Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muhammad Iqbal vs The State and others2017 SC MR 1932 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-10
  post-arrest bailabetmentfurther inquirybelated statementscriminal conspiracymurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition for leave to appeal directed against the dismissal of the petitioner's post-arrest bail application in a case involving offenses under sections 302 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who was not named in the initial FIR and whose implication rested on belated statements and contradictory versions regarding abetment, made out a case for further inquiry under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court held that due to significant delays in recording witness statements, contradictions regarding the place of the alleged conspiracy, and the absence of any overt act attributed to the petitioner during the actual occurrence, the case fell within the ambit of further inquiry. The appeal was consequently allowed and the petitioner admitted to bail. The key principle laid down is that contradictory belated statements regarding abetment without overt acts during the occurrence warrant the grant of post-arrest bail under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

  Questions settled

  • Does a case involving contradictory belated statements regarding abetment and no overt act during the occurrence fall within the ambit of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • Whether an accused not named in the initial FIR and implicated months later through delayed witness statements is entitled to post-arrest bail?
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• Muhammad Iqbal and others vs Mst. Baseerat and others2017 SCMR 367 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-08-24
  civil suitsale deedunregistered agreement to sellrevisional jurisdictiontransfer of propertyregistration of documentstitle to propertywill
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit challenging a registered sale deed in favor of the respondents. The appellants claimed ownership through a will executed by their grandfather, who allegedly purchased the property from the original allottee via an unregistered agreement to sell. While the Trial and Appellate Courts decreed the suit in favor of the appellants, the High Court reversed these findings in its revisional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High Court's decision, clarifying that the matter concerned the correct application of law rather than mere appreciation of evidence. The Court held that under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, an unregistered agreement to sell does not confer any title or right to immovable property. Furthermore, reading Section 17 and Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, the Court affirmed that without a registered instrument, no valid title could pass to the grandfather, thereby rendering the subsequent will and the challenge to the respondents' registered deed legally unsustainable.

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• Muhammad Iqbal alias Bala Bandri vs The State and others2017 SCMR 1939 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-09-06
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirycriminal appealsudden occurrencebail bondinvestigation finalization
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the refusal of post-arrest bail by the Lahore High Court in a case involving offences under the Pakistan Penal Code. The petitioner sought bail in a case registered under sections 302, 354, 147, 148, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court examined the record and noted that the petitioner was allegedly armed with a hockey stick, which was not blood-stained upon recovery. The court observed that the deceased had intervened in a pre-existing brawl, the injury caused by the petitioner was not fatal, and the petitioner was not connected to the stated motive. Furthermore, the initial report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 cited section 322, not 302, and the petitioner had been in custody for over a year with the investigation finalized. The Court held that the case warranted further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the petition was converted into an appeal, allowed, and the petitioner was admitted to bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of blood on an alleged weapon of offence constitute grounds for further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be granted when the initial police report cited a different offence than the subsequent challan?
  • Is the completion of investigation and submission of a challan a relevant factor in determining the necessity of continued physical custody for bail purposes?
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• Muhammad Ilyas vs Muhammad Abid alias Billa and others2017 SCMR 54 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-01-13
  acquittalleave to appealinquest reportpost-mortem examinationchance witnessessuppression of injuriesreasonable doubtforensic science laboratory
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal was filed by the complainant against the acquittal of the respondents. The core legal question concerned whether the prosecution had established its case beyond reasonable doubt given significant procedural and evidentiary discrepancies. The Supreme Court observed that the absence of the time of death in the Inquest Report suggested the FIR was not registered at the time of its preparation. Furthermore, a nine-hour delay in the post-mortem examination indicated potential time spent fabricating the prosecution story. The Court noted that the eyewitnesses were chance witnesses who failed to justify their presence at the scene. Crucially, the prosecution suppressed injuries sustained by respondent No. 1, which were medically verified by a defense witness. Additionally, contradictions between witnesses, unproven motive, and the delayed dispatch of crime-empties to the Forensic Science Laboratory further weakened the case. The Court held that the High Court's conclusion regarding the failure of the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt was sound. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused.

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• Muhammad Hanif Abbasi vs Jahangir Khan Tareen and others2017 SCP 4000 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-15
  quo-warrantodisqualification of parliamentarianArticle 62(1)(f)non-disclosure of assetsbeneficial ownershipoff-shore companyinsider tradingjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition, filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, sought the disqualification of a member of the National Assembly on grounds of dishonesty, specifically alleging insider trading, tax evasion, and non-disclosure of assets. The core legal question was whether the respondent’s conduct and failure to declare an off-shore company and its associated property in his nomination papers rendered him disqualified under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the respondent was the true beneficial owner of the off-shore company and the property, and his failure to disclose these assets in his nomination papers, coupled with his false statement before the Court regarding his beneficial interest in the trust arrangement, constituted dishonesty. Consequently, the Court declared the respondent disqualified from being a member of the National Assembly. The judgment establishes that the constitutional requirement of 'honesty' for parliamentarians is substantive; non-disclosure of assets and misleading the Court are antithetical to this requirement, warranting disqualification under the Court's quo-warranto jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a writ of quo-warranto is maintainable against a member of Parliament for disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution?
  • Does the failure to disclose beneficial ownership of an off-shore company in nomination papers constitute dishonesty under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution?
  • Can a 'without prejudice' communication be used as an admission of liability in quo-warranto proceedings?
  • Does the burden of proving facts especially within the knowledge of a person lie upon that person under Article 122 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
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• Muhammad Hanif Abbasi vs Imran Khan Niazi and others2017 SCP 4001 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-15
  quo warrantodisqualification of member of parliamentforeign fundingpolitical parties regulationnon-disclosure of assetsArticle 184(3) jurisdictionElection Commission of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution sought the disqualification of Imran Khan Niazi as a member of the National Assembly, alleging he failed to disclose assets (Niazi Services Limited), received prohibited foreign funding for his political party (PTI), and made false declarations regarding property ownership. The core legal questions concerned the mechanism for determining if a party is "foreign-aided," the ECP's jurisdiction to scrutinize political party accounts for prohibited contributions, and whether the Respondent’s alleged non-disclosures rendered him dishonest under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the declaration of a "foreign-aided party" under the Political Parties Order, 2002 (PPO) requires a formal declaration by the Federal Government and a subsequent reference to the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the Court held that the ECP is the competent forum to determine prohibited funding under the PPO. The Court laid down that disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) requires proof of intentional dishonesty rather than mere technical omissions, and that the ECP retains continuous supervisory jurisdiction to scrutinize political party accounts.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Election Commission of Pakistan the competent forum to determine if a political party has received prohibited contributions under the Political Parties Order, 2002?
  • Does the failure to disclose an asset acquired prior to becoming a member of the National Assembly automatically constitute dishonesty under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution?
  • What is the required mechanism for declaring a political party to be a 'foreign-aided political party' under the Political Parties Order, 2002?
  • Does an agreement to sell immovable property create a proprietary interest that must be disclosed in a statement of assets and liabilities?
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• Muhammad Farid Khan vs Muhammad Ibrahim etc.2017 SCMR 679 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-11-30
  bail cancellationpost-arrest bailSection 497(5) Cr.P.C.liberty of personjudicial discretioncriminal lawSupreme Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arose from a challenge to a High Court order declining the cancellation of bail previously granted to the respondents. The primary legal issue was whether the High Court exercised its discretion properly in maintaining the bail order. The Supreme Court held that the parameters for the cancellation of bail are significantly more stringent than those for the initial grant of bail. It was observed that once a competent court grants bail, it should not be cancelled unless the order is perverse, arbitrary, or suffers from a jurisdictional defect, or if the accused has misused the concession of bail by interfering with the investigation or threatening witnesses. The Court emphasized that the cancellation of bail involves the withdrawal of liberty already granted, requiring strong and exceptional circumstances. Finding no illegality or irregularity in the impugned order, the Supreme Court refused to interfere and dismissed the petition. The judgment reinforces the principle that bail cancellation requires proof of the order being patently illegal or the accused's conduct being prejudicial to a fair trial.

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• Muhammad Asif vs The State2017 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-18
  criminal appealmurderappreciation of evidenceinterested witnessesacquittal of co-accusedindependent corroborationmedical evidencebenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a murder conviction where the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment by the High Court, modifying the trial court's death sentence. The core legal question concerns the reliability of interested and related eye-witness testimony when co-accused have been acquitted on the same evidence, and in the absence of independent corroboration. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant, holding that the conduct of the alleged eye-witnesses ran counter to normal human behavior, the best independent evidence was withheld, the medical evidence and time of occurrence did not match, and witnesses disbelieved regarding co-accused cannot be relied upon against another without unimpeachable independent corroboration. The key principles laid down include the rule on the indivisibility of credibility of witnesses, the requirement of independent corroboration after acquittal of co-accused on the same evidence, and the necessity for proper serological matching of blood groups for forensic evidence to be incriminating.

  Questions settled

  • Can interested and related eye-witnesses be relied upon to convict an accused when co-accused in the same transaction have been acquitted on the basis of the same evidence?
  • Does the failure to produce independent eye-watchers available to the prosecution draw an adverse inference against the prosecution's case?
  • Is inconclusive serological and chemical examiner reporting regarding blood-stained weapons sufficient to serve as corroboratory evidence without group matching?
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• Muhammad Asif vs The State, etc2017 P.S.C. (Crl.) 120 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-18
  criminal appealmurderappreciation of evidencefalsus in uno falsus in omnibusacquittalcorroborationeyewitness testimonybenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which had converted the appellant's death sentence into life imprisonment for a murder committed during a night incident. The core legal questions involved the appreciation of evidence concerning unnatural conduct of eyewitnesses, the application of the principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus regarding co-accused who were acquitted on the same evidence, and the reliability of delayed and interested testimony. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant. The Court held that once prosecution witnesses are disbelieved regarding acquitted co-accused who are real brothers, their testimony cannot be relied upon against another co-accused without independent, unimpeachable corroboration, which was lacking in this case. The key principles laid down include that the unnatural conduct of related eyewitnesses following a victim at night, the withholding of independent eye-witnesses, inconsistencies in medical evidence regarding the time of death, and failure to establish motive or reliable recovery render a conviction unsafe, establishing that tainted evidence against one co-accused cannot sustain the conviction of another without strong corroboration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of eyewitnesses disbelieved with respect to an acquitted co-accused can be relied upon against another co-accused without independent corroboration?
  • Does the unnatural conduct of close relatives following a victim at night create a fatal doubt in the prosecution's case?
  • Whether inconsistencies between medical evidence and ocular testimony regarding the time of death warrant an acquittal?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained when the alleged motive is weak and unproven, and independent eyewitnesses are withheld by the prosecution?
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• Muhammad Asif vs State2017 PLJ SC 370 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-18
  criminal appealappreciation of evidenceinterested witnessescorroborationacquittalmedical evidenceforensic reportbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for murder, which was modified by the Lahore High Court from a death sentence to life imprisonment. The core legal question concerns whether the testimony of interested witnesses, who were previously disbelieved regarding the acquittal of co-accused, can sustain a conviction without independent, unimpeachable corroboration. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court found the eye-witnesses' presence and conduct unnatural, noting the unexplained failure to produce independent witnesses and the inconsistency between medical evidence and the alleged time of occurrence. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that once prosecution witnesses are disbelieved regarding one co-accused, their testimony cannot be relied upon against others without strong, independent corroboration. The Court also criticized the investigation for failing to link forensic evidence, specifically noting that chemical examiner reports are inconclusive without serological matching of blood groups. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the appellant, establishing that interested testimony, once discredited, requires independent corroboration to support a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of prosecution witnesses be relied upon to convict an accused if those same witnesses were disbelieved regarding the involvement of co-accused in the same occurrence?
  • Does the failure to produce independent witnesses who were present at the scene create an adverse inference against the prosecution's case?
  • Is a chemical examiner's report sufficient to link a crime weapon to a victim without serological evidence confirming the blood group matches?
  • What is the legal effect of unexplained delay in recording the statements of eye-witnesses by the police?
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• Muhammad Ashraf Javeed and another vs Muhammad Umar and others2017 SCMR 1999 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-08-31
  criminal appealmurder convictionocular accountbenefit of doubtappraisal of evidencedelayed FIRacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC), where the appellant was sentenced to death by the Trial Court, later commuted to life imprisonment by the High Court for the alleged murder of the deceased using an iron rod. The core legal question concerned the reliability of the ocular account and the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction. The Supreme Court found the prosecution's case riddled with factual and legal infirmities, noting the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, the lack of independent corroboration for the ocular account, and the failure to secure the alleged source of light at the crime scene. Furthermore, the medical evidence was inconclusive, with the autopsy suggesting the injury could have resulted from a fall. Emphasizing that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the Court held that the evidence was undependable. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted, establishing that where prosecution evidence is weak and lacks unimpeachable corroboration, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does a significant delay in lodging an FIR, without adequate explanation, cast doubt on the prosecution's case?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the ocular account is inconsistent with the medical evidence and lacks independent corroboration?
  • Is an acquittal warranted when the prosecution fails to produce independent evidence to corroborate the motive and the circumstances of the crime?
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• Muhammad Arif Idress & others vs Sohail Aamir and others2017 PLJ SC 542, 2017 SCMR 1379, 2017 SCP 916 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-04-21
  contempt of courthajj policyhajj group organizersmonopolyfundamental rightscompetition commissionquota allocation
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses Criminal Original Petitions seeking contempt proceedings under Article 204 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, read with Section 3 of the Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003, against government officials for allegedly violating the Supreme Court's earlier judgment in Dossani Travels (Pvt.) Ltd v. M/s Travels Shop (Pvt.) Ltd. The core legal question concerned whether the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) acted in contempt and violated fundamental rights by exclusively allocating the private Hajj quota to members of the Hajj Group Organizers Association of Pakistan (HOAP), thereby depriving newly enrolled, non-quota holder HGOs—including the petitioners—of participation and fair competition. The Supreme Court held that granting monopolies in the private Hajj sector to an exclusive association violates Articles 18 and 25 of the Constitution and defies the competition guidelines mandated in previous judgments. The Court directed MORA to review and reframe its Hajj policy to allocate quotas fairly to all eligible HGOs. The key principle laid down is that the state cannot create artificial monopolies or discriminate against newly enrolled, qualified business operators in violation of fundamental trade and equality rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the exclusive allocation of Hajj quotas to a specific association of tour operators violates the fundamental rights to freedom of trade and equality under the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Does the failure of the Ministry of Religious Affairs to follow previously mandated Supreme Court guidelines and Competition Commission recommendations regarding Hajj policy formulation constitute contempt of court?
  • Can the government create an artificial monopoly in the private Hajj sector to the detriment of newly enrolled and qualified Hajj Group Organizers?
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• Muhammad Arif Idrees and others vs Sohail Aamir and others2017 SCMR 1379 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-04-21
  Hajj quota allocationContempt of courtFreedom of tradeEquality before lawMonopolyHajj Group OrganizersAdministrative policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns contempt of court petitions filed against the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) for failing to implement Supreme Court directives regarding the allocation of Hajj quotas. The petitioners, enrolled Hajj Group Organizers (HGOs), alleged that MORA violated previous judgments by exclusively allocating the private sector Hajj quota to established members of the Hajj Group Organizers Association of Pakistan (HOAP), thereby excluding new entrants. The core legal question was whether this monopolistic allocation violated constitutional guarantees of equality and fair competition, as well as specific judicial mandates to ensure transparency. The Court held that the government's continued exclusion of non-quota holder HGOs lacked rational justification and contravened the principles of fair competition and equality. While finding the respondents’ conduct prima facie violative of previous orders, the Court adopted a lenient approach, directing the government to reframe its Hajj policy within thirty days. The key principle laid down is that government policy must not create arbitrary monopolies; it must ensure a level playing field, adhere to Competition Commission recommendations, and comply with constitutional mandates under Articles 18 and 25.

