Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Ainuddin and others vs Abdullah and another2019 PLJ SC 504, 2019 SCP 272, 2019 SCMR 880 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-14
  agreement to sellsuit for declarationlimitationcivil revisionleave to appealspecific performanceappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Balochistan, whereby a civil revision petition filed by the petitioners was dismissed. The petitioners had instituted a suit for declaration and permanent injunction based on an unexecuted agreement to sell dated 24.01.1957, claiming possession of the suit property since that time. The trial court decreed the suit, but the appellate and revisional courts set aside the judgment. The core legal questions involved whether a suit for declaration and permanent injunction was maintainable instead of a suit for specific performance, whether the suit was barred by a lapse of over 52 years, and whether the petitioners successfully proved the agreement to sell and explained the delay. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to prove the agreement to sell, were grossly unvigilant in waiting 52 years to approach the court, and incorrectly sought a declaration instead of specific performance. The petition was consequently dismissed, upholding the concurrent findings of the lower appellate and revisional forums.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit for declaration and permanent injunction maintainable when based upon an unexecuted agreement to sell instead of a suit for specific performance?
  • Does a delay of over 52 years in filing a suit for assertion of rights under an agreement to sell render the suit barred by time?
  • Whether the concurrent findings of appellate and revisional courts can be interfered with when no misreading or non-reading of evidence is shown?
  • What is the effect of failing to produce material marginal witnesses to prove an agreement to sell?
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• Ahsan Shahzad vs The State2019 SCMR 1165, 2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 509 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-28
  murderanti-terrorismpersonal vendettaocular evidenceSection 342 CrPCabscondencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld the appellant's conviction for murder but altered the death sentence to imprisonment for life. The core legal questions concerned the sufficiency of ocular evidence to sustain the murder conviction and whether the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 was applicable to an incident involving a single target motivated by personal vendetta. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, finding the ocular account credible and corroborated by medical evidence. However, the Court set aside the conviction under Section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, holding that the incident, stemming from personal enmity, did not constitute terrorism. The Court established that terrorism provisions are inapplicable where the crime lacks the intent to create public terror or insecurity. Additionally, the Court affirmed that evidence of abscondence cannot be utilized against an accused if the specific circumstance was not put to them during their examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 be sustained when the crime is motivated by personal vendetta against a single individual?
  • Is evidence of an accused's abscondence admissible if it was not put to the accused during their examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does a single firearm injury on a deceased person, in the absence of evidence of public terror, warrant the application of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
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• Agro. Tractors (Private) Limited vs Fecto Belarus Tractors Limited, Karachi and others2019 PCRLJ 590, PTCL 2019 CL. 319, 2019 PTD 156, 2019 SCMR 57 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-25
  promissory estoppelzero-rated importadministrative lawarbitrarinesscustoms dutygovernment schemetransparency
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the import of tractors under a government scheme that was subsequently declared illegal by the High Court due to lack of transparency and arbitrariness. The core legal question was whether the appellant could invoke the principle of promissory estoppel to secure the release of imported tractors at zero duty, despite the underlying scheme being set aside for illegality. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant could not benefit from promissory estoppel. The Court reasoned that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is only applicable when the initial concession or offer is made in a valid, transparent, and judicious manner. Since the High Court had already determined that the grant of permission for the import scheme was tainted by arbitrariness, favoritism, and excessive jurisdiction, the foundational requirements for promissory estoppel were absent. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that a subsequent prospective notification could retroactively validate past transactions, confirming that the appellant was not entitled to the requested duty exemptions.

  Questions settled

  • Can the principle of promissory estoppel be invoked to enforce a benefit derived from an administrative process that was found to be arbitrary and non-transparent?
  • Does the withdrawal of an appeal by the Federal Government against a judgment declaring a scheme illegal validate the claims of a private party seeking benefits under that same scheme?
  • Can a subsequent government notification allowing zero-rated imports be applied retrospectively to validate past transactions made under a previously cancelled scheme?
  • What are the mandatory prerequisites for invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel against the state in matters of administrative concessions?
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• Abu Bakar Farooq vs Muhammad Ali Rajpar & others2019 SCP 274 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-31
  Ad-hoc appointmentCivil service seniorityRegularization of serviceStop-gap arrangementPublic Service CommissionBack benefitsService Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a Federal Service Tribunal judgment that directed the regularization of ad-hoc employees in Pakistan Railways, granting them seniority and back benefits from their initial ad-hoc appointment dates. The core legal question was whether an ad-hoc appointee is entitled to seniority, regularization, or back benefits for periods of unemployment based on the duration of their ad-hoc service. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the Tribunal’s decision. The Court held that ad-hoc appointments are strictly "stop-gap" arrangements that do not confer any vested right to continuous service, seniority, or promotion. The Court affirmed that such appointments terminate upon the availability of a regular candidate selected through the Public Service Commission. The key principle laid down is that ad-hoc service, regardless of its duration, cannot be regularized or counted for seniority, as doing so would bypass the mandatory statutory recruitment process and provide an unlawful premium to the beneficiary. Prolonged ad-hoc employment, while potentially exploitative, does not grant the judiciary authority to regularize appointments in violation of established civil service rules.

  Questions settled

  • Does an ad-hoc appointment confer a right to seniority or continuous service?
  • Can an ad-hoc employee claim regularization based on the duration of their temporary service?
  • Is the government empowered to regularize an ad-hoc appointee without the recommendation of the Public Service Commission?
  • Does the termination of an ad-hoc appointment require specific notice or procedure under the Civil Servants Act 1973?
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• Abu Bakar Farooq through Chairman and others vs Muhammad Ali2019 PLC (C.S) 740, 2019 PLJ SC 481, 2020 P.S.C. 941, 2019 SCP 274, 2019 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-31
  ad hoc appointmentseniorityregularizationcivil servantservice tribunalpublic service commissionback benefitsstop-gap arrangement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a Federal Service Tribunal judgment that directed the regularization of ad hoc employees in Pakistan Railways, granting them seniority and back benefits from their initial ad hoc appointment dates. The core legal question was whether ad hoc appointees are entitled to seniority and regularization based on their length of service, despite failing to undergo the prescribed selection process. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the Tribunal's decision. The Court held that ad hoc appointments are strictly stop-gap arrangements intended to fill vacancies temporarily until regular candidates are available. Such appointments do not confer any vested rights to seniority, regularization, or back benefits. The Court affirmed that the only lawful entry into the service of Pakistan is through the Public Service Commission. Consequently, prolonged ad hoc service, even if considered exploitative, does not empower the government or the courts to regularize such employees or grant them seniority over regular appointees, as doing so would violate established statutory recruitment rules and undermine the integrity of the selection process.

  Questions settled

  • Does an ad hoc appointment confer a legal right to seniority or regularization?
  • Can a court order the regularization of an ad hoc employee when such an appointment violates the prescribed statutory recruitment rules?
  • Does prolonged ad hoc service entitle an employee to claim seniority from the date of their initial ad hoc appointment?
  • Is an ad hoc appointment a stop-gap arrangement that terminates upon the appointment of a regular candidate recommended by the Public Service Commission?
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• Abdullah Nawaz Cheema vs Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC), Islamabad and another2019 SCMR 622, 2019 PLC (C.S) 896 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-12-17
  CSS examinationWomen's quotaopen meritservice group allocationtrickle down effectquota carry forwardmerit position
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a candidate for the 2012 CSS examination, challenged the allocation of seats, arguing that vacancies in the Women's Quota should not be filled via a 'trickle down' mechanism but should instead be allocated to open merit candidates. The petitioner, who failed to secure a group due to his lower merit position, contended that the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) improperly transferred vacant open merit seats to the Women's Quota. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the principle established in Civil Petition No. 941 of 2010. The Court held that when a female candidate, by virtue of her merit, opts for a higher group within the Women's Quota, the seat she vacates in the Open Merit category is transferred to the Women's Quota to maintain the integrity of that reserved quota. The Court clarified that such vacancies are not available to male candidates who failed to qualify on open merit. Furthermore, the Court upheld that unfilled reserved seats must be carried forward to the next year's examination as per the applicable rules, rather than being diverted to open merit candidates.

  Questions settled

  • Can a female candidate who qualifies on open merit opt for a higher group within the Women's Quota?
  • When a female candidate vacates an open merit seat to take a higher group in the Women's Quota, is that vacated seat transferable to the Women's Quota?
  • Are vacant seats in a reserved quota available to male candidates who failed to qualify on open merit?
  • What is the procedure for handling unfilled reserved quota seats in the CSS examination?
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• Abdullah Jan vs The State & others2019 SCMR 1079, 2019 SCP 178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-30
  accountabilityassets beyond meansappellate scrutinyremandreasoned judgmentcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a conviction under accountability laws where the appellant, a former Store Keeper in the Communication & Works Department, was found guilty of accumulating assets disproportionate to his known sources of income by the Accountability Court. Following the affirmation of this conviction by the Peshawar High Court, the appellant challenged the appellate judgment before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's appellate judgment met the requisite standards of judicial scrutiny and reasoning. Upon review, the Supreme Court observed that the High Court had affirmed the trial court's findings without engaging in a detailed discussion or analysis of the evidence presented by either the prosecution or the defense. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remanded the case for a fresh decision. The key principle laid down is that an appellate court is legally obligated to provide a reasoned judgment that objectively evaluates the evidence and contentions of both parties, in accordance with the requirements of Section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appellate court required to discuss the evidence adduced by both parties when affirming a conviction?
  • Does a failure to analyze evidence in an appellate judgment necessitate a remand of the case?
  • What are the requirements for a valid judgment under Section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
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• Abdul Wahab, etc vs The State, etc2019 SCP 77 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-10
  hurtTa'zirimprisonmentArshcriminal appealprevious convict
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction and sentencing of the appellants for chopping off the right ear of the victim, which was upheld with an enhanced sentence for one appellant by the High Court under section 334 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether a sentence of imprisonment by way of Ta'zir could be awarded under section 337-N(2) of the Pakistan Penal Code in the absence of findings that the convicts were previous, hardened, or desperate criminals, or that the crime was committed in the name of honour. The Supreme Court held that unless the statutory conditions under section 337-N(2) are met, a sentence of imprisonment by way of Ta'zir cannot be sustained in hurt cases. The Court laid down the principle that imprisonment by way of Ta'zir for hurt offences requires proof that the accused falls within the specific categories enumerated in section 337-N(2), setting aside the imprisonment sentences while maintaining the convictions and modifying the Arsh liability.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a sentence of imprisonment by way of Ta'zir can be passed against a convict for hurt without satisfying the conditions laid down in section 337-N(2), PPC?
  • Are previous convictions, habitual criminality, or commission of an offence in the name of honour prerequisites for awarding imprisonment by way of Ta'zir under section 337-N(2), PPC?
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• Abdul Wahab vs The State2019 SCMR 2061, 2019 SCP 348 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-17
  narcotics controlpossession of charascredibility of police witnessesjail petitioncriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from jail petitions filed by Khan Muhammad and Abdul Wahab against their convictions under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for possession of large quantities of Charas, which were upheld by the High Court. The core legal question concerns the credibility of police witnesses in narcotics recovery cases and whether convictions can be sustained in the absence of public witnesses. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petitions, holding that official witnesses are competent, credible, and trustworthy when their testimony is consistent and confidence-inspiring, and that public witnesses are not strictly mandatory. The key principle laid down is that the testimony of police officials cannot be discarded merely due to the absence of public witnesses, provided it remains consistent and reliable on all material aspects.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of police officials can be relied upon for conviction in narcotics cases without the association of public witnesses?
  • Can a conviction under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 be maintained on the basis of consistent official evidence?
  • Does a minor typographical error in judicial proceedings vitiate a narcotics conviction when the correct volume of contraband is put to the accused in the charge?
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• Abdul Wahab and others vs The State and othersPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 238, 2019 P.S.C (Crl.) 241, 2019 SCMR 516 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-10
  Criminal appealCausing hurtTa'zir punishmentArshDiyatSentence modificationSection 337-N(2) PPCBailSupreme Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal concerned the conviction and sentencing of appellants under Section 334, P.P.C. for causing hurt by chopping off an ear. The core legal question examined was the applicability of Section 337-N(2), P.P.C. and whether imprisonment by way of Ta'zir could be imposed. The Supreme Court held that Ta'zir punishment under Section 337-N(2), P.P.C. is only permissible if the convict is a "previous convict, habitual or hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal or the offence has been committed by him in the name or on the pretext of honour." Finding that the appellants did not meet these criteria, the Court maintained their convictions under Section 334, P.P.C. but set aside the sentences of imprisonment by way of Ta'zir. The order for payment of Arsh was modified from Diyat to one-half of Diyat, in accordance with Section 337-R, P.P.C., to be deposited within six months.

  Questions settled

  • Can imprisonment by way of Ta'zir be awarded for causing hurt if the conditions of Section 337-N(2) PPC are not met?
  • What are the specific conditions under Section 337-N(2) PPC for imposing imprisonment by way of Ta'zir?
  • Can the quantum of Arsh be modified from Diyat to one-half of Diyat in cases of causing hurt?
  • Whether a court can award Ta'zir imprisonment without observing the credentials of the accused as specified in Section 337-N(2) PPC?
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• Abdul Latif and another vs M/s Parmacie Plus2019 SCP 102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-25
  tenancy agreementrent increasedefault in payment of rentevictionfair rentcantonments rent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a landlord's eviction application filed against a tenant before the Controller of Rents, Clifton Cantonment, Karachi, on grounds of default and personal need under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963. The core legal question was whether a periodical rent increase of seven percent after every eleven months, agreed upon in the tenancy agreement, violates the three-year restriction on rent increases under Section 7(5) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963. The Supreme Court held that Section 7(5) only prohibits unilateral rent increases and does not bar variable or periodical rent increases mutually agreed upon by the landlord and tenant in the tenancy agreement. The ratio is that contractual, consensual periodic increases in rent are valid and do not constitute a violation of the statutory three-year bar unless challenged through an application for fixation of fair rent. Consequently, the tenant's failure to pay the increased rent amounted to a default, justifying the striking off of their defence and eviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a periodical rent increase agreed upon in a tenancy agreement violate Section 7(5) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963?
  • What is the scope of the prohibition against rent increases within three years under Section 7(5) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963?
  • Does a tenant's failure to pay an agreed variable rent constitute a default rendering them liable for eviction?
  • How can a rate of rent agreed upon with the consent of the parties be legally challenged?
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• Abdul Latif and another vs Messrs Parmacie Plus2019 SCMR 627 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-25
  eviction applicationstriking off defencetenancy agreementperiodical increase in rentfair rentdefault in payment of rentCantonments Rent Restriction Act 1963
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from eviction proceedings initiated by the landlords against a tenant before the Controller of Rents, Clifton Cantonment, Karachi, on the ground of default. Under Clause 15 of the tenancy agreement, the rent was to increase by seven percent after every eleven months. Upon expiry of the initial eleven months, the tenant remitted rent below the agreed increased rate. The Rent Controller directed deposit of the increased rent under Section 17(8) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, and subsequently struck off the tenant's defence under Section 17(9) for non-compliance. The High Court set aside the order, holding that Section 7(5) of the Act prohibited any rent increase within three years. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that Section 7(5) only prohibits unilateral rent increases or increases after fair rent determination by a Controller within three years. Pre-agreed, consensual contractual increases form part of the agreed rent and do not violate Section 7(5), unless successfully challenged via a fair rent application.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 7(5) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 prohibit a pre-agreed contractual periodical rent increase within a three-year period?
  • Whether an agreed increase in rent under a tenancy agreement constitutes rent determined by agreement under Section 7(5) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963?
  • Can a tenant unilaterally refuse to pay a contractually agreed increased rent without filing an application for fixation of fair rent?
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• Abdul Jabbar and another vs The State2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 39, 2019 SCMR 129 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-11-20
  murdercriminal appealacquittaldelay in FIRocular evidencemedical evidencemotivebenefit of doubtproof beyond reasonable doubteyewitnesses
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned criminal appeals against the conviction of appellants Abdul Jabbar and Akhtar Abbas for murder under Section 302(b)/34 PPC, initially sentenced to death and later converted to life imprisonment by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the conviction could be maintained despite significant flaws in the prosecution's case, including an unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, contradictions between the deceased's statement and the FIR, doubtful presence of eyewitnesses, discrepancies between ocular and medical evidence, ineffective recoveries, and an unproven motive. The Supreme Court held that once a single loophole or glaring conflict is observed in the prosecution's case, or where the presence of eyewitnesses is not free from doubt, the benefit of such lacuna automatically goes to the accused. The Court found that the High Court erred in maintaining the conviction despite these "irreparable dents." Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the judgments of the lower courts and acquitting both appellants, concluding that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

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• Abdul Ghani and others vs The State and othersPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 462, 2019 SCMR 608 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-25
  Criminal appealNarcotics offencesControl of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997Safe custody of evidenceSafe transmission of samplesChemical ExaminerBenefit of doubtAcquittalProsecution evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the convictions of appellants under sections 6, 9(e), 14, and 15 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for narcotics offences following a raid and recovery of various substances. The central legal question was whether the prosecution had adequately established the safe custody of the recovered narcotics and the safe transmission of their samples to the Chemical Examiner. The Supreme Court noted that the Moharrir of the Police Station, responsible for safe custody, and the Head Constable who delivered the samples, were not produced during the trial to confirm these critical steps. Citing established precedents, the Court held that if the safe custody of recovered substance or safe transmission of samples is not proven by independent evidence, the prosecution fails to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the convictions and sentences upheld by the lower courts were set aside, and the appellants were acquitted by extending the benefit of doubt.

