Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Slackness in the Progress of Pending Enqu Iries Relating to Fake BankPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 71, 2019 SCMR 332 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-07
  suo motu noticefake bank accountsmoney launderingJoint Investigation TeamNational Accountability BureauExit Control Listcorruption and corrupt practices
  Summary & questions settled

  This suo motu matter under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan arose from widespread reports of fake bank accounts used for money laundering, kickbacks, and unlawful financial transactions involving several high-profile individuals and entities, including the Omni Group. Due to the complexity of electronic data and the inadequacy of specialized investigators within the Federal Investigation Agency, the Supreme Court previously constituted a Joint Investigation Team. The core legal question concerned the legality and scope of the Joint Investigation Team's findings and the appropriate forum to proceed with the investigation and trial of the accused. The Court held that the Joint Investigation Team's report revealed prima facie evidence of cognizable offences involving corruption and money laundering, and directed that the entire record and report be transmitted to the National Accountability Bureau for further inquiry and filing of references before the Accountability Courts in Islamabad/Rawalpindi. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court can constitute a specialized joint investigation team in complex financial crimes under its constitutional jurisdiction and direct the National Accountability Bureau to initiate proceedings based on such findings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court can constitute a Joint Investigation Team under Article 184(3) of the Constitution for complex financial crimes?
  • Can a Joint Investigation Team probe transactions and activities incidental to its original mandate regarding fake bank accounts and money laundering?
  • Whether the report and evidence collected by a court-appointed Joint Investigation Team can be legally transmitted to the National Accountability Bureau for further proceedings?
  • Do high-profile political figures possess an absolute right to remain off the Exit Control List when under investigation for financial crimes?
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• Sikandar Hayat Khan Jogazai, etc vs Muhammad Hashim, etc2019 SCP 328, 2020 KLR Supreme Court Cases 91, PLD 2019 Supreme Court · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-09-16
  waqf propertyChief Administrator Auqaflease of waqf propertysettlement of schemecommercial leaseadministration and developmentjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions against the concurrent judgments of the High Court, which had set aside the grant of a 30-year lease of waqf property by the Chief Administrator Auqaf for setting up a petrol pump. The core legal questions involved the scope of the Chief Administrator's powers under the Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1979, and the Punjab Waqf Properties (Administration) Rules, 2002, to lease out waqf property for commercial purposes, and the mandatory requirement of settling a formal scheme for the administration and development of such property. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that any lease of waqf property must be part of a well-reasoned scheme settled by the Chief Administrator Auqaf to maximize charitable objects or fulfill the waqif's wishes, rather than being done in isolation. Commercial leasing is permissible only as an exception when no viable alternative closer to the waqf's objectives exists, and any extension beyond the statutory lease period must be duly justified. The Court emphasized that the proper formulation of a scheme is a prerequisite for effective administration, ensuring structured discretion subject to judicial review.

  Questions settled

  • Can waqf property be leased out for commercial purposes by the Chief Administrator Auqaf?
  • Is the settlement of a formal administrative and development scheme mandatory before leasing out waqf property?
  • What is the maximum permissible duration for the lease of waqf property under the Punjab Waqf Properties (Administration) Rules, 2002?
  • Are decisions concerning the administration and development of waqf properties through schemes subject to judicial review by courts?
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• Shoaib Ullah Cheema vs Additional Registrar of Companies, S.E.C.P. etc2019 SCP 12, 2019 CLD 227, 2020 KLR Supreme Court Cases 415, 2020 P SC · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-15
  winding upcompanies ordinancedirect appealsupreme court jurisdictionofficial liquidatorpost-winding up ordersintra-court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from an appeal regarding the removal of an official liquidator of a company under liquidation, involving a preliminary question on the scope of direct appeals to the Supreme Court under Section 10(1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984. The core legal question was whether Section 10(1) permits a direct appeal to the Supreme Court against post-winding-up orders passed by a Company Judge, or if such appeals are restricted solely to the initial winding-up order, leaving other orders subject to intra-court appeal under Section 10(2). Reviewing conflicting precedents, a larger bench of the Supreme Court held that Section 10(1) applies to a winding-up order as well as any order, decision, or judgment made in winding-up proceedings after a company has been ordered to be wound up. Overturning the narrower interpretation in Kamaluddin Qureshi's case and endorsing Ibrahim Shamsi's case, the court laid down the principle that post-winding-up orders are directly appealable to the Supreme Court under Section 10(1).

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 10(1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 permit a direct appeal to the Supreme Court against orders passed after a company has been ordered to be wound up?
  • Whether an order passed by a Company Judge in winding-up proceedings subsequent to the winding-up order is appealable under Section 10(1) or Section 10(2) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984?
  • Does the phrase 'where the company ordered to be wound up' in Section 10(1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 confine appeals exclusively to the initial winding-up order?
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• Shoaib Ullah Cheema & others vs Additional Registrar of Companies, S.E.C.P. etc2019 PLJ SC 434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  winding up proceedingscompany lawappellate jurisdictionCompanies Ordinance 1984maintainability of appealofficial liquidatorSupreme Court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the maintainability of a direct appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 10(1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, against an order passed by a Company Judge during winding-up proceedings. The core legal question was whether the right of appeal to the Supreme Court is restricted solely to the initial winding-up order or extends to subsequent orders passed after the company has been ordered to be wound up. The Supreme Court held that Section 10(1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, permits direct appeals to the Supreme Court against both the winding-up order and any subsequent order or decision made by the Company Judge once the company has been ordered to be wound up. The Court reasoned that the statutory language, specifically the use of the word 'any' regarding orders, decisions, or judgments, reflects a legislative intent to avoid intermediary intra-court appeals after the winding-up process has commenced. Consequently, the Court overruled the contrary precedent in Kamaluddin Qureshi v. Ali International Company and affirmed the interpretation established in Ibrahim Shamsi v. Bashir Ahmed Memon.

  Questions settled

  • Does a direct appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 10(1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, lie against orders passed by a Company Judge subsequent to the winding-up order?
  • Is the scope of Section 10(1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, limited only to the initial order of winding up a company?
  • Does the phrase 'where the company ordered to be wound up' in Section 10(1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, include orders passed after the commencement of winding-up proceedings?
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• Shewaiz Rasool alias Shabi vs The State, etcPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 580, 2019 SCMR 1448, 2019 SCP 186 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-14
  criminal appealacquittalprinciple of consistencyjoint liabilityappreciation of evidencecapital punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant, Shewaiz Rasool, for his alleged involvement in a quadruple murder case. The prosecution alleged that the appellant, alongside several co-accused, committed the murders using automatic weapons. While other co-accused were previously tried and convicted, the Supreme Court had already acquitted the appellant's co-accused, Muhammad Rafi, and others in related proceedings. The core legal question was whether the appellant's case could be distinguished from his co-accused who had already been acquitted by the Supreme Court. The Court held that the appellant was identically placed with the acquitted co-accused, as the prosecution assigned joint firing without specific motive or distinct roles. Citing the principle of consistency, the Court found that the reasons for the acquittal of the co-accused—including issues regarding the identity of assailants, the improbability of witness presence, and the lack of motive—applied equally to the appellant. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and sentence, ordering the appellant's immediate release.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused person be convicted when co-accused, who were identically placed and assigned similar roles, have already been acquitted by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the lack of a proven motive and the improbability of witness presence at the crime scene constitute sufficient grounds for acquittal in a murder case?
  • Is it legally permissible to maintain a conviction against one accused when the evidence against him is identical to that of co-accused who were acquitted due to evidentiary deficiencies?
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• Sheikh Akhtar Aziz vs Mst. Shabnam Begum and others2019 KLR Supreme Court 305, 2019 P.S.C. 1002, 2019 SCMR 524 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-04
  specific performanceagreement to sellconsensus ad idemearnest moneydiscretionary reliefsecond appealimmovable propertypower of attorney
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals arose from a suit for specific performance of a contract based on a handwritten receipt. The appellant claimed that Respondent No. 8 agreed to sell property owned by his wife, daughters, and brother. The trial and first appellate courts decreed the suit, but the High Court reversed the decision, instead ordering the refund of earnest money with markup. The Supreme Court examined whether the receipt constituted a valid, enforceable contract. It held that for a document to be treated as a contract for the sale of immovable property, it must clearly identify the parties, the consideration, and the property, and demonstrate consensus ad idem. The Court found the receipt deficient as it lacked a specific description of the property and was signed by a party without written authority from the actual owners. Furthermore, the document was not attested by two witnesses as required by the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order. The Court affirmed that specific performance is a discretionary relief and cannot be granted where the essential ingredients of a contract are missing or where it would be inequitable.

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• Shaukat Ali vs The State, etc2019 PLD SC 577, PLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 145, 2019 SCP 190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-16
  retracted confessionkidnapping for ransomquantum of sentencevoluntary confessionanti-terrorismdeath penalty commutation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant for kidnapping for ransom and murder. The appellant was convicted by an Anti-Terrorism Court under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, receiving death sentences. The prosecution's case rested on witness testimony, cell phone data, and a judicial confession. The appellant retracted this confession during his examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court examined the voluntariness and truthfulness of the confession, finding it free from duress and corroborated by the recovery of the body. The Court affirmed the conviction, holding that a retracted confession, if found voluntary and truthful, can form the basis of a conviction. However, regarding the quantum of sentence, the Court observed that the primary motive was ransom and the death resulted from the administration of tranquilizers rather than direct violence. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal against conviction but commuted the death sentences to imprisonment for life, maintaining the fines and compensation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a retracted confession form the basis of a conviction if it is found to be voluntary and truthful?
  • Does the administration of tranquilizers leading to death in a kidnapping case warrant the commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Is a judicial confession reliable if the magistrate has administered necessary warnings and recorded the details in their own hand?
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• Shams ur Rehman vs Military Accountant General, Rawalpindi and another2020 P SC 757, 2020 SCMR 188, 2019 SCP 379 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-18
  locus poenitentiaeestoppelservice lawrecovery of salaryerroneous promotionselection gradegood faith
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Senior Auditor, was granted a selection grade (BPS-15) by the department, which he held for nine years. Subsequently, the department cancelled this grade, citing an erroneous grant, and ordered the recovery of the salary and benefits paid during that period. The petitioner challenged this before the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed his appeal and subsequent review petition. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the core legal question was whether the department could recover emoluments paid to an employee for a higher grade that was erroneously granted but held in good faith for a significant period. The Court held that while the department could correct the erroneous grant of the grade, it could not recover the salary and benefits already paid to the petitioner, as he was not at fault. The Court applied the principles of locus poenitentiae and estoppel, ruling that because the petitioner performed the duties of the higher post in good faith, the department was precluded from recovering the past emoluments, and the Tribunal erred in failing to rectify this in its review jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government department recover salary and benefits paid to an employee for a higher grade that was erroneously granted but held in good faith?
  • Does the principle of locus poenitentiae prevent the recovery of emoluments paid to an employee for a post held due to a departmental error?
  • Is a department estopped from recovering salary paid for a higher grade if the employee performed the duties of that grade for a significant period without fault?
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• Shafqat @ Shafaat vs The State2019 PLD Supreme Court 43 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-29
  qatl-i-amdcompounding of offencescompromisestare decisisacquittalta'azirafwsulhlarger bench
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition against a conviction under Section 302(b) PPC, where the legal heirs of the deceased subsequently filed a compromise application under Section 345 of the Cr.P.C. seeking to forgive the convict. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the acceptance of a compromise (compounding of an offence) results in the automatic setting aside of the conviction and a full acquittal, or merely saves the convict from punishment while leaving the record of guilt intact. Justice Qazi Faez Isa, in the lead opinion, held that while compounding brings the sentence to an immediate end, it does not automatically erase the conviction or equate to a factual acquittal, as Islamic injunctions and the language of Section 345(6) Cr.P.C. distinguish between remission of punishment and obliteration of guilt. However, noting a conflict with a prior three-member bench decision (PLD 2018 SC 703), the Court referred the matter to the Chief Justice for the constitution of a larger bench to resolve the jurisprudential conflict, while ordering the petitioner's release in the interim.

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• Shafqat @ Shafaat vs StatePLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 323 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-07-30
  qatl-i-amdcompounding of offenceSection 345 CrPCstare decisiscriminal convictionIslamic jurisprudenceafw and sulhacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner was convicted for qatl-i-amd (murder) under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Following a compromise between the petitioner and the legal heirs of the deceased, the core legal question arose: whether the acceptance of a compromise under Section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically results in the setting aside of the conviction and acquittal of the convict, or merely ends the sentence. The Court, per Qazi Faez Isa, J., held that while a compromise ends the sentence, it does not automatically erase the conviction or result in an acquittal that obliterates the guilt, as forgiveness (afw) and compounding (sulh) remit punishment but do not create a factual fiction of innocence. However, due to the principle of stare decisis and the existence of a contrary three-member bench judgment in Suo Motu Case No. 03 of 2017, the matter was referred to the Chief Justice for the constitution of a larger bench. Gulzar Ahmed, J., in a separate opinion, disagreed, citing the binding nature of the Suo Motu judgment and acquitted the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acceptance of a compromise in a murder case under Section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically result in the setting aside of the conviction?
  • Does the compounding of an offence under Section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 erase the record of guilt?
  • Is a three-member bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan bound by a previous judgment of another three-member bench on the same point of law?
  • Does the pardon of a convict by the heirs of a victim equate to an acquittal that obliterates the underlying criminal conviction?
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• Sh. Abdul Waheed vs Custodian Evacuee Property, Lahore and others2020 PLJ Supreme Court 56, 2019 SCMR 1745 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-14
  evacuee propertyrestoration of propertypermanent residencecustodianproperty statusconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over built-up properties in Lahore initially owned by a pre-partition owner who died in India in 1945. Following the 1947 Partition, the properties were declared evacuee and allotted to displaced persons, but were subsequently restored in 1948 to the original owner's family subject to conditions regarding permanent residence and non-alienation. Extensive litigation ensued over decades concerning whether the properties re-acquired evacuee status due to the heirs' subsequent movements, relocations to India and England, and contradictory stances taken before revenue and judicial authorities. The Supreme Court held that the properties re-acquired evacuee status because the heirs failed to establish that they made Pakistan their permanent place of residence, and their return was found to be temporary and intended to circumvent evacuee laws. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the High Court and dismissed the constitutional petition, ruling that properties restored conditionally revert to evacuee status upon breach of residency conditions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether property once restored to its original owners can re-acquire the status of evacuee property due to the subsequent movements and non-residence of the owners?
  • Can an order of restoration of evacuee property be made subject to conditions regarding permanent residence in Pakistan?
  • What is the effect of shifting stands and contradictory statements by claimants regarding their permanent place of residence in evacuee property proceedings?
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• Senator Muhammad Ali Durrani vs Government of Pakistan and others2019 KLR Supreme Court 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-06-12
  undeclared foreign assetsforeign exchange reservestax amnesty schemesuo motu proceedingsrepatriation of assetscapital flighttax evasion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from suo motu proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the unregulated outflow of foreign exchange, accumulation of undeclared foreign assets by Pakistani citizens, and declining national foreign exchange reserves. The Court had appointed a Committee of Experts to deliberate and recommend legislative and executive measures. The Committee submitted its final report identifying ten core factors causing foreign exchange leakage, including misuse of foreign currency accounts, under-invoicing, tax law loopholes, and informal transfer channels like Hundi and Hawala. Following the Court's intervention, the Federal Government promulgated the Foreign Assets (Declaration and Repatriation) Ordinance, 2018, later reenacted as the Foreign Assets (Declaration and Repatriation) Act, 2018, alongside amendments to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and other regulatory frameworks. The core legal question was whether the Court should examine the legality of the voluntary disclosure scheme and unaddressed fiscal deficiencies without a concrete legal challenge. The Court held that while it welcomes public interest measures protecting foreign exchange reserves, it will not unilaterally adjudicate upon the fiscal scheme in the absence of a concrete challenge, directing the relevant authorities to address remaining legislative gaps.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court unilaterally adjudicate upon the legality and propriety of a voluntary asset disclosure scheme in the absence of a concrete challenge?
  • What are the primary legislative and regulatory factors contributing to the unregulated outflow of foreign exchange from Pakistan?
  • What constitutes the legal framework and immunity provided under the Foreign Assets (Declaration and Repatriation) Act, 2018?
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• Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, Karachi vs Messrs2019 P.S.C. 560, 2019 SCMR 532 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-12
  locus standiquasi-judicial authorityfunctus officioinsurance claimjudicial reviewappellate authoritymaladministration
  Summary & questions settled

  The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside SECP's appellate orders regarding insurance claims. The core legal question was whether the SECP, acting as an appellate adjudicatory authority under the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, has the standing to challenge a High Court's decision that reversed its orders in a dispute between private parties (insurers and insured). The Supreme Court held that the SECP, as an independent and impartial adjudicatory forum, lacks the standing to act as an aggrieved party or defend its own orders in adversarial litigation between private litigants. The Court emphasized that statutory authorities exercising quasi-judicial functions become functus officio after passing orders and are not required to defend their decisions before higher courts. The key principle laid down is that tribunals and appellate authorities are not adversarial parties and cannot challenge judicial review decisions of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, as they must remain neutral and impartial in disputes between private parties.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appellate adjudicatory authority have the standing to challenge a High Court judgment that reverses its order in a private dispute?
  • Is a statutory authority required to defend its own orders in adversarial proceedings before a High Court or Supreme Court?
  • Can an Insurance Ombudsman or the SECP act as an aggrieved party against a High Court decision under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Securities & Exchange Commission of Pakistan, Karachi vs M/s East West2019 SCP 32 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-12
  statutory authority standingfunctus officiojudicial reviewInsurance Ordinance 2000appellate jurisdictionnon-adversarial roleSECP
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Securities & Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) against a High Court judgment that set aside its appellate orders regarding insurance claims. The core legal question is whether a statutory adjudicatory body, acting in an appellate capacity under the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, possesses the legal standing to challenge a High Court judgment that reverses its own orders in a dispute between private parties. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the SECP and the Insurance Ombudsman are independent, impartial, and non-adversarial forums. The Court established the principle that once these bodies issue a decision, they become functus officio and are not parties to the litigation. Consequently, they lack the standing to defend their orders before higher courts; such defense is the responsibility of the aggrieved private party. Statutory authorities exercising quasi-judicial functions cannot act as adversaries in judicial review proceedings against their own decisions.