  Questions settled

  • Does the exclusive allocation of Hajj quotas to established Hajj Group Organizers violate the constitutional right to equality?
  • Can the government create a monopoly in the Hajj services sector to the exclusion of other qualified private operators?
  • Is the government's Hajj policy subject to the guidelines and recommendations of the Competition Commission of Pakistan?
  • Does the enrollment of Hajj Group Organizers create a legitimate expectancy for a share in the national Hajj quota?
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• Muhammad Anwar vs The State2017 SCMR 630 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-12-13
  murderdeath sentence reductionimprisonment for lifemitigating circumstancesreappraisal of evidenceprompt FIRocular accountcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, Muhammad Anwar, challenged his conviction and sentence of death for the murder of his real brother, Muhammad Javed Iqbal, which had been concurrently upheld by the High Court. The core legal questions involved the reappraisal of evidence regarding ocular testimony, prompt lodging of the FIR, corroborating medical evidence, and the existence of mitigating circumstances justifying the commutation of the death sentence to imprisonment for life. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the prosecution successfully established the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt through credible eye-witnesses and medical evidence, and the concurrent findings of guilt by the courts below warranted no interference. However, noting mitigating factors—including the single shot fired without repetition, the withholding of an eye-witness son, an antecedent altercation involving abuses hurled at the appellant's and deceased's father, and contributory provocation by the deceased—the Court dismissed the appeal regarding the conviction but partly allowed it by reducing the sentence of death to imprisonment for life, while granting the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and modifying the default sentence for compensation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of guilt by the lower courts based on prompt ocular testimony and medical evidence warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove the recovery of the weapon of offence vitiate an otherwise strong murder case?
  • Can an antecedent altercation and verbal abuse directed at the father of both the deceased and the accused constitute a mitigating circumstance for reducing a sentence of death to imprisonment for life?
  • Whether the withholding of a material witness by the prosecution can be considered in exercising caution regarding the quantum of sentence?
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• Muhammad Anwar vs Safeer Ahmed and 5 others2017 SCMR 404 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-09-05
  pre-emptionTalb-i-Muwathibatsource of informationpleadings in pre-emptionpre-emption suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal arose from a Suit for Possession through Pre-emption filed by the Petitioner. The Trial Court decreed the suit, and the First Appellate Court upheld the decision. However, the High Court allowed the Respondents' Regular Second Appeal and dismissed the suit. The primary legal issue was whether the omission of the source of information (informant's name) regarding the sale in the plaint was fatal to the suit, and whether Talb-i-Muwathibat was validly performed. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that Talb-i-Muwathibat is a sine qua non for a pre-emption suit. The Court reiterated that the time, date, place, and source of information of the sale must be specifically pleaded in the plaint. As the Petitioner failed to disclose the source of information and the evidence showed prior knowledge of the sale, Talb-i-Muwathibat was not proved in accordance with law. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is it mandatory to disclose the source of information regarding a sale in the plaint of a suit for pre-emption?
  • Whether the failure to specify the source of information in a pre-emption plaint invalidates the claim of Talb-i-Muwathibat?
  • Can a suit for possession through pre-emption succeed if Talb-i-Muwathibat is not proved to have been effected in accordance with law?
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• Muhammad Ali vs The State2017 SCMR 1468 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-22
  murdersection 302(b) PPCchance witnessesrelated witnessesbenefit of doubtacquittalreappraisal of evidencemotive
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave arose out of the conviction and life imprisonment sentence of the appellant under Section 302(b) PPC for the murder of a woman. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court pertained to whether the testimonies of related chance witnesses who failed to offer any explanation for their presence at the uninhabited scene of occurrence could be relied upon without independent corroboration, and the effect of unproven motive and discarded recovery evidence. Reappraising the evidence, the Supreme Court held that related chance witnesses who offer no credible reason for being present at an open, uninhabited place of occurrence cannot be believed without independent corroboration. Since the prosecution also failed to prove the alleged motive and the recovery of the weapon was discredited, no evidence remained to establish guilt. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant by extending the benefit of doubt. The key principle laid down is that related chance witnesses who do not explain their presence at the crime scene cannot sustain a conviction without independent corroboration.

  Questions settled

  • Can related chance witnesses who fail to explain their presence at the scene of crime be relied upon without independent corroboration?
  • What is the effect on the prosecution case when the alleged motive and weapon recovery are both unproven or discredited?
  • Can a conviction for murder under Section 302(b) PPC be sustained solely on uncorroborated testimony of planted or chance witnesses?
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• Muhammad Akram vs DCO, Rahim Yar Khan and others2017 NLR Service 1, 2017 P.S.C. 203, 2017 SCMR 56, 2017 PLC (C.S.) 692 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-10-17
  Dismissal from serviceDepartmental appealWrit petitionLimitationConversion of proceedingsService TribunalPEEDA ActEx debito justitiaeCondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This service matter concerned a petitioner dismissed from service under Section 4(b)(vi) of the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2009 (PEEDA Act, 2006), who initially filed a writ petition instead of a departmental appeal. The High Court directed the writ petition to be treated as a departmental appeal and remitted it to the DCO, Rahim Yar Khan, who decided it on merits but also noted that no formal appeal under Section 16 of the PEEDA Act, 2006, had been filed. The Punjab Service Tribunal (PST) subsequently dismissed the appeal solely on limitation grounds. The core legal question was whether the PST erred in dismissing the appeal on limitation when the High Court had directed the writ petition, filed within the appeal's limitation period, to be treated as a departmental appeal. The Supreme Court held that courts possess the authority to convert one type of proceeding into another to do justice (ex debito justitiae) and remedy a wrong, and time spent pursuing a remedy before a wrong forum can be condoned. It ruled that once the High Court ordered the writ petition, filed within time, to be treated as a departmental appeal, the date of filing the writ petition should be reckoned as the date of the departmental appeal. The PST erred in dismissing the appeal on limitation without addressing merits. The impugned PST decision was set aside, and the service appeal was deemed pending for decision on merits.

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• Muhammad Akram vs DCO, Rahim Yar Khan & others2017 PLJ SC 68 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-10-17
  service lawdepartmental appeallimitation periodwrit jurisdictionconversion of proceedingsPunjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006service tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Junior Clerk, was dismissed from service under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006. Instead of filing a departmental appeal under Section 16 of the Act, he filed a writ petition, which the High Court subsequently ordered to be treated as a departmental appeal. The appellate authority dismissed the appeal on merits while noting that no formal departmental appeal had been filed. The Punjab Service Tribunal later dismissed the petitioner's appeal solely on the ground of limitation. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal erred by ignoring the High Court's order to treat the writ petition as a departmental appeal. The Court affirmed that courts are sanctuaries of justice with the inherent authority to convert proceedings between different forums to ensure the remedy of wrongs. Since the writ petition was filed within the limitation period for a departmental appeal, it should have been treated as such for all purposes. Consequently, the Tribunal's decision was set aside, and the case was remanded for a decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court order a writ petition to be treated as a departmental appeal?
  • Should time spent pursuing a remedy before a wrong forum be condoned in service matters?
  • Does a Service Tribunal have the authority to dismiss an appeal on limitation grounds when the underlying proceeding was filed within time?
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• Muhammad Akram vs D.C.O., Rahim Yar Khan and others2017 P.S.C. 203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-10-17
  service lawdepartmental appeallimitation periodconversion of proceedingswrit jurisdictionPEEDA Actservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the dismissal of a civil servant under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006. The petitioner, instead of filing a departmental appeal, initially approached the High Court via a writ petition within the limitation period. The High Court ordered the writ petition to be treated as a departmental appeal. The Appellate Authority decided the matter on merits but simultaneously observed that no formal departmental appeal had been filed, which led the Punjab Service Tribunal to dismiss the subsequent service appeal on the ground of limitation. The Supreme Court held that courts possess the authority to convert proceedings to ensure justice and that a writ petition filed within the limitation period for a departmental appeal, when converted by a court, must be treated as a timely filed appeal for all practical purposes. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's decision, ruling that the service appeal should be decided on its merits rather than being dismissed on technical grounds of limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court convert a writ petition into a departmental appeal?
  • Should a writ petition filed within the limitation period for a departmental appeal be treated as a timely filed appeal when converted by court order?
  • Is a Service Tribunal justified in dismissing an appeal on limitation grounds when the underlying proceeding was initiated within the statutory limitation period?
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• Muhammad Akhtar vs The State and others2017 SCMR 161 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-07
  narcotic possessionrecoverychemical examiner reportleave to appealprosecution witnessescriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from criminal proceedings against the petitioner, who was apprehended in possession of 30 kilograms of bhiki (poast). The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner was entitled to relief given the evidence of recovery and the statutory implications of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner was caught red-handed, and the recovered substance tested positive by the Chemical Examiner. Furthermore, the prosecution witnesses, who observed the recovery, had no apparent motive to falsely implicate the accused. The Court held that the case was squarely hit by the provisions of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, which governs the possession of narcotics. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal, affirming that the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to sustain the charges. The judgment reinforces the principle that where recovery is witnessed and corroborated by forensic evidence, and there is no evidence of enmity or false implication, the statutory prohibitions regarding narcotic possession must be strictly enforced.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recovery of a significant quantity of narcotics, corroborated by a positive chemical examiner report and witness testimony, justify the denial of leave to appeal?
  • Can a petition be dismissed for non-prosecution when the petitioner fails to appear or request an adjournment?
  • Is the possession of 30 kilograms of bhiki (poast) sufficient to attract the penal provisions of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
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• Muhammad Abdur Rehman Qureshi vs Sagheer Ahmad2017 SCMR 1696 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-25
  specific performancediscretionary relieftime of essenceimmovable propertyequitable reliefcompensationreal estate pricesSpecific Relief Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit for specific performance regarding an urban property agreement executed in 1994. The trial and High Courts had decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, with the High Court slightly modifying the sale consideration. The appellant contended that the respondent failed to pay the balance within the stipulated time and that the suit was filed after an unexplained delay of 19 months during a period of rising property prices. The Supreme Court observed that while time is generally not of the essence in immovable property contracts, this archaic rule must be applied flexibly given modern real estate market realities. The Court held that specific performance is a discretionary, equitable relief under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, and should be refused if it grants an unfair advantage or causes unforeseen hardship. Finding that property values had increased tenfold over 22 years and the respondent's conduct was not entirely above board, the Court set aside the decree. To balance equities, the Court ordered the refund of deposited amounts plus Rs. 10 million as compensation to the respondent under Section 19 of the Act.

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• Mst. Zeenat Alamzeb and anothers vs Mian Gul Aurangzeb and others2017 PLJ SC 143 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-01-10
  land reformsproduce index unitsaudi alteram partemco-ownersremand ordervoid ab-initioinheritance
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arose from a dispute among the descendants of the Ruler of Swat regarding the allocation of landed property resumed under the Land Reforms Regulation 1972 (MLR 115 of 1972). The petitioners challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that set aside the orders of the land authorities and remanded the matter to the Deputy Land Commissioner. The core legal question was whether one co-owner/heir could unilaterally exercise an option of choice for specific khasra numbers in lieu of inherited Produce Index Units (PIUs) without notice to other co-owners. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the right to exercise choice under Paragraph 11 of MLR 115 was a conjoint right of all legal heirs in the absence of partition. The Court laid down that any ex-parte selection of land by one co-owner behind the backs of others violates the principle of audi alteram partem, rendering such orders void ab-initio and subject to challenge without limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the right of choice under Paragraph 11 of the Land Reforms Regulation 1972 can be exercised unilaterally by one legal heir without notice to other co-owners?
  • Does an order allocating specific land parcels to a co-owner without notice to other interested legal heirs violate the principle of audi alteram partem?
  • Can a void ab-initio order passed behind the back of affected parties be challenged without the bar of limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zarina Khan vs Mst. Farzana Shoaib2017 SC MR 330 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-11-25Read full judgment →
• Mst. Safia Bano vs Home Department, Government of Punjab and others2017 PLJ SC 46 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-09-27
  death penaltyinsanity pleaparanoid schizophreniaexecution of death warrantmental healthprison rulescriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court order dismissing a writ petition filed by the wife of a death-row convict, Imdad Ali, seeking to stay his execution on grounds of mental illness. The core legal question was whether a convict diagnosed with 'paranoid schizophrenia' could avoid the execution of a death sentence after the plea of insanity had been consistently rejected by all courts, including the Supreme Court, and a mercy petition had been dismissed. The Supreme Court held that the petition was an attempt to delay the execution of a sentence that had already attained finality. The Court determined that schizophrenia is not a permanent mental disorder and does not automatically fall within the definition of 'mental disorder' under the Mental Health Ordinance 2001. The Court established that prison rules concerning mental sickness are not mechanisms to obstruct the execution of a death sentence. As the convict's mental state had been adjudicated during the trial and appellate proceedings, the plea could not be re-agitated to frustrate the legal process.

  Questions settled

  • Does a diagnosis of schizophrenia automatically constitute a 'mental disorder' sufficient to stay the execution of a death sentence under the Mental Health Ordinance 2001?
  • Can a convict re-agitate a plea of insanity to avoid the execution of a death warrant after the conviction and sentence have attained finality up to the Supreme Court?
  • Are the provisions of the Prison Rules 1978 regarding mental sickness intended to be used as a mechanism to delay the execution of a death sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rukhsana Begum vs Sajjad, etc.2017 PLJ SC 330, 2017 P.S.C. (Crl.) 1010 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-25
  criminal appealreappraisal of evidencechance witnessbenefit of doubtcorroboratory evidencemurder convictionrecovery of weapons
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a murder conviction where the appellants challenged their sentences for the murder of two individuals. The core legal questions concerned the credibility of eye-witness testimony, the status of chance witnesses, and the validity of recovery evidence in the absence of independent corroboration. Upon reappraisal of the evidence, the Supreme Court found the prosecution's case riddled with reasonable doubts. The Court held that the complainant's presence at the crime scene was implausible given the accused's failure to target him despite allegedly encircling the victims. Furthermore, the Court determined that the eye-witnesses were chance witnesses whose presence was not satisfactorily explained, and their testimony was inconsistent with the site plan and medical evidence. The Court laid down the principle that eye-witnesses cannot corroborate themselves through recovery evidence; such corroboration must originate from an independent source. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions, acquitted the appellants, and extended the benefit of doubt, emphasizing that a single reasonable doubt regarding a witness's presence is sufficient to discard their testimony in its entirety.

  Questions settled

  • Can an eye-witness corroborate their own testimony through the recovery of crime weapons?
  • Does a single reasonable doubt regarding the presence of a witness at the crime scene justify discarding their testimony in its entirety?
  • What constitutes a chance witness in criminal proceedings?
  • Is it legally permissible for eye-witnesses to corroborate themselves by acting as attesting witnesses to the recovery of incriminating articles?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rukhsana Begum vs Sajjad and 9 others2017 SCMR 596, 2017 P.S.C. (Crl) 14 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-25
  reappraisal of evidencereasonable doubtchance witnesscorroborationcriminal appealmurder trialFIR fabrication
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal involves the reappraisal of evidence in a murder case where the appellants were convicted by the trial court and the High Court. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, specifically regarding the credibility of eye-witnesses and the integrity of the investigation. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to establish guilt, citing significant discrepancies: the FIR appeared to be recorded after deliberation at the crime scene; the medical evidence in the inquest reports contradicted the prosecution's timeline; and the complainant’s presence was doubtful given the unnatural conduct of the assailants in sparing him. Furthermore, the Court determined that the corroboratory evidence was unreliable, as the eye-witnesses were chance witnesses and could not corroborate themselves by acting as recovery witnesses. The Court laid down the principle that a single reasonable doubt regarding the presence of witnesses at the crime scene is sufficient to discard their testimony, and that corroboratory evidence must originate from an independent source, not the eye-witnesses themselves. Consequently, the Court acquitted the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Can an eye-witness act as an attesting witness to the recovery of crime articles to corroborate their own testimony?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove the presence of a witness at the crime scene warrant the rejection of their entire testimony?
  • Is the testimony of a witness who lacks a cogent explanation for their presence at the crime scene considered that of a chance witness?
  • Does the unnatural conduct of assailants in sparing a prime target cast doubt on the prosecution's version of events?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rukhsana Begum vs Sajjad & others2017 PLJ SC 330 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-25
  murder appealreappraisal of evidencebenefit of doubtchance witnesscorroboratory evidenceFIR registrationcriminal acquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal concerns the conviction of the appellants for murder. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, specifically regarding the reliability of eye-witness testimony and recovery evidence. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's case was fundamentally flawed. The Court observed that the FIR appeared to be recorded at the crime scene after deliberation, rather than at the police station, and noted significant discrepancies between the inquest reports and the FIR regarding the time of death. Furthermore, the Court found the complainant’s testimony unbelievable, as he claimed to be a prime target yet remained unharmed during the attack, which contradicts natural human conduct. Additionally, the Court ruled that an eye-witness cannot corroborate their own testimony by acting as an attesting witness to the recovery of crime weapons. Consequently, the Court acquitted the appellants, emphasizing that a single reasonable doubt regarding a witness's presence is sufficient to discard their testimony. The principle laid down is that corroboratory evidence must originate from an independent source, and eye-witnesses cannot corroborate themselves through recovery proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can an eye-witness act as an attesting witness to the recovery of crime weapons to corroborate their own testimony?
  • Does the failure of assailants to harm a prime target present at the crime scene render the eye-witness account unbelievable?
  • Is a witness whose presence at the crime scene is not cogently explained considered a chance witness whose testimony should be discarded?
  • Does the registration of an FIR at the crime spot after deliberation invalidate the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rukhsana Begum and others vs Sajjad and others2017 SCMR 596 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-25
  murderappellate jurisdictionreappraisal of evidencechance witnessbenefit of doubtcorroborationrecovery of weaponscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from the conviction of the appellants for murder and rioting under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, specifically regarding the credibility of eye-witness accounts and the integrity of the investigation. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the appellants. The Court found the FIR was likely fabricated at the crime scene after deliberation, rather than at the police station as claimed. Furthermore, the Court rejected the testimony of the complainant and eye-witnesses, noting that the complainant’s survival despite being the alleged prime target was unnatural. The Court also held that the recovery of weapons was unreliable because the attesting witness was the same discredited eye-witness, violating the principle that corroboration must come from an independent source. Consequently, the Court acquitted the appellants, emphasizing that a single reasonable doubt regarding a witness's presence necessitates discarding their testimony, and that eye-witnesses cannot corroborate themselves through recovery proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can an eye-witness corroborate their own testimony by acting as an attesting witness to the recovery of crime weapons?
  • What is the legal effect of a delay in recording an FIR or recording it at the crime scene after deliberation?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove the presence of an eye-witness at the crime scene necessitate the rejection of their testimony?
  • Is the survival of a complainant, who was allegedly the prime target of an attack, a factor that can render their testimony unbelievable?
  Read full judgment →
• (1) Mst. Rukhsana Begum (2) Sajjad son of Inayat and (3) others vs (1)2017 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  criminal appealeye-witness credibilitychance witnessbenefit of doubtrecovery evidencecorroborationmurder trialFIR fabrication
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellants for murder under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns the reliability of eye-witness testimony and the validity of recovery evidence in a case involving alleged long-standing enmity. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in the acquittal of the appellants. The Court reasoned that the complainant’s presence was highly improbable, as he claimed to be the prime target yet was inexplicably spared by the assailants, a behavior contrary to natural human conduct. Furthermore, the Court determined that the FIR was likely fabricated at the crime scene rather than at the police station, and the recovery of weapons was tainted because the attesting witness was the same discredited eye-witness. The Court established the principle that eye-witnesses cannot corroborate their own testimony by acting as attesting witnesses for recoveries; such corroboration must originate from an independent, unimpeachable source. Additionally, the Court affirmed that the presence of a chance witness without a cogent explanation renders their testimony unreliable.