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• Abdul Ghani and others vs State and othersPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 529 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-25
  narcoticssafe custodysafe transmissionbenefit of doubtchemical examinercriminal appealnarcotic substances act
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and life imprisonment of the appellants for narcotics offences under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following their apprehension in a raid where various narcotics were allegedly recovered. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution successfully established the safe custody and transmission of the recovered contraband to the Chemical Examiner. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove these essential links because the Moharrir, who handled the substances at the Malkhana, and the official responsible for delivering samples to the Chemical Examiner were not produced as witnesses at trial. Consequently, the Court found the prosecution's case lacked the necessary evidentiary foundation to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Relying on established precedents, the Court laid down the principle that failure to prove the safe custody and safe transmission of recovered narcotics through independent evidence entitles the accused to the benefit of doubt. The convictions and sentences were set aside, and the appellants were acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to produce the Moharrir as a witness to prove the safe custody of recovered narcotics vitiate the prosecution's case?
  • Is the prosecution's failure to prove the safe transmission of samples to the Chemical Examiner sufficient grounds for acquittal in narcotics cases?
  • Can a conviction for narcotics possession be sustained if the chain of custody of the recovered substance is not established by independent evidence?
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• Abdul Ghaffar Adamjee and others vs National Investment Trust Limited2019 CLD 471, 2020 P SC 1379, 2019 SCMR 812, 2019 SCP 114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-03
  Contract of indemnityContract of guaranteeSponsors' undertakingDirectors' liabilityInterpretation of contractsBanking court decreeRecovery suitCompany liquidationContra proferentem rule
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed an appeal, affirming the liability of sponsor directors for a company's defaulted finance. The core legal question was whether a "Sponsors' Undertaking" constituted a contract of guarantee or indemnity, and the scope of the directors' personal liability. The majority held that the Undertaking was a contract of indemnity, not a guarantee, and that the directors' liability as indemnifiers matured once the company's assets were liquidated and the principal debt remained unsatisfied. The Court emphasized that the object of the undertaking, read in its entirety, was to secure the investment by making sponsors personally liable if recovery from the company became impossible. It was held that the liability of an indemnifier is not co-extensive with the principal debtor and arises when recovery from the principal debtor is no longer legally possible. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the recovery against the sponsor directors.

  Questions settled

  • Is a "Sponsors' Undertaking" a contract of guarantee or indemnity?
  • When does the liability of an indemnifier mature in relation to a principal debtor?
  • How should ambiguous clauses in a contract be interpreted, especially when drafted by one party?
  • Can the main purpose of a contract be frustrated by confining its scope to specific clauses when other clauses indicate a broader intent?
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• Abbasi Enterprises Unilever Distributor, Haripur and another vs Collector of Sales Tax and Federal Excise, Peshawar and othersPTCL 2020 CL. 159, PTCL 2020 CL. 272, 2020 PTD 147, 2019 SCMR 1989 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-03
  sales taxlimitationorder-in-originalshow-cause noticeextension of timemandatory provisionsadjudication
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the validity of an order-in-original passed by the Additional Collector under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The core legal question was whether the extension of time granted by the Collector for passing the order-in-original complied with the mandatory requirements of Section 36(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The appellant contended that the extension was granted mechanically without recording proper reasons, rendering the subsequent order time-barred. The Supreme Court held that the Collector’s power to extend time is not absolute or routine; it requires the application of mind and the recording of specific reasons in writing. Because the Collector failed to provide valid reasons for the extension, the order of extension was deemed invalid and inoperative. Consequently, the order-in-original, having been passed beyond the initial ninety-day statutory period, was declared time-barred and non est in law. The Court set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and the decisions of the departmental forums, quashing the order-in-original. This judgment reinforces the principle that statutory time limits and procedural safeguards regarding extensions are mandatory and cannot be bypassed through mechanical administrative actions.

  Questions settled

  • Is the requirement for the Collector to record reasons in writing for extending the time limit under Section 36(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 mandatory?
  • Can an extension of time granted by a Collector in a mechanical or routine manner, without recording specific reasons, be upheld as valid under the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • What is the legal consequence of an order-in-original passed beyond the statutory time limit without a valid extension?
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• (Syed) Imtiaz Ali vs Chairman, Implementation Tribunal for Newspaper2019 KLR Supreme Court 330 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Implementation Tribunaljurisdictional mandateWage Board Awardpartnership agreementcontractual claimnewspaper employeesmaster and servant relationship
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the jurisdictional limits of the Implementation Tribunal constituted under the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973. The appellant challenged a decision where the Tribunal awarded compensation and other claims to the private-respondent based on a private agreement. The core legal question was whether such contractual claims fell within the Tribunal's mandate, which is restricted to implementing Wage Board Awards. The Supreme Court held that the relationship between the parties was a partnership, not an employment relationship, and that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate private contractual disputes or partnership claims. The Court emphasized that the Tribunal's powers are limited to the enforcement of specific statutory rights and Wage Board Awards, excluding general civil claims. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned orders, holding that the Tribunal acted beyond its lawful mandate. The principle established is that the Implementation Tribunal is a specialized forum with limited jurisdiction, and it cannot entertain claims that do not arise directly from the implementation of Wage Board Awards or specific statutory provisions of the Act.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Implementation Tribunal constituted under the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973 have jurisdiction to adjudicate private contractual claims?
  • Can a relationship governed by a partnership agreement be treated as a master-servant relationship for the purpose of the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973?
  • Is the scope of the Implementation Tribunal's authority limited to the implementation of Wage Board Awards and specific statutory redressal?
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• (Suo Moto action regarding Islamabad-Rawalpindi Sit-in / Dharna) vs N/A2019 SCP 30 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-06
  fundamental rightsfreedom of movementright to protestsuo moto jurisdictionintelligence agencieshate speechpolitical partiesrule of lawpublic order
  Summary & questions settled

  This suo moto action concerns the 2017 Faizabad sit-in (dharna) by the Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP), which paralyzed the twin cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi. The Court examined the infringement of fundamental rights, including the right to life, freedom of movement, and access to education, caused by the prolonged blockade. The core legal questions involved the scope of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, the limits of the right to protest, and the statutory duties of state institutions, including the Election Commission, PEMRA, and intelligence agencies. The Court held that while the right to protest is inherent in a democracy, it is not absolute and cannot infringe upon the fundamental rights of others or threaten the state's security. It ruled that intelligence agencies must operate within their constitutional mandates, the Election Commission must enforce financial transparency for political parties, and state institutions must remain impartial. The judgment established that the law applies equally to all, and that inciting violence or hate speech, even under the guise of religious sentiment, is punishable under the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right to assemble and protest include the right to block public roads and infringe upon the fundamental rights of others?
  • Can the Supreme Court invoke its jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution in matters involving public importance and the enforcement of fundamental rights?
  • Are intelligence agencies authorized to engage in political activities or interfere with media broadcasts?
  • Does the Election Commission have the authority to take action against political parties that fail to provide financial details or operate in a manner prejudicial to the sovereignty of Pakistan?
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• (Notice in pursuance of the order passed by this Court on 13.02.2019_1a8103c42019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 400 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-04
  falsus in uno falsus in omnibusperjuryfalse testimonyappreciation of evidencesifting grain from chaffcriminal jurisprudenceIslamic injunctions
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal matter originated from an appeal against a conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, where the Supreme Court acquitted the appellant after finding the prosecution witnesses to be untruthful and planted. During the proceedings, the Court took notice of a prosecution witness who had given completely false testimony on oath and initiated perjury proceedings under Section 194 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question addressed by the Court was whether the long-standing practice of treating the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus as inapplicable in criminal jurisprudence in Pakistan should continue. The Court held that the previous view discarding the rule was based on subjective, practical considerations rather than sound legal or Islamic principles, and that it conflicted with both the criminal law on perjury and the Injunctions of Islam under Articles 2 and 227 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The ratio decidendi is that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is henceforth an integral, mandatory part of Pakistani criminal jurisprudence, requiring courts to reject the testimony of witnesses who resort to deliberate falsehood on material aspects and invariably institute perjury proceedings against them.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is applicable in criminal cases in Pakistan?
  • Does the practice of discarding the rule of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus accord with the Injunctions of Islam and the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is a court legally mandated to initiate proceedings for perjury against a witness found to have resorted to deliberate falsehood on a material aspect?
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• Zulfiqar Ali Ranjha and Mirza Habibullah vs Zia Ullah Ranjha and others2018 PLJ SC 706, 2018 SCMR 1036, 2018 SCP 1202 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-04
  election petitionlocal government electionsballot paperofficial markpresiding officer signaturevote recountdisenfranchisementbogus voting
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves an election dispute arising from local government elections for the seats of chairman and vice chairman of a Union Council in Punjab. The core legal question was whether the omission on the part of the presiding officer to sign ballot papers warrants their outright exclusion from the vote-count under sub-rule 4(c)(i) of the Punjab Local Governments (Conduct of Elections) Rules, 2013, despite the ballot papers bearing the official mark. The Supreme Court held that where ballot papers are stamped with the official mark and form part of the legitimately issued votes without any evidence of bogus voting or excess polling, the lack of the presiding officer's signature alone does not justify their exclusion, as voters should not be disenfranchised for official oversights. The key principle laid down is that the purpose of tally rules is to prevent bogus voting, and where genuineness is established through substantial compliance (such as the presence of the official mark), technical omissions by election officials should not invalidate genuine votes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the omission on the part of a Presiding Officer to sign ballot papers warrants their outright exclusion from the vote-count under Rule 35(4)(c)(i) of the Punjab Local Governments (Conduct of Elections) Rules, 2013 when the official mark is present?
  • Can genuine voters be penalized and disenfranchised due to an official omission or mistake committed by the Presiding Officer during an election?
  • Does the absence of the Presiding Officer's signature alone establish that bogus voting has taken place when the total vote count does not exceed the number of legitimately issued ballot papers?
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• Zulfiqar Ali Ranjha and another vs Zia Ullah Ranjha and others2018 SCMR 1036 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-04
  election petitionrecount of votesballot paper exclusionpresiding officer signaturevoter disenfranchisementlocal government elections
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from an election dispute concerning the seats of Chairman and Vice Chairman of a Union Council in Punjab. The appellants were initially declared successful by a thin margin, but a subsequent recount led to the exclusion of 207 ballot papers solely because they lacked the signature of the Presiding Officer, although they bore the official mark. This exclusion reversed the election result in favor of the respondents. The Election Tribunal and the Lahore High Court upheld the exclusion, strictly interpreting Rule 35(4)(c)(i) of the Punjab Local Governments (Conduct of Elections) Rules, 2013, which requires both the official mark and the signature. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, holding that the primary purpose of the rule is to prevent bogus voting. Since the total number of votes matched the number of legitimately issued ballot papers, the genuineness of the votes was established. The Court ruled that voters cannot be disenfranchised due to a mere clerical omission by an election official.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the omission of a Presiding Officer's signature on a ballot paper warrants its outright exclusion from the vote-count under the Punjab Local Governments (Conduct of Elections) Rules, 2013 when the official mark is present?
  • Can genuine voters be disenfranchised due to a clerical error or omission committed solely by an election official?
  • How should the word 'and' in Rule 35(4)(c)(i) of the Punjab Local Governments (Conduct of Elections) Rules, 2013 be interpreted when there is no evidence of bogus voting?
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• Zulfiqar Ahmed Bhutta., Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed., All Pakistan Aam Admi2018 P.S.C. 687 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  party headdisqualificationhonest and ameenpolitical partiesfundamental rightsharmonious interpretationelection act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves constitutional petitions challenging the validity of Sections 203 and 232 of the Election Act, 2017, which omitted the explicit bar preventing disqualified persons from serving as office-bearers or heads of political parties, a restriction previously contained in the Political Parties Order, 2002. The core legal questions concern whether a person disqualified under Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution can legally become or remain the head of a political party and exercise powers under Article 63A. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that sub-constitutional legislation cannot bypass or override constitutional provisions and that the Election Act, 2017 must be read harmoniously with the Constitution. Consequently, the court ruled that any person suffering from a disqualification under Articles 62 or 63 is legally debarred from holding the office of a party head. The key principle laid down is that qualifications and probity standards mandated for parliamentarians under Articles 62 and 63 equally apply to the leadership of political parties to preserve the foundational integrity of democratic and legislative institutions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person disqualified under Article 62 or 63 of the Constitution of Pakistan can hold the office of a Party Head under the Election Act, 2017?
  • Does the right to form and be a member of a political party under Article 17 of the Constitution include the unfettered right to choose a disqualified person as party head?
  • Can sub-constitutional legislation override or circumvent the qualifications and disqualifications prescribed for parliamentarians under the Constitution?
  • What is the effect of the repeal of the Political Parties Order, 2002, on a disqualification already incurred under its provisions prior to the enactment of the Election Act, 2017?
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• Zulfiqar Ahmed Bhutta and others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs and others2018 PLJ SC 328 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-21
  constitutional disqualificationparty headpolitical partyparliamentary democracyelection actfundamental rightsprobity and integrity
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the legality of a disqualified person holding the office of Party Head of a political party under the Election Act, 2017. The core legal question was whether the statutory provisions allowing such a person to lead a political party could override the constitutional requirements of probity and integrity mandated for parliamentary representatives. The Supreme Court held that the Election Act, 2017 must be construed in harmony with the Constitution. The Court declared that any person lacking the qualifications or suffering from disqualifications under Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, is legally barred from holding the position of Party Head or exercising powers under Article 63-A. Consequently, the Court ruled that all actions, orders, and documents issued by such a disqualified individual in the capacity of Party Head after their disqualification are void ab initio. The Election Commission of Pakistan was directed to remove the name of the disqualified individual from all records as Party Head, establishing the principle that constitutional disqualification extends to the leadership of political parties.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person disqualified under Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 hold the position of Party Head of a political party?
  • Are the provisions of the Election Act, 2017 subject to the constitutional requirements of Articles 62, 63, and 63-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • What is the legal status of actions taken by a Party Head after their disqualification under the Constitution?
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• Zulfiqar Ahmed Bhutta and 15 others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Minister of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs and others2018 PLD Supreme Court 366 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-21
  Constitutional interpretationPolitical party headDisqualificationParliamentary membershipElection Act 2017Fundamental rightsDemocratic process
  Summary & questions settled

  These constitutional petitions challenged the validity of certain provisions of the Election Act, 2017, specifically concerning the eligibility of a political party head. The core legal question was whether a person disqualified from parliamentary membership under Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, could legally hold the position of a political party head. The Supreme Court held that the Election Act, 2017 must be construed subject to the constitutional framework. The Court declared that any individual suffering from a lack of qualification under Article 62 or disqualification under Article 63 is debarred from holding the position of 'Party Head' and prohibited from exercising powers under Article 63-A. Consequently, all actions taken by a disqualified person in the capacity of Party Head were declared void, and the Election Commission was directed to remove the disqualified individual from party records. The judgment establishes the principle that the qualifications for parliamentary membership are essential prerequisites for holding the central role of a political party head, ensuring the integrity of the democratic process.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person disqualified under Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, hold the position of a political party head?
  • Are the provisions of the Election Act, 2017 subject to the qualifications and disqualifications prescribed by the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • What is the legal status of actions taken by a political party head after their disqualification from parliamentary membership?
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• Zohra Bibi and another vs Haji Sultan Mahmood and others2018 P.S.C. 748, 2018 SCMR 762 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-06
  Succession certificateRevocation of succession certificateFraudLimitationMuhammadan law of inheritanceTechnicalitiesLegal heirsConcealment of factsUndertakingCivil Procedure Code
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a Balochistan High Court judgment that set aside the revocation of a succession certificate, deeming the revocation application incompetently filed. The original succession certificate was obtained by Respondent No. 1, who fraudulently claimed to be the sole legal heir, concealing the existence of other heirs, including the appellants. The Supreme Court examined whether the application for revocation was time-barred and if procedural technicalities should obstruct justice. The Court held that no statutory period of limitation is provided for the revocation of a succession certificate under the Succession Act, 1925, and in cases of fraud, time runs from the date of knowledge. It further ruled that technicalities should not hamper the administration of justice, especially when the status and relationship of legal heirs are undisputed. The appeal was allowed, restoring the trial court's order of revocation, and the trial court was directed to initiate proceedings against Respondent No. 1 under Section 198 PPC for verifying a false statement and concealing facts.

