Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muhammad Hanif Abbasi vs Jahangir Khan Tareen and others2018 PLD Supreme Court 114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-10-15
  disqualificationMember of National AssemblyArticle 62(1)(f)honestyoffshore companyasset declarationuntrue statementinsider tradingagricultural income taxwritten-off loansquo-warrantobeneficial ownershiptrustSecurities and Exchange Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned a petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution seeking the disqualification of a Member of the National Assembly (MNA) on grounds of dishonesty and misdeclaration. The core legal questions involved whether the respondent was dishonest due to alleged insider trading, non-disclosure of an offshore company and property, misrepresentation of agricultural income, and written-off bank loans, thereby violating Articles 62(1)(f) and 63(1)(n) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court rejected the preliminary objection regarding the petition's maintainability. The Court held that the respondent's settlement with the SECP concerning insider trading, being a "without prejudice" offer and not leading to criminal prosecution, did not constitute dishonesty. Allegations of agricultural income tax misrepresentation were deemed sub judice before other forums, and the Court declined to adjudicate them. The claim regarding written-off loans was also dismissed as the loans pertained to a period before the respondent became a director. However, the Court found that the respondent was the true beneficial owner of "Hyde House," a property held through an offshore company (Shiny View Limited), which he failed to declare in his nomination papers. Furthermore, his statement denying beneficial interest in the trust arrangement was found to be untrue, as the trust deed showed him as a "discretionary lifetime beneficiary." Consequently, the Court declared the respondent not to be an "honest" person under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution and Section 99(1)(f) of ROPA, leading to his disqualification and cessation of membership in the National Assembly.

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• Muhammad Hanif Abbasi vs Imran Khan Niazi and others2018 P.S.C. 41 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-15
  quo-warrantodisqualificationdishonestyasset concealmentoffshore companyforeign fundingpolitical parties ordertax amnestybenami transaction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan sought a declaration that respondent Imran Khan Niazi was disqualified from being a member of the National Assembly on allegations of concealing assets, making false declarations regarding party funding under the Political Parties Order 2002, and failing to disclose an offshore company and property transactions. The core legal questions involved whether the respondent's political party received prohibited foreign funding, whether the respondent made false declarations in certificates submitted to the Election Commission of Pakistan, and whether non-disclosure of foreign assets and offshore entities warranted disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the Election Commission of Pakistan is the proper forum to determine prohibited funding questions, that the respondent's offshore company Niazi Services Limited was a shell company holding a declared London flat, and that the financial trail for the Banigala property and the tax amnesty declarations were lawful and fully accounted for. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition, ruling that the respondent did not make willful misdeclarations or conceal assets to attract disqualification.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Election Commission of Pakistan is the exclusive forum to determine questions regarding prohibited funding to political parties under Article 6 of the Political Parties Order 2002?
  • Does the non-disclosure of an offshore shell company that holds no independent assets apart from a previously declared property amount to concealment of assets under election laws?
  • Whether an individual who avails a tax amnesty scheme under Section 59D of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 receives complete immunity from past tax defaults and non-disclosures?
  • What constitutes the necessary element of 'dishonesty' required to attract disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Whether proceedings under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan permit the court to adopt an inquisitorial approach and grant latitude to parties to produce historical documentary evidence?
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• Muhammad Asif vs The State2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 65 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-18
  criminal appealmurder convictionappreciation of evidencecredibility of witnessesfalsus in uno falsus in omnibusindivisibility of credibilitymedical evidenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a conviction for murder, questioning whether the testimony of eye-witnesses, who were previously disbelieved regarding co-accused in the same transaction, can sustain a conviction without independent corroboration. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant. The Court held that the prosecution witnesses were unreliable due to their unnatural conduct, specifically their unexplained presence at the crime scene during a dark night and their failure to intervene. Furthermore, the prosecution withheld independent witnesses, warranting an adverse inference. The Court emphasized the principle of indivisibility of credibility, ruling that once witnesses are disbelieved regarding one accused, their testimony cannot be relied upon for others without strong, independent, and unimpeachable corroboration, which was absent here. Additionally, the medical evidence contradicted the prosecution's timeline, and the recovery of the weapon was deemed suspicious. The Court laid down that police must ensure forensic evidence, such as blood-stained items, is properly analyzed by a serologist to establish a link, and that withholding best evidence undermines the prosecution's case.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of prosecution witnesses be relied upon for the conviction of an accused if those same witnesses were disbelieved regarding co-accused in the same transaction?
  • Does the failure to produce independent witnesses who were present at the scene warrant an adverse inference against the prosecution?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the medical evidence contradicts the prosecution's established time of occurrence?
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• Muhammad Alam vs State through Prosecutor General Punjab, etc2018 PLJ SC 600 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-02
  criminal appealacquittalbenefit of doubtdelayed FIRinterested witnessessupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the acquittal of Respondent No. 2 by the High Court in a criminal case. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court was justified in extending the benefit of doubt and acquitting the accused based on an implausible motive, delayed FIR, planted related eye-witnesses, doubtful recovery, and co-accused acquittal. The Supreme Court held that the conclusions reached by the High Court were unexceptionable, given the significant gaps and infirmities in the prosecution's case. The court laid down that where the prosecution fails to establish a plausible motive through independent evidence, delays the FIR, and relies on related witnesses with suspicious recoveries, the extension of the benefit of doubt leading to acquittal is legally sound and warrants no interference. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether acquittal based on the benefit of doubt is sustainable when the prosecution fails to establish its motive through independent evidence?
  • Does a significant delay in lodging the FIR give rise to an inference of consultation and fabrication?
  • Can a recovery made from an open place like a bush near the place of occurrence be attributed to the exclusive custody of an accused?
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• Muhammad Ajmal vs The State and another2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 253 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-02
  pre-trial stagecross-examinationmedical expertjurisdictionremandcriminal procedureevidence admissibility
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which was dismissed by the Lahore High Court. The case originated from an FIR registered under Sections 337-A and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, where an injured victim subsequently died nearly a year after the incident. The Special Judicial Magistrate, at a pre-trial stage and without commencing a proper trial, recorded the incomplete examination-in-chief of a medical expert and, based on court questions, concluded that an offence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was made out. The Magistrate then forwarded the case to the Sessions Court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the Magistrate's procedure of recording incomplete medical evidence without allowing cross-examination violated Articles 132 and 133 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984. The Court emphasized that under Section 347 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, a Magistrate can only refer a case to the Sessions Court after the commencement of trial and proper appraisal of evidence. The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgments and remanded the case to the Trial Magistrate.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Magistrate record the statement of a medical expert at a pre-trial stage without providing the accused the right of cross-examination?
  • At what stage of the proceedings can a Magistrate exercise powers under Section 347 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to refer a case to the Court of Session?
  • Does an incomplete statement of a witness recorded in violation of Articles 132 and 133 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 possess any legal worth in judicial proceedings?
  • Can a Magistrate disregard a binding order of a revisional court regarding the mode of trial and determination of offences?
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• Muhammad Ajmal and others vs The State and another2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 253, 2018 SCMR 141 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-02
  jurisdictionMagistrate's powersreferral to Sessions Courtcriminal procedureevidence lawexamination of witnessescross-examinationQanun-e-Shahadat OrderCr.P.C.murdergrievous hurt
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court heard a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing a petition under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. The core legal question concerned the procedure adopted by a Special Judicial Magistrate, empowered under Sections 30 and 34 Cr.P.C., who, after the victim's death, recorded an incomplete statement of a medical expert (without cross-examination) and then referred the case to the Sessions Court under Section 193 Cr.P.C., concluding that Section 302 PPC was attracted. The Supreme Court held that the Magistrate's procedure was illegal and in disregard of mandatory provisions of law. The Court emphasized that the criminal justice system's three phases (investigation, inquiry, trial) have distinct jurisdictions. A Magistrate can only exercise powers under Section 347 Cr.P.C. to refer a case to the Sessions Court *after* recording evidence during the trial, if a different, exclusively triable offence is constituted. The law of evidence (Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, Articles 132 and 133) mandates proper examination of witnesses, including cross-examination, which cannot be bypassed. The Court set aside all impugned judgments and remanded the case to the Trial Magistrate to proceed in accordance with the law.

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• Muhammad Adnan vs The StatePLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 144, 2018 SCP 1309, 2018 PLD Supreme Court 823 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-15
  juvenile justicenarcotic drugscriminal appealfair trialpolice investigationchild rightsexpeditious trialbail
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, involving a juvenile offender. The core legal questions concern whether the prosecution established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt and whether the trial court failed to fulfill its statutory duty to protect the interests of a minor. The Supreme Court set aside the conviction, holding that the prosecution’s case was fundamentally flawed due to negligent investigation, unreliable witness testimony, and the trial court’s failure to consider the appellant's status as a child. The Court established the principle that juvenile courts must actively protect the interests of child offenders, including formulating specific points for determination regarding their capacity and understanding. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that trial delays for juveniles constitute grounds for bail under the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000. Consequently, the Court directed that juvenile trials be concluded expeditiously and that appeals filed by juvenile convicts be prioritized by High Courts, mandating that such cases be highlighted on file covers to prevent the prolonged incarceration of minors.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a juvenile court to consider the age and capacity of a minor accused constitute a legal error?
  • Is the delay in the conclusion of a juvenile's trial a valid ground for release on bail under the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000?
  • Are High Courts required to prioritize the hearing of appeals filed by juvenile convicts?
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• Muhammad Adnan son of Khadim Hussain vs The State2018 SCP 1309 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-28
  juvenile justicenarcotic drugsburden of proofinept investigationexpeditious trialreasonable doubtcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the conviction of a juvenile appellant for drug trafficking under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The appellant, a minor at the time of the incident, was convicted based on unreliable police testimony and a flawed investigation that failed to establish ownership of the vehicle or the narcotics. The Trial Court and the High Court both failed to consider the appellant's juvenile status or the lack of evidence, treating him as an adult. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, noting the investigation was inept and the police appeared to be shielding actual perpetrators. The conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted. The Court emphasized that Juvenile Courts must protect the interests of children, formulate points for determination, and ensure expeditious trials. It further directed that juvenile trials and appeals be prioritized across all courts to prevent the prolonged incarceration of minors resulting from procedural delays and judicial oversight.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a Juvenile Court to formulate points for determination regarding a minor's capacity and status constitute a legal error?
  • Is the delay in concluding a juvenile's trial a valid ground for release on bail under the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance 2000?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution relies solely on unreliable witnesses and fails to investigate the ownership of the vehicle used in the alleged crime?
  • Are courts required to prioritize the hearing and disposal of appeals filed by juvenile convicts?
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• Muhammad Abid vs The State and another2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 1081, PLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 132, 2018 PLD Supreme Court 813 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-10
  circumstantial evidencelast seen togetherbenefit of the doubtkidnapping for ransommurderputrefactionmedical jurisprudencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal arising from an unwitnessed murder case where a nine-year-old child was killed, and his body recovered in an advanced stage of putrefaction alongside allegations of kidnapping for ransom. The trial court convicted the appellant under sections 365-A and 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, which convictions were upheld by the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the circumstantial evidence, specifically the 'last seen together' theory, the alleged recovery of ransom money, and the motive, formed an unbroken chain of events sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the continuous chain of events, noting glaring inconsistencies in the time of death based on medical jurisprudence, lack of connectivity of telephone calls regarding ransom, and unverified recovery of currency notes. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant on the benefit of the doubt, laying down that the theory of last seen together requires strict adherence to proximity, small time gaps, absence of third-party interference, and robust corroborative evidence incompatible with innocence.

  Questions settled

  • What are the foundational principles and requirements for the 'last seen together' theory to be used as reliable circumstantial evidence in a criminal trial?
  • Does the mere circumstance of the deceased being last seen in the company of the accused suffice to sustain a murder charge without additional corroborative evidence?
  • How does the medical evidence regarding the stage of putrefaction impact the determination of the exact time of death in unwitnessed murder cases?
  • What is the evidentiary value of the recovery of a ransom amount when the currency notes were not marked or signed by a Magistrate and call data records lack connectivity to the accused?
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• Muhammad Abbas vs The State and others2018 SCMR 397 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-28
  criminal appealdeath penaltymitigating circumstancessectarian violencesentencing discretioncommon intentionmurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of the appellant for the murder of six individuals in a sectarian incident, for which the trial court and the High Court had concurrently imposed the death penalty on six counts. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the death sentences were appropriate given the specific role attributed to the appellant. Upon review, the Court upheld the convictions, finding the evidence of guilt sufficient. However, regarding the sentencing, the Court observed that no eyewitness testimony alleged the appellant had fired any shots or caused any injuries; rather, he was merely present at the scene. Furthermore, the recovered firearm was never connected to the crime. Consequently, the Court held that the maximum penalty of death was not warranted. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal regarding the convictions but partially allowed it regarding the sentences, converting the death sentences to imprisonment for life on each count, while also modifying the fines and compensation orders to be more proportionate to the circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Can a death sentence be commuted to life imprisonment where the accused's role was limited to presence at the scene without causing specific injury?
  • Is the appellate court empowered to reduce fines and compensation amounts imposed by a trial court if they are found to be excessive?
  • Does the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to sentences of imprisonment for life?
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• Mst. Yawar Azhar Waheed (deceased) through LRs, vs Khalid Hussain2018 SCMR 76, 2018 PLJ SC 345 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-10-24
  Cantonment Boardcommercializationresidential land usemaster planpermanent injunctionstatutory dutyland administration
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment decreeing a suit for permanent injunction against the commercialization of a residential plot in a Cantonment area. The core legal question was whether a Cantonment Board possesses the authority to unilaterally permit the conversion of a residential plot into a commercial site, specifically for a school, in violation of the established master plan and original allotment conditions. The Supreme Court held that the Cantonment Board acted illegally by allowing such conversion, as it is bound by the master plan, relevant laws, and its statutory obligations to maintain the residential character of the area. The Court emphasized that Cantonment Boards cannot prioritize revenue generation over the welfare of residents or ignore the binding nature of initial allotment covenants. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the Court directed the Secretary of Defence to ensure the gradual removal of unauthorized commercial structures in Cantonment residential areas across Pakistan to restore their original intended use, strictly enforcing compliance with the master plan and applicable bylaws.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Cantonment Board unilaterally convert residential land to commercial use in violation of a master plan?
  • Is a Cantonment Board bound by the original allotment conditions of a plot regarding its usage?
  • Does the commercialization of residential areas in Cantonments by the Board violate statutory obligations?
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• Mst. Yawar Azhar Waheed (Deceased) through LRs vs Khalid Hussain2018 SCMR 76 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-10-24
  cantonment boardland use conversionmaster planresidential vs commercialstatutory dutypermanent injunctionallotment conditions
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that upheld a decree prohibiting the commercial use of a residential plot within a Cantonment area. The core legal question concerns the authority of a Cantonment Board to unilaterally permit the conversion of residential land to commercial use, specifically for operating a school, in contravention of the original allotment conditions, the established master plan, and statutory regulations. The Supreme Court held that once a master plan is notified and a plot is allotted for residential purposes, the Cantonment Board lacks the authority to unilaterally alter the land use. The Court emphasized that such commercialization, driven by financial gain, violates the Cantonment Board's statutory duties to maintain residential environments and public welfare. The ratio established is that Cantonment Boards are bound by the master plan and statutory provisions, and cannot permit commercial activities in residential zones to the detriment of residents' rights. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal and directed the authorities to remove unauthorized commercial constructions in Cantonment areas nationwide to restore their original residential status.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Cantonment Board unilaterally alter a master plan to permit commercial use of a residential plot?
  • Does the Cantonment Board have the authority to convert residential land to commercial use in violation of original allotment conditions?
  • Are Cantonment Boards legally obligated to maintain residential areas for their designated purpose under the Cantonment Board Act 1924?
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• Mst. Yawar Azhar Waheed (decd.) thr. LRs. vs Khalid Hussain etc.2018 SCP 1160 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-03-21
  Cantonment Boardmaster planland use conversionresidential areacommercializationstatutory dutyallotment conditions
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment regarding the unauthorized conversion of a residential plot into a commercial school within a Cantonment area. The core legal question was whether a Cantonment Board possesses the authority to unilaterally alter a master plan and ignore original allotment conditions restricting land use to residential purposes for financial gain. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision that the commercialization was illegal. The Court held that Cantonment Boards, as statutory bodies, are bound by the law, rules, and the notified master plan. Once a master plan is established and a plot is allotted with specific residential conditions, the Board lacks the authority to unilaterally change the land use. The judgment established the principle that Cantonment Boards cannot prioritize revenue generation over the welfare, health, and security of residents. Furthermore, the Court directed the relevant authorities to remove unauthorized commercial structures in residential areas across Pakistan to restore the original master plan, emphasizing that statutory duties must be upheld over arbitrary administrative actions.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Cantonment Board unilaterally alter a notified master plan to allow commercial use of residential land?
  • Does a Cantonment Board have the authority to ignore original allotment conditions restricting a plot to residential use?
  • Is a Cantonment Board legally permitted to prioritize revenue generation over the welfare and master plan requirements of residents?
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• Mst. Sumaira Malik vs Malik Umar Aslam Awan and others2018 SCMR 1432, 2018 SCP 1243 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-06-29
  review petitionelection petitiondisqualificationstandard of proofArticle 84 QSOimpersonationforensic evidencereturned candidate
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition arose from an election matter wherein the returned candidate's election from NA-69 (Khushab-I) was set aside and she was disqualified by the Supreme Court on the ground that her B.A. degree had been obtained through impersonation, based on the Court's visual comparison of photographs and signatures under Article 84 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (QSO). The core legal questions pertained to the applicable standard of proof in election disqualification cases and the safety of relying solely on judicial visual comparison under Article 84 QSO to establish fraud or impersonation. The Supreme Court allowed the review petition and set aside the review judgment, holding that the standard of proof in election matters involving corrupt practice or disqualification is higher than the civil balance of probabilities, requiring positive, affirmative evidence excluding reasonable hypotheses favoring the returned candidate. The Court laid down that relying on visual comparison under Article 84 QSO to disqualify a candidate without seeking expert forensic evaluation is unsafe and constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record, especially where subsequent forensic expert examination disproves impersonation.