  Questions settled

  • Can an eye-witness act as an attesting witness for the recovery of crime weapons to provide corroboration?
  • Does the failure of an assailant to harm a prime target, despite having the opportunity, undermine the credibility of the eye-witness account?
  • What constitutes a 'chance witness' in criminal proceedings, and what is the evidentiary consequence of their presence?
  • Is the recovery of incriminating evidence legally valid if the attesting witness is the same person whose testimony as an eye-witness has been discarded?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mehboob Bibi and others vs The State2017 SCMR 1835 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-22
  abduction for ransombenefit of doubtdelay in FIRransom money recoverycriminal appealacquittalanti-terrorism
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from the conviction and sentencing of the appellants for the abduction of a minor for ransom under section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The trial court and High Court had convicted and sentenced the appellants to death and imprisonment for life. Upon hearing the appeal, the Supreme Court examined the evidence and noted significant flaws in the prosecution's case, including an unexplained four-day delay in lodging the FIR, lack of recovery of the vehicles allegedly used in the abduction, absence of call data records to substantiate the ransom demands, contradictions in witness statements regarding the recovery of the abductee, and unreliable evidence concerning the payment of ransom and subsequent recoveries of weapons and personal items. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, extended the benefit of the doubt to the appellants, allowed the appeal, and acquitted them of all charges.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unexplained delay of four days in lodging the FIR is fatal to a criminal prosecution for abduction?
  • Can a conviction for abduction and ransom be sustained in the absence of call data records or proof of ransom payment?
  • Does the failure to recover vehicles allegedly used in an abduction undermine the prosecution's case?
  • Whether uncorroborated recoveries of articles and weapons at the instance of accused persons can form the basis of a capital conviction when the core charge is doubtful?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Badarun Nisa vs Dr. Abdul Rehman & others2017 PLJ SC 457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-12-11
  landlord and tenantco-ownershipejectment applicationunpartitioned propertyrent lawproperty rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil appeals against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the dismissal of ejectment applications filed by the appellant against the respondents. The core legal question was whether a co-owner of an unpartitioned property possesses the status of a 'landlord' sufficient to establish a landlord-tenant relationship, thereby entitling them to initiate ejectment proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the appellant, having acquired title to a portion of the property through a registered sale deed, is a co-owner of the estate. The Court determined that the findings of the lower fora, which denied the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship, were legally unsustainable. Consequently, the appeals were allowed, the lower court findings were set aside, and the matter was remanded to the Rent Controller for further proceedings. The key principle laid down is that every co-owner of an unpartitioned property qualifies as a landlord, and this status is sufficient to establish a landlord-tenant relationship, regardless of any pending litigation between co-owners regarding the partition of the property.

  Questions settled

  • Does a co-owner of an unpartitioned property have the legal status of a landlord?
  • Can a landlord-tenant relationship be established by a co-owner despite pending litigation regarding property partition?
  • Is a co-owner entitled to initiate ejectment proceedings against tenants occupying the property?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Anwar Begum vs Akhtar Hussain alias Kaka and 2 others2017 SCMR 1710 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-12
  MurderAcquittalAppeal by leaveChance witnessCorroborationMedical evidenceDiscrepancySection 342 Cr.P.C.Benefit of doubtPresumption of innocence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned an appeal by leave against a High Court judgment that acquitted two respondents of murder charges, setting aside their death sentences. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's decision to acquit, based on benefit of doubt, was arbitrary, fanciful, or capricious, warranting interference. The High Court had found the ocular account from chance witnesses uncorroborated, noted discrepancies between the ocular account and medical evidence regarding firearm injuries, and determined that a forensic report was inconsequential as it was not put to the accused under Section 342 Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's judgment. The Court reiterated that conviction on a capital charge based on chance witness testimony requires corroboration, and medical evidence must be consistent with the ocular account. It was also emphasized that evidence not presented to an accused during examination under Section 342 Cr.P.C. cannot be used for conviction. Furthermore, the presumption of innocence is strengthened upon acquittal, requiring strong and cogent reasons to overturn such a finding.

  Read full judgment →
• Ms. Shabnam Irshad Ahmed and others vs Muhammad Muneer Malik and others2017 PLC (C.S.) 1263 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-07-29
  service mattereligibility criteriaappointmentselection boardconstitutional jurisdictionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Islamabad High Court which set aside the appointment of the petitioner as Deputy Director due to a lack of required experience. The core legal question was whether the petitioner met the mandatory statutory eligibility criteria of having 12 years of experience in the specific field of production, and whether the High Court could interfere with the Selection Board's recommendation. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's experience in the field of Design could not be equated with experience in Production, and that her experience fell well short of the mandatory 12 years. The Court ruled that while a High Court cannot normally substitute its view for that of a Selection Board, it is fully justified in interfering with and setting aside a conclusion based on a wrong arithmetical calculation and a departure from explicit statutory criteria. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether experience in the field of Design can be treated as equivalent to experience in the field of Production for the post of Deputy Director?
  • Can the High Court interfere with the recommendation of a Selection Board when the conclusion is based on a wrong calculation or misinterpretation of eligibility criteria?
  • Whether an appointment made in violation of statutory criteria and the principle of transparency is liable to be set aside?
  Read full judgment →
• Mr. Muhammad Junaid Farooqui vs Chairman, Members and officers of the Sindh Public Service Commission (“the Commission”)2017 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  suo motu jurisdictionpublic service commissioncivil service recruitmentfundamental rightscombined competitive examinationmerit and good governanceconstitutional bodyappointment of chairman and members
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from an application filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution concerning large-scale illegalities, corruption, and lack of requisite qualifications among the Chairman and members of the Sindh Public Service Commission during the Combined Competitive Examination (CCE-2013). The core legal questions involved whether the Supreme Court could exercise original jurisdiction under Article 184(3) in a matter affecting public importance and fundamental rights regarding civil service recruitment, and whether the flawed selection process and improperly constituted Commission vitiated the examinations. The Supreme Court held that the petition was maintainable as the integrity of the civil service directly engages fundamental rights relating to equality, non-discrimination, and lawful professions, and that pervasive irregularities, bias, and lack of transparency rendered the CCE-2013 examination process void. The Court laid down key principles mandating strict adherence to statutory qualifications for constitutional bodies, transparency in public sector recruitment, structured discretion in appointments, and equitable safeguards for candidates when setting aside compromised examinations for a fresh, transparent rerun.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court entertain a petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution regarding irregularities in public service commission appointments and competitive examinations?
  • Does an improperly constituted public service commission comprising unqualified members vitiate the selection and examination process conducted under its authority?
  • Whether large-scale discrepancies and lack of transparency in written tests and viva voce examinations justify setting aside a competitive examination process?
  • Does the appointment of the Chairman of a Provincial Public Service Commission require adherence to Article 242(1B) of the Constitution mandating appointment by the Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister?
  Read full judgment →
• Mr. Muhammad Junaid Farooq vs (1) Government of Sindh (2) Chairman &SCP 2017 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-03
  Sindh Public Service Commissioneligibility criteriasuo motu jurisdictionappointment of membersstructuring of discretionrule making powerpublic sector employment
  Summary & questions settled

  These suo motu proceedings arose under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 pursuant to an application challenging the eligibility and appointments of the Chairman and Members of the Sindh Public Service Commission under Section 3 of the Sindh Public Service Commission Act, 1989, amid allegations of corruption and mismanagement. The Supreme Court examined the service profiles of the appointees to determine whether their appointments complied with statutory qualifications. Noting that several members including the Chairman had resigned, the Court found the appointments of two members from the civil service valid under Section 3(3) of the Act. However, it held the appointment of a member purportedly from the private sector illegal under Section 3(4), as his service in a public entity disqualified him as a private-sector appointee and he lacked the required eminence. The Court directed the Sindh Government to frame rules under Section 10 to structure discretionary appointment powers through a high-powered scrutiny committee, ensuring transparency, competence, and impeccable integrity as established in precedent.

  Questions settled

  • Does prior service in a public sector organization disqualify a candidate from appointment as a member of the Public Service Commission under a statutory quota reserved for the private sector?
  • Is the government required to structure its statutory discretion through rules to establish objective and transparent selection procedures for appointing members to a constitutional or statutory commission?
  • Can the Supreme Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction scrutinize the service records and qualifications of statutory commission appointees to determine their eligibility under the governing Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohsin vs The State and others2017 SCMR 290 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-08-22
  post-arrest bailsodomyfurther inquirymedical evidencestatement under section 164 CrPCcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for post-arrest bail filed by Mohsin against the State and others, stemming from FIR No. 43 of 2016 registered at Police Station Jalalpur Bhattian, District Hafizabad, under sections 367-A and 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the petitioner made out a case for further inquiry under the Code of Criminal Procedure to warrant the grant of post-arrest bail. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal and admitted the petitioner to bail, holding that inconsistencies between the FIR, the medico-legal certificate showing a normal anus, and the victim's statement under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure—wherein the petitioner was not specifically named—brought the case within the ambit of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The key principle laid down is that where medical evidence and the victim's judicial statement create reasonable doubt regarding the specific role of the accused, the case falls within the scope of further inquiry, justifying the grant of post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contradictions between the FIR, medical evidence, and a statement under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure make a case one of further inquiry under section 497(2)?
  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail when the victim's judicial statement fails to specifically name him?
  • Does the absence of supporting medical findings on a medico-legal certificate justify the grant of bail in sexual assault cases?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Ruki1sana Murrad and others vs National Bank of Pakistan2017 P.C.T.L.R. 572, 2017 SCMR 1470, 2017 CLD 1405 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-02
  banking financeexport refinance schemerecovery suitdisbursement of fundscontractual liabilityadmission of debt
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a dispute between a sole proprietorship, Leather Goods International (LGI), and the National Bank of Pakistan regarding a financial facility. LGI challenged the validity of a finance agreement, arguing that no funds were disbursed to it, and consequently filed a suit for damages after the bank initiated a recovery suit. The core legal question was whether the finance agreement was enforceable when the sanctioned amount was utilized to settle LGI's pre-existing liabilities to the State Bank of Pakistan, rather than being disbursed directly to LGI. The Supreme Court held that the agreement was valid and enforceable. The Court reasoned that the finance facility was explicitly sanctioned to regularize LGI's account by paying off its outstanding export refinance obligations and penalties to the State Bank. The key principle laid down is that where a borrower acknowledges an outstanding liability and requests a bank to settle such debts on its behalf, the subsequent execution of a finance agreement to cover those payments constitutes valid disbursement, rendering the borrower's claim of non-disbursement legally inconsequential.

  Questions settled

  • Does the settlement of a borrower's outstanding liabilities to a third party by a bank at the borrower's request constitute valid disbursement of a finance facility?
  • Can a borrower deny the validity of a finance agreement on the grounds of non-disbursement when the funds were used to settle the borrower's own debts?
  • Is a written admission of debt by a borrower sufficient to establish liability in a banking recovery suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Rukhsana Murrad, etc. vs National Bank of Pakistan2017 P.C.T.L.R. 572 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-02
  banking financeexport refinance schemeloan recoverydisbursement of fundscontractual liabilityadmission of debtbanking litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute between a sole proprietorship, Leather Goods International (LGI), and the National Bank of Pakistan regarding the recovery of financial facilities and a counter-claim for damages. The core legal question was whether a finance agreement was valid and enforceable despite LGI's contention that no funds were physically disbursed to them under the specific agreement dated 18.02.1987. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's judgment. The Court held that although no cash was directly disbursed to LGI, the funds were utilized to settle LGI's outstanding liabilities and penalties owed to the State Bank of Pakistan under the Export Refinance Scheme, a fact LGI had previously acknowledged in correspondence. The Court established that where a financial facility is sanctioned to settle a borrower's pre-existing liabilities to a third party, the lack of direct cash disbursement to the borrower does not invalidate the agreement or the underlying debt obligation. Furthermore, admissions made in correspondence regarding outstanding balances serve as binding evidence of the debt's validity.

  Questions settled

  • Does the lack of direct cash disbursement to a borrower invalidate a finance agreement if the funds were used to settle the borrower's pre-existing liabilities?
  • Can a borrower deny the validity of a finance agreement after acknowledging the outstanding debt in correspondence?
  • Is a bank entitled to recover funds paid to a third party on behalf of a borrower under a sanctioned financial facility?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Rukhsana Murrad and others vs National Bank of Pakistan2017 SCMR 1470 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-02
  banking suitexport refinance schemefinance agreementdisbursement of fundssuit for damagesrecovery of loan
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of a judgment of the High Court which allowed the respondent bank's recovery suit and dismissed the appellants' suit for damages. The predecessor-in-interest of the appellants, operating a sole proprietorship, had availed financial facilities under the Export Refinance Scheme through the respondent bank. Upon failing to meet export targets, the State Bank of Pakistan recovered outstanding dues and penalties from the respondent bank, leading to the execution of a new finance agreement and security documents to cover these liabilities. The Banking Court initially dismissed the bank's recovery suit and decreed damages for the borrower on the ground that no cash was directly disbursed upon the execution of the agreement. The High Court reversed this decision. The core legal question was whether a finance agreement lacking direct cash disbursement is invalid when executed to adjust and settle pre-existing liabilities owed to a central bank. The Supreme Court held that the agreement was validly executed to regularize and settle the borrower's acknowledged liabilities to the State Bank, rendering the lack of subsequent direct cash disbursement legally inconsequential. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a finance agreement rendered void if direct cash is not disbursed upon its execution but is instead utilized to settle pre-existing liabilities?
  • Can a borrower deny the validity of a finance agreement after acknowledging the underlying debt and proposing repayment through the sale of mortgaged properties?
  • Whether a banking court can award damages to a borrower when the loan documents and statements of account establish valid adjustments toward central bank liabilities.
  Read full judgment →
• Mirza Sultan M. Saleem and 12 others vs NAB and others2017 SCP 126 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-03-31
  suo motoservice lawillegal appointmentsrelaxation of rulesdeputationpermanent absorptionacademic qualificationde-notification
  Summary & questions settled

  These suo moto proceedings were initiated under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 following allegations of widespread illegalities, nepotism, and violations of statutory rules in appointments, promotions, and inductions within the National Accountability Bureau (NAB). The core legal questions centered on whether the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) Employees Terms and Conditions of Service (TCS) 2002 and the Methods of Appointment and Qualification (MAQ) applied to all employees, including inductees and transfer employees, and whether the Chairman of NAB or the Prime Minister possessed the authority to relax academic qualifications or experience requirements. The Supreme Court held that the prescribed academic qualifications and experience criteria under the MAQ and TCS are mandatory and cannot be compromised. The Court rejected arguments regarding the 'deeming clause' for transfer employees, the Chairman's power to relax rules in hardship cases, and the Prime Minister's sports policy as justifications for bypassing statutory qualifications. Consequently, the Court directed the de-notification of unqualified officers, established a high-level committee to scrutinize disputed cases, and ordered that future vacancies be filled through the Federal Public Service Commission.