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• Zahid Hussain Makhdoom vs The Secretary/Chairman, Railway Board,2019 PLC (C.S.) 263, 2018 SCMR 2077 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-20
  service appealdismissal from serviceunauthorized absenceproportionality of punishmentcompulsory retirementFederal Service Tribunalmisconduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's service appeal against his dismissal from service for unauthorized absence from duty for about 16 months. The core legal question is whether the penalty of dismissal from service for prolonged absence was disproportionate to the misconduct, given the mitigating circumstances including long unblemished service and security threats. The Supreme Court held that the penalty of dismissal was indeed disproportionate to the proved misconduct under the specific facts and circumstances of the case, particularly considering 35 years of past service and undisputed reasons for absence. The Court laid down the principle that while unauthorized absence constitutes misconduct, the quantum of punishment must remain proportionate to the gravity of the infraction, and mitigating factors such as a clean long-term service record and lack of dispute regarding threat circumstances warrant leniency by converting major penalties like dismissal into compulsory retirement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the penalty of dismissal from service for unauthorized absence is disproportionate when the employee has a long unblemished service record?
  • Can the Supreme Court convert a major penalty of dismissal into compulsory retirement in service matters?
  • Whether mitigating circumstances such as security threats affecting an employee's absence should be considered in determining the quantum of punishment?
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• Zafar Ali and another vs Muslim Commercial Bank Limited and others2018 CLD 774, 2018 SCMR 987 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-09
  auction salebona fide purchaserbanking courtcourt auctiondecreeproperty rightsremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that nullified an auction sale of property solely because the underlying decree passed by the Banking Court was subsequently set aside. The appellants, who purchased the property for valuable consideration following a court-conducted auction, argued that their rights, having attained finality through the issuance of a sale certificate and delivery of possession, should be protected. The core legal question is whether a court-sanctioned auction sale can be automatically invalidated upon the reversal of the original decree, especially when third-party interests have intervened. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in setting aside the auction in a routine manner without considering the bona fide nature of the purchasers' claims. The Court established that the rights of a bona fide auction purchaser for valuable consideration, once the sale process is complete and final, require distinct legal protection. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the case to the High Court to determine the bona fide status of the appellants and whether their rights remain protected under the law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court-conducted auction sale be automatically nullified solely because the underlying decree was subsequently set aside?
  • Are the rights of a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration in a court-conducted auction protected even if the original decree is later reversed?
  • Does the finality of a court-conducted auction, including the issuance of a sale certificate and delivery of possession, create protected rights for a subsequent purchaser?
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• Waqar Zafar Bakhtawari and 6 others vs Haji Mazhar Hussain Shah2018 PLD Supreme Court 81, 2018 PLJ SC 66 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-21
  tenancy expiryevictionIslamabad Rent Restriction Ordinanceharmonious constructioninfringement of tenancy conditionslandlord-tenant relationshipholding over
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals concern the eviction of tenants in the Islamabad Capital Territory upon the expiry of their tenancy periods. The core legal question was whether the expiry of a tenancy term constitutes a valid ground for eviction under the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001, given that Section 17 enumerates specific grounds for eviction. The Supreme Court held that the appeals were without merit and dismissed them. The Court applied the principle of harmonious construction, ruling that Section 6 of the Ordinance, 2001, renders a tenancy invalid upon the expiry of the agreed period. Consequently, a tenant continuing in possession without the landlord's consent after the expiry of the tenancy term infringes the conditions of the tenancy. Such conduct falls within the purview of Section 17(2)(ii)(b) of the Ordinance, 2001, which allows for eviction where a tenant has infringed the conditions on which the building is held. The Court emphasized that reading these provisions together prevents the redundancy of Section 6 and avoids the illogical result of allowing a tenant to occupy premises indefinitely after their legal right to do so has expired.

  Questions settled

  • Does the expiry of a tenancy period constitute a valid ground for eviction under the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can Section 6 and Section 17 of the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001 be interpreted harmoniously to allow eviction upon the expiry of a tenancy?
  • Does a tenant who continues to occupy a property after the expiry of the tenancy period without the landlord's consent infringe the conditions of the tenancy under Section 17(2)(ii)(b) of the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001?
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• Wapda through its Chairman & others vs Raja Iftikhar Ahmed & others2018 SCP 1129 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-03-21
  service tribunalgeneration allowanceimplementation of judgmentabuse of processsupreme court of pakistanconstitutionalismrule of law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from civil petitions filed by State functionaries seeking leave to appeal against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which allowed miscellaneous petitions for the implementation of earlier service tribunal judgments regarding the grant of generation allowance and other benefits to employees. The core legal question is whether State functionaries can repeatedly re-agitate settled matters and refuse to implement final judgments of the highest judicial fora. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners' attempt to reopen finalized litigation reeks of mala fide, constitutes a gross abuse of the process of the court, and violates the constitutional command that executive authorities must act in aid of the court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, refused leave to appeal, and laid down the principle that deliberate non-implementation of final judicial orders by state functionaries undermines constitutionalism and the rule of law, warranting strict deprecation and imposition of personal costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether state functionaries can repeatedly re-agitate matters that have already been finally decided up to the Supreme Court?
  • Does the failure of executive authorities to implement judgments of the Service Tribunal and the Supreme Court violate the constitutional command to act in aid of the Court?
  • Can personal costs be imposed on a public functionary for mala fide and persistent non-implementation of judicial orders?
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• WAPDA through Chairman and others vs Raja Iftikhar Ahmed and others2018 SCMR 394 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-15
  generation allowanceimplementation of judgmentabuse of processcontempt of courtcivil servicestate functionariesjudicial restraint
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil matter arose from petitions for leave to appeal filed by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal directing the implementation of its prior judgments. The core legal question was whether state functionaries could delay or restrict the implementation of final, judicially affirmed decisions regarding the grant of generation allowance and other benefits to similarly placed employees. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petitions, holding that the petitioners' persistent refusal to implement the judgments of the Service Tribunal and the Supreme Court constituted a gross abuse of the judicial process and a blatant violation of constitutional commands. The Court laid down the principle that all executive and judicial authorities are constitutionally bound to act in aid of the Supreme Court, and any deliberate failure or delay in implementing final judicial orders undermines the rule of law and cannot be tolerated.

  Questions settled

  • Can a state authority re-agitate and reopen legal issues that have already been repeatedly considered and rejected by the Service Tribunal and the Supreme Court?
  • What is the constitutional obligation of executive authorities regarding the implementation of decisions of the Supreme Court?
  • Whether the Supreme Court can impose personal costs on the head of a state institution for persistent non-compliance with judicial orders?
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• WAPDA through Chairman and others vs Abdul Ghaffar and others2018 PLC (C.S.) 458, 2018 SCMR 380 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-21
  time scale placementwork charge servicemove-overextension of judicial benefitsimilarly situated employeeslimitation in service mattersleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal was filed by WAPDA challenging the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, Lahore, which granted respondents time-scale placement in BS-18 and move-over to BS-19 by counting their work-charge service towards the required ten years in BS-17. The core legal questions were whether service rendered on a work-charge basis should be included in calculating the ten years of continuous service under Rule 61C(1) of the Pakistan WAPDA (Water Wing) Scientific Officers Service Rules, 1980, and whether employees not original parties to earlier binding judicial decisions could claim identical benefits despite limitation objections. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions and refused leave to appeal. The Court held that temporary, ad-hoc, or work-charge service is to be counted toward calculating continuous service for time-scale placement. Reaffirming settled precedent, the Court held that when a point of law regarding service terms is decided, dictates of justice and good governance require extending the benefit to all similarly situated employees without compelling them to litigate, rendering limitation objections insignificant.

  Questions settled

  • Should work-charge, ad-hoc, or temporary service be counted toward calculating the ten years of continuous service for time-scale placement in BS-18 under WAPDA rules?
  • Whether the benefit of a judicial decision setting a point of law on service terms must be extended to all similarly situated employees regardless of whether they were original parties?
  • Does the question of limitation bar relief when civil servants seek identical benefits already granted to co-employees under established precedent?
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• WAPDA through Chairman and another vs Mst. Parizada2019 PLC (C.S.) 67, 2019 PLJ SC 284, 2018 P.S.C. 1648, 2018 SCMR 1542 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-07-11
  pension entitlementwork charge employeepermanent employeeWAPDA service rulespension eligibilityservice benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the entitlement of a widow to pensionary benefits following the death of her husband, who was employed as an office Chowkidar by WAPDA. The core legal questions were whether the deceased husband was a 'work charge' employee, thereby disentitling his widow to pension, and whether the length of his service (9 years and 8 months) met the minimum threshold for pension eligibility. The Supreme Court held that the deceased was a permanent employee, evidenced by his receipt of annual increments and other financial benefits, and that he was not a work charge employee. Furthermore, relying on the WAPDA Compendium of directives, the Court determined that pension is payable where service exceeds 9.5 years. Since the deceased had served for 9 years and 8 months, the widow was entitled to pensionary benefits. The Court affirmed the High Court's judgment, establishing that the nature of the post and specific departmental directives regarding service duration take precedence over the classification of an employee as work charge when the facts demonstrate permanent employment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee who receives annual increments and financial benefits is considered a permanent employee rather than a work charge employee?
  • Is a widow entitled to pensionary benefits if the deceased spouse served for 9 years and 8 months under WAPDA rules?
  • Does the WAPDA Compendium of directives allow for pension payments where service is 9.5 years or more?
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• Wali Muhammad Khan and another vs Mst. Amina and others2019 PLJ SC 34, 2019 P.S.C 747, 2018 SCMR 2080 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-08-15
  gift of propertyburden of proofinheritance rightsrevisional jurisdictionparda-observing ladyconcurrent findingsfraudulent mutation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Peshawar High Court judgment that set aside concurrent findings of subordinate courts regarding a disputed gift of property. The appellants (sons) claimed their mother, Mst. Pari, gifted them her entire property, thereby excluding her daughters from inheritance. The core legal question was whether the appellants sufficiently proved the gift, considering the mother was an elderly, illiterate, parda-observing woman. The Supreme Court held that the gift was not established. The burden of proof lay squarely on the appellants, who failed to produce the original document or verify the identity of the donor. The Court emphasized that courts must exercise extreme caution when faced with gifts that deprive female family members of their inheritance. It was held that the High Court correctly exercised its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to correct the material irregularities committed by the subordinate courts, which had erroneously assumed the validity of the gift without proper evidentiary support. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the protection of the respondents' inheritance rights.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proving a gift lie upon the person claiming the benefit of such gift?
  • Can a High Court exercise revisional jurisdiction to set aside concurrent findings of fact if there is a material irregularity in the appreciation of evidence?
  • What are the evidentiary requirements for establishing a gift made by an elderly, illiterate, parda-observing woman?
  • Is strict compliance with identification procedures required under the Land Revenue Act 1967 when recording a mutation based on a gift?
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• Usman Shahid, Manager Administration, Bol Medial Network vs Muhammad Saleem, Chairman, PEMRA2019 PLJ SC (Cr.C) 347, 2018 SCMR 1820 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-08-09
  media ratingsmonopolistic practicesfundamental rightsfreedom of tradecontempt of courtrestrictive trade practicesPEMRAexclusivity agreements
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns contempt proceedings and a constitutional petition regarding the denial of media ratings to Bol Media Network by Medialogic Pakistan (Private) Limited, allegedly due to collusive agreements between the Pakistan Broadcasters Association, Medialogic, and the Pakistan Advertisers Society. The core legal question was whether these restrictive agreements, which effectively created a market monopoly and denied access to advertising revenue, violated fundamental rights and statutory provisions against exclusivity. The Supreme Court held that the agreements were prima facie anti-competitive and violative of fundamental rights. Consequently, the Court suspended the operation of the agreement between the Pakistan Broadcasters Association and Medialogic, enabling market participants to operate freely. Furthermore, the Court initiated contempt proceedings against the CEO of Medialogic for failing to comply with court orders regarding the issuance of ratings. The judgment establishes that fundamental rights to trade and expression under Articles 18 and 19 of the Constitution prohibit monopolistic practices, and that regulators must ensure free competition, as exclusivity clauses in media industry agreements are legally inoperative under the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002.

  Questions settled

  • Does an exclusivity agreement between a broadcasters' association and a rating agency violate the fundamental rights to trade and expression?
  • Can the Supreme Court suspend the operation of private agreements that create monopolistic market conditions?
  • Is a regulatory body like PEMRA empowered to allow exclusivity in media rating services?
  • Does the failure to comply with a court order regarding the provision of media ratings constitute grounds for contempt proceedings?
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• Umer Khursheed and another vs Syed Tufail Ahmad and others2018 SCMR 1051 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-04-02
  murdercriminal appealbenefit of doubtocular accountprivate complaintappraisal of evidenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction and sentence of the petitioner under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the complainant's son, alongside the dismissal of a revision petition for sentence enhancement. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution had proven its case against the petitioner beyond a reasonable doubt in light of doubtful ocular testimony, disbelieved motive, and suspicious recovery evidence. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the lower courts' judgments, holding that the star eye-witness's presence and conduct were highly improbable, the motive and recovery were unreliable, and the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The key principle laid down is that where the primary ocular account lacks credibility, corroborative evidence such as medical reports and weapons recovery cannot sustain a conviction without independent proof, and benefit of doubt must be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether medical evidence alone can substitute for credible ocular testimony to establish the identity of an accused?
  • Does the unreliability of a primary eye-witness's testimony and conduct render the prosecution's case doubtful?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained when both the alleged motive and the weapon recovery are disbelieved by the court?
  • What is the evidentiary value of an eye-witness whose presence at the crime scene is shrouded in doubt and whose testimony is rejected regarding a co-accused?
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• Ulfat Husain vs The State2018 SCMR 313 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-06-15
  murderpost-mortem delayeye-witness contradictionsacquittal of co-accusedcorroborationbenefit of doubtcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a conviction under Section 302(b) PPC, where the appellant was sentenced to death for the murder of Talib Hussain, later commuted to life imprisonment by the High Court. The prosecution case rested on the testimony of the deceased's brother and widow, who alleged that the appellant and four co-accused (later acquitted) fired upon the deceased at his residence. The Supreme Court identified several fatal flaws in the prosecution's case, including an unexplained 16-hour delay in the post-mortem examination, significant contradictions between eye-witnesses regarding the presence of unknown assailants and the condition of the boundary wall, and the lack of blood-stained clothing from witnesses who claimed to have handled the injured deceased. Furthermore, the Court noted that the same evidence used against the appellant had been disbelieved regarding the acquitted co-accused. Applying the principle of safe administration of justice, the Court held that where evidence is insufficient to convict co-accused with similar roles, independent corroboration is required to convict the remaining accused. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was acquitted.

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• Trading Corporation of Pakistan vs Devan Sugar Mills Limited and others2018 SCP 1305 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-27
  doctrine of electionsuccessive remediesconstructive res judicataexecution of decreestriking off defensetentative rent ordermultiplicity of proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant matter arose from concurrent decisions of the executing and appellate courts dismissing an application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which orders were reversed by the High Court, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court. The appellant had obtained an ejectment order against the respondent-tenant after the tenant's defense was struck off under Section 17(9) of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act 1963 for failing to comply with a tentative rent order. The core legal question was whether a judgment-debtor, after unsuccessfully exhausting a remedy under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on substantially the same facts and grounds, can subsequently initiate proceedings under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that once a suitor elects and pursues one of several concurrent or co-existent remedies, the doctrine of election and principles of constructive res judicata bar the subsequent invocation of alternative remedies for the same grievance. The Court laid down that a party cannot engage in forum shopping or pursue successive remedies one after another on identical facts, as doing so constitutes an abuse of the process of law and encourages multiplicity of proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a judgment-debtor can invoke Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 after an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on substantially similar grounds has already been dismissed?
  • Does the doctrine of election bar a party from pursuing successive co-existent remedies against the same impugned order?
  • Whether failure to raise available objections in the first available proceeding attracts the principles of constructive res judicata under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the pursuit of multiple sequential remedies against a single wrong constitute an abuse of the process of law?
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• Tikka Khan and others vs Syed Muzaffar Hussain Shah and others2018 PLC (C.S.) 615, 2018 PLJ SC 160, 2018 SCMR 332 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-04-19
  civil service senioritycompulsory transferabolition of ministries18th AmendmentEstacodeservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which allowed appeals regarding the seniority of civil servants transferred to the Ministry of Religious Affairs following the reorganization of Ministries post-Constitution (18th Amendment) Act, 2010. The core legal question was whether the respondents' seniority should be determined under Rule 4 of the Civil Servants (Seniority) Rules, 1993, or under the provisions of the Estacode regarding compulsory transfer upon abolition of departments. The Supreme Court held that the respondents' transfer was not an appointment by transfer or deputation, but a compulsory transfer due to the abolition of their previous Ministry. Consequently, the Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision, holding that the respondents' past service must be recognized and counted for seniority purposes. The key principle laid down is that when civil servants are compulsorily transferred due to the reorganization or abolition of departments, their past continuous service must be respected and cannot be disregarded, making it unjust to treat them as junior to existing staff in the new department.