  Questions settled

  • What is the standard of proof required to establish disqualification or corrupt practices against a returned candidate in an election matter?
  • Can a court or election tribunal rely solely on its own visual comparison under Article 84 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 to declare an election candidate disqualified for impersonation?
  • Under what circumstances does a failure to refer disputed documents for expert forensic examination constitute an error apparent on the face of the record warranting review?
  • Is a visual comparison of photographs or signatures under Article 84 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 permissible if it operates in favor of the returned candidate?
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• Mst. Saeeda Bano Siddiqui vs Cantonment Executive Officer, Cantonment Board Malir, Karachi2018 SCMR 1616 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-08-05
  Cantonment Boardcommercializationresidential leasezoningadministrative decisionland policypremium payment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment dismissing the petitioner's request to commercialize her residential plot within the Malir Cantonment area. The petitioner had previously been granted opportunities to commercialize her property but failed to pay the required premium within the extended deadlines, which expired on March 7, 2008. Subsequently, a revised policy was implemented, and the petitioner's 2010 application was rejected because her property did not fall within the designated commercial zone. The core legal question was whether the petitioner possessed an enforceable right to commercialization despite failing to meet payment deadlines and being situated outside the approved commercial zone. The Supreme Court held that commercialization is an administrative decision, not an inherent right. Since the petitioner failed to avail the concessions within the stipulated time and her property was outside the designated commercial zone, the refusal was lawful. The Court affirmed that parity cannot be claimed with other plots situated within valid commercial zones, thereby upholding the High Court's dismissal of the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a lessee claim commercialization of a residential property as a matter of right?
  • Does the failure to pay the required premium within the stipulated time period result in the lapse of a commercialization offer?
  • Can a property owner claim parity with other plots for commercialization if their property falls outside the designated commercial zone?
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• Mst. Ravida vs Amjad and others2019 P.S.C (Crl.) 638, 2018 SCMR 28 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-10-13
  cancellation of bailabscondencemurderperverse orderprima facie casecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for the cancellation of bail granted by the Peshawar High Court to the respondents, who were accused in a murder case registered under Section 302 and Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court exercised its discretion judicially in granting bail despite the presence of incriminating evidence and the respondents' prolonged abscondence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's order was perverse, as it ignored material evidence connecting the accused to the crime. The Court observed that the FIR was lodged promptly, assigning specific roles to the respondents, and that the medical evidence corroborated the prosecution's version. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the respondents' unexplained abscondence for fifteen months was a significant factor weighing against the grant of bail. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order, and recalled the bail granted to the respondents, reaffirming that bail should not be granted when there is prima facie evidence of guilt and a history of abscondence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the unexplained abscondence of an accused for a significant period justify the cancellation of bail?
  • Can a bail order be set aside if it ignores material evidence connecting the accused to the crime?
  • Does a prompt FIR minimize the chances of false implication in a murder case?
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• Mst. Nazia Anwar vs The State, etc.PLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 355, 2018 SCMR 911, 2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-13
  murderdeath sentencecommutation of sentencemotivebenefit of doubtcriminal appealocular evidenceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the murder of her friend, Mst. Fahmeeda Bibi, under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerned whether the evidence, particularly the unproven motive and inherent obscurities in the prosecution's narrative, warranted the capital punishment imposed by the lower courts. The Supreme Court, by a majority, upheld the conviction but commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life. The Court held that while the appellant's guilt was established, the prosecution failed to prove the alleged motive—a loan dispute—which remained uncorroborated and contradictory. The Court laid down the principle that when the prosecution asserts a motive but fails to prove it, such failure may mitigate the sentence of death. Furthermore, where the prosecution's story contains significant mysteries or inherent obscurities regarding the circumstances of the crime, the Court must exercise caution and is justified in withholding the death penalty in favor of life imprisonment, extending the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove the alleged motive warrant the commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Can a conviction be maintained when the prosecution's narrative contains inherent obscurities and mysteries?
  • Is the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to a convict whose death sentence is commuted to life imprisonment?
  • Does the High Court have an obligatory duty under Section 375 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to record evidence when the prosecution's story is incomplete or doubtful?
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• Mst. Nazia Anwar vs The State and others2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 284, 2018 SCMR 911 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-13
  murderdeath sentence reductionunproven motivemitigating circumstancesappraisal of evidencecriminal appealbenefit of doubtimprisonment for life
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant was convicted by the trial court under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of her friend and sentenced to death, which conviction and sentence were upheld by the High Court. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court by a majority of two to one dismissed the appeal regarding the conviction but partly allowed it regarding the sentence, reducing the death penalty to imprisonment for life. The majority held that while the appellant's involvement was established, the prosecution's failure to prove the alleged motive of a financial dispute, coupled with inherent obscurities in the prosecution's narrative, warranted withholding the death sentence. A dissenting opinion favored a complete acquittal based on numerous doubts and the unproven nature of the prosecution's case. The key principle laid down is that when the prosecution asserts a motive for a murder charge but fails to prove it, such failure may serve as a mitigating circumstance to react against the imposition of the death penalty.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove an asserted motive in a murder case serve as a valid mitigating circumstance to reduce a sentence of death to imprisonment for life?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and the High Court regarding guilt can be maintained while altering the sentence on grounds of evidentiary obscurities?
  • Can an accused person be acquitted of a capital charge on the basis of probabilities and reasonable doubts arising from the prosecution's narrative?
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• Mst. Laiba Sultan vs Muhammad Nawaz and others2018 PLD Supreme Court 79 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-29
  child custodyGuardian and Ward Courtwelfare of the minorhabeas corpussummary jurisdictionminor's welfarecustody dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a custody dispute between a mother, an Afghan refugee, and her husband regarding their two minor children. The petitioner challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed her application under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which sought the recovery and custody of the minors. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly declined to exercise its summary jurisdiction in a habeas corpus-style petition regarding child custody, given the children's expressed aversion to the mother and concerns regarding her status as a refugee. The Supreme Court upheld the decision to relegate the parties to the Guardian and Ward Court. The Court held that summary proceedings under Section 491 are not the appropriate forum for determining complex custody disputes involving the welfare of minors, which require the recording of evidence. The key principle laid down is that the welfare of the minor is the paramount consideration in custody matters, and such disputes are best resolved by the specialized Guardian and Ward Court, which can properly assess evidence and ensure the children's long-term well-being.

  Questions settled

  • Is a petition under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 the appropriate remedy for determining the permanent custody of minor children?
  • Can the High Court decline to exercise summary jurisdiction in a child custody matter if the welfare of the minors is better served by a Guardian and Ward Court?
  • Should a court consider the expressed aversion of minor children towards a parent when determining interim custody arrangements?
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• Mrs. Khalida Azhar vs Viqar Rustam Bakhshi and others2018 SCP 1346 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-12-08
  inheritance disputegift deedgift mutationagricultural landmesne profitspartition suitproof of gift
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a suit for declaration and partition filed by the appellant regarding the estate of her late father. The core legal questions concerned the validity of a registered gift deed transferring a house and the validity of gift mutations transferring agricultural lands to the respondent. The Supreme Court held that the registered gift deed regarding the house was valid, as the appellant failed to impeach its authenticity despite a lapse of twenty-six years, and other legal heirs corroborated the transaction. Conversely, the Court held that the gift mutations regarding agricultural lands were invalid. It established the principle that mere mutation entries in revenue records do not constitute proof of a valid gift. To establish a gift of agricultural land, the beneficiary must independently prove the essential ingredients of a valid gift under Islamic law: a clear offer, acceptance, and the actual delivery of possession. As the respondent failed to prove these elements or the authenticity of the mutation process, the Court ordered partition of the agricultural lands and payment of mesne profits to the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mutation entry in revenue records alone constitute sufficient proof of a valid gift of agricultural land?
  • What are the essential ingredients required to prove a valid gift under Islamic law?
  • Can a registered gift deed be challenged after a significant lapse of time without evidence impeaching its execution?
  • Is a party entitled to mesne profits when a claim for inheritance in agricultural land is upheld?
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• Mr. Ashtar Ausaf Ali, Agp and Others vs Mr. Arif Nizami, Channel 24 and Others2018 SCP 1062 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-28
  criminal investigationmedia ethicsjudicial inquirypolice custodyfair trialcontempt of courtpublic interest litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the ongoing investigation into a criminal case involving the accused, Imran Ali, who was remanded to police custody. The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed concerns regarding the safety of the accused, directing the Inspector General of Police Punjab to ensure his protection. The Court further ordered the Inspector General of Police Punjab to provide profiles of police officers posted in jurisdictions where similar incidents occurred over the last five years. Addressing media conduct, the Court restrained the victim's family, their counsel, and media personnel from holding press conferences or participating in talk shows regarding the incident to prevent interference with a fair investigation. Furthermore, the Court investigated allegations made by Dr. Shahid Masood regarding the accused's financial status, specifically claims of multiple bank accounts, which were refuted by a State Bank of Pakistan report. Consequently, the Court constituted a high-level Inquiry Committee, headed by the Director General of the Federal Investigation Agency, to probe the veracity of Dr. Shahid Masood's allegations and submit a report within 30 days.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court restrain media personnel and private parties from discussing an ongoing criminal investigation in the media?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to constitute an inquiry committee to investigate allegations made by a media personality regarding a criminal case?
  • Is the Supreme Court empowered to direct the Inspector General of Police to provide personnel profiles for administrative review in relation to criminal incidents?
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• Mst. Asia Bibi vs The State etc2018 SCP 1322 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-31
  blasphemycapital punishmentbenefit of the doubtextra-judicial confessioncontradictions in evidencedelay in FIRfair trialcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction and death sentence of the appellant, Mst. Asia Bibi, under Section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code for allegedly uttering derogatory remarks against the Holy Prophet Muhammad. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution successfully proved the charges beyond a reasonable doubt given the inordinate delay in lodging the First Information Report, material contradictions in ocular and extra-judicial testimony, and suppressed facts regarding a preceding altercation over water. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the lower courts' judgments, and acquitted the appellant by giving her the benefit of the doubt. The Court laid down the principle that in criminal cases, particularly those involving capital punishment and serious religious allegations, the prosecution must strictly prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and any material contradictions, unexplained delays, or false implications arising from personal grudges or suppressed initial disputes entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an inordinate and unexplained delay in lodging the First Information Report undermines the prosecution's case in a criminal trial?
  • Can a conviction for a capital offence like blasphemy be sustained solely on fragile extra-judicial confessions made in an intimidating public gathering?
  • Whether the failure of the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt through consistent and unimpeachable evidence entitles the accused to an acquittal?
  • Does the principle that un-rebutted statements amount to admissions apply in criminal proceedings regarding the burden of proof?
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• Mirjam Aberras Lehdeaho vs SHO, PS Chung, Lahore & others2018 SCP 1110 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-03-21
  habeas corpuschild custodyguardianshipparental jurisdictionminor's welfareex parte orderinterim custody
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing a habeas corpus petition regarding the custody of two minor children. The core legal questions addressed were the maintainability of a father’s application for guardianship under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, and whether a High Court may exercise jurisdiction under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, to restore custody when proceedings are pending before a Guardian Court. The Supreme Court held that while a natural guardian may seek a guardianship certificate, such proceedings cannot be used to facilitate deceit or unlawful detention. The Court found the High Court erred in dismissing the habeas corpus petition, noting that Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 jurisdiction is not ousted by the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. Consequently, the Court set aside the ex parte guardianship order and restored the children's custody to the mother as an interim measure. The key principle laid down is that in exceptional cases involving the welfare of minors, courts must exercise parental jurisdiction to prevent harm, prioritizing the minor's best interest over procedural technicalities.

  Questions settled

  • Is a father, as a natural guardian, barred from seeking a formal guardianship certificate under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890?
  • Does the pendency of proceedings before a Guardian Court oust the High Court's jurisdiction to entertain a habeas corpus petition under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the Supreme Court invoke its parental jurisdiction to restore a minor's custody to a parent pending final adjudication by a Guardian Court?
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• Mirjam Aberras Lehdeaho vs SHO, Police Station Chung, Lahore and others2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 113, 2018 SCMR 427 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-24
  habeas corpuscustody of minorsguardianshipex-parte orderwelfare of the minornatural guardianSection 491 Cr.P.C.parental jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Finnish national and mother of two minors, sought leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing her habeas corpus petition. The children, who were Canadian citizens, were brought to Pakistan by their father (Respondent No. 2) for a short visit but were subsequently detained through deceptive legal maneuvers. The father had obtained an ex-parte guardianship order from a Guardian Court by concealing the mother's actual address and the children's residency status. The Supreme Court addressed whether a father as a natural guardian can seek a guardianship certificate and whether a habeas corpus petition under Section 491 Cr.P.C. is maintainable during the pendency of guardianship proceedings. The Court held that while a father may seek such certificates, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 491 Cr.P.C. is not ousted by the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, especially in exceptional cases involving trickery or urgent welfare concerns. Emphasizing the 'best interest of the child' and respecting the minors' expressed wishes to return to Canada for education, the Court set aside the ex-parte guardianship order and directed the restoration of interim custody to the mother.

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• Mirjam Aberras Lehdeaho vs S.H.O., PS Chung, Lahore and others2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 113 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-24
  habeas corpuscustody of minorsguardianshipinterim custodyparental jurisdictionwelfare of the minorex-parte order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition by the Lahore High Court, which sought the recovery of two minor children from their father. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of a guardianship petition by a natural guardian, the maintainability of a habeas corpus petition under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 while guardianship proceedings are pending, and the scope of the High Court's jurisdiction in such custody disputes. The Supreme Court held that while a natural guardian is not barred from seeking a guardianship declaration, the father’s ex-parte order was obtained through deceit and manipulation. Crucially, the Court ruled that Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 serve distinct purposes and are not mutually exclusive. The High Court erred by abdicating its jurisdiction; it possesses the authority to grant interim custody in exceptional cases to safeguard a minor's welfare. Consequently, the Court set aside the ex-parte guardianship order and restored interim custody to the mother.

  Questions settled

  • Is a natural guardian barred from seeking a declaration of guardianship under the Guardians and Wards Act 1890?
  • Does the pendency of proceedings before a Guardian Court oust the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the High Court grant interim custody of a minor to a parent pending final adjudication by a Guardian Court?
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• Mian Gul vs Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation and another2018 PSC 739, 2018 KLR Supreme Court Cases 117 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-23
  back benefitssuperannuationservice terminationreinstatementupgradationsupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by a retired employee of Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation seeking further back benefits and promotion up to grade PG-VII after having been reinstated into service pursuant to a 1991 labor tribunal order. The petitioner retired on superannuation in 2006 and subsequently engaged in multiple rounds of litigation before the High Court regarding the computation of his back benefits and upgradation. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to further arrears and grade advancements beyond those already granted and settled to his satisfaction in earlier proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any entitlement to grade PG-VII or further benefits, noting that a subsequent 2008 CBA agreement was inapplicable to him as he had already retired in 2006, and that he had previously expressed satisfaction with the compliance report and calculations submitted by the employer. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused.