  Questions settled

  • Does the 'deeming clause' under Rule 14.03 of the TCS exempt inductees from meeting the academic qualifications and experience prescribed in the MAQ?
  • Can the Chairman of NAB exercise the power to relax service rules under Rule 14.01 of the TCS to compromise basic eligibility and academic qualifications?
  • Can an employee cure an inherent lack of academic qualification at the time of initial appointment by acquiring the required degree subsequently during service?
  • Does a policy directive issued by the Prime Minister override the statutory qualifications and recruitment rules of an autonomous body like NAB?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirza Luqman Masud and others vs Chairman NAB and others2017 SCMR 838, 2017 P.S.C. 565 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-03-31
  NAB appointmentsservice structureillegal appointmentsjurisdiction of Supreme Courtsuo motu proceedingsterms and conditions of service
  Summary & questions settled

  These suo motu proceedings were initiated under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan to examine illegalities and irregularities in appointments, promotions, absorptions, and deputations made in the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) in violation of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) Employees Terms and Conditions of Service (TCS), 2002 and the Methods of Appointment and Qualification (MAQ). The core legal question was whether statutory rules, academic qualifications, and criteria could be bypassed through administrative exemptions, deeming clauses, or executive policies. The Supreme Court held that appointments and promotions in NAB must strictly comply with the prescribed rules, qualifications, and the principles of transparency, ruling that deputationists, absorbed employees, and initial appointees cannot be exempted from mandatory eligibility criteria, and that the Chairman NAB's power to relax rules cannot be invoked to compromise inherent qualifications. The court laid down the principle that statutory qualification requirements are mandatory, cannot be cured by subsequent acquisition of degrees unless expressly provided, and that executive policies or general directives cannot override specific statutory service rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees absorbed or inducted into the National Accountability Bureau are exempt from the mandatory academic qualifications and experience prescribed under the Methods of Appointment and Qualification?
  • Does the power of the Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau to relax rules under the Terms and Conditions of Service extend to compromising basic eligibility and academic qualifications?
  • Can an individual lacking the requisite academic qualifications at the time of initial appointment cure the defect by acquiring qualifications subsequently?
  • Whether a policy directive issued by the Prime Minister can override the statutory rules and qualification criteria prescribed for appointments in a statutory organization like the National Accountability Bureau?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Saleem Ahmed Khosa vs Zafarullah Khan Jamali and othersK.L.R. 2017 SC 61, 2017 PLJ SC 501, 2017 SCMR 664, 2017 SCP 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-02-22
  election petitionriggingcorrupt practicesburden of proofelection tribunalreturned candidatedisqualification
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the 2013 General Elections for National Assembly seat NA-266, where the appellant challenged the victory of the returned candidate, alleging widespread rigging, harassment of polling agents, and the casting of bogus votes. The core legal question was whether the appellant provided sufficient evidence to substantiate these allegations of corrupt and illegal practices to warrant nullifying the election result. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the Election Tribunal's decision. The Court held that the appellant failed to provide specific, substantiated evidence of rigging, relying instead on general allegations. It was established that the burden of proof lies heavily on the petitioner to provide material particulars regarding corrupt practices. Furthermore, the Court clarified that broken seals on election bags, absent other reliable evidence of tampering, do not automatically invalidate election results. Additionally, the Court refused to entertain arguments regarding the respondent's disqualification that were not specifically raised as grounds of attack in the memo of appeal. The judgment reinforces the principle that election results cannot be overturned based on unsubstantiated claims.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere existence of broken seals on election material bags constitute sufficient grounds to nullify an election result?
  • Is a petitioner required to provide specific material particulars to substantiate allegations of rigging in an election petition?
  • Can an appellate court consider grounds of disqualification that were not specifically raised in the memo of appeal?
  • Does the failure to challenge a vote at the time of polling undermine subsequent allegations of bogus voting?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Umar Ikram-Ul-Haque vs Dr. Shahida Hasnain and another2017 PLJ SC 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-10-10
  rented premiseseviction applicationdenial of tenancyjurisdictional factinterim rentagreement to sellstatutory interpretationlandlord-tenant relationshipPunjab Rented Premises Act 2009
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addressed whether an order under Section 24 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, for the deposit of rent, can be passed against a respondent in an eviction application who denies the relationship of landlord and tenant, and the effect of Section 10 of the Act on such denial. The Supreme Court held that a Rent Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to pass an order for payment of rent under Section 24 of the Act until the relationship of tenancy is positively ascertained, applying the doctrine of jurisdictional fact. The Court clarified that Section 24 refers specifically to a 'tenant,' not merely a 'respondent.' It further held that Section 10, concerning agreements to sell, applies only where an existing landlord-tenant relationship is subsequently altered, not where tenancy is denied from the outset. The High Court's judgment, which mandated deposit of rent despite denial of tenancy, was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Rent Tribunal order the deposit of rent under Section 24 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, if the respondent denies the landlord-tenant relationship?
  • What is the effect of Section 10 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, on an agreement to sell when the relationship of landlord and tenant is denied from the outset?
  • When does a Rent Tribunal acquire jurisdiction to pass an order for payment of rent under Section 24 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009?
  • Does the term 'tenant' in Section 24 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, include a 'respondent' who denies the tenancy relationship?
  • Can a Rent Tribunal refuse leave to contest and allow an eviction application if the denial of tenancy is found to be contumacious?
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• (1) Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif (2) Senator Muhammad Ishaq Dar (3) Maryam Nawaz Sharif, etc. (4) Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed vs (1) Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi (2) Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed, etc. (3) Siraj-ul-Haq, etc. (4) Federation of Pakistan and others2017 SCP 958 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-09-15
  review petitionNational Accountability BureauHudabiya Paper Millsappellate remedyprocedural dismissal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a series of Civil Review Petitions filed by various petitioners, including Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and others, challenging the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the context of the Panama Papers case. The core legal question addressed in the order was the finality of the review petitions and the status of a miscellaneous application regarding the filing of an appeal by the National Accountability Bureau. The Court dismissed all the review petitions filed by the parties. Additionally, regarding a Civil Miscellaneous Application, the Court noted the statement of the Prosecutor-General, Accountability, confirming that the Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau had approved the filing of an appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment concerning Hudabiya Paper Mills Ltd. Based on the undertaking that this appeal would be filed within seven days, the petitioner did not press the application. Consequently, the Court disposed of the miscellaneous application as not pressed. The judgment reinforces the procedural finality of review proceedings and the operational autonomy of the National Accountability Bureau in pursuing appellate remedies.

  Questions settled

  • Are review petitions against a Supreme Court judgment maintainable when the grounds are not pressed or substantiated?
  • Can a miscellaneous application be disposed of as not pressed upon an undertaking by the Prosecutor-General of the National Accountability Bureau?
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• (1) Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif (2) Senator Muhammad Ishaq Dar (3) Maryam Nawaz Sharif and others (4) Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed vs (1) Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi (2) Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed and others (3) Siraj ul Haq and others (4) Federation of Pakistan and others.2017 SCP 978 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-07
  review petitionunwithdrawn salaryasset disclosurenomination papersdishonestydisqualificationArticle 62(1)(f)National Accountability BureauSupreme Court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  These review petitions arose out of the judgment dated 28.07.2017 passed by the Supreme Court in constitutional petitions concerning assets beyond known sources of income and non-disclosure of unwithdrawn receivables in nomination papers. The core legal questions revolved around whether unwithdrawn salary constitutes an asset requiring disclosure under electoral laws, whether such non-disclosure warrants disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution, and the legality of the Supreme Court's directions to the National Accountability Bureau to file references and to monitor accountability proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petitions, holding that an unwithdrawn salary receivable under a contract constitutes an asset for all legal purposes, and its deliberate concealment in nomination papers renders the candidate dishonest, attracting disqualification from Parliament. The Court laid down that failure to disclose accrued receivables amounts to a false declaration under solemn affirmation, and reaffirmed its constitutional powers under Article 184(3) to direct investigative and judicial bodies to ensure justice in cases of institutional inertia.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unwithdrawn salary receivable under an employment contract constitute an asset requiring disclosure in nomination papers?
  • Whether the omission to disclose an accrued asset in nomination papers amounts to furnishing a false declaration under solemn affirmation attracting disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution?
  • Can the Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 184(3) direct the National Accountability Bureau to file references based on material collected by a Joint Investigation Team?
  • Does the nomination of a monitoring judge by the Supreme Court to oversee accountability court proceedings violate the principle of separation of powers?
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• Mian Javed Amir and Others vs United Foam Industries (Pvt) Ltd., Lahore., SH. Combined Industries (Pvt) Ltd. and Others2017 NLR Civil 107 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  company judgerectification of registersummary procedurejurisdiction of civil courtappointment of inspectortransfer of shareswinding up of company
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals by leave of the court arose from a common judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside the Company Judge's order referring a corporate dispute to the SECP for the appointment of an inspector under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, and directing the parties to approach the civil court. The core legal question was whether the High Court in its company jurisdiction could resolve disputed questions of fact and record evidence under the Companies Ordinance despite the provision for summary procedure, or if civil courts were the exclusive forum for such disputes. The Supreme Court held that the summary procedure mandated under Section 9(3) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 does not abridge or curtail the power of the Company Court to record oral or documentary evidence to determine issues relating to a company or its members, and mere involvement of factual controversies or pending civil suits does not oust the jurisdiction of the Company Court. The key principle laid down is that matters relating to companies falling under the special statute must be tried by the Company Judge who is fully empowered to receive evidence and decide title to shares and rectification of registers.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the summary procedure under Section 9(3) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 debars the Company Judge from recording oral and documentary evidence in matters involving factual controversies?
  • Does the pendency of civil suits bar the jurisdiction of the Company Judge to entertain petitions for winding up and rectification of the register of shareholders under the Companies Ordinance, 1984?
  • Whether a Civil Court is the proper forum to investigate allegations of fraud or title disputes regarding shares, or if the Company Judge possesses adequate powers under the Companies Ordinance, 1984?
  • Whether the Division Bench was justified in interfering with the Company Judge's direction for the appointment of an Inspector under Section 265 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984?
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• Mian Asghar Ali vs Government of Punjab through Secretary (Colonies), Bor, Lahore and others2017 P.S.C. 295 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-09-29
  civil review petitionconversion of proceedingsintra-court appealreview jurisdictiondictated exercise of jurisdictioncancellation of sale deedinherent powers of courtboard of revenue
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant civil review petitions arise out of an order dismissing civil petitions that challenged the setting aside of a single judge's judgment by a division bench in intra-court appeals (ICAs) converted into review applications. The core legal questions involved whether the cancellation of a conveyance deed was made under a dictated exercise of jurisdiction, whether a division bench of the High Court has the power to convert unmaintainable ICAs into review applications, and whether valid grounds for review existed. The Supreme Court held that the cancellation of the land sale was lawfully executed by the Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue pursuant to judicial directions and not on the dictation of the Chief Minister, and that courts possess inherent authority to convert proceedings to prevent injustice and advance the cause of justice when the original single judge is no longer available. The key principle laid down is that courts may convert one type of proceeding into another to secure the ends of justice, and a division bench is competent to hear a review application arising from an order of a single judge who is no longer on the court's strength.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has the jurisdiction to convert unmaintainable intra-court appeals into review applications?
  • Can a sale deed of government land obtained through misrepresentation be cancelled by the Board of Revenue?
  • What are the permissible grounds for exercising review jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
  • Whether an interlocutory or ancillary remark made during the pendency of a lis constitutes a final conclusion for the grant of relief?
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• Mian Asghar Ali vs Government of Punjab through Secretary2017 PLJ SC 117 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-09-29
  Civil ReviewIntra-Court AppealInherent JurisdictionColonization of Government LandEx Debito JustitiaeConversion of ProceedingsLand Allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns Civil Review Petitions challenging a Supreme Court order that declined leave to appeal against a High Court judgment. The petitioner, having previously obtained land through a private treaty later cancelled for misrepresentation, sought alternate land allotment. The core legal questions were whether the High Court Division Bench acted within its jurisdiction by converting Intra-Court Appeals (ICAs) into review applications, and whether the cancellation of the original land sale resulted from improper executive dictation. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the High Court correctly exercised its inherent jurisdiction to convert the proceedings, particularly as the original judge was unavailable, to ensure the adjudication of the matter on its merits. The Court affirmed that the cancellation of the land sale was lawful and not the result of improper executive command. The judgment reinforces the principle that courts possess inherent authority to convert proceedings to prevent injustice and secure the ends of justice (ex debito justitiae), ensuring that procedural technicalities do not obstruct the substantive administration of law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court Division Bench convert an Intra-Court Appeal into a review application when the original judge is unavailable?
  • Does a court have the inherent power to convert one type of legal proceeding into another to advance the cause of justice?
  • Is the cancellation of a government land sale based on misrepresentation valid under the Colonization of Government Land Act, 1912?
  • Are appellate and review jurisdictions distinct, and does the power to review lie only with the judge or court that passed the original order?
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• Messrs Squibb Pakistan Pvt. Ltd. and another vs Commissioner of Income Tax and another2017 PTD 1303 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-04-26
  transfer pricingincome tax referencetax assessmentappellate jurisdictionburden of proofcomparability analysisfiscal law interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the scope of Section 79 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, regarding transfer pricing between resident and non-resident companies. The core legal question was whether the Income Tax Officer correctly invoked Section 79 to make additions to the taxpayers' income based on price differences of imported raw materials, and the extent of the High Court's reference jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the Income Tax Officer failed to conduct a reasonable investigation or provide prima facie evidence that the business was arranged to reduce profits, as mere price differences without a proper comparability analysis are insufficient to invoke the provision. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals of Squibb Pakistan and dismissed those of the department. The judgment establishes that for Section 79 to apply, the department must prove that business was arranged to produce less than ordinary profits; the burden of proof shifts to the taxpayer only after the department establishes a prima facie case. Additionally, the Court clarified that under current law, reference jurisdiction is appellate in nature, permitting the consideration of any question of law arising from the Tribunal's order, regardless of whether it was previously argued.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 79 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 require the Income Tax Officer to establish a prima facie case of transfer mispricing before shifting the burden of proof to the taxpayer?
  • Is the reference jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 133 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 appellate in nature?
  • Can a High Court consider a question of law in a tax reference that was not raised before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal?
  • Are mere price differences in imported raw materials sufficient to establish transfer mispricing under Section 79 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
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• Messrs Shifa International Hospital, Islamabad vs Commissioner of Income Tax_Wealth Tax, Islamabad2017 PTD 1158 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-05-31
  depreciation allowanceincome taxfiscal statute interpretationfactory definitionworkshop definitionstatutory constructionhospital building
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a public limited company operating a hospital, challenged the High Court's decision limiting its depreciation allowance to 5% for its building. The petitioner contended that the hospital should be classified as a "factory" or "workshop" under the Third Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, thereby entitling it to a 10% depreciation allowance. The core legal question was whether a hospital building falls within the definition of a "factory" or "workshop" for the purpose of claiming higher depreciation rates under the Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that while a hospital is a building, it cannot be classified as a factory or workshop, as these terms imply facilities where goods are manufactured, repaired, or assembled. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision, restricting the depreciation allowance to the general rate of 5%. The key principle laid down is that fiscal statutes must be strictly construed, and in the absence of specific definitions in the statute, ordinary dictionary meanings apply, which exclude a hospital from the categories of factory or workshop.

  Questions settled

  • Does a hospital building qualify as a 'factory' or 'workshop' for the purpose of claiming a 10% depreciation allowance under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • Are fiscal statutes subject to strict construction when determining the classification of assets for depreciation purposes?
  • What is the applicable depreciation rate for a building that does not fall under the specific categories of factory, workshop, or residential quarters for labour under the Third Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
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• Messrs Power Construction Corporation of China Ltd. through Authorised Representative vs Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority through Chairman WAPDA and 2 others2017 P.S.C. 187, 2017 PLD Supreme Court 83 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-10-25
  pre-qualificationpublic procurementWorld Bank Guidelinesjudicial reviewjudicial restraintpublic policyinternational fundingconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal arose from the disqualification of the Petitioner, a Chinese construction company, from the pre-qualification process for the Dasu Hydropower Project. The project was funded by the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank, under a Finance Agreement stipulating that procurement follow World Bank Guidelines. Although WAPDA initially included the Petitioner in the pre-qualified list, the IDA requested its deletion under Clause 2(a) of Appendix-I of the Guidelines, citing lack of standalone expertise. The Petitioner challenged WAPDA's decision to comply with the IDA's request, alleging violations of Articles 4 and 10-A of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that under Rule 5 of the Public Procurement Rules, 2004, international commitments and financial institution agreements prevail over local rules in case of conflict. The Court further ruled that WAPDA's decision to follow IDA's request was a pragmatic commercial and policy decision aimed at securing project funding. Consequently, such matters fall within the domain of public policy, warranting judicial restraint and rendering the constitutional petition non-maintainable.