  Questions settled

  • Does Rule 4 of the Civil Servants (Seniority) Rules, 1993 apply to civil servants compulsorily transferred due to the abolition of a Ministry?
  • Should past continuous service be counted for seniority purposes when a civil servant is compulsorily transferred due to the reorganization of departments?
  • Is the transfer of civil servants resulting from the abolition of a Ministry considered an appointment by transfer or deputation under the Civil Servants (Seniority) Rules, 1993?
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• Tikka Khan & others vs Syed Muzaffar Hussain Shah and others2018 PLJ SC 160 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-04-19
  civil servants seniorityappointment by transfercompulsory transfermerger of ministriesabolition of ministriesservice tribunalpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal allowing appeals regarding the seniority of civil servants. The core legal question was whether the seniority of respondents—transferred to the Ministry of Religious Affairs following the abolition and reorganization of ministries under the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010—should be governed by Rule 4 of the Civil Servants (Seniority) Rules, 1993, or by Serial No. 33(6) of Estacode Vol. I and Rule 4A. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that since the respondents were compulsorily transferred due to the abolition of their ministry, their past continuous service must be respected and recognized for determining seniority, making their case akin to Rule 4A and covered by Serial No. 33(6) of Estacode Vol. I rather than Rule 4. The key principle laid down is that the past service of civil servants compulsorily transferred due to the reorganization or abolition of government departments cannot be ignored, and they cannot be treated as junior to the junior-most civil servants in the new office for no fault of their own.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the seniority of civil servants transferred upon the abolition and reorganization of ministries is governed by Rule 4 of the Civil Servants (Seniority) Rules, 1993?
  • Does the compulsory transfer of employees due to the abolition of a ministry allow them to count their past continuous service towards seniority in the new office?
  • Whether the provisions of Serial No. 33(6) of Estacode Vol. I apply to civil servants compulsorily transferred to another office along with their posts?
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• The Taxation Officer/Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore vs M/s2018 SCP 1344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-10-31
  rectification of mistakesminimum taxsurchargerepealed ordinanceprocedural lawlimitation periodpast and closed transactionmaintainability of writ petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan examines the legality of notices issued under Section 221 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, seeking to rectify assessment orders passed under the repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, and to levy a surcharge on minimum tax under Section 80-D of the repealed Ordinance. The core legal questions relate to the retrospective or procedural application of Section 221 of the 2001 Ordinance to past assessments, the legality of levying surcharge on minimum tax based on turnover rather than total income, and the maintainability of a constitutional writ petition against a show-cause notice. The Supreme Court held that Section 221 is a procedural provision governing limitation and rectification of mistakes, which validly applies to pending assessment orders that do not constitute past and closed transactions. However, the Court further held that surcharge cannot be levied on minimum tax assessed under Section 80-D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, because surcharge is statutorily tied to income tax charged on total income, whereas minimum tax is calculated on turnover. The key principles established are that procedural limitation provisions apply retrospectively to open transactions, and that surcharge cannot be charged on minimum tax in the absence of a clear statutory basis connecting it to turnover-based assessments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of Section 221 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 can be applied to assessment orders passed under the provisions of a repealed ordinance?
  • Whether surcharge can be levied on the minimum tax payable under Section 80-D and other pari materia sections of the repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • Whether a writ petition is maintainable against a notice issued under Section 221 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 without availing departmental remedies?
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• The Taxation Officer/Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore vs2018 PTD 1734, 2018 SCMR 1131 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  rectification of mistakesminimum taxsurchargeretrospective applicationprocedural lawlimitation periodmaintainability of writ petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a High Court judgment allowing a writ petition that challenged show-cause notices issued under Section 221(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ("ITO 2001") to rectify assessment orders originally passed under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 ("ITO 1979") by levying surcharge on minimum tax paid under Section 80-D of ITO 1979. The Supreme Court addressed whether Section 221 of ITO 2001 could apply retrospectively to orders passed under the repealed ITO 1979, whether surcharge could be levied on minimum tax payable under Section 80-D of ITO 1979, and the maintainability of the writ petition. The Court held that Section 221 of ITO 2001 is procedural in nature and applies to unclosed past transactions whose limitation period under ITO 1979 had not expired. However, on the merits, the Court held that surcharge under Section 10 of ITO 1979 is leviable only on total income tax, not on minimum tax based on turnover under Section 80-D. Consequently, the High Court petition challenging the notices was not maintainable as no jurisdictional error existed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the procedural provisions for rectification of mistakes under Section 221 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 apply to assessment orders passed under the repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • Can surcharge under Section 10 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 be levied on minimum tax calculated on turnover under Section 80-D of the same Ordinance?
  • Is a constitutional writ petition maintainable against a show-cause notice issued under Section 221 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 where the authority possesses statutory power and jurisdiction to issue such notice?
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• The State/Anti-Narcotics Force vs Parvez Hassan Haravi and another2018 PLJ SC 713, 2018 SCMR 1397 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-04
  forfeiture of assetsnarcotics traffickingretrospective applicationControl of Narcotic Substances Actburden of proofforeign convictionconstitutional protection
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the refusal of the Special Court and the High Court to order the forfeiture of a property under Section 40 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The Anti-Narcotics Force sought forfeiture based on the respondent’s conviction in a foreign court for narcotics trafficking. The core legal questions were whether the property was derived from illicit narcotics proceeds and whether Section 40 could be applied retrospectively to property acquired before the Act's promulgation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that forfeiture under the CNS Act requires a demonstrated nexus between the assets and illicit narcotics activities. The Court emphasized that Section 40 does not dispense with the necessity of proving that assets were acquired through drug-related proceeds. Furthermore, the Court held that applying Section 40 to property purchased in 1987, prior to the Act's 1997 enactment, would violate the protection against retrospective punishment under Article 12 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. Consequently, the lack of evidence linking the property to drug money and the constitutional bar on retrospective application necessitated the dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the forfeiture of assets under Section 40 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 require proof that the assets were derived from illicit narcotics trafficking?
  • Can the provisions of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 be applied retrospectively to property acquired before the Act's promulgation?
  • Is a foreign conviction sufficient, on its own, to warrant the forfeiture of assets in Pakistan without establishing a nexus between the assets and illicit narcotics proceeds?
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• The State through Regional Director ANF vs (1) Imam Bakhsh (2) FidaPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 90, 2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 1089, 2018 SCMR 2039, 2018 SCP 1313 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-12
  narcotic substanceschain of custodygovernment analyst reporttesting protocolsmandatory vs directory rulescriminal appealnarcotics testing laboratory
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment addresses multiple criminal appeals concerning the acquittal of individuals charged under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal questions involved whether the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001 are mandatory or directory, and the impact of non-compliance with these rules and failures in the chain of custody on the evidentiary value of a Government Analyst's report. The Supreme Court held that while Rule 5 is directory, Rule 6 is mandatory regarding the inclusion of full testing protocols in the analyst's report. The Court ruled that a report lacking these protocols is inconclusive and unreliable, failing to support a conviction. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the prosecution must establish an unbroken, secure chain of custody for seized substances from recovery to laboratory receipt. Any lapse in this chain or failure to document testing protocols renders the analyst's report insufficient for sustaining a conviction. Consequently, the Court dismissed the State's appeals against the acquittals, affirming that strict adherence to testing protocols and chain of custody is fundamental to the Act's statutory scheme.

  Questions settled

  • Are the provisions of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001 mandatory or directory?
  • Does the failure to include full testing protocols in a Government Analyst's report invalidate the report for the purpose of sustaining a criminal conviction?
  • What is the legal consequence of a break in the chain of custody of a narcotic sample from the point of recovery to the laboratory?
  • Is the requirement for two signatures on the Government Analyst's report under the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001 a mandatory requirement?
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• The Chairman NADRA, Islamabad and others vs Mohammad Ali Shah and others2018 P.S.C. 25 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  constitutional petitioncontractual employeesregularizationNADRAwrit jurisdictionterms and conditions of servicestatutory body
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged a common judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had altered the terms, designations, and pay scales offered by the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) for the regularization of its contractual employees. The core legal questions pertained to whether contractual employees of a statutory body could invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 to renegotiate or alter terms of regularization, and whether executive directives issued by the Ministry of Interior could override decisions of a statutory authority. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that contractual employees cannot invoke constitutional jurisdiction to challenge or alter the terms of regularization offered by a statutory organization prior to their formal regularization. The Court laid down that statutory authorities governed by their own enabling statutes and regulations are sole competent bodies regarding employee terms, and executive ministries lack legal authority to interfere or dictate terms contrary to statutory provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Can contractual employees of a statutory body invoke the constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to renegotiate or alter terms of regularization offered by the employer?
  • Does the Ministry of Interior have legal authority to order the regularization or determine service terms of contractual employees of NADRA?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to amend or rewrite the terms of an offer of regularization issued by a statutory authority?
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• Tariq Iqbal and others vs DG Military Land and Cantonments2018 SCMR 335, 2018 PLC (C.S.) 502 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-14
  transfer of cantonment servantstransferable categoriesnon-transferable postscantonment board employeesservice policypower of Director-General Military Lands and Cantonmentsconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arises from a common order of the Sindh High Court rejecting the petitioners' constitutional petitions, which challenged the transfer orders of various employees of the Ministry of Defence (ML&C Department) serving in Basic Scales 7 to 10 across different Cantonment Boards. The core legal question was whether the posts held by the petitioners were non-transferable and whether the Director-General of Military Lands and Cantonments legally possessed the authority to declare such posts transferable under Rule 5(1) of the Pakistan Cantonment Servants Rules, 1954, without a fresh notification or previous publication under Section 280 of the Cantonments Act, 1924. The Supreme Court held that Rule 5(1) of the Pakistan Cantonment Servants Rules, 1954, explicitly empowers the Director-General to specify posts with common designations as transferable in the public interest, notwithstanding other rules or terms of service, and that no fresh publication under Section 280 of the Cantonments Act, 1924, is required for such administrative categorization. The key principle laid down is that statutory rules once duly published can validly confer administrative powers on an authority to alter categories of service from non-transferable to transferable without repeating the rule-making publication process.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Director-General of Military Lands and Cantonments have the power under Rule 5(1) of the Pakistan Cantonment Servants Rules, 1954, to declare previously non-transferable posts as transferable?
  • Is a fresh notification or previous publication under Section 280 of the Cantonments Act, 1924, required when the Director-General specifies posts as transferable under Rule 5 of the Pakistan Cantonment Servants Rules, 1954?
  • Can cantonment board employees claim a right against transfer when the competent authority has validly placed their posts in the transferable category in the public interest?
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• Tariq Iqbal and others vs DG Military Land and Cantoments2018 SC MR 335 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-14
  Cantonment Boardtransfer of civil servantsservice rulesadministrative discretionstatutory interpretationnon-obstante clause
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, employees of various Cantonment Boards, challenged their transfers, contending their posts were non-transferable and that the Director General of Military Lands and Cantonments lacked the authority to reclassify them as transferable without fresh publication under Section 280 of the Cantonments Act, 1924. The core legal question was whether the Director General could exercise power under Rule 5(1) of the Pakistan Cantonment Servants Rules, 1954, to declare posts transferable without complying with the procedural requirements of Section 280 of the Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the transfers were valid. The Court ruled that Rule 5(1) of the 1954 Rules confers broad, non-obstante authority upon the Director General to specify posts as transferable in the public interest. This administrative power is distinct from the general rule-making process under Section 280 of the Cantonments Act, 1924. Consequently, the Director General’s directive reclassifying posts as transferable did not require fresh gazette notification, as the underlying 1954 Rules were duly published.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Director General of Military Lands and Cantonments have the authority to declare non-transferable posts as transferable under Rule 5(1) of the Pakistan Cantonment Servants Rules, 1954?
  • Is a fresh publication under Section 280 of the Cantonments Act, 1924, required when the Director General exercises powers under Rule 5(1) of the Pakistan Cantonment Servants Rules, 1954, to reclassify posts?
  • Can a Cantonment servant claim a vested right to a non-transferable post based on previous administrative policies?
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• Tallat Ishaq vs National Accountability Bureau through its Chairman, etc.2019 PLD Supreme Court 112, 2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 1110 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-01
  post-arrest bailstatutory delaytrial timeframedirectory vs mandatoryconstitutional jurisdictionhardshipcorruption reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment refusing post-arrest bail in a corruption reference filed under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The core legal question revolved around whether the thirty-day timeframe for concluding trials under Section 16(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 is mandatory and whether its non-compliance entitles an accused to automatic bail. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that Section 16(a) is directory in nature rather than mandatory, and its expiry does not automatically confer a right to bail. The Court clarified that while Section 9(b) of the Ordinance ousts the statutory jurisdiction of courts to grant bail, the High Courts retain extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 to grant bail in appropriate cases of undue hardship and shocking, unconscionable, or inordinate delay not attributable to the accused. The Court laid down detailed principles governing trial delays, hardship, and bail considerations under accountability laws.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the thirty-day time frame for conclusion of a trial provided under Section 16(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 is mandatory or directory?
  • Does the expiry of the thirty-day period under Section 16(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 entitle an accused person to bail automatically?
  • Does Section 9(b) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 bar the High Courts from granting bail under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  • What are the governing principles for granting bail on the ground of delay in trials under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
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• Tahir Mehmood @ Achoo vs The State and another2018 PLJ SC 477, 2018 SCMR 169 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-13
  re-appraisal of evidencethird probable storysuppression of material factsreduction of sentencelife imprisonmentAnti-Terrorism Actofficial duty
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction and death sentence awarded to appellant Tahir Mehmood under Section 302(b) PPC and Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, alongside convictions under Sections 324, 353, and 186 PPC. The prosecution alleged that the appellant fired upon a police constable on patrol duty. Upon re-appraising the evidence, the Supreme Court noted significant manipulations in police station records, suppression of material facts, and that the deceased constable was assigned watch and guard duty inside the police station rather than official patrol. The Court observed that both the prosecution and defense had suppressed material facts, compelling the Court to seek a third probable story based on established facts. The Court held that Section 7 ATA and Sections 353 and 186 PPC were inapplicable as the deceased was not on official duty. Consequently, the Supreme Court acquitted the appellant under Section 7 ATA, Sections 353 and 186 PPC, and converted the death sentence under Section 302(b) PPC to imprisonment for life.