  Questions settled

  • Is a retired employee entitled to the benefits of a collective bargaining agreement executed after the date of his superannuation?
  • Can a petitioner reopen settled claims regarding back benefits after expressing satisfaction with the employer's compliance report before the High Court?
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• Messrs Wak Limited Multan Road, Lahore vs Collector Central Excise2018 SCMR 1474 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-03-20
  sales taxmandatory vs directorylarger benchjudicial precedenttax liabilityleave to appealper incuriam
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition for leave to appeal involving disputes under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The petitioner raised three primary contentions: first, that the disposal of cylinders did not attract sales tax under Section 3; second, that the time limits for passing orders under the proviso to Section 36(3) are mandatory, rendering late orders void; and third, that legal questions not raised before the High Court under Section 47 could still be raised before the Supreme Court if they arise from the Tribunal's judgment. The Supreme Court observed a conflict in judicial precedents regarding whether a subsequent bench of equal strength can deviate from earlier decisions without referring the matter to a larger bench. The Court also expressed a prima facie view that Section 36(3) is directory rather than mandatory, as it lacks penal consequences for non-compliance and aims for expeditious disposal rather than tax extinguishment. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal and requested the Chief Justice to constitute a larger bench to resolve these legal conflicts.

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• Messrs Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd. and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2018 SCMR 802 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  legislative competenceEighteenth AmendmentIndustrial Relations Act 2012ultra viresintra viresfederal legislative listprovincial autonomytrans-provincial establishmentstrade unionsNational Industrial Relations Commissionextra-territorial jurisdictionlabour disputesconstitutional interpretationretrospective applicationcharitable organization
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed appeals and a petition concerning the legislative competence of the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies regarding labour laws after the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The core legal questions revolved around the constitutionality of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 (IRA 2012), the extent of federal and provincial legislative authority, particularly concerning extra-territorial jurisdiction, and the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC) for trans-provincial labour disputes. The Court held that the IRA 2012 was validly enacted and intra vires the Constitution. It ruled that the Federal Legislature possesses extra-territorial authority and competence to legislate for trans-provincial trade unions and labour matters, drawing power from Entries Nos.3, 32, 58, and 59 of Part-I and Entries Nos.13 and 18 of Part-II of the Federal Legislative List, especially in light of international conventions. Provincial Legislatures lack such extra-territorial competence. The IRA 2012, being procedural, applies retrospectively from May 1, 2010, and NIRC has jurisdiction over trans-provincial establishments.

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• Messrs State Oil Company Limited vs Bakht Siddique and others2018 SCMR 1181 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-08
  Regularization of serviceOutsourced employmentConstitutional petitionFundamental rightsArticle 9 of the ConstitutionArticle 25 of the ConstitutionEquityParity and equalityDisputed facts
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned petitions challenging a High Court judgment that directed the regularization of services for employees working with the petitioner company. The core legal questions addressed were whether a constitutional petition for regularization was competent in the absence of statutory rules, whether outsourced employees were genuinely contractor employees or direct employees, and if disputed facts precluded constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, affirming the High Court's decision. The Court held that regularization is not a matter of "terms and conditions of service" requiring statutory rules, but rather depends on length of service and equity, particularly when employees have dedicated significant time to a department. It was further established that constitutional jurisdiction could be invoked for the enforcement of fundamental rights, specifically Articles 9 and 25 of the Constitution, in such cases. The Court found that outsourcing permanent posts after long service (since 1984) could be a "sham or pretence," indicating a direct employment relationship. Applying the rule of parity and equality, the Court ruled that if other similarly situated outsourced employees had been regularized by the petitioner, all respondents should also be regularized, with regularization effective from the date of the constitutional petition, but long-term benefits accruing from their initial date of joining service.

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• Mst. Sughran Bibi vs State2018 PLJ SC 391 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  First Information Reportsecond FIRcriminal investigationcognizable offencepolice powersarrestprivate complaintCode of Criminal Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition seeking the registration of a second First Information Report (FIR) regarding an incident for which an FIR had already been registered and a private complaint was pending. The core legal question was whether a separate FIR can be registered for every new version of the same incident. The Supreme Court held that the registration of a second FIR for the same incident is not permissible under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Court ruled that once an FIR is registered, it constitutes a case, and the investigation must be conducted to discover the truth, regardless of the version in the initial FIR. Any subsequent information or divergent versions of the same incident must be recorded under Section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, within the same case. The Court established that the investigating officer is not bound by the initial FIR's narrative and that arrest is not an automatic consequence of being named in an FIR, but requires sufficient legal grounds. This judgment clarifies the statutory scheme of criminal investigation in Pakistan.

  Questions settled

  • Can a second First Information Report be registered for a new version of an incident for which an FIR has already been registered?
  • Is an investigating officer legally bound to follow the version of the incident narrated in the initial First Information Report?
  • Does the nomination of a person in a First Information Report automatically justify their arrest?
  • How should the police record subsequent information or divergent versions of an incident already under investigation?
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• Messrs J & S Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd. and others vs Gulzar Ahmed and others2020 KLR Supreme Court Cases 177, 2020 PSC 397, 2018 SCMR 1626 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-07-13
  newspaper employeestermination of serviceredundancygood causesettlement agreementlabor lawtechnological modernization
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns seventeen consolidated appeals challenging High Court judgments that reinstated newspaper employees terminated in 2001 due to technological redundancy. The core legal questions were whether a 1990 settlement agreement, which mandated the adjustment of redundant employees, bound the appellants and remained in force at the time of termination, and whether technological redundancy constituted 'good cause' for termination under the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973. The Supreme Court held that the 1990 agreement was not binding on J&S Enterprises as they were not a party to it, and for the other appellant, the agreement was time-bound and had expired in 1990, thus not applicable in 2001. Furthermore, the Court ruled that termination due to redundancy resulting from technological modernization constitutes 'good cause' under Section 4 of the 1973 Act. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgments, affirming the Labor Appellate Tribunal's decisions. The principle established is that settlement agreements must be interpreted within their specific temporal and contextual scope, and technological redundancy is a valid ground for termination under the 1973 Act.

  Questions settled

  • Does a settlement agreement between an employer and a union remain enforceable indefinitely if it contains a specific expiry date?
  • Is an employer bound by a settlement agreement to which it was not a signatory party?
  • Does the termination of a newspaper employee due to redundancy caused by technological modernization constitute 'good cause' under the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973?
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• Messrs Advance Telecom and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2018 PLJ 362, 2018 PTCL 558, 2018 SCMR 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-09-22
  regulatory dutycustoms dutyFree Trade Agreementstatutory dutySRObilateral trade agreementmultilateral trade agreementCustoms Act 1969
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from civil petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding the validity of SRO No. 568(I)/2014, whereby the Federal Government imposed regulatory duty on goods imported from China under a Bilateral Free Trade Agreement without making an exception for FTA goods. The core legal questions were whether the Federal Government could validly impose regulatory duty on goods covered under a bilateral Free Trade Agreement after reducing or eliminating customs duties pursuant to that agreement, whether bilateral agreements fall under the proviso to Section 18(5) of the Customs Act, 1969 as multilateral trade agreements, and whether a prior SRO excepting FTA goods had to be expressly withdrawn. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions and refused leave. The Court affirmed that regulatory duty under Section 18(3) is distinct from statutory customs duty under Section 18(1), and exemption or reduction of statutory customs duty under a bilateral agreement does not preclude the subsequent imposition of regulatory duty. Furthermore, bilateral trade agreements cannot be treated as multilateral agreements under the proviso to Section 18(5).

  Questions settled

  • Can the Federal Government impose regulatory duty under the Customs Act, 1969 on goods imported under a bilateral Free Trade Agreement?
  • Is regulatory duty imposed under Section 18 distinct from statutory customs duty levied under Section 18(1) of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Can a bilateral trade agreement be treated as a multilateral trade agreement for the purpose of the proviso to Section 18(5) of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Is it necessary for the Federal Government to formally withdraw an earlier notification that omitted certain goods from regulatory duty before issuing a new notification imposing regulatory duty on those goods?
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• Maula Bux Shaikh and others vs Chief Minister Sindh and others2019 PLC (C.S.) 282, 2019 PLJ SC 91, 2018 SCMR 2098 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-03
  service tribunalpromotion quotaprofessional engineering workPakistan Engineering Council Actcivil servants promotionaccredited engineering qualificationdiploma holdersB.Tech degree holders
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a qualified professional engineer and Assistant Engineer in the Works and Services Department, Government of Sindh, challenged a notification that provided a promotion quota to diploma holders and B.Tech (Hons.) degree holders for the post of Executive Engineer (BS-18), arguing it was ultra vires the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976. The core legal question was whether the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976 overrides the government's power to prescribe promotion qualifications and quotas for civil servants in engineering departments. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that it is exclusively within the domain of the government to prescribe academic qualifications and conditions for promotion to higher grades, and the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976 regulates the engineering profession rather than government employment. However, the Court laid down the key principle that while the government may determine promotion criteria, no person who is not a registered engineer possessing an accredited engineering qualification can be allowed or permitted to perform professional engineering work as defined under Section 2(xxv) of the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976 restrict the Government's power to prescribe qualifications for the promotion of civil servants?
  • Can diploma holders and B.Tech degree holders perform professional engineering work under the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976?
  • Is the Pakistan Engineering Council empowered to dictate service rules and promotion criteria for government departments?
  • What are the legal consequences of employing an unregistered person to perform professional engineering work?
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• Mst. Sughran Bibi vs The State2018 SCP 1218 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-23
  First Information ReportMultiple FIRsCriminal investigationCognizable offencePolice Rules 1934Code of Criminal Procedure 1898Section 161 CrPCPrivate complaint
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition seeking the registration of a separate First Information Report (FIR) for a different version of an incident where an FIR had already been registered. The core legal question was whether multiple FIRs can be registered for different versions of the same incident. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the law does not permit the registration of multiple FIRs for the same occurrence. The Court clarified that upon the registration of an FIR, a "case" is created, and all subsequent information regarding the same incident, regardless of the source or version, must be recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The investigating officer is duty-bound to investigate the case from all angles to discover the truth, rather than being restricted to the initial FIR's narrative. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that arrest is not a mandatory consequence of FIR registration but must be based on sufficient evidence. The judgment establishes that the investigation process is not driven by the initial FIR but by the pursuit of actual facts.

  Questions settled

  • Can a separate FIR be registered for every new version of the same incident?
  • Is an investigating officer bound by the version of the incident narrated in the initial FIR?
  • How should an investigating officer record a new version of an incident after an FIR has already been registered?
  • Is the arrest of an accused mandatory immediately upon the registration of an FIR?
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• Malik Shakeel Awan vs Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed and 21 others2018 SCP 1232 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-06-13
  election petitionnomination papersconcealment of assetsmisdeclaration of propertydisqualificationhonest and ameenstrict liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal under Section 67(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 arises from the judgment of the Election Tribunal, Rawalpindi, dismissing the appellant's election petition challenging the election of the returned candidate (Respondent No.1) to the National Assembly. The core legal questions concerned whether the respondent's alleged discrepancies and omissions in disclosing agricultural land holdings and the value of a residential property in his nomination papers constituted material misdeclarations or concealments attracting disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 and Section 99(1)(f) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, and whether divergent judicial precedents regarding strict liability and asset disclosures required resolution by a full court. By a majority of two to one, the appeal was dismissed, the court holding that the discrepancies in land measurements resulted from an obvious miscalculation in the printed forms while the details were otherwise provided, and that no material concealment or misstatement regarding property value or income had been established on the evidence. The leading opinion by Sh. Azmat Saeed, J., emphasized that unintentional errors or discrepancies unaccompanied by a clear breach of a legal obligation or absence of a tenable explanation do not warrant disqualification.

