLC (C.S.) 1085, 2021 PLJ SC 278, 2021 P SC 1190, 2021 SCMR 800, 2021 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-02-10
  departmental examinationservice lawaccrued rightsadministrative notificationofficial gazettepromotion criteriastatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment regarding the validity of a notification issued by the Controller General of Accounts (CGA) that shifted the conduct of departmental promotion examinations for Divisional Accounts Officers from the department to the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC). The core legal question was whether the CGA could unilaterally change the examination mode without following the prescribed legal and procedural requirements, specifically regarding Federal Government approval and official gazette publication. The Supreme Court held that the impugned notification was invalid because it lacked the requisite previous approval of the Federal Government and was not published in the official gazette, violating Section 12 of the Controller General of Accounts (Appointment, Functions and Powers) Ordinance, 2001. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the respondents, having already qualified Part-I of the examination, possessed accrued rights that could not be arbitrarily extinguished by an irregular administrative notification. The Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that the respondents were entitled to complete their examination under the previous regulations.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Controller General of Accounts unilaterally change the mode of departmental examinations without the previous approval of the Federal Government?
  • Does a notification issued by a department require publication in the official gazette to be legally effective?
  • Can administrative authorities retrospectively alter the examination process for employees who have already acquired vested rights under previous regulations?
  • Is a notification valid if it is issued without following the procedural requirements mandated by the relevant governing Ordinance?
  Read full judgment →
• Contempt proceedings initiated against Masood ur Rehman Abbasi on account of derogatory and contemptuous language vs N/A2021 SCP 222 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-06-22
  contempt of courtscandalizing the courtshow cause noticejudicial dignitycontempt proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the initiation of contempt of court proceedings against Masood-ur-Rehman Abbasi following a speech containing allegedly indecent, disrespectful, and scandalous remarks directed at the Chief Justice of Pakistan. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, upon taking cognizance of these remarks, determined that they prima facie constitute contempt of court. Consequently, the Court directed the issuance of a show-cause notice to the respondent, requiring him to explain why he should not be punished under the relevant legal provisions. Furthermore, the Court ordered the Inspector General of Police, Sindh, to ensure service of the notice and the respondent's appearance. Additionally, the Court directed the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) and the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) to provide all records and data concerning the speech. The Attorney General for Pakistan was also issued a notice to assist the Court in the proceedings. The matter was adjourned for further hearing to address the contempt allegations.

  Questions settled

  • Does the issuance of a show-cause notice for contempt of court require the respondent to appear before the Supreme Court?
  • Can the Supreme Court direct law enforcement agencies to secure evidence regarding a speech alleged to be contemptuous?
  • Is the Attorney General for Pakistan required to assist the Court in contempt proceedings under Order XXVII-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Of Inland Revenue vs Messrs Mughal Board Industry2022 PTD 434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-02
  tax amnestysales taxdefault surchargeinput tax adjustmentsubordinate legislation
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a tax matter originating from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, authored by Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J. The core legal question was whether the benefit of an amnesty notification granting exemption from default surcharge and penalties on illegally adjusted input tax could be extended to a taxpayer who deposited the principal amount of sales tax prior to the issuance of the notification, rather than between the notification date and the cut-off date. The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer is entitled to the benefit of the amnesty notification, dismissing the department's petition. The Court reasoned that the objective of the amnesty scheme is to incentivize the quick recovery of stuck-up tax revenue, and penalizing a taxpayer for a voluntary early deposit would add a premium to the intentional withholding of tax. The key principle laid down is that beneficial subordinate legislation, such as a tax amnesty notification, must be interpreted liberally in favor of the taxpayer to facilitate voluntary tax compliance and revenue collection, provided the substantive condition of payment by the cut-off date is met.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the benefit of a tax amnesty notification can be extended to a taxpayer who deposited the principal amount of sales tax prior to the issuance of the notification?
  • Does a tax amnesty notification penalizing voluntary early deposit of tax run counter to the purpose of quick tax recovery?
  • How should beneficial subordinate legislation relating to tax amnesty schemes be interpreted?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, ZoneBahawalpur, Regional Tax Office, Bahawalpur vs M_s Bashir Ahmed, (deceased through LRs.) Prop_ Sarfaraz Hussain & Brothers Commission Agent, Grain Market, Fortabbas2021 P C T L R 1309, 2021 P SC 1313, 2021 PTD 1182, 2021 SCMR 1290, 2021 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-01-28
  Income Tax Ordinance 2001deemed assessment orderamendment of assessmentdefinite informationunexplained incomeSection 111Section 122tax referenceAppellate Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose out of income tax proceedings under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 relating to the tax year 2010. The department sought to amend a deemed assessment order on the ground that it possessed 'definite information' regarding the taxpayer's acquisition of immovable property. Although the department issued a notice to amend the assessment under Section 122(1), (5), and (9), it issued a notice under Section 111(1)(b) subsequently, while maintaining throughout that it already possessed definite information. The Appellate Tribunal and the High Court held that there was no definite information available within the meaning of the law. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision and dismissed the department's appeal, holding that information regarding property acquisition could not constitute definite information under Section 122(5) until proceedings under Section 111 culminated or were appropriately combined with express notice. Proceeding on the premise of possessing definite information prior to providing mandatory opportunity under Section 111 constituted a fatal statutory defect.

  Questions settled

  • Can the tax department amend a deemed assessment order under Section 122(5) on the basis of unexplained property acquisition before completing proceedings under Section 111 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Whether notice under Section 111 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 can be issued after initiating proceedings under Section 122(5) on the premise that 'definite information' already exists?
  • Is it permissible to issue a notice under Section 111 along with a notice to amend an assessment under Section 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Regional Tax Office, Faisalabad. vs Mr.2022 SCP 267, 2022 SCMR 1938 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-08-31
  income taxfinal tax regimerendering of serviceslabour and carriage servicesstatutory interpretationejusdem generistax reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal filed by the tax department against a consolidated order of the High Court, which had decided tax references in favour of the taxpayer. The core legal question was whether contracts for rendering labour and carriage services fall under section 153(1)(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, making the taxpayer's income subject to the final tax regime, or under section 153(1)(b) of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the definition of 'services' under section 153(9) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is not exhaustive, and excluding labour and carriage services by applying the ejusdem generis rule after statutory omissions of the word 'professional' is impermissible. The Court dismissed the petitions, affirming that labour and carriage services are covered under the relevant provisions of the Ordinance as interpreted in prior consistent jurisprudence, and additionally criticized the Federal Board of Revenue for its persistent failure to maintain a proper digital litigation data bank.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contracts for rendering labour and carriage services fall under section 153(1)(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the definition of 'services' under section 153(9) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 include labour and carriage services?
  • Whether the omission of the word 'professional' from section 153 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 affects the interpretation of 'services'?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Multan, etc vs M/s. Acro Spinning &2021 SCP 250, 2021 PCTLR 1412, 2021 PSC 1333, 2021 PTD 1355, 2021 SCMR 1308 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-05-27
  sales taxzero ratingfurther taxunregistered personsVAT modeleave to appealtaxable supplies
  Summary & questions settled