  Questions settled

  • Is a court obligated to deduce a third probable story when both the prosecution and defense suppress material facts?
  • Can a conviction under Sections 353 and 186 PPC stand if the deceased public servant was not performing official duties at the time of the incident?
  • Does an offense attract Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 when the incident arises from a private intrusion rather than an act aimed at creating terror?
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• Tahir Mehmood @ Achoo vs State and another2018 PLJ SC 477 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  murderappraisal of evidencethird probable storyanti-terrorismdeath sentence reductionsuppression of factscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant for murder and other offences under the Pakistan Penal Code and the Anti-Terrorism Act. The core legal question involved the appreciation of evidence and whether the prosecution successfully established its version of events regarding the police encounter and murder. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that both the prosecution and the defence suppressed material facts, and upon analyzing the circumstances, deduced a third probable story indicating that the deceased constable was killed after an unauthorized intrusion into the appellant's house. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions under Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act and Sections 353 and 186 of the Pakistan Penal Code, and reduced the death sentence under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code to life imprisonment. The key principles laid down include the duty of the court to seek a third probable story when both rival parties conceal material facts, and the strict interpretation of anti-terrorism laws.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court is obligated to deduce a third probable story when both the prosecution and the defence suppress material facts?
  • Does an unauthorized and uninvited visit by a police constable outside his official duty attract provisions like Section 353 and Section 186 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Can a death sentence be reduced to life imprisonment when the evidence reveals concealed facts regarding the genesis of the occurrence?
  • When does an offence fail to attract the provisions of Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
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• Syeda Sakina Riaz vs Federation of Pakistan and another2018 KLR Supreme Court Cases 284, 2019 PLC (C.S.) 55, 2018 PLJ SC 635, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-06-01
  family pensionqualifying servicepensionary benefitsservice lawFamily Assistance PackageUniversity of Karachi
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, widow of a deceased University of Karachi employee, challenged the denial of family pension benefits. Her husband died after serving only five years, failing to meet the ten-year minimum qualifying service requirement mandated by the University of Karachi Service Pension Statute, 1972. While the appellant received a lump-sum grant under the Prime Minister's Family Assistance Package, the University refused the pension claim, citing the lack of qualifying service. The High Court dismissed her petition, holding that the pension statute was not statutory and that the deceased did not meet the service threshold. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that pensionary rights are inherently linked to the completion of a minimum qualifying service period, a principle based on 'quid pro quo' for services rendered. The Court clarified that the Family Assistance Package merely enhances existing pension benefits and cannot convert non-pensionable service into pensionable service. Consequently, the Court affirmed that without the requisite qualifying service, neither the employee nor their family is entitled to pensionary benefits, regardless of the assistance package's provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Prime Minister's Family Assistance Package convert non-pensionable service into pensionable service?
  • Is a minimum qualifying period of service a prerequisite for claiming family pension benefits?
  • Can the family of a deceased employee claim pension benefits if the employee died before completing the minimum qualifying service required by the University of Karachi Service Pension Statute, 1972?
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• Syed Shabbar Raza Rizvi and others vs Federation of Pakistan, Ministry of Law and Justice Division through Secretary, Islamabad and others2018 SCMR 514 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-05
  per incuriamaudi alteram partemcontempt of courtjudicial immunityProvisional Constitution Orderreview jurisdictionconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from petitions filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 by former Judges of the Lahore High Court. The petitioners sought to declare several landmark judgments of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, including Sindh High Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2009 SC 879), as per incuriam and of no legal effect. The petitioners, who had taken oath under the Provisional Constitution Order 2007 in defiance of a restraining order issued by a seven-member bench of the Supreme Court, argued that they were condemned unheard, that they could only be removed via Article 209 of the Constitution, and that judges of superior courts enjoy immunity from contempt proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the principle of audi alteram partem does not apply where individuals act in flagrant violation of a judicial restraint order for personal gain. The Court ruled that superior court judges do not enjoy immunity from contempt of court under Article 204 of the Constitution for willfully disobeying Supreme Court directions. Furthermore, the Court held that Article 184(3) cannot be used as a parallel review jurisdiction to re-agitate matters where review remedies have already been exhausted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a judgment of the Supreme Court be challenged via a fresh petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution after review remedies have been exhausted?
  • Are judges of the superior courts immune from contempt of court proceedings under Article 204 of the Constitution for disobeying a direct order of the Supreme Court?
  • Does the principle of audi alteram partem apply to protect individuals who have willfully acted in violation of a restraining order issued by a multi-member bench of the Supreme Court?
  • What are the legal parameters and grounds required for the Supreme Court to declare one of its own prior judgments per incuriam?
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• Syed Shabbar Raza Rizvi and another vs Federation of Pakistan, Ministry of Law and Justice Division through its Secretary, Islamabad and another2018 P.S.C. 539 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Article 184(3) jurisdictionper incuriamjudicial reviewcontempt of courtProvisional Constitution Order 2007removal of judgesaudi alteram partemres judicata
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 by former Lahore High Court judges seeking to declare previous Supreme Court judgments—specifically Sindh High Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2009 SC 879) and Justice Hasnat Ahmed Khan v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2011 SC 680)—as per incuriam. The petitioners, who had taken oath under the Provisional Constitution Order 2007, challenged their subsequent removal and the contempt proceedings initiated against them. The core legal question was whether these prior judgments, which upheld the removal of judges who violated the restraint order of November 3, 2007, were legally flawed and whether the petitioners could re-litigate these issues. The Court held that the impugned judgments were well-reasoned, constitutional, and not per incuriam. Furthermore, the Court ruled that Article 184(3) cannot be invoked as a parallel review jurisdiction to re-agitate matters where constitutional remedies, such as review petitions, have already been exhausted or dismissed. The principle established is that final judgments cannot be challenged through independent petitions under Article 184(3) once legal remedies are exhausted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 be used as a parallel review jurisdiction to challenge a final judgment where the remedy of review has already been exhausted?
  • What are the specific criteria for declaring a Supreme Court judgment per incuriam?
  • Does the doctrine of audi alteram partem apply to judges who violated a judicial restraint order by taking an oath under an unconstitutional instrument?
  • Are judges of superior courts immune from contempt of court proceedings under Article 204 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 when they violate a specific restraint order of the Supreme Court?
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• Syed Rizwan Ahmed vs Secretary, Cadd. Islamabad and others2018 KLR Supreme Court Cases 113 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-27
  service matterslacheslimitationreview jurisdictionpromotion quotarecruitment rulescivil petitions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves civil petitions seeking leave to appeal against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioners' review petitions regarding service promotion quotas. The core legal questions were whether the petitioners, who challenged a 2008 modification to recruitment rules seven years later, were barred by laches and limitation, and whether the Service Tribunal correctly dismissed their review petitions. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the petitioners failed to demonstrate vigilance, having slept on their rights for seven years without justification. The Court affirmed that review jurisdiction is limited to correcting glaring omissions or patent mistakes and cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal. The Court laid down the principle that in service matters, civil servants must display promptitude, and unexplained delay is fatal to their claims. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that review jurisdiction is not intended for re-examining arguments on merits, and no question of law of public importance under Article 212(3) was established to warrant interference.

  Questions settled

  • Can a review petition be used as a substitute for an appeal in service matters?
  • Does the involvement of fundamental rights excuse a failure to challenge service rules within the period of limitation?
  • Is unexplained delay in challenging service-related recruitment rules a valid ground for dismissal of a petition?
  • What is the scope of review jurisdiction regarding the correction of judicial orders?
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• Syed Rizwan Ahmed vs Secretary, Cadd, Islamabad and others2018 P.S.C. 657 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-27
  service tribunalpromotion quotalatcheslimitationreview petitioncivil servantleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The present civil petitions seek leave to appeal against the order of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, which dismissed the petitioners' review petitions against the dismissal of their service appeals. The petitioners, employees of the Directorate General of Special Education, challenged the modification of recruitment rules made through an SRO in 2008 that reduced their promotion quota from 100% to 75%. The core legal questions relate to the effect of an unexplained delay and latches in challenging service rule modifications, the scope of review jurisdiction, and whether a question of law of public importance is raised under the Constitution. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that civil servants must display vigilance and promptitude, and unexplained delay of seven years is fatal to their claim. Furthermore, review cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal or for re-visiting matters on merits without establishing a patent mistake or glaring omission. The key principle laid down is that indolent litigants who sleep over their rights cannot invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of courts, and limitation principles apply strictly to service matters.

  Questions settled

  • Whether unexplained delay and latches of several years in challenging the modification of recruitment rules can be condoned in service matters?
  • Can review jurisdiction be invoked as a substitute for an appeal to re-examine a case on merits?
  • Does a modification of recruitment rules reducing a promotion quota raise a question of law of public importance under Article 212(3) of the Constitution?
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• Syed Rizwan Ahmed and 3 others vs Secretary, Cadd, Islamabad and others2018 KLR 113, 2018 PLC (C.S.) 1209, 2018 PSC 657, 2018 SCMR 997 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-27
  promotion quotaservice appeallacheslimitationreview petitioncivil servantsupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arises from an order of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing review petitions filed by the petitioners, who are employees of the Directorate General of Special Education, against the modification of their Recruitment Rules in 2008 that reduced their promotion quota from 100% to 75%. The core legal questions relate to whether unexplained delay and laches bar service appeals against alterations in promotion quotas, and whether review petitions are maintainable to re-argue matters on merits. The Supreme Court held that civil servants must display vigilance and promptitude, and unexplained delays of several years are fatal to their claims, while review jurisdiction cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal to re-examine a case on merits. The key principles laid down are that equity refuses aid to stale demands of indolent litigants, and review is strictly limited to correcting glaring omissions or patent mistakes rather than re-arguing settled points.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unexplained delay of seven years in challenging the modification of recruitment rules and reduction of promotion quota constitutes laches barring relief?
  • Can review jurisdiction before a Service Tribunal be invoked as a substitute for an appeal to re-examine a case on merits?
  • Whether limitation ceases to be a hurdle in service matters merely because a violation of fundamental rights is alleged?
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• Syed Mehmood Akhtar Naqvi., Muhammad Sohail., Director General Malir2018 P.S.C. 869 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  state land allotmentland exchangeincremental housing schemevoid ab initioproprietary rightsjudicial reviewpublic purposeNational Accountability Bureau
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from applications alleging illegal exchange and adjustment of valuable state land by the Malir Development Authority (MDA) with private land owned by Bahria Town. The core legal question was whether the MDA and the Board of Revenue, Sindh, possessed the lawful authority to exchange state land granted for an incremental housing scheme with private/Kabuli land, and whether such transactions violated statutory prohibitions and outstanding court restraining orders. The Supreme Court, by a majority decision, held that the grant of state land to the MDA, its subsequent exchange with Bahria Town, and all related transactions were void ab initio. The Court ruled that under Section 10(2A) of the Colonization of Government Lands (Sindh) Act 1912, state land granted under tenancy is strictly non-exchangeable with private or Kabuli land. The Court emphasized that subordinate regulations cannot override the parent statute's prohibitions, and the MDA could not alienate land in which it held no proprietary rights. Consequently, the Court ordered the land to revert to the state, restrained Bahria Town from further sales, and directed the National Accountability Bureau to complete its investigation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether state land granted under Section 10 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Sindh) Act 1912 can be lawfully exchanged with private or Kabuli land?
  • Can a development authority dispose of or exchange land by sale or lease before proprietary rights have vested in it?
  • Can subordinate rules or regulations override express prohibitions contained in the parent legislative enactment?
  • Whether a transaction executed in violation of a Supreme Court restraining order can be granted legal legitimacy?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Mehmood Akhtar Naqvi and others vs Malik Israr, Senior2018 PLD Supreme Court 468 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  state landland exchangeconsolidationhousing schememalir development authoritycolonization of government landssuo motu jurisdictionillegal allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the legality of the grant of extensive tracts of state land by the Board of Revenue, Sindh, to the Malir Development Authority (MDA) and its subsequent exchange with private lands to facilitate a housing project developed by Bahria Town. The core legal question revolves around whether state land granted under tenancy conditions for specific public purposes can be lawfully exchanged with private or kabuli land, and whether the MDA and provincial authorities acted within their statutory powers. In a majority decision, the Supreme Court held that the land transactions, exchanges, and the underlying notifications were void ab initio, violating the Colonization of Government Lands Act 1912 and the Malir Development Authority Act 1993. The Court laid down that state land granted under tenancy cannot be exchanged with private land, that subordinate legislation and administrative actions cannot override parent statutory prohibitions, and that public property cannot be bartered away to private entities under the guise of consolidation or exchange without statutory backing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether state land granted to a development authority under the Colonization of Government Lands Act 1912 can be lawfully exchanged with private or kabuli land?
  • Does the Malir Development Authority possess the statutory power under the Malir Development Authority Act 1993 to exchange state-granted tenancy land for scattered private land holdings outside approved master programs?
  • Whether a subordinate notification issued by a revenue authority contrary to the explicit provisions of a parent statute can create valid title or authority?
  • Can executive authorities and development bodies bypass mandatory statutory procedures for land disposal and convert public land transactions into private commercial schemes?
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• Syed Liaqat Shah vs Vice-Chancellor, University of Engineering and Technology, Peshawar and others2018 SCMR 1661 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-07-09
  contractual employmentmaster and servantdisciplinary inquirytermination of servicecontractual tenureadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a contractual Project Director at the University of Engineering and Technology, Peshawar, challenged his removal from service and the subsequent constitution of an inquiry committee against him, which followed a directive from the Chief Minister's Complaint and Redressal Cell. The Peshawar High Court dismissed his petitions, holding that his contractual tenure lacked legal protection, though it ordered that he be given an opportunity to be heard in the pending inquiry. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, addressing the core question of whether a contractual employee can be subject to an inquiry after being relieved of their duties. The Court held that the termination of a contractual employee does not preclude an inquiry into alleged wrongdoings committed during their tenure. The principle established is that while protected employees require disciplinary proceedings prior to termination, contractual employees governed by the 'master and servant' principle can be relieved of service first, with inquiries into their conduct commencing thereafter. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that credible information of wrongdoing from any source, including a provincial cell, can validly trigger an inquiry by the competent authority.

  Questions settled

  • Can an inquiry be conducted against a contractual employee after they have been relieved of their duties?
  • Does the termination of a contractual employee prevent the initiation of civil or criminal proceedings for wrongdoings committed during their tenure?
  • Is a contractual employee entitled to disciplinary proceedings prior to termination?
  • Can a competent authority initiate an inquiry based on information received from a provincial complaint cell regarding a federally funded project?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Liaqat Shah vs (1) Vice Chancellor, University of Engineering &2019 PLC (C.S.) 74, 2019 PLJ SC 203, 2018 SCMR 1661, 2018 SCMR 1661, 2018 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-07-09
  contractual employmentmaster and servantdisciplinary inquirycontractual terminationconstitutional petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by a contractual employee, a Project Director, against the dismissal of his constitutional petitions by the Peshawar High Court. The petitioner challenged his removal from service and the constitution of an inquiry committee to investigate allegations of wrongdoing during his tenure. The core legal question was whether a contractual employee, governed by the principle of master and servant, can be relieved of their duties and subsequently subjected to an inquiry for alleged misconduct, particularly when the project is federally funded. The Supreme Court held that the termination of a contractual employee does not preclude an inquiry into their performance or alleged wrongdoings. The Court affirmed that such employees do not enjoy protected tenure and can be relieved of their duties, with inquiries into their conduct proceeding thereafter. Furthermore, the Court established that credible information regarding wrongdoing from any source, including provincial bodies, can trigger a lawful inquiry by the competent authority. The petitions were dismissed, as the Court found no legal infirmity in the university's actions.

  Questions settled

  • Can a contractual employee be subjected to an inquiry for alleged wrongdoing after being relieved of their duties?
  • Does the termination of a contractual employee provide a defense against civil or criminal liability for actions taken during their tenure?
  • Is a federally funded project immune from inquiry proceedings initiated based on information from a provincial government complaint cell?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Asghar Hussain vs Muhammad Owais and others2018 SCMR 1720 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-07-23
  striking off defencetentative rent orderlandlord and tenant relationshiprent defaultleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arose from an order of the High Court of Sindh which maintained the Rent Controller's decision striking off the petitioner's defence under Section 16(2) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The petitioner contended that no landlord-tenant relationship existed, noting that a previous rent appeal had been withdrawn by the respondent with permission to file fresh proceedings. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner, despite disputing the relationship, chose not to comply with the tentative rent order passed under Section 16(1) of the Ordinance. The Court held that the proper course for a tenant disputing such a relationship is to comply with the tentative rent order under protest and contest the matter to its logical conclusion. By failing to comply, the petitioner forfeited his right of defence. Finding no factual or legal infirmity in the concurrent findings, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • What is the legal consequence if a tenant fails to comply with a tentative rent order passed under Section 16(1) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Can a tenant who denies the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship refuse to comply with a tentative rent order without risking the striking off of their defence?
  • What is the proper legal course for a tenant who wishes to contest a landlord-tenant relationship after a tentative rent order has been issued?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Ali Iqbal Hussain vs District Sessions Judge, Bahawalpur and others2018 SCMR 1009 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-09
  public appointmentmerit policyaudi alteram partemjudicial reviewrecruitment processcomplete justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside the petitioner's appointment as a driver. The core legal question was whether the High Court could interfere with an appointment based on a merit list that had not been challenged by other candidates, and whether the petitioner's appointment, which bypassed higher-scoring candidates, was legally sustainable. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, holding that the High Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction upon discovering a gross illegality and violation of merit policy in the recruitment process. The Court affirmed that the High Court is not precluded from taking cognizance of apparent illegality simply because no private party challenged the merit list. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the principle of audi alteram partem may be dispensed with where adherence to it would defeat the ends of justice and frustrate the legal process, particularly when the appointment was demonstrably based on a violation of merit, and the petitioner failed to demonstrate any lawful basis for his selection.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with an appointment based on a merit list if the list was not challenged by other candidates?
  • Under what circumstances can the rule of audi alteram partem be dispensed with in public appointment cases?
  • Does the Supreme Court of Pakistan have the authority to ensure complete justice even when procedural rules might otherwise suggest a remand?
  Read full judgment →
• Suo Motu Notice Taken in Court vs N/A2018 SCP 1097 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-28
  Suo Motupublic exchequerpre-poll rigginggovernment advertisementsmisuse of public fundspolitical self-projectionaccountability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a Suo Motu notice taken by the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the practice of Provincial Governments in Punjab, Sindh, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa utilizing public funds for advertisements that promote political figures and parties. The Court observed that these advertisements, ostensibly for public information, constitute self-projection and aggrandizement at the taxpayers' expense. The Court held that such expenditure is an improper use of public funds, potentially providing an unfair advantage to the ruling party in an election year and amounting to pre-poll rigging. To address this, the Court directed the Provincial Governments to submit detailed reports regarding expenditures incurred on these advertisements, including specific breakdowns of costs, the media houses involved, and the government departments responsible for the payments. The Court mandated that these reports be submitted within one week, signed by the respective Provincial Secretaries of Information, and countersigned by the Chief Secretaries, supported by sworn affidavits confirming the accuracy of the information provided to ensure transparency and accountability in the use of public resources.