  Questions settled

  • Does every nondisclosure or misdeclaration in the nomination form result in the disqualification of a candidate or only those whereby one has circumvented some inherent legal disability to participate in an election?
  • If a petition does not disclose the particular facts on the basis of which disqualification is sought, can these be considered when subsequently disclosed in the affidavit-in-evidence of the petitioner or discovered during the hearing?
  • Does Article 225 of the Constitution exclude the application of Article 184(3) of the Constitution to election disputes?
  • Does the court of law mentioned in Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution include the Supreme Court when exercising jurisdiction under Article 184(3)?
  • If a candidate is disqualified on account of nondisclosure or misdeclaration, does such disqualification subsist only till the next elections or is it permanent?
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• Malik Khan Muhammad Tareen vs M/s Nasir & Brother Coal Company thr.2019 KLR Supreme Court 19, 2019 PLJ SC 190, 2018 SCMR 2121, 2018 SCP 1318 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-16
  territorial jurisdictionmining leasewaiver of jurisdictionimmovable propertyfailure of justiceCode of Civil Procedurecivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that set aside orders returning a plaint for lack of territorial jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether a civil suit regarding a mining lease, situated outside the court's territorial limits, could proceed in Quetta, and whether the defendant had waived the right to challenge jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that mining leases constitute rights and interests in minerals, which are classified as moveable property, distinct from immovable property. Consequently, the suit was not restricted by the location of the lease under Section 16(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that under Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, an objection to territorial jurisdiction must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity before the trial court, and the objector must demonstrate a consequent failure of justice. Since the petitioner failed to raise the objection promptly and could not prove any prejudice or failure of justice, the objection was deemed waived. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Are mining leases considered immovable property for the purpose of determining the territorial jurisdiction of a civil court?
  • What are the three mandatory conditions under Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for an appellate court to entertain an objection regarding territorial jurisdiction?
  • Can an objection to territorial jurisdiction be waived if not raised at the earliest possible opportunity?
  • Does the location of a mining lease automatically dictate the territorial jurisdiction of a civil suit involving rights to that lease?
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• Malik Khan Muhammad Tareen vs Messrs Nasir and Brother Coal2019 KLR Supreme Court 19, 2018 SCMR 2121 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-03
  territorial jurisdictionmining leasemoveable propertyCode of Civil Procedurewaiver of jurisdictionfailure of justiceplace of suing
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition challenges a High Court judgment regarding the territorial jurisdiction of a trial court in Quetta over a dispute involving a mining lease situated in Duki. The core legal question was whether the suit, concerning mining rights, was subject to the venue rules for immovable property and whether the defendant’s jurisdictional objection was validly raised under Section 21, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that mining leases are classified as moveable property, not immovable property, and thus the suit was properly instituted where the cause of action arose. Furthermore, the Court held that the defendant failed to raise the jurisdictional objection at the earliest possible opportunity, having instead engaged in protracted litigation in higher forums. The key principle laid down is that under Section 21, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, objections to territorial jurisdiction are waived unless raised at the earliest opportunity in the court of first instance, and the party must demonstrate that the court's exercise of jurisdiction resulted in a consequent failure of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Are mining leases considered immovable property for the purposes of determining territorial jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • What are the three conditions that must co-exist for an appellate or revisional court to consider an objection regarding territorial jurisdiction under Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the failure to raise an objection to territorial jurisdiction at the earliest possible opportunity constitute a waiver of that objection?
  • Can a party successfully challenge the territorial jurisdiction of a trial court if they cannot demonstrate that a failure of justice has occurred?
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• Malik Ameer Haider Sangha and another vs Mrs. Sumaira Malik, etc.2018 PLJ SC 743, 2018 SCMR 1166, 2018 SCP 1205 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-08
  Election Commission of Pakistanre-pollsecrecy of ballotlocal government electionsconstitutional mandateelectoral integrityelection petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court judgment that set aside an order of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) directing a re-poll for the offices of Chairman and Vice Chairman of the District Council, Khushab. The core legal question was whether the ECP possesses the jurisdiction and power to order a re-poll before the official notification of election results, particularly when the secrecy of the ballot has been compromised. The Supreme Court held that the ECP, as a constitutional body mandated under Article 218(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to ensure elections are conducted honestly, justly, and fairly, possesses the inherent and implied power to order a re-poll to maintain the integrity of the electoral process. The Court affirmed that this power exists prior to the issuance of the official notification of returned candidates. The key principle laid down is that the ECP is not helpless in the face of electoral malpractice and can exercise its broad constitutional and statutory authority to ensure the sanctity of the secret ballot, regardless of whether specific enabling provisions exist in local government legislation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Election Commission of Pakistan have the jurisdiction to order a re-poll before the official notification of election results?
  • Is the Election Commission of Pakistan empowered to order a re-poll if the secrecy of the ballot is compromised?
  • Can the Election Commission of Pakistan exercise its powers to ensure fair elections even in the absence of specific statutory provisions for re-polling in local government laws?
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• Malik Ameer Haider Sangha and another vs Mrs. Sumaira Malik and others2018 SCMR 1166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-08
  election commission powerssecret ballotlocal government electionsre-pollviolation of ballot secrecynotification of returned candidatesconstitutional mandate
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute concerning the election of the Chairman and Vice Chairman of District Council, Khushab, where respondents Nos. 1 and 2 won by a single vote. The Presiding Officer and a candidate lodged written complaints regarding the violation of ballot secrecy. Consequently, the Election Commission of Pakistan set aside the election and ordered a re-poll. Respondents challenged this order in the Islamabad High Court, which allowed the writ petition, holding that the Election Commission lacked jurisdiction to order a re-poll and that the matter could only be resolved by an Election Tribunal via an election petition. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the Election Commission possesses the power to order a re-poll before notifying election results. The Supreme Court held that the Election Commission, being constitutionally mandated to ensure elections are conducted honestly, justly, and fairly, retains wide powers under the Constitution and applicable local government laws to order a re-poll prior to the official notification of returned candidates when ballot secrecy is compromised. The Court established that such powers are not contingent on explicit statutory provisions mirroring Section 103AA of the Representation of the People Act 1976 and that the intervention was justified given the established breach of secrecy.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Election Commission of Pakistan have the jurisdiction and power to order a re-poll before issuing the official notification of returned candidates?
  • Whether the requirement of a secret ballot under Article 226 of the Constitution applies to local government elections?
  • Can the Election Commission order a re-poll under its general constitutional and statutory powers in the absence of a specific provision similar to Section 103AA of the Representation of the People Act 1976?
  • Is a dispute regarding the violation of ballot secrecy required to be adjudicated solely through an election petition before an Election Tribunal once polls have been closed?
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• Major (R) Pervaiz Iqbal vs Munir Ahmad and othersK LR 2018 Supreme Court Cases 95, 2018 PSC 337, 2018 SCMR 566 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-15
  specific performancelimitation periodcause of actionagreement to sellpremature suitevacuee propertymutually destructive pleas
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the concurrent judgments and decrees of the courts below, which decreed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell concerning a portion of an evacuee property. The core legal question revolved around whether the suit filed by the buyers was barred by limitation under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, or whether the cause of action remained suspended until the petitioner himself acquired title to the property. The Supreme Court held that the cause of action for specific performance only arises when the vendor is in a position to perform their part of the contract effectively and the vendee can compel performance. The Court laid down the principle that limitation does not run while the vendor lacks title and the cause of action is inchoate, and further that a plea that a suit is premature is mutually destructive to a plea that it is barred by time. The petition was converted into an appeal and partly allowed with a modification regarding an equalizer payment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the period of limitation for a suit for specific performance commences when the vendor acquires title to the property in question?
  • Can a defendant simultaneously raise pleas that a suit is both premature and barred by limitation?
  • When does the cause of action for specific performance of an agreement to sell arise in cases where the vendor's own title is contingent upon pending litigation?
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• Mag Entertainment (Pvt.) Ltd. and others vs Independent Newspapers Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. and others2018 SCMR 1807 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-08
  DTH licensingvertical integrationmedia monopolyundue concentration of media ownershipstatutory interpretationprovisoregulatory power
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a Lahore High Court judgment declaring Rules 13(3) and (4) of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Rules 2009 ultra vires the parent statute, the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance 2002. The core legal question was whether the regulator (PEMRA) possesses the statutory authority to exclude broadcasters from bidding for Direct To Home (DTH) distribution licenses to prevent vertical integration and media monopolies. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the impugned judgment. The Court held that Section 23 and Section 39(e) of the Ordinance empower PEMRA to define and prevent "undue concentration of media ownership" to ensure fair competition and protect public interest. Furthermore, the Court clarified that a proviso must be construed strictly as a limitation or exception to the main enacting clause, and cannot be interpreted to create an absolute right or enlarge the scope of the enactment. Consequently, excluding broadcasters from distribution licensing to prevent anti-competitive vertical integration is a valid exercise of regulatory power under Article 18 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority has the statutory power to exclude broadcasters from bidding for Direct To Home distribution licenses to prevent vertical integration?
  • How should a proviso to a statutory section be interpreted in relation to the main enacting clause?
  • Does the restriction on broadcasters holding distribution licenses violate the fundamental right to conduct business under Article 18 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  Read full judgment →
• Lal Khan and others vs Qadeer Ahmed and others2018 SCMR 1590 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-06-01
  criminal appealacquittalappreciation of evidencepolice encounterinference vs conjecturefalse implicationmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a High Court judgment that acquitted the respondent, Qadeer Ahmed, of charges related to a police raid on his residence, which resulted in the death of a police officer and the respondent's brother. The prosecution alleged that the respondent and his brother initiated firing, leading to the officer's death, and that the respondent surrendered with his weapon. The core legal question was whether the evidence sufficiently established the respondent's culpability, specifically regarding the firing incident. The Supreme Court upheld the acquittal, reasoning that the prosecution's narrative contained significant infirmities. Specifically, the Court noted that if both accused had fired, the police would likely have targeted both, yet only the brother was killed. The Court inferred that the respondent did not fire at the police, rendering the recovery of crime-empties from his weapon a result of police fabrication. The Court held that while conjectures are inadmissible in criminal law, logical inferences drawn from established facts are permissible. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the respondent's acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the court draw logical inferences from established facts to determine the credibility of a prosecution story?
  • Is it permissible for a court to rely on conjectures in criminal proceedings?
  • Does the failure of police to return fire at all alleged assailants in a cross-fire situation undermine the prosecution's case?
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• Khawaja Saad Rafique and others vs Hamid Khan and others2018 P.S.C. 1816 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-06-12
  election petitionmaterially affectedcorrupt and illegal practicesNADRA verificationthumb impression forensicreturning officerrepresentation of the people act
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from the judgment of the Election Tribunal, Faisalabad, which declared the election for NA-125, Lahore void under Section 67(1)(d) read with Section 70 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, following an election petition filed by the runner-up candidate. The core legal questions involved whether the election staff and Returning Officer failed to comply with election laws and whether such failures or alleged corrupt and illegal practices materially affected the election result. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the election petitioner failed to discharge the heavy burden of proof required to establish corrupt practices or that irregularities materially affected the election outcome, especially given the substantial victory margin. The Court laid down the principle that mere negligence or administrative lapses by election officials, in the absence of cogent evidence linking them to the returned candidate or demonstrating that they materially altered the election results, are insufficient to annul an election.

  Questions settled

  • Whether administrative lapses and non-compliance with guidelines by election officials are sufficient to declare an election void under the Representation of the People Act, 1976?
  • What is the standard of proof required to establish allegations of corrupt and illegal practices in an election petition?
  • Does a discrepancy between Form-14 and Form-16 necessarily warrant the annulment of election results?
  • Can an election be declared void without cogent evidence showing that irregularities materially affected the final outcome?
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• Khawaja Muhammad Asif vs Muhammad Usman Dar and others2018 SCMR 2128, 2018 SCP 1320, 2019 PLJ SC 127 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-19
  quo warrantoArticle 62(1)(f)disqualificationnon-disclosure of assetsconflict of interestelection lawsdishonesty
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that disqualified the petitioner, a Member of the National Assembly and federal minister, under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution. The core legal question was whether the petitioner’s failure to disclose foreign salary income and a dormant foreign bank account, alongside his employment with a UAE-based company, constituted "dishonesty" warranting lifetime disqualification. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the disqualification was unsustainable. The Court established that Article 62(1)(f) cannot be invoked for every omission or error in asset declaration. It held that disqualification requires proof of intentional dishonesty, corruption, or wrongdoing associated with the non-disclosure. Mere inadvertent omissions, bad judgment, or negligence—absent evidence of bad faith or illicit financial gain—do not satisfy the threshold for lifetime disqualification. The Court clarified that the test for honesty hinges on the intent behind the concealment, and since no wrongdoing or conflict of interest was established regarding the petitioner's foreign employment or assets, the writ of quo warranto was unjustified.

  Questions settled

  • Does every non-disclosure of an asset in a nomination paper automatically result in disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution?
  • Is a writ of quo warranto maintainable against an elected member for non-disclosure of assets after the election process has concluded?
  • What constitutes 'dishonesty' sufficient to trigger lifetime disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution?
  • Can a court in quo warranto proceedings determine tax liability in the absence of an assessment by the relevant tax authorities?
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• Khan Muhammad vs Chief Secretary, Government of Balochistan2018 PLC (C.S.) 893 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-22
  service lawposting and transferrules of businessministerial powerscivil servant tenureown pay and scaleadministrative disciplineconstitutional governance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a service appeal regarding the posting and transfer of a civil servant in the Balochistan Education Department. The core legal question was whether a provincial Minister possesses the authority to order the posting or transfer of civil servants, and whether such transfers can be made in violation of seniority and tenure principles. The Supreme Court held that the notification delegating the power of posting and transfer to the Minister was ultra vires the Balochistan Government Rules of Business, 2012 and the scheme of governance envisaged in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973. Consequently, the Court struck down the impugned notification and the transfer order, declaring that the Minister lacks the legal authority to interfere in administrative postings. The Court established that the Secretary is the official head of the department responsible for discipline and administration, and that civil servants cannot be transferred frequently or placed under subordinates without cogent reasons. Furthermore, the Court deprecated the practice of 'own pay and scale' appointments and emphasized that administrative discretion must be exercised in a structured, transparent, and reasonable manner.

  Questions settled

  • Does a provincial Minister have the legal authority to order the posting or transfer of a civil servant under the Balochistan Government Rules of Business, 2012?
  • Is the appointment of a civil servant on an 'own pay and scale' (OPS) basis legally permissible?
  • Can a senior civil servant be lawfully transferred to serve under a junior officer without cogent reasons?
  • What is the scope of a Departmental Secretary's duty when a Minister issues an order that departs from established rules or government policy?
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• Khalid Mehmood vs State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan etc.2018 PLJ SC 149 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-12
  back benefitstermination simplicitercoerced undertakinglabour lawreinstatementpermanent employeeunfair labour practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that denied back benefits to the appellant, a Junior Office Assistant, following his reinstatement. The appellant’s services were initially terminated without cause, a decision overturned by the Labour Court and Appellate Tribunal. The respondent-Corporation argued that the appellant waived his right to back benefits upon reinstatement by signing a charge assumption report and that the termination was valid under internal service regulations. The Supreme Court held that the termination of a permanent employee without assigning explicit reasons is illegal and that internal regulations allowing for "termination simpliciter" are ultra vires. Furthermore, the Court ruled that waivers or undertakings signed by employees under the duress of unemployment and financial hardship are not binding or enforceable. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's decision, upheld the findings of the Labour Court and Appellate Tribunal, and ordered the respondent-Corporation to pay the appellant's back benefits, rejecting the employer's belated, unsubstantiated claims regarding the initial illegality of the appellant's appointment.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employer terminate a permanent employee without assigning explicit reasons?
  • Is a waiver of back benefits signed by an employee under financial duress legally binding?
  • Are service regulations allowing for termination simpliciter valid under the law?
  • Can an employer raise a new plea regarding the illegality of an appointment for the first time before the Supreme Court?
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• Khalid Mehmood vs State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan and others2018 SCMR 376 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-12
  back benefitstermination simpliciterreinstatementindustrial employmentwaiver and acquiescenceservice regulations
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the termination of the appellant's service as a Junior Office Assistant by the respondent-Corporation. The appellant's service was terminated without assigning reasons under Regulation 22(I)(a) of the State Life Employees (Service) Regulations, 1973, prompting him to approach the Punjab Labour Court, which ordered his reinstatement. The Labour Appellate Tribunal dismissed the Corporation's appeal, but subsequent writ proceedings led to the High Court partially accepting the Corporation's petition by denying back benefits due to the appellant's acceptance of reinstatement. The core legal questions involved the legality of termination without reasons under statutory regulations versus labour laws, and the entitlement of the employee to back benefits notwithstanding a purported waiver or charge assumption report. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that termination without explicit reasons violates the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, and that forced waivers or charge reports signed under duress by jobless employees do not preclude back benefits. The appeal was allowed, restoring the Labour Court and Tribunal judgments and granting back benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee's services can be terminated without assigning explicit reasons under service regulations in conflict with the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Is an employee entitled to back benefits upon reinstatement when the initial termination has been adjudicated as illegal by competent labour forums?
  • Does signing a charge assumption report or waiver under the compulsion of joblessness bar an employee from claiming legal back benefits?
  • Can a plea regarding the illegality of an initial appointment be raised for the first time in a concise statement after the judgment has been reserved?
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• Khalid Mahmood vs State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan, etc. 4.2018 P.S.C. 203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-12
  back benefitsillegal terminationtermination simpliciterlabour courtmaster and servantwaiver and acquiescencereinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the termination of the appellant's services as a Junior Office Assistant by the respondent-Corporation. The appellant's service was terminated without assigning reasons, prompting him to approach the Punjab Labour Court, which ordered his reinstatement—a decision upheld by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal. Subsequent litigation led the High Court to hold that the appellant was not entitled to back benefits due to accepting reinstatement. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether an employee reinstated after an illegal termination without cause is entitled to back benefits, and whether a regulation allowing termination simpliciter overrides statutory protections. The Supreme Court held that the termination without explicit reasons violated the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, and that regulations permitting termination without cause are ultra vires. The Court further held that an employee forced to sign a joining report under duress of joblessness cannot be denied back benefits through waiver or acquiescence. The appeal was accordingly allowed, restoring the Labour Court's judgment with an order for back benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee whose termination is declared illegal by a labour court is legally entitled to back benefits for the intervening period?
  • Does a regulation permitting termination simpliciter without assigning reasons override the protections of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Can an employer rely on a charge assumption report or joining undertaking signed under duress to deny back benefits to a reinstated employee?
  • Whether a new factual plea regarding the illegality of an initial appointment can be raised for the first time in a concise statement after judgment has been reserved?
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• Kamal Din alias Kamala vs The State2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 235, 2018 SCMR 577 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-10-13
  MurderAttempted murderTest identification paradeWeapon recoveryBenefit of doubtAcquittalEvidentiary valueCriminal appealPolice encounter
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the conviction and death sentence of Kamal Din alias Kamala for offences under Section 302(b) PPC read with Section 34 PPC, and Section 324 PPC read with Section 34 PPC, stemming from an incident where a police official was killed and others injured. The Supreme Court undertook a reappraisal of the evidence, focusing on the reliability of the test identification parade and the alleged weapon recovery. The Court found the identification parade flawed due to the initial non-nomination of culprits, the Investigating Officer's inability to deny showing the accused to witnesses prior to the parade, the lack of reference to any specific role during identification, and its conduct as a joint parade for multiple accused. An injured witness also confirmed being shown the accused at the police station. The weapon recovery was deemed irrelevant as it related to an earlier case, and its safe custody and transmission were not proven. The Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, allowing the appeal, setting aside the convictions and sentences, and acquitting the appellant.