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• Messrs Pakistan Television Corporation Limited vs Commissioner2017 PTD 1372 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-04-24
  withholding taxincome tax deductionfiscal interpretationbusiness expendituretax liabilitystatutory interpretationprincipal and agent
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Pakistan Television Corporation (PTV), challenged the disallowance of service fees paid to WAPDA/DISCOs for collecting television license fees. The tax authorities argued that PTV failed to deduct withholding tax under Sections 153 and 233 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, thereby violating Section 21(c) of the Ordinance. The core legal question was whether PTV was obligated to deduct tax despite not making an actual payment to WAPDA, as the latter retained its fee from the collected funds. The Supreme Court held that the statutory requirement to "deduct" tax under Section 153(1)(b) necessitates an actual payment, which did not occur here. Furthermore, no principal-agent relationship existed to trigger Section 233. The Court established that "deduct" and "collect" are distinct fiscal concepts and that fiscal statutes must be interpreted strictly in favor of the taxpayer. Additionally, the Court ruled that the amendment to Section 21(c) allows for the deduction of expenditure if the recipient has discharged its tax liability, thereby preventing double taxation. Consequently, PTV was entitled to claim the service fee as an allowable business expenditure.

  Questions settled

  • Does the requirement to 'deduct' tax under Section 153(1)(b) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 apply where no actual payment is made by the withholding agent?
  • Is a service fee retained by a collection entity from collected funds considered a payment subject to withholding tax obligations under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the phrase 'paid or' in Section 21(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 allow a taxpayer to claim an expenditure deduction if the recipient has discharged their tax liability on that income?
  • Does a contract for the provision of services for a fee inherently create a principal-agent relationship for the purposes of Section 233 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
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• Messrs National Transmission and Despatch Company Ltd vs Pub2017 SCMR 1506 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-12-19
  Octroi taxfiscal exemptionstatutory interpretationlocal government lawWAPDAcontractor liabilitypolicy decision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a consolidated High Court judgment regarding the recovery of outstanding Octroi tax dues by a contractor against the National Transmission and Despatch Company (NTDC). The core legal questions were whether NTDC was exempt from Octroi tax based on an Inter-Provincial Coordination Committee policy decision, and whether an Octroi contractor could be sued for the recovery of such taxes. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, upholding the lower courts' findings. The Court held that policy decisions by the Inter-Provincial Coordination Committee are merely recommendatory and cannot override statutory law. Furthermore, the Court established that fiscal exemptions must be strictly construed and require formal government notification under the Sindh Local Government Ordinance, 1979. Additionally, the Court clarified that under the Sindh Municipal Committee (Octroi) Rules, 1964, Octroi contractors possess specific statutory authority to collect and refund taxes, rendering them proper parties for litigation, thereby excluding the application of general agency principles under the Contract Act, 1872. The petitioner failed to demonstrate any valid exemption or legal error in the lower courts' judgments.

  Questions settled

  • Can a policy decision of the Inter-Provincial Coordination Committee override statutory law regarding tax exemptions?
  • Are Octroi contractors personally liable for the refund of taxes collected erroneously under the Sindh Municipal Committee (Octroi) Rules 1964?
  • Does the general law of agency under the Contract Act 1872 apply to the relationship between a Municipal Council and an Octroi contractor?
  • Is WAPDA exempt from paying Octroi tax on its equipment and materials based on Inter-Provincial Coordination Committee policy decisions?
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• Messrs Chiltan Ghee Mills, Quetta and others vs Deputy Collector of Sales Tax (Refund), Customs House, Quetta and another2017 PTD 138 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-10-03
  sales tax refundinput tax adjustmentexempt suppliestaxable suppliesstatutory interpretationtax exemption
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a manufacturer of ghee and tin containers, sought a refund of sales tax paid on the purchase of tin plates used to manufacture tin containers, arguing that because its finished supplies were exempt from sales tax under S.R.O. 580(1)/91, the input tax paid on raw materials should be refundable. The Sales Tax Department, the Appellate Tribunal, and the High Court rejected this claim. The Supreme Court addressed the question of whether input tax paid on raw materials used in the production of exempt supplies is refundable. The Court held that under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, the facility to deduct or claim a refund of input tax is strictly reserved for 'taxable supplies'. The Court affirmed that Section 8(1)(a) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 explicitly prohibits the claim of input tax paid on goods used in the manufacture of exempt supplies. Consequently, the Court ruled that an exemption from sales tax on finished goods does not entitle a manufacturer to a refund of input tax paid on raw materials, dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Is a registered person entitled to claim a refund of input sales tax paid on raw materials used in the manufacture of goods that are exempt from sales tax?
  • Does the exemption of finished goods from sales tax liability automatically entitle a manufacturer to a refund of input tax paid on raw materials?
  • Can input tax be deducted or refunded for goods that do not fall within the definition of taxable supplies under the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
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• Messrs Bara Ghee Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. and 2 others vs The Assistant2017 PLD Supreme Court 738 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-04-06
  customs dutiesrecovery of government dueslimitation periodalternate remedywrit jurisdictionmanufacturing in bondinterim orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves petitions challenging the resumption of recovery proceedings for customs duties and government dues arising from the export of ghee and oil to Afghanistan under interim court orders that were later vacated. The core legal questions concern whether the recovery of such dues is barred by limitation periods under sections 32 or 211 of the Customs Act, 1969, and whether a constitutional petition is maintainable when an alternate statutory remedy is available under the Customs Act, 1969 and the Customs Rules, 2001. The Supreme Court held that the recovery of government dues under section 202 of the Customs Act, 1969 following the vacation of stay orders is not subject to the limitation periods prescribed for short-levies or untrue statements under section 32, and that writ petitions are incompetent where a complete statutory hierarchy leading to the High Court's referral jurisdiction is available. The court affirmed that resumption of recovery proceedings stayed by judicial orders does not attract limitation, dismissing the petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the recovery of government dues after the vacation of a judicial stay order is barred by the limitation periods prescribed under section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Does a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 lie against an order passed under Rule 142 of the Customs Rules, 2001 when an alternate statutory hierarchy of appeals and revisions is available under the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Whether recovery proceedings initiated under section 202 of the Customs Act, 1969 for dues payable on goods exported during the subsistence of an interim court order are subject to the limitation rules governing short-levies or erroneous refunds?
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• Messrs Al-Haj Enterprises (Pvt.). Ltd. vs Collector of Customs, Model2017 PTD 2016 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-22
  customs rulesbonded carrierPOL productsshort supplyevaporationpost export auditcustoms reference application
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the transport of POL products by a bonded carrier to ISAF in Afghanistan under the Customs Rules, 2001. During a post-export audit, shortages exceeding the permissible one percent limit under Rule 564(4) of the Customs Rules, 2001 were discovered, leading to show-cause notices, adjudication by the Collector of Customs, an appeal before the Customs Appellate Tribunal, and a Customs Reference Application in the Islamabad High Court, all of which went against the petitioner. The core legal question was whether a bonded carrier can be held liable for short supplies exceeding one percent under Rule 564(4) when the shortage is attributed to factors like evaporation rather than pilferage or broken seals. The Supreme Court held that since the consequences for short supply beyond one percent are explicitly provided in Rule 564(4) and were fully attracted, no legal error was committed by the lower forums. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave refused. The key principle laid down is that strict liability applies under Rule 564(4) of the Customs Rules, 2001 for cargo shortages exceeding the prescribed one percent limit during transit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a bonded carrier can be held liable under Rule 564(4) of the Customs Rules, 2001 for cargo shortages exceeding one percent caused by evaporation?
  • Does Rule 564(4) of the Customs Rules, 2001 require proof of pilferage or broken seals before imposing liability on a carrier for short supplies?
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• Messrs Al-Haj Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd vs Collector of Customs, ModelK.L.R. 2017 S.C. 539, 2017 PLJ SC 596, 2017 PTD 2016, 2017 SCP 930, 2017 SCMR · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-22
  bonded carrierPOL productsshort supplycustoms dutyevaporation lossstrict liabilityCustoms Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a customs dispute where the petitioner, a bonded carrier, was held liable for duties, taxes, and penalties due to short-delivered petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) products exported to Afghanistan. The shortages exceeded the one percent permissible variation limit under Rule 564(4) of the Customs Rules, 2001. The petitioner contended that the shortages were due to natural evaporation in hot weather rather than pilferage, arguing that Rule 564(4) should be interpreted to allow carriers to justify shortages if they occurred without fault. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that because the consequences for short supply beyond the one percent threshold are explicitly provided for under Rule 564(4) of the Customs Rules, 2001, the provisions were fully attracted. The Court affirmed that in the absence of any legal error by the lower forums, the strict liability imposed by the rules must be upheld, and no further adjudication into the physical causes of the shortage was required once the statutory limit was breached.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a bonded carrier can escape liability for short-delivered cargo exceeding the one percent limit under Rule 564(4) of the Customs Rules, 2001 by pleading natural evaporation?
  • Does Rule 564(4) of the Customs Rules, 2001 require the customs authorities to prove pilferage or broken seals before imposing liability for shortages exceeding the statutory limit?
  • Is a bonded carrier strictly liable for duties and taxes on short-delivered goods once the variation in quantity exceeds the permissible limit under the Customs Rules, 2001?
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• Meraj Din and anothers vs Muhammad Sharif and another2017 SCMR 376 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-05
  pre-emption suitlimitation periodregistration of sale deedphysical possessionconstructive noticeSection 47 Registration ActArticle 10 Limitation Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerns the determination of the limitation period for filing a suit for pre-emption under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. The core legal question was whether the one-year limitation period prescribed by Article 10 of the Limitation Act, 1908, commences from the date of execution of the sale deed or the date of its registration. The Court held that the limitation period commences from the date of registration of the sale deed. The Court reasoned that Article 10 of the Limitation Act, 1908, provides for limitation based on physical possession or registration, both intended to provide notice to the pre-emptor. It clarified that Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, which dictates that a document operates from the date of execution for parties to the transaction, does not apply to third-party pre-emptors. Consequently, the Court ruled that the date of registration is the starting point for calculating the limitation period in such suits, setting aside the High Court's contrary finding.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for a pre-emption suit under Article 10 of the Limitation Act, 1908, commence from the date of execution or the date of registration of the sale deed?
  • Does Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, govern the starting point of limitation for a pre-emptor who is not a party to the sale transaction?
  • Is a mere recital of delivery of possession in a sale deed sufficient proof of possession to trigger the limitation period for a pre-emption suit?
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• Meraj Din and another vs Muhammad Sharif and another2017 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-05
  pre-emptionlimitation perioddate of registrationdate of executionRegistration ActLimitation Actphysical possessionPunjab Pre-emption Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether the limitation period for filing a pre-emption suit under Article 10 of the Limitation Act 1908 commences from the date of execution or the date of registration of a sale deed when physical possession of the property has not been delivered earlier.

  The respondents bought property via a sale deed executed on May 8, 1975, and registered on May 26, 1975. The appellants filed a pre-emption suit on May 25, 1976. The High Court dismissed the suit as time-barred, applying Section 47 of the Registration Act 1908 to hold that limitation ran from the date of execution.

  The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment. The Court held that under the second part of Article 10 of the Limitation Act 1908, limitation runs strictly from the date of registration. Section 47 of the Registration Act 1908 governs rights inter se between parties to a transaction and cannot operate to abridge or alter the statutory limitation period available to a prospective pre-emptor.

  Questions settled

  • Does the period of limitation under Article 10 of the Limitation Act 1908 run from the date of execution or the date of registration of a sale deed?
  • Does Section 47 of the Registration Act 1908 apply to alter the starting point of limitation for a third-party pre-emptor under Article 10 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • When does Section 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 apply in preference to Article 10 of the Limitation Act 1908?
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• Mazhar Iqbal and another vs The State and others2017 SCMR 2036 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-08-31
  leave to appealmurderself-defencehouse trespassbenefit of doubtacquittalillicit relationschance witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition seeks leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, alongside a connected petition by the complainant challenging an acquittal and seeking sentence enhancement. The case arose from an incident where the deceased truck driver was killed during a late-night altercation after entering a house where he allegedly maintained illicit relations with a female occupant. The trial court convicted the main petitioner under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and co-accused under section 302(c), which the High Court modified by reducing the petitioner's sentence and acquitting the others. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence, noting unexplained late-night presence, lack of credible eye-witnesses, and circumstances indicating house trespass for illicit purposes, thereby attracting the right of private defence under sections 97 and 100 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts ignored the vital right of self-defence and the circumstances of trespass. Consequently, the Court granted the appeal, extended the benefit of the doubt, acquitted the petitioner, and dismissed the complainant's connected petition as infructuous, while issuing directives regarding medico-legal examinations in cases involving illicit relations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the right of private defence of property and person extends to causing death of a trespasser who enters a house for illicit purposes?
  • Can the testimony of chance witnesses be accepted without cogent reasons explaining their presence at the crime spot?
  • Does nighttime entry into another's house under suspicious circumstances substantiate a plea of self-defence?
  • Whether an appellate court is justified in interfering with a conviction when material aspects concerning the right of private defence are ignored by lower courts?
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• Mazhar Hussain vs The State and others2017 SCMR 1936 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-08-23
  pre-arrest bailcancellation of bailforfeiture of bail bondabscondenceEmigration Ordinance 1979
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose out of a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court recalling pre-arrest bail granted to the petitioner in a case registered under Sections 17 and 22 of the Emigration Ordinance 1979. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in recalling pre-arrest bail on the ground of the petitioner's alleged abscondence when the trial court forfeited his bail bond upon a single non-appearance. The Supreme Court observed that the trial court reached its conclusion regarding the petitioner's abscondence without following the required legal procedure, noting the absence of any execution report concerning previously issued arrest warrants. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the High Court's cancellation order was legally unsustainable. Converting the petition into an appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, restored the pre-arrest bail, and directed the trial court to conclude the trial expeditiously.

  Questions settled

  • Can pre-arrest bail be recalled on grounds of abscondence without proper procedure and execution reports for arrest warrants?
  • Is a single non-appearance sufficient for a trial court to hold an accused as an absconder for the purpose of cancelling bail?
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• Mazhar Abbas alias Baddi vs The State2017 SCMR 1884 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-15
  murderqatl-i-amdsingle blowmotivemitigating circumstancequantum of sentencelife imprisonmentSection 382-B CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction and death sentence of the appellant under Section 302(b) PPC for the murder of Muhammad Waseem, as upheld by the High Court. The core legal questions pertained to the sufficiency of evidence to sustain the conviction and whether the failure to prove an alleged motive constitutes a mitigating circumstance warranting a reduction in sentence. Upon reappraisal of the evidence, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully proved the appellant's guilt through reliable ocular account, medical evidence, and a positive recovery of the weapon of offense. However, the Court determined that the sentence of death was not warranted because the appellant inflicted only a single dagger blow without repetition, and the prosecution failed to prove the alleged motive. The Court laid down the established principle that where prosecution alleges a motive but fails to prove it at trial, such failure can be considered as a mitigating factor in deciding the quantum of sentence. Consequently, the Court partly allowed the appeal, converting the death sentence to life imprisonment while granting the benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C.