  Questions settled

  • Does the use of public funds for government advertisements featuring political leaders constitute an unfair advantage in an election year?
  • Can the Supreme Court direct provincial governments to disclose expenditures related to media advertisements?
  • Is the expenditure of public funds on self-projection by government officials permissible under the principle of public accountability?
  Read full judgment →
• Suo Motu Case Re: the issue as to whether compounding of an offencePLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 102, 2018 PLD Supreme Court 703 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-06-27
  compounding of offencesacquittalTa'zirQisascriminal proceduresuo motuIslamic jurisprudencewaiver of offence
  Summary & questions settled

  This Suo Motu case addressed the legal consequences of compounding an offence under Section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, specifically whether such compounding results in a full acquittal or merely sets aside the sentence while maintaining the conviction. The Court examined whether the "effect of an acquittal" mentioned in Section 345(6) implies that the guilt of the accused persists. The Supreme Court held that a successful and complete compounding of a compoundable offence, particularly in cases of Ta'zir, results in an acquittal that erases, effaces, and obliterates the alleged or adjudged guilt of the accused. The Court clarified that the "effect of an acquittal" is synonymous with an acquittal, granting the accused all benefits and fruits of a lawful acquittal, including protection under the principle of autrefois acquit. The Court established that compounding is a legislative and Islamic concession for reconciliation, and once the court grants leave to compound, the resulting acquittal is absolute and honorable, purging the offender of the crime.

  Questions settled

  • Does the compounding of a compoundable offence under Section 345, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 result in an acquittal that erases the guilt of the accused?
  • Does an acquittal resulting from the compounding of an offence constitute an 'honourable' acquittal?
  • Can a court refuse to grant leave to compound an offence even if the parties have reached a compromise?
  • Does the phrase 'effect of an acquittal' in Section 345(6), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 differ in legal consequence from a standard acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Suo Motu Case No. 03 of 2017 vs N/A2018 SCP 1240 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-06-29
  compounding of offencescomposition of offenceeffect of acquittalwaiver and sulhtazirqisascriminal compromisesuo motu jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This suo motu matter addressed the core legal question of whether a successful and complete compounding of an offence under section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 leads to the complete acquittal of the accused or convict, or whether it merely has the effect of an acquittal while leaving the judicially determined guilt intact. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that a successful and complete compounding of a compoundable offence in a case of Ta'zir—with the permission or leave of the relevant court where required—results in the acquittal of the accused person or convict. The Court ruled that such an acquittal erases, effaces, obliterates, and washes away the alleged or already adjudged guilt, and carries all the benefits, fruits, and effects of a lawful acquittal, including setting aside any sentence or punishment. The key principle laid down is that compounding under the law goes beyond merely waiving punishment and operates to absolve the offender of the crime, vanishing the offence itself and leaving no subsisting finding of guilt.

  Questions settled

  • Does a successful and complete compounding of an offence under section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 result in the actual acquittal of the accused or does it only have the effect of an acquittal without wiping out the finding of guilt?
  • Whether the compounding of a compoundable offence under Ta'zir obliterates and erases the judicially determined guilt of the convict alongside setting aside the sentence?
  • Does the requirement of obtaining leave from the court under section 345(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 mean that the court must exercise judicial discretion rather than act in a mechanical manner when dealing with a compromise?
  • Whether an acquittal obtained on the basis of a compromise or compounding of an offence leaves any subsisting blemish or stigma regarding the guilt of the acquitted person for future purposes?
  Read full judgment →
• Suo Motu Action Taken Up in Court: In the matter of vs N/A2018 SCMR 574 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-01
  suo motu jurisdictionfundamental rightspublic importancetax evasionrecovery of national wealthforeign bank accounts
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a suo motu action initiated by the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the issue of Pakistani citizens holding undisclosed foreign bank accounts and assets, often linked to illegal channels, tax evasion, and potential kickbacks from public contracts. The Court observed that such activities constitute a drain on the national economy and a violation of citizens' fundamental rights, as these funds could otherwise be utilized for public welfare. The core legal question addressed is the Court's authority to intervene in matters of significant public importance involving the recovery of national wealth stashed abroad. Exercising its jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, the Court held that it has the power to direct state institutions to take concrete steps to identify these assets and facilitate their retrieval. The Court issued comprehensive directives to the State Bank of Pakistan, the Federal Board of Revenue, and other relevant state agencies to collaborate, utilize international agreements, and report on actions taken against individuals named in the Panama and Paradise Papers, emphasizing the state's obligation to protect national wealth.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority under Article 184(3) to direct state agencies to investigate undisclosed foreign assets held by Pakistani citizens?
  • Can the Supreme Court order state institutions to collaborate on the retrieval of national wealth allegedly stashed in foreign jurisdictions?
  Read full judgment →
• Suo Motu Action Taken Up in Court: In the matter of vs Not2018 CLD 472 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-01
  suo motu jurisdictionfundamental rightsforeign assetstax evasionnational wealthpublic importancePanama Papers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a suo motu action concerning the widespread practice of Pakistani citizens maintaining undisclosed foreign bank accounts and assets, potentially representing ill-gotten gains, kickbacks, or tax evasion, which the Court observed causes significant economic disparity and constitutes a plunder of national wealth. The core legal question addressed was the Court's authority to intervene in matters of public importance involving the potential violation of citizens' fundamental rights due to the siphoning of national wealth abroad. Exercising its jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, the Court held that the failure to address the illicit transfer of wealth and the lack of progress regarding disclosures in the Panama and Paradise Papers warranted judicial oversight. The Court directed the State Bank of Pakistan, the Federal Board of Revenue, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, and various intelligence and investigative agencies to collaborate, retrieve information through diplomatic and legal channels, and submit comprehensive reports on actions taken to identify and recover such assets. The holding emphasizes that the state has a duty to protect national resources for public welfare.

  Questions settled

  • Does the maintenance of undisclosed foreign accounts by citizens, potentially involving ill-gotten gains, constitute a matter of public importance justifying the invocation of Article 184(3) of the Constitution?
  • Can the Supreme Court direct state institutions to collaborate and retrieve information from foreign jurisdictions regarding undisclosed assets held by Pakistani citizens?
  Read full judgment →
• Suo Motu Action Taken Up in Court vs N/A2018 SCP 1069 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-01
  suo motuforeign accountstax evasionPanama PapersParadise Papersfundamental rightspublic importance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by way of a suo motu action regarding Pakistani citizens maintaining undisclosed foreign bank accounts and assets, including those revealed in the Panama Papers and Paradise Papers, allegedly representing illegal gains or tax evasion. The core legal question concerns whether the siphoning of national wealth abroad without tax payment constitutes a violation of the fundamental rights of citizens of Pakistan and a matter of public importance warranting the Court's intervention. The Court held that such actions bleed the national economy and violate fundamental rights. Consequently, the Court invoked its jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, and issued comprehensive directions to the State Bank of Pakistan, the Federal Board of Revenue, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, ministries, and intelligence agencies to submit reports, identify account holders, collaborate through international agreements, and take steps for the retrieval of stashed funds. The key principle laid down is that the illicit transfer of national wealth abroad is a matter of great public importance engaging fundamental rights, obligating state institutions to trace and retrieve such assets.

  Questions settled

  • Does the maintenance of undisclosed foreign bank accounts by Pakistani citizens constitute a matter of public importance involving the enforcement of fundamental rights?
  • Can the Supreme Court of Pakistan exercise jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution to direct state institutions to investigate and retrieve wealth siphoned off abroad?
  • What obligations are placed upon the State Bank of Pakistan and the Federal Board of Revenue regarding citizens identified in leaked documents like the Panama Papers and Paradise Papers?
  Read full judgment →
• Suo motu action regarding non-payment of retirement benefits by the relevant departments vs Secretary Privatization Commission and Others2018 PLC (C.S.) 692, 2018 PSC 576, 2018 SCMR 736, 2018 SCP 1095 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-27
  suo motupensionary benefitsprivatized banksminimum pensionright to lifedignity of manfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from suo motu proceedings before the Supreme Court of Pakistan following numerous complaints by retired employees of nationalized and privatized banks—United Bank Limited, Allied Bank Limited, and Habib Bank Limited—regarding inadequate and frozen monthly pensions. The central legal issue was whether paying retirees an extraordinarily nominal pension that fails to sustain basic living costs violates their fundamental rights to life and dignity under Articles 9 and 14 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Court held that while the entitlement to a pension must be earned, once perfected, receiving an illusory amount that subjects pensioners to impoverishment directly infringes their constitutional rights to life and human dignity. Encouraged by the Court, the respondent banks voluntarily offered a revised scheme without prejudice to their legal stances. Disposing of the proceedings, the Court directed that the minimum monthly pension for all eligible categories of retirees and surviving widows be set at Rs. 8,000 prospectively, with an automatic five percent annual increase effective on the first of January each year.

  Questions settled

  • Does paying an illusory pension to a retired employee violate the fundamental rights to life and dignity under Articles 9 and 14 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Are retired employees of privatized nationalized banks entitled to a minimum threshold of monthly pensionary benefits?
  • Does a perfected right to earn a pension entitle retirees to protection against severe financial impoverishment?
  Read full judgment →
• Suo Motu action regarding non-payment of retirement benefits by the relevant departments vs N_a2018 P.S.C. 576 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  pensionary benefitsfundamental rightsdignity of mansuo motuprivatized banksright to lifeminimum pension
  Summary & questions settled

  These suo motu proceedings were initiated following numerous complaints from retired employees of United Bank Limited, Allied Bank Limited, and Habib Bank Limited regarding stagnant, meager pensionary benefits. The core legal question addressed whether the Court could intervene to ensure a minimum living wage for pensioners, thereby protecting their fundamental rights to life and dignity under the Constitution, despite the banks' arguments concerning the maintainability of the petitions against privatized entities. The Court, while refraining from issuing a definitive ruling on the maintainability of the petitions or the amenability of privatized banks to writ jurisdiction, exercised its discretion to direct the banks to implement a minimum pension of Rs. 8,000 per month, with a 5% annual increase, based on the banks' voluntary offers. The key principle laid down is that while the right to pension may not be a fundamental right per se, forcing a pensioner to live on an illusory amount that prevents independent sustenance violates the fundamental rights to dignity and life under Articles 14 and 9 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Does the payment of an illusory pension that prevents a retiree from maintaining a dignified life violate the fundamental rights to life and dignity under the Constitution?
  • Can the Supreme Court exercise its jurisdiction to mandate a minimum pension threshold for employees of privatized banks?
  • Does the right to a reasonable pension become a vested right once an employee has fulfilled the requisite service criteria?
  Read full judgment →
• Suo Motu Action Regarding Non-Payment of Retirement Benefits by the Relevant Departments and Others_ In the matter of vs N_a2018 SCMR 736 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-13
  suo motupensionary benefitsprivatized banksfundamental rightsright to dignityright to lifeminimum wagemaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from suo motu proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court of Pakistan following numerous complaints regarding the non-payment and inadequacy of pensionary benefits by various departments and privatized banks, specifically United Bank Limited (UBL), Allied Bank Limited (ABL), and Habib Bank Limited (HBL). The core legal questions centered on whether the right to a reasonable pension, once earned, becomes a vested right protected under the fundamental rights to life and dignity under Articles 9 and 14 of the Constitution, and whether privatized banks remain liable for commitments made under statutory notifications prior to their privatization. The Court held that while the entitlement to a pension is not a fundamental right per se, once the right is perfected and earned, the pension paid must be of a level that allows retirees to live with dignity. Without formally deciding on the maintainability of writs against privatized banks, the Court, exercising its discretion and noting the banks' corporate social responsibility proposals, directed that the minimum pension for all categories of retirees of the three banks be enhanced to Rs. 8,000 per month prospectively, with a 5% annual increase.

  Questions settled

  • Does the payment of an illusory or extremely low pension to a retired employee violate the fundamental rights to life and dignity under Articles 9 and 14 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Can a privatized bank unilaterally reduce or freeze pensionary benefits that were established under government notifications prior to its privatization?
  • Are employees who were retrenched after completing the qualifying service period entitled to pensionary benefits despite the existence of a retrenchment scheme?
  Read full judgment →
• Suo motu action regarding maintaining of Foreign Currency Accounts by Pakistani Citizens without disclosing the same_paying taxes vs Government of Pakistan and others2018 SCP 1237 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-06-12
  suo motuforeign currency accountsundeclared foreign assetstax amnestycapital flightforeign exchange reservestax evasion
  Summary & questions settled

  This suo motu matter addressed the unregulated outflow of foreign exchange, accumulation of undeclared foreign assets by Pakistani citizens, and related tax evasion. The Supreme Court had appointed an expert committee to recommend legislative and executive measures to trace and retrieve such assets. The committee submitted a detailed report identifying ten major factors contributing to capital flight, including provisions of the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992, and the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and noted the promulgation of the Foreign Assets (Declaration and Repatriation) Act, 2018. The core legal and policy question revolved around addressing systemic economic vulnerabilities caused by capital outflows while ensuring appropriate legislative frameworks for tax compliance and asset recovery. The Court held that while it acknowledges and welcomes the legislative and regulatory steps taken by the Federal Government—such as the enactment of the Foreign Assets (Declaration and Repatriation) Act, 2018—it will not unilaterally adjudicate upon the legality of the scheme in the absence of a concrete challenge, recognizing its own limitations in fiscal and economic policy-making. The Court directed the government, Federal Board of Revenue, and State Bank of Pakistan to address remaining unaddressed deficiencies.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court unilaterally adjudicate upon the legality or propriety of a voluntary disclosure tax scheme in the absence of a concrete legal challenge?
  • What are the primary statutory and regulatory factors contributing to the unauthorized outflow of foreign exchange from Pakistan?
  • Whether the protections and immunities granted under the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992 facilitate the accumulation of undeclared foreign assets?
  Read full judgment →
• Suo Motu Action Regarding Maintaining of Foreign Currency2018 PLD Supreme Court 686 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-06-12
  Suo Motu jurisdictionforeign exchange reservesundeclared foreign assetstax amnestycapital flightfiscal policyeconomic stability
  Summary & questions settled