  The Commissioner Inland Revenue filed leave petitions against High Court orders that had allowed writ petitions of respondent taxpayers, following an earlier judgment in MKB Spinning Mills (Pvt) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (2018 PTD 2364). The core legal question concerned whether taxable supplies made to unregistered persons by taxpayers belonging to specified sectors were subject to further tax under Section 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, despite being zero-rated under Section 4 through SRO 1125(I)/2011. The Supreme Court held that Section 4 contains a non-obstante clause rendering it overriding over Section 3, meaning zero-rated goods are not liable to further tax under Section 3(1A). However, the Court corrected an erroneous observation in the High Court precedent regarding the existence of two separate tax regimes, clarifying that the Sales Tax Act creates a single integrated VAT-mode tax regime. Consequently, the Supreme Court declined leave to appeal and dismissed the petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether zero rating of goods under Section 4 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 overrides the levy of further tax under Section 3(1A) of the said Act?
  • Does the Sales Tax Act, 1990 create multiple tax regimes or a single integrated tax regime operating in the VAT mode?
  • Whether taxable supplies made to unregistered persons by specified sectors under SRO 1125(I)/2011 are chargeable to zero percent tax?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Multan Zone, Rto, Multan vs Falah ud DinPTCL 2021 CL. 788, 2021 SCP 388 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-10-12
  Advocate-on-Recordcondonation of delaylimitationprofessional misconductSupreme Court Rulesadjournmentlegal ethics
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by the Commissioner Inland Revenue, which was barred by time. The petitioner filed an application for condonation of delay, but on the day of the hearing, the Advocate Supreme Court (ASC) requested an adjournment, and the Advocate-on-Record (AOR) initially failed to appear. Upon being summoned, the AOR was unprepared, lacked the case file, and could not justify the delay, which was attributed to routine administrative procedures. The Supreme Court examined the roles and responsibilities of an AOR under the Supreme Court Rules 1980, emphasizing that the primary responsibility to act, appear, and plead remains with the AOR, who is not absolved of this duty by engaging an ASC. Finding no sufficient cause for the delay, the Court dismissed the condonation application and consequently dismissed the main petition as time-barred, while warning the AOR of potential disciplinary action for professional misconduct.

  Questions settled

  • Does the engagement of an Advocate Supreme Court (ASC) absolve the Advocate-on-Record (AOR) of their primary responsibility to appear and plead under the Supreme Court Rules 1980?
  • Can routine administrative delays in obtaining departmental permission constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing a petition before the Supreme Court?
  • What are the disciplinary consequences for an Advocate-on-Record who fails to prepare for a case or maintain the case file under the Supreme Court Rules 1980?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lto, Karachi vs Packages Limited2022 SCMR 634, PTCL 2022 CL. 25, 2022 PCTLR 1576, 2022 PTD 727 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-13
  Income Tax Ordinance 1979section 66Alimitation periodtime-barred noticeshow cause noticeFederal Board of Revenuefrivolous litigationcosts
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan assailed the order of the High Court of Sindh regarding the limitation period under the repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the show cause notice issued by the Department under Section 66A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, was time-barred. The Supreme Court observed that under Section 66A, a notice must be issued by the Inspecting Additional Commissioner within four years from the date of the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner. Since the initial order was passed on 16 March 1998, the show cause notice issued on 23 May 2011 (as well as a subsequent notice dated 12 June 2013) was issued well beyond the prescribed four-year period. The Court held that the Department could not initiate action under Section 66A after the expiration of the statutory timeframe. Consequently, leave to appeal was declined, and the petition was dismissed with costs against the Department for pursuing frivolous litigation.

  Questions settled

  • What is the statutory limitation period for issuing a notice under Section 66A of the repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • Can the Income Tax Department initiate action under Section 66A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, after the expiry of four years from the Deputy Commissioner's order?
  • Whether a show cause notice under Section 66A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, issued thirteen years after the original assessment order, is barred by time?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, etc vs Jahangir Khan Tareen & others2022 PSC 121 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-09-15
  show cause noticewrit petitiondelegation of powersincome tax assessmentjurisdictionalternative remedypremature petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses whether a constitutional petition is maintainable against a show-cause notice issued by a tax authority. The respondent challenged a show-cause notice issued under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, through a writ petition before the Lahore High Court, which quashed the notice on the ground that the issuing officer lacked jurisdiction and delegation of authority. Upon conversion of the petition into an appeal, the Supreme Court held that interference by a constitutional court at the premature stage of a show-cause notice is generally unwarranted, as the recipient has adequate statutory remedies and can raise all jurisdictional objections before the departmental authority. The Court ruled that the matter must be remanded to the Additional Commissioner to first establish the conditions of valid delegation under Section 210 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, before proceeding on the merits. Additionally, the Court emphasized the statutory and constitutional obligation of tax authorities to publish all relevant notifications in the official gazette and website to avoid unnecessary litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution is maintainable against the mere issuance of a show-cause notice by a tax authority?
  • Can an Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue amend an assessment without establishing a valid delegation of authority under Section 210 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Must tax authorities ensure that statutory notifications and orders having the force of law are published in the official gazette and on official websites?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-I, Lahore vs M/s. Pak Elektron Ltd. etcPTCL 2021 CL. 801, 2022 SCMR 757, 2021 PTD 765 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-02-04
  zero ratingelectricity metersSROsales taxindustrial processleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue against the judgment of the High Court upholding the Appellate Tribunal's view that electricity meters qualify as equipment eligible for zero-rating under SRO 530(1)/2005 dated 06.06.2005. The core legal question is whether electricity meters constitute equipment used in the operation of an industrial process and are thus eligible for zero-rating under the relevant statutory regulatory order, or whether they are merely consumer durables. The Supreme Court held that power supply is crucial for plant and machinery operation, and electricity meters function as metering equipment classifiable as equipment used in the industrial process, aligning with previous jurisprudence. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal, affirming the lower forums' interpretation.

  Questions settled

  • Are electricity meters eligible for zero-rating as equipment under SRO 530(1)/2005?
  • Whether electricity meters can be classified as equipment used in the operation of an industrial process?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue Multan vs Sh. Muhammad Amin Arshad2021 SCMR 437 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-01-07
  definite informationamended assessmentIncome Tax Ordinance 2001Section 122(5)unexplained incomebanking channeladvisory jurisdictiontax reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a tax reference matter where the Department challenged a High Court order declining to answer a reference under advisory jurisdiction regarding amended tax assessment. The core legal question was whether payments received through banking channels far exceeding an assessee's declared income, verified by the paying entity, constituted 'definite information' under Section 122(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 to justify amended assessment and addition under Section 39. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, setting aside the High Court's order and restoring the orders of the Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals). The Court held that undocumented or under-declared income backed by verified bank transactions constitutes 'definite information' under Section 122(5). The key principle laid down is that where receipt of payments via banking channels is confirmed and unsubstantiated by the assessee, the tax authorities are fully empowered under Sections 122(5) and 39 of the Ordinance to amend assessment and determine income tax liability.