  Questions settled

  • Does a statutory adjudicatory body have the standing to challenge a High Court judgment that sets aside its own order?
  • Is the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan an adversarial party in a dispute between an insurer and an insured?
  • At what point does the Insurance Ombudsman or the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan become functus officio regarding a complaint?
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• Secretary Revenue Division, Islamabad vs Iftikhar Ahmed Tabassam, etc2019 SCP 130 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-21
  service lawgovernment accommodationpenal rentsubstantial question of lawpublic importanceabuse of processArticle 212(3)civil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This service matter concerns the unauthorized retention of government accommodation by a retired civil servant beyond the period permitted under the Accommodation Allocation Rules, 2002. The core legal question was whether the respondent was liable to pay standard rent with penal charges for such retention, and whether the Federal Service Tribunal erred in exempting him from these charges based on a previously granted stay order. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the respondent was liable for the penal rent as the stay order became ineffective upon the withdrawal of the underlying appeal. The Court ruled that the Tribunal’s decision to entertain an application in a withdrawn appeal constituted an abuse of process. Furthermore, the Court laid down the principle that the jurisdiction under Article 212(3) of the Constitution is restricted to substantial questions of law of public importance. It clarified that matters involving the interpretation of service rules and the abuse of judicial process, which affect a class of civil servants, transcend individual disputes and satisfy the threshold for Supreme Court intervention.

  Questions settled

  • Does the unauthorized retention of government accommodation by a retired civil servant beyond the permitted period attract liability for standard rent and penal charges?
  • Can a Service Tribunal entertain an application in an appeal that has already been withdrawn?
  • What constitutes a substantial question of law of public importance under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does a stay order granted by a Tribunal survive the withdrawal of the main appeal?
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• Secretary Revenue Division, Islamabad vs Iftikhar Ahmed Tabassam2019 PLD Supreme Court 563 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-21
  accommodation allocation rulespenal rentunauthorized retentionservice tribunalsubstantial question of law of public importancesupreme court jurisdictionwithdrawal of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the Revenue Division addresses whether a retired civil servant is liable to pay standard rent with penal charges for unauthorized retention of government accommodation beyond six months post-retirement. The respondent had retained official accommodation on the basis of a stay order obtained during a pending service appeal, which he subsequently withdrew. Following the withdrawal, the department demanded standard rent under the Accommodation Allocation Rules, 2002. The Federal Service Tribunal erroneously set aside the demand, holding that the occupation was protected by the earlier stay order. The Supreme Court held that the withdrawal of the appeal nullified the interim stay order ab initio, rendering the continued retention unauthorized and subject to penal rent under the rules. Furthermore, the Court examined the scope of Article 212(3) of the Constitution, ruling that the interpretation of service rules affecting a class of civil servants and issues involving abuse of process constitute a substantial question of law of public importance. The appeal was allowed and the department's demand for standard rent was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a retired civil servant is liable to pay standard rent with penal charges for retaining government accommodation beyond the permissible six-month period after retirement?
  • Does the withdrawal of a service appeal automatically vacate an interim stay order granted during its pendency?
  • What constitutes a substantial question of law of public importance for invoking the appellate jurisdiction under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 in service matters?
  • Can the Federal Service Tribunal entertain an application in a service appeal that has already been unconditionally withdrawn?
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• Secretary Revenue Division / Chairman, FBR and another vs Muhammad2019 KLR Supreme Court 350, 2020 PLJ Supreme Court 19, 2019 P.S.C. 876, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-26
  service lawsenioritymutual transfervoluntary transferEstacodediscriminationcivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a service dispute regarding the determination of seniority for a civil servant who was transferred between posts via mutual consent. The respondent, initially appointed as a Preventive Officer, sought to have his seniority as an Inspector of Customs reckoned from his original date of appointment in 1988, rather than the date of his voluntary transfer in 1991. The Service Tribunal had ruled in his favor, citing discriminatory treatment compared to other officers. The Supreme Court examined the relevant service rules, specifically paragraph 6(i)(a) of the Estacode, which mandates that when a transfer is voluntary, seniority in the new office commences from the date of transfer. The Court held that since the respondent’s transfer was based on his own volition and mutual consent, he was not entitled to count his previous service towards seniority. Furthermore, the Court clarified that an alleged past error in granting seniority to others cannot be used to establish a claim of discrimination or to override established service principles. The appeal was allowed, and the Service Tribunal's judgment was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant who voluntarily transfers to a new office via mutual consent have the right to count previous service towards seniority in the new post?
  • Can a claim of discrimination be sustained based on the incorrect application of service rules to other employees?
  • Under the Estacode, what is the distinction between voluntary and compulsory transfer regarding the calculation of seniority?
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• Secretary Establishment Division and others vs Dr. Imdad Ali Raza2019 PLC (C.S.) 111, 2018 SCMR 1998 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-03-01
  civil servicemisconductunauthorized absencecompulsory retirementextraordinary leavedisciplinary proceedingsservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a Federal Service Tribunal judgment that reinstated a civil servant removed from service due to unauthorized absence. The core legal question was whether the respondent's prolonged absence from duty, purportedly for higher education and family medical reasons, constituted misconduct warranting removal from service, and whether the authority's decision to remove him was legally sustainable given his long service record. The Supreme Court held that while the respondent's unauthorized absence could not be justified or taken for granted, his removal from service was disproportionate given his twenty-one years of unblemished service. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, set aside the Tribunal's judgment and the authority's removal order, and substituted the penalty with compulsory retirement. The key principle laid down is that while civil servants cannot treat extraordinary leave as a right or justify prolonged unauthorized absence on casual pretexts, the disciplinary authority must balance the gravity of misconduct against the length and quality of a civil servant's total service record when determining the appropriate penalty.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant claim extraordinary leave as a matter of right?
  • Does unauthorized absence from duty constitute misconduct justifying removal from service?
  • Can the Supreme Court substitute a penalty of removal from service with compulsory retirement based on the length of service?
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• Sarhad Development Authority N.W.F.P. (now K.P.K) thr. Coo/ CEO (Officio)2020 P SC 941, 2020 SCMR 265, 2019 SCP 392 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-11-07
  compulsory acquisitionland acquisitionmarket valuecompensationpotential valueReferee CourtKhyber Pakhtunkhwa
  Summary & questions settled

  The Sarhad Development Authority challenged the Peshawar High Court’s judgment regarding compensation for land acquired for the Nowshera Industrial Estate. The core legal questions concerned whether sale transactions occurring after the Section 4 notification could be considered for compensation assessment and whether the Supreme Court could adjudicate disputed questions of fact raised for the first time in appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the High Court’s decision. It held that under the amended Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 applicable in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the market value is determined based on the date of taking possession, not the date of the Section 4 notification. Consequently, post-notification transactions are relevant. The Court further ruled that it would not entertain disputed questions of fact not previously agitated before the Referee Court or High Court. The judgment established that compensation assessment must account for potential land value, contemporaneous transactions in the vicinity, and price escalation during acquisition, emphasizing that no rigid mathematical formula exists for determining market value in compulsory acquisitions.

  Questions settled

  • Can sale transactions occurring after the issuance of a Section 4 notification be considered when determining compensation for acquired land?
  • Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to determine disputed questions of fact that were not raised before the lower courts?
  • In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, is the market value of acquired land determined on the date of the Section 4 notification or the date of taking possession?
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• Sardar Yar Muhammad Rind vs The Election Tribunal Balochistan, Quetta2019 SCP 376 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-12-05
  election candidatedisqualificationArticle 62(1)(f)dishonestynomination paperseducational qualificationsburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from the rejection of the petitioner's nomination papers for provincial and national assembly constituencies and the subsequent dismissal of his constitutional petitions by the High Court, which upheld his disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The core legal question concerns whether a candidate can be disqualified under Article 62(1)(f) for alleged dishonesty regarding educational credentials without positive evidence or a judicial finding of deliberate deceit. The Supreme Court converted the petitions into appeals and allowed them, setting aside the lower judgments. The ratio decidendi is that disqualification under Article 62(1)(f), which entails a lifetime bar, requires a judicial declaration of dishonesty founded on positive oral or documentary evidence demonstrating a deliberate and conscious false statement or deceitful conduct, rather than mere conjecture, presumption, or unverified admissions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 can be sustained without positive evidence of dishonesty?
  • Does a candidate's omission or non-denial constitute a judicial admission of a false statement for the purpose of electoral disqualification?
  • Can a presumption of dishonesty replace the requirement of recording evidence to establish a lifelong bar from contesting elections?
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• Sana Ullah vs Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, Lahore and another2019 PLJ SC 347, 2019 SCMR 944 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-10
  service lawdismissal from serviceabuse of authoritypolice misconductdisciplinary proceedingsPunjab Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had upheld the dismissal of the petitioner, a police official, from service by the CCPO, Lahore. The core legal question was whether the disciplinary dismissal was justified given the admitted facts of the petitioner's conduct. The petitioner had stopped three individuals late at night without any reasonable suspicion or allegation of a cognizable offense and detained them at a police station. The Supreme Court held that these admitted actions constituted a serious abuse of authority, implying an intent to extract an undue advantage. The Court rejected the petitioner's reliance on precedent involving different factual circumstances, noting that where the underlying misconduct is admitted, further inquiry is unnecessary. The Court affirmed the dismissal, establishing the principle that the abuse of authority by law enforcement officials to interfere with the lives of ordinary citizens without legal basis warrants severe disciplinary action, including dismissal from service, and does not necessitate further evidentiary inquiry when the material facts are undisputed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the detention of citizens by a police official without allegation of a cognizable offense constitute an abuse of authority justifying dismissal?
  • Is further departmental inquiry necessary when the material facts constituting misconduct are admitted by the delinquent official?
  • Can a disciplinary dismissal be upheld where the official's conduct demonstrates an intent to extract an undue advantage from citizens?
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• Sami Pharmaceuticals (Pvt.) Ltd vs Federation of Pakistan and others2019 SCMR 574 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-07
  customs duty exemptionSRO 575(I) 2006locally manufactured goodsEngineering Development Boardfiscal exemptionLetter of Credittax concession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment denying customs duty and sales tax exemptions to the petitioner for imported 'Air Handling Units' under SRO 575(I) 2006. The core legal question was whether an importer remains entitled to fiscal exemptions under the said SRO when the Engineering Development Board (EDB) certifies the goods as locally manufactured after the Letter of Credit was established but before the goods declaration was filed. The Supreme Court, by majority, dismissed the petition, holding that the exemption is unavailable if the imported goods are locally manufactured. The Court ruled that the timing of the EDB certification is immaterial; if the item was already being manufactured locally at the time the Letter of Credit was opened, the importer is disentitled to the concession. The principle laid down is that the exemption under SRO 575(I) 2006 is intended to encourage local industry, and where a local manufacturer is capable of supplying the goods, the importer cannot claim the benefit, regardless of when the certification process was initiated.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an importer is entitled to customs duty exemption under SRO 575(I) 2006 if the imported goods are certified as locally manufactured by the Engineering Development Board?
  • Does the timing of the Engineering Development Board's certification regarding local manufacture affect the entitlement to fiscal exemptions under SRO 575(I) 2006?
  • Can an importer claim customs duty exemption for goods that are locally manufactured but were not listed in a Customs General Order at the time of opening the Letter of Credit?
  Read full judgment →
• Saleem Zada and others vs The State etc2019 SCMR 1309, 2019 SCP 230 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-06-10
  Criminal Petition for Leave to AppealQatl-e-amdAttempt to murderEye-witness testimonyInjured witnessCorroborationAcquittalConviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involved Criminal Petitions for Leave to Appeal challenging convictions for qatl-e-amd and attempt to murder, and also an acquittal of a co-accused. The core legal question was whether the High Court's decision to maintain convictions and sentences for Saleem Zada, Khawat Shah, and Swat Shah, while acquitting Sher Zamin, was legally sound based on the evidence presented. The Supreme Court dismissed both sets of petitions, upholding the convictions and sentences of Saleem Zada, Khawat Shah, and Swat Shah, and refusing to interfere with the acquittal of Sher Zamin. The Court held that the testimony of a sole, injured eye-witness, found to be confidence-inspiring and corroborated by investigative conclusions and medical evidence, was sufficient to sustain the convictions. The acquittal of a co-accused, seemingly out of abundant caution due to 'mute presence', was deemed not to offend any principle of law in the absence of extraordinary grounds to recall freedom.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of a sole, injured eye-witness be sufficient to sustain a conviction for qatl-e-amd and attempt to murder?
  • Whether an acquittal based on 'mute presence' and 'abundant caution' offends principles of law?
  • What evidentiary weight is given to an injured eye-witness whose presence at the crime scene cannot be doubted?
  • Can prompt reporting of an incident and consistent medical evidence corroborate an eye-witness account?
  Read full judgment →
• Sajjan Solangi vs The StatePLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 499, 2019 SCMR 844 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-26
  criminal appealillegal weaponsbenefit of doubtrecovery witnessfirearm expert opinionacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition impugning a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which dismissed the petitioner's criminal appeal and maintained his conviction and sentence under the Sindh Arms Act, 2013. The core legal question concerns the sustainability of a conviction based on a disputed and unverified weapon recovery from an open, accessible place without corroborating expert opinion or proper exhibits. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt due to glaring discrepancies in recovery witnesses, the accessible nature of the place of recovery, the failure to exhibit the weapon, and the absence of an expert report confirming the weapon's working condition. Consequently, the petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, setting aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitting the petitioner with immediate release. The key principle laid down is that recovery from an accessible open place without independent corroboration, unexhibited weapons, and lack of expert opinion regarding the operable condition of a firearm creates serious doubt in the prosecution case, entitling the accused to the benefit of doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recovery of a weapon from a place accessible to the general public sustain a conviction without independent corroboration?
  • Is expert opinion regarding the working condition of a recovered firearm necessary to maintain a conviction under the arms legislation?
  • Whether contradictions between recovery evidence and witness statements in court vitiate the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Sajjad Ali vs Vice Chancellor thr. Registrar University of Malakand at2020 PLJ SC 275, 2020 P SC 272, 2020 SCMR 124, 2019 SCP 360, 2020 PLC · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-24
  disability quotaemployment lawstatutory interpretationpublic sector employmentUniversity of Malakandmerit-based appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the rejection of his application for a Lecturer position under the disability quota by the University of Malakand, which had argued that the two percent quota could not be applied to a single advertised post. The Supreme Court examined the Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance, 1981, and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) (Amendment) Act, 2012. The Court held that the two percent quota for disabled persons is calculated based on the total number of persons employed by an establishment, not on the number of posts advertised at a specific time. The Court emphasized that the procedural requirements of Section 12, including registration with the Employment Exchange and assessment by the Provincial Council regarding fitness for work, are essential to implementing the quota. The University was directed to formulate a policy to allocate the required quota based on its total employee strength, while maintaining merit and standard eligibility criteria for appointments. The petition was disposed of with instructions for the University to reconsider the petitioner's case under the new policy.