  This Suo Motu action was initiated to address the unregulated outflow of foreign exchange and the accumulation of undeclared foreign assets by Pakistani citizens, which adversely impacted national economic stability. The Court appointed a Committee of Experts to identify causes and recommend legislative and executive reforms. The core legal question concerned the adequacy of the existing regulatory framework in preventing capital flight and facilitating asset retrieval. The Court held that while it may intervene in matters of grave public interest, it would not unilaterally adjudicate the legality of fiscal legislation, such as the Foreign Assets (Declaration and Repatriation) Act, 2018, absent a concrete legal challenge. The Court welcomed the government's legislative and regulatory initiatives, including restrictions on cash feeding of foreign currency accounts, but directed the authorities to address the remaining deficiencies identified by the Committee. The principle established is that the Court will not sit in academic judgment on economic policy or fiscal legislation, deferring to the executive while maintaining oversight on matters of national economic priority.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to adjudicate the legality of fiscal legislation in the absence of a concrete challenge?
  • Can the Supreme Court sit in academic judgment on the propriety of voluntary disclosure schemes for foreign assets?
  • What is the scope of the Supreme Court's intervention in matters of national economic policy and foreign exchange reserves?
  Read full judgment →
• Suo Moto vs Private Medical Colleges2018 SCP 1055 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-12
  suo motuprivate medical collegesfee refundadmissions merit listillegal constructionsstay ordersLahore Development Authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a suo motu proceeding concerning private medical colleges, fee structures, admissions, and related urban issues. The core legal questions involve the regulatory compliance of private medical colleges, the refund of exorbitant fees, admissions in unaligned or newly affiliated colleges, and the issuance of stay orders against enforcement actions by the Lahore Development Authority regarding unauthorized marriage and function halls. The Supreme Court of Pakistan issued various interim directions, including the constitution of an inspection committee for a medical college, orders requiring private medical colleges to respond to fee refund applications filed with the University of Health Sciences within three days, and directions to submit lists of admitted candidates and merit lists. Additionally, the Court addressed civil miscellaneous applications and directed that courts granting interim relief against Lahore Development Authority notices concerning unauthorized constructions must consider the nature of the present proceedings. The key principle laid down is that judicial restraint and institutional oversight must be exercised when interim orders are sought against lawful enforcement actions authorized or supervised by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Can private medical colleges be directed to respond within a specified timeframe to fee refund applications filed by parents?
  • Whether courts granting interim relief against notices issued by the Lahore Development Authority must consider the nature of ongoing proceedings before the Supreme Court?
  • What are the requirements for the submission of admission and merit lists by private medical colleges to the Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Suo Moto Case vs N/A2018 KLR Supreme Court Cases 281, 2018 P.S.C. 1446, 2018 SCP 1185 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-04-25
  suo motoright to informationPEMRAfundamental rightsmedia regulationstatutory appointmentfreedom of press
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a suo moto proceeding regarding the regulation of media channels and the failure of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) to address complaints of legal violations and service interruptions. The core legal questions involve the enforcement of fundamental rights, specifically the right to information, and the administrative failure to appoint a Chairman for PEMRA as previously directed by the Court. The Court expressed dismay at the lack of substantive action taken by PEMRA against media channels violating the law, characterizing existing measures as cosmetic. The Court held that the fundamental right to information under Article 19A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 must be strictly enforced, ensuring that all media channels and newspapers remain accessible to citizens. Furthermore, the Court reiterated its prior directive for the immediate appointment of the Chairman of PEMRA, demanding the production of the Search Committee's report. The principle established is that regulatory bodies must actively enforce legal compliance and protect constitutional rights, and that administrative delays in statutory appointments, particularly when ordered by the Court, are unacceptable and subject to potential accountability.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a regulatory body like PEMRA to take substantive action against media violations constitute a breach of its mandate?
  • Is the right to information under Article 19A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 enforceable against state interference with media distribution?
  • Can the Court compel the appointment of a statutory head, such as the Chairman of PEMRA, when previous directives have been ignored?
  Read full judgment →
• Suo Moto Case vs Mr. Talal Chaudhry2019 PLJ SC 62, 2018 SCP 1280 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-08-02
  suo moto contemptfreedom of speechscandalizing the courtjudicial restraintcontempt of courtcontempt proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This suo moto matter concerns contempt of court proceedings initiated against a political figure, Talal Chaudhry, following derogatory speeches made against the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal questions addressed whether the Chief Justice could unilaterally initiate contempt proceedings, whether the right to freedom of speech under Article 19 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 protects such remarks, and whether the charge and show cause notice were legally sufficient. The Court held that the Chief Justice possesses the authority to initiate contempt proceedings, and that freedom of speech is subject to reasonable restrictions, including the law of contempt. The Court found the respondent guilty of scandalizing the judiciary and bringing the Court into ridicule, thereby undermining the administration of justice. The respondent was sentenced to imprisonment until the rising of the Court and a fine of Rs. 100,000. The judgment establishes that contempt law is a necessary public policy tool to maintain the efficacy of judicial institutions and that judicial restraint is not a universal principle applicable to all instances of institutional abuse.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Chief Justice of Pakistan unilaterally initiate suo moto contempt proceedings without a full bench?
  • Is the right to freedom of speech under Article 19 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 absolute, or is it subject to the law of contempt?
  • Does the burden of proving that a speech was taken out of context rest upon the alleged contemnor?
  • Is the principle of judicial restraint a universal requirement that prevents the Court from punishing contemptuous conduct?
  Read full judgment →
• Suo Moto Action Regarding Islamabad -Rawalpindi Sit-in (Dharna) Case2018 SCP 1044 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-03Read full judgment →
• Sudhir Ahmad and others vs The Speaker, Balochistan Provincial Assembly2018 P.S.C. 224 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  deputationabsorptionrepatriationcivil servantsservice rulesseniorityout of turn appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals, converted and heard as review petitions, arose from the Balochistan High Court judgment dismissing the appellants' Constitution Petitions regarding their repatriation to their parent departments. The core legal questions involved the legality of appointing civil servants or employees on deputation and subsequently absorbing them into different departments or autonomous bodies without following the prescribed statutory rules and methods of recruitment. The Supreme Court held that appointments by absorption or deputation that deviate from governing service rules and statutory provisions, which exclusively provide for initial recruitment or promotion, are illegal and cannot be sustained. The ratio decidendi is that back-door entries and unauthorized absorptions of public servants into departments where no such rules permit them violate established legal norms, merit, and transparency. The key principles laid down include that public offices cannot be dolled out through arbitrary interventions without open competition, and employees absorbed against rules must be repatriated to their parent departments, save where a competent judicial determination conclusively establishes their lawful employment status.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee appointed on deputation can be legally absorbed into a department where the relevant service rules do not provide for appointment by absorption?
  • Can a civil servant holding a non-cadre post be absorbed against a cadre post in another department?
  • Whether the repatriation of public servants who were irregularly absorbed without following prescribed recruitment rules is lawful?
  • Does a judgment of a Service Tribunal upheld by the Supreme Court create a binding determination of an employee's parent department that cannot be arbitrarily disturbed?
  Read full judgment →
• State through Prosecutor-General, Punjab vs Jahangir Akhtar and others2018 PLC (C.S.) 577, 2018 SCMR 733 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-17
  double jeopardypremature acquittaldisciplinary proceedingscriminal prosecutionSection 249-A CrPCArticle 13 ConstitutionSection 403 CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose out of orders acquitting the respondents under Section 249-A Cr.P.C. The respondents allegedly obtained police employment using fake and forged School Leaving Certificates, resulting in compulsory retirement from service and criminal prosecution via FIRs. The trial court acquitted the respondents on the premise that departmental compulsory retirement barred criminal prosecution under the doctrine of double jeopardy pursuant to Article 13(a) of the Constitution and Section 403 Cr.P.C., which decision was affirmed by the High Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the acquittals, holding that departmental disciplinary proceedings and criminal prosecutions are distinct in nature and purpose, and can proceed simultaneously or sequentially without violating double jeopardy principles. Furthermore, the court held that Section 249-A Cr.P.C. can only be invoked if the charge is groundless or there is no probability of conviction, neither of which was established below. The status of the respondents as accused was restored for trial according to law.

  Questions settled

  • Does departmental compulsory retirement bar subsequent criminal prosecution for the same matter under the principle of double jeopardy?
  • Can departmental disciplinary proceedings and criminal prosecution against a public servant proceed simultaneously or sequentially?
  • Under what specific circumstances may a trial court invoke Section 249-A Cr.P.C. to acquit an accused person?
  Read full judgment →
• State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan vs Sami-Ur-Rehman and others2018 SCMR 443 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-28
  ejectment petitionhanding over of possessionsublettingrent defaultwaiver by conductcorporate veillandlord-tenant relationship
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that reversed an order for the ejectment of tenants from commercial premises. The core legal questions concern whether the conversion of a sole proprietorship into a private limited company and the subsequent transfer of business operations to that company constitutes "handing over of possession" under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979, and whether the landlord waived its right to eject by accepting rent. The Supreme Court held that the tenant’s unilateral conversion of the business into a separate legal entity and the resulting transfer of possession to that entity without the landlord’s consent constitutes "handing over of possession" under Section 15(2)(iii)(a) of the Ordinance. The Court affirmed that a company is a distinct legal entity from its directors; thus, parting with possession to such an entity exposes the tenant to eviction. Additionally, the Court ruled that acceptance of rent due to omission does not constitute a waiver of the right to eject, and rent deposited by an unauthorized entity does not satisfy the tenant's obligation, establishing grounds for default.

  Questions settled

  • Does the conversion of a sole proprietorship into a private limited company and the transfer of business operations to that company constitute "handing over of possession" under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  • Is a private limited company a distinct legal entity from its directors for the purpose of determining if a tenant has parted with possession of rented premises?
  • Does the acceptance of rent by a landlord through omission or ignorance constitute a waiver of the right to seek ejectment on the ground of unauthorized handing over of possession?
  • Can rent deposited with a Rent Controller by an unauthorized entity satisfy the tenant's obligation to pay rent to avoid default?
  Read full judgment →
• State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan and another vs Messrs2018 SCMR 581 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-28
  fair rentSindh Rented Premises Ordinanceper square feet rentlump sum rentrent controller jurisdictionperiodic rent increasecommercial tenancy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from appeals concerning the fixation of fair rent under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The appellant-landlord had initiated proceedings in 1992 seeking to increase the rent of a commercial shop on a per-square-foot basis, citing prevailing market rates and increased taxes. The Rent Controller and Appellate Court fixed a lump-sum rent, refusing to calculate it on a per-square-foot basis because the original agreement was for a lump-sum amount. The High Court partially accepted the landlord's writ petition, increasing the lump-sum rent and directing a 25% increase every three years. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that an agreement for lump-sum rent does not restrict the Rent Controller's jurisdiction to fix fair rent on a per-square-foot basis in accordance with prevailing market norms. The Court further held that under Section 9 of the Ordinance, subsequent inflation and economic conditions justify a periodic percentage increase to prevent multiplicity of litigation. The Supreme Court allowed the landlord's appeal, fixing the fair rent on a per-square-foot basis with a 25% increase every three years.

  Questions settled

  • Does an agreement between a landlord and tenant to pay rent in a lump sum bar the Rent Controller from fixing fair rent on a per-square-foot basis?
  • Can the Rent Controller or appellate courts ignore evidence of prevailing market rent of similar premises solely because the subject building is older than the comparison buildings?
  • Whether a court can direct a periodic percentage increase in fair rent under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, to account for inflation and prevent a multiplicity of litigation during long-pending cases?
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• State Bank of Pakistan through Chief Manager, Peshawar and another vs Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan and others2018 CLD 177, 2018 PLD Supreme Court 52 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-10-27
  winding updelinquent directorsstatutory regulatorspromotersmisfeasanceliquidation proceedingspenal statutesstrict constructionState Bank of PakistanSecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from liquidation proceedings involving Islamic Investment Bank Limited (IIBL), where official liquidators and depositors filed applications seeking to hold the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) and the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) liable under Sections 412 and 413 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 for failure to properly regulate and supervise IIBL. The High Court rejected SBP and SECP's objections to maintainability, holding that as regulatory bodies, they fell within the definition of 'promoters' involved in the 'promotion' of the company. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, reversing the High Court's judgments. The Supreme Court held that regulatory authorities and central banks cannot be categorized as promoters or entities carrying on the business of a company under Sections 412 and 413. As penal provisions, these sections must be strictly construed. Statutory regulators acting in their supervisory capacity do not owe fiduciary duties as promoters, nor can they be held liable for misfeasance, breach of trust, or fraudulent trading without specific allegations and evidence of personal misapplication of corporate funds or property.

  Questions settled

  • Can statutory regulatory authorities such as SBP and SECP be categorized as promoters under Section 412 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984?
  • Whether regulatory bodies can be held liable under Sections 412 and 413 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 for statutory negligence in supervisory duties?
  • How should penal provisions under company law regarding offences antecedent to winding up be interpreted?
  • Are dictionaries the primary source for interpreting legal terms when constructing a statute?
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• Speaker, National Assembly of Pakistan, Islamabad and others vs Habib Akram and others2018 PLD Supreme Court 678 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-06-06
  Nomination FormsElections Act 2017Representation of the People Act 1976Candidate DisclosureInterim ReliefConstitutional InterpretationArticles 62 and 63Election TransparencyAffidavitGeneral Elections 2018
  Summary & questions settled

  This case involves appeals challenging a Lahore High Court judgment concerning the disclosure requirements in Nomination Forms for candidates for National and Provincial Assemblies under the Elections Act, 2017, as compared to the repealed Representation of the People Act, 1976. Key issues included the maintainability of appeals without prior Intra Court Appeals, the locus standi of the Speaker, National Assembly, and the interpretation of Articles 62, 63, 218-222 of the Constitution regarding candidate qualifications. As an interim measure, the Supreme Court directed all candidates to file a detailed affidavit disclosing additional information previously required under the 1976 Act but omitted in the 2017 Act. This decision was made to ensure greater transparency, facilitate the determination of candidate qualifications, and enable the electorate to make informed choices for the General Elections 2018. Failure to submit this affidavit would render nomination papers incomplete and subject to rejection, with false declarations entailing legal penalties.

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• Slackness in the Progress of Pending Enqu Iries Relating to Fake Bank2018 SCMR 1851 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-05
  suo motu noticeJoint Investigation Teammoney launderingfake bank accountsfinancial investigationconstitutional jurisdictionArticle 184(3)
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a suo motu notice taken by the Supreme Court concerning inquiries into fake bank accounts and suspected money laundering involving significant sums of money. The Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) reported that investigations were being hampered by the complexity of the financial data, a lack of specialized investigative expertise, and interference from influential figures. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court possesses the jurisdiction to constitute a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) to conduct an effective probe in such circumstances. The Court held that it has ample jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, to appoint a JIT in appropriate cases. It determined that technical inability to handle complex financial investigations and the necessity to protect national wealth justify such intervention. Consequently, the Court constituted a high-powered JIT comprising experts from various state institutions to ensure a transparent and incisive investigation, while also directing that security be provided to the investigators to prevent obstruction and intimidation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have the jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution to constitute a Joint Investigation Team?
  • Can technical inability to conduct complex financial investigations justify the formation of a Joint Investigation Team by the Court?
  • Does the existence of an ongoing investigation by a statutory agency preclude the Supreme Court from appointing a Joint Investigation Team?
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• Siraj Ahmed through LRs vs Faysal Bank Limited and others2018 PLD Supreme Court 91 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-08
  execution proceedingscourt auctionreserve priceprocedural irregularitiescollusive salemiscarriage of justicebanking court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld the dismissal of objections to an auction sale in execution proceedings. The core legal question was whether the auction proceedings, which suffered from procedural irregularities—including the failure to fix a reserve price, inadequate publicity, and the conduct of the auction at the decree-holder's premises—could be sustained. The Supreme Court held that the auction was neither fair nor transparent, noting that the property was sold at a throwaway price in violation of mandatory procedural requirements. The Court emphasized that technicalities should not be used to defeat substantive rights and that courts must guard against collusive auctions. The ratio established is that where an auction process is replete with procedural flaws and lacks transparency, the court must intervene to prevent manifest fraud and miscarriage of justice, even if the judgment debtor has not strictly complied with all procedural timelines, as the substance of justice prevails over mere technical form.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to fix a reserve price in a court-ordered auction invalidate the sale?
  • Can an auction sale be set aside if the auction process lacks transparency and proper publicity?
  • Should technical procedural objections prevail over the substantive rights of parties in execution proceedings?
  • Does an auction conducted at the premises of the decree-holder rather than the property location render the sale suspect?
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• Siraj Ahmed through LRs vs Faysal Bank Limited & others2018 SCP 1139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-03-21
  execution proceedingsauction salereserve pricefraudulent auctionprocedural irregularitydecreetal amountright of first refusal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing an appeal relating to execution proceedings in a bank recovery suit. The core legal question concerns the legality and transparency of property auction proceedings conducted in execution of a money decree, particularly regarding the mandatory requirements of proclamation, fixation of reserve price, and fair valuation. The Supreme Court held that the auction proceedings were replete with fatal procedural flaws, including the failure to fix a reserve price, lack of proper advertisement, and holding the auction on the premises of the decree-holder bank rather than the property site, resulting in a collusive sale at a throwaway price. The Court laid down that procedural technicalities cannot be permitted to defeat substantive justice, and that courts must jealously guard against clever maneuverings designed to dispose of a judgment debtor's property for a paltry sum through compromised or non-transparent auctions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an auction sale conducted in execution of a decree can be sustained in the absence of a fixed reserve price and proper public notice?
  • Does holding an execution auction on the premises of the decree-holder bank render the auction suspect?
  • Can technicalities and periods of limitation be used to uphold a property auction tainted by material procedural flaws and manifest unfairness?
  • What remedies are available to an auction purchaser when a court-ordered execution auction is set aside due to procedural irregularities?
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• Siraj Ahmed through L.Rs, vs Faysal Bank Limited & others2018 PLJ SC 215 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-08
  execution proceedingsauction salereserve pricethrowaway priceprocedural irregularitybanking courtsubstantive justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal concerning execution proceedings. Faysal Bank Limited obtained a recovery decree against the petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, leading to execution and subsequent auction of agricultural property. The petitioner challenged the auction on grounds of procedural flaws, non-fixation of reserve price, lack of proper publicity, and that the auction was held at the bank's premises rather than the property location, resulting in a sale at a throwaway price. The core legal questions involve whether execution auctions conducted with severe procedural irregularities and lack of transparency can be sustained, and whether technicalities should override substantive justice. The Supreme Court held that the auction proceedings were replete with fatal flaws, lacked fairness, and resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The Court set aside the impugned judgment, remanded the matter to the executing Court for a fresh auction in accordance with law, and laid down the principle that execution sales must be transparent, adequately publicized, and guarded against collusive manoeuvres to ensure properties fetch their fair value.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an execution auction conducted without fixing a reserve price and proper publicity is sustainable in the eyes of law?
  • Can technicalities be allowed to defeat substantive rights and prevent a court from remedying a fraudulent or defective auction sale?
  • What is the effect of holding property auction proceedings at the premises of the decree-holder bank instead of the location of the property?
  • Whether an auction sale conducted in violation of mandatory procedural requirements under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 warrants setting aside by the court?
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• Sindh Rural Support Organization (Srso) vs Federation of Pakistan2018 SCMR 407 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-20
  Auditor-General of PakistanConstitutional auditPublic fundsSubstantially financed bodiesConsolidated FundStatutory auditAccountability
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a non-profit organization registered under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, challenged a High Court judgment upholding a notice from the Auditor-General of Pakistan requiring an audit of its accounts. The core legal question was whether an entity receiving substantial funding from the Provincial Government, though not established by the government, is subject to the audit jurisdiction of the Auditor-General of Pakistan under the Constitution and relevant statutes. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Auditor-General possesses the constitutional and statutory mandate to audit bodies "substantially financed" by loans or grants from the Consolidated Fund of the Federation or Provinces. The Court established the principle that the Auditor-General’s mandate extends beyond entities directly established by the government to include any body substantially financed—defined as receiving 50% or more of its expenditure or at least five million rupees—by public funds. This constitutional audit serves a distinct purpose from standard statutory corporate audits, ensuring transparency and accountability for public funds utilized by private entities for public welfare programs.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Auditor-General of Pakistan have the authority to audit a private entity that is substantially financed by government grants?
  • What constitutes a 'substantially financed body' for the purpose of audit by the Auditor-General of Pakistan?
  • Does the constitutional mandate of the Auditor-General to audit public funds supersede the statutory audit requirements of a company?
  • Can the Auditor-General of Pakistan audit an organization that is not established by the Federal or Provincial Government?
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• Sher Alam Khan vs Abdul Munim and others2018 PLD Supreme Court 449, 2018 P.S.C. 763 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-23
  disqualification of MPApre-election disqualificationconstitutional petitionwrit of quo warrantoElection Commission of Pakistan jurisdictionArticles 62 and 63 of ConstitutionArticle 113 of ConstitutionArticle 184(3) of ConstitutionRepresentation of the People Act, 1976false declaration
  Summary & questions settled