  Questions settled

  • What constitutes 'definite information' under Section 122(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001?
  • Whether payments received through banking channels exceeding declared income empower the tax authorities to amend an assessment under Section 122(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001?
  • Can tax liability be determined under Section 39 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 based on verified bank transactions not declared by the assessee?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Faisalabad Division, Faisalabad and another vs Allah2021 PLJ SC 24 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  service lawmisconductquantum of punishmentdepartmental inquiryservice tribunal powersfraud against governmentjudicial review of administrative action
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had reduced the penalty of dismissal from service imposed on a government servant to the forfeiture of two years' approved service. The respondent had admitted to the unauthorized transfer of 270 Kanals of government land to a private party, causing significant financial loss. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal, in exercising its appellate jurisdiction, possesses unbridled discretion to reduce penalties imposed by departmental authorities for proven misconduct, particularly involving fraud or embezzlement of government assets. The Supreme Court held that the powers of the Tribunal under the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974 are not discretionary or unbridled. The Court ruled that where misconduct is established, the quantum of punishment is the prerogative of the department, and the Tribunal cannot interfere unless the penalty is perverse or demonstrably disproportionate. The Court emphasized that fraud or embezzlement of government property warrants strict disciplinary action and that subsequent recovery of assets does not mitigate the gravity of the initial misconduct.

  Questions settled

  • Are the powers of the Service Tribunal under Section 5 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974 to modify departmental penalties discretionary and unbridled?
  • Can a Service Tribunal interfere with a departmental penalty of dismissal where the government servant has admitted to the misconduct of transferring government land?
  • Does the recovery of government property after an unauthorized transfer mitigate the gravity of the misconduct for the purpose of determining the quantum of punishment?
  • Under what circumstances can a Service Tribunal legally interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed by a departmental authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Collector of Custom FBR and another vs M/s. Fitter Pakistan (Pvt.) LtdPTCL 2021 CL. 359 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-25
  tax exemptionsales taxcustoms tariffstatutory interpretationtextile classificationfiscal statute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a tax dispute regarding the eligibility of 'Artificial Filament Tow' for a sales tax exemption under SRO 509(I)/2007. The respondent imported the item, classified under PCT Heading 5502.0090, and sought a zero-percent sales tax rate applicable to 'Textile and articles thereof' under Chapters 50 to 63 of the Pakistan Customs Tariff. The core legal question was whether the imported item, used for cigarette filter rods, qualified as a textile item under the exemption notification. The Supreme Court held that the item did not qualify for the exemption. The Court determined that the respondent failed to establish that the imported goods fell within the description of 'textiles or an article thereof,' noting that the item's specific application in cigarette filters distinguished it from textile products. The Court reaffirmed the principle that tax exemptions must be construed strictly, as they are exceptions to general tax liability. Furthermore, when an exempting provision is susceptible to two interpretations, the interpretation favoring the revenue rather than the taxpayer is to be preferred.

  Questions settled

  • Does the classification of an item under a specific PCT chapter automatically entitle it to a tax exemption if the notification requires the item to also meet a specific descriptive category?
  • How should an exemption notification be interpreted when it is susceptible to two different interpretations?
  • Is 'Artificial Filament Tow' used for cigarette filter rods considered a textile or an article thereof for the purposes of SRO 509(I)/2007?
  Read full judgment →
• Civil Petitions Nos. 4540 and 4541 of 2021 vs Hamza Sugar Mills Ltd. and others2021 PLD Supreme Court 806 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-08-12
  sugar pricinginterim reliefjudicial restraintconstitutional jurisdictioncommercial policywrit jurisdictionprice regulation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against an interim order passed by the Lahore High Court in writ petitions challenging government notifications fixing the sale price of sugar. The core legal question addressed is whether the High Court, under its constitutional jurisdiction, should engage in monitoring commercial pricing mechanisms and policy-related supply terms of edible commodities. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by entering the uncertain territory of supervising commercial profit and loss dealings, which falls outside the scope of judicial adjudication under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Court emphasized that judicial duty is to resolve legal disputes rather than manage market pricing. Consequently, the Supreme Court directed the High Court to expedite the final determination of the pending legal issues within a fortnight. To protect the interests of the regulators during the interim period, the Court modified the security arrangements, ordering that the price differential between the government-fixed rate and the rate charged by the sugar mills be deposited with the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) of the High Court, with the Cane Commissioner's calculations prevailing in case of disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to monitor and supervise commercial pricing mechanisms and profit-loss dealings?
  • Should a High Court engage in the regulation of supply terms for edible commodities in the market?
  • Is a surety bond sufficient security for regulators when a court stays a government notification fixing the price of a commodity?
  Read full judgment →
• Chief Secretary, Government of the Punjab, Lahore, etc vs Parveen Shad, etc2021 KLR Supreme Court Cases 100 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-02-08
  pay protectionregularization of contract employeesright to livelihoodpersonal allowanceinitial pay scaleconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by the Chief Secretary, Government of the Punjab, challenging the entitlement of employees, who were initially appointed on a contract basis in the year 2000 and subsequently regularized under a Notification dated 19.10.2009, to pay protection for their contract period. The core legal question was whether a contractual employee, upon regularization, is entitled to their last drawn salary including all increments earned over the years, or whether such increments can be converted into a Personal Allowance while reverting their salary to the initial pay scale stage. The Supreme Court held that clause 6 of the Notification, which reverts regularized employees to their initial starting salary and converts their earned increments into a Personal Allowance, is harsh, unreasonable, and violative of the fundamental rights to livelihood and dignity under Articles 9 and 14 of the Constitution of Pakistan. The Court laid down the principle that regularization is a step up that must improve or maintain terms and conditions of service, and it cannot be used to make an employee financially worse off by reducing their salary and disregarding years of service.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contract employees who are subsequently regularized are entitled to pay protection for the period they remained on contract?
  • Does converting increments earned during contract service into a Personal Allowance upon regularization violate the constitutional rights to livelihood and dignity?
  • Can regularization result in reducing an employee's salary by reverting them to the initial pay stage of their service career?
  Read full judgment →
• Chief Secretary, Government Of Punjab, Lahore and others vs Ms. Shamim2021 SCMR 1390, 2021 PSC 1160 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-07-01
  Constitutional jurisdictionService mattersProforma promotionJurisdiction of High CourtArticle 212 of the ConstitutionPunjab Service TribunalExclusion of jurisdictionCivil servantFitness for promotionVoid order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned a challenge to a High Court order directing the petitioner-department to grant proforma promotion to the respondent, a civil servant, to Grade-20, despite the competent authority having declined her case. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction to entertain such a matter, given the constitutional bar under Article 212 of the Constitution, which vests exclusive jurisdiction in Administrative Courts and Tribunals for service-related terms and conditions. The Supreme Court held that the High Court lacked jurisdiction. The Court found that the matter did not fall within the exception of "fitness" for promotion under Section 4(1)(b) of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974. The High Court's impugned order was set aside, and the respondent's constitutional petition was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that Article 212 of the Constitution overrides the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 in service matters, rendering any transgression of this limitation void and illegal.