  Questions settled

  • Is the disability employment quota calculated based on the total number of employees in an establishment or the number of posts advertised at a specific time?
  • Does the definition of 'establishment' under the Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance 1981 include a university?
  • What is the legal significance of the assessment by the Provincial Council regarding a disabled person's fitness for work under Section 12 of the Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance 1981?
  Read full judgment →
• Sardar Masood Khan Luni vs Election Commission of Pakistan and others2019 PLJ SC 141, 2019 P.S.C. 977, 2019 SCMR 61 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-29
  election petitionriggingfree and fair electionnull and voidelectoral malpracticepolling station takeoverElection Commission of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against an order of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) declaring the election for constituency PB-05, Duki null and void due to widespread irregularities. The core legal question was whether the election was conducted in a free, fair, and transparent manner, or if the ECP was justified in setting aside the results. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the election process was fundamentally compromised by serious law and order lapses, the intimidation of election staff, the takeover of polling stations by candidate supporters, and biased conduct by presiding officers. The Court affirmed that elections must be held in a free, fair, and transparent environment, ensuring the electorate can exercise their franchise without fear or intimidation. The ratio established is that where the integrity of the electoral process is undermined by violence and rigging, the ECP is empowered and obligated to declare the election null and void to preserve the credibility of the democratic process and reflect the true will of the people.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Election Commission of Pakistan have the authority to declare an election null and void upon finding that it was not held in a free and fair manner?
  • What constitutes sufficient grounds for the Election Commission of Pakistan to declare an election result void?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with an order of the Election Commission of Pakistan if no illegality or defect is shown in the exercise of its powers under the Elections Act 2017?
  Read full judgment →
• Saif-ur-Rehman vs Addl. District Judge, Toba Tek Singh and two others2019 SCP 100 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-04-17
  dowry articlesfamily courtappeal maintainabilitystatutory interpretationbeneficial legislationpurposive interpretationgender sensitivityfamily disputes
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged an order partly accepting a constitutional petition, which had reduced the amount awarded for dowry articles from Rs. 400,000/- to Rs. 300,000/-. The primary legal question addressed was the interpretation of Section 14(2) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, specifically whether the wife's appeal for enhancement of a dowry decree, initially for Rs. 25,000/-, was maintainable. The Supreme Court held that the embargo on the right of appeal under Section 14(2) applies only to the husband (judgment-debtor) against whom a decree has been passed, and not to the wife (decree-holder) who is dissatisfied with the quantum or denial of relief. The Court emphasized that beneficial provisions in statutes, like the Family Courts Act, 1964, must be interpreted purposively and liberally to advance their object of expeditious dispute resolution and protection of women, rather than frustrating their beneficial nature. Consequently, the wife's appeal was deemed validly filed, and the civil appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appeal filed by a wife seeking enhancement of a dowry decree maintainable under Section 14(2) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, if the initial decree amount was below the statutory threshold for appeal?
  • Does the embargo on the right of appeal under Section 14(2) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, apply to a wife dissatisfied with the quantum or denial of relief?
  • How should beneficial provisions in a statute, such as the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, be interpreted?
  • Can a judgment-debtor appeal a decree for dissolution of marriage, dower, dowry, or maintenance if the amount awarded is less than the amount mentioned in Section 14(2) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964?
  Read full judgment →
• Saif Ullah vs The State and othersPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 591, 2019 SCMR 1458 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-07-18
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirymurderpolice investigationno recoverycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arose from the Lahore High Court's refusal to grant post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a case registered under Sections 302, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure based on the police's investigative findings. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal and granted bail, noting that despite being nominated in the First Information Report for firing at the deceased, the police investigation concluded that the petitioner arrived after the incident was nearly over and did not cause any injury. Furthermore, the petitioner had been incarcerated since October 2016 with no recoveries made from him. The Court held that these circumstances rendered the petitioner's involvement a matter of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, justifying the grant of bail subject to a bail bond.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petitioner is entitled to bail under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the police investigation concludes they arrived after the incident and caused no injury, despite being nominated in the FIR?
  • Does the lack of recovery from an accused during investigation support a finding that the case requires further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • Can a delay in filing a criminal petition for bail before the Supreme Court be condoned upon a showing of sufficient cause?
  Read full judgment →
• Safdar Mehmood etc. vs Tanvir Hussain, etc.2019 SCMR 1978, PLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 555 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-29
  criminal appealmurderacquittalbenefit of doubtreappraisal of evidenceeyewitness identificationFIR delayspecific injury attributionpost-mortem delaycommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment consolidates two criminal appeals concerning a murder and injury incident from 2007, rooted in a blood feud. The core legal question revolved around the reappraisal of evidence, particularly the reliability of eyewitness identification in darkness, attribution of specific injuries, and the impact of discrepancies in the timing of the First Information Report (FIR) and post-mortem examination. In Criminal Appeal No. 68 of 2019, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the conviction under Section 302(b) PPC and acquitting the appellant, Fayyaz Ahmed, by extending the benefit of doubt. The Court found it inconceivable that eyewitnesses could identify specific injuries caused by different accused in darkness without a secured light source, noting contradictions between the FIR time and medical evidence. In Criminal Appeal No. 67 of 2018, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's acquittal of Tanvir Hussain for offenses under Sections 302(b) and 148 PPC, and his reduced sentence under Section 324 PPC, which he had already served. The Court emphasized that specific injury attribution in darkness was not substantiated beyond reasonable doubt and declined to enhance the sentence after a 12-year delay.

  Questions settled

  • Can specific injuries be reliably attributed to individual accused persons by eyewitnesses when an incident occurs in darkness without a secured light source?
  • Does a significant delay in lodging an FIR, contradicted by medical evidence showing earlier police contact, raise caution in appreciating prosecution evidence?
  • Is the prosecution's case against an accused weakened if co-accused have been acquitted and others declared proclaimed offenders?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the investigating agency has declared the appellant innocent and no recovery was made from their custody?
  • Should a sentence for an offense be enhanced after a substantial delay (e.g., 12 years) if the accused has already served the reduced sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Safdar Baloch alias Ali vs The State, etc2019 SCP 184 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-09
  abduction for ransombenefit of the doubtidentification evidencecriminal appealmurderous assaultchild witnessanti-terrorism
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the conviction of the appellants under Section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, Section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, and Section 324 read with Section 34 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for abduction for ransom and murderous assault. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established the identity and participation of the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt, given that they were nominated after a momentary glimpse at a marriage ceremony and were not apprehended at the scene when the victim child was recovered. The Court held that the identification of the appellants was fraught with doubt, the child witness's testimony required cautious scrutiny due to his impressionable age, and criminal liability cannot be based on moral satisfaction rather than evidentiary certainty. Consequently, the appeals were allowed, the convictions were set aside, and the appellants were acquitted on the principle of benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for abduction and murderous assault can be sustained when the identification of the accused is based on a momentary glimpse at a prior event?
  • Does the testimony of a child witness of impressionable age require cautious scrutiny regarding the identification of accused persons?
  • Can criminal liability be established on the basis of moral satisfaction rather than evidentiary certainty?
  Read full judgment →
• Safdar Baloch alias Ali and another vs The State and othersPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 578, 2019 SCMR 1412 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-09
  criminal appealkidnapping for ransombenefit of the doubtidentification evidencechild witnessrebuttable presumptionmurderous assault
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from convictions under Section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, Section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, and Section 324 read with Section 34 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for kidnapping for ransom and murderous assault. The core legal question was whether the identification and nomination of the appellants by the complainant, based on a momentary glimpse at a prior marriage ceremony, alongside the testimony of a child witness of impressionable age, met the rigorous standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeals, set aside the convictions, and acquitted the appellants. The ratio decidendi is that criminal liability must be established on strict evidentiary certainty rather than moral satisfaction; where the source of nomination of accused persons is fraught with doubt and vulnerable witness testimony lacks corroborative certainty, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused, and convictions cannot be sustained.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal conviction be sustained solely on identification arising from a momentary glimpse at a prior social gathering?
  • Whether the testimony of a child witness of impressionable age requires cautious scrutiny before being relied upon for a capital conviction?
  • Is criminal liability established on moral satisfaction or strict evidentiary certainty?
  • What is the legal effect on a prosecution case when the source of nomination of the accused is found to be doubtful?
  Read full judgment →
• Sadi Ahmad and another vs The State2019 PLJ SC Cr.C. 438, 2019 SCMR 1220, 2019 SCP 212 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-23
  murderrobberylast seen evidenceconfessional statementbenefit of doubtasphyxiaidentification testcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of Sadi Ahmad and Mukhtar Ahmad for the murder of a cab driver during a robbery. The prosecution's case rested on 'last seen' evidence, recoveries of weapons, and a confessional statement made by Mukhtar Ahmad during the trial. The Supreme Court of Pakistan scrutinized the evidence and found significant gaps. The court observed that the 'last seen' evidence lacked proximity in time and space and failed to inspire confidence. Furthermore, the medical evidence (asphyxia) contradicted the recovery of weapons, and the identification of the accused following a purported road accident was not established. The court rejected the confessional statement of Mukhtar Ahmad, noting it was exculpatory, inconsistent with the prosecution's original narrative, and later repudiated during his Section 342 Cr.P.C. examination. Holding that convictions cannot be based on moral satisfaction alone without proof beyond reasonable doubt, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants by extending the benefit of the doubt.

  Read full judgment →
• Sabir Iqbal vs Cantonment Board, Peshawar, through its Executive Officer, etc2019 PLD Supreme Court 189, 2019 PLJ SC 415, 2019 P.S.C. 1032, 2019 SCP 262 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-04
  service lawremoval from servicedoctrine of proportionalitydisciplinary proceedingscantonment servantsjudicial reviewexecutive discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition filed against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Peshawar High Court, which had upheld the petitioner's removal from service as a Telephone Operator in the Cantonment Board, Peshawar, following an absence from duty. The core legal questions involve whether the authorized officer could competently pass an order of removal without forwarding the case to the authority under the applicable rules, whether disagreement with an inquiry officer's report requires reasons and a fresh opportunity of hearing, and whether the penalty of removal violated the doctrine of proportionality. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that the removal order was passed without jurisdiction due to procedural omissions and violated the principle of proportionality by imposing an excessively harsh penalty for a one-day absence. The Court laid down that administrative discretions must satisfy the test of proportionality, ensuring a fair balance between the objective and the means adopted, without resorting to unduly oppressive or drastic measures.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an authorized officer can impose a major penalty without forwarding the case to the competent authority under the Pakistan Cantonment Servants Rules, 1954?
  • Is an authorized officer required to issue a fresh notice and provide reasons when disagreeing with the recommendations of an inquiry officer?
  • Does the doctrine of proportionality apply to the exercise of administrative and executive discretion in disciplinary matters?
  • Whether the penalty of removal from service for unauthorized absence of a single day meets the test of proportionality and necessity?
  Read full judgment →
• Sabir Iqbal vs Cantonment Board, Peshawar through Executive Officer2019 PLD Supreme Court 189 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-04
  disciplinary proceedingsproportionalityjudicial reviewmajor penaltyadministrative discretionunauthorized absencereinstatementcantonment service
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Telephone Operator in the Cantonment Board, Peshawar, was removed from service following a single day of unauthorized absence. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated, and an inquiry officer recommended a minor penalty of salary deduction. However, the authorized officer imposed the major penalty of removal from service. The petitioner's departmental appeal was dismissed as time-barred, and the Peshawar High Court upheld the removal. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that the removal order was legally flawed because the authorized officer failed to forward the case to the competent authority for major penalties as required by the Pakistan Cantonment Servants Rules, 1954. Furthermore, the Court held that if an authorized officer disagrees with an inquiry officer's findings, they must provide reasons and grant the accused a fresh opportunity of hearing. Additionally, the Court applied the doctrine of proportionality, ruling that removing an employee for a single day's absence was a disproportionate and unreasonable exercise of executive discretion. Consequently, the Court set aside the removal order and reinstated the petitioner without back benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the doctrine of proportionality apply to the exercise of executive discretion in disciplinary matters?
  • Is an authorized officer required to provide reasons and a fresh hearing if they disagree with the findings of an inquiry officer?
  • Must an authorized officer forward a case to the competent authority when imposing a major penalty under the Pakistan Cantonment Servants Rules, 1954?
  • Can a court set aside a disciplinary removal order if the punishment is wholly out of proportion to the misconduct?
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• Roshan Ali Buriro vs Syed Murad Ali Shah and others2019 SCMR 1939 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-23
  quo warrantodual nationalityrenunciation of citizenshipArticle 62(1)(f)Returning Officercourt of lawlifetime disqualificationbona fidesalternative remedydoctrine of merger
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a High Court judgment dismissing a constitutional petition seeking a writ of quo warranto against respondent No. 1, who had renounced his Canadian citizenship after the 2013 elections and subsequently won in the 2018 General Elections. The petitioner argued that an order passed by a Returning Officer in 2013 disqualifying respondent No. 1 under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution constituted a permanent disqualification. By a majority of two to one, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition. The majority held that a Returning Officer is a summary statutory forum, not a court of law, and a summary order without evidence or recorded findings of dishonesty cannot impose a permanent lifetime disqualification under Article 62(1)(f). Additionally, the Returning Officer's order merged into the Election Tribunal's order, which only disqualified the respondent under Article 63(1)(c). Furthermore, a writ of quo warranto was not maintainable where the petitioner bypassed statutory election appeal remedies out of personal political rivalry, lacking bona fides.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order passed by a Returning Officer in summary proceedings constitute a declaration by a court of law for the purposes of lifetime disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution?
  • Can a writ of quo warranto under Article 199 of the Constitution be maintained when motivated by personal political rivalry and where the petitioner bypassed statutory election remedies?
  • Does an order of disqualification passed by a Returning Officer survive independently after an Election Tribunal decides an appeal on a distinct constitutional ground under the doctrine of merger?
  Read full judgment →
• Riffat Shaheen vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief2019 PLC (C.S) 835, 2019 SCMR 659 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-07
  government accommodationallotment of quartersvested rightrepeal of rulesconstitutional petitionseniority quota
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the Peshawar High Court's judgment dismissing her constitutional petition. The petitioner, a government employee's spouse, sought transfer in her name of government accommodation originally allotted to her husband, who retired on 01.04.2017. Her application under the KPK Residential Accommodation at Peshawar (Procedure for Allotment) Rules, 1980 was not acceded to, and subsequently the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Buildings (Management, Control and Allotment) Act, 2018 was promulgated, repealing previous rules and not providing for automatic retention or out-of-turn allotment to spouses of retired civil servants, though safeguarding rights via a special seniority quota. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had no vested right to retain the accommodation under the repealed Rules of 1980, that her case was governed by the Act of 2018, and that she was entitled to accommodation only in accordance with her seniority on the waiting list. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a spouse of a retired civil servant have a vested right to retain government accommodation under repealed rules?
  • Whether the repeal of previous allotment rules extinguishes pending applications for out-of-turn government accommodation?
  • Are spouses of retired civil servants entitled to automatic retention of government accommodation upon retirement of the original allottee under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Buildings (Management, Control and Allotment) Act, 2018?
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• Rifat Hussain vs The State2019 SCP 324 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-09-12
  criminal leave to appealhomicidedelayed FIRpost-mortem delayre-appraisal of evidencecriminal justice administration
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Riffat Hussain, sought leave to appeal against his conviction for homicide under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, which was upheld by the High Court. The core legal question revolved around the re-appraisal of prosecution evidence in light of contentions regarding delayed reporting of the crime, delayed autopsy, shifting of the dead body, absence of crime scene casings, elimination of a co-accused in a police encounter, and the non-appearance of the Investigating Officer, which allegedly caused prejudice to the defense. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to re-appraise the prosecution evidence with a view to ensuring the safe administration of criminal justice. The key principle laid down is that the apex court will re-appraise evidence in criminal cases where material circumstances such as unexplained delays and procedural lapses escape the notice of the courts below, potentially prejudicing the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay in reporting the crime and conducting the autopsy render eyewitness accounts doubtful?
  • Whether the non-appearance of the Investigating Officer causes serious prejudice to the accused in a criminal trial?
  • Can the Supreme Court re-appraise prosecution evidence upon granting leave to appeal in a homicide case?
  Read full judgment →
• Regarding functioning of Patwaris, Kanungos and Tehsildars in urban area2019 KLR Supreme Court 241, 2019 PLD Supreme Court 297 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  land revenueurban arearevenue authoritiesmutationstransfer of propertyrecord of rightsabadi dehsuo motu
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant matter arises from a suo motu notice regarding the functioning of revenue authorities (Patwaris, Kanungos, and Tehsildars) and the maintenance of revenue records in urban areas such as Lahore, where land is not subject to land revenue. The core legal question revolves around whether revenue authorities possess the statutory authority to maintain records, conduct demarcations, or enter property mutations in urban rating areas exempted from land revenue. The Supreme Court held that urban properties falling within the ambit of the Punjab Urban Immoveable Property Tax Act, 1958, are exempt from land revenue, and revenue authorities are consequently not authorized to enter mutations or perform functions relating to the transfer of property in such areas. The Court laid down the principle that urban areas not governed by the Land Revenue Act, 1967, are instead regulated by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and the Registration Act, 1908, meaning oral mutations are invalid, and revenue records in such localities serve solely for record-keeping rather than property transfers.