  This Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that allowed a Constitutional Petition, setting aside an Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) order de-notifying a Member of Provincial Assembly (MPA). The core legal questions concerned the applicability of Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution to Provincial Assembly members, the ECP's jurisdiction to de-notify a returned candidate after the statutory 60-day period, and the scope of constitutional jurisdiction (quo warranto) in cases of pre-election disqualification. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and set aside the High Court's judgment, thereby reviving the ECP's de-notification order. The Court held that Articles 62 and 63 apply to Provincial Assembly members via Article 113 of the Constitution. It found the respondent disqualified under Article 63(1)(k) for being a government employee within two years of contesting elections and not qualified under Article 62(1)(f) for making a false declaration. The Court affirmed its power to convert proceedings into suo motu under Article 184(3) of the Constitution to ensure disqualified persons do not remain in legislative bodies, emphasizing the fundamental right of the people to be governed by qualified representatives.

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• Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed and Others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs and others2018 SCP 1092 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-21
  Party HeaddisqualificationArticle 62Article 63Election Act 2017political partyconstitutional interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the constitutional validity of provisions within the Election Act, 2017 regarding the eligibility of a 'Party Head' of a political party. The core legal question was whether a person disqualified from being a Member of Parliament under Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 could simultaneously hold the position of 'Party Head' and exercise powers under Article 63-A. The Supreme Court held that the Election Act, 2017 must be read, construed, and interpreted subject to the qualifications and disqualifications prescribed in Articles 62, 63, and 63-A of the Constitution. The Court laid down the principle that any person suffering from a lack of qualification under Article 62 or a disqualification under Article 63 is debarred from holding the position of 'Party Head' and prohibited from exercising any powers associated with that capacity. Consequently, all actions, orders, and documents issued by a disqualified person acting as Party Head are declared void in the eyes of the law, and the Election Commission of Pakistan is mandated to remove such persons from party records.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person disqualified under Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 hold the position of 'Party Head' of a political party?
  • Are the provisions of the Election Act 2017 subject to the qualifications and disqualifications prescribed by the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • What is the legal status of actions taken by a Party Head after their disqualification under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Shaukat Ullah Khan Bangash vs Adil Tiwana, etc.2018 P.S.C. 757 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-08
  review petitionspecific performanceequitable reliefcompensationreturn of earnest money
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a review petition seeking modification of a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan which had declined specific performance of a contract. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to interest or compensation on sums paid in part performance of the contract and utilized by the respondent for nearly two decades, as well as amounts deposited in court during litigation. The court held that while specific performance was rightly declined, it would be unjust to leave the petitioner uncompensated for the prolonged use of his funds. The court modified its earlier judgment to award a lump sum of Rs. 50,00,000/- over and above the returned principal amount to satisfy the equities of the case. The key principle laid down is that when equitable relief of specific performance is declined, the court must balance equities by compensating a party whose substantial funds were retained and utilized by the opposing party for a prolonged period.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party is entitled to compensation or interest on sums paid in part performance of a contract when specific performance is declined?
  • Can an omission to award compensation for funds utilized during prolonged litigation constitute an error on the face of the record warranting review?
  • How are equities balanced when denying specific performance of a contract where substantial funds remained with the opposing party for decades?
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• Shaukat Ullah Khan Bangash vs Adil Tiwana and others2018 PSC 757, 2018 SCMR 769 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-08
  specific performancereview petitionequitable reliefcontract lawinterest on capitalrestitution
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition was filed against the Supreme Court's judgment that declined the specific performance of a contract. The petitioner argued that the court failed to award interest on the substantial sums paid to the respondent and deposited in court, which the respondent had utilized for nearly two decades. The petitioner contended that equity required compensation for the loss of use of these funds, especially given the finality of the trial court's order condoning the delay in depositing securities. The Supreme Court held that while the denial of specific performance was maintained, it was unjust to leave the petitioner without compensation for the long-term deprivation of their capital. The Court applied equitable principles, determining that the petitioner was entitled to interest on the amounts held by the respondent and the court. Consequently, the Court modified its earlier judgment to award a lump sum of Rs. 50,000,000 as compensation, establishing the principle that when specific performance is denied, the court must balance equities by ensuring the party who paid the consideration is compensated for the loss of use of their capital.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court award interest on funds held by a respondent when specific performance of a contract is denied?
  • Does the denial of specific performance of a contract preclude the court from granting equitable compensation to the party who paid the consideration?
  • Is a party entitled to compensation for the loss of use of funds deposited in court pursuant to a previous judgment that is later reviewed?
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• Shaukat Ali vs Election Commission of Pakistan through Secretary, Islamabad and others2019 PLJ SC 85, 2019 P.S.C. 1167, 2018 SCMR 2086 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-26
  electionsre-pollwomen's suffragepositive discriminationvires of statuteElection Commission of Pakistanconstitutional interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged an order of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) directing a re-poll in a constituency due to low female voter turnout, arguing that Section 9(1) of the Elections Act 2017, which permits such re-polls, violates the constitutional principles of equality and non-discrimination. The core legal question was whether Section 9(1) is ultra vires the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the provision is intra vires, affirming that it constitutes a permissible form of positive discrimination. The Court reasoned that Article 25(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 explicitly empowers the State to make special provisions for the protection of women, thereby validating measures aimed at ensuring their electoral participation. The Court further clarified that re-polls under this section are not automatic but require ECP satisfaction and justification, rendering the appellant's argument regarding the possibility of infinite re-polls merely theoretical. Consequently, the Court upheld the ECP's authority to order re-polls to safeguard women's constitutional right to vote.

  Questions settled

  • Is Section 9(1) of the Elections Act 2017 unconstitutional for violating the principle of equality under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 permit positive discrimination in favor of women in the electoral process?
  • Can the Election Commission of Pakistan order a re-poll based on the presumption that women were restrained from voting when turnout is below 10%?
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• Sharjeel Inam Memon vs National Accountability Bureau2018 SCMR 2023 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-08-31
  post-arrest bailmedical groundsbail on medical groundsunder-trial prisonerspecialized treatmentjudicial custody
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged a High Court order dismissing the petitioner's post-arrest bail application on medical grounds. The petitioner, previously denied bail on merits, sought release citing serious medical conditions requiring specialized treatment. The Supreme Court reviewed various medical reports, including those from the Jinnah Postgraduate Medical Centre and the Agha Khan University Hospital, which indicated that while the petitioner required physiotherapy and hydrotherapy, his condition was not life-threatening or disabling. The Court observed that the petitioner's medical evidence, including MRI reports, did not substantiate the necessity for the surgical intervention previously claimed. Relying on established principles, the Court held that the purpose of bail on medical grounds is to facilitate necessary medical treatment or surgical intervention, not to grant liberty until the trial's conclusion. Finding no merit in the claim that the petitioner's detention was hazardous to his life or that he required immediate release for treatment, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that medical bail is a temporary concession contingent on the necessity of treatment, not a permanent entitlement.

  Questions settled

  • What is the primary purpose of granting post-arrest bail on medical grounds?
  • Does the grant of bail on medical grounds entitle an accused to remain at liberty until the conclusion of the trial?
  • Can bail granted on medical grounds be withdrawn or cancelled once the prisoner recovers from the ailment?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail on medical grounds if the required treatment can be provided through hospital visits while remaining in judicial custody?
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• Shakeel Ahmad Siddiqui vs Muhammad Nauman Siddiqui and others2018 SCMR 511 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-18
  de novo trialremand of casecriminal appealappellate reappraisalprocedural lacunaconviction and sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges an order passed by the Lahore High Court whereby a case involving charges under sections 302 and 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 was remanded to the trial court for a de novo trial. The core legal question revolves around the legality and justification of remanding a fully tried criminal case for a de novo trial without pointing out any procedural lacunae. The Supreme Court held that since the trial court had conducted a full-fledged trial, recorded statements of prosecution witnesses, examined the accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and recorded defence evidence, the High Court's order remanding the case without valid reasons was not sustainable in law. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that an appellate court cannot order a de novo trial without identifying concrete procedural defects or legal justifications in the trial court proceedings, and must instead decide the appeal on the available evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can remand a criminal case for a de novo trial without identifying any procedural lacuna in the trial court proceedings?
  • Is an order of de novo trial sustainable when the trial court has already conducted a full-fledged trial and recorded evidence?
  • How should the High Court deal with a criminal appeal and capital sentence reference when the trial has been lawfully concluded?
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• Shahid Hussain vs State and another2018 PLJ SC 813 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-02
  post-arrest bailfurther enquiryinvestigation reportinnocence in investigationmurder casebail
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, which refused post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a murder case registered under Sections 302, 109, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the findings of the police investigation. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner had been found innocent during the investigation, no recovery was made at his instance, and a discharge report had been submitted, despite the Magistrate's disagreement. Furthermore, the Court noted that the co-accused were also declared innocent and were not arrested. Consequently, the Court held that the case against the petitioner fell within the ambit of 'further enquiry' under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, converted the petition into an appeal, and granted post-arrest bail to the appellant subject to the furnishing of bail bonds, establishing that investigation findings of innocence can constitute grounds for further enquiry justifying bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does a police finding of innocence during investigation constitute grounds for further enquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is bail appropriate when the prosecution's investigation report declares the accused innocent and recommends discharge?
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• Shahid Anwar Bajwa vs S.M. Asif and others2018 KLR Supreme Court Cases 295, 2018 PLD Supreme Court 337, PLJ 2018 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-25
  retired judgelegal practiceconstitutional interpretationjudicial independencebar on practiceArticle 207professional conduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns whether a retired permanent Judge of a High Court is constitutionally barred from practicing as a counsel before the same High Court. The appellant, a retired Judge of the High Court of Sindh, challenged a decision prohibiting him from appearing before that Court, arguing that the omission of specific language in Article 207(3)(b) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, compared to the 1956 Constitution, removed the restriction on practicing before the High Court where he served. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the constitutional bar remains effective. The Court reasoned that the restriction is designed to maintain judicial independence, preserve the dignity of the judicial office, and prevent potential embarrassment to both the retired Judge and the sitting bench. Interpreting the legislative intent, the Court affirmed that the prohibition against pleading or acting within the jurisdiction of the High Court includes the High Court itself. The Court emphasized that such regulatory restrictions on legal practice are valid and do not violate fundamental rights, aligning with common law principles observed in other jurisdictions.

  Questions settled

  • Does Article 207(3)(b) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 prohibit a retired permanent Judge of a High Court from practicing as a counsel before the same High Court?
  • Is the restriction on a retired High Court Judge practicing before the same Court a violation of fundamental rights?
  • Does the omission of the phrase 'that Court' in Article 207(3)(b) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, compared to the 1956 Constitution, allow a retired Judge to practice before the High Court where they served?
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• Senator Nehal Hashmi vs N/A2018 SCP 1081 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-01
  contempt of courtcriminal contemptunconditional apologyjudicial independencedisqualification of member of parliamentpanama papers casethreats to judges
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves contempt of court proceedings initiated against Senator Nehal Hashmi following a public speech delivered on May 28, 2017, wherein he launched a severe verbal assault and issued explicit threats against the Judges of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and members of the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) constituted in the Panama Papers case. The core legal question was whether the respondent's public statements constituted contempt of court under Article 204 of the Constitution of Pakistan and the Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003, and whether a belated, unconditional apology tendered after contesting the proceedings warranted acquittal. The Supreme Court held that the respondent's speech deliberately obstructed, interfered with, and prejudiced the due course of judicial proceedings, bringing the judiciary into ridicule and disrepute. The Court ruled that a belated apology offered at the fag end of trial does not merit automatic acceptance, though it may mitigate the sentence. The respondent was convicted of contempt, sentenced to simple imprisonment along with a fine, and consequently disqualified from being a member of Parliament for five years pursuant to Article 63(1)(g) of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Does a public speech threatening judges and members of an investigative team constitute contempt of court?
  • Is an unconditional apology tendered at the belated stage of a trial automatically accepted by the court?
  • Does a conviction for contempt of court result in the disqualification of a member of Parliament under Article 63(1)(g) of the Constitution of Pakistan?
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• Secretary, Housing and Physical Environmental Planning and Phe2018 SCMR 301 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-10-11
  allotment of state landpublic propertymarket pricepast and closed transactionland disposaljudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment directing the implementation of an allotment order for a plot of land in favor of the respondent, Muhammad Ramzan. The core legal question was whether the respondent was entitled to the allotment at the price prevailing in 1991, when the initial allotment order was passed, or at the current market price. The Supreme Court held that while the allotment itself was valid and upheld by previous judicial findings, the respondent could not claim the land at the 1991 price. The Court reasoned that the transfer of state land was not a "past and closed transaction" as no payment had been made nor possession taken. Consequently, the Court affirmed the allotment but directed that the respondent must pay the current market price. The key principle laid down is that public property cannot be treated as a bounty; its disposal must adhere to prescribed procedures, and in the absence of a completed transfer, the state is not bound by historical pricing, ensuring the protection of public assets.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party claim the allotment of state land at a historical price if the transfer was not finalized?
  • Does the doctrine of 'past and closed transaction' apply to an allotment of state land where no payment has been made and possession has not been delivered?
  • Is the disposal of state land subject to the market price prevailing at the time of actual transfer?
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• Secretary, Housing & Physical Environmental Planning and the Department, Govt of Punjab and others vs Muhammad Ramzan and others2018 PLJ SC 307, 2018 SCMR 301 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-10-11
  allotment of state landmarket pricespecific performancehousing schemepublic propertyallotment cancellationstate bounty
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment directing the implementation of a 1991 order for the allotment of a plot to the respondent, Muhammad Ramzan. The core legal question was whether the respondent was entitled to the plot at the 1991 market price, given the long delay in implementation caused by the department's failure to execute the allotment. The Supreme Court held that while the respondent's right to the allotment was established and upheld by previous judicial forums, the state cannot 'dole out' land as a bounty. The Court determined that since the respondent had not yet made any payment for the land, he was not entitled to the 1991 price. The principle laid down is that where a final order of transfer has not been executed and no payment made, the allottee must pay the current market price of the land, as state property must be disposed of within the parameters of the law and not at the whims of functionaries.

  Questions settled

  • Can an allottee of state land claim the price prevailing at the time of an original allotment order if the order was not implemented for many years?
  • Is the disposal of state land considered a bounty that can be granted at the whims of state functionaries?
  • Does a change in law or policy regarding the disposal of state land have retrospective application?
  • When does a right to the transfer of property become a vested right?
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