  Read full judgment →
• Chief Secretary Govt. of the Punjab, Lahore, etc vs Ms. Shamim Usman2021 SCP 278 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-06-30
  service matterproforma promotionconstitutional jurisdictionservice tribunalterms and conditions of servicejurisdictional barfitness vs eligibility
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a challenge to a High Court order directing the provincial government to grant proforma promotion to a civil servant. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed the jurisdiction to entertain a petition regarding the terms and conditions of a civil servant’s service, specifically concerning promotion, in light of the constitutional bar imposed by Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Supreme Court held that the High Court lacked jurisdiction, as the matter fell within the exclusive domain of the Service Tribunal. The Court clarified that while Section 4(1)(b) of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974 excludes matters of 'fitness' for promotion from the Tribunal's jurisdiction, the present case involved eligibility rather than fitness, thus remaining within the Tribunal's purview. The Court established that the non-obstante clauses of Article 212 override the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 199. Consequently, the High Court’s order was set aside as unconstitutional and void, and the respondent was directed to approach the appropriate forum for redress.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to entertain a petition regarding the terms and conditions of a civil servant's service under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Does the exclusion of 'fitness' for promotion under Section 4(1)(b) of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974 apply to matters of eligibility for promotion?
  • Does Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 override the writ jurisdiction of the High Court in service matters?
  • Is a High Court order issued in violation of the jurisdictional bar under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 considered void?
  Read full judgment →
• Chief Executive, Pesco Department, Government Of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar and others vs Afnan Khan and another2021 SCMR 2100, 2022 PLJ SC 56, 2022 PSC 346 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-10-14
  civil revisionlimitation periodoffice objectionssuo motu jurisdictionboard resolutionremand
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court heard an appeal against the High Court's judgment dismissing a civil revision petition as time-barred due to delay in re-submission after office objections, and for non-filing of a Board of Directors resolution. The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to follow established precedent regarding the exercise of suo motu revisional jurisdiction and limitation, specifically ignoring principles laid down by a 5-Member Bench in Hafeez Ahmed v. Civil Judge, Lahore (PLD 2012 SC 400). The Court noted that since the initial revision was filed within time, office procedures under the High Court Rules regarding re-submission and notice ought to have been properly followed. Furthermore, regarding the corporate resolution, the Court held that since the suit and revision were filed against designated officials rather than the corporate entity itself, the objection regarding the non-filing of a board resolution was unjustified. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the matter to the High Court for a fresh decision in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil revision filed within time but re-submitted after office objections beyond the allowed period can be dismissed without following the prescribed High Court Rules?
  • Can a revisional court dismiss a revision petition on limitation grounds without considering the exercise of its suo motu revisional jurisdiction to correct jurisdictional errors?
  • Is a resolution of the Board of Directors required when a suit or revision is filed against specific officials of a corporate entity rather than the corporate entity itself?
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• Chief Executive Officer, Multan Electric Power Company Ltd, Khanewal2021 KLR Supreme Court Cases 155, 2021 P SC (Crl.) 332, 2021 SCMR 775, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-03-22
  judicial reviewjudicial overreachseparation of powersrecruitment processwrit jurisdictionexecutive functionsappointment letterconstitutional limits
  Summary & questions settled

  This case originated from a constitutional petition where the High Court directed Multan Electric Power Company (MEPCO) to issue an appointment letter to a candidate for the post of Assistant Line Man, despite the candidate failing to meet the merit threshold and the subsequent cancellation of the entire recruitment process. The core legal question concerned the scope of judicial review under Article 199 and whether the High Court's direction constituted an encroachment upon executive functions. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's orders, holding that the judiciary cannot assume the role of the executive by disregarding recruitment policies and merit criteria. The Court laid down the principle that judicial review is limited to determining the legality of executive actions and does not empower a judge to perform executive functions. The judgment emphasized that judicial overreach violates the doctrine of separation of powers and that courts must remain within their constitutionally mandated oversight functions without being swayed by personal notions of justice.

  Read full judgment →
• Chaudhry Nadeem Sultan vs The State through P.G. Punjab and another2022 SCMR 663, PLJ 2022 SC (Cr.C.) 91, 2022 PSC 593, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 318 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-12
  post-arrest bailplea of alibiColumn No. 2further inquirydefinition of accused personunexplained delay in FIRCDR evidenceSection 497(2) Cr.P.C.
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution assailed the Lahore High Court's order denying post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a murder case registered under Sections 302, 324, 449, 109, and 34 PPC. Although directly named in the FIR for firing upon the deceased, the petitioner took a plea of alibi supported by affidavits and cell phone CDR data. Consequently, the Investigating Officer placed his name in Column No. 2 of the Section 173 Cr.P.C. report. The Supreme Court observed an unexplained five-hour delay in lodging the FIR. Citing precedent, the Court clarified that a person becomes an 'accused' only when charged in a trial or sent up for trial by the police. Where the police place an individual in Column No. 2 and no recovery is made, and the Trial Court issues summons under Sections 91/204 Cr.P.C., the case falls under Section 497(2) Cr.P.C. requiring further inquiry. The Court converted the petition into an appeal and granted post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • At what stage does a person against whom an accusation is made legally acquire the status of an 'accused person' under the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • Whether the placement of a suspect's name in Column No. 2 of a Section 173 Cr.P.C. report based on accepted alibi evidence entitles them to bail under Section 497(2) Cr.P.C. on the ground of further inquiry?
  • Does an unexplained delay of several hours in registering an FIR create a case for further inquiry in a capital offence?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman, Federal Board Of Intermediate And Secondary Education vs Kumail Khan2022 SCMR 912 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-22
  date of birth correctioneducational recordconcurrent findingsrevisional jurisdictionNADRA birth certificateevidentiary valuematriculation certificate
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that directed the Federal Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education to alter the respondent's date of birth in his Secondary School Certificate from 5.6.1994 to 5.6.1998. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in exercising its revisional jurisdiction to set aside concurrent findings of the lower courts, which had rejected the respondent's claim based on consistent documentary evidence—including school records and the respondent's own examination forms—and unreliable oral testimony. The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed a gross error by prioritizing a NADRA birth certificate obtained nineteen years after the respondent's birth, without supporting documentation, over the established educational records. The Court emphasized that concurrent findings of fact should not be disturbed in revision without compelling justification, especially when the evidence relied upon by the High Court was insufficient and contradictory. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the original date of birth recorded in the respondent's matriculation certificate.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court in revisional jurisdiction set aside concurrent findings of fact based on a late-issued birth certificate?
  • Is a NADRA birth certificate issued years after birth sufficient to override consistent educational records regarding a student's date of birth?
  • Can oral testimony from witnesses who lack personal knowledge and provide hearsay evidence be relied upon to alter official educational records?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman Pakistan Ordnance Factories Board, Wah Cantt vs Shahzad2021 SCP 194, 2021 PLC (C.S.) 1099, 2021 SCMR 1055, 2022 PSC 341 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-02-16
  pensionary benefitscompulsory retirementqualifying servicecivil service regulationsservice tribunalgratuity
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an order of the Federal Service Tribunal directing the Appellant to process the Respondent's pensionary benefits under Regulation 371-A of the Civil Service Regulations. The Respondent, an employee of Pakistan Ordnance Factories, was dismissed from service, but the Tribunal previously converted the dismissal into compulsory retirement after finding he had served for 13 years. Subsequently, the Respondent sought a pension, which was denied on the ground that he had not completed the 25 years of service required for a pension, and he was paid gratuity instead. The Respondent filed a miscellaneous petition, leading to the Tribunal's impugned order. The core legal question is whether an employee with 13 years of service is entitled to pensionary benefits under Regulation 371-A of the Civil Service Regulations or otherwise. The Supreme Court held that the minimum qualifying service for receipt of pension is 25 years, and Regulation 371-A does not grant pensionary benefits to an employee with only 13 years of service. The Court set aside the Tribunal's order, laying down that pension entitlement strictly depends on fulfilling the prescribed minimum qualifying service and that temporary service regulations cannot be misapplied to grant pensions where qualifying service is lacking.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee who has rendered 13 years of service is entitled to receive pensionary benefits upon compulsory retirement?
  • Does Regulation 371-A of the Civil Service Regulations apply to permanent employees who have not completed the minimum qualifying service for a pension?
  • What is the minimum qualifying service required for the entitlement to receive pension under the civil service rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman Pakistan Ordnanace Factories Board, Wah Cantt vs Dr. Naveeda2021 PLC (C.S. ) 502, 2021 P SC 723, 2021 SCMR 172 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-12-09
  study leavehalf payFundamental Rulesservice lawdiscriminationgovernment servantpay and allowances
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil appeals filed by the Chairman, Pakistan Ordnance Factories Board, challenging the Federal Service Tribunal's decision to grant a medical officer full pay while on study leave. The core legal questions were whether the respondent was entitled to full pay during her study leave and whether her circumstances were comparable to colleagues who received different treatment. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal erred in its interpretation of the applicable regulations. The Court ruled that under Rule 19 and Rule 20 of Appendix 9 to the Fundamental Rules, study leave is restricted to half-pay, not full pay. Furthermore, the Court determined that the respondent’s case was factually distinguishable from her colleagues, as she had independently applied for training rather than being nominated by the employer. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal’s judgments, affirming that the respondent was entitled only to half-average salary for the duration of her study leave, thereby upholding the strict application of the Fundamental Rules regarding study leave entitlements.