  Questions settled

  • Whether revenue authorities have the jurisdiction to enter property mutations in urban areas governed by the Punjab Urban Immoveable Property Tax Act, 1958?
  • Does the inclusion of land within municipal limits ipso facto exclude it from the operation of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967?
  • Are oral mutations valid for the transfer of property in urban areas where the Land Revenue Act does not apply?
  • What statutes govern the transfer of property and devolution of rights in urban areas exempt from land revenue?
  Read full judgment →
• Regarding alarming high population growth rate in the country vs State2019 SCP 10 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-03
  population growthfundamental rightsright to lifefamily planningsocio-economic progresssuo motu
  Summary & questions settled

  This suo motu matter addressed the alarming high population growth rate in Pakistan and its severe detrimental effects on national resources, infrastructure, and socio-economic development. The core legal question examined the linkage between unchecked population expansion and the fundamental right to life, along with other constitutional rights. The Supreme Court held that the right to life under Article 9 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 is not merely restricted to vegetative existence but encompasses the right to a meaningful life with basic amenities, adequate living standards, clean drinking water, health, and education, which are severely compromised by overpopulation. The Court laid down the principle that economic prosperity and population planning are sine qua non for the meaningful enjoyment and implementation of all fundamental rights, endorsing a comprehensive set of national recommendations formulated by an expert task force to curb population growth, enhance contraceptive prevalence, and promote reproductive health.

  Questions settled

  • Does the fundamental right to life under Article 9 of the Constitution include the right to basic amenities and a minimum standard of living that is threatened by overpopulation?
  • Can socio-economic principles and directives of state policy be integrated with fundamental rights to address national crises like population explosion?
  • Whether the State is obligated to take active policy measures and implement family planning programs to safeguard the constitutional rights of its citizens?
  Read full judgment →
• Regarding Alarming High Population Growth Rate in the Country vs N_a2019 SCMR 247, 2019 SCP 10, 2019 PLJ SC 227 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-03
  population growthfamily planningright to lifefundamental rightssuo motusocio-economic progresssustainable development
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the alarming and rapid population growth rate in Pakistan, which has positioned the country as the fifth most populous nation globally with over 200 million people, threatening severe socio-economic consequences, resource depletion, and widespread poverty. The core legal question revolves around whether the unchecked population growth infringes upon fundamental rights, particularly the right to life under Article 9 of the Constitution, which encompasses the right to a meaningful life with basic amenities such as food, education, healthcare, clean drinking water, and employment. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that economic prosperity and population control are prerequisites for the realization of fundamental rights, and initiated suo motu proceedings to relaunch a national population planning campaign. The Court approved a comprehensive set of policy recommendations formulated by an inter-provincial Task Force and endorsed by the Council of Common Interests. The key principles laid down include that the right to life under Article 9 extends beyond mere existence to guarantee a dignified standard of living, and that the state and all relevant stakeholders have a constitutional obligation to implement robust population control and family planning measures to secure sustainable national development.

  Questions settled

  • Does the fundamental right to life under Article 9 of the Constitution of Pakistan include the right to adequate resources, basic amenities, and a standard of living that is dependent on population control?
  • Can the state's obligations to enforce fundamental rights be effectively fulfilled in the face of an unchecked population explosion?
  • Whether the Supreme Court can initiate suo motu proceedings to address alarming national issues such as rapid population growth and direct the formulation of a uniform national population policy?
  Read full judgment →
• Rana Abdul Khaliq vs The State, etcPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 506, 2019 SCMR 1129, 2019 SCP 160 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-13
  pre-arrest baildishonor of chequemala fideextraordinary remedybail cancellationabuse of processcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a challenge to a Lahore High Court order granting pre-arrest bail to a respondent accused under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code following the dishonor of a bank cheque. The High Court had confirmed the bail on the grounds that the respondent did not misuse ad interim relief and would likely be entitled to post-arrest bail if taken into custody. The Supreme Court of Pakistan set aside the impugned order, holding that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary remedy intended to protect innocent persons from arrests motivated by mala fide or ulterior motives. The Court clarified that pre-arrest bail is not a substitute for post-arrest bail and cannot be granted in routine criminal cases without a demonstration of abuse of process. Finding that the considerations for judicial protection were missing and that the High Court misapplied legal precedents, the Supreme Court cancelled the respondent's bail, emphasizing that the absence of misuse of ad interim bail is not a sufficient ground for confirmation.

  Read full judgment →
• Rajmeer Khan and another vs Noor-Ul-Haq and others2019 SCMR 1949 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-09-04
  cross-version casebenefit of doubtfree fightcriminal appealappreciation of evidencemurderacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves cross-appeals arising from a criminal incident where both the complainant and accused parties filed FIRs against each other, alleging murder and injuries. The core legal question concerned the reliability of evidence in a cross-version case where both parties attempted to conceal the truth and minimize their respective roles. The High Court had previously characterized the incident as a "free fight" entailing individual liability. Upon review, the Supreme Court observed that the evidence presented by both sides was heavily tainted with falsehood, making it impossible to discern the truth or establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the Court held that where the prosecution's case is inextricably mixed with untruths, the only viable course is to extend the benefit of doubt to the accused. Accordingly, the Court acquitted the appellant Mushtaq Khan, while dismissing the appeal regarding Noor-ul-Haq, finding no legal error in the High Court's decision to acquit him of specific charges due to the absence of expert medical evidence.

  Questions settled

  • In a cross-version case where both parties conceal the truth, is it legally permissible to reconstruct the story to determine individual liability?
  • What is the consequence when the prosecution's evidence is so heavily mixed with falsehood that the truth cannot be discerned?
  • Is an expert report mandatory to sustain a conviction under Section 337-D of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when medical clarity regarding the injury is lacking?
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• Raja Farhat Iqbal vs The State2019 SCMR 2063, 2019 SCP 342 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-15
  homicidewithdrawal of appealreview petitionfinality of judgmentcounsel authorityparole
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant, who was acquitted of homicide by the trial court but subsequently convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment by the High Court of Sindh, sought to challenge his conviction. His appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan was withdrawn by his counsel in 2009, and his subsequent review petition was dismissed in 2019, partly because he had already been released on parole. The applicant filed a subsequent application (Cr.M.A. No. 1404 of 2019) challenging the office's refusal to entertain his request after the dismissal of his review petition. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of a review petition forecloses all subsequent legal avenues for the applicant. Furthermore, the Court ruled that a client cannot escape the consequences of a course of action adopted by their duly engaged counsel simply by claiming they did not instruct the counsel to do so, especially after a significant delay. Consequently, the application was dismissed as hopelessly misconceived.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dismissal of a review petition by the Supreme Court foreclose all subsequent attempts and avenues for relief by an applicant?
  • Can an applicant escape the legal consequences of a decision made by their duly engaged counsel on the ground that they did not instruct the counsel to take that course of action?
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• Qazi Munir Ahmed vs Rawalpindi Medical College and Allied Hospital2019 PLC (C.S) 928, 2019 SCMR 648 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-06
  Leave to appealContract employmentConstitutional petitionIntra Court AppealVoid orderLimitationAggrieved personNecessary partyReinstatementDamages
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan decided two petitions for leave to appeal challenging a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside a Single Judge's order allowing a constitutional petition concerning the termination of a contract ECG Technician's services. The core legal questions involved the competence and timeliness of Intra Court Appeals (ICAs), the validity of the petitioner's initial appointment, and the appropriateness of invoking constitutional jurisdiction for contract employment disputes. The Court dismissed the petitions, affirming the High Court's Division Bench decision. It held that an aggrieved person, even if not a party to the original proceedings, can file an appeal, and if one of multiple appeals against the same judgment is timely, others can also be entertained on merits, especially against a void order, against which no period of limitation runs. The petitioner's appointment was found to be void, made without proper authority. Furthermore, the constitutional petition was deemed incompetent due to the non-impleadment of the Province of Punjab as a necessary party and because contract employees cannot seek reinstatement through constitutional jurisdiction, their remedy being a suit for damages.

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• Qari Muhammad Ishaq Ghazi vs The State2019 SCMR 1646 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-06-27
  incendiary pamphletshate speechpossession of inflammatory materialanti-terrorismcredibility of police witnessespublic witnesses
  Summary & questions settled

  Surprised by a police contingent, the appellant was found in possession of incendiary pamphlets inciting hatred towards a particular sect. He was indicted before an Anti-Terrorism Court, convicted under Section 9 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and sentenced to five years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine, which conviction and sentence were upheld by the High Court. Impugning these judgments before the Supreme Court after having completed his sentence, the appellant contended that mere possession without actual distribution does not attract Section 9 and challenged the non-association of public witnesses. The Supreme Court held that a plain reading of Section 9 establishes that possession of inflammatory material by itself constitutes an offence even before distribution, aiming to nip the evil in the bud. The Court further held that police officials are credible witnesses whose testimony can be relied upon in the absence of animus or flaw, particularly given societal apathy. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does mere possession of inflammatory material constitute an offence under Section 9 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 without actual distribution?
  • Are police officials considered credible witnesses to prove possession of inflammatory material in the absence of public witnesses?
  • Can a criminal appeal be heard on merits even after the appellant has completed the sentence?
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• Qaiser Javed Khan vs The State thr. Prosecutor General Punjab, Lahore &2020 KLR Supreme Court Cases 103, 2020 PLD Supreme Court 57, 2020 PSC · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-12-18
  narcotic substancesgovernment analyst reportforensic evidencecriminal convictionevidentiary valueprocedural compliancedrug trafficking
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition challenges the conviction of the petitioner under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the possession of narcotics. The core legal question concerns whether a Government Analyst’s report, which fails to specify the detailed protocols of the tests conducted, satisfies the mandatory requirements of Rule 6 of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001. The Supreme Court held that the report in the instant case was deficient as it lacked the necessary protocols, rendering it inconclusive and unreliable for sustaining a conviction. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and sentence. The judgment establishes that for a Government Analyst’s report to be reliable, it must explicitly state the tests applied, the specific protocols used for those tests, and the results obtained. Furthermore, while Trial Courts may summon an analyst under Section 510 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to clarify ambiguities in a report, this power cannot be used to allow the prosecution to fill evidentiary gaps or conduct fresh tests.

  Questions settled

  • Is compliance with Rule 6 of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001 regarding the specification of testing protocols mandatory?
  • What are the essential requirements for a valid Government Analyst report under the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001?
  • Can a Trial Court summon a Government Analyst under Section 510 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to cure evidentiary gaps in a forensic report?
  • Does the admissibility of a Government Analyst's report equate to its evidentiary value?
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• Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary, Sindh and another vs Messrs2019 SCMR 1885 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-08-07
  breach of contractdamagesreview petitionlimitationleave to appealAdvocate Generalpublic funds
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil suit founded on breach of contract and damages, which was partly decreed in favor of the respondent. Instead of filing a regular appeal against the judgment and decree of the learned Single Judge, the petitioner, represented by the Advocate General's office, chose to file a review petition under Section 114 read with Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which was also delayed. The review petition was dismissed, and a subsequent appeal against that dismissal was also rejected by the High Court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether indulgence could be granted to the government on the grounds of colossal public funds being involved, despite the incompetent handling of the litigation by the Advocate General's office. The Court held that the state is expected to appoint competent officers paid through public money to defend its interests, and the personal involvement of public servants in other matters does not justify professional negligence here. Consequently, the Court declined leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party file a review petition under Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 as a substitute for a regular appeal against a judgment and decree?
  • Whether the involvement of colossal public funds justifies judicial indulgence for procedural lapses and incompetent handling of litigation by the Advocate General's office?
  • Is the government entitled to special leniency in condoning delays or procedural errors due to the alleged incompetence of its state counsel?
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• Phoenix Security (Pvt) Limited vs Pir Muhammad & others2020 PLC 44, 2020 PSC 470, 2020 SCMR 132, 2019 SCP 382 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-03
  security guardswatchmanweekly holidaysovertime wagesdouble ratepayment of wagesstatutory exclusion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a dispute regarding the final settlement of dues of retired security guards employed by the petitioner. The respondents filed applications under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, claiming unpaid wages for weekly holidays and overtime at double the rate of wages. The Authority allowed the claims, which were subsequently modified by the Labour Court and further reduced by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal. The High Court restored the Labour Court's decision. The Supreme Court of Pakistan was called upon to determine whether the West Pakistan Shops & Establishments Ordinance, 1969 applied to security guards, and whether the respondents were entitled to double wages for weekly holidays and overtime under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The Court held that security guards are synonymous with 'watchmen' and are excluded from the 1969 Ordinance under Section 5(1)(ix). Furthermore, the 1968 Ordinance does not prescribe double rates for weekly holidays or overtime, and the respondents failed to prove any contract, custom, or usage to that effect. The Court allowed the appeals, modifying the High Court's order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the term 'watchman' under Section 5(1)(ix) of the West Pakistan Shops & Establishments Ordinance, 1969 includes a security guard?
  • Can the definition of 'wages' in the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 be used to interpret the term 'wages' under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Are employees governed by the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 entitled to double the rate of wages for weekly holidays and overtime in the absence of a specific contract, custom, or usage?
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• Perveen Shoukat vs Privince of Sindh and others2019 PLD Supreme Court 710 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-09-06
  missing personpresumption of deathfamily pensionburden of proofconstitutional petitionprobable time of death
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition, converted into an appeal, addresses the determination of the probable time of death of a missing person for the purpose of calculating family pension benefits. The husband of the petitioner was kidnapped in May 1999 and remained untraced, leading the petitioner to obtain a declaration of his death under Article 124 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The core legal question was whether Article 124 prescribes or helps determine the exact date or probable time of death within the statutory seven-year waiting period, or whether such a date must be independently inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case. The Supreme Court held that Article 124 merely creates a legal presumption that a missing person is dead after seven years but does not fix the date or time of death, which must be determined independently based on evidence and surrounding circumstances. The Court partly allowed the appeal, setting aside the lower court judgment, and directed that the family pension be calculated from the probable date of death inferred around the lodging of the FIR.

  Questions settled

  • Does Article 124 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 help in determining the probable time of death of a missing person within the statutory seven-year period?
  • Can the date of death of a missing person be presumed to be the exact day the seven-year statutory period expires?
  • How is the probable time of death of a missing person to be ascertained when no direct evidence of death is available?
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• Parveen Shoukat vs Province of Sindh and others2019 SCP 316 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-09-06
  missing personpresumption of deathfamily pensionburden of proofprobable time of deathconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought family pension following the disappearance and subsequent statutory declaration of death of her husband, a government employee who was kidnapped in May 1999. A declaration of death was obtained under Article 124 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The core legal question concerned whether Article 124 establishes a presumption as to the exact date of death upon the expiry of the seven-year period, or whether the probable time of death must be inferred independently from the facts and circumstances of the case. The Supreme Court held that Article 124 merely creates a legal presumption of death after seven years without fixing the date or probable time of death within that period. The Court ruled that the probable time of death must be determined based on the specific circumstances of disappearance, such as the filing of the First Information Report and subsequent events. Consequently, the Court partly allowed the appeal, directing that the family pension be calculated from the date the FIR was lodged rather than the date of disappearance or the expiry of the seven-year period.