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• Justice Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Law and Justice, Islamabad2018 P.S.C. 1078 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Supreme Judicial Councilin camera proceedingsjudicial accountabilityindependence of judiciaryimplied powersopen justiceArticle 209due process
  Summary & questions settled

  Sitting High Court Judges facing misconduct inquiries before the Supreme Judicial Council filed constitutional petitions under Article 184(3) challenging the Council's order refusing open-court hearings and contesting the constitutional validity of the Supreme Judicial Council Procedure of Enquiry 2005, specifically paragraphs 7 and 13. The Supreme Court examined the legal nature of the Council, its procedural powers, and the constitutionality of in-camera disciplinary inquiries. Disposing of the petitions, the Court held that the Council is a unique constitutional domestic fact-finding forum possessing implied and ancillary powers to frame its own procedural rules, rendering the 2005 Procedure intra vires. While preliminary scrutiny must strictly occur in camera, subsequent inquiry proceedings are also presumed in camera for institutional integrity and the judge's reputation; however, the judge may waive this privilege. Nonetheless, the Council retains overriding discretion to maintain in-camera proceedings under recognized exceptions, such as preventing scandalous attacks. The Council was directed to decide the petitioners' open-hearing requests afresh.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Judicial Council possess implied and ancillary constitutional powers to formulate its own rules of procedure in the absence of an express legislative enactment?
  • Does Article 209(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 disqualify a member of the Supreme Judicial Council from participating in inquiries concerning third parties merely because that member is also facing an inquiry?
  • Can a judge facing an inquiry before the Supreme Judicial Council waive the benefit of in-camera proceedings under paragraph 13 of the Supreme Judicial Council Procedure of Enquiry 2005, and what are the limitations on such a waiver?
  • Are in-camera proceedings conducted by the Supreme Judicial Council violative of fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 10A and 19A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Justice Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui and others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Law and Justice, Islamabad and others2018 PLD Supreme Court 538 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Supreme Judicial CouncilJudicial misconductIn-camera proceedingsOpen courtConstitutional petitionImplied powersJudicial independenceDue processFundamental rightsJudicial accountability
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court adjudicated Constitution Petitions challenging the in-camera proceedings of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) against sitting Judges for alleged misconduct, and the vires of the SJC Procedure of Enquiry 2005. The core legal questions revolved around whether SJC proceedings must be open, the constitutionality of in-camera hearings, the SJC's power to frame its own procedure, and the applicability of fundamental rights like due process and freedom of information. The Court held that the SJC is a unique constitutional forum, not a court, akin to a domestic disciplinary tribunal, conducting administrative and fact-finding inquiries with recommendatory but conclusive findings. It ruled that the SJC possesses implied power to frame its own procedure, thus validating the SJC Procedure of Enquiry 2005, including paragraph 7 (preliminary scrutiny) and paragraph 13 (in-camera proceedings). The Court affirmed that in-camera proceedings do not violate the Constitution, serving to protect the judge's reputation and the judiciary's institution from baseless allegations. While acknowledging the general principle of open justice, the Court recognized well-defined exceptions, emphasizing that the right to information (Article 19A) is subject to reasonable restrictions. The SJC was directed to revisit and decide afresh the request for open proceedings, considering the judge's waiver of in-camera privilege and the SJC's discretion to hold in-camera proceedings based on recognized exceptions.

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• Javed Iqbal and another vs The State2018 SCMR 1380 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-26
  criminal appealrapeabductionbenefit of doubtprosecution evidencemedical evidencecredibility of witnessesacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal challenged the conviction and sentences of the petitioners for abduction and rape under Sections 365-B and 376(ii) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven its case beyond reasonable doubt, given the alleged eyewitness testimony and medical evidence. The Supreme Court observed that the complainant’s account of witnessing the rape after a chase was highly improbable, considering the distance, the presence of populated areas, and the lack of inquiry by the complainant. Furthermore, the court noted significant contradictions between the victim's testimony and the medical examination, particularly regarding the timing of the alleged injury and the absence of forensic evidence on the victim's clothing. Holding that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt due to these unexplained lacunas and inconsistencies, the Court set aside the lower courts' judgments and acquitted the petitioners. The key principle laid down is that the benefit of any doubt arising from material inconsistencies and unexplained gaps in the prosecution's evidence must be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to explain material contradictions in the testimony of the complainant and the victim entitle the accused to an acquittal?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the medical evidence regarding the timing of an injury contradicts the prosecution's timeline of the occurrence?
  • Should the benefit of the doubt be extended to an accused when the prosecution's narrative of the crime is inherently improbable and unsupported by physical evidence?
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• Jahanzaib Malik vs Balochistan Public Procurement Regulatory Authority2018 KLR S.C. 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-04
  public procurementappointment validityeducational qualificationjudicial reviewjurisdictioncontract extensionservice matter
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that set aside the appointment and subsequent contract extension of the petitioner as Director (Monitoring and Evaluation) at the Balochistan Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (BPPRA). The core legal questions were whether the petitioner possessed the requisite educational qualifications by the application deadline and whether the High Court acted within its jurisdiction by setting aside an extension order that was not challenged in the pleadings and affected third parties not before the court. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was qualified, as the transcript confirmed completion of his MBA degree by the relevant date, despite the formal issuance of the degree certificate occurring later. Furthermore, the Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by setting aside an extension order that was never challenged by the respondent and by nullifying the extensions of other employees who were not parties to the proceedings. The judgment reaffirms that formal degree issuance dates do not invalidate qualifications if course work was completed by the deadline and emphasizes the limits of judicial review regarding unchallenged administrative orders.

  Questions settled

  • Does the formal issuance date of a degree determine qualification if the course work was completed by the application deadline?
  • Can a High Court set aside an administrative order that was not challenged in the pleadings?
  • Is it permissible for a court to set aside the service extensions of third parties who were not impleaded in the petition?
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• Jahanzaib Malik vs Balochistan Public Procurement Regulatory2018 SCMR 414 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-04
  public procurementeducational qualificationservice extensionwrit jurisdictionsuo motu noticeappointment eligibilitynatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a High Court judgment that set aside the appointment and subsequent service extension of the petitioner as Director (Monitoring and Evaluation) at the Balochistan Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (BPPRA). The High Court had ruled that the petitioner lacked the requisite educational qualification on the application deadline, as his MBA degree was formally issued after that date. The Supreme Court examined whether the completion of academic requirements prior to the deadline, despite the delayed formal issuance of a degree, satisfied the eligibility criteria. The Court held that since the petitioner had successfully completed his coursework and examinations in January 2014, as evidenced by his transcript and degree certificate, he was duly qualified before the August 2014 deadline. Furthermore, the Court found that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by setting aside a service extension order that was never formally challenged by the respondent. The Court emphasized that a candidate who has completed all academic requirements for a degree is considered qualified, and courts cannot strike down administrative orders involving third parties without providing them a hearing.

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• Ishtiaq Ahmad vs The State, etc.2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 76 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-02-21
  polygamyMuslim family lawsArbitration Councilsecond marriagepermission of Arbitration Councilcriminal convictionIslam injunctions
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against his conviction under Section 6(5)(b) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, for contracting a second marriage without the prior written permission of the Arbitration Council. His conviction was upheld by the Additional Sessions Judge and the Lahore High Court. The core legal questions involved the constitutional vires of Section 6 of the Ordinance regarding Islamic injunctions, the procedural necessity of seeking permission from the Arbitration Council, and the locus standi or competence of the complainant. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that Section 6 does not violate Islamic injunctions as it implements the Quranic precondition of justice in polygamy, that the absence of elected local government officials does not invalidate the requirement where an Administrator acts as Chairman, and that an aggrieved wife is competent to lodge a complaint. The Court laid down that contracting a secondary marriage without fulfilling statutory procedural prerequisites of prior permission and due process constitutes a punishable offense under the law, affirming the penal consequences for non-compliance.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 violate the injunctions of Islam regarding polygamy?
  • Can a man contract a second marriage without the prior written permission of the Arbitration Council if local government elections have not been held?
  • Is an aggrieved wife competent to file a complaint under Section 6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961?
  • Is a statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 sufficient in itself to establish that a first wife granted permission for a second marriage?
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• Iqbal Pervaiz and others vs Harsan and others2018 SCMR 359 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-11
  suit for possessionrevenue recordreview jurisdictionfunctus officiogrant of landmesne profitsrevision application
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants filed suits for possession and mesne profits against members of the Kolhi community, claiming ownership of a survey number based on a 1932 allotment to their predecessor-in-interest. The respondents contended that the land was Government land where their village had existed for over a century, and that the appellants' title documents were bogus. The trial court dismissed the suits, but the appellate court reversed this decision. The Sindh High Court then overturned the appellate court's decision in revision. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeals, holding that the appellants failed to prove a valid grant as the primary document (Form-A) did not list the disputed survey number. The Court also ruled that a Member of the Board of Revenue, in review proceedings, acted beyond the scope of review by declaring the appellants as owners without identifying any error apparent on the face of the record, thereby violating the doctrine of functus officio.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court or authority in review proceedings reverse its own final decision on merits without identifying an error apparent on the face of the record?
  • Does the doctrine of functus officio prevent a review forum from substituting its original findings with a completely new opinion?
  • Can a claim of land ownership be sustained if the primary grant document (Form-A) does not contain the disputed survey number?
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• Intekhab Ahmad Abbasi and others vs The State and others2018 SCMR 495, 2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 98 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-30
  judicial confessionconfessional statementanti-terrorism courtexplosive substances actbenefit of doubtcondonation of delayinterpreter appointmentchain of custody
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from criminal appeals against convictions and life sentences awarded under Sections 120-B, 420, 468, and 471 PPC, Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, and Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA). The central legal questions addressed were whether judicial confessions obtained after prolonged unauthorized detention, without proper interpreter appointment, and under the influence of investigating officers are legally reliable, and whether independent witness association is essential in high-profile vehicle search and recovery operations. The Supreme Court converted the jail petitions into appeals and acquitted all appellants by extending the benefit of doubt. The Court held that the prosecution case suffered from irremediable defects, including non-production of key independent witnesses, unexplained alterations in registers and recovery memos, improper recording of confessional statements by Special Magistrates without necessary procedural safeguards, lack of certified interpreter, and unproven explosive composition of the seized materials. The judgment established guidelines and mandatory additional questions for Magistrates when recording judicial confessions in sensitive terrorism matters.

  Questions settled

  • What mandatory procedural safeguards and questions must a Magistrate observe when recording a judicial confession under the Cr.P.C.?
  • Does the failure to appoint an interpreter under Section 543 Cr.P.C. render a judicial confession invalid when the accused does not understand the court's language?
  • Can a conviction be sustained on the basis of a judicial confession recorded in the presence or under the influence of investigating officers?
  • Is the non-association of independent public witnesses during a search and seizure operation fatal to the prosecution's case in terrorism trials?
  • Can unsubstantiated chemical analysis reports of seized substances establish an offence under the Explosive Substances Act?
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• Intekhab Ahmad Abbasi and another vs The State, etc2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 98 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  terrorismbenefit of doubtjudicial confessioncriminal appealexplosive substancesprocedural irregularityinvestigation standardsAnti-Terrorism Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the convictions of the appellants for terrorism-related offences, including conspiracy and possession of explosives. The core legal question concerns the reliability of the prosecution’s evidence, specifically the recovery of explosive materials and the validity of judicial confessions. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case, citing significant procedural flaws, including the absence of independent public witnesses during recovery, the failure to establish the explosive nature of the seized substances, and the coerced nature of the confessions. The Court emphasized that in high-profile cases, courts must exercise extreme caution to prevent being misled by investigating agencies. Furthermore, it laid down that confessions recorded after prolonged police custody, without adherence to strict judicial safeguards—such as the appointment of interpreters for non-native speakers and the exclusion of printed proforma—lack legal efficacy. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, granting the appellants the benefit of the doubt and ordering their immediate acquittal, highlighting the necessity for modern forensic investigation techniques over reliance on forced confessions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to associate independent public witnesses during recovery proceedings render the recovery unreliable?
  • Are confessions recorded by a Special Magistrate after prolonged police custody legally valid if they lack proper judicial safeguards?
  • Is the use of printed proforma for recording judicial confessions legally permissible under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the failure to appoint an interpreter for an accused who does not understand the language of the court vitiate a confession?
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• Inquiry under Article 209 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 against Mr. Justice Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui, Judge, Islamabad High Court, Islamabad vs N/A2018 SCP 1315 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-16
  Supreme Judicial Counciljudicial misconductcode of conductremoval of judgefreedom of speechcontempt of judiciaryIslamabad High Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an inquiry conducted by the Supreme Judicial Council under Article 209 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, regarding a public speech delivered by Mr. Justice Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui, a Judge of the Islamabad High Court, before the District Bar Association, Rawalpindi. The core legal question was whether the respondent judge's public statements—which leveled serious allegations against the superior judiciary, intelligence agencies, and other state institutions, and criticized judicial verdicts and fellow judges—constituted judicial misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a judge. The Supreme Judicial Council unanimously held that the judge had failed to substantiate his wide-ranging allegations, violated express provisions and the Preamble of the Code of Conduct, and displayed conduct unbecoming of a judge. The Council concluded that the respondent was guilty of misconduct and recommended his removal from office under Article 209(6) of the Constitution, laying down the principle that judges must maintain strict restraint, avoid public controversy, and adhere to traditional requirements of judicial behavior.

  Questions settled

  • Does a judge's public denunciation of the judiciary and state institutions constitute judicial misconduct under Article 209 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Can the freedom of speech guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution be invoked by a superior court judge to justify public criticism of the judiciary and judicial officers?
  • Is the Code of Conduct issued for judges exhaustive, or does it incorporate broader traditional requirements of judicial behavior?
  • What is the scope of the Supreme Judicial Council's inquiry powers regarding extra-judicial public speeches made by serving judges?
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• Income Tax Officer vs Akbar Gul2018 PCTLR 495, 2018 PSC 844, 2018 PTD 1664, 2018 SCMR 1126 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-04-09
  income taxtax exemptionpoultry farmingunregistered partnership firmindependent assesseesecond recipientshare of profit
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh allowing an income tax reference in favor of the respondent-assessee. The core legal question was whether a partner of an unregistered partnership firm could claim tax exemption on his share of profits derived from poultry farming when the firm itself had already availed the exemption under the relevant tax law. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that an unregistered partnership firm is an independent assessee and a distinct legal entity under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. Consequently, the firm is the original recipient of the exempt income, and a partner receiving a share of profits from the firm is a second recipient. The Court laid down the principle that under section 151 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, tax exemptions are strictly limited to the original recipient and do not extend to any person receiving payments wholly or in part out of that exempt income.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unregistered partnership firm is an independent assessee for the purposes of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • Does a tax exemption available to a partnership firm extend to its partners receiving a share of profits from the firm?
  • Whether section 151 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 prohibits extending the benefit of a tax exemption to a second recipient of income?
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• Imtiaz alias Taj vs The State and others2018 SCMR 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-26
  Criminal appealMurderReappraisal of evidenceEyewitness testimonyIndependent corroborationBenefit of doubtAcquittalSection 342 Cr.P.C.Co-convict acquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal appeal against the conviction and sentence of the appellant and his co-convict for murder under Section 302(b) PPC read with Section 34 PPC. The core legal questions involved the reappraisal of evidence, specifically the credibility of eyewitnesses when co-accused with similar roles were acquitted without independent corroboration, the impact of medical evidence contradicting the prosecution's timeline, the inadmissibility of evidence not put to the accused under Section 342 Cr.P.C., and the validity of the alleged motive. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the convictions and sentences of both the appellant and his co-convict, acquitting them by extending the benefit of doubt. The Court held that eyewitnesses disbelieved against some accused cannot be relied upon against others with similar roles without independent corroboration. It further reiterated that evidence not put to an accused under Section 342 Cr.P.C. cannot be used against them, and the benefit of acquittal can be extended to a non-appealing co-convict if warranted by the case circumstances.

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• Imtiaz Ahmed vs The State thr. Special Prosecutor, ANF2018 SCP 1115 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-03-21
  statutory delaypost-arrest bailcontrol of narcotic substancesfundamental rightsspeedy trialsickness of accusedspecial court
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses an appeal against the dismissal of a bail petition sought on the statutory ground of delay in concluding the trial under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal question concerns whether the ouster or restrictive clauses regarding bail in special statutes, such as section 51 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, exclude the beneficial provisos of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, particularly regarding statutory delay and serious sickness. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and granted bail to the petitioner, holding that the superior courts' constitutional jurisdiction and duty to protect personal liberty and ensure a speedy trial remain intact despite restrictive provisions in special laws, and that unreasonable or shocking delay in trial proceedings entitles an accused to bail. The key principle laid down is that the beneficial provisos of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898—such as those addressing statutory delay or grave illness—are not entirely displaced by special legislation and can be invoked in appropriate circumstances to protect fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the bar on the grant of bail under section 51 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 excludes the beneficial provisos of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Does an unreasonable or shocking delay in the conclusion of a trial before a Special Court entitle an accused person to the concession of bail?
  • Can the superior courts grant bail on statutory delay or medical grounds despite restrictive clauses in special statutes ousting the jurisdiction of courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Imran Khan Niazi vs Ayesha Gulalai2018 SCMR 1043 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-03-14
  defectiondisqualificationparliamentary partyshow cause noticeprocedural fairnessArticle 63AElection Commission of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged an order of the Election Commission of Pakistan, which declined to disqualify the respondent, a Member of the National Assembly, for alleged defection from her political party. The core legal questions were whether the respondent had resigned from her party and whether she had violated party directions by abstaining from voting in the National Assembly. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the respondent had not resigned, as no written resignation was submitted. Regarding the alleged failure to vote, the Court found that the appellant failed to produce evidence of written party directions, rendering the claim based on oral assertions insufficient. The Court further observed that the appellant failed to act against other members who were similarly absent, indicating selective enforcement. Additionally, the Court found the show-cause process procedurally flawed, as the respondent was denied a reasonable opportunity to defend herself. The Court affirmed that disqualification under Article 63A requires strict adherence to procedural fairness and concrete evidence of defection, which was absent in this case.