  Questions settled

  • Is a government servant entitled to full pay while on study leave under the Fundamental Rules?
  • Can a government employee claim discrimination when their situation is factually distinguishable from colleagues who were nominated for training by the employer?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the authority to grant full pay for study leave contrary to the provisions of the Fundamental Rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman National Accountability Bureau through Prosecutor General Accountability, NAB Headquarters, Sector G-5/1, Islamabad vs Faraz Ahmed Sherwani and others2022 PLC (C.S.) 356, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 441 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-06-09
  service lawpromotionNational Accountability BureauTCS-2002implied amendmentcivil servantsBPS-17
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the legality of the promotion of the respondents to the post of Private Secretary (BPS-17) within the National Accountability Bureau (NAB). The respondents, initially appointed as Stenographers (BPS-15) and later promoted to Personal Assistants (BPS-16), challenged their promotion to Private Secretary (BPS-17) as being contrary to the NAB Terms and Conditions of Service (TCS-2002), seeking instead promotion to Assistant Director (BPS-17). The core legal question was whether the creation and filling of the Private Secretary (BPS-17) posts were legally valid despite not being explicitly listed in the original TCS-2002. The Supreme Court held that the NAB, by virtue of paragraph 14.08 of the TCS-2002, had validly adopted the rules applicable to other civil servants, which included the creation and filling of Private Secretary posts. The Court emphasized that the existence of these posts and the adoption of relevant government rules effectively amended the TCS-2002 by implication. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, upholding the validity of the respondents' promotion to Private Secretary (BPS-17).

  Questions settled

  • Can the Terms and Conditions of Service (TCS) of a statutory organization be amended by implication through the adoption of general civil service rules?
  • Does the existence of a post in practice and its filling through established promotion quotas validate the post even if not explicitly listed in the initial service rules?
  • Are employees of the National Accountability Bureau governed by general civil service rules in matters not specifically covered by the NAB TCS-2002?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Riaz Ahmad vs Munir Sultan Malik2022 SCMR 667, 2022 PSC 1078 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-12
  pre-emption suitTalb-e-MuwathibatTalb-e-Ishhadrecording of evidenceslip of tongueburden of proofservice of notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside concurrent findings of the lower courts in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question concerned whether the plaintiff successfully proved the performance of Talb-e-Muwathibat and Talb-e-Ishhad, given significant contradictions in the dates of knowledge pleaded versus those testified to by witnesses, and the failure to produce the postman to prove service of notice. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff failed to establish the essential requirements of pre-emption. The Court emphasized that the trial and appellate courts erred in characterizing testimonial contradictions regarding the date of knowledge as mere 'slips of tongue' without any evidentiary basis or procedural correction by the witness during the recording of evidence under Order XVIII, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that failure to produce the postman to prove the delivery or refusal of the notice of Talb-e-Ishhad is fatal to the suit. Consequently, the High Court's decision to dismiss the suit was upheld as legally sound.

  Questions settled

  • Is a court competent to declare a witness's statement a 'slip of tongue' without any material on record or a request for correction by the witness?
  • What is the legal consequence of a plaintiff's failure to produce the postman to prove the delivery or refusal of the notice of Talb-e-Ishhad?
  • Does the procedure under Order XVIII, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 allow a witness to correct recorded testimony after it has been read over?
  • Can a court, on its own motion, interpret contradictory testimony as a 'slip of tongue' in the absence of evidence supporting such a conclusion?
  Read full judgment →
• Capital Development Authority, CDA through Chairman, CDA, Islamabad2021 SCMR 61 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  frivolous litigationimposition of special costssuppression of material factstransferability of plotconsent decreestatutory bodyaccess to justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition filed by the Capital Development Authority (CDA) challenging a judgment of the High Court which had accepted Respondent No.1's constitutional petition against an order setting aside a consent decree under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. CDA claimed that the disputed plot was non-transferable outside the original allottee's family. The core legal questions pertained to whether CDA could challenge the transferability of a plot after repeatedly permitting transfers to non-family members and conceding to ownership in prior judicial proceedings, and whether special costs ought to be imposed on a statutory body for suppressing material facts and engaging in frivolous, vexatious litigation that wasted court resources. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused leave. The Court held that statutory institutions must abide by their own decisions and cannot invoke court jurisdiction to rectify internal managerial lapses or past concessions. Furthermore, concealing relevant prior decisions and engaging in baseless, repetitive litigation violates the right to expeditious justice under Articles 9 and 37(d) of the Constitution, justifying the imposition of exemplary special costs under Order XXVIII Rule A(3) of the Supreme Court Rules 1980.