  Questions settled

  • Does Article 124 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 create a presumption regarding the exact date or probable time of death of a missing person?
  • How is the probable time of death of a missing person determined when a declaration is sought under Article 124 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • From what date should family pension be calculated in the case of a missing government employee declared dead under the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
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• Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, PTA Headquarters, Islamabad vs Pakistan Mobile Communication Limited2019 PLJ SC 476, 2019 P.S.C 1318, 2019 SCMR 924, 2019 SCP 200 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-02
  telecommunication regulationappellate jurisdictionshow cause noticeadministrative lawexhaustion of remediesjudicial reviewPakistan Telecommunication Authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the maintainability of an appeal filed before the High Court under the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996, challenging show-cause notices issued by the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA). The core legal question was whether the High Court could exercise appellate jurisdiction under Section 7(1) of the Act in the absence of a final decision or order by the Authority. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s appellate jurisdiction is strictly contingent upon the existence of a final 'decision or order' of the Authority. As the respondent had only received show-cause notices and had failed to submit responses, no final order existed to be challenged, rendering the appeal before the High Court premature and incompetent. The Court established the principle that judicial intervention in administrative proceedings is impermissible until the administrative process has concluded with a final decision. Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment, directing that the respondent be granted a final opportunity to respond to the show-cause notices before the Authority proceeds to a final determination.

  Questions settled

  • Does the issuance of a show-cause notice constitute a 'decision or order' appealable under Section 7(1) of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996?
  • Can a High Court exercise appellate jurisdiction under the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996, in the absence of a final order from the Authority?
  • Does the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority have the legal power to conduct quality of service surveys under the Cellular Mobile Quality of Service Regulations, 2011?
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• Pakistan State Oil Co. Ltd., Karachi vs Collector Customs Central2020 P C T L R 627, 2019 PTD 1956, PTCL 2020 CL. 139, 2019 SCMR 1124 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-18
  tax fraudadditional taxpetroleum products exportdiversion of consignmentsquestion of factSupreme Court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from concurrent findings of the departmental fora and the Tribunal holding the appellant, Pakistan State Oil Co. Ltd., liable for the unlawful local diversion of petroleum products purportedly shipped for export to Afghanistan without payment of duties and taxes. Following show-cause notices and recovery proceedings, the appellant deposited the evaded duties and taxes, but the Tribunal further found the appellant guilty of tax fraud due to its knowledge of the diversion, justifying the imposition of additional tax and duty. The core legal question concerned the legality of imposing additional tax and additional duty under the relevant fiscal statutes based on factual findings of deliberate delay and tax fraud. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that concurrent findings of fact regarding tax fraud and deliberate delay cannot be assailed before this Court, particularly when no proper question of law relating to the said liability was framed or raised before the High Court. The key principle laid down is that pure findings of fact establishing tax fraud and deliberate delay in payment of duties cannot be reopened in the apex court absent a properly framed question of law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a pure finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal regarding tax fraud and deliberate delay be assailed before the Supreme Court?
  • Whether the imposition of additional tax and additional duty under the Central Excise Act, 1944 and Sales Tax Act, 1990 is justified when petroleum products meant for export are diverted to the local market?
  • Does a reference application before the High Court constitute a valid challenge on a question of fact if no proper question of law is framed?
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• Pakistan Refinery Ltd., Karachi vs Barrett Hodgson Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd.2020 P SC 113, 2019 SCMR 1726 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-11
  appellate judgmentreasons for judgmentfirst court of factCode of Civil Procedureremandaffirmative judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh dismissing appeals and upholding judgments of a Single Judge. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court, acting as the first court of appeal and final court of fact, rendered a judgment in compliance with Rule 31 of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 by stating the points for determination, decisions, and reasons. The Supreme Court held that the impugned appellate judgment failed to conform to the mandatory requirements of Rule 31 of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 because it merely reproduced arguments without analyzing or providing reasons for accepting or rejecting them, even in an affirmative judgment. The Court laid down the principle that a first court of appeal must explicitly state points for determination, decisions thereon, and reasons for its findings, ensuring due application of mind so that litigants and higher forums understand the basis of the decision, and such statutory duties cannot be dispensed with or passed on to higher courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a first court of appeal is required to state points for determination and reasons when agreeing with the trial court?
  • Does a judgment that merely reproduces arguments without stating reasons satisfy the requirements of Rule 31 of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can the requirement of rendering a reasoned judgment be dispensed with in the case of an affirmative appellate judgment?
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• Pakistan Olympic Association vs Nadeem Aftab Sindhu etc2019 PLJ SC 348, 2019 SCMR 221, 2019 SCP 1, 2022 PSC 823 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-01
  Writ petitionMaintainability of writPakistan Olympic AssociationPublic functionaryFunction testFundamental rights enforcementJudicial reviewSocieties Registration ActConstitutional jurisdictionPrivate body
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court heard appeals challenging a High Court judgment that declared elections of the Pakistan Olympic Association (POA) illegal, primarily addressing the maintainability of a writ petition against the POA. The core legal questions were whether the POA, an autonomous society, qualified as a 'person' performing public functions under Article 199(1)(a) of the Constitution, and if a writ was maintainable against it under Article 199(1)(c) for fundamental rights enforcement. The Court held that the POA did not satisfy the 'function test' for Article 199(1)(a) as it was not substantially controlled or funded by the Federal Government and did not exercise sovereign or public power. While acknowledging that Article 199(1)(c) has a wider scope and can apply to private bodies for fundamental rights enforcement, the Court found that the internal functioning of the POA, specifically its election method, did not involve a violation of any fundamental rights (Articles 9, 14, 17, 18, and 25 of the Constitution were deemed irrelevant). Consequently, the appeals were allowed, and the High Court's judgment was set aside, concluding that a writ was not maintainable against the POA under either provision in the given circumstances. Aggrieved parties were advised to approach courts of plenary jurisdiction.

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• Pakistan Match Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and others vs Assistant2019 PTCL .CL 453, 2019 PTD 1299, 2019 SCMR 906 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-11
  Sales Tax ExemptionSRO 77(1)/95Interpretation of ProvisoFiscal StatuteConstitutional PetitionTax ReferenceFactual DisputeAppellate TribunalImported Plant and MachineryLocally Manufactured Plant and Machinery
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court heard two appeals from the Peshawar High Court concerning the denial of sales tax exemption under SRO 77(1)/95. The primary legal question was the proper interpretation of the first proviso to SRO 77, specifically whether the exemption was limited to industrial units that opened letters of credit for imported plant and machinery, or if it also applied to units using locally manufactured plant and machinery. The Court held that the first proviso was a "true" proviso, intended only to carve an exception by limiting the benefit for units with imported machinery to those opening LCs by a specific date, and did not restrict the main exemption to only imported machinery. Consequently, the High Court's interpretation was deemed incorrect. C.A. 243/2013 (arising from a tax reference) was allowed, as the High Court erred in treating factual disputes in a tax reference similarly to a writ petition, failing to appreciate that material misreading of evidence by the Appellate Tribunal constituted a question of law. However, C.A. 94/2012 (from a constitutional petition) was dismissed because, despite the High Court's misinterpretation of the SRO, the High Court was justified in denying relief due to unresolved material factual controversies and the taxpayer's failure to adequately respond to specific factual allegations.

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• Pakistan International Airlines Corporation and another vs Zaeem Aziz2019 PLC (C.S.) 194, 2018 SCMR 1944 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-06
  compulsory retirementRemoval from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance 2000competent authorityservice lawdisciplinary proceedingscorporate governanceadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment that set aside a compulsory retirement order issued against a Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC) employee under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000. The High Court had invalidated the retirement order, reasoning it was issued by an incompetent authority because the Chairman/CEO did not personally sign the communication letter, despite the decision being reached in an Employee Leadership Team (ELT) meeting. The Supreme Court allowed the Corporation's appeal, holding that the decision was substantively made by the competent authority, who chaired the ELT meeting and explicitly endorsed the decision in writing. The Court clarified that the communication of such orders by an HR Manager is standard corporate practice and does not invalidate the underlying decision-making process. The Court emphasized that procedural form should not prevail over substance where the competent authority has applied its mind and authorized the action. Consequently, the Court upheld the compulsory retirement, finding no prejudice caused to the employee by the administrative manner in which the decision was communicated.

  Questions settled

  • Does the communication of a compulsory retirement order by an HR Manager invalidate the order if the decision was made by the competent authority?
  • Can a decision made by a competent authority in a collective meeting be considered valid if the authority later endorses the minutes?
  • Is an act by a legally incompetent authority capable of being subsequently ratified by the competent authority?
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• Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) through its2020 P SC 732, 2020 SCMR 206, 2019 SCP 380 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-01
  FM radio licensePEMRAlicense renewal feeradio frequency spectrumregulatory interpretationadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns seven petitions for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment regarding the determination of renewal license fees for FM radio operators under the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulation Authority Ordinance, 2002. The core legal question was whether the renewal fee should be based on the last approved bidding price for the relevant area or the original bidding price paid by the licensee. The Supreme Court held that the regulatory framework, specifically Regulation 9(2) of the Radio Broadcast Station Operation Regulations, 2012, mandates that the renewal fee be the 'prevailing applicable license fee'—interpreted as the last bidding price approved by PEMRA for the respective category and area—plus the annual inflationary rate set by the State Bank of Pakistan. The Court clarified that where no subsequent bidding has occurred, the fee is the original bidding price plus the inflationary rate. The judgment establishes that 'prevailing' implies the most current market-determined price, ensuring transparency and equity in the allocation of limited radio frequency spectrum.

  Questions settled

  • How is the renewal license fee for FM radio determined under the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulation Authority Ordinance, 2002?
  • Does the term 'prevailing applicable license fee' in the context of license renewal refer to the last approved bidding price or the original bidding price?
  • What is the role of the Frequency Allocation Board in the allocation of radio frequencies for broadcast services?
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• Pakistan Bar Council through Chairman and others vs Federal2019 SCMR 389 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-08-31
  legal educationPakistan Bar CouncilRule of Lawlaw collegesaffiliationHigher Education Commissionlegal professionbar entrance examination
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition, filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, addressed the declining standards of legal education and the proliferation of substandard law colleges in Pakistan. The core legal question concerned the enforcement of regulatory standards for legal education and the compliance of law colleges with the Pakistan Bar Council’s (PBC) rules. The Court held that the judiciary has a constitutional duty to uphold the Rule of Law, which necessitates a competent legal profession, and that the PBC and Higher Education Commission of Pakistan (HECP) are the primary regulators of legal education. Consequently, the Court issued comprehensive directions, including the mandatory implementation of Law Admission Tests (LAT) and Law Graduate Assessment Tests (LAW-GAT), the prohibition of evening classes, the restriction of LL.M. and Ph.D. admissions, and the specification of territorial jurisdictions for affiliating universities. Furthermore, the Court ordered the disaffiliation or closure of non-compliant institutions. The key principle laid down is that legal education is a matter of public interest, and the Bar and Bench must collaborate to ensure that law degree-awarding institutions adhere to stringent quality standards to safeguard the integrity of the legal profession.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Pakistan Bar Council have the authority to set binding standards for legal education that prevail over conflicting rules of affiliating universities?
  • Can the Supreme Court issue specific regulatory directions to law colleges and universities to enforce standards of legal education under its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Are law colleges required to maintain specific infrastructural and faculty standards to remain affiliated and authorized to confer law degrees?
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• Pakistan Airline Pilots Association and others vs Pakistan International2019 SCMR 278, 2019 SCP 14 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-16
  pension calculationmaster and servantstatutory ruleswrit jurisdictionlachesservice grievancetrust deedmaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants, retired pilots and flight engineers of Pakistan International Airline Corporation (PIAC), challenged the calculation of their pensionary benefits, seeking the application of a formula from a 1980 Trust Deed. The core legal questions involved whether a trust deed rescinded by Martial Law Regulation No. 52 of 1981 could be revived for pension calculations and whether the relationship between PIAC and its employees was governed by statutory rules or the principle of 'master and servant'. The Supreme Court held that the 1980 Trust Deed stood rescinded by MLR-52 and was subsequently replaced by various administrative orders and pension schemes. Furthermore, the Court observed that since the terms and conditions of PIAC employees are not regulated by statutory provisions, the relationship is governed by the principle of 'master and servant', rendering a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution non-maintainable. The Court also noted that the petition suffered from laches as the appellants sought to enforce a revoked deed after several decades while having acquiesced to subsequent schemes.

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• Pakistan Aeronautical Complex through its Chairman, Kamra & others vs Nazar-ul-Islam2019 P.S.C. 1725 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  service appealoption of service rulesdepartmental promotion examinationestoppelcivil servantPakistan Aeronautical Complex
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenges a judgment of the Federal Services Tribunal that allowed the respondent's service appeal. The core legal question was whether an employee of the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex who failed to submit his option to be governed by the Civil Servants Act within the stipulated deadline, and who subsequently participated in a departmental promotion examination under the PAC Board Employees Rules, could later claim exemption from those rules and demand promotion based on seniority-cum-fitness. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of a timely option exercising the right to remain under the civil servants regime, and by voluntarily participating in the promotion examination conducted under the 2012 Rules, the respondent was bound by the new rules and could not approbate and reprobate. The impugned judgment of the Tribunal was accordingly set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee who fails to submit a timely option under Section 7 of the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex Board Ordinance 2000 is deemed governed by the new service rules?
  • Can an employee participate in a departmental promotion examination under new service rules and subsequently challenge the applicability of those rules upon failing to secure promotion?
  • Does participation in a promotion exam preclude an employee from claiming past status as a civil servant?
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• Pakistan Aeronautical Complex through its Chairman, Kamra & others vs Nazar ul Islam2020 PLJ SC 223, 2019 SCMR 1933, 2019 SCP 334 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-08-19
  service tribunalservice rulesoption of rulesdepartmental promotion examinationestoppelcivil servantpromotionstatutory ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, which had allowed the respondent's service appeal concerning promotion from BS-16 to BS-17 at the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, Kamra. The core legal question was whether an employee who failed to exercise the statutory option to remain governed by the Civil Servants Act within the stipulated deadline, and who subsequently participated in promotion examinations under the new PAC Board rules, could later challenge those rules and claim promotion under the old civil servant rules. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of a timely option, the employee was governed by the new service rules under the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex Board Ordinance, 2000, and by participating in the departmental promotion examinations, was estopped from challenging the applicability of the said rules. The Court laid down the principle that an employee cannot blow hot and cold by voluntarily submitting to a new regulatory framework for promotion and subsequently turning to challenge it upon an unfavorable result.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee who fails to submit an option within the prescribed time under Section 7 of the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex Board Ordinance, 2000 is deemed governed by the new service rules?
  • Can an employee participate in a departmental promotion examination under new service rules and subsequently challenge the applicability of those rules upon failing to secure promotion?
  • Whether an employee is estopped from alleging non-applicability of new service rules after deriving benefits and submitting to examinations prescribed thereunder?
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• Oxford University Press vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Companies Zone-2019 PCTLR 1, 2019 PTD 523, 2019 SCMR 235, 2019 SCP 3 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-17
  Income tax exemptionEducational institutionUniversityTax interpretationExemption clauseProfit motiveSolely for educational purposesSupreme Court of PakistanIncome Tax OrdinanceBranch income
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed appeals concerning the tax exemption claim of Oxford University Press (OUP), a branch of Oxford University, under Clause (86) of Part I of the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the exemption, granted to "any university or other educational institution established solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit," required the institution to conduct educational activities within Pakistan or precluded it from making any profits. The High Court had denied the exemption, interpreting the clause to imply a requirement for educational activities in Pakistan and equating "not for purposes of profit" with not making profits. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, holding that OUP was entitled to the exemption. The Court ruled that the words "in Pakistan" could not be read into Clause 86, as the word "established" had no locational significance. Furthermore, "not for purposes of profit" meant that there should be no distribution or disbursement of profits to owners or stakeholders, not that profits could not be made. As long as profits remained with the institution and were not disbursed, its purpose remained solely educational, and "any income" from any source was exempt.