  Questions settled

  • Is the failure of the prosecution to prove an alleged motive a valid mitigating circumstance for reducing a sentence from death to life imprisonment?
  • Can a single weapon blow without repetition be taken into consideration as a ground to convert a death sentence into life imprisonment?
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• Maqsood Ahmad vs The State and others2017 SCMR 397 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-06-23
  suspension of sentencecriminal appealmurderpost-mortem opinionacquittal of co-accusedappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition arising from the refusal of the High Court to suspend the petitioner's sentence pending appeal. The petitioner was convicted under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of the complainant's father by allegedly giving kick blows, while his co-accused were acquitted by the trial court. The core legal question was whether the petitioner made out a prima facie case for the suspension of his sentence during the pendency of his appeal. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that the lack of a final medical opinion regarding the cause of death by the doctor, the acquittal of co-accused attributed with specific roles, and the complainant's testimony stating the petitioner was not the culprit made out a case for suspension of sentence. The key principle laid down is that where material contradictions exist in the prosecution evidence, including an inconclusive medical report and a resiling complainant, along with the non-availability of early disposal of the appeal, the sentence of a convicted person may be suspended pending appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a prima facie case for suspension of sentence is made out when the medical officer gives no final opinion on the cause of death?
  • Can the sentence of a convict be suspended pending appeal when co-accused assigned similar or major roles have been acquitted?
  • What is the effect of the complainant making statements in court exonerating the accused on the question of suspension of sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Tariq Mahmood, etc. vs Ghulam.Ahmed and others2017 PLJ SC 653 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-06-05
  pre-emption suitzar-e-soimstatutory depositextension of timeplaint rejectionconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arises from an order of the Lahore High Court whereby a pre-emption suit dismissed by the Additional District Judge for failure to deposit zar-e-soim within thirty days under Section 24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 was restored and remanded for a fresh trial. The core legal question concerns whether the thirty-day period for depositing zar-e-soim under Section 24 of the Act is mandatory, reckoned from the date of filing the suit, and whether a court has the jurisdiction to extend this period beyond thirty days. The Supreme Court examined the rival contentions regarding the computation of the statutory period and the consequences of non-compliance under Section 24(2) of the Act. The judgment engages with statutory interpretation concerning mandatory pre-emption deposits and judicial discretion in extending time for such deposits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the period of 30 days for depositing zar-e-soim under Section 24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 is to be reckoned from the date of filing the suit?
  • Does a court have the jurisdiction to extend the time for depositing zar-e-soim beyond the statutory period of 30 days?
  • What are the consequences under Section 24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 if a pre-emptor fails to deposit the zar-e-soim within the stipulated period?
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• Malik Tariq Mahmood, etc vs Ghulam Ahmed and others2017 P.S.C. 1239 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-06-05
  pre-emptionzar-e-soimstatutory limitationfiling of suitActus curiae neminem gravabitdismissal of suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the respondent failed to deposit the zar-e-soim (one-third of the sale price) within the statutory period. The core legal question was whether the thirty-day period for depositing zar-e-soim under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991 commences from the date of filing the suit or its formal registration, and whether the court possesses the discretion to extend this period beyond thirty days. The Supreme Court held that the thirty-day period must be reckoned from the date of filing the plaint, as defined by the presentation of the document to the court. The Court affirmed that the statutory limit of thirty days is absolute, and trial courts lack the jurisdiction to extend this period. While acknowledging the principle that an act of the court should not prejudice any party, the Court clarified that this principle cannot be used to circumvent the mandatory statutory embargo on extending the time for deposit beyond the thirty-day limit. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the respondent's suit for failure to comply with the mandatory deposit requirements.

  Questions settled

  • Does the thirty-day period for depositing zar-e-soim under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991 commence from the date of filing the suit or the date of its formal registration?
  • Does a trial court have the discretion to extend the thirty-day statutory period for the deposit of zar-e-soim in a pre-emption suit?
  • Can the principle that an act of the court shall prejudice no man be invoked to extend the statutory time limit for the deposit of zar-e-soim beyond thirty days?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Tariq Mahmood and others vs Ghulam Ahmed and others2017 PLJ SC 653, 2017 PLD Supreme Court 674, 2017 P.S.C. 1239 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-06-05
  pre-emption suitzar-e-soimdeposit of sale pricestatutory periodextension of timefiling of suitActus curiae neminem gravabitsuit dismissalconstitutional jurisdictioninterpretation of statute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order that restored and remanded a pre-emption suit. The core legal question revolved around the interpretation of Section 24 of "the Act, 1991," specifically concerning the mandatory deposit of zar-e-soim (one-third of the sale price). The Supreme Court examined when the 30-day period for this deposit commences and whether courts possess discretion to extend this period. The Court held that the 30-day period for depositing zar-e-soim begins from the date of "filing of the suit," which refers to the presentation of the plaint, not its formal registration or the date of a court order directing the deposit. It was further held that the court has no power or discretion to extend this 30-day period beyond its statutory limit. While a court's omission to direct the deposit can be remedied under the principle Actus curiae neminem gravabit, any such remedy must still adhere to the 30-day maximum from the date of filing. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the pre-emption suit, finding that the extension granted by the trial court beyond the statutory 30 days was unsustainable.

  Read full judgment →
• Malik Bahadur Sher Khan vs Haji Shah Alam and others2017 PLJ SC 462, 2017 SCMR 902 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-03-07
  Specific performanceAgreement to sellTime is of the essencePleadings and proofSecundum allegata et probataConcurrent findingsMisreading of evidenceLand disputeContract lawAppeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment dismissing a revision petition concerning a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell land. The core legal questions addressed were whether time was of the essence in the agreement, the admissibility of evidence contradicting pleadings, and the weight of concurrent findings by lower courts based on misappraisal. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the lower courts' judgments. It held that time was of the essence in the contract, especially considering the specified performance period and the economic realities of fluctuating land prices. The Court reiterated the principle that evidence constituting an outright departure from the averments in the plaint cannot be led or considered (secundum allegata et probata). While denying specific performance, the Court directed the appellant to pay an enhanced amount to the respondent, acknowledging the appellant's retention of the initial payment and the decrease in rupee value.

  Read full judgment →
• Malik Abid Hussain vs Returning Officer, Wards 1 to 47 Municipal2017 P.S.C. 252 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Local Bodies Electionsreserved seatworker definitionnomination paperseligibility criteriastatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the eligibility of a candidate for a reserved 'worker' seat in the Local Bodies Elections, 2016. The core legal question was whether a person engaged in the business of LPG dealership and holding the office of President of an LPG Union qualifies as a 'worker' under the definition provided in the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013. The Appellate Authority rejected the petitioner's nomination papers, finding that his status as a businessman and distributor did not align with the statutory definition of a worker, a decision upheld by the Lahore High Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the definition of 'worker' under Section 2(mmm) of the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013, is restricted to persons directly engaged in physical work or dependent on personal labour for subsistence, or those defined as workers under the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010. The Court affirmed that a businessman or trader does not qualify for such reserved seats, and since the petitioner did not deny his status as an LPG dealer, he was ineligible.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person engaged in the business of LPG dealership and holding the office of President of a trade union qualify as a 'worker' under the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013?
  • What is the scope of the definition of 'worker' as provided in Section 2(mmm) of the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013?
  • Can a businessman or trader contest an election on a seat reserved for a 'worker' under the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Abid Hussain vs Returning Officer, Wards 1 to 47 Municipal2017 P.S.C. 252, 2017 PLJ SC 100, 2017 SCMR 132 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-11-16
  reserved seatworker definitionnomination paperselection disputelocal government electiondisqualificationstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the rejection of the petitioner's nomination papers for a reserved 'worker' seat in the Municipal Committee, Muzaffargarh. The core legal question was whether a candidate engaged in the business of LPG dealership and serving as the President of an LPG Union qualifies as a "worker" under the relevant local government legislation. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the lower authorities' decisions to reject the nomination. The Court held that the petitioner, being a businessman and trader, did not meet the statutory definition of a "worker." The Court clarified that the definition of "worker" under the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013, is restricted to persons directly engaged in physical work or dependent on personal labor for subsistence, or those falling under the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010. It emphasized that businessmen or traders do not qualify for reserved worker seats, and the status of the candidate is subject to scrutiny at the nomination stage, rather than being deferred to post-election proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person engaged in the business of LPG dealership qualify as a 'worker' for the purpose of contesting a reserved seat under the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013?
  • Is the status of a candidate for a reserved 'worker' seat subject to scrutiny at the nomination stage?
  • What is the legal definition of 'worker' under the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Abid Hussain vs Returning Officer, Wards 1 to 47 Municipal2017 SCMR 132 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-11-16
  worker reserved seatnomination paperslocal bodies electionsLPG distributordefinition of workerelection dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging the rejection of the petitioner's nomination papers for a reserved seat of 'Worker' in the Local Bodies Elections, 2016. The core legal question is whether an LPG dealer and distributor, who also serves as the President of the LPG Union and holds a National Tax Number, qualifies as a 'worker' under section 2(mmm) of the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner, being a businessman and trader who is not directly engaged in physical work for subsistence living nor covered under the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010, does not meet the statutory definition of a 'worker'. The Court dismissed the petition, laying down the principle that a person engaged in commercial business and trade cannot claim the status of a worker to contest elections on a reserved labour seat.

  Questions settled

  • Does an LPG dealer and distributor qualify as a 'worker' under section 2(mmm) of the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013?
  • Whether a businessman holding a National Tax Number and heading a traders' union can contest an election on a reserved seat for workers?
  • Does summary rejection of nomination papers for lacking the qualifications of a worker violate the right to contest local government elections?
  Read full judgment →
• Major Pervez Iqbal vs Muhammad Akram Almas, etc.2017 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-10
  tax recoveryauction salecollateral proceedingsIncome Tax Rules 1982Section 12(2) CPCtax defaulterwrit of mandamus
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an order dismissing an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which sought to set aside a previous judgment directing the issuance of a sale certificate for property auctioned to recover tax arrears. The core legal question is whether a tax defaulter, having failed to utilize the specific remedies provided under the Income Tax Rules, 1982, can subsequently challenge an auction sale through collateral proceedings under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant could not invoke collateral proceedings after failing to challenge the auction within the statutory timelines and forums established by the Income Tax Rules, 1982. The Court affirmed that the Income Tax Rules, 1982 constitute a self-contained code for tax recovery and auction challenges. Consequently, where a special law provides an elaborate mechanism for challenging actions, recourse to general law or collateral proceedings is impermissible. Furthermore, alleged irregularities in the conduct of a sale do not vitiate the sale if statutory remedies are not timely pursued.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tax defaulter challenge an auction sale through collateral proceedings under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 after failing to utilize the remedies provided under the Income Tax Rules, 1982?
  • Does the Income Tax Rules, 1982 constitute a self-contained code for the recovery of tax arrears and the challenging of auction sales?
  • Can an auction sale be challenged on the ground of irregularity if the statutory conditions for setting aside the sale were not met?
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• Major (Retd.) Pervez Iqbal vs Muhammad Akram Almas and others2017 SCMR 831 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-10
  tax recoveryauction salesale certificateSection 12(2) CPCcollateral challengeself-contained codespecial lawtax defaulterwrit of mandamus
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil appeal arose from the Lahore High Court's dismissal of an application filed under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The appellant, an adjudged tax defaulter, placed his immovable property at the disposal of the Tax Recovery Officer to secure his release from arrest. The property was subsequently auctioned to recover tax arrears, and Respondent No. 1 emerged as the successful bidder, depositing the full amount. When authorities delayed issuing the sale certificate, Respondent No. 1 obtained a writ of mandamus, which the appellant later challenged under Section 12(2), CPC alleging fraud and lack of notice. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that Chapter IX of the Income Tax Rules 1982 constitutes a complete and self-contained code governing attachment, auction, sale confirmation, and statutory remedies (including appeals, revisions, and reviews). Because special law provides an elaborate mechanism to challenge auction proceedings, a defaulter who fails to avail statutory remedies cannot mount a collateral challenge under general procedural law.

  Questions settled

  • Can an auction sale conducted under the Income Tax Rules 1982 be challenged through collateral proceedings under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 instead of availing the statutory remedies provided in the special law?
  • Whether objections raised by a third-party department regarding property mutation can be treated as a valid application to set aside an auction sale under Rules 149 and 150 of the Income Tax Rules 1982 without satisfying the mandatory pre-deposit conditions?
  • Does an irregularity in publishing or conducting an auction sale vitiate the sale of immovable property under the Income Tax Rules 1982 where the tax defaulter consented in writing to the attachment and sale?
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• Majeed and Sons Steels (Pvt.) Ltd. (In C.P. 2532/15) Shanghai IndustriesPTCL 2017 CL. 385 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-09-18
  customs dutyregulatory dutymultilateral trade agreementtreaty enforcementstatutory interpretationGeneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trademunicipal law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Sindh High Court regarding the interpretation of customs duties under the Customs Act, 1969. The core legal question was whether the cumulative incidence of customs duties levied under subsections (1), (3), and (5) of Section 18 of the Customs Act, 1969, exceeded the rates agreed upon by the Government of Pakistan under multilateral trade agreements, specifically referencing Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The petitioners argued that duties exceeding these agreed rates were invalid. The Supreme Court held that the proviso to Section 18(5) of the Customs Act, 1969, is clear and unambiguous, and that the regulatory duties imposed did not exceed the bound rates prescribed in the relevant tariff tables. The Court affirmed that international treaties or agreements, whether bilateral or multilateral, cannot override or alter express statutory provisions unless they have been incorporated into domestic law through specific legislation. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, finding no merit in the challenge to the High Court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Can an international treaty or agreement be enforced by a court in Pakistan if it has not been incorporated into domestic law through legislation?
  • Does the proviso to Section 18(5) of the Customs Act 1969 allow for the inclusion of bilateral agreements within the scope of 'multilateral trade agreements'?
  • Are courts empowered to repair legislative omissions or blunders in a statute?
  • Does the cumulative incidence of customs duties under Section 18 of the Customs Act 1969 exceed the rates agreed to by the Government of Pakistan under multilateral trade agreements?
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• Lt. Col. Nasir Malik vs Additional District Judge, Lahore, etcK.L.R. 2017 SC 27 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-07-14
  maintenance allowanceenhancement of maintenancefamily courtex parte proceedingsminors' welfare
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a writ petition challenging family court proceedings regarding the enhancement of maintenance allowance. The core legal question concerned whether maintenance allowance previously decreed for minors could be enhanced based on rising inflation, school expenses, and improved financial status of the father, and whether ex parte proceedings were validly conducted. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' findings that the father, serving in the military, had sufficient means and that minors were entitled to maintenance reflecting current economic realities and educational needs. The key principle laid down is that the father's obligation to maintain his children is commensurate with his financial capacity and changing socio-economic conditions, allowing for the enhancement of maintenance allowance to meet the reasonable educational and living necessities of growing children.

  Questions settled

  • Can a maintenance allowance fixed by a family court decree be subsequently enhanced on the grounds of rising inflation and growing educational needs of minors?
  • Whether a family court can proceed ex parte against a judgment-debtor who fails to appear despite due service of summons and publication?
  • Is a father legally and morally bound to increase the maintenance allowance of his children in proportion to his improved financial status and salary increments?
  Read full judgment →
• lrfanullah Khan Marwat vs M. Abdul Rauf Siddiqui & others2017 [M] C.L.R. 967 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-11
  election petitionvoid electionNADRA verificationcorrupt practicesinvalid votesvoter identificationmaterially affected
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a judgment of the Election Tribunal, Karachi, which declared the election of the appellant to the Provincial Assembly constituency PS-114, Karachi, void as a whole under the Representation of the People Act 1976. The runner-up candidate (Respondent No. 1) had challenged the election alleging corrupt practices, rigging, and harassment. Although direct evidence of corrupt practices was limited to six polling stations, a NADRA verification report, obtained with the consent of both parties, revealed that over 18,000 votes were invalid due to missing or invalid CNIC numbers, duplicate votes, and failed fingerprint authentications. The appellant argued that his victory margin of 6,826 votes remained unaffected if only the six polling stations were excluded. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under Section 70 of the Representation of the People Act 1976, an election can be declared void as a whole either due to extensive corrupt practices or where non-compliance with statutory provisions by election staff materially affects the result. Since the number of invalid votes vastly exceeded the victory margin, the result was materially affected.