  Questions settled

  • Can a statutory body challenge the transfer of a plot to a non-family member after repeatedly approving similar transfers in the past?
  • Whether the suppression of material judicial proceedings and facts in pleadings amounts to misleading the court justifying special costs under Order XXVIII Rule A(3) of the Supreme Court Rules 1980?
  • Does filing frivolous and vexatious litigation by public institutions infringe the constitutional right of access to expeditious justice under Articles 9 and 37(d) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Capital Development Authority through its Chairman, Islamabad and others vs Shabir Hussain and others2021 SCP 424, 2022 PSC 1484, 2022 PLC (C.S.) 859, 2022 SCMR 627 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-12-01
  vested rightdepartmental promotion committeenatural justicedue processlocus poenitentiaeservice regulationsadministrative lawfair trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This Civil Petition challenged a judgment by the Islamabad High Court, which set aside the Capital Development Authority's (CDA) order withdrawing the promotions of several employees. The respondents, regular CDA staff, were promoted to Assistant Director (BS-17) following Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) recommendations and approval by the competent authority. Subsequently, the CDA cancelled these promotions without providing notice or reasons. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that once a promotion is recommended by a DPC and approved by the competent authority, a vested right is created in favor of the employee. The Court emphasized that administrative authorities cannot withdraw such rights in a casual manner without adhering to principles of natural justice, due process, and the right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Court invoked Section 24A of the General Clauses Act, 1897, noting that executive power must be exercised reasonably and with provided reasons. The Court concluded that future rule amendments cannot retrospectively disturb past and closed transactions, and the doctrine of locus poenitentiae protects the respondents' earned promotions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recommendation of a Departmental Promotion Committee followed by the approval of a competent authority create a vested right for an employee?
  • Can an administrative authority cancel a promotion order without providing notice or an opportunity for a hearing?
  • Does the principle of locus poenitentiae prevent an authority from retrospectively withdrawing promotions based on future rule amendments?
  • Is an executive authority required to provide reasons for its decisions under Section 24A of the General Clauses Act, 1897?
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• Capital Development Authority through its Chairman vs Rana Munawar Khan2021 P SC 1124, 2021 SCMR 483, 2021 SCP 30 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-12-07
  commercial plot allotmentdelayed payment chargesCapital Development Authoritymisreading of evidenceWafaqi Mohtasib
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Islamabad High Court upholding a trial court decree in favor of the respondent, who had filed a civil suit against the Capital Development Authority (CDA) regarding plot allotment dues and delayed payment charges. The core legal question concerned whether the respondent was justified in withholding installment payments due to alleged encumbrances (high-tension wires) on the allotted commercial plot and whether the CDA was lawfully bound to waive delayed payment charges based on proceedings before the Wafaqi Mohtasib. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the courts below misread and misinterpreted the evidence and clause (6) of the allotment letter, as the respondent had admitted in the possession letter that there were no encroachments, and the Vice Chairman's proposal for rescheduling lacked CDA Board approval. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of lower courts based on misreading and non-reading of evidence are unsustainable, and allottees cannot evade statutory financial obligations to public authorities on baseless grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an allottee of a commercial plot can withhold installment payments on the ground of delayed delivery of possession due to alleged encumbrances?
  • Can a recommendation by the Vice Chairman of the Capital Development Authority for rescheduling payments bind the CDA without the approval of the CDA Board?
  • Do judgments of lower courts based on misreading and non-reading of evidence warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
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• Capital Development Authority (CDA) through its Chairman CDA, Headquarters, Islamabad and another vs M_s Habib Rafiq (Pvt) Ltd and others2021 SCP 174, 2021 SCMR 1137, 2022 KLR Supreme Court Cases 55, 2022 PCTLR · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-03-25
  arbitration actarbitral awardfiling of awardrule of the courtprocedural irregularitylimitation period
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a civil petition assailing a common judgment of the Islamabad High Court concerning an arbitral award. The core legal question revolves around whether an arbitral award was validly filed in court in accordance with Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, where a dispute arose over whether the award was filed directly by the arbitrator or through the claimant's counsel, and whether a subsequent statement by the arbitrator could cure any procedural irregularity. The Supreme Court held that the arbitrator is mandated to cause the award to be filed at the request of a party or by court direction, and where a dispute arises on the mode of filing, the court may seek clarification from the arbitrator rather than improperly remitting the award. The key principle laid down is that procedural technicalities regarding the physical filing of an arbitral award under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 can be rectified and cured by the subsequent ratification or statement of the arbitrator confirming that it was filed at the request of a party.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an arbitral award can be considered validly filed under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 when submitted pursuant to a party's request accompanied by the arbitrator's subsequent clarifying statement?
  • Does the Arbitration Act, 1940 impose a prohibition upon the arbitrator from causing the award to be filed through a party or their counsel?
  • Can a court resolve a dispute regarding the proper filing of an award by seeking clarification from the arbitrator rather than remitting the award?
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• Bilal Khan vs The State2021 SCMR 460 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-01-25
  post-arrest bailnarcoticsamphetamineIcetentative assessmentred-handed arrestforensic report
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition for leave to appeal against the refusal of bail in a narcotics case. The petitioner was apprehended by the Excise Police while driving a vehicle containing 1200 grams of amphetamine (Ice) concealed in a secret cavity. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail based on a claim of false implication despite being caught red-handed with a significant quantity of lethal contraband. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the recovery of a considerable quantity of narcotics, supported by a positive forensic report, brought the case within the statutory prohibition of bail under Section 51 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The Court maintained that a claim of false implication requires a deep dive into the evidence, which is prohibited during the tentative assessment stage of bail proceedings. The key principle laid down is that where there is a red-handed arrest and a positive forensic report for a lethal quantity of narcotics, the courts cannot look beyond a tentative assessment to grant bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a claim of false implication can be considered beyond the scope of tentative assessment during bail proceedings?
  • Does the recovery of 1200 grams of amphetamine supported by a positive forensic report attract the prohibition under Section 51 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Can bail be granted when an accused is apprehended red-handed with a lethal quantity of contraband concealed in a vehicle?
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• Bashir Ahmad Anjum vs Muhammad Raffique and others2021 PLJ SC 195, 2021 P SC 886, 2021 SCMR 772, 2021 SCP 122 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-03-25
  gift mutationpower of attorneysecondary evidenceinheritanceburden of prooffrivolous litigationabuse of processcosts
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose out of a suit filed by a legal heir challenging a gift mutation registered in favour of his brother based on a power of attorney executed by their deceased father. The trial court decreed the suit after finding that the alleged power of attorney in favour of the attorney was never produced in original, no permission for secondary evidence was obtained, and the Registrar's office denied its existence. The appellate and revisional courts dismissed the petitioner's appeals on procedural grounds without deciding on merits. The core legal question was whether a gift of land executed via an unproven, non-existent power of attorney in favour of a close relative could be sustained. The Supreme Court held that the burden of proving a power of attorney rests strictly on the beneficiary claiming under it. The Court sustained the trial court's judgment, finding the power of attorney fictitious and structured to circumvent legal restrictions. The petition was dismissed with costs throughout.

  Questions settled

  • On whom does the burden of proof lie to establish the validity and execution of a power of attorney when a gift mutation is made pursuant to it?
  • Can secondary evidence of a power of attorney be relied upon without obtaining prior permission from the court?
  • Is a gift mutation based on an unproven power of attorney valid in law when official records deny the existence of such power of attorney?
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• Bahar Shah and others vs Manzoor Ahmad2022 SCMR 284, 2022 PLJ SC 10, 2022 PSC 1604 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-10-14
  specific performancebona fide purchaseragreement to sellconstructive noticeburden of proofsecond appealgood faith
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell agricultural land. The respondent (plaintiff) alleged that after executing an agreement to sell in his favour, the vendor (appellant No. 2) transferred the same property to her real brother (appellant No. 1) via an oral sale and mutation before the contract's completion date. While the Trial Court dismissed the suit, the first Appellate Court and the High Court decreed it, rejecting the plea of bona fide purchase. The Supreme Court examined whether appellant No. 1 qualified as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice under Section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act. The Court held that the burden of proof lies on the subsequent purchaser to demonstrate good faith, payment of consideration, and lack of notice. Given the close relationship between the parties and the hasty transfer, the Court ruled that the appellants failed to exercise due diligence. The Court affirmed that wilful abstention from inquiry or gross negligence constitutes constructive notice, thereby dismissing the appeal.