  Questions settled

  • Does a public statement expressing an intention to leave a political party constitute a formal resignation under Article 63A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is a Party Head required to provide written evidence of party directions to establish defection based on an abstention from voting?
  • Can a Party Head selectively apply disqualification proceedings to a member while ignoring similar conduct by other party members?
  • Does the failure to provide a reasonable opportunity to respond to a show-cause notice violate the requirements of Article 63A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
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• Imran Ali vs The State2018 SCMR 1372 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-06-12
  plea of guiltyconfessional statementsection 412 Cr.P.C.DNA evidencedeath sentencecoercion and duressleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose out of the petitioner's conviction and death sentences for kidnapping, sodomizing, raping, and murdering a minor girl, aged 7/8 years, as well as concealing evidence and terrorism under the Pakistan Penal Code and Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The core legal questions involved whether a conviction and sentence were maintainable where the accused voluntarily pleaded guilty, made a detailed confession corroborated by objective physical evidence, and later raised unproven allegations of coercion and duress on appeal. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the trial court and High Court, noting that the confession was both voluntary and true as fully corroborated by CCTV footages, photographs, medical evidence, and DNA tests. Applying Section 412 Cr.P.C., the Court ruled that an accused who pleads guilty can challenge only the extent or legality of the sentence. Given the barbaric nature of the crimes against a minor victim and similar admissions regarding other minor victims, no leniency in sentencing was warranted.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused who pleads guilty before the trial court challenge his conviction on appeal beyond the extent or legality of the sentence under Section 412 Cr.P.C.?
  • Whether an unproven claim of coercion made during appellate arguments invalidates a voluntary confessional statement corroborated by physical evidence?
  • Does corroborative evidence such as DNA tests, CCTV footage, and medical reports establish the voluntary and true nature of a confessional statement?
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• Imran Ahmad Khan & others vs Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of Pakistan and others2018 PLJ SC 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  disqualificationassets beyond meansconstitutional petitionaccountability referencedue processnomination papersunwithdrawn salaryjoint investigation team
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns constitutional petitions filed against the Prime Minister of Pakistan and others, alleging the acquisition of assets disproportionate to known sources of income. Following an earlier order constituting a Joint Investigation Team (JIT), the Court reviewed the JIT's final report. The core legal questions were whether the respondents possessed assets beyond their known means, whether the Prime Minister failed to disclose unwithdrawn salary as an asset, and whether the Court could disqualify a member of Parliament based on JIT findings without a full trial. The Court held that while a prima facie case existed regarding various assets, it could not bypass the due process of a full trial in an Accountability Court for criminal liability. However, the Court ruled that the Prime Minister’s failure to disclose his unwithdrawn salary as an asset in his nomination papers constituted a false declaration. Consequently, the Court disqualified the Prime Minister from being a Member of Parliament under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution and directed the National Accountability Bureau to file references against the respondents in the Accountability Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unwithdrawn salary receivable by a public office holder constitute an asset that must be disclosed in nomination papers?
  • Can the Supreme Court disqualify a member of Parliament under Article 62(1)(f) based on findings of a Joint Investigation Team without a full criminal trial?
  • Does the failure to disclose assets in nomination papers render a candidate not 'honest' and 'ameen' under the Constitution?
  • Is the Supreme Court empowered to direct the filing of references in an Accountability Court based on material collected by a court-constituted investigation team?
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• Ikhlaq Ahmed vs Chief Secretary, Punjab, Lahore, etc.2018 P.S.C. 1438 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-04-22
  regularization of contract employeesrelaxation of rulesservice tribunallimitationcivil servantinitial appointmentsubordinate legislation
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal dismissing appeals against the termination of the petitioners' employment. The petitioners were initially appointed on contract in the Chief Minister's Secretariat and subsequently regularized under an omnibus order invoking rule 23 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974. The core legal questions involved whether contract employment could be regularized without fulfilling initial appointment requirements and whether the ingredients for relaxing rules under rule 23 were fulfilled. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners' appeals were rightly dismissed by the Tribunal as time-barred and that the purported regularization and relaxation of rules were illegal, as mandatory preconditions of rule 23 were completely flouted and subordinate legislation cannot contravene the parent statute. The key principle laid down is that rule relaxation powers cannot be abused to bypass statutory appointment procedures, and bureaucrats must act as servants of the State and law rather than showing abject subservience to political executives.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 permits changing the nature of employment from contract to regular without fulfilling legal requirements of initial appointments?
  • What are the ingredients and requirements for the relaxation of rules under rule 23 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974?
  • Can an appeal before the Punjab Service Tribunal and a departmental appeal be dismissed on the ground of limitation?
  • Does subordinate legislation have the power to contravene the provisions of its parent statute?
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• Ikhlaq Ahmed and others vs Chief Secretary, Punjab, Lahore and others2018 SCMR 1120 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-04-23
  regularization of servicescontract appointmentrelaxation of rulescivil servantservice tribunallimitationtermination of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves petitions for leave to appeal against the Punjab Service Tribunal's dismissal of the petitioners' appeals challenging their termination from service. The petitioners were initially appointed on contract in the Chief Minister's Secretariat, and their services were later regularized in purported relaxation of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974. The core legal questions concern whether the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 or its rules permit changing contract employment to regular initial appointment without fulfilling statutory requirements, and what the statutory ingredients and requirements for relaxing rules under rule 23 of the said rules are. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioners' appeals were rightly dismissed by the Tribunal as time-barred, and further ruled on merits that the regularization of the petitioners was carried out in blatant disregard of rule 23, as no individual case of hardship or special reasons were recorded by the competent authority. The key principle laid down is that subordinate legislation and rule relaxation powers cannot be abused to bypass statutory appointment procedures, and bureaucrats must act as faithful servants of the law rather than blindly complying with political directives.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 or its rules permit changing the nature of employment from contract to regular employment without fulfilling initial appointment requirements?
  • What are the mandatory ingredients and requirements for the valid relaxation of rules under rule 23 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974?
  • Can a service appeal or departmental appeal be entertained when filed beyond the statutory period of limitation?
  • Does an omnibus order regularizing employees without recording individual cases of hardship satisfy the legal threshold of rule relaxation?
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• Human Rights Cell vs Cantonment Boards2018 SCP 1190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-04-26
  Cantonment Boardseducational institutionsevictionhuman rightsjudicial stayadministrative action
  Summary & questions settled

  The Human Rights Cell of the Supreme Court of Pakistan initiated proceedings regarding directives issued to schools located within Cantonment areas across Pakistan, mandating their relocation within a fifteen-day period. This action appeared to contradict a previous order dated 24.10.2017, passed by a two-member bench of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 800/2012, which had stipulated that the removal of educational and commercial buildings from such areas should be conducted gradually. The Court observed that the abrupt nature of the current directives threatened the educational careers of a substantial number of students and indicated a failure to comply with the spirit of the earlier judicial mandate. Consequently, the Court issued notices to all Cantonment Boards in Pakistan, requiring them to justify the urgency and haste behind their actions. Furthermore, the Court ordered that the previous directive of 24.10.2017 be held in abeyance, effectively staying the eviction or transfer of any schools from Cantonment areas until further orders are passed by the Court, thereby prioritizing the stability of students' education over immediate relocation.

  Questions settled

  • Can Cantonment Boards unilaterally order the immediate removal of schools from Cantonment areas in contravention of prior judicial directives?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to stay administrative actions of Cantonment Boards regarding the relocation of schools?
  • Is a gradual approach required for the removal of educational institutions from Cantonment areas?
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• Hotel Galaxy (Pvt.) Ltd. (Days Inn) vs Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd.2018 SCMR 1468 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-03
  captive power generationgas connectiongovernment policydiscriminationexport-oriented industryregulatory authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the refusal of the respondent, Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd., to provide a gas connection for captive power generation to the appellant, a hotel operator. The core legal questions were whether the appellant met the criteria for such a connection under the prevailing government policies and whether the denial constituted discriminatory treatment in violation of fundamental rights. The Supreme Court held that the appellant failed to satisfy the requisite criteria, as it was neither an export-oriented unit nor possessed the requisite sizable foreign investment as defined by the applicable government policies. Furthermore, the Court found that the appellant's application, having been rejected prior to the issuance of subsequent policies, did not qualify as a 'backlog' matter. Regarding the allegation of discrimination, the Court determined that the respondent provided sufficient justification for the gas connections granted to other entities, demonstrating that those connections complied with the relevant policies. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the principle that regulatory bodies must adhere strictly to government-mandated policies regarding the allocation of scarce resources like gas, and that claims of discrimination require evidence of arbitrary deviation from established criteria.

  Questions settled

  • Does a hotel qualify as an industrial unit entitled to a gas connection for captive power generation under government policies?
  • Can an applicant claim the benefit of a government policy regarding 'backlog' cases if their application was rejected prior to the policy's issuance?
  • Is a regulatory body's refusal to provide a gas connection discriminatory if the applicant fails to meet the established criteria applicable to other entities?
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• Hayatullah vs The StatePLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 50, 2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 1070, 2018 SCMR 2092 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-24
  police confessioninadmissible evidencediscovery of factsburden of proofappraisal of evidencecriminal appealmurder trialacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from an appeal by leave of the court against the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court which had partly allowed the appellant's appeal, converting his death sentence under section 302(b), P.P.C. into imprisonment for life for murder, while maintaining or altering other convictions. The core legal question revolves around the admissibility and evidentiary value of confessions made before police officers, memo of disclosures, pointing out of places already known to the police, and recoveries of weapons and stolen property without proper corroboration. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that confessions made before police officers and pointing out of places already within the police's knowledge are completely inadmissible under Articles 38, 39, and 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, and that tainted evidence cannot corroborate other tainted evidence. Furthermore, the court held that the burden of proof rests entirely on the prosecution and never shifts to the accused to prove his innocence. Consequently, the convictions and sentences were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Are confessions made before police officers admissible in evidence during a criminal trial?
  • Does the pointing out of a place of occurrence already known to the police qualify as a valid discovery under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Can one tainted piece of evidence be used to corroborate another tainted piece of evidence?
  • Does the burden of proof shift to the accused to prove his innocence if the prosecution fails to establish its case?
  • What is the duty of a trial judge when inadmissible evidence is tendered during the recording of witness testimony?
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• Hashmat Medical and Dental College vs Pakistan Medical and Dental2018 KLR Supreme Court Cases 331, 2019 PLJ SC 21, 2018 SCMR 1310 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-04-04
  medical educationprivate medical collegePMDC registrationexcessive fee refundinterim reliefsuo motu jurisdictionstudent career protection
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Hashmat Medical and Dental College, sought leave to appeal against an Islamabad High Court order declining interim relief to direct Riphah International University to conduct professional MBBS examinations for its students. The core legal questions involved whether a sub-standard private medical college lacking basic infrastructure, valid registration, and proper affiliations could be permitted to continue admissions and conduct examinations, and whether excess fees charged from students should be refunded. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that institutions failing to meet Pakistan Medical and Dental Council standards must be shut down and their registrations cancelled. The Court laid down key principles emphasizing that private medical education requires strict regulatory oversight, unauthorized and sub-standard medical colleges must be weeded out firmly, and students of affected institutions must be accommodated or granted refunds while criminal investigations are initiated against illegal managements.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unauthorized medical college lacking basic infrastructure and PM&DC registration is entitled to interim relief for conducting student examinations?
  • Can the Supreme Court direct the Federal Investigation Agency to lodge an FIR and investigate private medical colleges charging excessive fees?
  • Whether students of a disaffiliated and unrecognised medical college can be adjusted in other approved colleges upon qualifying their examinations?
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• Haroon Shafique vs The State and others2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 971, 2018 SCMR 2118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-07-16
  MurderAppeal by leaveReappraisal of evidenceBenefit of doubtAcquittalEye-witness testimonyCorroborationMotiveRecovery of weaponUnexplained injuries
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by leave before the Supreme Court challenging the appellant's conviction and life sentence for murder under Section 302(b) PPC, read with Section 149 PPC. The core legal question involved a reappraisal of evidence, specifically concerning the identification of the accused in a night occurrence, the non-production of natural and independent injured witnesses, unexplained injuries sustained by the appellant and co-accused, and the lack of independent corroboration. The Court held that the prosecution's case suffered from material doubts, including the absence of secured electric light, non-production of crucial witnesses leading to an adverse inference, and inconsistencies regarding motive and weapon recovery. The Court also noted that the High Court had itself concluded it was a case of a free fight without premeditation. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant by extending the benefit of doubt, emphasizing that such benefit must be given when the prosecution's story is doubted in material particulars and corroboration is lacking.

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• Haq Nawaz vs The State2019 P.S.C (Crl.) 641, 2018 SCMR 21 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-10-09
  criminal appealdeath sentencemitigating circumstancesproof of motivemurder convictionsentence reductionCode of Criminal Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the murder of the deceased. The core legal question was whether the death sentence was appropriate or if mitigating circumstances warranted a reduction to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 but allowed the appeal to the extent of the sentence, reducing the death penalty to imprisonment for life. The Court held that the prosecution’s failure to prove the alleged motive, coupled with the non-production of key eye-witnesses, a delay in the post-mortem examination, and the complainant's lack of interest in the proceedings, constituted significant mitigating factors. The established legal principle applied is that when the prosecution asserts a specific motive but fails to substantiate it during trial, such failure may react against the imposition of the death penalty. Consequently, the Court maintained the compensation order while extending the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove the alleged motive in a murder case constitute a mitigating factor for the sentence?
  • Can a death sentence be reduced to imprisonment for life based on the prosecution's failure to produce key witnesses?
  • Is a delay in the post-mortem examination a relevant factor in determining the appropriateness of a death sentence?
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• Haq Nawaz and others vs The State and others2018 SCMR 95 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-10-23
  reappraisal of evidencesole eye-witnessbenefit of doubtmurdercriminal appealunnatural conductacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal arising from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan wherein convict-appellants Haq Nawaz and Muhammad Hayat challenged their conviction under sections 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Mst. Nooran Bibi. The core legal question revolved around the reappraisal of evidence, specifically the reliability and trustworthiness of the sole eye-witness/informant whose testimony formed the basis of the conviction. The Supreme Court held that the testimony of the primary witness was unnatural, fraught with contradictions, and lacked corroboration, particularly in light of strained family relations and an unexplained two-month delay in recording her statement to the police. Furthermore, the same witness's testimony had already been disbelieved regarding the acquitted co-accused. Consequently, the Court laid down that when the sole ocular account is unnatural, uncorroborated, and comes from an interested witness with strained relations, it fails to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a shadow of reasonable doubt, warranting an acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of an eye-witness whose conduct is unnatural and improbable can form the basis of a murder conviction without reliable corroboration?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a belated statement recorded by the police after an unexplained delay of two months?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the testimony of the sole star witness has already been disbelieved by the courts regarding co-accused who were acquitted?
  • Does an interested witness with a background of strained family relations inspire confidence for capital punishment without strong corroborative evidence?
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• Haji Sultan Abdul Majeed (decd.), etc. vs Mst. Shamim Akhtar (decd.), etc2018 PLJ SC 466 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  amendment of pleadingsalternative pleaforgeryundue influencecoercionwillcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arose from a suit seeking a declaration that two wills were the result of coercion and undue influence. During the pendency of the suit, the petitioners sought to amend their plaint under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to add a plea that the wills were forged. The trial court and High Court rejected the application on the grounds that adding a plea of forgery alongside coercion and undue influence introduced a contradictory plea that would change the entire complexion of the suit and cause delay. The Supreme Court of Pakistan converted the petition into an appeal and allowed the amendment. The Court held that the proposed amendment did not introduce mutually destructive or contradictory pleas, but rather an alternative plea that could legitimately coexist with the main plea. The Court laid down the principle that while contradictory and mutually destructive pleas cannot be taken, alternative or inconsistent pleas that can naturally coexist may be introduced through an amendment to the pleadings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party amend their plaint to introduce an alternative plea of forgery when the original suit was based on coercion and undue influence?
  • What is the distinction between an alternative plea and a contradictory or mutually destructive plea for the purpose of amending pleadings?
  • Whether an amendment to a plaint can be allowed if it introduces an alternative plea that does not alter the fundamental character of the suit?
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• Haji Sultan Abdul Majeed (Decd) through Mehboob Sultan and Habib2018 PLJ SC 466, 2018 SCMR 82 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-10-13
  amendment of plaintalternative pleacoercion and undue influenceforgerycivil proceduremutually destructive pleas
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners filed a civil suit seeking a declaration that two wills were executed as a result of coercion and undue influence. During the pendency of the suit, they filed an application under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 seeking to amend the plaint to include the plea that the wills were forged and did not bear the testator's signatures. The trial court and the High Court rejected the application, holding that the amendment would change the complexion of the suit and introduce a contradictory plea. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether an alternative plea of forgery can be introduced alongside an existing plea of coercion and undue influence. The Court held that the proposed amendment did not introduce mutually destructive or contradictory pleas, but rather constituted a legitimate plea in the alternative that could co-exist with the original case. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned judgments, and permitted the amendment to the plaint, laying down that alternative or even inconsistent pleas may be raised by way of amendment provided they are not mutually destructive.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an amendment to the plaint introducing a plea of forgery can be permitted alongside an existing plea of coercion and undue influence?
  • Can alternative or inconsistent pleas be raised by way of amendment to pleadings under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • What is the distinction between alternative pleas and mutually destructive contradictory pleas in civil litigation?
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• Haji Shahid Hussain and others vs The State and another2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 88 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-02-22
  bail refusalfraudHajj tour operatorsconstitutional jurisdictionstatutory dutypublic interest litigationcriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court order denying bail to petitioners accused of operating a fraudulent travel agency. The petitioners were charged under Sections 419, 420, and 468 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for allegedly defrauding citizens seeking to perform Hajj. The core legal question concerned the petitioners' entitlement to bail given the evidence of their involvement in the scheme. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioners were prima facie connected to the crime and that no malice was attributed to the complainants. Emphasizing the gravity of frauds involving religious obligations, the Court held that such cases require distinct judicial treatment. Furthermore, the Court invoked its powers under Articles 184(3) and 187 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to issue mandatory directions to the Ministry of Religious Affairs and other state authorities. The Court established the principle that state institutions have a constitutional and statutory obligation to proactively prevent such organized financial crimes through public awareness and strict regulatory oversight, rather than merely responding after the commission of offenses.