  Questions settled

  • Can an election be declared void as a whole under Section 70 of the Representation of the People Act 1976 if corrupt practices are proven only in a limited number of polling stations but widespread statutory non-compliance is shown?
  • Does the presence of invalid or missing CNIC numbers on counterfoils, exceeding the victory margin of the returned candidate, satisfy the test of the election result being 'materially affected'?
  • Can a party challenge the validity of a NADRA verification report on appeal if they had previously consented to the verification process before the Election Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• lqbal Hussain vs General Manager Southern Telecom Region-II and others2017 P.S.C. 1281 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-08-15
  civil servant statusPTCL employeesFederal Service Tribunal jurisdictionstatutory protection of serviceConstitutional jurisdictiontransfer of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the legal status of employees transferred from the Pakistan Telecommunication and Telegraph Department to the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL). The core legal question was whether these employees, despite having their terms and conditions of service protected by statute, retain the status of civil servants and thus possess the right to approach the Federal Service Tribunal for grievances. The Supreme Court, relying on the precedent established by a five-member bench in PTCL v. Masood Ahmed Bhatti (2016 SCMR 1362), held that upon transfer to the Corporation and subsequently to the Company, these individuals ceased to be civil servants. The Court affirmed that while the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation Act, 1991 and the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996 protect their terms and conditions, this protection does not confer civil servant status. Consequently, the Court ruled that such employees cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the Federal Service Tribunal; instead, they must seek redress for violations of their statutory terms and conditions through the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Do employees transferred from the Pakistan Telecommunication and Telegraph Department to the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited retain the status of civil servants?
  • Can employees of the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited invoke the jurisdiction of the Federal Service Tribunal for service-related grievances?
  • Is the violation of statutory terms and conditions of service for transferred PTCL employees amenable to the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Khushdil Khan Malik vs Secretary, Ministry of Defence Rawalpindi Cantt.2017 P.S.C. 617 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Defence Housing Authorityallotment of plotattached departmentprinciples of natural justiceshow-cause noticevested rightSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses the legality of the cancellation of a residential plot allotted to the appellant by the Defence Housing Authority, Islamabad. The core legal question is whether the appellant, serving in the Directorate of Education of the Garrison, is an employee of an attached department of the Ministry of Defence and thus eligible for plot allotment under the housing scheme, and whether the unilateral cancellation of the plot without a show-cause notice was lawful. The Supreme Court held that the appellant belongs to an attached department of the Ministry of Defence, is paid from Defence Estimates, and acquired a vested right upon succeeding in the balloting and depositing the initial installment. The Court ruled that the cancellation of the plot without affording an opportunity of hearing violated the principles of natural justice. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the cancellation order was set aside, and the Court directed the restoration or alternate allotment of the plot.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee of the Directorate of Education of the Garrison is an employee of an attached department of the Ministry of Defence?
  • Whether unilateral cancellation of a plot allotted through balloting without a show-cause notice violates the principles of natural justice?
  • Does a successful ballot and deposit of initial installment create a vested right in favor of the allottee?
  Read full judgment →
• Khushdil Khan Malik vs Secretary, Ministry of Defence Rawalpindi2017 P.S.C. 617, 2017 PLD Supreme Court 173 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-05-29
  Defence Housing AuthorityCategory-J eligibilitycivilian employees paid from defence estimatesnatural justiceshow cause noticeattached departmentRules of Business 1973
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the cancellation of a residential plot allotted to the appellant under 'Category-J' of the Defence Housing Authority (DHA), Islamabad. The core legal question was whether the appellant, a civilian employee of the Federal Government Educational Institutions (Cantonments/Garrisons) Directorate—an attached department of the Ministry of Defence—qualified as a 'civilian officer paid out of Defence Estimates' under the DHA eligibility criteria. A split verdict was rendered. The majority held that the appellant belonged to the Defence Services education cadre, was paid through internal arrangements of Defence Estimates, and that the unilateral cancellation of his plot without a show-cause notice violated natural justice. Conversely, the minority view concluded that the employee's department was funded through civil estimates and administered via the Accountant General of Pakistan Revenues, rendering him ineligible under Category-J. The appeal was allowed in accordance with the majority opinion, setting aside the cancellation and restoring the allotment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether civilian employees of the Federal Government Educational Institutions Directorate are paid out of Defence Estimates for the purpose of DHA plot allotment?
  • Does the unilateral cancellation of a plot allotted through balloting, without issuing a show-cause notice, violate the principles of natural justice?
  • Whether an attached department of the Ministry of Defence falls within the definition of a defence-paid organization?
  • Can administrative instructions override the statutory or structural classification of government budgetary estimates?
  Read full judgment →
• Khuda-E-Noor vs The State2017 NLR Criminal 68 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-11-11
  honour killingterrorismAnti-Terrorism Court jurisdictionmens reastatutory interpretationcriminal trialtransfer of case
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged the transfer of his criminal case, involving the murder of his sister, from a Sessions Court to an Anti-Terrorism Court. The trial court, relying on a previous High Court precedent, deemed the alleged 'honour killing' to be 'terrorism' under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The core legal question was whether all cases of honour killing automatically fall within the definition of 'terrorism' under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, thereby requiring trial by an Anti-Terrorism Court. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts erred in their interpretation. It clarified that an action specified in Section 6(2) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, does not constitute 'terrorism' unless accompanied by the specific 'design' or 'purpose' defined in Section 6(1)(b) or (c) of the Act. The Court ruled that private disputes or honour killings lacking such statutory design do not attract the jurisdiction of an Anti-Terrorism Court. Consequently, the Court set aside the transfer orders, affirming that the case must be tried by a court of ordinary jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does every instance of honour killing automatically constitute 'terrorism' under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Is the presence of a 'design' or 'purpose' as defined in Section 6(1)(b) or (c) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, a mandatory requirement for an act to be classified as terrorism?
  • Can a private offence committed without the specific designs mentioned in the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, be tried by an Anti-Terrorism Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Khuda-E-Dad alias Pehlwan vs The State2017 SCMR 701 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-03-03
  murderbenefit of reasonable doubtreappraisal of evidenceeye-witness testimonymotivecriminal appealdeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the judgment of the High Court upholding the appellant's conviction and death sentence under section 302(b), P.P.C., alongside convictions under sections 324 and 337-F(i), P.P.C., for murder and causing injuries. Upon granting leave to appeal to reappraise the evidence, the appellant's counsel did not contest the convictions under sections 324 and 337-F(i) as the sentences had already been served, confining the challenge solely to the murder conviction. The core legal question was whether the prosecution proved the murder charge beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court observed that the prosecution failed to establish any motive, the eye-witnesses did not witness the actual shooting as they arrived after hearing gunshots, and the forensic evidence regarding the recovered firearm was legally inconsequential due to delayed dispatch of crime empties. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt regarding the murder. Consequently, the appeal was partly allowed, the conviction and death sentence under section 302(b), P.P.C. were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted of that charge, while the appeal regarding the other sections was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the prosecution can sustain a murder conviction under section 302(b), P.P.C., in the absence of proof of motive and direct eye-witness account of the shooting?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a firearm recovery when crime empties are sent to the forensic laboratory after the recovery of the weapon?
  • Can an appellate court set aside a capital sentence when eye-witnesses arrive at the scene only after hearing reports of firing?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan vs Zahoor Ahmed, Etc2017 NLR Criminal 21 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  illegal dispossessionland grabbersqabza mafiastatutory interpretationpreamblecriminal liabilityspecial law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a larger bench reference to resolve a conflict regarding the scope and applicability of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, specifically whether prosecution under Section 3 is restricted exclusively to individuals who possess the credentials and antecedents of professional land grabbers or Qabza Mafia, or whether it extends to anyone who commits the defined offence. The core legal question addresses whether a complainant must establish past criminal antecedents of the accused as a condition precedent to maintain a complaint. The Supreme Court held that the statute applies universally to 'anyone' or 'whoever' commits illegal dispossession without lawful authority, and no precondition requires proving that an accused belongs to a land grabber class. The Court ruled that restricting the statute based on the preamble or legislative history was erroneous, thereby affirming the broader interpretation in earlier judgments and declaring restrictive precedents to be bad law. The appeals were allowed and cases remanded.

  Questions settled

  • Whether prosecution under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 is restricted only to those who possess the credentials and antecedents of professional land grabbers or Qabza Mafia?
  • Does Section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 impose a precondition that a complainant must establish the past criminal history of the accused before a complaint can be entertained?
  • Can the preamble of a statute be used to curtail or enlarge the clear and unambiguous meaning of its substantive provisions?
  • Does the term 'whoever' or 'anyone' in Section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 bring any person who commits illegal dispossession within the ambit of prosecution without distinction?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan Toti and others vs Government of NWFP through Secretary Finance2017 PLC (C.S) 266 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-16
  ministerial staff of judiciaryseparation of powersservice tribunal jurisdictioncivil servantsdiscriminationfinancial benefitsequal treatmentSupreme Court original jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition questions the legality of the Peshawar High Court judgment setting aside a Civil Court decree in a matter concerning the extension of financial and service benefits (selection grades and advance increments) to ministerial staff (Readers, Moharars, Examiners) of the District Judiciary, and directing them to approach the Provincial Service Tribunal. The core legal questions involve whether the ministerial staff of the subordinate judiciary fall within the definition of civil servants amenable to the Provincial Service Tribunal, and whether denying them financial benefits granted to similar grades constitutes unconstitutional discrimination under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Supreme Court held that the judiciary stands separated from the executive under Article 175(3) of the Constitution and landmark jurisprudence, meaning the staff of the district judiciary are not civil servants under the control of the provincial service tribunal. Furthermore, the court held that denying financial benefits to the petitioners while granting them to others in identical grades violates the guarantee of equal treatment. The petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, declaring the impugned actions discriminatory and ordering the refund of all deductions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the ministerial and paralegal staff of the District Judiciary are civil servants amenable to the jurisdiction of the Provincial Service Tribunal?
  • Does the denial of financial benefits and selection grades to judicial staff while granting the same to comparable grades in the executive violate Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • What is the effect of the constitutional separation of the judiciary from the executive on the administrative and disciplinary control over subordinate court establishments?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan Muhammad through L.Rs and others vs Mst. Khatoon Bibi and others2017 SCMR 1476 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-15
  InheritanceMuslim Personal LawPre-deceased son's childrenLimited estateShari shareSuccessionLimitationCo-sharerOccupancy tenantsConstitutional suspension
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned a suit for declaration filed by the daughter of a pre-deceased son, seeking her shari share in her grandfather's legacy. The core legal questions revolved around whether the widows of the pre-deceased son inherited as full owners or limited estate holders, the entitlement of the pre-deceased son's daughter and widows to inherit, and the applicability and construction of the Punjab Tenancy Act, Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, and West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application) Act, 1962, particularly regarding the retrospective effect of Section 4 of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision. It held that the widows were limited estate holders, and upon termination of their limited estate under the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application) Act, 1962, Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, became applicable, entitling the pre-deceased son's heirs to their shari shares. The Court also reiterated that no limitation runs against a co-sharer, and the operation of a Federal Shariat Court verdict against Section 4 MFLO is suspended under Article 203D of the Constitution.

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• Khalil Ahmed Soomro and others---Petitioners vs The State---2017 PLD Supreme Court 730 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-08-28
  pre-arrest bailmala fideprohibitory clauseshort orderjudicial reasoningmedico-legal reportliberty of citizen
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a High Court order recalling interim pre-arrest bail for the petitioners in a case involving various hurt provisions under the Pakistan Penal Code. The Supreme Court expressed strong displeasure regarding the High Court's failure to provide detailed reasons for its short order, emphasizing that judicial delay in such matters adversely affects the institution's decorum. On the merits, the Court observed that the alleged offences did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.P.C. The Court held that where an accused is entitled to post-arrest bail, denying pre-arrest bail becomes a matter of technicality that risks unnecessary humiliation. Regarding mala fide, the Court ruled that solid evidence is often unavailable at the pre-arrest stage and may be inferred from circumstances such as over-broad accusations or exaggerated injuries. Furthermore, the Court censured Medico-legal Officers for assuming the role of prosecutors by citing specific penal sections, clarifying that their role is limited to describing the nature of injuries. Consequently, the Court granted leave and allowed pre-arrest bail.

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• Khalid Mehmood vs The State2017 SCMR 201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-11-14
  death sentencemitigating circumstancesQisasTa'zirmurderbrutalitysentence reduction
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged his convictions and death sentence under Sections 302(b), 324, and various sub-sections of Section 337 of the Pakistan Penal Code (P.P.C.) for murdering his wife and brother-in-law, and injuring three others. Leave to appeal was granted to determine if Sections 306, 307, and 308 of the P.P.C. applied to the case, and whether mitigating circumstances existed to reduce the death sentence to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that Sections 306, 307, and 308 of the P.P.C. are applicable exclusively to cases of Qisas and have no relevance to cases of Ta'zir. On the question of mitigation, the Court observed that the appellant acted with extreme brutality, using a pistol and a screw-driver to gouge out the eyes of some victims. Consequently, the Court found no mitigating circumstances to warrant a reduction in sentence, maintaining the convictions and death penalty.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of Sections 306, 307, and 308 of the Pakistan Penal Code apply to cases of Ta'zir?
  • Can a death sentence be reduced to life imprisonment on the ground of mitigation if the offender acted with extreme brutality and mercilessness?
  • Are the statutory provisions governing Qisas relevant to a trial and conviction under Ta'zir?
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• Khalid Mehmood Afzal, Malik Muhammad Sabir, Awais Malik and others, Muhammad Haseeb vs Mushtaq Sukhera, Ig Police and other, Mushtaq Sukhera, Ig Police, Muhammad Amin Vans and others2017 SCMR 868 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-03-29
  out of turn promotionservice mattersconstitutional jurisdictionservice tribunalseniorityres judicatalimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the implementation of the Supreme Court's earlier judgment in Shahid Pervaiz v. Ejaz Ahmed (2017 SCMR 206), which declared 'out of turn promotions' in the police force unconstitutional. Following this, the Inspector General of Police (IGP), Punjab, reviewed individual cases and issued orders withdrawing such promotions. Certain police officers, supported by the Home Department, challenged these withdrawals, contending that their promotions were protected by judicial orders and paragraphs 111 and 143 of the Shahid Pervaiz judgment. The core legal question was whether promotions previously granted via High Court or Tribunal orders remained protected despite the Supreme Court's mandate. The Court held that the IGP’s actions were correct and in accordance with the law. It clarified that High Court orders granting such promotions were issued without jurisdiction, as service matters fall exclusively under the purview of Service Tribunals per Article 212 of the Constitution. Furthermore, previous Supreme Court dismissals based on limitation did not constitute decisions on merits or res judicata. The Court directed the immediate de-notification of the affected officers.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to issue writs regarding out of turn promotions in service matters?
  • Do previous Supreme Court dismissals of petitions on the ground of limitation constitute a decision on merits or res judicata?
  • Are out of turn promotions granted by judicial fora protected if the Inspector General of Police has reviewed and withdrawn them in accordance with Supreme Court directives?
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• Khalid Mehmood Afzal, Malik Muhammad Sabir, Awais Malik and others2017 PLC (C.S) 1242 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-03-29
  out of turn promotionservice mattersjurisdiction of High CourtArticle 212police serviceres judicatalimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the implementation of the Supreme Court's judgment in Shahid Pervaiz v. Ejaz Ahmed, which declared out-of-turn promotions in the police service unconstitutional. The core legal question was whether police officers who previously obtained court orders for out-of-turn promotions were protected from the withdrawal of such benefits under the Shahid Pervaiz ruling. The Court held that the Inspector General of Police, Punjab, correctly reviewed individual cases and that the officers were not entitled to protection. The Court clarified that the High Court lacked jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to entertain service-related petitions, as Article 212 mandates exclusive jurisdiction for Service Tribunals. Furthermore, the Court ruled that previous dismissals of petitions on limitation grounds did not constitute decisions on merits or create res judicata. The principle laid down is that administrative actions withdrawing unconstitutional benefits, based on a proper review process, are valid, and that judicial fora cannot bypass the constitutional bar on service matters by issuing writs for out-of-turn promotions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dismissal of a petition on the ground of limitation constitute a decision on merits or create res judicata?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to entertain petitions regarding out-of-turn promotions in service matters?
  • Are out-of-turn promotions granted pursuant to High Court or Service Tribunal orders protected from withdrawal if the underlying basis for those promotions was unconstitutional?
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• Khalid Mehmood Afzal , Malik Muhammad Sabir , Awais Malik and others_0254dd192017 P.S.C. 1169 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  out of turn promotionpolice serviceseniorityservice tribunal jurisdictionconstitutional jurisdictionpast and closed transaction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter emanates from previous judgments of the Supreme Court declaring out-of-turn promotions unconstitutional and violative of Fundamental Rights, notably Shahid Pervaiz v. Ejaz Ahmed. The Inspector General of Police, Punjab, reviewed individual police officers' out-of-turn promotion cases and issued speaking orders withdrawing them, while the Home Department and Advocate General Punjab contended that certain promotions were judicially protected under paragraphs 111 and 143 of the Shahid Pervaiz judgment. The core legal question was whether out-of-turn promotions granted or facilitated by judicial fora or service tribunals remained protected under the exceptions carved out in the Shahid Pervaiz case, and whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction to entertain such service matters under Article 199 of the Constitution in light of the constitutional bar of Article 212. The Supreme Court held that the IGP's review and individual speaking orders withdrawing the out-of-turn promotions were valid and in conformity with the law, clarifying that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain service matters relating to terms and conditions of service under Article 199. The key principle laid down is that out-of-turn promotions are subject to review, and service matters exclusively fall within the domain of departmental authorities and service tribunals under Article 212 of the Constitution, barring constitutional petitions before the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to entertain petitions relating to out-of-turn promotions in view of the bar contained in Article 212?
  • Do out-of-turn promotions granted pursuant to orders of judicial fora or service tribunals stand protected under paragraphs 111 and 143 of the Shahid Pervaiz case after departmental review?
  • Does the dismissal of a time-barred civil petition by the Supreme Court constitute a binding precedent on merits under Article 189 of the Constitution?
  • Whether the Inspector General of Police has the authority to review and withdraw out-of-turn promotions following the declarations made by the Supreme Court?
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• (1) Khalid Mehmood Afzal (2) Malik Muhammad Sabir (3) Awais Malik and2017 PLC (C.S) 1242, 2017 P.S.C. 1169, 2017 SCMR 868, 2017 SCP 150 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-03-29
  out of turn promotionpolice servicesenioritypast and closed transactionconstitutional jurisdictionservice tribunalcontempt proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter emanates from earlier judgments of the Supreme Court declaring out of turn promotions unconstitutional, specifically the ruling in Shahid Pervaiz v. Ejaz Ahmed (2017 SCMR 206). The core legal question concerned whether certain police officers who had previously obtained out of turn promotions through orders of judicial fora or service tribunals were protected from the reversal of such promotions under paragraphs 111 and 143 of the Shahid Pervaiz judgment. The Supreme Court held that the view point of the Inspector General of Police, Punjab, was correct and that the out of turn promotions were not protected, as the review contemplated by the judgment had been lawfully conducted by the IG of Police after issuing notices and hearing the affected officers. The Court laid down that promotions granted by courts acting without jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution in service matters barred by Article 212 do not constitute binding precedents or past and closed transactions when the underlying basis of discrimination has been removed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether out of turn promotions granted pursuant to judicial orders are protected under the principles laid down in the Shahid Pervaiz case?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to entertain petitions relating to terms and conditions of service in view of the bar contained in Article 212?
  • Whether the dismissal of a civil petition on the ground of limitation constitutes a decision on merits having binding force under Article 189 of the Constitution?
  • Can an out of turn promotion initially granted on the ground of discrimination remain intact after the promotions of the benchmark officials have been reversed?
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• Khalid Hussain Magsi vs Mir Abdul Rahim Rind and othersK.L.R. 2017 SC 489 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-02-03
  election petitionverification on oathbiometric verificationNADRA reportriggingreturned candidatevoid election
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from an election dispute over the National Assembly seat NA-267 Kachi-cum-Jhal Magsi following the general elections held on 11.5.2013, where the appellant was declared the returned candidate. The respondent challenged the election before the Election Tribunal, alleging widespread rigging and the detention of polling agents. During the proceedings, biometric verification by NADRA cast doubt on 7555 votes across several polling stations. The Tribunal declared the election void as a whole, leading to the present appeal. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of the election petition regarding its verification on oath and whether widespread irregularities and dubious voting patterns warranted setting aside the election. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the election petition was duly verified and, upon analyzing the consolidated voting data and NADRA's report, concluded that the election was not conducted fairly. The appeal was dismissed, and the election was declared void under Section 70(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976. The key principle laid down is that anomalous voting patterns, exceptionally high turnouts in specific polling stations, and substantial biometric discrepancies established by NADRA can collectively prove pervasive illegal practices, justifying the invalidation of an entire election.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an election petition is maintainable when there is a discrepancy of one day between the printed date and the date of verification by the Oath Commissioner?
  • Does an election petition contain sufficient compliance with verification on oath if it bears the stamp 'sworn before me' and an accompanying affidavit?
  • Whether anomalous voting patterns and unusually high voter turnouts in specific polling stations can serve as proof of illegal practices during an election?
  • Can an election be declared void as a whole under Section 70(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, when the number of doubtful votes identified by NADRA exceeds the winning margin of the returned candidate?
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• Khalid Humayun vs The NAB through its D.G. Quetta and others2017 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-02-22
  plea bargainNAB corruption casediscretionary powerbailstatutory interpretationpublic accountabilitymisuse of authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment dismissing the petitioner's bail application in a corruption case. The core legal questions concerned the nature of the Chairman NAB’s discretion under Section 25(b) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 regarding plea bargains, and whether such discretion was exercised lawfully. The Supreme Court dismissed the bail petition, finding sufficient prima facie evidence of the petitioner's involvement in the defalcation of public funds. The Court held that the Chairman NAB’s discretion under Section 25(b) is structured, not absolute or arbitrary, and must be exercised reasonably, fairly, and justly, as mandated by Section 24A of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The Chairman is required to independently consider the facts and circumstances of each case rather than merely endorsing the recommendations of subordinates. The Court emphasized that corruption is a crime against humanity, and NAB’s statutory powers must be utilized to eradicate corruption, not to facilitate plea bargains that effectively condone criminal conduct. The judgment underscores that statutory functionaries must act strictly in accordance with the law to maintain institutional credibility.