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• Azhar Hussain vs The State & others2022 SCP 218, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 958, 2022 SCMR 1907 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-08-16
  Section 302(b) PPCocular evidencerelated witnessmitigating circumstanceslife imprisonmentquantum of sentencenon-recovery of weapon
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from petitions filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by the convict seeking acquittal and by the complainant seeking enhancement of sentence, following the High Court's judgment modifying the convict's death sentence under Section 302(b) PPC to life imprisonment for murder. The core legal issues pertained to the reliability of related eyewitness testimony, the impact of minor discrepancies in evidence, the absence of blood at the crime scene, and whether non-recovery of the weapon and unproven motive affected conviction or sentence. The Supreme Court dismissed both petitions, maintaining the conviction and life imprisonment sentence. The Court held that ocular evidence from interested or related witnesses cannot be discarded absent proof of previous enmity. Minor discrepancies that do not affect salient features of the case must be ignored. Furthermore, where ocular evidence is trustworthy and corroborated by medical evidence, conviction can be sustained despite the non-recovery of the weapon or unproven motive; however, the absence of motive and recovery constitutes valid grounds for mitigating the sentence from death to life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of a prosecution witness be discarded solely on account of relationship with the deceased?
  • Whether minor discrepancies in eyewitness statements are sufficient to shatter the prosecution case?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained on trustworthy ocular evidence when the weapon of offence is not recovered?
  • Does the absence of proven motive and non-recovery of weapon justify converting a death sentence to life imprisonment?
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• Azam Saleem vs The State, etc2021 P SC (Crl.) 832, 2021 SCP 314 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-08-06
  pre-arrest bailsecond bail petitionnon-prosecutionnon-appearanceabuse of processfraudleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of the petitioners' second pre-arrest bail petitions by the Lahore High Court in a case registered under Sections 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerns the maintainability of a second pre-arrest bail petition when the first such petition was dismissed for non-prosecution due to the non-appearance of the accused under Section 498-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court held that a fresh pre-arrest bail petition is only maintainable if the accused provides a satisfactory explanation for their absence on the date the first petition was dismissed; if the explanation is unsatisfactory, the petition must be dismissed for abuse of process without examining the merits. Applying this principle, the Court found the explanations lacking and the conduct of the petitioners amounting to playing hide and seek with the court, while also noting sufficient incriminating material on merits. Leave to appeal was accordingly declined.

  Questions settled

  • Can a second pre-arrest bail petition be entertained if the first pre-arrest bail petition was dismissed for non-appearance?
  • What is the effect of failing to provide a satisfactory explanation for absence in a previous pre-arrest bail hearing?
  • When can a court examine the merits of a second pre-arrest bail petition after the dismissal of the first for non-prosecution?
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• Attaullah Khan vs Ali Azam Afridi and others2021 SCMR 1979, 2022 PSC 375, 2023 PLC (C.S.) 182 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-08-11
  writ of quo warrantoupgradation policypersonal upgradationcronyismlocus standicivil serviceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 arose from a High Court judgment in a writ of quo warranto that declared the petitioner's third personal upgradation from BPS-20 to BPS-21 void and without lawful authority. The core legal questions were whether multiple personal upgradations of an employee violated the applicable Upgradation Policy of the Provincial Assembly Secretariat of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and whether a writ of quo warranto was maintainable against such unlawful promotion. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal, affirming the High Court's decision. The Court held that when a statute or policy requires an act to be done in a specific manner, it must be done in that manner or not at all. The petitioner's repeated personal upgradations directly contravened the Assembly's policy permitting personal upgradation only once during service. The Court emphasized that cronyism violates meritocracy and that a writ of quo warranto lies to prevent persons from illegally holding public offices.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant or public employee be granted personal upgradations multiple times in violation of an express statutory upgradation policy?
  • Whether a writ of quo warranto can be filed by any person to challenge an individual holding a public post without lawful authority?
  • Does the principle that a thing required by law to be done in a particular manner must be done in that manner or not at all apply to administrative personal upgradation policies?
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• Atif-Ur-Rehman vs The State and another2021 SCMR 324 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-11-12
  post-arrest bailnarcotics controlfurther inquiryrecoverypointationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the petitioner, Atif-ur-Rehman, challenging the Peshawar High Court's order that declined his post-arrest bail in a case registered under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the circumstances of the recovery of narcotics. The Supreme Court observed that no narcotics were recovered from the vehicle driven by the petitioner. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Anti-Narcotics Force officials already possessed knowledge regarding the narcotics found in a separate truck, meaning no new facts were discovered based on the petitioner's pointation. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner's case fell within the scope of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and granted the petitioner post-arrest bail, subject to the satisfaction of the trial court, while leaving the determination of the applicability of section 15 of the CNSA to the trial court after evidence is recorded.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of recovery from a vehicle driven by an accused entitle them to bail in a narcotics case?
  • Does information already known to law enforcement officials constitute a 'new fact' discovered on the pointation of an accused?
  • When does a case fall under the scope of further inquiry pursuant to section 497(2) of the Cr.P.C. in narcotics offences?
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• Atif Zareef, etc vs The State2021 PLD Supreme Court 550, PLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 128, 2021 P SC (Crl.) 315, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-01-04
  rapetwo-finger testvirginity testingDNA evidenceright to dignitysexual historybenefit of doubtmedical jurisprudence
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard an appeal against the conviction of three appellants for gang rape under Section 376(2) PPC. The prosecution's case relied on the victim's testimony, medical evidence, and DNA reports. The Court upheld the convictions of two appellants whose involvement was corroborated by DNA evidence, while acquitting the third appellant by extending the benefit of doubt due to his non-nomination in the FIR and a negative DNA report. Crucially, the Court addressed the legality of the 'two-finger test' (TFT) and 'virginity testing' in rape cases. The Court held that such tests have no scientific basis, are medically irrelevant to determining sexual assault, and violate the constitutional rights to dignity and privacy under Articles 4 and 14 of the Constitution. The Court further observed that the omission of Article 151(4) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, prohibits impeaching a victim's credibility based on 'general immoral character'. The judgment establishes that a victim's sexual history is irrelevant to the question of consent or the factum of rape.