  Questions settled

  • Are petitioners entitled to bail when prima facie evidence connects them to a fraudulent scheme involving religious travel services?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to issue directions to government ministries to ensure public awareness and regulatory compliance regarding Hajj tour operators?
  • Is there a constitutional and statutory obligation upon state authorities to proactively prevent organized financial crimes?
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• Haji Baz Muhammad Khan and another vs Noor Ali and another2019 PLJ SC 343, 2018 SCMR 1586 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-24
  specific performancenovation of contractarbitration awardtenancy rightscontractual obligationcivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the specific performance of an oral agreement to sell a shop. The respondent No. 1, a tenant, entered into an oral agreement to purchase the shop from the owner (respondent No. 2), but failed to complete the payment within the stipulated time. Subsequently, the parties referred the dispute to arbitration, resulting in an award where the respondent No. 1 agreed to vacate the premises in exchange for a specific monetary payment. This award remained unchallenged. The core legal question was whether the respondent No. 1 could maintain a suit for specific performance of the original oral agreement after the dispute had been settled by an arbitration award. The Supreme Court held that the suit was not maintainable, as the arbitration award constituted a novation of the contract. The Court established the principle that when parties mutually agree to substitute an existing contract with a new one, the original agreement is extinguished under Section 62 of the Contract Act 1872, precluding the enforcement of the earlier agreement unless rights thereunder were expressly reserved.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party seek specific performance of an original agreement after the dispute has been settled by an unchallenged arbitration award?
  • Does an arbitration award settling a dispute over a contract constitute a novation of that contract under Section 62 of the Contract Act 1872?
  • Is a party entitled to enforce an original agreement after entering into a subsequent agreement that substitutes the original terms?
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• Haji Baz Muhammad Khan & Haji Dad Muhammad Khan vs Noor Ali and Shakil Ahmed2018 SCP 1262 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-07-13
  specific performancenovation of contractarbitration awardtenancy rightscontractual obligationsuit maintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the specific performance of an oral agreement to sell a shop. The respondent No. 1, originally a tenant, entered into an oral agreement to purchase the property, which he failed to complete. Subsequently, the parties referred the dispute to arbitration, resulting in an award where the respondent No. 1 agreed to vacate the premises in exchange for a specified payment. This award remained unchallenged. Despite this, the respondent No. 1 later filed a suit for specific performance of the original oral agreement. The Supreme Court held that the arbitration award constituted a novation of the original contract. Under Section 62 of the Contract Act, 1872, the original agreement was extinguished, and the respondent No. 1's rights were limited to the terms of the arbitration award. Consequently, the suit for specific performance was not maintainable. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the lower court judgments, and directed the payment of the arbitration-awarded sum to the respondent No. 1, conditional upon the surrender of possession of the property.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unchallenged arbitration award regarding a disputed contract constitute a novation of the original agreement?
  • Can a party seek specific performance of an original contract after entering into a subsequent arbitration agreement that settles the dispute?
  • Under what circumstances does a new contract extinguish an existing one pursuant to Section 62 of the Contract Act 1872?
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• Haider Abbas vs Versus FPSC through its Chairman2018 SCP 1297 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-27
  CSS Competitive Examinationallocation of vacanciesquota systemmerit quotawomen quotareallocation of serviceFederal Public Service Commission
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, who appeared in the CSS Competitive Examination-2011 from the Gilgit-Baltistan-FATA region, was allocated to the Inland Revenue Service based on merit, whereas his first preference was the Foreign Service. He subsequently sought reallocation to a vacancy in the Foreign Service that arose due to the non-joining of a female candidate who had been selected against the women's quota, or alternatively, claimed that a vacancy should have been carried forward from the 2010 competitive examination. The Federal Public Service Commission rejected his representation, and the High Court dismissed his appeal. The Supreme Court upheld the lower decisions, holding that a vacancy reserved for a specific quota (such as the women's quota) cannot be claimed by a candidate on the general merit quota when it falls vacant, and that the calculation and allocation of vacancies for the 2010 examination were in accordance with the recruitment policy. The Court established that quota-specific vacancies must be filled within the same category upon a candidate's failure to join, and belated representations are barred by time.

  Questions settled

  • Can a candidate on the general merit quota claim a vacancy that originally arose and was reserved under the women's quota?
  • How are unutilized vacancies or fractions under specific regional quotas required to be handled in competitive examinations?
  • Whether a belated representation before the Federal Public Service Commission is maintainable.
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• Habib Bank Ltd. vs WRSM Trading Company, LLC and others2019 PLJ SC 45, 2018 CLD 1282 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-07-02
  banking court jurisdictionforeign finance recoveryfinancial institutioninterest-based transactionState Bank circularsforum non-conveniensterritorial jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court which dismissed the appellant bank's regular first appeal and upheld a Banking Court's order returning a plaint for lack of jurisdiction because the finance was extended by the bank's branch in Dubai, UAE. The core legal questions involved whether a Banking Court and the civil procedure laws cover financial transactions conducted by branches abroad of institutions incorporated in Pakistan, whether such interest-based agreements violated State Bank of Pakistan circulars rendering them void under contract law, and whether Banking Courts have jurisdiction over such matters. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Banking Court has jurisdiction over a customer residing in Pakistan for finance extended abroad, that State Bank circulars do not render interest-based agreements void under Section 23 of the Contract Act, and that special recovery laws encompass institutions operating through branches within or outside Pakistan. The Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter to the Banking Court for fresh adjudication, establishing the principle that recovery mechanisms apply to defaulting citizens residing in Pakistan irrespective of where the finance was originally disbursed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether section 20 of the C.P.C. is applicable to banking courts when exercising their jurisdiction?
  • Whether branches abroad of financial institutions incorporated in Pakistan fall within the definition of financial institutions under section 2(a) of the F.I.O., 2001?
  • Whether loans extended by such branches in Pakistan fall within the definition of finance under section 2(d) of the F.I.O., 2001?
  • Whether SBP BCD Circulars No. 13 and No. 32 have the force of law?
  • Whether interest-based agreements made outside Pakistan are void in terms of section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872?
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• Gulistan Textile Mills Ltd. vs Soneri Bank Ltd. and another2018 P.C.T.L.R. 165 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  banking recoveryinterim saleFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinanceres judicatainterlocutory orderspledged goodsspecial law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Banking Court order directing the interim sale of pledged or hypothecated goods during the pendency of a recovery suit. The core legal question is whether a Banking Court possesses the jurisdiction to order the interim sale of security before the final adjudication of a recovery suit under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The Supreme Court held that the Banking Court lacks such power. The Court reasoned that the Ordinance is a special, comprehensive code, and Section 16 exhaustively defines the interim measures available—such as restraint, attachment, and the appointment of receivers—which notably excludes the power of interim sale. The principle of generalia specialibus non derogant applies; the special provisions of the Ordinance displace general procedural laws like the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Furthermore, while res judicata applies to interlocutory applications, it does not bar a subsequent application if the prior dismissal was not on merits or if new facts or circumstances have emerged. The appeal was allowed, and the order for interim sale was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Banking Court have the jurisdiction to order the interim sale of pledged or hypothecated goods during the pendency of a recovery suit under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the principle of res judicata apply to interlocutory applications in banking recovery proceedings?
  • Can the general powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 be invoked by a Banking Court to order the interim sale of security, notwithstanding the provisions of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
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• Gulistan Textile Mills Ltd. and another vs Soneri Bank Ltd. and another2018 CLD 203, 2018 PCTLR 165, 2018 PLD 322, 2018 SCP 1040, 2018 PLJ SC 77 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  interim salerecovery of financesbanking courtpledged goodshypothecated goodsspecial lawgeneral lawres judicataleave to defendfinancial institutions ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, granted leave by the Supreme Court, concerned an interim order by a Banking Court directing the sale of goods allegedly pledged/hypothecated by a customer to a bank, pending adjudication of a recovery suit. The core legal questions were whether a Banking Court possesses the power to order interim sale of such property under Section 16 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, prior to judgment, and if the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) (Order XXXIX Rule 6 or Section 151) could be invoked. Additionally, the Court considered if a second application for sale was barred by res judicata. The Supreme Court held that Section 16 of the Ordinance does not grant Banking Courts the power to order interim sale of pledged/hypothecated goods before judgment, as its provisions are exhaustive and specific, overriding general CPC provisions. Sale is only permissible post-decree under Section 19(3) of the Ordinance. The Court further ruled that res judicata did not apply to the second application, as the first was dismissed as premature and new facts had emerged. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the interim sale order was set aside.

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• Gulistan Textile Mills Ltd and another vs Soneri Bank Ltd and another2018 CLD 203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001interim sale of securityBanking Court jurisdictionres judicatainterlocutory applicationspledged goodshypothecated goodsspecial law vs general law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a recovery suit filed by a financial institution against a borrower under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The core legal question was whether a Banking Court possesses the jurisdiction to order the interim sale of pledged or hypothecated goods during the pendency of a recovery suit. The Supreme Court held that the Banking Court lacks such authority. The Court reasoned that the Ordinance is a comprehensive special law that exhaustively lists permissible interim measures under Section 16, such as attachment, restraint, and the appointment of receivers, but notably excludes the power of sale. The Court emphasized that the power to sell security arises only after a decree is passed, pursuant to Section 19(3). Consequently, the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, regarding interim sales are inapplicable due to the principle of generalia specialibus non derogant. The Court further clarified that while the principle of res judicata applies to interlocutory applications, it does not bar subsequent applications if new facts emerge or if the prior dismissal was merely on the ground of prematurity.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Banking Court have the jurisdiction to order the interim sale of pledged or hypothecated goods during the pendency of a recovery suit under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the principle of res judicata apply to interlocutory applications in civil proceedings?
  • Can the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, be invoked to order the interim sale of security when the special law governing banking recovery provides exhaustive interim measures?
  • Does the dismissal of an interlocutory application on the ground of being 'premature' constitute a decision on merits that bars a subsequent application under the principle of res judicata?
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• Gulfam and another vs State2018 PLJ SC 57 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-04-12
  criminal appealmurderrobberybenefit of the doubtchance witnessesidentification paradedock identificationweapon recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  Criminal appeals were filed by leave of the Supreme Court against the judgments of the High Court upholding the conviction and death sentences of the appellants under Section 302(b) and Section 394 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and robbery. The core legal questions involved the reliability of chance witnesses, the legality of joint identification parades, the evidentiary value of dock identification after numerous witnesses, and the corroborative weight of unlinked weapon and vehicle recoveries. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the convictions and sentences, and acquitted the appellants by extending the benefit of the doubt. The Court held that presumptions regarding the source of light cannot replace proof in criminal cases, that joint identification parades of multiple accused are legally flawed, that identification in court is unsafe when witnesses testify late after seeing the accused in the dock, and that recoveries of weapons and vehicles without supporting connecting evidence (such as crime empties or specific descriptive FIR details) are inconsequential.

  Questions settled

  • Whether presumptions regarding the source of light can form the basis of a conviction in a criminal case?
  • Is a joint identification parade of multiple accused persons legally sustainable?
  • Is the identification of an accused person for the first time in court during trial considered safe and reliable?
  • What is the evidentiary value of the recovery of a weapon when no crime-empty is secured from the place of occurrence?
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• Government of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division_CBR House, Islamabad and others vs Muhammad Junaid Talat2018 SCP 1220 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-24
  tax evasioninformer rewarddefinite informationincome tax assessmenttax recoveryadministrative lawstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court judgment directing the payment of a reward to an informant who had identified non-payment of income tax by Pakistani seafarers. The core legal question was whether merely pointing out a category of persons failing to pay tax constitutes 'definite information' regarding 'tax evasion' sufficient to entitle an informant to a reward. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment. The Court held that the concept of 'tax evasion' requires the adoption of deceitful mechanisms or manipulation to reduce tax liability. Consequently, merely drawing the tax department's attention to a class of persons who have failed to pay tax does not constitute 'definite information' of tax evasion, as the department is already aware of its obligation to collect tax. The Court established that for an informant to be eligible for a reward, the information provided must lead to the discovery of concealed income or assets that were intentionally hidden from the tax authorities through manipulation, rather than merely identifying a general failure to pay tax.