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• N/A vs N/A2019 KLR Supreme Court 27, 2018 P.S.C. 1725 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-07-12
  suo motupublic sector companyfiduciary dutyillegal appointmentcorporate governancerecovery of public fundsnepotismjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This suo motu matter concerned the legality of the appointment of Mr. Ata-ul-Haq Qasmi as Director and Chairman of Pakistan Television Corporation Limited (PTV), alongside the validity of his salary package and expenses. The Supreme Court examined whether PTV, a public sector company, performs state functions, thereby invoking jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. The Court held that the appointment process was arbitrary, lacking transparency, and violated established procedures, including the requirement for open advertisement and selection committees. Consequently, the appointment was declared illegal. Furthermore, the Court found the remuneration and perks granted to Mr. Qasmi were unauthorized and excessive, constituting a breach of fiduciary duty. The Court ruled that public functionaries must exercise authority transparently and in accordance with the law. Holding specific government officials responsible for the illegal process, the Court ordered the recovery of Rs. 197,867,491/- from Mr. Qasmi and the responsible officials, and declared Mr. Qasmi ineligible for future directorships due to his lack of fiduciary behavior.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction under Article 184(3) to examine the appointment of a Director in a public sector company?
  • Is an appointment to a public sector company without open advertisement and adherence to prescribed selection procedures legally valid?
  • Can a Director of a public sector company be held personally liable for the recovery of public funds misused during their tenure?
  • What constitutes a 'tenure post' for the purpose of applying exemptions from open advertisement requirements in public sector appointments?
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• Notice in Pursuance of the Order Passed by This Court on 13.02.2019 _ed8fcb92PLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 265 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-04
  falsus in uno falsus in omnibusperjuryfalse testimonysifting grain from the chaffappreciation of evidencecriminal jurisprudenceIslamic injunctionswitness credibility
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter emanates from criminal proceedings where a witness, Khizar Hayat (PW8), gave patently false testimony on oath resulting in a wrongful capital conviction, prompting the Supreme Court of Pakistan to issue notice for perjury under Section 194 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question addressed is whether the maxim 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus' (false in one, false in everything) should continue to be held inapplicable in criminal jurisprudence in Pakistan, or whether it ought to be restored in light of legal history, statutory provisions concerning perjury, and Islamic injunctions. The Supreme Court held that the long-standing judicial practice of discarding the rule and 'sifting grain from the chaff' was based on pragmatic, subjective considerations introduced in 1951, which run counter to Islamic jurisprudence, constitutional mandates, and statutory penal provisions against false testimony. The Court authoritatively laid down that the rule 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus' is henceforth an integral part of Pakistan's criminal jurisprudence, requiring courts to mandatorily apply it and invariably initiate perjury proceedings against witnesses who resort to deliberate falsehood on material aspects.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the legal maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is applicable in criminal cases in Pakistan?
  • Is a court obliged to sift the grain from the chaff when a witness has been found to have lied on a material aspect?
  • Does the continued inapplicability of the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus run counter to the Injunctions of Islam and the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Must courts mandatorily initiate proceedings for perjury against witnesses who depose falsely on material facts?
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• Notice in compliance with the order dated 12.02.2019 passed in Criminal2019 PLD Supreme Court 488, PLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 153, 2019 P.S.C. (Crl) 332, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-22
  Criminal AppealAbduction for RansomMurderCircumstantial EvidenceTest Identification ParadeJoint IdentificationEvidentiary ValueBenefit of DoubtJudicial MagistrateAcquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court heard a criminal appeal against convictions for abduction for ransom and murder, where the appellant was initially sentenced to death, later reduced to life imprisonment by the High Court. The core legal questions revolved around the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence and the validity of a test identification parade. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, finding the circumstantial evidence, including last-seen and recovery evidence, to be flawed or fabricated. Crucially, the test identification parade was deemed legally defective due to being a joint identification of multiple accused, a practice consistently disapproved by the Court. Consequently, the appellant's conviction and sentence were set aside, and he was acquitted. Separately, a notice issued to the Special Judicial Magistrate who conducted the parade was discharged after his explanation regarding lack of legal training and institutional support was found plausible. The Court reiterated and consolidated established principles for conducting proper test identification parades, emphasizing that such evidence is corroborative, not substantive, and joint identification is improper.

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• Noor Ahmad vs The State, etc2019 PLJ SC Cr.C. 432, 2019 PSC (Crl.) 516, 2019 SCMR 1327, 2019 SCP 194 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-17
  benefit of doubtmurder trialmedical evidencerigor mortisforensic recoveryocular accountacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  Criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arising from the conviction of the appellant under Section 302(b) and Section 449 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, where the High Court had altered the sentence of death to imprisonment for life. The prosecution alleged that the appellant shot and killed his betrothed inside her home after her family refused the marriage proposal. The core legal question was whether the prosecution established its case beyond a reasonable doubt given significant discrepancies between medical evidence and ocular account, as well as procedural anomalies regarding recoveries. The Supreme Court observed that the autopsy findings revealed recent sexual intercourse contrary to the claim that the deceased was a nubile virgin, development of complete rigor mortis in hot weather contradicted the alleged time of occurrence, and the matching empty casing was dispatched to the forensic lab a day prior to the appellant's arrest. Holding these doubts to be real rather than imaginary, the Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant by extending the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained when medical evidence regarding the time of death directly contradicts the prosecution's ocular account?
  • What is the effect on prosecution evidence when forensic items are dispatched to the laboratory prior to the accused's arrest?
  • Whether substantial conflicts between autopsy findings and the prosecution's narrative entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt?
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• Nida Khuhro vs Moazzam Ali Khan and others2019 P.S.C. 1573, 2019 SCMR 1684, 2019 SCP 308 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-08-01
  election petitiondisqualificationconcealment of assetsfalse affidavitcorrupt practicereturned candidatefamily settlementbenami ownership
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from the judgment of the Election Tribunal of the High Court of Sindh, which had dismissed the appellant's election petition challenging the election of Respondent No. 1 as a Member of the Provincial Assembly. The appellant contended that Respondent No. 1 failed to disclose his entire landholding and the agricultural assets of his minor children in his nomination papers, statement of assets, and sworn affidavit. Respondent No. 1 admitted the non-disclosure but argued that the omitted land was under the beneficial control and possession of his father, and that the omission was a bona fide error. The Supreme Court of Pakistan rejected this explanation, holding that because the proprietary rights, title, and interest in the land legally vested in Respondent No. 1 and his children, he was under a strict statutory and constitutional obligation to disclose them. The Court held that filing a false declaration and affidavit under oath constitutes a corrupt practice and triggers disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Tribunal's judgment, annulled the election of Respondent No. 1, and directed the Election Commission of Pakistan to hold fresh elections.

  Questions settled

  • Does the nominal or beneficial control of land by a candidate's father excuse the candidate from disclosing that land in their statement of assets if the legal title vests in the candidate?
  • Whether the submission of a false statement of assets and liabilities under solemn affirmation in nomination papers constitutes a corrupt practice under the Election Act, 2017?
  • Can a candidate be disqualified under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of Pakistan for failing to disclose assets belonging to themselves and their minor children in a sworn affidavit?
  • Is the Supreme Court of Pakistan a 'Court of Law' capable of issuing a declaration of disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Nazli Hilal Rizvi vs Bank Al-Falah Ltd and others2020 P SC 1418, 2019 SCP 310, 2019 CLD 1222, 2019 SCMR 1679 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-08-07
  banking suitexecution proceedingsmortgaged propertyauction saleautomatic conversionconstructive noticeforced sale value
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld the dismissal of an application to set aside an auction sale of mortgaged property. The core legal question was whether the auction proceedings were vitiated by the lack of fresh notice to the judgment-debtor at her foreign address and whether the property valuation was inadequate. The Supreme Court held that under Section 19(1) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001, a banking suit automatically converts into execution proceedings upon the pronouncement of a decree, dispensing with the requirement for fresh notice to the judgment-debtor. The Court found that the petitioner had constructive knowledge of the proceedings, as her counsel remained on record and the Banking Court had explicitly notified the parties of this automatic conversion in its original judgment. The Court affirmed that the petitioner failed to satisfy the decretal amount despite ample opportunity and that alleged inadequacy in valuation does not constitute a valid ground to set aside a court-conducted auction sale.

  Questions settled

  • Does a banking suit automatically convert into execution proceedings upon the pronouncement of a decree under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001?
  • Is a fresh notice required to be served upon a judgment-debtor for execution proceedings following the decree of a banking suit?
  • Can an auction sale of mortgaged property be set aside solely on the grounds of alleged inadequacy in the valuation of the property?
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• Nazir Ahmad vs The State2019 PLJ SC (Cr.C) 307, 2018 P.S.C. (Crl) 240, 2018 SCMR 787 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-07
  MurderAppeal by leaveReappraisal of evidenceBenefit of doubtOnus of proofUnnatural deathReliability of evidenceAcquittalCriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned an appeal by leave against the appellant's conviction for the murder of his wife, Mst. Anwar Bibi, inside their matrimonial home. The High Court had upheld the conviction under Section 302(b) PPC but reduced the death sentence to life imprisonment. The core legal question involved a reappraisal of the evidence and the applicability of the principle of shifting the onus to the accused to explain an unnatural death in their house, particularly when the prosecution's evidence is found unreliable. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant by extending the benefit of doubt. The Court held that the initial onus of proof always rests with the prosecution, and if the prosecution fails to adduce reliable evidence, an accused cannot be convicted solely on the basis of a failure to discharge a partial onus, especially when the entire prosecution case is not believable.

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• Nazeer Khan vs The State and another2019 SCMR 1308, 2019 SCP 228 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-06-10
  criminal leave to appealhomicidemurderdying declarationabsconsioncorroborative evidenceocular account
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition for leave to appeal arising from a conviction for homicide. The petitioner, Nazeer Khan, remained an absconder from January 1992 until his eventual trial, conviction, and sentencing by an Additional Sessions Judge in 2011 for the murder of Nisar Muhammad over a land dispute. The conviction was subsequently upheld by the Peshawar High Court in October 2014. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution had successfully established the petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, relying upon the deceased's dying declaration corroborated by medical and ocular evidence, notwithstanding the prolonged absconsion of the accused. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the dying declaration was straightforward, confidence-inspiring, and fully corroborated by the medical evidence and ocular account. The Court further noted that the petitioner's prolonged absconsion was without justification and that he had already been dealt with leniently by the lower courts given his advanced age. Consequently, the Court laid down the principle that a reliable and consistent dying declaration, when duly supported by corroborative evidence, forms a sufficient basis for a murder conviction, and the petition was dismissed with leave to appeal refused.

  Questions settled

  • Is a dying declaration sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder when supported by medical and ocular evidence?
  • Does prolonged absconsion without justification weigh against an accused person in criminal proceedings?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts when the judgment is well within the remit of law and facts?
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• Nazeer Ahmed vs The State and othersPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 515, 2019 SCMR 594 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-25
  criminal appealQatl-i-khataaccidental actappreciation of evidencechance witnessesjudicial confessionmurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a conviction for murder. The respondents were initially convicted by the trial court for murder under Section 302(b) PPC. On appeal, the High Court acquitted one respondent and converted the conviction of the other to Section 319 PPC, sentencing him to five years imprisonment for Qatl-i-khata. The complainant appealed this decision. The Supreme Court reviewed the prosecution's case, finding the narrative of the murder and the subsequent dragging of the body to be highly improbable and inconsistent with the evidence. The Court noted that the prosecution witnesses were chance witnesses, the motive was unsubstantiated, and the investigating agency had initially declared the respondents innocent. Furthermore, the Court observed that the High Court’s reliance on a judicial confession to establish an accidental killing was legally inconsistent with the conviction under Section 319 PPC, as Section 80 PPC exempts accidental acts from criminal liability. Finding no perversity in the High Court's acquittal of the second respondent and noting the first respondent did not challenge his conviction, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does an act committed by accident constitute an offence under the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Can a conviction for Qatl-i-khata be sustained if the underlying judicial confession suggests the act was purely accidental?
  • Is the testimony of chance witnesses who are closely related to the deceased sufficient to sustain a conviction when the prosecution story is otherwise improbable?
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• Nawab Ali vs The State2019 SCMR 2009 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-14
  murderdeath sentencemitigating circumstancesquantum of sentencemotivelife imprisonmentcompensationconcurrent sentences
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerned the quantum of sentence for an appellant convicted on four counts of murder under Section 302(b) PPC. The appellant was accused of killing four family members over a motive related to the conduct of a female relative. While the Court maintained the convictions based on the prosecution's evidence, it examined whether mitigating circumstances existed to warrant a reduction of the death sentences to life imprisonment. The Court observed that the prosecution's asserted motive was vague, unspecific, and lacked independent corroboration. Furthermore, the recovery of the weapon was deemed legally inconsequential as it was sent to the laboratory simultaneously with the crime-empties. The Court also noted the suppression of underlying family issues that likely triggered the occurrence. Applying the settled principle that failure to prove an asserted motive reacts against a death sentence, the Court partly allowed the appeal, commuting the death sentences to life imprisonment on each count and reducing the compensation amount. All sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

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• Naveed Akram and others vs Muhammad Anwar2019 KLR Supreme Court 341, 2019 PLJ SC 531, 2019 P.S.C. 867, 2019 SCMR 1095 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-26
  specific performanceagreement to selloral giftgift mutationadverse inferencediscretionary reliefearnest moneycivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell land. The respondent alleged that the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest executed an agreement to sell but subsequently transferred the property to his sons via an antedated gift mutation to defeat the respondent's rights. The trial and appellate courts decreed the suit, and the High Court, on remand, upheld these findings. The Supreme Court examined whether the agreement was proved and whether the discretionary relief under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, should be withheld. The Court held that the respondent successfully proved the agreement through marginal witnesses and the Notary Public, while the petitioners failed to prove the oral gift. Crucially, the predecessor's failure to testify triggered a presumption against him under Article 129 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The Court further ruled that since the respondent acted diligently and the delay was attributable to the petitioners' conduct, equity favored the respondent. The petition was dismissed as no jurisdictional or legal error was found in the concurrent findings.

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• National Commission on Status of Women through its Chairperson, etc vs Government of Pakistan through its Secretary Law & Justice, etc2019 PLD Supreme Court 218, 2019 SCP 18 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-16
  JirgaPanchayatKangaroo CourtsRule of LawFundamental RightsAccess to JusticeDue ProcessFair TrialEquality Before LawSeparation of PowersFATA Interim Governance RegulationConstitutional PetitionDiscriminationInternational CommitmentsArbitrationMediation
  Summary & questions settled

  This case addresses the legality of informal justice systems, specifically jirgas/panchayats, and the FATA Interim Governance Regulation 2018. The Supreme Court considered whether these informal bodies, when acting as courts, are illegal under Pakistani law and international commitments, and if the FATA Interim Regulation 2018 is ultra vires the Constitution following the merger of FATA with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Court held that jirgas/panchayats, to the extent they adjudicate civil or criminal matters, are illegal, unconstitutional, and ultra vires, violating fundamental rights (Articles 4, 8, 10-A, 25, 175 of the Constitution) and international obligations (UDHR, ICCPR, CEDAW). They may only function as voluntary arbitration, mediation, negotiation, or reconciliation forums for civil disputes within legal limits, without legal enforceability unless through courts. Furthermore, the FATA Interim Regulation 2018 was declared ultra vires (Articles 4, 8, 25, 175, 203 of the Constitution) due to its discriminatory nature after the 25th Amendment. The Court directed the KPK government to establish a uniform court system in erstwhile FATA within six months, emphasizing the State's duty to ensure access to justice and equal protection of law for all citizens.

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• National Accuontability Bureau through Chairman vs Murad Arshad2019 P.S.C (Crl.) 224, 2019 PLD Supreme Court 250 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-22
  post-arrest bailcorporate veilwhite collar crimeNABcheating public at largeconstitutional jurisdictionpiercing the veilaccountability
  Summary & questions settled

  The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) challenged a Lahore High Court judgment granting post-arrest bail to Murad Arshad, a director of companies involved in the 'DHA City Lahore' land scam. The respondent was accused of cheating the public and corrupt practices involving billions of rupees. The High Court had granted bail by applying the doctrine of 'corporate veil,' holding that the respondent, as a shareholder and director, was not shown to have direct active participation in the fraud. The Supreme Court, in setting aside the bail, held that the National Accountability Ordinance (NAO), 1999, specifically defines 'accused' and 'person' to include associates and directors exercising control, thereby empowering authorities to pierce the corporate veil. The Court ruled that the doctrine of separate juristic entity cannot be used as a shield for fraud or white-collar crime. It reaffirmed that while High Courts possess jurisdiction under Article 199 to grant bail in NAB cases, such power must be exercised sparingly and only in extraordinary circumstances, which were not present in this case.