  Questions settled

  • Is the discretion vested in the Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau under Section 25(b) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, absolute and unfettered?
  • Does Section 24A of the General Clauses Act, 1897 apply to the exercise of discretionary powers by the Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau?
  • Is the Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau required to independently consider the facts and circumstances of a case before accepting a plea bargain?
  • Can the Supreme Court of Pakistan exercise its powers under Article 187(1) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to issue directions regarding the exercise of statutory functions by the National Accountability Bureau?
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• Khalid Humayun vs The NAB through D.G. Quetta and others2017 PLD Supreme Court 194, 2017 PLJ SC 377 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-02-22
  post-arrest bailNational Accountability Bureauplea bargaindiscretion of Chairman NABSection 24A General Clauses ActArticle 187(1) Constitutioncomplete justicemisappropriation of public funds
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the High Court of Balochistan refusing bail to the petitioner in a corruption inquiry conducted by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB). The petitioner, acting as Advisor on Finance, was implicated alongside the Secretary Finance regarding massive defalcation of municipal development funds. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the merits, finding sufficient prima facie evidence implicating the petitioner and holding that medical grounds were insufficient to warrant release. Additionally, exercising its constitutional powers under Article 187(1) to ensure complete justice, the Court reviewed the Chairman NAB's acceptance of a plea bargain under Section 25(b) of the NAB Ordinance, 1999. The Court held that the Chairman's discretion under Section 25(b) is not absolute, arbitrary, or unfettered, but structured and bound by Section 24A of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The Chairman must independently evaluate the facts and give reasons rather than mechanically endorsing subordinate recommendations or accepting seized assets as voluntary offers.

  Questions settled

  • Is the discretion of the Chairman NAB to accept a plea bargain under Section 25(b) of the NAB Ordinance absolute and unfettered?
  • Does the seizure of assets during a raid constitute a voluntary offer to return ill-gotten gains for the purposes of a plea bargain?
  • Are statutory functionaries like the Chairman NAB required under Section 24A of the General Clauses Act, 1897 to give reasoned decisions when exercising executive power?
  • Can bail be granted on medical grounds if medical reports do not establish that continued incarceration poses a danger to the accused's life or health?
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• Khalid Humayun vs NAB through its D.G. Quetta and others2017 PLJ SC 377 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-02-22
  post-arrest bailplea bargainNational Accountability Bureaumisappropriation of public fundsexercise of discretionmedical grounds baildelay in filing reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Balochistan dismissing the petitioner's constitutional petition for post-arrest bail in a corruption inquiry conducted by the National Accountability Bureau. The core legal questions involve whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the prolonged detention without a reference, whether bail was warranted on medical grounds, and the legality of the Chairman NAB's acceptance of a plea bargain under Section 25(b) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly declined bail on merits and medical grounds, finding no immediate risk to life, and further ruled that the Chairman NAB failed to exercise his statutory discretion reasonably, fairly, and independently when accepting the co-accused's plea bargain regarding seized public funds. The key principles laid down are that the Chairman NAB's discretion under Section 25(b) is structured and must be exercised reasonably, fairly, and with due consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case in accordance with Section 24A of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and that bail cannot be granted as a matter of course when serious prima facie allegations exist.

  Questions settled

  • Whether plea bargain under Section 25(b) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 can be entered into when money and assets are seized by NAB as opposed to ill-gotten assets or gains voluntarily offered to be returned by the accused?
  • Whether the Chairman NAB must take into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case while making a decision under Section 25(b) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Does indefinite incarceration without the filing of a reference entitle an accused to post-arrest bail in corruption cases?
  • Whether the discretionary powers vested in the Chairman NAB under Section 25(b) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 are subject to Section 24A of the General Clauses Act, 1897?
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• Khalid Aziz and another vs Government of Punjab through Chief2017 PLC (C.S.) 1090 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-11
  disciplinary proceedingsremoval from servicebogus transfer ordersservice tribunalcriminal proceedingssupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant petitions arise out of a consolidated judgment passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, upholding the penalty of removal from service imposed upon the petitioners after joint disciplinary proceedings conducted under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006. The core legal question involved whether the penalty of removal from service could be sustained when proper disciplinary proceedings, codal formalities, and substantial evidence regarding the preparation of bogus transfer orders in exchange for bribe money were established, and whether criminal proceedings by Anti-Corruption Establishment (ACE) authorities override independent departmental proceedings. The Supreme Court held that proper disciplinary proceedings were duly conducted, that criminal proceedings and departmental proceedings can proceed simultaneously and independently without one overriding the other, and that no substantial question of law of public importance arose to warrant interference. The Court laid down the principle that the conclusion arrived at in criminal proceedings by ACE authorities does not override independent departmental disciplinary proceedings, and refused leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings by anti-corruption authorities override independent departmental disciplinary proceedings?
  • Whether joint disciplinary proceedings under the PEEDA Act, 2006 can result in the major penalty of removal from service upon proof of corruption?
  • Does an acquittal or exoneration in criminal proceedings automatically vitiate a penalty imposed through departmental disciplinary proceedings?
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• Kashif Ali vs The Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court No, II, Lahore and others2017 P.S.C. (Crl.) 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Anti-Terrorism Act 1997Section 23 ATAtransfer of casedefinition of designpersonal enmityelection candidate murderjurisdiction of ATCsupplementary statement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed against the Lahore High Court judgment dated 16.08.2010, which had allowed Respondent No. 2's writ petition and set aside the Anti-Terrorism Court's order rejecting an application under Section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 to transfer the case to an ordinary criminal court. The case involved the targeted, indiscriminate firing and murder of a provincial assembly candidate and his companion on the eve of general elections. The core legal question was whether an offence motivated by personal rivalry falls under the jurisdiction of the Anti-Terrorism Court when executed in a manner that creates terror and insecurity. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment. The Court held that substituted terms like 'design' in Section 6 exclude motive and intent; if an act is planned to create fear or insecurity, or if creating fear is an inevitable consequence in a public setting—such as targeting an election candidate on election eve—it constitutes terrorism regardless of underlying personal enmity. Additionally, a supplementary statement recorded long after the FIR cannot oust ATC jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of personal enmity exclude an offence from the jurisdiction of an Anti-Terrorism Court under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • How does the statutory term 'design' in Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 affect the relevance of motive or intent when determining ATC jurisdiction?
  • Can a supplementary statement recorded long after the registration of an FIR be used to alter the jurisdiction of the Anti-Terrorism Court?
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• Karim Nawaz vs Additional District Judge, Khushab and 4 others2017 SCMR 385 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-09-02
  arbitration awardrule of the courtfraud and misrepresentationconcurrent findings of factburden of proofpresumption of regularity
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from concurrent judgments of the lower courts dismissing the appellant's application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which sought to set aside a 1979 judgment and decree making an arbitration award a rule of the court. The core legal question was whether the impugned judgment and decree were obtained through fraud and misrepresentation, specifically concerning whether the appellant's late father had actually appeared in court and conceded to the award. The Supreme Court held that the appellant failed to discharge the heavy onus of proving fraud, as official records, testimonies of the counsel and stamp vendor, and the father's thumb impression established his appearance and consent during his lifetime, while the appellant's evidence was merely hearsay. The Court reaffirmed that concurrent findings of fact based on proper appreciation of evidence will not be disturbed in the absence of misreading or non-reading of evidence, and that judicial proceedings carry a presumption of regularity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding an application under Section 12(2) C.P.C. can be interfered with when no misreading or non-reading of evidence is shown?
  • Does a party alleging fraud in obtaining a judgment and decree discharge the onus of proof through hearsay evidence?
  • What is the evidentiary value of judicial proceedings and recorded statements when challenged on the ground of impersonation years after the death of the maker?
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• Kareem Nawaz Khan vs The State through PGP & Another2017 NLR Criminal 103 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-06-01
  anti-terrorismcompromiseqatl-i-amddeath sentenceconstitutional petitionleave to appealnon-compoundable offence
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, which sought to modify an Anti-Terrorism Court order and secure acquittal following a compromise with the legal heirs of the deceased. The petitioner had been convicted under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sections 7(a) and 21L of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, with convictions having attained finality up to the Supreme Court. Subsequently, a compromise was effected under section 338-E of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, leading the Trial Court to acquit him of the compoundable murder charges while maintaining his conviction and sentence under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The core legal question was whether a compromise in an offence under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 dilutes or affects a conviction under section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The Supreme Court held that offences under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 are independent and non-compoundable, and a subsequent compromise regarding compoundable offences does not impact convictions under anti-terrorism laws. The Supreme Court laid down that a conviction under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 remains intact despite a compromise in underlying compoundable offences due to statutory bars.

  Questions settled

  • Does compounding an offence under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 dilute or affect a conviction under section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Can a sentence awarded under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 be set aside as a result of a subsequent compromise with the legal heirs of the deceased?
  • Are offences under section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 independent and non-compoundable?
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• Karachi Development Authority through Director General, Civil Centre, Gulshan-e-Iqbal, Karachi vs Mst. Hawa Bai and 6 others2017 SCMR 1801 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-02-22
  commercialization feechange of land usemaster planningbinding precedentleave-refusing orderremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the Karachi Development Authority challenges judgments of the High Court regarding commercialization of properties. Leave was granted to consider whether a notification dated 20.7.1998 was issued by the Provincial Government and duly gazetted. During the proceedings, the appellant conceded that the area where the properties are situated had been commercialized, but contended that property owners cannot use them as commercial properties without paying the requisite commercialization fee or charges. The core legal question addressed is whether property owners in a commercialized area are exempt from paying commercialization charges and whether previous leave-refusing orders constitute binding precedent. The Supreme Court held that while respondents can seek commercialization of their properties, they must pay the applicable commercialization fee or charges, the rates of which must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, the Court clarified that a leave-refusing order does not constitute enunciated law with binding precedent. Consequently, the appeals were allowed and the matters remanded to the High Court for determination of the commercialization fee rates.

  Questions settled

  • Are owners of previously residential properties entitled to use them as commercial properties without paying commercialization fees once an area is commercialized?
  • Does a leave-refusing order passed by the Supreme Court constitute a binding precedent?
  • How should the rate of commercialization fee or charges be determined for properties situated in a commercialized area?
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• Kaleem Ullah vs The State and others2017 SCMR 19 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-02-01
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirycriminal petitionexoneration during investigationbail adjudicationtrial delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arose from the Lahore High Court's refusal to grant post-arrest bail to the petitioner, Kaleem Ullah, in a case involving offences under sections 324, 427, 109, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the circumstances of the investigation and his specific role in the alleged offence. Upon review, the Supreme Court observed that while ten individuals were originally implicated in the FIR, seven were exonerated during the investigation. Furthermore, no specific injury was attributed to the petitioner, and the investigation had concluded with the submission of a challan. The Court held that the petitioner's culpability required further probe, rendering his case one of 'further inquiry' under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the Court granted bail, emphasizing that continued incarceration served no beneficial purpose when the trial had not yet commenced with the recording of prosecution witnesses.

  Questions settled

  • Does the exoneration of a majority of co-accused during investigation constitute grounds for further inquiry regarding the culpability of the remaining accused?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to post-arrest bail when no specific injury is attributed to them and the investigation is finalized?
  • Does the absence of prosecution witnesses having recorded their statements at the trial stage support the grant of bail?
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• Javed vs The State2017 SCMR 531 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-31
  post-arrest bailControl of Narcotic Substances ActSection 9(c)constructive knowledgedisabled personrecovery of narcoticsco-accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the order of the Peshawar High Court, which had denied bail to the petitioner in a case registered under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal question was whether a passenger in a vehicle, who is disabled, can be refused bail when narcotics are recovered from secret cavities of the car owned and controlled by an absconding principal accused, without preliminary evidence of constructive knowledge. The Supreme Court held that on the available record, there was no clear evidence connecting the petitioner to constructive knowledge of the hidden contraband. Furthermore, the court noted that the petitioner was disabled due to polio, entitling him to concession on humanitarian grounds. The court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, set aside the High Court's order, and granted post-arrest bail to the petitioner. The decision establishes that mere presence in a vehicle does not automatically establish constructive possession of hidden narcotics for bail purposes without prima facie evidence of knowledge, especially where the accused is disabled.

  Questions settled

  • Can bail be granted to a passenger where narcotics are recovered from secret cavities of a vehicle owned by an absconding principal accused?
  • Whether mere presence in a vehicle is sufficient to attribute constructive knowledge of hidden narcotics at the bail stage?
  • Can physical disability of an accused be considered as a ground for granting bail in a narcotics case under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
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