  Questions settled

  • Does merely pointing out a category of persons failing to pay tax constitute 'definite information' of tax evasion?
  • What is the legal distinction between 'failure to pay tax' and 'tax evasion' in the context of claiming an informer's reward?
  • Is an informant entitled to a reward when the tax department was already aware of the tax liability but failed to collect it?
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• Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Energy and Power Department Peshawar and others vs Ihsan Ullar and others2018 PLC (C.S.) 354 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-05
  regularization of servicecontract employeesproject employeescivil servantsemi-autonomous bodystatutory interpretationdiscrimination
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Peshawar High Court judgment that ordered the regularization of contract employees of the Pakhtunkhwa Energy Development Organisation (PEDO), a semi-autonomous body. The core legal question was whether these project employees were entitled to regularization under Section 19(2) of the KPK Civil Servants Act, 1973. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision, holding that the respondents were not entitled to regularization. The Court reasoned that Section 19(2) applies exclusively to provincial government civil servants, not employees of semi-autonomous statutory bodies. Furthermore, the Court noted that the respondents were hired for temporary project posts, which are distinct from regular sanctioned posts. The key principles laid down are that the statutory fiction of regularization under Section 19(2) is limited to provincial government employees and does not extend to project employees of semi-autonomous organizations. Additionally, claims of discrimination require evidence that the claimant is similarly situated to those who received the benefit, which was not established in this case. The appeals were partly allowed, subject to a limited verification process.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 19(2) of the KPK Civil Servants Act, 1973 apply to employees of semi-autonomous bodies?
  • Are project employees of a provincial government department eligible for regularization under the KPK Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Does the KPK (Regularisation of Services) Act, 2009 cover project employees?
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• Government of K.P.K. through Secretary Home & Tribal Affairs Department2018 PLJ SC 54 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  pre-conviction detentionSection 382-B CrPCjail remissionsdiscriminatory treatmentrectification of omissionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The Government of KPK sought leave to appeal against the Peshawar High Court's judgment allowing the respondent the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 along with general and special remissions. The core legal questions concerned whether an omission by a court to grant the benefit of pre-conviction detention can be rectified through an independent petition without amounting to an impermissible review, and whether the recovery of a SIM-less cell phone from the jail premises justifies denying remissions. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that granting the benefit of pre-conviction detention under Section 382-B is mandatory unless reasons for refusal are recorded, and an inadvertent omission by the court can be rectified at any stage. Furthermore, denying remissions on flimsy grounds like possessing a SIM-less mobile phone constitutes discriminatory treatment prohibited under Article 25 of the Constitution. The key principles laid down are that the primary duty to apply correct law rests with the judges, and statutory benefits mandated by law cannot be denied due to technical court omissions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an omission by a court to grant the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be rectified through a subsequent petition?
  • Is it mandatory for a court to record reasons for refusing the benefit of pre-conviction detention under Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the possession of a cell phone without a SIM card inside prison premises constitute a valid ground for denying general and special remissions?
  • Does the denial of earned remissions to a prisoner while granting them to co-prisoners violate Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Ghee Corporation of Pakistan (Private) Ltd. vs Suraj Ghee Industries2018 CLD 1333, 2018 P.C.T.L.R. 1067, 2018 SCMR 1860 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-08-24
  winding up petitionarbitration awardprivatization agreementrecovery suitestoppelbona fidelocus standicompany law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment dismissing a winding-up petition filed by the petitioner against the respondent company. The core legal question was whether a winding-up petition remains maintainable when the underlying financial disputes between the parties have been resolved through arbitration and made a rule of court. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, holding that the winding-up petition was not filed bona fide but served as a pressure tactic. The Court established that winding-up proceedings cannot be utilized as a substitute for a recovery suit. Furthermore, a party that has consented to and participated in arbitration proceedings regarding the underlying disputes is estopped from subsequently filing a winding-up petition based on those same issues. The Court emphasized that once an arbitration award is made a rule of court, the petitioner may lose the requisite standing as a creditor to maintain such a petition, particularly when the grounds for winding up are inextricably linked to resolved disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Can winding-up proceedings be used as a substitute for a recovery suit?
  • Is a party estopped from filing a winding-up petition after consenting to and participating in arbitration proceedings regarding the same dispute?
  • Does an arbitration award made a rule of court affect the maintainability of a pending winding-up petition?
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• Gerry's International (Pvt.) Ltd vs Aeroflot Russian International Airlines2018 SCP 1089 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-20
  arbitration awardjudicial reviewarbitrator misconductwinding up petitionforeign company registrationCompanies Ordinance 1984Arbitration Act 1940specific performance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals arising from the enforcement of an arbitration award and subsequent winding-up proceedings against the appellant company. The core legal questions addressed the scope of judicial review regarding arbitration awards, the validity of arbitrator appointment under specific contractual clauses versus general statutory provisions, and the effect of a foreign company's non-registration under the Companies Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that courts cannot sit in appeal over an arbitrator's decision or re-evaluate evidence, as the arbitrator is the final judge of facts and law. Judicial interference is strictly limited to cases of patent illegality, misconduct, or errors apparent on the face of the award. The Court affirmed that specific contractual provisions regarding arbitrator appointment override general statutory provisions and that a foreign company's failure to register is a curable defect rather than a fatal one. The key principle laid down is that the judiciary must exercise restraint, avoiding a roving inquiry into the merits of an award, and should only intervene when the award is fundamentally flawed or the arbitrator has exceeded their jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court sit in appeal over an arbitration award to re-examine evidence or substitute its own view?
  • Does a specific contractual provision regarding the appointment of an arbitrator override general statutory provisions?
  • Is the failure of a foreign company to register under the Companies Ordinance a fatal defect that renders legal proceedings non-maintainable?
  • What constitutes misconduct by an arbitrator under the Arbitration Act 1940?
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• Gerry's International (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Aeroflot Russian International2018 SCMR 662 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-01
  arbitration awardsetting aside awardarbitrator misconductjurisdiction of courterror apparent on face of awardwinding upcompanies ordinanceforeign company registrationarbitrator appointmentcurable defect
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court heard appeals concerning an arbitration award made a rule of court and subsequent winding-up proceedings. The core legal questions revolved around the scope of Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, the court's jurisdiction in reviewing arbitration awards, grounds for arbitrator misconduct, the validity of arbitrator appointment by IATA, and the maintainability of a suit by an unregistered foreign company under the Companies Ordinance, 1984. The Court dismissed the appeal against the arbitration award, affirming that courts cannot sit in appeal over arbitrators' factual conclusions or re-evaluate evidence unless there is an error apparent on the face of the award or arbitrator misconduct. It held that specific provisions in an agreement for arbitrator appointment override general ones, and that non-registration of a foreign company under Section 451 of the Companies Ordinance is a curable defect. For the winding-up appeal, the Court granted the appellant a two-month opportunity to pay the decretal amount and costs to avoid the company's winding up.

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• Gerry's International (Pvt.) Ltd vs Aeroflot Russian International Airlines2018 P.C.T.L.R. 245 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-01
  arbitration awardrule of courtmisconduct of arbitratorpatent illegalitywinding upforeign company registrationcurable defect
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment resolves two interconnected civil appeals arising from a commercial dispute between Gerry's International (Pvt.) Ltd. and Aeroflot Russian International Airlines. The dispute originated from a General Sales Agreement (GSA) that was terminated, leading to arbitration proceedings and a subsequent unanimous award in favor of the respondent, which was made the rule of court. The appellant challenged the decree and the subsequent winding-up order initiated by the respondent under the Companies Ordinance 1984. The Supreme Court examined the scope of Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act 1940, clarifying that a court reviewing an arbitration award does not sit in appeal, cannot reappraise evidence, and must restrict its interference to patent illegalities or misconduct apparent on the face of the award. The Court also held that under the Companies Ordinance 1984, the failure of a foreign company to register is a curable defect that does not invalidate its contracts or permanently bar legal proceedings once cured. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal against the award and conditionally allowed the appellant two months to pay the decretal amount to avoid winding up.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of the court's jurisdiction when deciding whether to make an arbitration award the rule of court under the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • Can a court reviewing an arbitration award re-examine and reappraise the evidence considered by the arbitrator to substitute its own view?
  • Whether the failure of a foreign company to register under Section 451 of the Companies Ordinance 1984 is an incurable defect that permanently bars it from initiating legal proceedings?
  • Does a specific contractual provision regarding the appointment of an arbitrator override a general governing law clause in the same agreement?
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• G. M. Niaz vs The State2018 SCMR 506 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-09
  Criminal appealMurderReappraisal of evidenceBenefit of doubtOcular evidenceChance witnessMedical evidenceDelayed FIRMotiveAcquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant for murder under Section 302(b), P.P.C., where the High Court had reduced his death sentence to life imprisonment. The core legal question involved a reappraisal of the evidence to determine if the prosecution had proven its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court found that the prosecution failed to establish its case. The ocular account provided by closely related and chance witnesses was deemed unreliable, as their presence at the scene was not established and was contradicted by the fact that the deceased was taken to the hospital by a police constable. Medical evidence also conflicted with the ocular account, showing unexplained blunt weapon injuries and a delayed post-mortem. Further doubts arose from a seven-hour forty-minute delay in lodging the FIR, unproven motive, inconsequential weapon recovery due to the absence of crime-empties, and unproven abscondance. The Court noted that the defense version, suggesting the appellant acted in response to an attempted rape on his sister, gained credence from the lack of blood-stained earth and clothes. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted by extending the benefit of doubt.

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• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Federal2018 PTD 1403 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-06
  burden of proofcustoms dutyimport restrictionorigin of goodsfactual disputeconstitutional jurisdictionimport policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a High Court judgment that placed the burden of proof on Customs authorities to establish the "Indian origin" of imported textile products, thereby exempting the importers from proving their claimed Chinese origin. The core legal question concerns the allocation of the burden of proof regarding the origin of imported goods under the Customs Act, 1969, and relevant import policies. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s approach was erroneous. It determined that the primary onus of proof rests upon the importer, who possesses the specific knowledge and documentation regarding the manufacturer, shipper, and movement of goods. The Court emphasized that the Customs Act empowers authorities to demand information to verify import legality, and the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, reinforces that the party with special knowledge bears the burden. Consequently, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the adjudicating authority to resolve the factual dispute regarding the origin of the goods.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proving the origin of imported goods lie with the Customs authorities or the importer?
  • Can a High Court decide a serious factual dispute regarding the origin of imported goods in the exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Are importers required to provide documentation to establish the place of manufacture or production of imported goods under the Rules of Origin, 1973?
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• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence and another vs Bashir Ahmed, Sba in Mes, Ministry of Defence, Ge(Army), Nowshera2018 PLC (C.S.) 93 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-04-18
  unauthorized absencecompulsory retirementabsconsiondisciplinary proceedingsservice tribunalcriminal casecivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arises from a service dispute where the respondent, a civil servant, was involved in a criminal murder case and remained absent from duty without authorization, subsequently becoming an absconder. Following departmental disciplinary proceedings, the respondent was compulsorily retired from service. The Service Tribunal converted the major penalty of compulsory retirement into a minor penalty of withholding increments and ordered his reinstatement, viewing his absence as justified due to criminal charges and enmity. The core legal question was whether unauthorized absence from duty resulting from absconsion in a criminal case can be condoned and justified for setting aside departmental disciplinary action. The Supreme Court held that absconding and remaining a fugitive from law cannot be regarded as a reasonable ground to explain or condone absence from duty, as doing so would put a premium on unlawful conduct. The Court accordingly converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, set aside the Service Tribunal's judgment, and restored the departmental penalty of compulsory retirement, laying down the principle that absconsion from criminal proceedings does not constitute a valid defense against departmental action for unauthorized absence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether unauthorized absence from duty resulting from absconsion in a criminal case can be condoned in departmental proceedings?
  • Does being a fugitive from law constitute a reasonable ground to explain absence from service?
  • Can the Service Tribunal convert a major penalty of compulsory retirement into a minor penalty on the ground of criminal involvement and subsequent acquittal?
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• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Capital Administration and Development Division, Islamabad and others vs Nusrat Tahir and others2018 SCMR 691 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-17
  Health AllowanceCivil ServantsLocus PoenitentiaeService TribunalExecutive FiatVested RightStatutory Interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals by the Federal Government challenging Federal Service Tribunal judgments that affirmed the entitlement of Directorate General of Special Education (DGSE) employees to a 'Health Allowance.' The core legal question was whether these employees, engaged in the education and rehabilitation of disabled persons, qualified as 'health personnel' under the Federal Government's Office Memoranda dated 04.02.2012 and 06.02.2012, which granted the allowance to health personnel in the BPS scheme. The Court held that the respondents were entitled to the allowance, as the definition of 'health personnel' incorporated by reference from the Career Structure for Health Personnel Scheme Ordinance, 2011, broadly covered those delivering services in the health sector, including the respondents. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the executive is barred by the doctrine of locus poenitentiae from unilaterally rescinding a benefit once it has been conferred and acted upon, absent a change in the underlying eligibility criteria. Consequently, the Court affirmed the respondents' entitlement, dismissing the government's attempts to restrict the allowance to specific hospital staff.

  Questions settled

  • Does the doctrine of locus poenitentiae prevent the executive from unilaterally withdrawing a benefit once it has been conferred and acted upon?
  • Are employees of the Directorate General of Special Education entitled to the Health Allowance granted to health personnel under the Federal Government's Office Memoranda of 2012?
  • Does the definition of 'health personnel' under the Career Structure for Health Personnel Scheme Ordinance, 2011, extend to staff engaged in the rehabilitation of disabled persons?
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• Fayyaz Hussain, etc. vs Haji Jan Muhammad and others2018 P.S.C. 346 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  limited ownercustomary inheritanceallotment of landlast male ownersettlement schemelimitationinheritance
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal concerns the inheritance rights of a deceased landowner’s estate, originally situated in India. The core legal question was whether the estate was governed by custom or Sharia, and whether land allotted in Pakistan in lieu of such property conferred full or limited ownership upon the widow. The Supreme Court held that the inheritance was governed by custom, rendering the widow a "limited owner." Consequently, the property allotted in Pakistan retained its character as a limited estate, which must devolve upon the heirs of the last male owner, Shahab-ud-Din, rather than the widow's heirs. The Court affirmed that with the enforcement of the Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Removal of Difficulties) Act, 1975, heirs of the last male owner automatically become co-sharers, creating a recurring cause of action that prevents the claim from being time-barred. The principle established is that property allotted to a limited owner in lieu of an abandoned limited estate in India devolves upon the heirs of the last male owner under the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962.

  Questions settled

  • Whether property allotted in Pakistan in lieu of a limited estate held in India confers full or limited ownership?
  • Does the inheritance of a deceased person governed by custom devolve upon the heirs of the last male owner or the limited owner's heirs?
  • Are claims by heirs of the last male owner regarding property held by a limited owner barred by limitation under the Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Removal of Difficulties) Act, 1975?
  • Can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Fayyaz Hussain and others vs Fayyaz Hussain and others2018 PSC 346, 2018 SCMR 698 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-30
  limited ownercustomary lawinheritancelast male ownerallotment of landsettlement schemelimitationShariat law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the inheritance of agricultural land originally owned by Shahab-ud-Din, who died in 1918. The core legal question was whether the estate was governed by custom or Sharia, and consequently, whether the widow, Mst. Imam Sain, held the property as a full owner or a limited owner under custom. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the devolution of property after Shahab-ud-Din's death occurred under custom, rendering Mst. Imam Sain a limited owner. The Court held that property allotted to a limited owner in Pakistan in lieu of land abandoned in India retains its character as a limited estate, which, upon the owner's death, must devolve upon the heirs of the last male owner, not the heirs of the limited owner. Furthermore, the Court clarified that heirs of the last male owner are not required to initiate separate proceedings under the Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Removal of Difficulties) Act, 1975, as they automatically become co-sharers upon the Act's enforcement, with a recurring cause of action.

  Questions settled

  • Does property allotted to a limited owner in Pakistan in lieu of land abandoned in India devolve upon the heirs of the limited owner or the heirs of the last male owner?
  • Are heirs of the last male owner required to initiate proceedings under the Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Removal of Difficulties) Act, 1975, to claim their inheritance?
  • Does the enforcement of the Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Removal of Difficulties) Act, 1975, create a recurring cause of action for the heirs of the last male owner?
  • Can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, if the lower courts misinterpreted the law?
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• Fayyaz Ahmad vs The State2018 PLJ SC 49, 2021 P SC (Crl.) 619, 2017 SCMR 2026 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-09-13
  circumstantial evidencelast seen evidencemurdercapital punishmentbenefit of doubtre-appraisal of evidenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court which maintained the appellant's conviction and sentence of life imprisonment under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for an un-witnessed murder relying on circumstantial evidence and last-seen theory. The core legal questions involved the standard of proof required for circumstantial evidence, the evidentiary value of uncorroborated last-seen evidence, and the reliability of an improbable prosecution narrative in a capital case. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant, holding that the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence without missing links, and that uncorroborated last-seen evidence and flawed investigations are insufficient to sustain a capital conviction. The key principles laid down include the strict criteria for evaluating circumstantial and last-seen evidence, the necessity of independent corroboration, and the imperative that any reasonable doubt arising from fatal infirmities in the prosecution case must be resolved in favor of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • What is the standard of proof required for circumstantial evidence to sustain a capital conviction?
  • Can an accused be convicted solely on uncorroborated last-seen evidence in a murder case?
  • What principles must the prosecution satisfy when relying on the last-seen theory?
  • How should courts treat multiple inconclusive police investigations when evaluating the guilt of an accused?
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• Fayyaz Ahmad vs State2018 PLJ SC 49 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-09-13
  circumstantial evidencelast seen evidencecapital punishmentbenefit of doubtmurderre-appraisal of evidenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court maintaining the appellant's conviction for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution case rested entirely on un-witnessed circumstantial evidence, specifically the 'last seen' theory and a belatedly introduced motive. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a conviction for a capital charge could be sustained on weak, uncorroborated circumstantial evidence fraught with missing links and fatal infirmities. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution miserably failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt, noting that the chain of circumstantial evidence was broken, multiple investigations were inconclusive, the medical evidence contradicted the prosecution's timeline, and the recovery of the crime weapon was unreliable. The Court laid down that to sustain a capital conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must form an unbroken chain connecting the accused to the crime, and 'last seen' evidence must satisfy strict foundational criteria and be corroborated by independent, unimpeachable evidence. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for a capital charge can be sustained solely on uncorroborated circumstantial evidence?
  • What are the fundamental principles and legal obligations the prosecution must fulfill when relying on 'last seen' evidence?
  • Does an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence require every link to be conclusively established without missing parts?
  • What is the effect of inconclusive multiple police investigations on the credibility of a prosecution case in a criminal trial?
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