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• Nasrullah alias Nasro vs The State2019 SCP 79 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-03-07
  murderbenefit of the doubteyewitness credibilitymedical evidenceburden of proofdeath sentencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the alleged murder of his wife, which was upheld by the High Court. The core legal questions involved the re-appraisal of evidence, the credibility of eyewitnesses whose presence at the crime scene was doubtful, the contradiction between ocular and medical evidence, and the legal burden of proof in cases where a spouse dies an unnatural death inside a house. The Supreme Court held that while an onus may lie on an accused to explain an unnatural death occurring in his house, this does not shift the entire burden of proof from the prosecution, which must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt at all stages. The Court laid down the principle that where prosecution eyewitnesses fail to inspire confidence, are contradicted by medical evidence, and corroborative pieces of evidence like motive and weapon recovery fail, an accused cannot be convicted merely on the presumption arising from being the husband of the deceased. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was acquitted on the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the death of a wife in her husband's house shift the entire burden of proof to the accused?
  • Can an accused be convicted of murder solely on the presumption that the crime occurred inside his house when prosecution eyewitnesses are untrustworthy?
  • What is the legal consequence when the ocular testimony of eyewitnesses is directly contradicted by the medical evidence?
  • Is a recovered weapon and crime-empty legally consequential when received at the Forensic Science Laboratory on the same day?
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• Nasir Mehmood and another vs Umar Sajid and others2019 P.S.C. 970, 2019 SCMR 382 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-12-13
  disqualificationmoral turpitudeconcurrent sentencescumulative sentencesuspension of sentencelocal government electionconviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court upholding the rejection of the appellants' nomination papers for local government elections due to their prior criminal convictions. The core legal question was whether multiple sentences awarded on different counts, ordered to run concurrently, are to be viewed cumulatively or individually when determining disqualification under Article 63(1)(h) of the Constitution and Section 27(2)(i) of the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013 (PLGA), and whether the suspension of a sentence removes the disqualification. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that sentences awarded on multiple counts must be read cumulatively to determine the total quantum for disqualification, and that concurrent sentencing only reduces actual jail time, leaving the aggregate awarded sentence intact. Furthermore, the Court held that a mere suspension of sentence does not erase the conviction, which continues to attract disqualification unless the conviction itself is explicitly suspended or set aside on appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether multiple sentences awarded on different counts and ordered to run concurrently are to be considered cumulatively for the purpose of electoral disqualification?
  • Does the suspension of a sentence by an appellate court have the effect of removing the disqualification arising from a conviction?
  • Is the period of actual incarceration relevant for determining disqualification under Article 63(1)(h) of the Constitution and Section 27(2)(i) of the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013?
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• Nadeem Hussain vs The StatePLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 134, PLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 86, 2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 923, 2019 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-07-11
  criminal appealbenefit of doubtcircumstantial evidenceconfessional statementAnti-Terrorism Actadmissibility of evidenceterrorismacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant for involvement in suicide bombings at the Pakistan Naval War College, Lahore. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt based on circumstantial evidence and a confessional statement recorded under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The Supreme Court found that the prosecution’s circumstantial evidence was insufficient, failing to link the appellant to the crime scene, the alleged shop, or the recovered explosive materials. Regarding the confession, the Court held that under Section 21-H of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, a confession made to the police is only conditionally admissible, requiring independent evidence to connect the accused to the offence. As no such corroborative evidence existed, the confession was deemed unworthy of consideration. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions and sentences, and acquitted the appellant by extending the benefit of the doubt. The judgment reinforces the principle that circumstantial evidence and police confessions require robust, independent corroboration to sustain a criminal conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Is a confession made to the police admissible under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 without independent corroborative evidence?
  • Does the failure to produce a recovery memorandum regarding explosive substances render the recovery evidence inadmissible?
  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on circumstantial evidence that fails to establish a nexus between the accused and the crime?
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• NAB thr. It Chairman, Islamabad vs Murad Arshad & others2019 SCP 24 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-22
  corporate veilpost-arrest bailNational Accountability Ordinancewhite-collar crimeconstitutional jurisdictionpiercing the corporate veilaccountability reference
  Summary & questions settled

  The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that granted post-arrest bail to the respondent, a director of companies implicated in a housing scheme fraud. The core legal question concerned the applicability of the "corporate veil" doctrine in shielding an accused from criminal liability under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, and the propriety of invoking Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, to grant bail in such matters. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order, and cancelled the respondent's bail. The Court held that the doctrine of corporate veil cannot be used to insulate individuals from criminal liability when statutory provisions, specifically Sections 5(d) and 5(o) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, explicitly allow for piercing the veil to identify real perpetrators. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the High Court’s extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 must be exercised sparingly and with caution, rather than as a routine substitute for ordinary criminal procedure, particularly given the non-bailable nature of offences under the Ordinance.

  Questions settled

  • Can the doctrine of corporate veil be invoked to shield an accused from criminal liability under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to grant bail under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, in cases governed by the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • What are the criteria for piercing the corporate veil in cases involving financial crimes under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
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• M/s Independent Media Corporation (Pvt.) Limited vs Province of Sindh,2020 PLJ SC 137, 2019 P.S.C. 1447, 2019 PTCL .CL 499, 2019 PTD 1438, 2019 SCMR · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-22
  sales tax on servicesdefault surchargeexemption notificationamnesty schemeSindh Revenue Boardrepeal and savingretrospective applicationconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions for leave to appeal assail a judgment of the High Court of Sindh concerning sales tax on services levied on television advertisements under the Sindh Sales Tax Ordinance, 2000. The core legal question revolves around whether the benefit of an exemption and amnesty notification issued by the Sindh Revenue Board under the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, exempting penalties and default surcharges, applies retrospectively to tax liabilities accrued prior to the 2011 Act under the repealed 2000 Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the Sindh Revenue Board, established under the Sindh Revenue Board Act, 2010, had the statutory competence with the approval of the Government of Sindh to issue the notification covering past arrears saved under section 83 of the 2011 Act, and neither the courts nor the government could arbitrarily restrict its scope without formally withdrawing or challenging it. The key principle laid down is that taxing instruments and exemptions must be administered with certainty, and statutory exemption notifications covering saved proceedings under repealed tax laws remain fully enforceable unless lawfully withdrawn or substituted by competent authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an exemption notification issued under the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011 can apply to tax arrears and default surcharges accrued under the repealed Sindh Sales Tax Ordinance, 2000?
  • Does the Sindh Revenue Board have the authority to grant exemptions from penalties and default surcharges in respect of periods prior to the promulgation of the Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011?
  • Can the government or courts restrict the scope of an exemption notification without it being formally withdrawn, supplanted, or challenged before a court of law?
  • Whether the Sindh Revenue Board is a necessary and proper party under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in proceedings concerning sales tax collections and notifications issued by it?
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• M/s Adamjee Insurance Company Ltd. I.I. Chundrigar Road, Karachi vs The2019 PCTLR 1100, 2020 P SC 86, 2019 SCP 236 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-31
  central excise dutyexcess duty collectionunjust enrichmentlimitation perioddeemed arrearexpress trustrecovery of tax as debt
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a tax dispute regarding excess central excise duty collected by an insurance company under the Central Excises Act, 1944 and the Central Excise Rules, 1944. The core legal question concerned the applicability and recovery mechanism of Section 3-D of the 1944 Act (added by the Finance Act, 1993) concerning excess duty collected and not deposited, along with the issue of limitation and retrospective operation. The Supreme Court held that while Section 3-D applied retrospectively to collections made prior to its enactment via the phrase "has collected", an amount deemed to be an arrear of duty under Section 3-D does not constitute a trust under Section 10 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Court laid down that since specific departmental recovery machinery (Rule 10 of the 1944 Rules) was inapplicable to Section 3-D duties, the Government's proper remedy to recover such sums in the absence of tailored provisions was by way of a civil suit treated as a debt, governed by the sixty-year limitation period under Article 149 of the Limitation Act, 1908.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 3-D of the Central Excises Act, 1944 apply retrospectively to excess duty collected prior to its enactment?
  • Is an amount deemed to be an arrear of duty under Section 3-D of the Central Excises Act, 1944 regarded as a trust under Section 10 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • What is the applicable limitation period and remedy for the recovery of excess duty collected under Section 3-D of the Central Excises Act, 1944 when standard departmental rules do not provide a recovery mechanism?
  • Does Rule 10 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 apply to the recovery of excess amounts collected under Section 3-D of the Central Excises Act, 1944?
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• Mureed Sultan and another vs The State through P.G., Punjab and another2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 69 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-10-03
  compromisecompounding of offenceseffect of an acquittalmurderPakistan Penal Codepost-conviction compromisewaiver of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicants filed a criminal petition for leave to appeal challenging a Lahore High Court judgment that had modified their death sentences to life imprisonment for murder. During the pendency of the petition, the applicants filed an application seeking their release based on a compromise reached with the legal heirs of the deceased. A verification report confirmed the genuineness of the compromise. The Supreme Court accepted the compromise under Section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The majority held that the composition of the offence results in the setting aside of the conviction and an acquittal under Section 345(6). A concurring opinion by Qazi Faez Isa, J., agreed with accepting the compromise and releasing the petitioners, but held that compounding an offence has 'the effect of an acquittal' rather than operating as a literal acquittal of the charge, as the finding of guilt recorded by the trial court remains intact when legal heirs forgive a convicted murderer. The key principle laid down is that while a valid compromise between legal heirs and a convicted murderer warrants the release of the convict and brings the sentence to an end, the conceptual distinction between an acquittal and the effect of an acquittal must be maintained in view of Islamic injunctions and statutory text.

  Questions settled

  • What is the legal distinction between an acquittal and the effect of an acquittal under Section 345(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 upon a post-conviction compromise?
  • Does a compromise between the legal heirs of a deceased and a convicted murderer erase the finding of guilt recorded by a court of law?
  • Can a criminal convict be acquitted of the charge solely on the basis of a compromise accepted under Section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
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• Munir Ahmed and others vs The State and others2019 SCMR 2006 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-09
  murderunlawful assemblyindiscriminate firingvicarious liabilityexaggerated nominationinjured witnessacquittalcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a double murder and murderous assault incident involving eighteen named and eight unknown accused. The prosecution alleged that the petitioners, as part of an unlawful assembly, trespassed into the complainant's house and fired shots resulting in two deaths and one injury. While the Trial Court and High Court maintained the petitioners' convictions based on specific attributions of shots, the Supreme Court observed significant inconsistencies. Key issues included the implausibility of twenty-six assailants firing indiscriminately yet resulting in only single wounds to each victim, the acquittal of numerous co-accused on the same evidence, and the lack of forensic support for precision attribution during a crisis. The Court held that the massive exaggeration of the number of assailants and the identical placement of the petitioners with acquitted co-accused rendered the prosecution's story improbable. Applying the principle of caution in cases of exaggerated nominations, the Court concluded it was unsafe to maintain the convictions, subsequently acquitting the appellants.

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• Munir Ahmad and another vs The State and others2019 SCMR 79 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-11-15
  MurderAttempted murderAcquittalBenefit of doubtOcular evidenceCorroborationFalsus in uno falsus in omnibusSifting grain from chaffCriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned a criminal appeal by Munir Ahmad against his conviction for murder and attempted murder, and a cross-petition by the complainant challenging the acquittal of co-accused and the alteration of Munir Ahmad's death sentence to life imprisonment. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether evidence disbelieved for co-accused could be relied upon against the appellant without strong independent corroboration, considering the non-applicability of "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus." The Supreme Court held that while the principle of "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" is not applicable and courts must sift grain from chaff, if a set of witnesses is disbelieved for acquitted co-accused, their evidence can only be believed against the appellant if strong independent corroboration exists. Finding no such corroboration, particularly after the appellate court disbelieved recovery and motive, the Supreme Court concluded there was no credible evidence against Munir Ahmad and acquitted him by extending the benefit of doubt. The complainant's petition was consequently dismissed.

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• Muneer Ahmad Sheikh and another vs Director-General NAB Karachi2019 SCMR 1738 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-06-15
  post-arrest bailpre-arrest bailselective prosecutionaccountabilityillegal appointmentsequal treatmentNational Accountability Bureau
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from two petitions before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, one seeking post-arrest bail and the other seeking pre-arrest bail, after both were declined by the High Court. The petitioners were accused of maneuvering the appointments of their close relatives in the Sindh Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority by bypassing merit. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail when other similarly situated co-accused, including those who conducted inquiries and exonerated them, were neither arrested nor prosecuted, and where another accused with an identical role was granted pre-arrest bail without challenge. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and granted bail, holding that the law regulating accountability must be applied across the board and not in a lopsided or selective manner. The Court laid down the principle that selective prosecution and unequal application of accountability laws against similarly situated accused persons justify the exercise of judicial discretion to grant bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether selective prosecution and the failure to arrest or prosecute similarly situated co-accused persons justify the grant of bail to an accused?
  • Can bail be granted where the law regulating accountability is not applied across the board against all alleged accomplices?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail if another co-accused with an identical role has been granted bail and the prosecution has not challenged that concession?
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• Muhammad Zubair and another vs The State and another2019 SCMR 1210 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-07-01
  abduction for ransombenefit of doubtcriminal appealtest identification paradeappreciation of evidenceacquittalanti-terrorism
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellants for the abduction of the deceased for ransom and his subsequent murder, for which they were sentenced to death and life imprisonment by the Anti-Terrorism Court. The core legal question is whether the prosecution's evidence—comprising alleged ransom payments, identification of the accused, and recovery of the body—was sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's case was fraught with significant doubts, including unexplained discrepancies in the date of the initial complaint, the implausible conduct of the accused in exposing themselves during ransom exchanges, and the failure of key witnesses to identify the appellants during a test identification parade. Furthermore, the Court found the evidence regarding the ATM transaction and the occupancy of the premises to be unreliable and fabricated. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants, establishing the principle that where prosecution evidence is self-contradictory and lacks corroboration, it is unsafe to maintain a conviction, necessitating the benefit of the doubt to be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does a significant discrepancy in the date of the initial complaint undermine the entire prosecution case?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when key witnesses fail to identify the accused during a test identification parade?
  • Is a conviction safe when the prosecution evidence regarding the recovery of incriminating items and the occupancy of premises is found to be fabricated?
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• Muhammad Yousaf vs The State, etc2019 SCP 38 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-20
  compounding of offencesqatl-i-amdtazirqisasheirs of the victimwalisulhIslamic law of inheritance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, heard by a larger bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, addresses the question of whether the right to compound an offence of intentional murder (qatl-i-amd) under the regime of Ta'zir can devolve upon the heirs of a deceased heir of the victim, similar to the regime of Qisas. The appellant, a brother of the deceased victim, argued that upon the death of their father (who was an heir of the victim), the capacity to compound the offence devolved upon the appellant and his brothers, thereby vitiating a compromise entered into by the surviving widow and son of the victim. The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal, holding that in cases of Ta'zir, compounding is governed strictly by Section 345(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which limits the capacity to compound exclusively to the direct heirs of the victim. The Court affirmed that the distinct principles of Qisas and Ta'zir cannot be conflated, and that the right to compound in Ta'zir does not devolve upon the heirs of an intermediate heir who did not exercise the right during his lifetime. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the right to compound an offence of qatl-i-amd in cases of Ta'zir devolves upon the heirs of a deceased heir of the victim?
  • Do the principles governing waiver and compounding in Qisas cases apply uniformly to cases of Ta'zir?
  • Can an offence of murder under Ta'zir be compounded by surviving direct heirs of the victim when an intermediate heir passed away without exercising his right to compound?
  • Who qualifies as an 'heir of the victim' entitled to compound an offence under Section 345(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Muhammad Yousaf vs The State and others2019 PLD Supreme Court 461 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-20
  qatl-i-amdta'zirqisascompounding of offencesheirs of the victimwalicriminal appealstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a murder case treated as Ta'zir, where the complainant challenged the acquittal of respondents granted by the High Court on the basis of a compromise. The core legal question was whether the right to compound an offence of murder in a Ta'zir case devolves upon the heirs of a deceased heir (wali) of the victim, or if it is restricted to the victim's direct heirs. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the regimes of Qisas and Ta'zir are distinct. In Qisas, the right to compound may devolve upon heirs of a wali; however, in Ta'zir, the capacity to compound is a statutory concession under Section 345, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, strictly limited to the victim's direct heirs. The Court ruled that principles applicable to Qisas cannot be transposed to Ta'zir, and the right to compound does not devolve upon the heirs of a deceased heir of the victim. Consequently, the compromise entered into by the surviving direct heirs was valid, and the appellant, as a brother of the deceased, lacked standing to object.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right to compound an offence of murder in a Ta'zir case devolve upon the heirs of a deceased heir of the victim?
  • Are the principles governing the compounding of offences in Qisas cases applicable to cases of Ta'zir?
  • Is a partial compromise acceptable in a case of Ta'zir?
  • Does the capacity to compound an offence under Section 345, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, extend to persons who are not direct heirs of the victim?
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• Muhammad Yousaf vs State, etcPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 241 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  qatl-i-amdta'zirqisascompounding of offenceheirs of the victimwaliheritability of right to compound
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal concerns the compounding of a murder case (qatl-i-amd) under the regime of Ta'zir. The core legal question is whether the right to compound an offence of murder is heritable by the heirs of a deceased heir of the victim, or if it is restricted to the direct heirs of the victim at the time of the offence. The Supreme Court held that the regimes of Qisas and Ta'zir are distinct, and the principles governing compounding in Qisas (where the right to Qisas may devolve upon heirs of a wali) do not apply to Ta'zir. In Ta'zir, the capacity to compound under Section 345(2), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, is restricted to the heirs of the victim who inherit directly from the victim. Upon the death of an heir, their capacity to compound does not devolve upon their own heirs if those heirs are not direct heirs of the original victim. The principle laid down is that compounding in Ta'zir is a concession regulated by statute, not a heritable right of Qisas, and thus cannot be extended through judicial interpretation.