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• Atif Mehmood Kiyani and another vs MIs Sukh Chayn Private Limited, Royal2021 SCP 288, 2021 SCMR 1446, 2021 PSC 1669, 2021 CLD 946, KLR 2022 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-02-16
  bank guaranteeinsurance guaranteetemporary injunctionstay of suitSection 10 CPCSection 151 CPCconsolidation of suitsbreach of contract
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from two civil petitions for leave to appeal against a consolidated judgment of the High Court involving cross-suits between property buyers and sellers. The Supreme Court examined two primary legal questions: whether a temporary injunction can be granted to restrain the encashment of an unconditional guarantee, and whether a subsequent suit can be stayed under Section 10 CPC when only some matters in issue are common. Dismissing both petitions, the Supreme Court held that an insurance or bank guarantee containing an absolute, unconditional undertaking is an independent contract that must be honoured upon demand, regardless of underlying contractual disputes between the principal parties. Consequently, no prima facie case exists to restrain encashment. Furthermore, Section 10 CPC applies only when all matters in issue are directly and substantially the same; where a subsequent suit includes additional claims such as damages, Section 10 CPC cannot be invoked to stay the proceedings. Instead, courts should consolidate cross-suits under Section 151 CPC to prevent conflicting decisions and avoid multiplicity of litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court grant a temporary injunction to restrain the encashment of an unconditional insurance guarantee pending resolution of an underlying contract dispute?
  • Does a bank or insurance guarantee constitute an independent contract from the underlying agreement between the parties?
  • Can proceedings in a subsequent suit be stayed under Section 10 CPC if only some, but not all, matters in issue are common to both suits?
  • May a court consolidate cross-suits under Section 151 CPC to prevent conflicting findings when Section 10 CPC is inapplicable?
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• Asim Murtaza Khan vs The State through Chairman NAB, Islamabad2021 SCP 354, 2021 PSC 1666 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  admissibility of evidencecriminal trialdocumentary evidencerebuttable presumptionaccountability courtwitness authorizationSection 94 CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment affirming the dismissal of the petitioner's application under Section 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner, an accused in a corruption reference, objected to the production of documents by a witness (PW-1) from Pakistan Petroleum Limited, arguing the witness lacked proper Board of Directors authorization, rendering the evidence inadmissible. The core legal question was whether such authorization is a mandatory prerequisite for the admissibility of documents produced by a witness in a criminal trial involving a non-banking entity. The Supreme Court held that the admissibility and veracity of evidence, including the necessity of authorization, are matters to be determined by the Trial Court during the proceedings. The Court emphasized that while investigators must collect material, the presumption of genuineness under Article 91 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order 1984 is rebuttable. The Court directed the Trial Court to hear and decide the petitioner's objections regarding admissibility in accordance with the law, ensuring that inadmissible evidence does not prejudice the trial, without expressing a final opinion on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Is a formal authorization from a Board of Directors a mandatory prerequisite for the admissibility of documents produced by a witness in a criminal trial involving a non-banking company?
  • Does the presumption of genuineness under Article 91 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order 1984 apply to documents produced by a witness in a criminal proceeding?
  • Must a Trial Court decide objections regarding the admissibility of evidence immediately when raised by a party during the trial?
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• Asif Khan vs Sher Shah and others2021 P SC (Crl.) 859 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-06-30
  criminal appealmurderacquittalreappraisal of evidenceocular accountleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the High Court whereby the respondents were acquitted of charges relating to murder and connected offences. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court erred in overturning the trial court's conviction based on minor narrative variations in the evidence. The Supreme Court held that the reasons advanced by the High Court were artificial and ran counter to settled principles of criminal justice administration, warranting the Court's intervention to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the Court granted leave and directed the issuance of bailable warrants for the respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether narrative variations in evidence are sufficient to overturn a conviction for murder?
  • Does an acquittal based on subjective reasoning warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  • How should ocular testimony corroborated by injured witnesses be evaluated in criminal trials?
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• Asif Ali and another vs The Inspector General, Pakistan Railway Police, Lahore and others2021 PLJ SC 253, 2021 SCMR 545 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-01-14
  service appealdepartmental enquirymisconductdismissal from servicerapecomplainant pardondisciplinary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against the dismissal of service of two Pakistan Railway Police officials who were found guilty of raping a female passenger during their duty escorting a train. The appellants challenged their dismissal, relying on a subsequent statement by the complainant husband claiming his initial complaint was false. The core legal question was whether the departmental dismissal, based on a regular enquiry finding the appellants guilty of rape, could be overturned based on a subsequent pardon granted by the complainant after the appellants swore an oath on the Holy Quran. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, noting that the departmental enquiry had conclusively established the appellants' guilt. The Court held that a complainant's subsequent pardon, motivated by extra-judicial reconciliation, does not invalidate the findings of a properly conducted departmental enquiry into serious misconduct. The principle laid down is that departmental disciplinary proceedings are distinct from criminal proceedings, and findings of guilt in a regular enquiry regarding heinous misconduct cannot be negated by the complainant's subsequent withdrawal or pardon.

  Questions settled

  • Can a departmental dismissal for serious misconduct be overturned solely based on a subsequent pardon by the complainant?
  • Does a complainant's withdrawal of allegations after an oath on the Holy Quran invalidate the findings of a regular departmental enquiry?
  • Are departmental disciplinary proceedings distinct from criminal proceedings regarding the effect of a complainant's pardon?
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• Ashfaque alias Shaka vs The State2022 SCMR 915 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-04
  murderSection 302(b) PPChostile witnessinjured witness defectionocular evidenceballistic confirmationautopsy delayappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail petition before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose out of the petitioner's conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, where the trial court awarded a death sentence that was subsequently commuted to imprisonment for life by the High Court. The primary legal questions centered on whether the defection of an injured prosecution witness dismantled the prosecution's case, whether the acquittal of co-accused required independent corroboration, and whether a purported delay in conducting the autopsy damaged the prosecution's narrative. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and declined leave to appeal. The Court held that the subsequent departure of an injured witness, who had earlier supported the case during initial investigation, does not by itself destroy the prosecution case when other ocular witnesses named in the crime report provide consistent and unblemished testimony. Furthermore, the petitioner was specifically assigned the solitary fatal shot, corroborated by forensic ballistic matching, and the timing of the autopsy was justified as the deceased had survived for a period after the assault.

  Questions settled

  • Does the subsequent defection of an injured witness alone destroy the prosecution's case when other reliable eyewitnesses consistently support the charge?
  • Whether the conduct of an autopsy on the day following an occurrence can be treated as fatal prosecution delay where the injured victim survived for a period before succumbing to injuries?
  • Can a conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be maintained on the consistent ocular account of eyewitnesses corroboratively supported by a matched weapon recovery despite the acquittal of co-accused?
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• Asfandiyar vs The State and others2021 SCMR 2009, PLJ 2022 SC (Cr.C.) 15 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-02-01
  Qatl-i-amdsolitary witnessocular accountrule of prudenceabsconsionlife imprisonmentcriminal appealsubstitution plea
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a conviction for Qatl-i-amd under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, where the petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment. The petitioner challenged the conviction on the grounds that it rested upon the testimony of a solitary, related eye-witness, and that the prosecution failed to establish a motive or provide forensic corroboration. The Supreme Court examined whether the testimony of a single witness, being the father of the deceased, was sufficient to sustain a conviction on a capital charge. The Court held that the ocular account was consistent, straightforward, and confidence-inspiring, having been reported promptly without possibility of deliberation. The Court clarified that the law does not require a specific number of witnesses to prove a criminal charge; the testimony of a solitary witness with a ring of truth is sufficient. Corroboration was deemed a rule of prudence rather than an absolute legal requirement. Furthermore, the petitioner's long-standing absconsion supported the hypothesis of guilt. Consequently, the Court declined leave to appeal.

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