  Questions settled

  • Is the right to compound an offence of qatl-i-amd in a case of Ta'zir heritable by the heirs of a deceased heir of the victim?
  • Does the definition of 'wali' and the rules of devolution of the right of Qisas apply to cases of Ta'zir?
  • Can a partial compromise be accepted in a case of Ta'zir?
  • Are the principles of compounding in Qisas cases applicable to Ta'zir cases?
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• Muhammad Yaqoob vs The State2019 SCP 232 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-30
  homicidecourt-room murdermitigating circumstancescommutation of death sentenceanti-terrorism actcriminal appealfactions enmity
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction and death sentence of the appellant, Muhammad Yaqoob, handed down by an Anti-Terrorism Court for homicide committed inside a court-room premises in Gujranwala. The core legal questions involve the appreciation of evidence regarding sudden provocation, the existence of mitigating circumstances justifying the commutation of a death sentence to imprisonment for life, and the applicability of anti-terrorism laws to an offense committed within a court setting arising from factional enmity. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while the appellant's guilt for homicide was established due to his presence, apprehension at the spot, and forensic evidence linking his weapon to the crime casings, the totality of circumstances—including the adjournment of the case, lack of exclusive motive, injuries sustained by the appellant, and exoneration of co-accused—warranted the commutation of the death penalty to imprisonment for life. Furthermore, the Court held that the incident lacked the nexus with the terrorist objectives contemplated under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, thereby setting aside the conviction under Section 7(a) thereof. The key principles laid down relate to the reassessment of quantum of sentence in homicide cases presenting clouded antecedents and the strict interpretation of terrorist nexus under anti-terrorism legislation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the quantum of sentence in a homicide case warrants reduction to imprisonment for life when circumstances immediately preceding the occurrence remain shrouded in mystery and the accused sustained injuries during the episode?
  • Does an offense committed within a court-room arising from factional enmity necessarily attract the provisions of Section 6 of the Anti Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Can a conviction under Section 7(a) of the Anti Terrorism Act 1997 be sustained if the aftermath of the crime has no nexus with the situations contemplated under the statute?
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• Muhammad Umar Panhwar and others vs Province of Sindh and others2019 SCMR 52 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-07
  casual vacancylocal governmentmunicipal committeebye-electiondelegation of powersdemise of chairman
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a challenge to orders passed by the High Court of Sindh regarding the assignment of functions of the Chairman of the Municipal Committee, Dadu, following the demise of the elected Chairman, Gul Hassan Qambrani. The core legal question concerned whether the functions of a deceased Chairman could be exercised by the Vice-Chairman under section 80(2) of the Sindh Local Government Act, 2013, and how a casual vacancy resulting from death is to be filled. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that section 80(2) does not apply to a permanent vacancy caused by the death of a Chairman, which must instead be filled by a bye-election conducted by the Election Commission of Pakistan under section 24 of the Act. The Court laid down the principle that temporary delegation provisions cannot be stretched to cover permanent vacancies arising from death, and directed the Election Commission to complete the election process for the vacant seat within the stipulated timeframe.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the temporary delegation of functions to a Vice-Chairman under section 80(2) of the Sindh Local Government Act, 2013 applies in the event of a permanent vacancy caused by the death of a Chairman?
  • How is a casual vacancy in the office of a Chairman or member of a council to be filled under the Sindh Local Government Act, 2013?
  • Does the existence of a vacancy in a council invalidate its proceedings under the Sindh Local Government Act, 2013?
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• Muhammad Tariq Ramzan vs The State2019 SCMR 1971 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-09
  murderocular evidenceanti-terrorismmotiveconvictioncriminal appealwitness credibility
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for murder, following his trial alongside co-accused who were acquitted. The prosecution alleged the appellant and a co-accused shot the deceased, initially citing a motive related to blasphemy. While the appellant was convicted and sentenced to death by the trial court, the High Court altered the sentence to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court examined the ocular evidence provided by eyewitnesses, finding their presence at the scene credible and their testimony consistent, despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the blasphemy charge. The Court held that the ocular account was sufficient to sustain the murder conviction independently of the failed motive. However, the Court ruled that the failure to prove the blasphemy charge undermined the motive, thereby necessitating the acquittal of the appellant under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. Consequently, the Court maintained the conviction for murder under the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, but set aside the conviction under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, while upholding the sentence of life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained based on ocular evidence when the alleged motive fails?
  • Does the failure to prove a specific motive, such as blasphemy, necessitate acquittal under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Is the presence of eyewitnesses at a crime scene in a small locality sufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of evidence of animus?
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• Muhammad Siddique vs The State etc2019 SCP 254 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-27
  criminal appealabductionrapebenefit of the doubtdelay in FIRcontradictory statementsmedical evidenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, arising from a jail petition, challenges the concurrent judgments of the courts below convicting the petitioner under sections 365-B and 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions involved the credibility of the prosecution's case in the face of an inordinate unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, major contradictions among prosecution witnesses, lack of corroborative medical or forensic evidence such as a DNA test, and active hostility by the alleged victim against her own family's stance. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the prosecution miserably failed to establish its case against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt due to glaring discrepancies, material improvements, and the victim's own recorded petitions against the complainant party. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and ordered the immediate acquittal and release of the appellant. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution story suffers from unexplained delays, fatal contradictions, and lack of credible corroboration in serious sexual and abduction charges, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an inordinate and unexplained delay in reporting an abduction case to the police casts serious doubt on the veracity of the prosecution case?
  • Can a conviction for rape and abduction be sustained when the medical examination is conducted months later without corroborative DNA testing and in the presence of material contradictions among eyewitnesses?
  • What is the legal effect on a prosecution case when the alleged victim herself files petitions and complaints against her own family members alleging fabrication of the criminal case?
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• Muhammad Siddique vs The State and others2019 P.S.C (Crl.) 625, 2019 SCMR 254, 2019 SCMR 1048 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-27
  criminal appealabductionrapedelay in lodging FIRmaterial contradictionsacquittalbenefit of doubtDNA test
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail petition filed by petitioner Muhammad Siddique challenged his conviction and sentences under Sections 365-B and 376, P.P.C., which were upheld by the High Court. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner and co-accused abducted and raped the victim. The Supreme Court observed that there was an un-explained seven-day delay in lodging the FIR. Furthermore, the statements of the prosecution witnesses, including the star witness (the victim) and her family members, contained fatal material contradictions regarding her marital status, alleged divorce, remarriage, and previous litigation. Documents produced by the defence revealed that the victim had previously filed a harassment petition and a criminal complaint against her own father (the complainant) and brother, alleging that the FIR was falsely registered to force her into compliance. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case against the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained, inordinate delay in lodging an FIR create reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case?
  • Can a conviction for rape under Section 376 P.P.C. be sustained when material contradictions exist in the testimony of the alleged victim and prosecution witnesses?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a chemical examiner's report indicating semen on vaginal swabs when no DNA test is performed and the victim has remarried prior to examination?
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• Muhammad Sharif and others vs The State and othersPLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 83, 2019 SCMR 1368 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-07-01
  criminal appealdeath penaltymitigating circumstancesforensic evidenceocular accountsentence enhancementpolice encounter
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and petition arise from a judgment of the High Court, which upheld the convictions of the appellants for their involvement in a fatal confrontation with a police party during an attempted arrest at an Afghan Refugee Camp. The core legal question concerned the sufficiency of evidence to sustain the convictions and the appropriateness of the death sentences awarded to the appellants. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully established the presence of the police party for a lawful purpose and corroborated the ocular account through subsequent recoveries of weapons. The Court affirmed the convictions, finding the witness testimony intrinsically sound. Regarding the quantum of sentence, the Court observed that the forensic evidence regarding weapon casings was dispatched subsequent to the appellants' arrests, a factor previously accepted by the High Court as a mitigating circumstance for one appellant. Consequently, the Court applied this principle consistently, altering the death penalty of the remaining appellant to imprisonment for life, while maintaining the other convictions and sentences. The principle laid down is that forensic delays in dispatching evidence can serve as a mitigating factor for sentencing.

  Questions settled

  • Can a delay in dispatching forensic evidence to the laboratory serve as a mitigating circumstance for the purpose of sentencing?
  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused on the basis of abundant caution necessarily invalidate the convictions of other accused persons assigned effective roles?
  • Are sentences for multiple convictions required to run concurrently when the Court grants the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Muhammad Shamoon deceased through legal representatives vs The State and another2020 PSC (Crl.) 1, 2019 SCMR 1144, 2019 SCMR 1144, 2019 SCMR 1146, 2019 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-30
  abatement of appealdeath of appellantDiyatmonetary punishmentestate of deceasedcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal appeal filed by Muhammad Shamoon against his conviction under Section 316 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for Qatl Shibhi-i-Amd, wherein he was ordered to pay Diyat. During the pendency of the appeal, the convict passed away, and the High Court disposed of the appeal as having abated. The legal heirs of the convict approached the Supreme Court challenging the abatement. The core legal question is whether a criminal appeal against a conviction involving a monetary punishment such as Diyat abates upon the death of the appellant, or whether it survives for adjudication on merits. The Supreme Court held that while corporal punishments wither away with the death of the offender, monetary punishments like Diyat are recoverable from the deceased's estate under Section 331 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, reading Section 431 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 with Section 331 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, an appeal survives for decision on merits to the extent of financial liability. The appeal was allowed and the matter remanded to the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a criminal appeal against a conviction involving the payment of Diyat abate upon the death of the appellant?
  • Can Diyat be recovered from the estate of a deceased offender?
  • Whether an appeal by an offender liable to pay Diyat continues even after his death under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Muhammad Shafi alias Kuddoo vs The State, etc2019 SCP 170, PLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 503, 2019 SCMR 1045 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-07
  reversal of acquittalqatl-e-amddouble presumption of innocenceocular evidencemedical evidencebenefit of doubtcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the High Court's reversal of an acquittal order passed by the trial court regarding a murder charge under Section 302(b) PPC. The appellant, along with co-accused, was initially acquitted of the murder of Khalil Ahmed due to inordinate delay in reporting, contradictions between ocular and medical evidence, and the doubtful presence of inimical witnesses. The High Court subsequently convicted the appellant while maintaining the acquittal of co-accused with identical roles. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court's reversal of acquittal adhered to established judicial principles. The Court held that an acquittal carries a double presumption of innocence and can only be set aside if the trial court's judgment is blatantly perverse or impossible. Finding that the trial court's view was a possible one based on the evidence, and noting that the prosecution's case lacked certainty, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the acquittal, emphasizing that acquittal cannot be reversed merely because a contrary view is possible.

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• Muhammad Saleem vs The State2019 PLJ SC Cr.C. 425, 2018 YLR 1162, 2018 SCMR 1001 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-28
  murder convictionocular evidenceappreciation of evidencepostmortem delaycriminal appealrecovery of weaponabscondence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a conviction for murder and causing injury, where the appellant challenged the trial court's judgment, which had been modified by the High Court to life imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the ocular and medical evidence, alongside the recovery of the weapon and stolen money, was sufficient to sustain the conviction despite the defense's arguments regarding delayed postmortem, the relationship of prosecution witnesses to the deceased, and alleged inconsistencies in the description of the weapon. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The court affirmed that the testimony of eye-witnesses, including an injured victim, remained consistent and unshaken. It further ruled that minor discrepancies, such as the description of the weapon as a knife versus a dagger, or a delay in the postmortem examination, do not inherently invalidate credible ocular evidence. The principle established is that where ocular testimony is consistent and corroborated by medical evidence and recovery, such evidence cannot be discarded based on minor procedural delays or insignificant descriptive variations.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delay in conducting a postmortem examination automatically invalidate the prosecution's ocular evidence?
  • Can minor discrepancies in the description of a weapon by witnesses be sufficient to discard otherwise consistent ocular testimony?
  • Is the evidence of an injured eyewitness, who is also a relative of the deceased, sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder?
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• Muhammad Saleem vs National Industrial Relations Commission and others2019 SCMR 142 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-07-26
  service matterad interim orderssalary adjustmentretirement datebenefit of own wrongleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a service matter where the petitioner challenged the determination of his retirement date by the respondent. During the pendency of the proceedings, the petitioner had obtained ad interim orders allowing him to continue working. Upon final adjudication, the court upheld the respondent's determination regarding the petitioner's retirement date. Consequently, the court ordered that the salary received by the petitioner during the period covered by the ad interim orders be adjusted against the salary paid during that intervening period. The petitioner sought to retain the salary earned during this time on the basis that he had performed the work. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a litigant cannot be permitted to benefit from their own wrong or seek protection behind court orders obtained during litigation when the underlying claim is ultimately found to be meritless. The court affirmed the principle that interim relief does not create a vested right to retain benefits if the final adjudication determines the petitioner was not entitled to the position or status during that period.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner retain salary received during the currency of an ad interim order if the final judgment determines the petitioner was not entitled to the position?
  • Does a court order allowing a party to continue working during litigation create a vested right to the salary earned if the underlying claim is ultimately dismissed?
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• Muhammad Saleem vs Federal Public Service Commission and others2020 KLR Supreme Court Cases 67, 2020 PLC (C.S.) 306, 2020 P SC 52, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-12-16
  occupational groupscivil servantspermanent absorptiondeputationrule-making poweroffice memorandumlateral entryhorizontal movement
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a Federal Service Tribunal order regarding the permanent absorption of officers from the Income Tax Group and Audit and Accounts Group into the Military Lands and Cantonments Group (ML&C Group) in BS 18. The core legal question concerns the legal status and source of power of Office Memorandums constituting Occupational Groups vis-a-vis the Civil Servants Act 1973 and rules framed thereunder, particularly regarding horizontal movement and lateral entry. The Supreme Court held that Office Memorandums establishing Occupational Groups emanate from the rule-making power conferred under Section 25(1) of the Civil Servants Act 1973, placing them on a co-equal footing with the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules 1973 rather than subordinate to them. Furthermore, the Court held that the absorption of the contesting respondents complied with the requirements of paragraphs 5 and 8 of the ML&C Group Office Memorandum. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the validity of the absorption.

  Questions settled

  • What is the legal source and status of Office Memorandums constituting Occupational Groups under the Civil Servants Act 1973?
  • Whether Office Memorandums creating Occupational Groups are subordinate to the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules 1973?
  • Can civil servants on deputation be permanently absorbed into another Occupational Group under the applicable service framework?
  • Do the concepts of horizontal movement and lateral entry under the Military Lands and Cantonments Group Office Memorandum permit the absorption of officers from other groups?
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